

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 9

FEBRUARY 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, AND 14, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



UNITED STATES
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**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

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JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[10519] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The Chair understands that counsel concluded last evening.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, I had, but I have some other matters, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as the committee has indicated that it proposes to make the evidence and proceedings contained in the earlier investigations a part of the record of the committee here, I would like to ask the committee to reserve Exhibit Nos. 143 to 149, inclusive, to cover the seven reports, the Roberts, the Hart, the Navy, the Army, the Hewitt, the Clarke, and possibly the Clausen, if the Clausen should come in—reserve those exhibit numbers for those reports so that those exhibits might run in a list of exhibits in consecutive numbers.²

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection that will be done.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, next: Some time ago, the committee, or members of the committee, asked that the prior testimony of Admiral Bloch and Admiral Stark and General Marshall be collated and mimeographed copies of it made up, the same as had been done for General Short and Admiral Kimmel.

Now, we have done that and we will have during the day available for distribution to the committee the compiled testimony of Bloch and Stark and Marshall if the committee wants [10520] us to deliver it to the members of the committee in view of the later determination of the committee that all of the earlier reports, which would include all of the testimony, is to be put in the record generally and printed copies of all of this will, in due course, be laid before each member of the committee in the page proof sheets that are now being delivered to us. We have the mimeographed copies if members of the committee want us to furnish them.

¹Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

²See Index of Exhibits in Part 12.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, counsel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I inquired yesterday something about the progress that was being made with regard to printing, and I understood from Mr. Masten—is he here now?

Mr. RICHARDSON. He was here just a minute ago.

Mr. MASTEN. We have solved that problem.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have taken care of that all right?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might state—this is off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)¹

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, I only have a few questions. I have to go and preside over another committee at 10:30, so I will have to be brief, and I would be, anyhow.

[10521] You are familiar, of course, with the Japanese intercepts setting forth the conditions under which a winds execute message might be expected. That is, if communications were cut off, or diplomatic relations broken so that the ordinary methods of communication could not be utilized, if this broadcast about the weather should appear, that would mean certain things.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to the United States and Great Britain and Russia.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the basis upon which you were looking for, and as far as you know, and I believe you testified, that everybody in the Department was looking for, or expecting, an execute based upon that?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, the conditions under which such a message should come through were never fulfilled. That is, there was never any breaking in communications or in diplomatic relations prior to the 7th of December, is that true?

Captain KRAMER. Precisely, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the message that you referred to as the one having been brought by your door on the 5th of December and taken to Captain Safford—I want to clear up in my [10522] own mind whether you regarded that message as an execute based upon the previous messages with regard to the winds situation?

Captain KRAMER. I did so regard it; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did?

Captain KRAMER. However, if I may interject at this point, Mr. Chairman, in the last few minutes here I have been making some notes regarding this winds message which I consider part of the answers to some of the questions of the counselor yesterday afternoon which, however, were not included in my answer due to interspersed questions about points that came up in the part of the answer that I gave. If I may do so, I would like to cover these loose points at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead.

Captain KRAMER. I mentioned the fact regarding this so-called skipped file number, that there are a number of reasons why such a

¹ Capt. Kramer's testimony begins in Hearings, Part 8, p. 3898.

file number should be canceled or skipped in the JD file by section GZ. I specifically covered two of the points, the two primary reasons why such file numbers were skipped.

There are two others which I meant to include in that and explain them. I would like to do so now.

One reason is the fact that occasionally the numbering machine which we used skipped a number in changing from one [10523] number to the next. I previously indicated that there were 14 copies to number. There was no automatic shift on the machine at the end of 14 numberings, it had to be done by hand.

The notation in the particular blank we are talking about, 7001, in the file indicates it was canceled. It may have been canceled rather than skipped. However, earlier in the year file No. 2074 has a notation in Lieutenant Harrison's handwriting that the number was skipped in error.

I should like to mention at this point that for the first time since 1941 I have had access to these files or, rather, I might put it I have examined these files this Monday. In the course of this examination I looked back into the 1940 files and found similar canceled numbers. In fact, there is one block of numbers from, as I recollect, No. 4100 through 4499 that is skipped in that file; in other words, a block of approximately 400 numbers skipped in that file. At the time it was noted, a day or two later, as I recollect it, I said not to bother going back to fill in those numbers.

Regarding another possibility of a canceled number, it will be noted in this Exhibit 142 that there is a notation under file No. 4647 by Lieutenant Harrison in his handwriting—he customarily used handwriting because he was not a typist— [10524] that that number was canceled by Army after being numbered by Navy.

In other words, apparently, a dispatch, a decryption was sent over to us by Army and subsequently canceled. My guess at this time as to the reason for the cancellation is that it was Army practice not to include in these numbered series messages bearing on the text of this decryption work. They customarily left that out of the file. That was not, however, the Navy practice. We left them in the files.

That covers the points I wanted to bring out about the canceled number. Regarding the interception of the message—

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you, then, if you are through with that part just this question: If I understand your testimony, there was nothing particularly unusual about this 7001 being a blank sheet?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely the point I am trying to emphasize, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that whatever should have been on it, or might have been on it if it had been filled out, was somewhere else in the files, is that true?

Captain KRAMER. It would not necessarily be anywhere else in the files. It might, of course, be because of a duplication of the file number message.

[10525] The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday you talked about changing the file numbers or switching it from one file number to another and I got the impression that it might be located on some other file number. Maybe I was wrong about that.

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; that was purely a question of the number they gave to a particular message. That number might be canceled for the various reasons I have given.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if that number were canceled, though, would it appear on some other file?

Captain KRAMER. Oftentimes it was reallocated if it occurred the same day, particularly to fill out the solid block, but particularly during the latter part of 1941 that was rare because of the fact that with the earlier episodes of that kind I had cautioned the men doing that particular work on the point and there are none apparently in the latter part of 1941 of that kind of error, skipping or allocating numbers erroneously. By that I mean, as I explained yesterday, the two primary reasons for the cancellation of numbers would be allocating a number to a part of a multipart message the first parts of which we had previously received. In other words, it was purely a clerical matter of making a proper check of our files to see whether or not we had those previous parts of that multipart message before allocating a number to the current part that had come in.

[10526] The CHAIRMAN. Are we to understand, then, your testimony to mean that there is no particular significance to be attached to the fact that this 7001 is a blank sheet?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely what I mean to indicate, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now you were about to interpret the message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think he has one thing further he wants to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed in any way you wish.

Captain KRAMER. I am going off this subject of the canceled number now, but it is on the general subject of this winds message. I have been under the impression during the past 4 years, purely as a matter of memory, that in that piece of teletype that was shown me by the GY watch officer only one country was involved. I so indicated the first time I had occasion to testify on that point before the court of Admiral Murfin.

The CHAIRMAN. You referred to that as a court of Admiral Murfin. It was the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. I am still under that impression. I, however, am not positive and have never been positive on the [10527] precise wording of that message since I first attempted to recollect what the wording was.

In that connection, too, I should like to emphasize this point. I heard Captain Safford in the last few days indicate that in that piece of teletype Russia was also included but in the negative form. I can categorically state that if any of that phraseology had appeared in the negative form in my mind it would have thrown the whole thing out, because there was no provision whatsoever for a negative form of any of these phrases.

Regarding the question of my memory, I would like to comment to this effect: My contact with that piece of teletype totaled only a few seconds in duration, I probably saw it not over 10 or 15 seconds. I did not see it while Captain Safford was examining it. He was standing—he was holding it, and standing in front of me. At no

occasion from December of 1941 until the question was asked me before Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry, was the question of what country was involved brought up in conversion or on any other occasion. That question took me, you might term it, cold.

In that connection, too, I would like to comment on my testimony before Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry, that my testimony was given without any preparation whatsoever. I had [10528] been detached 2 days before from the South Pacific, ordered north under priority one transportation by air. I had been traveling 2 days and arrived in Pearl Harbor around midnight.

I phoned Captain Layton, whose number as Fleet Intelligence officer I readily found, to find out what my assignment was to be. It was then that I first learned that the purpose of ordering me up on fast transportation was to testify before this court of inquiry. I was not aware even that it was meeting there.

I called Captain Layton from the airport. It was not until the following morning at 8:30 that I first learned that I was free to disclose to this court of inquiry anything having to do with radio intelligence. In other words, I was still strongly impressed by all the security indoctrination connected with this work. I was not at all certain that it was proper in the interest of national security to disclose any matters concerning radio intelligence or cryptanalysis before this court of inquiry. For that reason I stopped at Captain Layton's office before proceeding to where the court was meeting and asked him about that specific point and was first assured at that time, one-half hour before I commenced testifying, that this court had full authority to delve into all aspects of cryptanalysis as far as the Navy was concerned, [10529] that such testimony would be made a top secret supplement to their record of proceedings.

That is what I mean by being caught cold on what my recollections were in testifying before that court.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all you wanted to say about that?

Captain KRAMER. In further amplification of the question of my memory I should like to make this brief comment also:

Every other—perhaps not other—but every message that was typed up and disseminated by section GZ of Naval Communications was seen by me at least six or eight and sometimes as many as a dozen times. I invariably examined the file of current traffic quite closely; in fact, early in the year I studied it closely enough to write a gist of each message; the last month or so before December 1941, when we had ceased the practice of gisting the day's traffic because of the urgency of getting the material out promptly, I studied these things particularly closely because I did not have a gist before me while the recipients to whom I normally delivered this material were examining it. I felt that it was a part of my job to be thoroughly familiar with what they were looking at, so that in case questions were asked, references given, personalities whose names appeared therein were asked about, that I would be familiar with what they were talking about and could elucidate.

[10530] By contrast this particular winds message that I have described I saw only once and for not more than 15 seconds or so.

One further point in connection with this winds message. Captain Safford has testified that the translation of the set-up of these winds

messages is incorrect. I agree to that to this extent. The version on the work sheet from which the translation was made in the Navy Department was garbled, appreciably garbled.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are speaking now, Captain, of the original winds code message?

Captain KRAMER. Original set-up of this message; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Captain KRAMER. I think it is Circular 2343.

The CHAIRMAN. Fifty-three.

Captain KRAMER. I have had occasion in the last few days to examine that work sheet again and confirm my memory on that point. Without changing those garbles the translation as it appears in Exhibit 1 is still correct, but by modifying the garbles or clearing these garbles it can be made to fit fairly precisely the British translation submitted by Singapore to commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet.

Senator LUCAS. Just a moment.

[10531] Captain KRAMER. One final point in connection with this thing—

Senator LUCAS. Will you kindly go into that just a little more, that last statement you made about fitting the parts?

Captain KRAMER. That is what I am going to do now, sir.

Senator LUCAS. But you are starting with another subject.

[10532] Captain KRAMER. No, sir. That version furnished by the British to the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, which was put on the Kopek channel, was put on that circuit and came into the Navy Department, as I recollect, the same date that we had our translation in that winds set-up.

It was for that reason that no message was drafted by the Navy Department covering this winds set-up. We felt it was fully and adequately covered by the translation of the circuit already. It was in more emphatic form.

From current examination, it was in more precise form than the version we had in the Navy Department.

That is all I have to state.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, Captain, I have to go to another committee, and I will not be able to finish my examination.

Will it be agreeable to the committee if I reserve the right to resume my examination later, unless some other member covers the points I have in mind? I am sorry I have to leave, but I have to go to another committee.

Thank you very much.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, do you now have, or have you ever at any time had any interest in the prosecution or the defense of Admiral Kimmel, or anybody else connected [10533] with this Pearl Harbor attack?

Captain KRAMER. Most emphatically no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Have you ever at any time exercised yourself in helping to prepare any type or form of prosecution or defense of Admiral Kimmel, or anybody else connected with the Pearl Harbor attack?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Have you ever at any time, or do you now feel that the officers of the General Staff of the Army or the Navy,

in effect, are crooks or would indulge in framing Admiral Kimmel or anybody else connected with this Pearl Harbor attack, or that they are not to be trusted?

Captain KRAMER. Such phenomena are inconceivable to my mind, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, with respect to the so-called winds execute message, Captain, just a few questions in connection with that.

I have before me page 12 of the statement read to this committee by Captain Safford. I assume counsel can supply you a copy of it, if you do not have it.

Captain KRAMER. I have one.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I ask you to please turn to page 12 of Captain Safford's prepared statement, which he read to this committee about the middle of the page, and I [10534] invite your attention to the paragraph beginning:

When I first saw the winds message, it had already been translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, in charge of the Translation Section of the Navy Department Communications Intelligence Unit. Kramer had underscored all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below the printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon in Kramer's handwriting the following three translations:

"War with England (including NEI, etc)

"War with the U. S.

"Peace with Russia."

I am not sure of the order; but it was the same in the broadcast, and I think England appeared first. I think Kramer used "U. S." rather than "United States." It is possible that the words "No war" instead of "Peace" were used to describe Japan's intentions with regard to Russia.

Now, having read that part of Captain Safford's testimony, Captain, are you prepared to give this committee information bearing on that?

Captain KRAMER. I think the testimony I have given already covers most of this point. I can only reiterate those statements. Anything appearing in one of these winds [10535] broadcasts indicating a negative form, in other words, as interpreted on this page, peace with someone would have immediately discarded it in my mind as being a signal in this winds system.

I might further comment along that line that I think it would be a very strange sort of disguising on the part of the Japanese to have said "No north wind."

The winds set-up was to be ostensibly an authentic weather broadcast.

I would like to comment further, that there were at least six or eight false alarms on this weather broadcast.

From the time we were set up at the end of November, I was called down, I definitely recollect one time, I believe three times at night to check with the GY watch officers on some of the reams, yards, of teletype paper covering the plain language broadcasts of the Japanese.

In every case that I have just described, what I examined was on long lengths of teletype with solid blocks of Japanese news appearing on the teletype as well.

In each case a careful examination of this plain language broadcast of weather made me reach the conclusion that it was nothing more than ordinary weather broadcasts.

The specific piece of teletype that was shown me and which I accompanied the watch officer with to Captain Safford's [10536] office, was a short piece of teletype paper torn off the teletype machine. My presumption at the time was that the GY watch officer had determined that it fitted the general conditions required by this weather broadcast, namely that it appeared in its proper location in the text of a news broadcast, either at the beginning or at the end or both, and that it had been repeated the required number of times.

That was part of the function of the GY watch officer, not only on this particular weather system but on all systems. They were the break-down people, they identified systems; they turned into my section only the final Japanese text.

That applies to everything except incompletely recovered codes in which the coded Japanese text would be turned into my section.

I therefore personally, in the case of this Friday morning so-called winds message, had no occasion to check on these points the question of whether it appeared in its proper context of a news broadcast or whether it was repeated the proper number of times. It may have been repeated the proper number of times on the piece of teletype paper. I am not positive as to the precise wording of that.

[10537] In the last few weeks, I have had occasion to see some interrogations conducted by General MacArthur's headquarters in Japan of high Japanese officials who were concerned with these broadcasts.

In view of their statements that no such weather signal was made, it is my present belief, in the light of my recollections on this matter, as well, that what I saw Friday morning in December before Pearl Harbor was also a false alarm on this winds system. It was, nevertheless, definitely my conception at the time that it was an authentic broadcast of that nature. I am still of that opinion, that it used that precise wording, keeping in mind, as I indicated this morning, that my recollections on that are that only one country was involved.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What country was that?

Captain KRAMER. To the best of my recollection, it was England.

I would like to point out one other item in connection therewith.

I have already indicated that the first time the question of what country appeared on that winds broadcast came up in conversation, or anything that we had in connection with this matter, was when that one question was asked me by the court of inquiry at Pearl Harbor.

[10538] My first reaction was, without having thought about it since December 1941, that it was the United States, because of the fact we were at war with Japan, so of course, it must have been the United States.

[10539] I would like, however, to invite the committee's attention to the fact that later on, in the course of questioning me at Pearl Harbor, on page 187 of the transcript of that court of inquiry, I made the statement that through the latter part of that week and until the attack on Pearl Harbor there was still nothing whatsoever in this traffic to indicate any overt intentions of the Japanese directed at the United States. That I believe appreciably modifies my first hasty reactions to the first time the question was propounded to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, Captain, returning to the testimony here of Captain Safford which I have read, it states there:

When I first saw the winds message, it had already been translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer.

Is that true?

Captain KRAMER. I am fairly definite on the point that I did not make the original translation. I may have corrected a hand-written translation already made by the GY watch officer who had all these three Japanese phrases, the translation on hand in pursuance of instructions from Captain Safford and Admiral Noyes, to be able to take care of this matter during the night promptly by the Navy Department communications officers.

[10540] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, if you and the watch officer went to Captain Safford's office and simply handed him the paper he could not have known who translated it, could he?

Captain KRAMER. Unless he recognized the handwriting, I do not see how he could.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Was not the thing supposed to be typewritten?

Captain KRAMER. It was a piece of teletype paper, which of course is typewritten.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Then he goes on to say:

Kramer had underscored all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet.

Had you done that?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall that, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. "Below the printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon in Kramer's handwriting, the following free translations:" which I have read.

Did you write in colored pencil or crayon in your handwriting these phrases that are mentioned here in Captain Safford's statement?

Captain KRAMER. I have no recollection that I used my colored pencil or that I made the original translation. I can most emphatically state that any translation I might have made would most emphatically not have used the expression "war." That was entirely outside the provisions of the winds set-up called for by the message appearing in Exhibit 1, which refers only to disruption of communications.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you are confident, Captain, that there was no use of the word "war" in this so-called winds message on that occasion?

Captain KRAMER. Certainly not by me, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you see or hear anything to indicate that anybody at that time saw or thought they saw the word "war" in the message.

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understand then, Captain, that these messages, including the number 7001, were in your custody.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And were kept in your safe in your office?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, were any of those files ever stolen, filched, or removed from the file there in your custody?

Captain KRAMER. In my period of duty in that section there was never such an occasion, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And all of the files were in their [10542] proper order and in their proper place and kept there in your safe?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

I might further amplify that answer, sir, to this effect, that the so-called numerical file, after a series of messages were numbered for dissemination, a copy was invariably and immediately inserted in that numerical file. Messages were never removed from that numerical file for reference or for any other purpose. That numerical file had two primary purposes, one to have a solid file of what had been translated and disseminated and, two, the primary purpose was to have something to which the translators could turn in case of references to back traffic when future messages were received.

We had a very complete and involved cross-index system on 3 by 5 cards, covering every originator in the Japanese diplomatic service. By that I mean every consulate, every embassy, every legation that originated messages had their own serial numbers for their series of messages.

In addition there was a series of circulars by each originating major diplomatic post. All that was very carefully cross-indexed by my chief yeoman. That was the primary file to which we turned for determining the duplication of incoming traffic. Sometimes we received as many as [10543] six or seven copies of a particular message. Later copies were as a rule simply filed without any further work on them if it had been received earlier and translated and disseminated. On occasion, if the earlier copy were appreciably garbled a corrected translation would be made from one of these later copies if it were in better or less-garbled form.

From this exhaustive cross-index I have described and which included references to the numerical file of translations, the translator would determine whether we had a previous translation and could refer then to the previous translation for interpretation of the reference. That numerical file, as I have indicated, was never touched for the purpose of inserting in subsequent folders these back references in disseminating later traffic to the normal recipients of this later traffic. The extra copies that had previously been disseminated and returned were normally retained for a period varying from a few days to a few weeks for that purpose.

In fact, there were two or three other files that we normally kept on other subjects, namely, the war in Europe and the United States negotiations. We had a subfile for that covering particular phases of the negotiations and on the file arranging all the Washington and Tokyo serial numbers in order.

[10544] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, you were constantly using these messages and these files, as I understand it?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, were any of them ever destroyed or removed or done away with during your tour of duty in that office?

Captain KRAMER. From this basic numerical file there was no occasion that I know of where anything was removed or destroyed

from that file with the exception of the fact that if it was determined later, probably a few days or a week later, that we had two identical messages, one of which was a duplication of another, when that was discovered the latest numerical file number would be canceled as a duplication of the earlier one.

Examples of that appear in this Exhibit 142.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the point I am getting at, Captain, is this, if anybody had wilfully taken out of those files all messages relating to this winds execute message you would have known about it, wouldn't you?

Captain KRAMER. I most certainly think I would have, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you say nothing of that kind ever happened during your tour of duty there?

Captain KRAMER. To my best knowledge and belief most categorically no, sir.

[10545] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, could anybody have gone in there and filched or stolen all of the messages relating to the winds execute message and you have known nothing about it?

Captain KRAMER. I don't see how that would be possible, sir, with this possible exception, that the combination of the safe in which these were kept, there was a copy of that combination in a double-sealed envelope in some of the front offices. If that envelope had been opened someone else would, of course, be able to open my safe. Otherwise, the only people who knew the combination of the safe in which that particular file was kept were three people, Lieutenant Harrison, the then Chief Yeoman Bryant, and myself.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you feel confident that nobody in the so-called front office who had the combination in the sealed envelope never removed any of those files?

Captain KRAMER. I am thoroughly confident of that point, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All those files were in a locked safe there in your office?

Captain KRAMER. At all times, yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you positive, Captain, that 7001 had no relation whatever to the so-called winds execute message?

[10546] Captain KRAMER. From an examination of the files last Saturday in the Navy Department and this study, Exhibit 142, of about a week or so ago, I am almost positive, I am as positive as I can be that that file number 7001 could not possibly have been any winds message. That is in addition to the fact that I have absolutely no matter of any kind, no recollection, no knowledge that a winds message was ever written up by my section.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, one more question, if I may, Captain.

Captain Safford says he received orders to destroy notes, memoranda, and so forth. Did you ever hear of any such order as that?

Captain KRAMER. I first heard of that a few days ago when Captain Safford testified.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And heard it from him?

Captain KRAMER. From him on this witness stand.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the only time you ever heard of anything like that?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. May I have that question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain Safford says he received orders to destroy notes, memoranda, and so forth.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

[10547] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You recall that?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, I remember.

Captain KRAMER. I might further amplify that reply in this respect: I have appeared as a spectator in these hearings only four or five times before last Friday, initially while General Marshall was testifying, again while Admiral Wilkinson was testifying, and while Captain McCollum was testifying. I have had at least a half dozen conversations during the past year with Captain Safford going over a number of points connected with Pearl Harbor. Last Saturday I had intended with my wife to go out of town for the day. I was so astonished by some of the statements made on Friday afternoon I felt that I better remain here Saturday, which I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You mean statements made by Captain Safford?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead.

Captain KRAMER. That is all I have to say.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Could you indicate—

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire what question the witness was answering by that last remark?

Captain KRAMER. I was amplifying my earlier reply.

Senator FERGUSON. To what question?

[10548] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I asked him the question, Senator, I stated that Captain Safford had testified—

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted it from the witness, what question he was answering, if I can get it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you want the reporter to read it?

Senator FERGUSON. If the Chairman would allow me I would like to ask the witness what question he thought he was answering when he gave that answer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I don't see that that is especially material, but if the Captain—

Senator FERGUSON. I will question him about it later.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator George would be next in line for recognition. He is not here. Mr. Clark, of North Carolina, will inquire, Captain.

Mr. CLARK. Captain, was this piece of paper that you did see at your office door ever distributed as magic?

Captain KRAMER. I didn't understand.

Mr. CLARK. The piece of paper that you saw at your office door and which went to Captain Safford's office, was that ever distributed as magic?

Captain KRAMER. It never came into my office, was never written up, was never disseminated by me.

Mr. CLARK. You mean it was never distributed as magic, [10549] was not distributed by you?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Who determined what portion of this radio traffic, as I believe you call it, would be distributed as magic?

Captain KRAMER. That was done by my office, sir.

In amplification of that point and your previous question I might state that nothing was ever disseminated by my office until we had a piece of paper in my office to work from. No piece of paper, either this—specifically this piece of paper—that was taken to Captain Safford's office ever came back to my office.

Mr. CLARK. Well, you were the judge of what should be disseminated, as you call it, of magic. Why didn't this paper come to your office in the first instance?

Captain KRAMER. The things that came to my office were determined in the first instance by the GY watch officers. There were many systems in various states of analysis. After an attack on a new system the traffic in that new system might be held for periods varying from weeks to years before any of that material ever came to my office. When a system was sufficiently broken down to pull any intelligible text out of it, however, it then came to my office. The determination of what was of sufficient importance to write up was the function of my office and that is what I referred to.

[10550] Mr. CLARK. But if someone else determined what should come to your office, then you didn't really have the determination of what should be distributed as magic, did you?

Suppose something came in that was magic and wasn't sent to your office?

Captain KRAMER. Then I would have nothing to do with its dissemination; no, sir. However, there was no provision for any other means of dissemination that I am aware of except the special provision set up by Admiral Noyes for handling anything that came in in this particular winds system.

That was an unprecedented set-up and was the only instance of that kind that I am aware of.

Mr. CLARK. Now, did I understand you that anything that came in in the nature of a winds execute would go to Admiral Noyes and not to you?

Captain KRAMER. It was not very clear-cut how that particular message would be handled during the daytime. The provisions set up by Admiral Noyes and Captain Safford were primarily intended to promptly take care of that at night.

In carrying out the provisions of those instructions, however, apparently the GY watch officer was proceeding [10551] to Captain Safford's office and then to Admiral Noyes.

My only possible explanation at this time of why that did not come back to my office for normal dissemination, translating and dissemination—this is merely presumptuous, I might interpolate—is that whoever saw it after I saw it, which I have already indicated was a matter of only a few seconds, must have determined that it was only another instance of a false weather broadcast, of which we had had numerous examples during the previous week or ten days.

Mr. CLARK. Just exactly who would that be?

Captain KRAMER. I don't know just who it would have been because I don't know who that piece of teletype paper was passed on to.

Mr. CLARK. Well, who could it have been passed on to.

Captain KRAMER. My presumption was and still is that Captain Safford was heading for Admiral Noyes' office with it.

Mr. CLARK. Did all the magic that was disseminated as such have to come through your office?

Captain KRAMER. So far as I am aware, that is precisely correct, sir, so far as the Navy Department is concerned and responsibilities outside of the Navy Department that the Navy had.

Mr. CLARK. I am speaking only about the Navy Department. [10552]

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Can you advise the committee with certainty as to whether all messages disseminated as magic had to come through your office?

Captain KRAMER. I know of no instance when any dissemination was made not through my office.

Mr. CLARK. Who set up this plan for disseminating magic? Who established it?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know, sir. It had been in effect for at least 15 or 20 years when I took charge of that office.

Mr. CLARK. I see.

You say this particular piece of paper never came back to your office, and was never disseminated as magic?

Captain KRAMER. Precisely, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I understood you to answer Senator Barkley's question on one point that you considered this some kind of a winds message?

Captain KRAMER. I did at the time, sir, because of the fact that it used the phraseology called for by the set-up of that winds message.

[10553] Mr. CLARK. I am under the impression from the testimony that has been given here, that all of you were very particularly interested in any winds execute message that might come in; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Very particularly what, sir?

Mr. CLARK. Interested.

Captain KRAMER. Precisely.

Mr. CLARK. And on the lookout for it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Do you consider that this slip of paper that you saw was a winds execute message?

Captain KRAMER. I did at the time; yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And you interpreted it to mean what?

Captain KRAMER. That the provisions called for by Tokyo's Circular 2353 were in effect regarding the country mentioned in that particular winds message.

The provisions referring purely and simply to the cutting off of communications with supplementary instructions to burn certain papers.

Mr. CLARK. Well, broken down in language which I can understand, you interpreted it to mean that it was war with England?

Captain KRAMER. Not war with England; no, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Well, what?

[10554] Captain KRAMER. That the winds message applied to England, in my best recollection.

Mr. CLARK. And referred to diplomatic relations, rather than war?

Captain KRAMER. Perhaps better would be a diplomatic crisis; yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Did you make any effort to ascertain where this piece of paper went, or what became of it?

Captain KRAMER. Never.

Mr. CLARK. Did you discuss it or mention it to any of the people to whom you had been distributing magic?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Did you consider—

Captain KRAMER. I would like to modify that, however, by saying that I may have mentioned it in the course of distribution of the other traffic on Friday to the usual recipients.

I am uncertain of that point.

Mr. CLARK. Now, did you consider this a winds execute message insofar as the United States was concerned?

Captain KRAMER. My best recollection now is, and I believe has been throughout the period since 1941, that it did not apply to the United States.

Mr. CLARK. And consequently it was of much less [10555] importance than if it had referred to the United States?

Captain KRAMER. It was not only of much less importance than if it had applied to the United States, but it was nothing new in its reference to England. It was more emphatic in nature than any such winds message might have been. Was the scheme being cooked up between the Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok and the Thai Chief of State for an occupation of Thailand and forcing of the Thai premier's hand to throw in Thailand in Japan? We knew about that in appreciable detail.

In fact, on 1 December, the subject of the dispatches relating to that were drafted by me, sent, I believe, initially, as was usual, to Captain Safford's office, and released by Admiral Noyes, and appears, I believe, as an exhibit in this hearing as Opnav Dispatch 011926, dated December 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. December what?

Captain KRAMER. 01. 01 indicates the first day.

Senator FERGUSON. The 1st of December?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Captain Kramer, I must confess to some little confusion. As I understand the winds code set-up, it was arranged so that if an execute message came in, it would indicate, or certain words would be taken to indicate [10556] war with the United States?

Captain KRAMER. I have never had that conception, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Well, will you, if you don't mind—well, I think Senator Lucas is going into that. I will not pursue it.

Senator LUCAS. Go ahead.

Mr. CLARK. No.

It merely related to the severance of diplomatic relations, and not war?

Captain KRAMER. Not necessarily the severance of diplomatic relations. Fundamentally and primarily severance of communications which, of course, normally accompanies severance of diplomatic relations also.

Mr. CLARK. Then they would use this weather broadcast, too, as a means of communication.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And certain words used, however, were to indicate certain things, were they not?

Captain KRAMER. Were to indicate certain countries, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Well, anyway, I may be a little confused on the technicalities of that, but what is in my mind is that whenever a winds execute message should come in, it was con- [10557] sidered by all of the people who had access to magic to be very important and significant, and you were on the alert in looking for it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Still, you now say that a message came in which you regarded as a winds execute message but which doesn't seem to have been of any importance. There is where my confusion is.

Now, if this was a winds execute message why did it not have the significance and the importance that the people in the Department had attached to it?

Captain KRAMER. It had importance, yes, sir. No more importance, however, than many other things that we were getting. As regards England in my mind, at least, it had less importance because of its very unspecific character than this contemplated invasion or demonstration before Kota Bharu, which was something specific. Important, yes, sir, in that it would be another straw in the wind indicating a further reaching of a climax in diplomatic relations.

Mr. CLARK. Well, now, what kind of a winds execute message would have qualified in importance and significance with what was expected here in such a message?

I mean to say this, stating the question this way: It is in evidence, and I have already referred to it, [10558] that everyone here who was familiar with magic was particularly interested in a winds execute message.

Now, what kind of a message, a winds execute message, would have met that interest and expectation? What would it have had to say to be of that importance and interest?

Captain KRAMER. I believe the primary interest of all of the high officials in Washington receiving these intercepts was the United States. We were still conducting negotiations with Japan, even though those negotiations had been de facto terminated.

One of the principal things that we were still interested in would be the nature and character of Japan's reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November which we had not yet received.

There were many indications of Japanese intentions directed at England, specifically, this Kota Bharu affair. There still was no intention of an overt nature anywhere in this traffic directed at the United States, with the possible exception of the dispatch late in November from Tokyo to Berlin, disclosing for the first time to the Germans, their Tri-Partite partners, the nature and terms of negotiations that were being conducted through 1941 with the United States.

Up to that time Japan had been consistently and con- [10559] tinually putting off Ribbentrop and Hitler in their direct inquiries on this subject.

The Japanese ambassador in Berlin was not cognizant of the nature and character of these negotiations.

Mr. CLARK. Then the lack of interest and importance of the particular message to which you refer, that was on this yellow teletype paper, was, that it did not refer to the United States?

Captain KRAMER. That is the best of my present recollection; yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Well, do you know about that?

Captain KRAMER. I am not positive of the wording appearing on that piece of teletype paper. My connection with it was so fleeting that I do not believe it is strange that I do not recollect it.

Mr. CLARK. Well, Captain, I do not mean to suggest anything strange about it, but here you were performing a very long faithful service as you were—

Captain KRAMER. I would like to state further, sir, that if it had referred to the United States, I am quite positive that it would have impressed itself on my memory.

The fact that it does not impress itself at this time, and without reference prior to 4 days ago to any of this material—I remember some details of all this [10560] traffic—is a further indication that I did not consider it, as I do not now, as referring to the United States.

The fact that it did not impress itself on my memory is a further indication to me now that it in most probability referred to England, which, of course, would not have impressed it on my memory because of the fact that we knew so much more in detail Japanese intentions directed to England.

Mr. CLARK. That is about what I was fixing to call to your attention, but it still strikes me as strange that with everyone here who knew anything about magic interested in this particular winds execute message, and with tension high on that subject, it is hard for me to understand how an accomplished officer like yourself in this line could have read a message that did refer to the United States, and therefore qualified as a winds execute message, without being immediately impressed by that fact.

Captain KRAMER. I am sure it would have been impressed on my memory if it had referred to the United States.

Mr. CLARK. And still you can't tell this committee positively whether it did or whether it didn't?

Captain KRAMER. The reason I have not categorically stated what the wording of that is, is the fact that I have no positive, had no positive recollection of that, and that any statement I would make now as to its precise wording [10561] would be reconstruction in my mind of what it might have said.

Mr. CLARK. But I am not asking you, Captain, to repeat the wording. I am suggesting to you that if under those tense conditions, this paper had qualified as a winds execute message, you certainly would have known it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, I would.

Mr. CLARK. Then don't you know whether it did or not?

Captain KRAMER. To the best of my current belief, it did not.

Mr. CLARK. And you are not in a position to make a positive statement on that particular point to the committee?

Captain KRAMER. Not purely from memory. I could make a positive statement on reconstruction as I have outlined.

Mr. CLARK. But you would have to proceed by reconstruction on that most vital and important point in the situation that then existed?

Captain KRAMER. I am sure, sir, that if the United States had been mentioned, that a dissemination of that piece of paper would have been made.

I am further of the belief, sir, that whoever saw that piece of paper after it left Captain Safford's office came to the conclusion that it was only one of many of [10562] these other apparent winds messages.

This particular piece of paper apparently impressed itself on my memory not appreciably more than these other false winds messages for which I was called to the office several times during the night of the week or ten days preceding Pearl Harbor, and which at the time we determined to be false winds messages.

[10563] Mr. CLARK. Well, that all looks reasonable to me and still we are left more or less in the realm of speculation?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir, speculation insofar as my precise memory of the wording of that piece of teletype paper is concerned.

Mr. CLARK. Speculation insofar as you cannot tell this committee positively that you never saw a message that completely qualifies as a winds execute message?

Captain KRAMER. With reference to the United States I cannot make that categorical statement purely from memory.

Mr. CLARK. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire, Captain.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, in the statement presented to this committee by Captain Safford, the Captain said that when you and the watch officer came to his office you made the statement, "This is it," as you handed him the winds message, and he has underscored the word "it."

Do you care to elaborate upon your previous statement?

Captain KRAMER. The "it" which I may have used referred to the fact that this was the first determination of anything appearing with the phraseology called for by this winds system.

Senator LUCAS. Do I understand you to tell the committee [10564] that when you made that statement to Captain Safford that you did not mean that it referred to the United States?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, as I understand this is the only message in traffic, if there was such a message of this kind, that was not actually translated and delivered to the proper recipients in the days of November and December 1941?

Captain KRAMER. That is not an accurate statement, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you correct me, Captain. You may have to do that frequently.

Captain KRAMER. I should say that the translations disseminated not only during this period but prior and subsequent periods were only a small percentage of all traffic received by this section of the Navy Department. I previously indicated that a percentage of that traffic was in various states of analysis by the crypt-analysts. Other parts of this traffic were in various states of code recovery by my section.

Other parts of this traffic were in minor systems which were given only a partial translation to determine their character. If they were purely of an administrative nature they were frequently not translated if we were pressed by more important traffic. By "administrative [10565] nature" I mean that some office, diplomatic post of the Japanese, might be asking for more funds for a certain purpose, and elaborating in some detail the purpose for which they wanted their funds, and so forth.

Senator LUCAS. I understand.

Now, did Captain Safford talk with you about this message at any time between December 3 or 4 and the date of the attack on December 7 after you met in his office?

Captain KRAMER. I have no recollection of discussing this piece of teletype with Captain Safford between the time I took it to his office and the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever talk to him about this particular message thereafter?

Captain KRAMER. To my best recollection and belief the first time it was discussed subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor was this past spring.

Senator LUCAS. And how did that happen?

Captain KRAMER. Captain Safford is an acquaintance of mine for some years back. He had written me a letter concerning certain phases of this subject in late December 1943 and early 1944. Shortly after I returned to Washington last spring I had occasion to be in the branch building of the Navy Department where his office was and looked him up, more in the nature of a greeting of him after a couple of [10566] years absence. During the course of that and subsequent conversations we discussed some of the points concerning this matter.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever agree with him in these discussions that this particular message in controversy was a genuine implementing winds message?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I did not. I tried to disillusion him of that idea since it was so diametrically contrary to the conception of it that I had.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever talk to him again about this same winds message following that conversation?

Captain KRAMER. I have met him, I think, about half a dozen times during this past year prior to seeing him during these hearings in the last few days where I have had further conversations with him.

Senator LUCAS. And I presume you two reached the same conclusion about the type of a message this was?

Captain KRAMER. We did not on that point as well as on a number of other points concerning this. I, however, expressed my opinions to him on a number of points. In fact, he showed me the courtesy of permitting me to examine some of the files that he had been preparing. I looked through some of those files partly with the idea of refreshing my memory on some points that he had material on. That, [10567] incidentally, was the first occasion since 1941 that I had seen any pieces of paper connected with this matter with the exception of the exhibits shown to me during previous hearings I appeared at.

Senator LUCAS. Well, if you never saw this so-called execute message after your conversation with Safford on either December 4th or 5th where, in the course of natural events, or in the course of understanding, would that message go after it left Safford's office?

Captain KRAMER. I have already indicated, Senator, that that particular message came in as a part of a news broadcast coverage which we had not been customarily covering during the course of 1941, except occasional sampling of that coverage, primarily because of the fact the FCC then had that function of monitoring foreign broadcasts. That coverage was instituted only after we were aware of the Japanese setting up this particular winds system of signals. It was an added burden not only to my section, with limited translating talent, but, of course, to Captain Safford's whole organization, including the monitoring stations and his watch officers in the decrypting section, to examine this plain language coverage.

Senator LUCAS. Did that come through in Morse code?

Captain KRAMER. I believe it did, sir. However, I [10568] cannot be certain of that from first-hand knowledge because of the fact that material coming in in teletype would normally be transcribed onto a teletype ribbon for rapid transmission and such transcription would not clearly indicate whether it was Romaji, in other words, Arabic letter transmission or Kana Morse, Japanese Morse transmission.

Senator LUCAS. That is, by an examination of the teletype itself you could not tell whether it was Morse code or not?

Captain KRAMER. You could not tell whether it was international Morse or Japanese Kana Morse.

Senator LUCAS. There is quite a difference, as I understand it, between the two.

Captain KRAMER. There is a difference when picked out of the air, yes, sir, but not when transcribed on a teletype.

Senator LUCAS. I mean as far as the interception is concerned, there is quite a difference?

Captain KRAMER. As far as the interception, but not when it is transcribed to English letters.

[10569] Senator LUCAS. Well, this message, according to the evidence that is before this committee at the present time, could only go to one place after it left Stafford's office and that would be to Admiral Noyes' offices, isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That was my understanding at the time, and still is.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it is my understanding that Safford has told the committee that he directed one of the men in his office to take this message to Admiral Noyes, but he does not remember who it was. Now, do you recall the watch officer that came to your door that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I am not positive of his name. It, however, does impress itself on my memory that he was approximately my height. I recall that because we walked for approximately 150 yards. My belief has been and still is, that it was a Lieutenant Murray, one of the watch officers.

Senator LUCAS. If Admiral Noyes received this so-called execute winds message, or this false weather message, whatever it was, what would be his duties, Captain, with respect to that message?

Captain KRAMER. This is purely presumption on my part based on his instruction to me to prepare certain cards concerning this winds message. I presumed if he received such a [10570] winds message that he would at once telephone the sense of that message to these usual recipients of this decrypted traffic.

Senator LUCAS. Well, would he follow the telephone communication with the delivery to these proper recipients of that type message?

Captain KRAMER. Would he what?

Senator LUCAS. Would he follow the telephone communication with an actual delivery of this type of a message to these various recipients? That is the custom you followed, as I recall.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And I presumed he would follow the same course, would he not? Of course, you are speculating now.

Captain KRAMER. I do not know about that point, sir.

Senator LUCAS. All right. In Captain Safford's statement on page 14 he says:

It is my recollection that Kramer and I knew at the time that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the Winds Message to the War Department, to the "Magic" distribution list in the Navy Department, and to the Naval Aide to the President. For that reason, no immediate distribution of the smooth translation of the Winds Message was made in the Navy Department. The six or [10571] seven copies for the Army were rushed over to the War Department as rapidly as possible; here the Navy's responsibility ended. The individual smooth translations for authorized Navy Department officials and the White House were distributed at noon on December 4, 1941, in accordance with standard operating procedure.

Now, who delivered those smooth copies, who delivered the smooth translations around noon of December 4, 1941, if you know? Whose responsibility would that be? Assuming now that it is in Noyes' office and assuming that the statement of Captain Safford is correct, who would have the responsibility for ultimately making the distribution of the smooth translations as is stated here?

Captain KRAMER. With the exception of certain deliveries made on my instructions by Lieutenant Harrison, I know of no one else who ever made a dissemination in the Navy Department of the final translations except myself.

Senator LUCAS. That was my understanding. In other words, if Admiral Noyes had considered this message as a winds message, then it would have been your duty, under the previous arrangement that you had, to have delivered these smooth translations to the proper recipients?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, Admiral Noyes would not [10572] have detailed some other officer who was not familiar with magic and familiar with the recipients to have made the delivery in this particular and special case?

Captain KRAMER. It would have been unprecedented and I cannot conceive of his so doing.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, it is a fact, and I think you stated it categorically, that you, as the one individual who had delivered all these magic messages, never received from Admiral Noyes any instructions of any kind to deliver to the proper recipients this so-called execute winds message?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you know of no one who did make this delivery?

Captain KRAMER. I do not, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you agree with me that if this winds execute message was the type and kind as was outlined in circular 2353, that it would have been absolutely the thing to do, to make such a delivery?

Captain KRAMER. It would have been if it had come into my section for translation and dissemination. However, as has been repeatedly pointed out, there were special provisions made to handle this particular winds system messages.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, I understand that, but even though this particular provision was made whereby Admiral Noyes was [10573] to receive this kind of a winds execute, as I understood you to say it would still have been your duty, if the delivery of the smooth translation had been requested, it would have been your duty to do it?

Captain KRAMER. It certainly would, yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And if Admiral Noyes, who will testify later about this, if Admiral Noyes selected any other officer, then he broke a precedent up to that time as far as delivering this magic?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. I might state further, sir, in connection with this whole subject that it was my presumption that this particular message would not come into my section because of the special provisions made by Admiral Noyes and Captain Safford for dissemination. However, if it came into my section, it would have been disseminated through the usual channels, via myself. I have not had this particular winds message impressed on my memory during the intervening years partly for that reason, partly for other reasons I have already given and partly because what is apparently a considerable issue on this particular winds message apparently came to a head not before at least two years or so after Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. Two years after Pearl Harbor, about the time when Captain Safford started writing you asking you [10574] while you were serving in the Pacific whether or not you knew anything about this particular message?

Captain KRAMER. That is just about the time, sir, that I was first aware that there were any questions or issues concerning this subject.

Senator LUCAS. And he asked you in question 18 of that letter as to whether or not you knew anything about this particular message and your reply was wholly on another message at that time?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, your memory two years afterwards did not coincide with Stafford's memory about that message the first time that it was ever brought to your attention?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And as far as you know that is the first time that the so-called winds execute message was ever called to the attention of anyone in connection with the Pearl Harbor controversy?

Captain KRAMER. Precisely, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, in this same statement Captain Safford said that it was his recollection that "Kramer and I knew that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the winds message."

[10575] Do you recall that Admiral Noyes told you at any time that he had telephoned the substance of this so-called winds execute message to the proper recipients?

Captain KRAMER. I was never aware of what phone calls Admiral Noyes made, if he made any. In fact, I have no knowledge of what happened to this particular piece of paper, this so-called winds message, after I left Captain Safford's office.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, returning for a moment, Captain, to circular 2353: Are you the individual who originally translated that message when it was intercepted?

Captain KRAMER. My section translated it, sir—one of my translators did. The "Y" at the bottom before the expression, "Navy translation" indicated that it was a Mr. Cory.

Senator LUCAS. Who?

Captain KRAMER. Cory; C-o-r-y, who about 8 months later was killed on Guadalcanal as a young officer in the Marines, into which he was commissioned in the spring of 1942.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you were familiar, of course, with this particular message after it came in and was translated?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You were the one who made the delivery of this message—

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

[10576] Senator LUCAS (continuing). To the proper people here in Washington who were on the "in", so to speak, on magic?

Captain KRAMER. I think that probably the first delivery was made to Captain Safford because it was my customary practice to bring at once to his attention anything bearing on the technicalities of his section.

Senator LUCAS. Now, the first part of that message is as follows:

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

That was thoroughly understood by you?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Was there ever anyone who translated those words from the intercepted message in different language than what we find now in this circular?

Captain KRAMER. At no time, sir. There was only one translation made of this in the Navy Department. About the same date as this translation we received a translation from the Far East of this same circular.

Senator LUCAS. Is that the one Captain Safford gives to the committee in his statement which is found on—

[10577] Captain KRAMER. A dispatch originated by commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, as a translation furnished by Singapore.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. That is the one that Captain Safford—

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. That translation from the Asiatic Fleet was essentially the same as ours, disagreed only in certain parenthetical points with reference to the southwest Pacific. My recollections now of my reaction at the time were that the Asiatic Fleet version of it differed from ours; it further made it—was probably made more emphatic than ours because of the closer proximity of those people to danger; that for that reason alone I would not question their translation. I recall at no time going back to the original decryption of ours to determine why the two translations were dif-

ferent—I first saw, since those days, the work sheet of this message a few days ago—and that there would be no necessity of our briefing and drafting the subject of this message to send to the usual recipients, the Asiatic Fleet specifically, and commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, because it was already on that channel, they already had it.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I notice in Captain Safford's statement that he says:

[10578] Consul-General Foote, our Senior Diplomatic Representative in the Netherlands East Indies, on December 4, 1941 (Java time), which is December 3, 1941 (Washington time), sent a similar message to the Secretary of State, from which I quote:

"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports: One east wind rain war with United States. Two north wind cloudy war with Russia. Three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies."

Now, do you consider that message any different than the one which you received in circular 2353?

Captain KRAMER. I do not believe I saw until some time later that particular message. I may have. I know that I was told about it, however, because my reactions at the time I was told about it, about 3 or 4 December, were that that particular subject was getting a pretty wide dissemination.

I was concerned purely from the security angle. I was concerned that if too many people became cognizant of it, inasmuch as this thing was set up in a secret Japanese code, that the Japanese might get wind of the fact that that code was broken.

Senator LUCAS. Well, did Admiral Noyes know about this [10579] particular message which was sent in by Consul-General Foote?

Captain KRAMER. Very probably he did.

Senator LUCAS. Could it be that this so-called winds execute message that we have been talking about was following the pattern as laid down here in this message that I have just read?

Captain KRAMER. So far as I am aware, sir, those messages from Java were never used by Captain Safford's organization in connection with interception or attempted interception of anything on this winds system. We had our own translation, which was the primary and initial translation, and we had the Asiatic Fleet version of the translation furnished by the British, which in most essentials were identical. Those two versions of it were the basis on which instructions, in my understanding, were sent to our intercept stations and provisions made, all the provisions made to handle this particular winds system.

Senator LUCAS. Well, do I understand you to say, then, from your last answer, that Captain Safford and yourself and all other individuals who were intercepting and decoding and translating these messages from Japan were following the pattern as laid down in circular 2353 or circular 2354 and you were eliminating any message that you might have received from Java?

Captain KRAMER. My only reaction to those messages from [10580] Java, was that, as I have indicated, it was getting a very wide dissemination. Incidentally, I might interpolate that to my best recollection this is the first instance that I was aware that the Dutch were working on this traffic.

Senator LUCAS. So you had good reasons to discount, I presume, in view of the fact that you fellows had been working on it a long, long time, and thought that your system of analysis of these intercepts was as good as any, or better?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir. I might amplify my previous answer by stating that although it was obvious that the Dutch had differences on the subject, my first reaction was that very likely the British at Singapore had furnished it to them.

Senator LUCAS. Well, if Captain Safford was not using these reports that came in from Java, why does he use it here; can you tell that?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot presume to diagnose the thought processes of Captain Safford.

Senator LUCAS. Getting back to circulars 2353 and 2354, the one which all responsible people in the Army and Navy had, there is nothing in that message which speaks about war with the United States or Russia or Britain?

Captain KRAMER. Nothing whatsoever in the text of the message. The war angle could be only personal inference and [10581] deductions of what a diplomatic crisis involving severance of communications might lead up to.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. So in the event that any winds implement message had come in on the basis of what is laid down in circular 2353 it could only mean, if this message is correct, that diplomatic relations were cut off or international communications had ceased, isn't that right?

Captain KRAMER. Precisely correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And at the time, either on December 4 or 5, we were carrying on diplomatic relations with Japan?

Captain KRAMER. We were, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And the communications between Tokyo and her people in this country and all over the world were continuing, were they not?

Captain KRAMER. So far as the United States is concerned, they continued in full effect; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, negotiation and communications both continued right up almost until the bomb fell?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. The first bomb fell at Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. So if this message is correct there was never any reason for Japan ever sending out an implementing [10582] winds message because no communications ceased and no diplomatic relations ceased between the two countries?

Captain KRAMER. So far as the United States was concerned, it appears to me to have been an extremely illogical thing for Japan to have sent such a message with reference to the United States since they took such stringent precautions to safeguard the fact that they contemplated not only a break but actually an overt act directed toward the United States.

[10583] Senator LUCAS. All right, now, Captain, one more question.

I have always considered circulars 2353 and 2354 of tremendous importance, and I always thought any implementing winds message following the plan laid down, was also of tremendous importance.

Do you agree with me that if an implementing message had come with the instructions as set forth in these circulars, it would have been followed distinctly and carefully?

Captain KRAMER. What instructions do you refer to, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. I am speaking now of the latter part of the circular which says, "This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast, and each sentence will be repeated twice."

Now, that is clear, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. If the words "Higashi—" you pronounce them for me please.

Captain KRAMER. Higashi no kaze ame.

Senator LUCAS. If they had appeared only in the middle of the winds execute message, would that, standing alone have been sufficient for you to reach the conclusion [10584] that that was an implementation of the winds message, or false message?

Captain KRAMER. In my examination of these earlier false alarms where I saw the full teletype paper, sometimes running to 12 and 15 yards in length, in analyzing those weather reports, that was one of the points I looked for, to see whether it appeared in the middle and at the end.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. If it did not appear at the end, it would have tended to discount anything appearing in the middle.

However, its omission from the end would very likely be accompanied by an omission of part of the end of the weather broadcast due to interference or atmospherics, and therefore incomplete reception of that news broadcast.

Senator LUCAS. That could happen?

Captain KRAMER. It might possibly happen; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. It might possibly happen?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you would have to consider under those circumstances then, if you received any one of these danger signals, either in the middle or the end of the message, I take it, you would have to give that some weight, [10585] and consideration so far as beings a winds execute message is concerned?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; and I did in those earlier things I mentioned.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Would it disturb you to suspend at this point?

Senator LUCAS. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There is a very important roll call in the House, and as soon as the House convenes, the House Members will have to be present for that.

Without objection, the committee will now stand in recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m. the committee recessed until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[10586]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

**TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY
(Resumed)**

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, do you have anything you desire to submit before your examination is resumed?

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, in the past few minutes I have examined a document presented to me this morning as I commenced to testify. There is a notation on here that it is exhibit 41. I have never seen it before, however. It is information from documentary evidence on messages 901, 2, 7, and 10. The first one of those, 901, is what has been termed in this hearing the "pilot" message.

Yesterday I testified concerning the time of receipt of the translation of that message in the Navy Department. I was unpositive as to the exact time. My impressions were purely from memory after over 4 years that it was received late in the afternoon, after the first of the parts of the Japanese note were coming in.

An examination of this document would tend to confirm [10587] such testimony inasmuch as in the fourth paragraph under 901 it states:

Teletype sheet containing Japanese code received by Army SIS from Navy (A) 12:05 P. M. 6 December.

In the normal course of processing this material it took several hours. It is therefore extremely unlikely that that message was processed, translated, and disseminated prior to late Saturday afternoon.

That is the only thing I wanted to bring up at this time, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas of Illinois will continue his inquiry.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall, Captain, what we were talking about just before lunch? There were a number of things but I am trying to think of the last one.

Captain KRAMER. I have forgotten just the line of the questioning, sir.

Senator LUCAS. We were discussing the circular 2353 with respect to whether or not it was necessary in order to complete the cycle that the word, for instance, which means "East wind-rain" should appear in the center and at the end of the message.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And then there was another warning in [10588] there which said that each sentence will be repeated twice.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, would atmospheric conditions interfere with that last instruction with respect to each sentence being repeated twice?

Captain KRAMER. On that point, Senator, I was somewhat confused at the time and still am confused because it disagrees with the subsequent directive on this subject, 2354.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. In a subsequent directive it says:

The above will be repeated five times.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading) :

And included at the beginning and end.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct. We expected, certainly, that that would be repeated. Just which of those would apply, we were still uncertain what the Japanese intended.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. In other words, if they followed either one of these circulars, which they would be compelled to do in the implementing wind message, it would be necessary that they either repeat twice or five times?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. I might comment further on that to this effect, that in 2354 it says it will be included at the beginning and the end; 2353 says in the middle and at the end.

[10589] I have previously indicated that it was only a few days ago that I saw the original work sheets since 1941 of these two messages. There is still doubt in the minds of any person in the United States as to the precise meaning as to what the Japanese intended. Those discrepancies are undoubtedly due to only tentative or erroneous recoveries by my code recovery section. As a matter of fact, that beginning in 2354 from a personal examination of the work sheet appears to be a tentative and erroneous recovery which could very well be better recovered, more precisely and accurately recovered as "the middle."

The expression actually appearing on the work sheet now in the files of the Navy Department is "Boto," meaning "beginning." It was a tentative recovery. In contexts in which that code group have previously appeared it seemed to be a logical recovery. With subsequent appearances of those code groups we very likely would have made a more accurate recovery. That is just another indication of doubt with reference to the precise meaning intended by the Japanese in these two messages.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I can understand that from an examination of the two Circulars and your explanation of it, too. What I want to know, Captain, is whether or not if this implementing wind message had been a genuine one if it [10590] would have been necessary for them to repeat the message twice or at least five times?

Captain KRAMER. We certainly expected that it would be repeated; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. From what you saw in these three lines that came into your office was that message repeated more than once?

Captain KRAMER. My recollection is that there was repetition.

Senator LUCAS. There was repetition in there?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In that particular message?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you do not recall, now, how many times, I take it?

Captain KRAMER. I am not certain on the number of times; no, sir. I have previously commented on that particular point, that it was the function of the Gy section of cryptanalysis to determine the authenticity of codes. They for the most part examined these various other weather reports that had been coming in, threw many of them out themselves as not fitting the precise phraseology or the repetition called for, and did not call on me.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, in this same message it further states: [10591]

When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Now, as I understand it there was a message went out from Tokyo to Washington on December the 4th telling them:

Before you burn the codes brought you by KOSAKA, have him teach all your telegraphic staff how to use them—

and so forth.

Are you familiar with that one in Exhibit 1 on page 231?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I am familiar with that.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, that message could have nothing to do with the winds execute message.

Captain KRAMER. Nothing whatsoever, sir. That would, in that connection, tend to prove that there was no winds execute message up to that time.

Senator LUCAS. That is exactly the point I wanted to raise. In other words, in view of the fact that they said here in Circular 2353:

When this is heard please destroy all code papers—

in other words, on December the 4th, 1941, if a winds execute message had been sent from Tokyo there wouldn't have been any reason for them on December the 4th to send out that kind of a message, would there?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. Also, there would be no point [10592] to addressing such a winds system message to Washington in view of the precise instructions that they had sent Washington on the third to retain certain systems and codes.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. There is another message here about burning of codes some place that I want to call your attention to. It is on page 236 of Exhibit 1, Captain, from Washington to Tokyo, December the 5th, 1941:

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.

Now, do you agree with me that that message from Washington to Tokyo, when it talks about negotiations still continuing, is in line with what they were talking about in Circular 2353 about negotiations there?

Captain KRAMER. There is no connection whatsoever, sir.

Senator LUCAS. It has none?

Captain KRAMER. None, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, will you explain that and get me straight on that, please?

Captain KRAMER. On page 215 is a directive from Tokyo to Washington.

Senator LUCAS. In Exhibit 1?

Captain KRAMER. In Exhibit 1.

[10593] Senator LUCAS. All right.

Captain KRAMER. The translation reads, of a message dated 2 December:

Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code—

a character Japan intended as "Oite"—
and abbreviating code (L)—
which we knew as "L. A."

(Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)

That is presumably for distribution.

Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.

That, incidentally, is the first time we knew that Washington had more than one code machine. We were curious about that point.

When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "haruna."

At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.

Burn all the codes which Telegraphic Official KOSAKA brought you.

That is the one you referred to initially, sir. In view of that and the fact that Washington's dispatch of 5 December [10594] refers back to that, it is quite evident, it appears to me, that Washington's destruction of part of their codes was the direct result of that dispatch from Tokyo of 2 December and had no connection whatsoever with any winds system message.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I refer you, Captain, to the language in there, "We have completed destruction of codes," and I agree with you that is in line with the message that you have read into the record here dated December the 2nd.

Captain KRAMER. The one of December 5, Senator, says, "Re your 867."

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. Which is the one of December 2?

Senator LUCAS. But isn't it a fact when they state:

But since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine—

in other words, this is Circular 2353—no, I am wrong on that. You are right and I am wrong.

Anyhow, this message of December the 5th definitely indicates that no additional winds execute message had been received or there would not have been any necessity for that.

Captain KRAMER. It certainly indicates that the Japanese embassy in Washington was not talking about, and presumably had received nothing, concerning any winds message.

[10595] Senator LUCAS. Well, if this had been a genuine winds execute message and had followed the advice given in Circular 2353 when it says, "When this is heard please destroy all code papers," there wouldn't be any necessity for them sending this message of December the 5th.

Captain KRAMER. I do not see that it would, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, Captain, we have spent a good long time about this so-called winds execute message and assuming that this winds execute message had been a genuine one, what would that have added to what you already had as far as the tenseness of the situation is concerned between Japan and this country?

Captain KRAMER. It would have added considerable to the already tense situation between Washington and this country because it would

have indicated a contemplated break with this country. To date and up until December 7, the time of the attack, there was still no indication that the Japanese definitely contemplated a complete break in relations with this country, to say nothing about the slightest indication of any intention to attack this country.

Senator LUCAS. Well, is the so-called execute winds message, if it had been a genuine one and if it had been understood, more important than the 14-point message?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; it is not.

[10596] Senator LUCAS. In other words, the so-called winds execute message did not say when war was going to break out?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. It did not say where war was going to break out?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Assuming Captain Safford's theory of this thing or his explanation is correct, all it said was, "War with United States," that is correct, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Not necessarily war, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I am assuming that his theory of this is correct, all that it said on that message was, "War with United States, war with England and peace with Russia." That is what he had on there.

Now, everybody knew at that time that has testified here, practically, that war was coming sooner or later with Japan, didn't they?

Captain KRAMER. From the general situation, yes, sir; that is true.

Senator LUCAS. Nobody knew when that message came in?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And nobody knew where the attacks were going to—where the Japs were going to attack the United States if they attacked us at all? [10597]

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; or that they would attack the United States. In fact, I am speaking from my own personal recollections, but I believe that it was the consensus of the opinion of my associates and many of the high officials in Washington, that it was very illogical and foolish on the part of Japan to undertake open warfare with the United States, that it was almost inconceivable that they would in view of the fact that it was very likely that they could get everything that they wanted and as they had got in French Indochina and what they wanted in the south of French Indochina, without any action being taken by the United States.

Senator LUCAS. Well, Captain Safford in his statement to the committee said this:

The Japanese were going to start the war on Saturday, December 6, 1941, or Sunday, December 7, 1941. The War and Navy Departments had been given 72 hours' advance notification of the attack on England and the United States by the Japanese themselves.

Assuming, sir, that Captain Safford's statement is absolutely correct, that there was this execute winds message and it said on it just what he contends that it says, is there any reason to deduce a statement of that kind, in your opinion, from that message?

[10598] Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir.

Senator LUCAS. There is one other question. You prepared a file for Secretary Forrestal?

Captain **KRAMER**. Yes, sir.

Senator **LUCAS**. You have said that you did not discuss with Safford at that time about the preparation of that file.

Captain **KRAMER**. In reply to that, Senator, I would like to refer to page 15 of Captain Safford's statement.

I do not believe that Captain Safford knew until some years after Pearl Harbor that I had prepared any such folder for Secretary Forrestal. When I returned to this country last spring and had some of my conversations with Captain Safford I told him specifically that only one folder had been prepared; no material from my section in the Navy Department had ever been presented before the Roberts hearing.

I testified, I believe, yesterday that during the course of the Roberts hearing I was curious on that point myself. I had no knowledge of whether these decryptions were being presented as evidence in that hearing. I asked my immediate superior, Captain McCollum, about that point. That was the first time I knew that they were being presented.

I was very curious about what safeguards were being maintained on the handling of that in that hearing. Captain McCollum was uncertain.

[10599] As regards the statement made in the bottom of page 15 of Captain Safford's statement, he says:

I had no responsibility in the matter after forwarding the original message to Admiral Noyes—

and this is the point particularly—

and after checking Kramer's "folder" to see that the messages were presented in a logical and understandable order.

At no time during all my duty in that section of Naval Operations do I have any recollection of my presenting a folder to Captain Safford for his checking my manner of presentation or being shown anything except what I showed him.

Senator **LUCAS**. That was your responsibility?

Captain **KRAMER**. Yes, sir.

Senator **LUCAS**. Not Safford's responsibility.

Captain **KRAMER**. That is correct, sir.

Senator **LUCAS**. Well, now, when you talked to Secretary Forrestal, according to Safford you told him that you discussed this message along with others with Forrestal for about 2 hours. Now, in that conversation was there anything ever said about this so-called controversial execute winds message?

Captain **KRAMER**. Captain Safford's statement in that regard is apparently a garbled recollection of our conversations of this past spring. I told him that I was in Secretary Forrestal's office not more than 15 or 20 minutes ex- [10600] plaining the general nature of the material in that folder. He read some of the things in my presence; Captain McCollum was also there. The folder was then left with him to study further since he had not customarily been seeing any of this traffic. On a few occasions he did see it.

One specifically I recall was when I was at Secretary Knox's desk while he was examining a folder and Mr. Forrestal came into the office. Secretary Knox called Mr. Forrestal over to point it out to

him; he let him read one of the particularly interesting items in the folder he was reading.

There was no winds message in that at all. There was the one referred to as the hidden-word message, which I specifically took pains to point out was an error in that it omitted the United States. That was one that appeared Sunday morning, 7 December 1941.

Senator LUCAS. But insofar as this message is concerned that is in controversy here and the one that Captain Safford claims that he saw and delivered to Noyes, that was not in the file and that was not discussed with Forrestal?

Captain KRAMER. No winds message of any nature or kind whatsoever was discussed with Mr. Forrestal. In fact, not even the nature or system by which that hidden-word message came was discussed with Mr. Forrestal, only the text of the messages themselves.

[10601] Senator LUCAS. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire, Captain.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, when I was questioning Captain Safford on the stand I asked him to give the names of those officers who might corroborate him as to the winds execute and in giving me those names he listed your name and then he also listed Colonel Bratton of the Army; he also listed Colonel Sadtler of the Army and while he was on the stand I read to him what Colonel Bratton had to say about it.

According to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in Top Secret Report at page 7 Colonel Bratton testified that no information reached him as to the break in relations shown by the winds message prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster December 7, 1941, and he does not believe anybody else in G-2 received such information. So much for Colonel Bratton.

I now go to the Army Pearl Harbor Board report dated October 6, 1944, at page 251. This is the testimony of the second witness, Colonel Sadtler, claimed by Captain Safford. [Reading:]

General FRANK. Go ahead.

Colonel SADTLER. We paid a great deal of attention to that message, and then when the directive came from Tokyo regarding the destruction of codes, that message [10602] began to assume some importance, or a great deal of importance.

General FRANK. That is, in the estimation of the people who were handling it?

Colonel SADTLER. That was in the estimation of General Miles, Colonel Bratton, and myself; others, maybe; I don't know.

On the morning of the 5th of December, Admiral Noyes, who was Chief of Naval Communications at that time, called me, about 9:30, with words to the effect, "Sadtler, the message is in." I asked him which one it was and he said he didn't know, but he thought it was the one that meant war between Japan and Great Britain. I asked him for the Japanese word, and he said he didn't know it, but to please tell G-2.

I went immediately to General Miles' office and told him that the word was in. He said, "Wait a minute, I will call Colonel Bratton," and in a very short while Colonel Bratton came into the office, and we sat down at General Miles' desk. There were General Miles, Colonel Bratton; some officer, I don't know who it was. I think he has since been identified as General Roderick, who is now dead; and myself.

I then reported what General Noyes had told me, [10603] and Colonel Bratton took out his little notebook, and he said, "Which one of these three words is it?" And I said, "I don't know, but Admiral Noyes says it is the one meaning war between Japan and Great Britain." "Well," he said, "do you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." I says, "I will go back and call Admiral Noyes on the secret phone."

I got Admiral Noyes, and he said, "I don't know," and I said, "can you verify it?" He said, "I can't do it right now, as I have to attend a meeting in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations," or some place, I don't know where; but he was unable to verify that at the time, "and," he says, "I will do it later." I says, "I think later will be too late." I went back to General Miles' office and told them that Admiral Noyes was unable to verify the word at that time, that he had to go to a meeting, but he was positive that it was the word meaning Japan and Great Britain, and it was the implementation of that "Winds" message. I would like to add here that my memory is a little bit faulty as to whether it was not Japan and Great Britain. It may have been Japan and Russia, but I am positive it was not Japan and the United States.

I went back to my office. Rather, General Miles [10604] said, "Well, I don't know what we will do. You keep on the lookout for anything that comes in and let us know just as soon as possible."

I went back to the office, and then I went down to see General Gerow, who was head of the War Plans, told him the effect of what Admiral Noyes had said, and didn't he think we should send a message to Hawaii. I don't mean Hawaii—to Panama, the Philippines, and Hawaii. He says, "I think they have had plenty of notification." And the matter dropped.

So much for Colonel Sadtler.

Captain, you have talked, as I understand it, to Captain Safford on a great many occasions. Do you know of any feeling between Captain Safford and Redman of the Navy? Was it Admiral Redman or Captain Redman?

Captain KRAMER. It was Captain Redman in 1941 and in 1942.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, Captain Safford has talked about orders from Redman in the week of December 14 and 15. He has spoken of Redman wanting publicity in connection with the trial in Chicago, with apparently some feeling as to Chicago, about his loving publicity. Do you know of any feeling between those two men or any reason for any ill feeling between them?

[10605] Captain KRAMER. Well, sir, in answer to that question I attended some conferences in late January of 1942 and in early February 1942 aimed at splitting up the three primary functions of the Communications Security Group, then under Captain Safford, into three subsections. Captain Safford was in charge of Section 20-G, known as the Communications Security Group.

One of its primary functions was the development, the preparation, and the dissemination of all United States Navy codes and ciphers. That function occupied a large part of the time of Captain Safford from my general understanding at that time because of the rapid expansion of the Navy at that time, particularly in view of the way developments were taking place in Europe. Among the things being developed were new U. S. Navy machines, cipher machines.

There were many conferences that I became aware of between Captain Safford and various manufacturers who were contracted to make parts of these machines. Without digressing into that function of Captain Safford's office any more, there was another function which was carried on on only a minor scale, namely, the policing function on our own use of Navy systems. It was a function that I first became aware of in 1935, when I went to sea after returning from Japan, although it had been carried on for years before that. It, among other things, required that every ship originating a code or cipher- [10606] ing a message had to send a copy of that message to the flagship of the fleet for checking as to violations of security measures.

As part of the function and competition in vogue in those days certain demerits were assigned in the Communications competition for

such violations. That function, that manner of activity, was still going on and was intensified—in 1941 and was intensified after the war between Japan and the United States broke out. That was another reason, I believe from these conferences, we had for splitting up Captain Safford's three functions.

A third reason was a desire on the part of the director to further intensify our efforts in the cryptanalytical field. Apparently the Director of Naval Communications felt that in view of the contemplated intensified efforts in these three functions the job now became too big for one individual, regardless of how remarkable his talents might be, to handle. Therefore, these conferences aimed a splitting up these functions into three subsections.

During the course of these conferences Captain Safford presented some papers giving his views on how to split up, on how the split-up should take place, and what officers should be in charge of the respective contemplated three subsections. He suggested himself to head the Communication Intelligence [10607] subsection engaged in cryptanalysis.

After these several conferences the final conclusion, whether by Captain Redman or by higher officers in naval operations, I do not know; in any case the decision was to put a Commander John Redman and a Commander Wenger in charge of that cryptanalytical section, to leave with Captain Safford as his primary function full charge of the continued development of our own naval codes and ciphers, which function I believe he continued to exercise at least during the early part of the war.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, the recommendation of Captain Safford as to his particular assignment was not given to Captain Safford as requested or recommended, but given to Commander Redmond?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. The son of Captain Redman?

Captain KRAMER. The younger brother of Captain Redman.

Mr. MURPHY. A younger brother?

Captain KRAMER. Who had had long communications experience.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he ever express any particular peeve to you over that?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall any particular expression along that line before my return from the Pacific last year [10608] There may have been; certainly there was during the course of these conferences an expression of his desire to head that section.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, he did say in his letter to you in the Pacific that both Redmans, both brothers, the Admiral and the Commander, both loved publicity, didn't he, that they were after publicity in Chicago?

Captain KRAMER. He said that, yes sir.

Mr. MURPHY. But did he ever use any stronger words or other words to indicate any feeling as to the Redmans, either one of them?

Captain KRAMER. No conversations along that line stand out in my mind although there may have been before my departure from Washington for the Pacific.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know if he had any grievances against—well, I withdraw that.

Who would be responsible for making that decision that he did not get the assignment that he desired? In the last analysis who would make the final decision? Would that be Admiral Stark?

Captain KRAMER. Normally such allocations as to duty in the Division of Naval Operations is made by the Director of that Division. I believe it is customary on occasion, however, to confer with the Assistant Chief of Naval Opera- [10609] tions on those issues, on those assignments.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, would Admiral Stark's office have the right to say "Yes" or "No" as to that?

Captain KRAMER. They most certainly would, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he ever express any feeling to you about Admiral Stark subsequent to his failure to get that assignment?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; he did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, did you have any information as to his—he said that for a long time he had a certain attitude toward what happened at Pearl Harbor and then he made a change. Did he ever tell you why he made the change?

Captain KRAMER. The first indication I had of what I might term bitterness on the part of Captain Safford toward any other officers in the Navy Department was Captain Safford's second letter to me.

Mr. MURPHY. That was the one I read in detail on the record?

Captain KRAMER. Dated, I believe, January 22, 1944.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. Now, then, you went to the hospital at Bethesda on the 28th of September 1945, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you had a visit from Captain Safford on October the 3rd, that is right, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Approximately that date, yes, sir.

[10610] Mr. MURPHY. What was the purpose of that visit?

Captain KRAMER. Quite frankly, Mr. Murphy, I was somewhat surprised at that visit. My relations with Captain Safford have been, I believe, cordial; I believe they still are. They have never been intimate to the extent of myself or my wife making social calls on Captain Safford and his wife. It was purely office and official contacts. That is part of the reason at my surprise at his visit to me at the hospital. It was not too surprising, however, inasmuch as he was a long-time acquaintance of mine.

We discussed a few things, not bearing on Pearl Harbor. We played a game of chess that evening. He brought me a box of chocolates, for which I thanked him, naturally.

He called again about 3 or 4 days later and picked up a book which he had left with me, a book of cartoons, on his first visit. Our conversations then were of the same character. We may have played a game of chess then, too. He was one of probably six or eight visitors I had during that first few weeks there.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate did you ever discuss Pearl Harbor with him while you were at the hospital?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; we did not because all our contact was in the company of other patients in the hospital.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I notice here a headline in a New York [10611] paper, "Key Pearl Harbor Witness Vanishes."

Captain KRAMER. I was made aware of that headline, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, can you tell us where you were on that particular day? This is a headline of the New York Journal-American of Friday, November the 9th, 1945. Where were you that day? Or at least it had reference to your vanishing. Did you leave the hospital?

Captain KRAMER. The day before, Mr. Murphy, my wife arrived in Washington from Florida. After one or two discussions with my doctors, and I believe on my request, I was permitted to what is termed "subsist" out of the hospital.

My wife contacted that afternoon the Red Cross in the hospital about locating a room near the hospital. We got such a room and stayed there that night. The following day, since it was several days before I had any appointment for further treatments, my wife and I went to Washington shopping. I got permission from the doctor before I left the hospital.

I learned on returning to the hospital the following morning from the nurse that on the previous afternoon there had been another visitor trying to see me. The visitor was described to me as a woman. From the description I could not determine who it might have been. It was that morning about 9:15 in the company of my wife at the hospital that I was preparing [10612] to leave the hospital again, having gotten the doctor's permission to do so, to go into town, when the medical officer in charge, Dr. Duncan, informed me that he had a phone call just then from the Navy Department to the effect that a Mr. Gearhart and Mr. Keefe were on their way out there to interview me. It was not until Mr. Keefe, I believe, explained to me that it was his secretary or someone from his office that had come out the day before that I first had any clue as to who my previous day's visitor was.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there have been statements in the press—and I am reading now from the New York Times of November the 12th, the byline of C. P. Trussel, a very able and distinguished writer for that great paper—there is a statement there that—

Navy Captain issues a denial that he had been beset and beleaguered; asserted that he was feeling very well and would appear before the committee prepared to state fully "anything I know that they may want to know."

Now, were you ever beset or beleaguered by anybody in regard to this case? And, if so, I think the committee are entitled to every detail.

Captain KRAMER. At no time have I been what is termed beset and beleaguered, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. There is a statement further in this article that—

Captain Kramer had been badgered and beset by an effort [10613] to breakdown his testimony.

Now, do you know of anybody and if you do I think we ought to have the details.

Captain KRAMER. That statement, sir, is false.

Senator LUCAS. Did Trussel make those statements?

Mr. MURPHY. No; Mr. Trussel is not making them himself but quoting a very distinguished gentleman, not the writer.

Mr. GEARHART. Name him. Don't hold it back.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I come to the Washington Times-Herald, the United Press.

Senator LUCAS. What is the date of that?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't know the date of this but it is current or about the same time as the New York Times. This is the Washington Times-

Herald and the only reason I think is pertinent to go into these matters is that the composite mind of America is influenced by **everything they** hear on this case and I think we ought to go into the whole story. I see here a statement:

I stand exactly on my statement that Kramer is being badgered and beset. Here is the most important witness in the investigation. He entered the Naval Hospital under orders. They took away his uniform, gave him pajamas, bath-robe and slippers. His meals were served in a ward from September 28 to the morning of [10614] November 7. I know that Kramer is chafing under this restraint.

Were you chafing under any restraint at the hospital?

Captain KRAMER. I was getting restless in the hospital because that was the longest hospitalization I had ever had. My previous hospitalizations in the Navy had never been of more than a few days duration.

In that respect I might refer back to about 15 years ago when I was operated on for tonsilectomy in the Navy Hospital in Boston. The normal period in such operations, I was informed, was to keep the patient in the hospital not less than a week. After 3 days following my operation I walked out of the hospital and returned to my ship. I again was "chafing," if you want to use that term, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I am just quoting from the paper, sir.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I now quote from the Washington Post, something by the Associated Press, that you were being—quoting a distinguished gentleman—that you were being badgered to—

change his original testimony, meaning he was being badgered to change his original testimony.

Had anybody asked you to change your original testimony?

Captain KRAMER. At no time during my hospitalization at Bethesda Naval Hospital has anything in connection with decryption or testimony been brought up in any conversation in which I engaged.

Mr. MURPHY. There is also a statement in this same piece from the Washington Post by the Associated Press, not that of the Associated Press writer, but that of a distinguished gentleman, that the Navy was holding you incommunicado.

Captain KRAMER. That statement is incorrect, sir.

I have previously indicated that I had a number of visitors, and I made some phone calls as well.

Mr. MURPHY. I am referring now to another story from another issue of the Washington Times Herald, an article by an able writer, Ted Lewis, in which he quotes another distinguished gentleman, other than the one who had made the previous statement, to the effect that there was a missing winds message of December 6, 1941, which purportedly showed that the Japs were committed to immediate attack.

You do not know anything about any message of December 6, do you?

Captain KRAMER. I do not, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I now quote from the Scranton Times of Scranton, Pa., United Press dispatch of November 7:

The Navy today denied Republican charges that a potential witness in the Pearl Harbor inquiry had been "broken in mind and body" and was being held incommunicado [10616] in a hospital psychopathic ward.

Were you broken in mind or body?

Captain KRAMER. I do not believe so, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You were in this room for several days were you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And under questioning by members of this committee yesterday morning and yesterday afternoon, this morning and this afternoon?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, when you were at the hospital, you were interviewed, were you?

Captain KRAMER. By Mr. Keefe and Mr. Gearhart, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you tell them what you know about this inquiry, and what facts you knew?

Captain KRAMER. Our discussions lasted approximately 4½ hours, interrupted in the early part of those discussions by some members of the press. I believe we covered most of my story that I had given in previous hearings and have given in this hearing in those conversations.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you feel you told them the truth at that time?

[10617] Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Is what you are telling today and told yesterday under oath different in any respect from what you told them at that time?

Captain KRAMER. In no respect whatsoever, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. My reason for going into this is, if there is one single individual who has approached you in any way, low or high, no matter who he is, in any way to attempt to influence your testimony, I think in fairness to yourself, and the members of this committee, we ought to know about it.

Was there ever any such person?

Captain KRAMER. There was never any such person, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, sir; I would like to review with you your testimony before the Hewitt inquiry. You stated at page 128:

The evaluation was normally done by Commander McCollum, the head of the Far Eastern Section, or Admiral Wilkinson, but I gave them the benefit of my opinion about it too.

Is that so?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You stated on page 129, that you had seen those two dispatches set forth on pages 154 and 155 of Exhibit 1. That would be Circular 2353 and Circular [10618] 2354, would it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you were asked if you had seen the dispatch marked "exhibit No. 3" from Alusna, Batavia, and you said:

I do not recall having seen that.

Which one was that? Would that be the one sent to the Pacific, or would that be the so-called Foote dispatch?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; it would be the dispatch from the United States Naval Liaison Officer stationed in Batavia.

Mr. MURPHY. And distinct from either 2353, 2354, and the so-called dispatch that we received by way of Admiral Hart?

Captain KRAMER. That is right, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. At page 130, you stated:

We were very interested in seeing any of this traffic after the thing was set up, which was about the end of November, but traffic did not appear in this system until the 7th of December and the latter part of December, 1941.

I take it at that time you were talking about the hidden word dispatches.

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Murphy, until I was shown a photostat of the hidden word message during Admiral Hewitt's hearing, I was still under the impression that the dispatch received [10619] Sunday morning was a winds message.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it not a fact that from December 7, 1941, down to the time you testified before Admiral Hewitt, you thought the December 7 dispatch was an execute of the winds code?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I take you to the bottom of page 130:

Captain KRAMER. That is correct. That refreshes my memory now. I remember now that you remind me of it, that these reams of plain language traffic that we were getting in, several weeks before Pearl Harbor, were searched for that indicator. That, however, I didn't recall specifically, because I didn't do the searching. It was done by the GY watch officers.

Admiral HEWITT. I believe that about the middle of the first week of December, there was a teletype message which, to the best of your recollection, one of the watch officers had in his possession and which was subsequently delivered to Admiral Noyes. Will you tell me about that to the best of your recollection?

Captain KRAMER. I previously testified on that matter at Pearl Harbor, Admiral. I would like to go over that previous testimony again in the light of thinking it over since [10620] that time.

I had no recollection of that message at the time it was first mentioned to me in the spring of 1944. However, after being given some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, I did recall a message some days before 7 December 1941, I believe about the middle of the week 1-7 December, and I do recall definitely being shown such a message by the GY watch officer and walking down with him to Captain Safford's office, and being present while the GY watch officer turned it over to him.

A brief conversation ensued, and Captain Safford then took it, I assumed, to Admiral Noyes, since that message we had all been on the qui vive about for a week or ten days.

That is the last I saw of such a message.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you recall what the general subject of the message was?

Now this is important. You speak up above about the one on December 7 and here, as I understand it, you are describing the one you saw with Safford.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you recall what the general subject of the message was?

Captain KRAMER. It was, as I recall it, a "winds" code message. The wording of it I do not recall. It may have been, "Higashi no kaze ame", specifically referring to the United States, as I have previously testified at Pearl Harbor, but I am less positive of that now than I believe I was at that time. The reason for revision in my view on that is the fact that in thinking it over, I have a rather sharp recollection in the latter part of that week of feeling there was still no overt mention or specific mention of the United States in any of this traffic, which I was seeing all of and which also was the only source in general of my information since I did not see, as a rule, the dispatches from the Fleet Commanders or going out to them from Operations.

Is your memory more clear now than it was then on that subject, or do you still feel the same way?

Captain KRAMER. I still feel the same way regarding the precise wording of that piece of teletype. I, however, [10622] am thoroughly convinced from my study of the papers in the last few days, in the last few weeks, that the United States did not appear on that thing. That is my current conviction.

At the time I was testifying in previous hearings I had not thought particularly about this. In fact, the first time that there was occasion to think about it at all was in preparing my reply to Captain Safford's first letter, in which there is no mention or reference to what country was involved.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, Admiral Hewitt then said to you:

Then it is still your belief, the best you can recall in view of that, there was no indication—

Captain KRAMER. I would like to continue that statement, Admiral, by saying: For that reason I am now at least under the impression that the message referred to England and possibly the Dutch rather than the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too.

Captain KRAMER. That is simply because I was unpositive, and still am unpositive, of the precise wording.

Mr. MURPHY. Then Admiral Hewitt says:

Or possibly it may have referred to Russia?

Captain KRAMER. I just don't recall.

Now Admiral Hewitt said:

[10623] Reference to one or more of the messages supplied by the FCC is in Exhibit 65. Can you recall whether any of those may have been seen by you?

Is it your recollection that you did or did not see any of those?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I saw some of those; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You said then:

Captain KRAMER. This document 1 is not a message and document 4 is the one of the 8th of December about midnight GMT. I may have seen these specific messages. I cannot be certain, however, because we saw a great many messages of this kind in looking for this particular type of "winds" code message. When we started monitoring all Japanese plain language some weeks before Pearl Harbor, the volume of material coming in was simply tremendous, swamping. We had only three linguists at the time for translation purposes, with a pretty heavy volume of coded traffic concerning the negotiations. Consequently, we felt the extra burden of having to scan all this Japanese plain language stuff and there were many instances of weather occurring in that, but because of the fact that the particular code thing we were looking for, we felt it was incumbent on us to examine it all. The reason I cannot state specifically that these particular ones were ones I had seen, but they were of the [10624] same nature as many I did see.

Then at the bottom of the page Admiral Hewitt said:

My understanding is that when that was first decoded, the word "minami," which related to the United States, was overlooked, so that the translation merely referred to England. Is that your recollection?

Captain KRAMER. Last summer when that question of the late morning of 7 December had come up at Pearl Harbor, my recollection had been that it was a "winds" message. It wasn't until I saw these exhibits yesterday afternoon—

and that would be sometime between May and July of 1945, would it not?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Your testimony was on Tuesday, May 22, 1945, so I take it that you saw the message on May 21, the day before.

Captain KRAMER. I believe that is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You said:

It wasn't until I saw these exhibits yesterday afternoon that my recollection was refreshed to the extent that I thought it was one of these hidden word messages rather than the "winds." I do recall on that that after my return from the

State Department near 10:30 the morning of 7 December, we had just had translated a message specifying the time of delivery of the 14-part [10625] note from the Japanese Government to the United States. That item, together with several other minor messages, one thanking the Ambassador for his services and another to the Embassy Staff and another directing final destruction of codes, all added up in my mind to a crisis to take place at 1 o'clock. Consequently, I was in very much of a hurry to get the word out. The books were made up in the course of a couple of minutes and as I was leaving the office, I looked at another short plain language message that had just come in, had just been brought in, and I recognized, as I recall it now, the first word in there as being a code word in this plain language text.

Now at that point, do we have here, or is it available, the plain language text of the Japanese message before translation?

Captain KRAMER. Here it is [indicating].

Mr. MURPHY. Now will you look at that just a minute please? The first word was "Koyanagi," was it not?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And if you will look at page 186 of Exhibit 1, "Koyanagi" was England, wasn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then there are several other words, "rijivori seirino-tugoo, arunituki," and then "hattori," and [10626] "hattori" meant "relations between Japan and (blank country) are not in accordance with expectation," is that not right?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely what it means, sir. If the committee is interested they, of course, may call a Japanese expert other than presumably myself, and refer to a dictionary which I have in front of me.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, the way it was set up for the Navy on page 187 was precisely "relations between Japan and (blank country) are not in accordance with expectation," is that not so?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely an exact translation, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, after "hattori," which was the general part, the next word is "minami," which means the U. S. A., is that right?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, at that time you said you dictated a translation of this particular message. Is that true?

Captain KRAMER. That is true, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And then you apparently, in your hurry, left with the translation as you thought it was at the time, having overlooked "minami" or the U. S. A. word.

Captain KRAMER. I did not overlook it exactly. I [10627] overlooked it to the extent of not identifying it as a code word. The plain text message, which this is, should be translated:

Please have director Koyanagi send a wire stating the sum which has been decided to be spent on the hattori minami memorial library in order that this business may be wound up—

and then the code indicated a stop.

Now in translating this message—the word "minami" I might explain is a very common word in the Japanese language. It simply means "south". In a hasty scanning of this message, without referring to the Japanese code list on this hidden word set-up, that message could be translated in the same way I have just read, except

that it could also mean, if it was not immediately apparent that "minami" was a code word:

Please have director Koyanagi send a wire stating the sum which has been decided to be spent on the hattori southern memorial library in order that this business may be wound up.

It was for that reason, the fact that that word "minami" fitted very well into a normal translation, did not stand out at the moment as a code word, that it was overlooked. The words "Koyanagi" and "hattori" are proper names in the Japanese language, which can readily immediately be distinguished from any ordinary Japanese word.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, upon examination of [10628] part 4 of the hidden word code set-up on page 187 you found that "minami" was a code word meaning "U. S. A."?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you did add in pencil on that particular paper that correction, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. On one copy of that particular write-up, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And that copy, did it have any more than just the word "minami," or did it have some of your writings?

Captain KRAMER. Just an insertion with the word "United States", and it was done with a view to sending around a corrected translation, which was not at all an infrequent occurrence, on the next dissemination of this material.

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering if Captain Safford saw that message with your handwriting in it "United States."

Captain KRAMER. I doubt if he did, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I think you will find from the evidence that he did, or at least he examined it later.

Captain KRAMER. Normally the copies of this traffic——

Mr. MURPHY (interposing). I do not mean on December 7, but at a subsequent time he saw the message.

Captain KRAMER. That is what I am referring to. [Continuing:]—were destroyed, except the numerical file copy for reference, and occasionally one, and at one [10629] time during 1941, two other copies which we retained for cross-references by subjects.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, when you translated this message which would then say that relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations on the 7th of December, you immediately put that into the pouch and took that to the addressees, did you not, the receivers of the pouch?

Captain KRAMER. That first version; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then subsequently you made a phone call saying there would be a correction adding the translation of the word "minami"?

Captain KRAMER. My memory on that point is not very clear. That, too, was not an unusual thing to do. I made frequent phone calls, and in fact every time I started delivery prior to leaving the office I made a number of phone calls to locate recipients. There were a number of times that I specifically recall during 1941 when I made calls indicating corrections, whether major or minor.

My recollection on this thing is that when I first noted it I did make two or three phone calls indicating that the United States should be included in that.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, the force and effect of it had been considerably lessened by the delivery of the 1 o'clock message to the recipients of the pouch before you [10630] had discovered that "minami" was a code word?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that was my impression at the time, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now what puzzles me is, that here is a message that is a hidden word message on the 7th, and it immediately comes to you and it immediately is distributed to all of the receivers of the pouches, and I am wondering why the difference was made between that one of the 7th and why there was this treatment of this other one of the 5th which would go direct to Noyes.

Captain KRAMER. When this so-called hidden word system was set up, the first knowledge of which we had, I believe, in early December, it was so involved by comparison with the winds system, which was extremely simple in nature and character, there were so many code words involved, that no special provision was made to handle it. It would have required, in view of the complicated character of this by comparison with the winds thing, processing like our other coded traffic.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it not a fact, Captain, that the cards that were distributed to Noyes and the others had the code words from the messages of 2353 and 2354?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. They did not, however, have the code words [10631] of—

Captain KRAMER (interposing). They had the translations of those code words.

Mr. MURPHY. The translations. They did not have the word "minami," which meant "U. S. A." or the word "kodama," which meant "Japan", or the word "Koyanagi", which meant England, or the word "hattori", which meant "relations between Japan and (blank country) are not in accordance with expectation"?

Captain KRAMER. Absolutely not, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So then, if they got a message which purported to be an intercept and it was under the hidden word code, and they were to make any comparisons at all they would not know whether it was a real execute under that code because they did not have that translated?

Captain KRAMER. I do not see how they could possibly have gotten anything under this hidden word system in other than the pouch I delivered to recipients.

Mr. MURPHY. I do not know that they did. I am just talking about Noyes.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now the message that was delivered to Noyes, is it your recollection that the Japanese words as such were delivered to him or an English translation of the words?

[10632] Captain KRAMER. My recollection and understanding is that the piece of teletype which I saw was taken by Captain Safford to Admiral Noyes' office.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you recall my reading from Sadtler's testimony, that he wanted to know what word was used?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And I take it from that that he apparently had certain Jap words such as "kita" and the other words from the winds code. Do you know whether they were furnished the Japanese or English?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know, sir, what Admiral Noyes phoned to him.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, so far as your testimony goes, you state that it is your best recollection that you did not see a message, which was a winds intercept, referring to the United States?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I never did.

Mr. MURPHY. And are you able to state "yes" or "no" to the question as to whether or not, on December 4, 5—let me change that—on December 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 you delivered any message in any pouch which would be a winds intercept to the White House and the other recipients showing a break in relations, negotiations, either one of those two, between Japan and the United States?

[10633] **Captain KRAMER.** I can categorically state, sir, that no message in the winds system was delivered in any pouch which I brought to the recipients of this material.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, let me ask you just one final question.

If you will refer, Captain, to Exhibit 1, at page 226—do you have a copy of Exhibit 1?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. There is a message from Tokyo to (Circular) 3 December 1941, "Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE)"—which means "hidden words," and "INGO DENPO," which means "hidden words," too, doesn't it?

Captain KRAMER. "DENPO" means "telegram."

Mr. MURPHY. That is important, for this reason, that in setting up the hidden word code on page 186 of Exhibit 1 they refer to "INGO DENPO" as "hidden word" and that would be the hidden telegram, is that it?

Captain KRAMER. "IN" means "hidden," "GO" means "word," and "DENPO" means "telegram."

Mr. MURPHY. Now, on page 226 they speak of "INGO HIKAE." Would that mean one would be by telegram and the other would be by voice?

Captain KRAMER. There is no distinction of that kind that I am aware of, sir. I am uncertain offhand as to the reason for the discrepancy between those two. "HIKAE" might [10634] be an inaccurate recovery of the code group applying to that, and this circular may have been sent in a quite different system from the earlier one.

Mr. MURPHY. Now these two messages then on page 226:

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE) (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment—

and then the next one from Tokyo to Vancouver:

Please retain the "hidden meaning" codes and the codes to be used in conjunction with radio broadcasts until the last moment—

would that indicate to you the possibility, and the ability of Tokyo to broadcast to London by the PA-K2 code any message they wanted to about relations between the two countries not being in accordance with expectations?

Captain KRAMER. These two dispatches do not refer to the so-called PA-K2. That was still another system which the Japanese referred to, I believe, by the name "O" or "Oite".

Mr. MURPHY. Will you get the original, Mr. Masten, and have it here?

You think it is "O", is that right? You think it would be the code "O", or "Oite"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In that connection, if it is "Oite" I would like to refer you to page 216, a dispatch from Bern [10,635] to Ankara. In that case it says:

Orders have been issued to our diplomatic officials in North America (including Manila), Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas (including Timor), Singora, Chienmai, and to all our officials in British (including our Embassy in London) and Netherlands territory to inform me immediately upon the burning of all their telegraphic codes except one copy of Oite "L."

So if it is "Oite" they could still get the broadcast about the break in relations, could they not, on the code referred to on page 226?

Captain KRAMER. There are three codes involved, Mr. Murphy: The Oite, the L, which we knew as LA, and the hidden word code, which had been set up only a few days previously.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. Well, do you know of any reason why, on December 3, 4, and 5, Tokyo could not broadcast to England, as well as to all other places, a message to the effect, by international Morse or by what you call Kani Morse, or by any other system of communication generally used, the fact that relations were in danger?

Captain KRAMER. I do not have any first-hand knowledge of what systems were actually held or burned by the Japanese Embassy in London. From this dispatch which you have read on page 216, however, it is apparent to me that Japan [10,636] could have sent via either of these code systems or via the hidden words system indications of any disruption in relations to England.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that on the 7th of December Japan did send such a message, did it not, referring to England? I refer you now to page 251, from Tokyo to (Circular Telegram), 7 December 1941:

(plain Japanese language using code names) Circular #2494, Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

Captain KRAMER. That was a circular telegram which could very well have included England; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean as a recipient?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; as a recipient.

Mr. MURPHY. But it did refer to relations between Japan and England on the 7th of December?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster being absent, Congressman Gearhart is recognized.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, there are certain respects in which your testimony coincides completely with that of Captain Safford, is that not correct?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that is the case, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain Safford testified that on the 4th [10637] of December 1941 you appeared before him at his office with a yellow teletype paper in your hands and said to him "This is it." To that extent your testimony is in agreement, is it not?

Captain KRAMER. Except for the date in my present conviction on the matter; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. What is your present conviction?

Captain KRAMER. That incident occurred on the morning of 5 December.

Mr. GEARHART. Not the 4th?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. I explained, I believe, yesterday afternoon the reason for the confirmation of my conviction on that is that was an examination of our directives to our outposts in the western Pacific and Asia on destruction of codes. That showed the dispatches were drafted, as indicated by the date time group on the dispatch on the afternoon of 4 December. I specifically have had my memory refreshed by these things on that point, because I do have a definite recollection of the fact that those dispatches were drafted, the first two, I think, by Admiral Noyes in his office in my presence while he was examining a folder which included the directive from Japan to the Western Hemisphere to burn and destroy certain systems.

There was nothings "winds" whatsoever connected therewith.

[10638] **Mr. GEARHART.** Is that the only reason why you think that the date was the 5th instead of the 4th, the fact that Admiral Noyes was writing these messages directly to our outlying positions to destroy their codes, code machines and particular papers, and you do not remember that contemporaneously with the preparation of those orders there had been any discussion of a winds message, is that it?

Captain KRAMER. Until I saw those dispatches quite recently and read parts of the so-called Navy Narrative prepared by Lieutenant Commander Baecher, in which there is quoted some of the Army testimony bearing on this point of the date, I was still uncertain as to the precise date that this incident occurred.

Mr. GEARHART. But you did not indicate in any of your previous testimony that there was any uncertainty in your mind until you came here to testify?

Captain KRAMER. I invariably indicated that there was uncertainty as regarding the date that incident occurred. My mind was only refreshed on that point when I saw this series of our directives, and—

Mr. GEARHART (interposing). Then the only basis—

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness finish his answer, please.

Mr. GEARHART. Is there anything further you wanted to say, Captain?

[10639] **Captain KRAMER.** I do not think it is material. I have given what I was about to say already, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now is the only basis for your saying that it was the 5th, instead of the 4th, that you remember distinctly the sending out of the code destruction method, and you remember distinctly that preceding that there was no discussion of a winds message, is that it?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is the only basis for it?

Captain KRAMER. That is the only basis. That was testimony taken from the Army inquiries that fixed positively the date in my mind; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you want us to understand that your memory 5 years later is better than it was shortly after the event, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. I do not want to create that impression, sir, I never have created, or intended to create, that impression.

Mr. GEARHART. Your attention has been called to the fact that a certain message was sent out by direction of Admiral Noyes to destroy codes, which had been prepared by Captain Safford.

Captain KRAMER. They were prepared in final form, I believe, by Captain Safford; yes, sir.

[10640] Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Now for the first time you remember that those messages were sent out at a date different from the date upon which there was discussion of the winds message?

Captain KRAMER. I recall no discussion of any winds message, sir, except the few words exchanged with Captain Safford and the GY watch officer, and a few remarks I may have made on the date the winds message was received in the process of disseminating the folders of other decrypted traffic.

Mr. GEARHART. And now, after 5 years, you are positive that those two subjects were on different days. Now will you tell me why it was on the 5th that the winds message was discussed rather than on the 4th?

Captain KRAMER. I have never been positive of the date, sir. I stated—

Mr. GEARHART (interposing). Well, you mean—

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness finish his answer.

Mr. GEARHART. Go ahead.

Captain KRAMER. I stated that my memory was refreshed only in the last few days as to the date, and that is my current conviction, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And are you positive today?

Captain KRAMER. I am positive only to the extent that these things I have mentioned refresh my memory, sir.

[10641] Mr. GEARHART. Well, there is nothing to refresh your memory in respect to the date when the winds message was received. There is no record you have been able to look at. You simply say it was the 5th because it was not the 4th, is that it?

Captain KRAMER. That is not quite it, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. All right, name one paper that refreshes your memory in respect to the discussion of the winds message. Upon what do you base your conviction of today?

Captain KRAMER. On the relative times of occurrence of this incident in Admiral Noyes' office when he drafted these dispatches and I received this piece of teletype paper containing the words which might have been the winds message.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. I know that you have the evidence of the messages that were sent forth to destroy the codes and code machines and secret papers, you have refreshed your memory on that occurrence, but tell me from what record do you refresh your memory in respect of the day when the winds code message was received.

Captain KRAMER. On the basis of no record whatsoever, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you want us to understand that that is purely memory bestirred after five years of discussion to the contrary, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. My first recollection of this incident [10642] in Admiral Noyes' office was only after I saw those four dispatches which we sent out directing our destruction of codes. At that time my memory was refreshed to that extent.

I might remark in that regard, sir, that my memory has been refreshed on a number of other details connected with this hearing—

Mr. GEARHART. (interposing). I am only asking about one thing now.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness finish his answer.

Captain KRAMER (continuing). Concerning events taking place about the time of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. GEARHART. Has anybody pointed out to you that it might be in corroboration of Captain Safford's testimony that when they received the winds code they immediately prepared the code destruction notices and that, therefore, you better put it on a subsequent day?

Captain KRAMER. Will you repeat that question?

Mr. GEARHART. Has anybody suggested that to you recently?

The CHAIRMAN. What was that question?

Mr. GEARHART. Read it, Mr. Reporter.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Gearhart, no one has pointed out anything to me at any time concerning the matter you just [10643] mentioned. My current conviction, based on refreshing due to examination of these dispatches, was my own personal conviction, not due to pointing out or discussions with anyone, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now the winds message was being watched for, wasn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Everybody having to do with the interception of the messages was on his toes, very alert, looking for the winds message?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that was the case, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And you received a message which related to the possibility that it was a winds message that came on the teletype paper and you went in and said to Captain Safford, "This is it"?

Captain KRAMER. It was far more than a possibility in my mind, sir. The fact is it was a conviction in my mind at that time, that the words appearing on that piece of teletype paper coincided precisely with what was called for by this winds system. That could very well be, since it was very simple Japanese language, which might well be used in any normal weather broadcast.

[10644] Mr. GEARHART. When you were on your toes, alert, looking for this message, and were at the time convinced that it was the message, convinced at the time that it contained the words directly pointing to the United States, how do you explain the fact after 5 years your conviction today is to the contrary?

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Gearhart, I have never been of the positive conviction that that piece of teletype paper referred to the United States. My statement as to the wording of that is hazy. It has always

been hazy. My contact with that was only for a few seconds duration. If it had referred to the United States, I am fairly certain that it would have impressed itself on my memory.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, you had been looking for this paper for a long time. You had it in your own hands. You looked at it, and you said after reading it, "This is it." Do you mean to say that you weren't convinced at that moment that it was it?

Captain KRAMER. I certainly was convinced that it was it to the extent of being the first thing that we had seen which was believed by me and by the GY watch officer was something in that hidden word—rather in that winds system. That, purely, and simply, is what I meant by this expression which I apparently used. I have no positive [10645] recollection of using that expression, incidentally.

Mr. GEARHART. You have no positive recollection of having said, "This is it"?

Captain KRAMER. I have repeatedly so testified.

Mr. GEARHART. You have testified in this hearing that it was the expression you used, haven't you?

Captain KRAMER. I have stated I may well have said that. I have no positive recollection of having said it.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, will you tell us why, when you had been waiting for this paper for a long time, when you read it, and you felt it was a winds message, why you didn't make out any file for it?

Captain KRAMER. Of this approximately quarter of a mile of plain language traffic that we had been receiving for a week or 10 days past, there is no record that I am aware of that was ever maintained on all that traffic.

The only record I kept in my section, section GZ, was of broken-down messages by the decrypters, or in the case of plain language papers that were sent in to my section for translation, every one of those papers were filed.

I am fairly certain every one of those papers will now be found in the files of the Navy Department.

Mr. GEARHART. The paper you had been waiting for, the paper you thought was the paper you had been waiting for, [10646] the one you took to Captain Safford, you made no file out for it?

Captain KRAMER. Made no file of anything, sir, except what came in to my section. That did not come in to my section. There were specific provisions made why it should not have come in to my section. I do not believe, sir, that any record was kept by the GY section of any of that plain language traffic coming in either.

Mr. GEARHART. Who was this watch officer that brought it to you?

Captain KRAMER. To the best of my recollection it was a Lieutenant Murray, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was he in your section?

Captain KRAMER. He was in the adjacent section, GY.

Mr. GEARHART. The missing file 7001 is a file that might have been filled by paper that came in during the first week in December; is that right?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. What was the last you saw of this teletype yellow sheet of paper?

Captain KRAMER. The last I saw of that piece of teletype paper was when I left Captain Safford's office.

Mr. GEARHART. It was then in his possession?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10647] **Mr. GEARHART.** At the time, as you have testified, you considered that message to be the winds execute?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

I might amplify that remark, as I believe I have previously testified, that that is the first occasion I know of where I left my office and accompanied a GY watch officer to Captain Safford's office. It was primarily for the purpose of confirming with Captain Safford the language appearing on that piece of teletype paper.

The watch officer himself had instructions on how to handle anything coming in in that particular winds system.

Mr. GEARHART. Why did he bring it to you?

Captain KRAMER. He did not bring it to me, sir. As he was passing the door of my office, he noted that I was in and he called me to the door to confirm his interpretation of what appeared on that piece of teletype.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you read it carefully to confirm his interpretation, and you don't remember anything about it now?

Captain KRAMER. I do not, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you weren't too much help to him in reading it, were you, then?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I was of some help at the time, sir. I saw that paper for only a few seconds. All [10648] these other things which my section handled, I saw from six or eight to two or three dozen times. I read and studied them carefully in order to be familiar with what the recipients were reading when I was present while they were reading.

Mr. GEARHART. He asked you for the purpose of checking himself, asked you to read it with care and to see if he interpreted it correctly.

In the days gone by, you remembered that it contained words referring to the United States, and now you are uncertain because the paper was in your hands so fleetingly?

Captain KRAMER. In days gone by, sir, I have never definitely remembered that piece of teletype as referring to the United States. I have never recalled, and still do not recall, the precise wording of that piece of teletype.

Mr. GEARHART. And upon that you are sure and you are willing to say that you never testified that it did refer to the United States?

Captain KRAMER. My first reaction when that question was first propounded to me during the course of Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry was having in mind very well the expressions involved and in view of the fact that we had been engaged in a serious war for 2 years with Japan, that, of course, it was the United States.

[10649] Later on in that hearing, however, I indicated in reply to another question that the only thing involving the United States in all this decrypted traffic was the disclosure at the end of November to Berlin wherein they used the expression "Anglo-Saxon," which included the United States, presumably.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, a question has been raised as to whether or not there was any reason behind the winds message being sent by directional broadcast to London 2 or 3 days before the actual breaking out of hostilities.

Can you think of any reasons why the Japanese would want London advised in advance of the event and would take great chances possibly of exposing their hand to advise London?

Captain KRAMER. I believe, sir, that it would have been an illogical thing to do.

Mr. GEARHART. A what?

Captain KRAMER. An illogical thing to do.

Mr. GEARHART. You can't think of any reason why London, that is, the Japanese Embassy in London, would want to know in advance?

Captain KRAMER. In view, Mr. Gearhart, of the stringent security measures imposed by the Japanese military on all their moves connected with the outbreak of war between Japan [10650] and England and the United States, I very much doubt it.

Mr. GEARHART. I direct your attention to intercept No. 1410, which appears on page 234 of Exhibit 1, the message from Berlin to Tokyo, December 4, 1941, translated December 5, 1941:

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London—

That would seem to indicate that Berlin was expecting evacuation and war, wouldn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Not necessarily war, sir. We ourselves had evacuated all of our language officers from Tokyo in August of 1941.

Mr. GEARHART. That is probably another explanation, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. War is still another possibility, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. That would be a matter of personal deduction, if you wanted to stretch this thing to that meaning, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is no more of a stretch than the other, is it?

Captain KRAMER. By that token, you could stretch our evacuation of our language officers from Tokyo as meaning we intended to go to war with Japan.

[10651] Mr. GEARHART. It says:
evacuation by the members of our Embassy.

That means all, doesn't it?

Captain KRAMER. I don't see that it does, sir. We evacuated members of our Embassy, namely, the language officers.

Mr. GEARHART. This doesn't say anything about part of the members, but it says "the members." A fair interpretation of that, even to an Intelligence officer, is that it would mean all, wouldn't it?

Captain KRAMER. You could put that extreme interpretation on it; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, let's go on:

In the case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others—

And they are named in the message.

—stay here. Please do your best to this end.

That is from Berlin.

Now, there is a possible direct reason, is there not, why London should know before the breaking out of hostilities, because after the breaking out of hostilities there would be no chance to evacuate any members of the Japanese Embassy in London, would there?

[10652] Captain KRAMER. Presumably not.

Mr. GEARHART. They would be immediately interned, would they not?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. So there is a reason given right here, given in the intercept, why London should be advised in order to accomplish a purpose before it was too late; is that not true?

Captain KRAMER. I would invite your attention, Mr. Gearhart, to the following message.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right; but we are talking about this one first.

In that message we have been discussing, the one I have just read, is contained a possible reason why London should be advised before the outbreak of hostilities, isn't there?

Captain KRAMER. Not necessarily hostilities. It might be the breaking of diplomatic relations, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Diplomatic relations does not mean internment, does it?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, then, they could go on and evacuate their men if it was just a breach of diplomatic relations?

Captain KRAMER. Not necessarily. They would be dependent then, presumably, on special arrangements for shipping.

[10653] Mr. GEARHART. That is right, unless they had arranged to take their people off the island by the German submarines?

Captain KRAMER. That is possible, of course, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, in all fairness—now, I am not asking you to strain your conclusions—in all fairness, if the Japanese wanted to get some people off the British Isles, and over to Berlin before the outbreak of hostilities, that would be a reason for a directional broadcast of a winds message 3 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. You could put such a construction on that, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, it has been testified that any directional broadcast from Tokyo to London could be heard on the East Coast of the United States; is that not so?

Captain KRAMER. I am not familiar with the technicalities of what could be heard or not heard in various parts of the world.

Mr. GEARHART. You were present in this room when testimony was given that because of atmospheric conditions, natural phenomena, scientific consequences, that a directional broadcast from Tokyo to London could be and would be heard on the Atlantic Coast of the United States?

[10654] Captain KRAMER. I heard that testimony, sir, and I am in general familiar with the subject of communications as a line officer in the Navy, and also with the difficulties which we had at various times with our own intercept set and the reallocation of certain monitoring stations to cover certain circuits, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. If that were the consequence of that kind of a directional broadcast, the Japanese would know it, their scientists would know it there, just as ours here?

Captain KRAMER. Presumably; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It seems, by the next message, that Tokyo wanted to get some people out of the United States before hostilities broke out.

The next message reads:

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
5 December, 1941.
Re your #1245

Will you please have Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of days.

In that message you see a possible reason why Tokyo wanted the United States to know that relations with the United States were failing and were about to end; isn't that correct? Isn't that a fair conclusion?

[10655] Captain KRAMER. That is a possible conclusion, sir.

However, there are many movements of diplomatic officials disclosed by this traffic to us. In fact, every transfer of a Japanese diplomatic official was as a result of instructions of this kind. Referring back to page 227 of this exhibit, in a message from Washington to Tokyo dated 3 December, Washington apparently objects to detaching Secretary Terasaki.

The message is incomplete. Apparently badly garbled. Presumably there had been prior discussion in this traffic which we had not read because of its not being picked up, or other reasons, concerning the movement of Secretary Terasaki.

This one that you have just read, of 5 December, apparently is a later message bearing on the subject of evacuation—not evacuation—but the transfer or movement of Terasaki and certain other people, and the officials.

Mr. GEARHART. I was merely asking you the possibility. I don't care to pursue it any further.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain, I am not going to speak to you about the winds message for a while. We will take a [10656] rest on that message.

Captain KRAMER. Thank you, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to show you a message in Exhibit 1, No. 904, page 245. Are you familiar with that message?

Captain KRAMER. I am, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first see that message?

Captain KRAMER. I believe on Saturday evening, 6 December 1941, sir. It was translated, as indicated at the bottom, on the 6th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Now, was that message delivered to the Secretary of the Navy and the President on the evening of the 6th?

Captain KRAMER. I am quite certain, sir, that that was included in the folder delivered that night.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, just read that message, will you? I want to ask you some questions about it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Read it aloud for the record, Captain.

Captain KRAMER (reading) :

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
#904.

[10657] Re My #902

There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or other person.

Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that message, "In re my #902" referred to the long diplomatic reply to Secretary Hull's message of the 26th?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What interpretation did you give this message that they were to use no typist on it, they were to do it personally, themselves, and to "be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy"?

I want you to consider that at the same time you had a pilot message indicating that this 902 was to be delivered when a certain time was given to them here in Washington.

How do you interpret this message?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recollect precisely my reaction to this thing, sir. It was included, however, as I told you in the folders delivered that night with the first 13 parts of the note. I believe my reaction at the time was that the note itself was of a much more serious nature than previous notes forwarded to this country.

Senator FERGUSON. You had read the 13 parts, had you?

[10658] Captain KRAMER. I believe I had read part of the 13 parts at the time this came in. I believe this came in while we were still writing up the 13 parts.

Senator FERGUSON. Before they went to the White House had you read the 13 parts?

Captain KRAMER. Before I went to the White House I had; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you come to the conclusion that the end had come as far as relations between the United States and Japan were concerned?

Captain KRAMER. There was certainly a strong possibility of that; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a possibility?

Captain KRAMER. Well, perhaps a probability.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't this message, that they were to be sure and not use a typist or any other person on it, together with the pilot message, indicate to you that the time had come when negotiations were ended?

Captain KRAMER. I believe my reaction at the time was, particularly after reading most of the note, that negotiations which had been going on were ended, yes, sir; but as regards the interpretation or construction to be put on this cautionary message, 904, the Japanese Embassy in Washington had previously in very strong language [10659] been cautioned on security, particularly in the spring of 1941 when quite categorical orders were sent from Tokyo to the Japanese ambassador in Washington that no one except himself and his Counsellor of Embassy was to handle a certain code.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at one time the messages indicated that they knew that we were breaking their code; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. As a result of their investigation in the spring of 1941, they concluded that we were reading something. We did not know, and do not know to this date, what they found out at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that, but you had indications that they knew that you were breaking the code and reading messages; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. Breaking some code, yes, sir, because one of their messages so stated.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, their method then, to keep you from, or to slow you down on reading their code, was to change the cipher, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. Was to change a cipher they suspected our reading.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[10660] Captain KRAMER. In that connection, sir, there were a number of incidents, not only during 1941, but during 1940, when they cancelled codes arbitrarily as soon as they had the first inkling or suspicion that we were reading their code.

A code which we designated as AJ-12, in my recollection, I have not seen the message since those days, I remember Japan cancelling arbitrarily, because as I recall that message, they suspected that the British and the Dutch, I believe, were reading that system.

In, I think it was May of 1941, one of their systems, a naval system in this case, was compromised by a search of narcotic agents in San Francisco. Within 24 hours of the time that search was made, a report had been made to Tokyo about this search and Tokyo had issued instructions to cancel it at once.

Senator FERGUSON. There is nothing unusual about the changing of ciphers so that someone can't read your code, is there?

Captain KRAMER. Not at all, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that saves you at times changing your code book, isn't that true, by changing your cipher?

Captain KRAMER. That was the usual practice.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it takes some time to get back [10661] into stride, as it were, to get the cipher, and then you can decode again, but if they change again on you, you have the same trouble? Isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I notice in reading your testimony of yesterday that you didn't mention this 904 as being taken to the White House and the Secretary of the Navy the night before.

Captain KRAMER. I was not questioned on that point, sir. That night, however, there were probably five or six messages in the folders distributed.

Senator LUCAS. Will you tell us what five or six messages were in the folders the night you left the 13 parts at the White House?

Captain KRAMER. This is the first time that question has been propounded, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I am not going to repeat, if I can help it.

Captain KRAMER. I would presume, without having made a study of this traffic to determine that point, that you ask, that my file numbers 7142 through 7149 were distributed that night.

Senator FERGUSON. What book have you got? You are reading from another book?

[10663] Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Four one what?

Captain KRAMER. I will correct that 7143, which was the note.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the 13 parts?

Mr. MURPHY. The JG number is at the bottom of the page.

Senator FERGUSON. What other numbers—7144?

Captain KRAMER. Presumably numbers 7143 through 7149, sir. I recall distinctly that one of the messages in that folder was on the Tokyo-Berlin circuit, or vice versa. I have made no study of this file to determine the particular point you are bringing up, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you have a conversation with the aide at the White House?

Captain KRAMER. A brief one; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was said?

Captain KRAMER. The general tenor of our conversation was to the effect that there was something of high importance in that pouch, which the President should see as soon as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall who the aide was?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall his name, sir, but it was one of the junior officers which Captain Beardall [10663] had on duty in that office he set up.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether it was Schmidt?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot be sure, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know a man named Schmidt?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall him now, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he the same man as you delivered the 14th part and the 1 o'clock message to the following morning?

Captain KRAMER. I again do not know who the man was. The delivery, however, was made to the Situation Room in the White House where these men were on watch.

Senator FERGUSON. The Situation Room was merely a map room was it not?

Captain KRAMER. A map room and a file of considerable classified material including dispatches from the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't this true, that that was one of the few times that you left a message there? As a rule you waited until it was read, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. There were only two occasions, sir, one subsequent to Pearl Harbor, but one occasion prior to Pearl Harbor, when I took material directly into the President, and that occurred in the late summer or early fall of 1941. At other times delivery was made to the naval [10664] aide.

There was a short period during the summer when there was no naval aide, and Admiral McIntyre, the Surgeon General of the Navy, acted in that capacity.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, what was the occasion that you took it in to the President personally?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall just what was in the dispatches, sir, but it was something bearing on these negotiations which I might characterize as "hot" and I felt the President should see at once, and Admiral McIntyre was not available to take charge of this particular pouch and I did not entrust it to Mr. Roosevelt's private secretary to take.

Senator FERGUSON. Being that "hot" you can't recall it? As you say, it was so "hot" you wanted to take it in personally?

Captain KRAMER. My principal purpose, Senator, was to see that the President got it promptly, and it was of sufficient importance to see that he did get it promptly. It probably concerned some negotiations to take place the following morning. That may have been the "hot" aspect of it.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't consider this 13th part as "hot" then, because you left that with an assistant; [10665] is that true?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I left that with an assistant, yes, sir, but I further stated during this brief conversation that I had learned in phoning to Admiral Wilkinson's home, that Admiral Beardall was there, and I stated that undoubtedly Admiral Beardall would check up later in the evening to see whether the President had yet received it, presuming that if he had not, Admiral Beardall himself would then come down to the White House to see that he did see it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you tell the aide that?

Captain KRAMER. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. So the aide was instructed that if he didn't get it to the President, that Admiral Beardall would check up later in the evening?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever learned as to whether or not Admiral Beardall did check up with the President as to whether or not he got that 13th part, and this 904?

Captain KRAMER. I know, sir, only that I informed Admiral Beardall when I arrived at Admiral Wilkinson's home of the instructions I left with his assistant in the White House. I do not know what further action Admiral Beardall took.

[10666] Senator FERGUSON. You never learned later?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there wasn't any doubt that Admiral Beardall was not the appraiser or the evaluator of these messages, the President received these messages and he evaluated them personally, so far as you know.

Captain KRAMER. Presumably Admiral Beardall did do evaluating, but undoubtedly the President had evaluations from many other high officials too.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were these delivered to Beardall for the President, or to Beardall for Beardall? Who was getting these messages?

Captain KRAMER. They were intended for the President, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't it your understanding that the President was personally receiving these raw messages to place his own evaluation on?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was why you told the aide in charge on Saturday night, that he was to give it to him, and it was important and that you would speak to Beardall later about it?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, before you went to the White House, did you telephone the White House? [10667]

Captain **KRAMER**. No, sir; I did not. I had prior to setting up of that Situation Room. After that was set up, I knew it was manned 24 hours, there was no need to phone.

Senator **FERGUSON**. So you went to the White House knowing that there would be someone in the map room, or Situation Room, and would see him without calling.

Now, who did you call before you left the Navy Department?

Captain **KRAMER**. I attempted to call Admiral Stark's home, Admiral Turner's home. I didn't succeed in reaching either of those people. I called my own home, requested my wife to bring the car down to expedite delivery that night.

I called Captain McCollum at his home in Alexandria.

I called Secretary Knox's apartment at the Wardman Park hotel. And after making all these calls, I then called Admiral Wilkinson to inform him of whom I had been able to contact and what I proposed to do in the way of delivery.

Senator **FERGUSON**. Now, Admiral Stark, next to the President, was in charge in the Navy?

Captain **KRAMER**. Yes, sir.

Senator **FERGUSON**. The Commander in Chief, and then [10668] Admiral Stark?

Captain **KRAMER**. Yes, sir.

Senator **FERGUSON**. In the line of orders, the Secretary of the Navy came in between—

Captain **KRAMER**. Yes, sir.

Senator **FERGUSON**. In a certain way.

Captain **KRAMER**. Yes, sir.

Senator **FERGUSON**. But the highest ranking officer was Admiral Stark; is that correct?

Captain **KRAMER**. That is correct, sir.

Senator **FERGUSON**. Now, did you know that the evaluation of these messages had been turned over to Admiral Turner's office and taken away from the Intelligence Branch? Did you know that?

Captain **KRAMER**. I was unfamiliar with that, sir, until these hearings commenced.

Senator **FERGUSON**. You didn't know it then, when you called Admiral Turner; is that correct?

Captain **KRAMER**. On that particular point, yes, sir; that was my understanding.

Senator **FERGUSON**. So, as I understand it, your office was fully alerted to war on the evening of the 6th of December 1941?

Captain **KRAMER**. I believe it was, sir. It was no [10669] differently alerted, however, than it had been during a large part of the year of 1941.

Senator **FERGUSON**. Well, when did the change in the kind of alert come in your office?

Captain **KRAMER**. When the volume of this traffic, particularly with reference to the war in Europe and the negotiations of the United States—

Senator **FERGUSON**. Do you include in the war in Europe the war in the Atlantic that we have heard here from the witness stand, about the undeclared war that started in August? Is that what you have reference to?

Captain KRAMER. By the war in Europe, I refer specifically to the Tokyo-Berlin circuit and anything bearing on hostile action of the Germans and the Italians. That would include, of course, the war in the Atlantic, if anything came up in this traffic.

Senator FERGUSON. If it came in on this same traffic?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, from the testimony we have here now, that Admiral Turner's office had taken over the evaluation of these messages, his office was apparently not alerted for war on the night of the 6th, because you couldn't reach him; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. I am unfamiliar with that point, sir.

[10670] Senator FERGUSON. Well, you couldn't reach him?

Captain KRAMER. I could not reach him; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you call?

Captain KRAMER. His home.

Senator FERGUSON. You had that telephone number?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And Admiral Stark, apparently his office was not alerted, because you couldn't reach him; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. I was unable to reach him, sir; that is all I can say.

[10671] Senator FERGUSON. You personally tried to call his home and you couldn't reach him?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the telephone not answer or he was not there, which?

Captain KRAMER. My recollection is that the telephone did not answer.

Senator FERGUSON. The telephone did not answer. Did it answer at Admiral Turner's?

Captain KRAMER. I believe the same thing in the case of Admiral Turner.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you try the Deputy, Ingersoll?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know any reason why you didn't call him? Hadn't it been your custom to deliver to Ingersoll if you couldn't reach Stark?

Captain KRAMER. It had not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever delivered to Ingersoll?

Captain KRAMER. On a few occasions when Admiral Stark was absent from his office and his flag secretary, Commander Wellborn, indicated that Admiral Ingersoll would probably want to see that right then, and because the flag secretary was busy at the moment with other paper work. Normally deliveries to Admiral Stark's office were made to Admiral [10672] Stark's private secretary, his flag secretary, rather, Commander Wellborn, who got them to Admiral Stark, as well as the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, as well as many of them to then Captain Schuirmann, head of the Central Division.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try Admiral Stark's office that night?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it answer?

Captain KRAMER. I do not believe it did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try Turner's office that night?

Captain KRAMER. I tried those first before I tried their homes.

Senator FERGUSON. And it didn't answer?

Captain KRAMER. It did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So there were two offices and their homes that were not alerted to war that evening as far as telephone communications were concerned?

Captain KRAMER. On that interpretation of the alerting for war, sir, I know nothing about it. What provisions Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner had made in that regard I am not familiar with, only in a general way in that there were certain senior captains on duty at night in the Navy [10673] Department to take care of getting dispatches that might come into those officers.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find any of these officers in charge to get these dispatches to that night?

Captain KRAMER. Those officers, sir, on the watch list that I referred to included many captains, I believe certain admirals as well, who never had access to this decrypted material, and they were, therefore, never shown it, and would not be shown it that night.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then as I understand it now, Opnav, Admiral Stark's office, could not be reached. His home couldn't be reached. The next in line, the War Plans, which was Operations at the time, couldn't be reached, and his home couldn't be reached, and there were no other officers assigned to which these important messages could be delivered?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, there were.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were the officers?

Captain KRAMER. Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval Intelligence, whose prime responsibility it was to see that these things were delivered.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, do I understand that you were not the man to deliver these messages, but Wilkinson's duty was to make [10674] deliveries?

Captain KRAMER. It was my responsibility as a subordinate of Admiral Wilkinson to make such deliveries as I was instructed to make.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand you conferred with Wilkinson and that it didn't reach anyone out of his office—and he didn't have the authority, we have learned here, to evaluate these messages, they were to be delivered to War Plans for evaluation as far as the Navy was concerned, were they not?

Captain KRAMER. I have stated I am unaware of what arrangements were made regarding evaluation. My position on that was that in carrying out the general instructions in effect to deliver this traffic to the normal recipients, in case I was unable to reach Admiral Wilkinson first, which was the normal procedure, that that particular night when I informed Admiral Wilkinson of who I had been able to reach and what I proposed to do, and further that later that night when I showed these things to Admiral Wilkinson, that if he decided further efforts should be made in reaching the Chief of Naval Operations that he would so instruct me.

His instructions to me were to have this material ready to deliver promptly early the following morning as soon as the Admiral reached his office.

[10675] Senator FERGUSON. I understand then that you called Wilkinson before you called Stark and Turner?

Captain KRAMER. I called Admiral Wilkinson last, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Last. Did you call him and tell him that you couldn't reach these two men or reach anyone in their offices?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did he tell you to bring it out to his home?

Captain KRAMER. He approved my proposed distribution first to the White House and then to Mr. Knox and then to his home.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did he say then that you were not to deliver to Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner that night? You didn't try them again after that one call, did you?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what time would you say you called their homes?

Captain KRAMER. It was within a few minutes of 9 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, let's go to Mr. Knox. Did you call him on the phone and offer to deliver these messages, which included the one not to use any typist or any other person?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, I did call his home.

[10676] Senator FERGUSON. When you went there you found Mr. Knox there?

Captain KRAMER. I did, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he read all of the information that was in your folder?

Captain KRAMER. He did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he remark anything, did he make any remarks to you?

Captain KRAMER. There were some brief remarks and conversation, none that stands out in my mind, however.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything said about evaluating these messages? That is, as far as Knox was concerned?

Captain KRAMER. My recollection is that he agreed with the construction I had placed on it, that it aimed towards a conclusion of negotiations.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell him that there was a 14th part yet to come?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what other conversation had you on this 14th part?

Captain KRAMER. After he made his phone calls, apparently to Mr. Hull and Mr. Stimson, he instructed me to appear at the State Department the following morning by 10 o'clock, [10677] when there would be a conference of the three Secretaries and to bring at that time the material I had just shown him, as well as the 14th part, and any other thing of that type which might have come in during the night up to the time that delivery was made at 10 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any discussion with him that prior to the 14th part, or did you remind him that there had been a message which indicated it was to be delivered to the American Gov-

ernment at a certain time and that that time would come later, did you explain that to Mr. Knox?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that message was also in the folder, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The pilot message then was in the folder that you were delivering to the White House and to Knox?

Captain KRAMER. I am quite certain it was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, Admiral Stark didn't have this pilot message on Saturday at all, or he didn't have any of the 13 parts, or this message about the typing; is that true?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You say it is not true?

Captain KRAMER. That is true, sir; he did not have it.

Senator FERGUSON. And Turner had none of those messages?

[10678] Captain KRAMER. So far as I am aware, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Because they hadn't been delivered, and you were the only one that had the pouches?

Captain KRAMER. That was normally the case. However, it is possible that they would get delivery or at least see these things by other means, namely, the Director of Intelligence or Captain McCollum or possibly some officers, senior officers in the War Department.

Senator FERGUSON. But as far as delivery was concerned they had not seen them?

Captain KRAMER. So far as my delivery was concerned they had not.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had no knowledge that they had seen them or had copies or you wouldn't have taken the trouble to deliver to them?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I will take up later when these messages were received but I want to go along on this.

Did you hear Secretary Knox telephone?

Captain KRAMER. I did not hear his phone conversation; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That I assume was in another room?

Captain KRAMER. I believe it was in an adjacent room.

Senator FERGUSON. In an adjacent room. When he came [10679] back he told you that he had arranged a conference with the Secretary of war and the Secretary of the Navy at the State Department with the Secretary of State at 10 o'clock on the following morning; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did he tell you to bring the 13-part message, the pilot message, and this typist message to the State Department at 10 o'clock?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; he told me to bring all the messages in that folder.

Senator FERGUSON. And whatever came in that night?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, then, I assume that you drove—is that all the conversation you had with Secretary Knox?

Captain KRAMER. That was approximately the sum total of the sense of our conversations in private. There was a subsequent conversation for about 10 minutes in which Mrs. Knox and the business associate of Mr. Knox engaged.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ask you what your evaluation—by the way, you were in the Intelligence Branch of the Government?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And part of your job was to know all of the Intelligence and therefore have an over-all view [10680] of it to evaluate these things?

Captain KRAMER. At that time I had a comparatively limited view sir. Approximately 2 years before, when I was in charge of the Japanese desk in the Far East Branch of Naval Intelligence I had a much more comprehensive picture than I did at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Who was the man in that department or the Intelligence Branch that had the comprehensive view and the over-all view?

Captain KRAMER. Captain McCollum, Admiral Wilkinson, and presumably their seniors.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Wilkinson had only been there, had never been in Intelligence before, he only came there October 15; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. That is true as far as his arrival is concerned, sir. Just what his intelligence background was, I was and am unfamiliar with.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you just assuming that he had the over-all view of this?

Captain KRAMER. It is my presumption that a director of Naval Intelligence would have a much more comprehensive view than I had.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, even though he had only been there a month and a half?

[10681] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you went down to Wilkinson's home, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. Admiral Wilkinson's home, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you found there what officers?

Captain KRAMER. The naval aide to the President, Beardall, Admiral Wilkinson, and, as my memory has been recently refreshed, General Miles, the head of Military Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you really had Intelligence in one office, didn't you?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; one room.

Senator FERGUSON. One room. You had the top man in the Army, you had the top man in the Navy, and you had the top man in the White House, as far as Intelligence was concerned; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. I can say that is approximately true.

Senator FERGUSON. That Army and Navy Intelligence for one time in one room; isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had in a bag, in a brief case, a pilot message for delivery of a 14-part message, and you knew of the message between Tokyo and Berlin telling us that there was going to be war sooner than they would think between the Anglo-Saxons, meaning America and Britain, you [10682] had the 13th part of this message, and you have described what you thought of it, and you had this typist part and these other messages; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You gentlemen took them out there and read them; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you now, what was the conclusion of the Army and the Navy Intelligence after they read these various messages?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot state what their conclusions were, what the conclusions they reached in their minds were, sir. There was some conversation—

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I want, the conversation, and that will tell me what the attitude of mind was.

Captain KRAMER. There were some conversations during that period in Admiral Wilkinson's home that I took part in. The general tenor of the conversations in which I took part was approximately as I have described in the case of Secretary Knox. There were other conversations at the side of the room one or two times, while I left that room to go out to my car where my wife was waiting, that I did not engage in.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, let's keep to the part that [10683] you were in. How long were you in this room with these gentlemen?

Captain KRAMER. I should say approximately one-half hour before we all left that room and went to another room where a number of Admiral Wilkinson's dinner guests were.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume that nothing was discussed there in relation to the message?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, I assume, and is it correct, that you told them that the Secretary of the Navy was the only man in the Navy outside of the President that you had been able to reach on these messages?

Captain KRAMER. Except for the fact that I informed Admiral Wilkinson that I had phoned Captain McCollum about them.

Senator FERGUSON. I will come back to get Captain McCollum's conversation with you later.

Now, did you tell them that Secretary Knox had arranged a meeting for the following morning at 10 o'clock with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what was their reply and who replied to it?

[10684] Captain KRAMER. I do not recall the precise wording of their reply. Admiral Wilkinson, I believe, told me to be sure to be there on time, or something to that effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you that it would not be necessary for you to try later to get Stark?

Captain KRAMER. My recollection is that I asked him about that point and I was not so instructed.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he tell you?

Captain KRAMER. He told me specifically to be sure to have those things ready for delivery to Admiral Stark as soon as he arrived in the office the following morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you not to bother him that night, it was late, and therefore you could give it to him the next morning?

Captain KRAMER. I don't recall that he put it in so many words, sir, but that was the general effect of what he told me.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that time did you know that Admiral Stark had not visited his office on Sunday?

Captain KRAMER. I am uncertain of what Sundays Admiral Stark visited his office. He was there on some Sundays during 1941. Other Sundays I know he was not because I made delivery to him at his home.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am getting at is, you couldn't [10685] reach him on the phone at night, and you had no knowledge that Wilkinson had reached him on the phone?

Captain KRAMER. I was under the impression that Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral Stark that night, but that was only an impression.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, he phoned him, and when he came back he said:

Deliver him the information tomorrow morning, he will come down to the office to get it.

Captain KRAMER. Admiral Wilkinson left that room on several occasions during the approximately half-hour while these officers were reading this material. I simply presumed that he may have made phone calls similarly to those made by Secretary Knox.

In any case, he instructed me to be sure that Admiral Stark saw them the first thing in the morning.

[10686] Senator FERGUSON. Somehow Wilkinson knew that night and told you to deliver this to Admiral Stark the next morning at his office?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the reason that you paid no more attention to delivering it that night, and didn't try to deliver it that night?

Captain KRAMER. That is not quite accurate, sir, in that the impression I had from the instructions and the conversations with Admiral Wilkinson were that no efforts to reach those officers that night were called for.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Then we come to the conclusion that one of the intelligence officers, the top—you told us Wilkinson was the top of the evaluation section because you didn't know that that had been taken away by Admiral Turner?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He told you that these messages were not so important that they should receive attention that night? That was the substance of what he told you. It would be perfectly all right the next morning.

Captain KRAMER. This is the substance; yes, sir. There was no evaluation or construction of that kind put on. I am referring in what I am saying simply to when I [10687] was instructed to get them to Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. You drew that conclusion from what he said after he read them?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, how did they read them? You had enough copies for all, and they sat there and read them, or did one read it aloud?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I had two copies with me. I may have had three when I went to Admiral Wilkinson's home. I am sure I had two, and those three officers read them between them.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did each one sit and read them, or did someone read them aloud so they could all hear?

Captain KRAMER. There was no reading aloud.

Senator FERGUSON. So it was necessary that each one take them and read them?

Captain KRAMER. I believe two of those individuals were reading one copy at certain parts of that half hour.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do I understand now that that wasn't of such importance that a man would sit and really read it, but that he would just look over the other man's shoulder and read part of it?

Captain KRAMER. I believe all three of those officers [10688] read every word appearing in that folder.

Senator FERGUSON. All of the words in the folder?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did General Miles tell you anything about or comment in any way about these messages?

Captain KRAMER. I have no recollection of anything General Miles may have stated. I could very well have informed Admiral Wilkinson at that time—I believe I did inform him that all this traffic, specifically the note which we had been writing up, had been sent to the Army by 9 o'clock.

I believe that Colonel Bratton knew about it. I presume that as he always did in the past, that he was making his usual prompt deliveries of that material.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore you would assume that Colonel Bratton had delivered them the same as you were delivering them?

Captain KRAMER. That was my presumption; yes, sir.

I have a distinct impression that Colonel Bratton knew about it that night. In fact, I even may have called him as I did on a number of occasions in the past to make sure that he had gotten something.

Senator FERGUSON. Your best recollection is that you didn't want to scoop him on this delivery, that you called [10689] him?

Captain KRAMER. There was no question of scooping, sir. Normally delivery was made about the same time by both Colonel Bratton and myself.

Senator FERGUSON. And you wanted that to continue so that they would be able to be delivered at the same time?

Captain KRAMER. Colonel Bratton had responsibility for delivering to different officials than I did; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you wanted to see that he could deliver them at the same time so there would be no change in time, one wouldn't get it before the other?

Captain KRAMER. I intended to make no reference or presumption to the time of delivery. My reference is simply to the fact that it is my distinct impression and was at that time that Colonel Bratton knew about it that night, and my presumption merely is that he was making his usual delivery.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you tell him that you were going to deliver that night?

Captain KRAMER. I may have said that if I phoned him; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I take it, because you were delivering at night, you were quite concerned with the [10690] importance of these messages?

Captain KRAMER. Of course I was concerned; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But that concern was not present with these three men at Wilkinson's home, because they then said:

Well, deliver them tomorrow morning. Be sure and be at the State Department at ten o'clock and see that Admiral Stark gets his in the morning—

is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. I have another impression on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Give it to us.

Captain KRAMER. Concerning Admiral Wilkinson's reaction when I first phoned him, he was concerned that the President and Secretary Knox got it promptly.

Senator FERGUSON. He was concerned that those two gentlemen get it promptly, but he wasn't so concerned about Admiral Stark, or Admiral Turner getting it promptly?

Captain KRAMER. What his concern was in that respect, I don't know, except as I can deduce.

Senator FERGUSON. Would your deduction be along that same line?

Captain KRAMER. It would be that Admiral Wilkinson did not feel sufficiently concerned to instruct me to attempt further delivery to Admiral Stark that night; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Admiral Wilkinson say to [10691] you about delivery to Admiral Turner?

Captain KRAMER. The same thing applies to Admiral Turner as to Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. He told you that?

Captain KRAMER. That is my distinct recollection of the impression I had.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he tried to call Admiral Turner that night?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know that he did, sir. It was my impression at the time that he did make some phone calls.

I presume that a phone call would be made to Admiral Turner.

Senator FERGUSON. The next morning did you deliver to Admiral Turner?

Captain KRAMER. I don't believe that Admiral Turner first saw the material when I delivered it. I think Captain McCollum got it to him that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, you didn't follow out the instructions of Admiral Wilkinson to deliver to Admiral Turner immediately?

Captain KRAMER. I was not instructed regarding Admiral Turner.

Senator FERGUSON. I misunderstood you then.

[10692] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, that night Admiral Wilkinson did not tell you to deliver to Admiral Turner the next morning?

Captain KRAMER. I have no recollection of any such instructions; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the only one you were to deliver to was Admiral Stark?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir. However, I, of course, would continue efforts as soon as I arrived at the office the following morning to make delivery to Admiral Turner.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next morning, as I understand it, you arrived at 7:30 in the morning?

Captain KRAMER. Thereabouts, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And immediately, I assume, you got in touch with Admiral Stark's office?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I phoned it shortly after that; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did you reach?

Captain KRAMER. I don't recall reaching anyone, although I may have. In any case, Admiral Stark was not there on my first phone call, nor his Flag Secretary, with whom I could leave a pouch for Admiral Stark.

[10693] Senator FERGUSON. When were you first able to alert or to get an answer from OpNav that you could deliver to Admiral Stark's office?

Captain KRAMER. I—

Senator FERGUSON. I assume you kept trying all the time after 7:30?

Captain KRAMER. I did not keep trying; no, sir. It was, I believe, around 8 o'clock or shortly after, it may have been shortly before, that those folders were brought to Captain McCollum in the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. The ones that you had?

Captain KRAMER. The folders I had; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain KRAMER. Captain McCollum had not seen the material the night before. He was my next senior responsible for these deliveries; he indicated that he would also keep in touch with Admiral Stark's office and get it to him as soon as he arrived.

I believe I left an extra folder; I may have left two extra folders with Captain McCollum at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you are of the opinion that Captain McCollum delivered to Admiral Stark?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that is the case, sir.

[10694] Senator FERGUSON. And you therefore do not know the hour it was actually delivered?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But it would include all of these messages, pilot and the other 13 parts and the typist and the other messages?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then did you leave a copy for Admiral Turner?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recollect that particular point, sir. I don't believe I left a copy for Admiral Turner with Captain McCollum. However, he could make use of one of the copies I did leave.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand it, the so-called 1 o'clock message came in at 5 o'clock in the morning.

That is on page 248. I wish you would refer to that.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when we get a message from Tokyo to Washington and there is a date, is that the Tokyo date?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is the Tokyo date, presumably, of its drafting, but certainly the date of the cipher used to encode or encipher the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[10695] Now, look at that message at the top of the page.

It says:

To be handled in Government code.

It is No. 907.

Re my #902.

So you could tell immediately it was in relation to the 14-part message?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10696] Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

So that made it so that there was to be a delivery to the United States, to the Secretary of State, on a Sunday at 1 o'clock.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There wasn't any doubt about that.

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I want you to look at page 249, the top message, from Tokyo to Washington, December the 7, 1941, "Extremely urgent." The other one was listed, 907, "Urgent, very important," but this is "Extremely urgent" and I will read it:

After deciphering part 14 of my #902* and also #907^b, 908 and 909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine—

You will notice it says:

the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

Now, I will ask you when that message was received and decoded.

[10697] Captain KRAMER. I cannot state, sir, from first-hand knowledge when it was received and when it was decoded. I do know that it was not received, or at least seen by me, until about the middle of Sunday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what hour would that be?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that this particular one, 910, which you read, was seen by me first when I returned from my appointment at the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that it was seen at the same time as the 1 o'clock message?

Captain KRAMER. That is my recollection, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, I have information here that a 910 and 907—907—there are two short messages I have just read—was filed in Tokyo on 4:18 a. m. on the 7th of December. That is Exhibit 41. It is page 248 of Exhibit 1. And it was intercepted in Japanese code by the Navy station at Bainbridge Island, Washington, at 4:35 a. m.

Captain KRAMER. It says "4:37".

Senator FERGUSON. And it appears in the testimony that it was in your possession at 5 o'clock in the morning. Now, going over to the next page:

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy—
blank.

Decoded by Navy—
blank.

Sent by Navy to Army SIS—
blank.

[10698] Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode—
December 7th.

How do you account for the fact that that very vital message that had an investigation by the Roberts Commission immediately following, that you could not get the time when that message was decoded so that it would be part of the files of the Navy Department?

Captain KRAMER. I know nothing about the records kept on those times, sir. It was entirely outside the province of my section. Certain files in that regard were kept by the GY watch officers with which I have only a general acquaintance; certain other times I believe that time stamps were used by the Signal Intelligence section which I have no first-hand knowledge of.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose duty was it to get that information and see that the time stamps were used on this kind of material?

Captain KRAMER. I am not sure that the Navy ever used a time stamp. I know that the SIS did on certain things. The question of the keeping of a log on these incoming messages was, I presume, on Captain Safford's office orders or instructions, the duty of Section GY and its watch officers.

Senator FERGUSON. It was their duty to get that information and put it there?

[10699] Captain KRAMER. I am unfamiliar with what instructions were in effect in that regard.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know; all right.

Now, let us get to 910, this message about:

Please destroy at once—After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907, #908 and #909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes—

and so forth.

Then after that is code destruction. That describes that message, doesn't it, on page 249 of Exhibit 1?

Filed by the Japanese 6:44 p. m. 7 December Tokyo time (N & A).

What does that stand for?

Captain KRAMER. What page are you on now?

Senator FERGUSON. I am looking at—I don't know whether you have got a copy of it. This has been furnished by the Navy.

Captain KRAMER (reading):

Filed by the Japanese 6:44 p. m.

That is under No. 910, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, No. 910.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the "N & A"?

Mr. KAUFMAN. "N" is Navy files and "A" is Army files.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next is 4:47 on the 7th. In [10700] other words, it came in at 4:44 and the 1 o'clock message came in at 4:18. [Reading:]

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge)—
that is the same one that intercepted 907—

at 5:07 A. M. 7 December—

and the other one was 4:37, so it is just 30 minutes apart.

Then it says:

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A)—

blank.

Decoded by Navy (A)—

blank.

Sent by Navy to Army SIS—

blank.

Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode (A) 7 December.

Now, your answer would be the same in relation to that?

Captain KRAMER. Precisely, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you had a teletype to Bainbridge?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, these two messages—and I assume that you alerted Bainbridge; that you were looking for valuable information, because you were looking for the fourteenth part; you were looking for the time of delivery; you had alerted them to that effect, had you not?

Captain KRAMER. Any alerting that might have been done I am entirely unfamiliar with, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And we have information here that it [10701] was in the office at 5 o'clock. How do you account for the fact, if this office was alerted to war or near war, that those two messages were not immediately decoded and translated in the morning at 5 o'clock?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot account for anything in that connection, sir. I would like to state, however, that these messages in general were handled far more promptly than was the normal course throughout early months and years. In the usual routine of handling messages for which we already had broken the cipher or code it was quite normal for a period of anywhere from 4 to 6 hours to several days to elapse before such message was processed, translated, and disseminated. These particular messages were handled, in my opinion, extremely promptly by all hands. As regarding a precise time schedule on which piece of paper moved where, I am unfamiliar with that aspect of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what code those two messages were in? Were they in the same code?

Captain KRAMER. I believe all these were in the so-called purple machine, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, it has been testified here that you found the key immediately, or at least you found the key on the 6th

for this particular fourteenth part message, and this code had a different key to it as far as [10702] ciphering was concerned, and you had the code. Now, how long would it take you, the department, to decode those messages that contained three lines?

Captain KRAMER. It probably would not take very long, but there are a number of reasons why it might not be decoded promptly. The machines we were using were constructed from a variety of manufactured parts. Our own machine in the Navy Department—we had only one in the Navy—broke down at various times and—

Senator FERGUSON. Was it broken down this morning?

[10703] Captain KRAMER. Not that I am aware of, sir. There were occasions when a particular key which we presumed we had recovered was inaccurate in some respects, maybe three or four letters in the whole key were inaccurate, and therefore throughout the text of a message coming out of that machine there would be what appeared to be garbles appearing every three or four or six or eight letters, or oftener.

All of those aspects of it were purely within the province of GY.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, did you translate these two messages?

Captain KRAMER. I am certain I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are certain that you did not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us any information as to how long it would take to translate those messages after they were decoded?

Captain KRAMER. Messages of this length in Japanese text, provided there were no bad garbles in them, should not take more than a very few minutes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Fifteen minutes apiece?

Captain KRAMER. Less than that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Less than that.

[10704] Now, if you were trying to find out in that department in connection with the receipt of these messages, if you wanted to find out just when they were received, how long it took to decode them, what the delay was, if any, and the time for reciphering them and translating them, whom would you call to this witness stand, if you wanted to get that information?

Captain KRAMER. On those technicalities, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. They are not technicalities. It is information I am asking about.

Captain KRAMER. I think Captain Safford would be fully competent on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. And if he was not there that morning whom would you call?

Captain KRAMER. I think further that any of the GY watch officers would be fully competent to give you full information in that respect, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I understand also that the watch officers that were on at that time—that record is not in existence. Do you know anything about that?

Captain KRAMER. I am entirely unfamiliar with that record, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who was on that morning, whom we can call? That is what I am trying to get at.

[10705] Captain KRAMER. I cannot recall the names of the watch officers that were on that Sunday morning. My impression is there was not only the regular one on, but there was another one.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the regular one?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recollect who the particular one who was on that morning. Evidence has been presented here that Brotherhood was there. I have no first-hand recollection on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Is he a decoder or translator?

Captain KRAMER. He was one of the watch officers, and was primarily a cryptanalyst or decoder. He, however, had some familiarity with simple Japanese, particularly the Japanese appearing in these dispatches.

Senator FERGUSON. Then he may have translated these two?

Captain KRAMER. That is extremely doubtful, sir. His knowledge of Japanese would not have extended that far.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I think you will find in the record he said around 5 in the morning he knew what was in it, but he was not positive. Then it waited in the Navy from [10706] then until morning, then it was sent from the Navy to the Army and then translated by the Army and then sent back to the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. It is possible, if we would get a sergeant in the Army or a yeoman in the Navy, we would get answers to some of these questions.

Captain KRAMER. Senator, may I further possibly enlighten you on certain aspects of that? I do not know whether it has been brought out fully in previous testimony, at least I am unfamiliar with it.

I have indicated already, I believe, the translator situation in effect that particular night, and the following morning, in the Navy.

I would like to make further this point, however, that on the evening of December 6 the Army Signal Intelligence Section instituted an overnight watch for the first time of translators. My distinct impression is that there were no Army translators there from the end of working hours shortly after Saturday noon until around 6 that evening, when that watch was to start. I am uncertain of the time, but, in any case, there were translators on duty in the Army Signal Intelligence Section that night, a newly instituted watch. I was aware of that point, sir.

I left instructions as I had frequently done, so in [10707] the past with my watch officers to call me down if anything important came in which required the efforts of a translator.

Apparently—this is purely my presumption—the GY watch officer exercised some discretion on Sunday morning in not calling me, as he was instructed to, but sent certain of these dispatches over to the Army to be translated rather than calling me up, probably in view of the fact that I had been up quite late the night before and he knew I would be in quite early the following morning.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not want this to be intended in any way as criticism of your actions.

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. I was intending by my last statement to amplify some point that may not have been brought out here.

Senator FERGUSON. You were one man that was apparently alert, as you worked until after midnight and you were in the next morning at 7:30.

Captain KRAMER. I do not wish to create the impression I was any more alert than any other officers in those departments.

Senator FERGUSON. But you tell us this, that the Army was closed from noon until 6 o'clock on this important [10708] day of Saturday, the 6th of December 1941, as far as interceptors, decoders, or translators were concerned.

Captain KRAMER. That is not correct, sir. I was referring purely to translators.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I got the wrong impression.

Captain KRAMER. That is simply my impression.

Senator FERGUSON. The translators went home at noon?

Captain KRAMER. I am not certain on that point, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You stated that, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. That was my impression.

Senator FERGUSON. How many translators had they in the Army?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know, sir. I think they had at least as many as we did.

Senator FERGUSON. How many did you have?

Captain KRAMER. I had six, three of which were highly competent, and three others of which were much less competent as regards the work of our office.

One was a top notch expert in Japanese, but was in training as far as the work of our office was concerned.

The other two were what I might term our weakest translators.

Senator FERGUSON. We had 12 translators between the Army and Navy. How many decrypters and decoders were there [10709] in your department in the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. I have only a general knowledge of that, sir; nothing first hand. There are other officers who can give you precise information in that respect.

Senator FERGUSON. Haven't you any idea how many we had?

Captain KRAMER. My impression is that we had probably a dozen quite competent cryptanalysts on duty, and several dozen others of various degrees of competency, and in various states of training.

Senator FERGUSON. And how many had the Army, if you know?

Captain KRAMER. My general impression is that the Army establishment was approximately our size.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be 24 or 25 decrypters, and so forth?

Captain KRAMER. Cryptanalysts, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And a dozen translators. I want you to tell me why they were not all on duty that night when you had these 13 parts and these other messages coming in, so that they would get them early in the morning.

Captain KRAMER. Senator, the reason I did not specifically order any of my translators—in that connection I might point out too, that these translators were all [10710] civil-service personnel. There was no overtime pay in those days. Any extended hours which they worked was in effect a gift to the Government. Those translators,

particular certain ones, worked a great many hours overtime on some occasions quite late into the night. I wanted to be certain that on Sunday we had competent translators available who had not worked all night the night before. That is the reason that I did not institute an overnight watch that night myself.

However, I, as I had frequently done in the past, left instructions I was to be called. I considered myself as an available translator who could arrive at the Navy Department within not over 10 minutes, probably less than that, of the time I received a phone call.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that is the explanation of not having people work that night on this important occasion?

Captain KRAMER. That is the explanation of why I had no Navy translator in my office all night that night, yes, sir.

In that connection, too, I might point out, Senator, there is one other aspect of that.

An institution of a 24-hour watch, with only three highly competent translators, meant that the talents of these highly competent individuals would be wasted for many [10711] hours during periods of time when no traffic was coming in.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you know this, that on Saturday evening, when you had the 13 parts, and the 14th part did not come in in the same intervals as the other parts, that they were greatly concerned about it? Did you know that?

Captain KRAMER. I believe all recipients I delivered it to that night were greatly concerned, at least greatly interested in seeing that 14th part; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So the President of the United States, the Secretary of the Navy, the top of the Army and Navy being together, Wilkinson and Miles, were all greatly concerned about this 14-part message coming in and getting it immediately.

Now, we find that it came in intercepted in Japanese code by the Navy station S—and, by the way, station S had a teletype in it, and the teletype works in minutes, doesn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. It takes time, however, to cut the ribbon for transmission.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It came in from 3:05 to 3:10 a. m. on December 7?

Captain KRAMER. Which one?

[10712] Senator FERGUSON. That important message came in to the Navy. It was intercepted at that time, and again we come to the point that the time that it was teletyped from Japanese code in the Navy was blank. How do you account for that?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot account for that. I have no first-hand knowledge whatsoever of the details of filing and traffic logs kept by those GY and Signal Intelligence sections.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it now, we had no one in the Navy Department as a translator from 12 o'clock at night until 7:30 when you got there?

Captain KRAMER. Not actually present; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Not actually present.

Do you know of any decoders or decryptors present from 12 o'clock until you got there Sunday morning?

Captain KRAMER. I know there was a 24-hour watch on, as there had been for many months in the Navy; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it could have been decrypted but not decoded?

Captain KRAMER. Decrypted.

Senator FERGUSON. And not translated?

Captain KRAMER. And decoded if it were in code, but not translated.

[10713] Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, as I understand it, this message was in English.

Captain KRAMER. Which message do you refer to?

Senator FERGUSON. The 14 parts I am talking about, 902.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But it did have to be decoded, did it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And decrypted?

Captain KRAMER. I do not believe there was any coding. It was purely a cipher; in other words, decrypted.

Senator FERGUSON. When you broke the cipher, you had the English words, and they were in order?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that took less time, and you had the machine set up, as I understand it, so you had the key to these 13 parts, so you could get immediately the fourteenth part, isn't that right?

Captain KRAMER. I believe they had those keys predicted; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, there was no one there to translate, and in fact you did not need a translator for the 14th part, isn't [10714] that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Not quite correct, sir.

There were introductory instructions. Probably the first three lines would have instructions in Japanese, but the main text of the 14th part of the note was in English, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was in English.

So the minute it was deciphered, it could be sent off to the White House and to the various departments; isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Not quite correct, sir.

[10715] Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you tell me what is correct?

Captain KRAMER. There were throughout the text of this decrypted version of it frequent three-letter code groups which, of course, were in the hands of the GY section, concerning punctuation, capitalization, and so forth, quotations, parentheses, spacing, indentation, and what not, that had to be transcribed to a finished version. A multiple set of copies of these would have had to be prepared before dissemination could be made.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and it is about one-third of a page, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. The length of the message, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now what you told me about is done by the translator or the decrypter?

Captain KRAMER. This thing could have been done, I think, by a translator. I am unfamiliar with how much Japanese text there was in that thing. Probably very little, except the introductory instructions I referred to.

Senator FERGUSON. Now the first thing, the note, "In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase 'Very important,' " who put that in?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I inserted that note at [10716] the time it was written up.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So in English to the broadcasting station were the words "Very important," isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So there you had the flag that you had the 14th part, because it said "#902 part 14 of 14" and "VERY IMPORTANT".

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now when did that reach you? When is the first that you saw that in the rough on Sunday morning?

Captain KRAMER. I am uncertain of the precise time. Probably very shortly after I arrived at the office.

Senator FERGUSON. At 7:30, or within the next half-hour?

Captain KRAMER. I should say so, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Was it in the rough then, and how long did it take you to smooth it out?

Captain KRAMER. I do not believe it took as much as a half hour, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. A half hour. So you would say sometime between 8:00 and 8:30 on Sunday morning you had the 14th part?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now will you tell us—you being the deliverer, as it were—why you did not awaken these [10717] people if there were any of them asleep and deliver this 14th part, to show them what they had all told you they were waiting for? Now why did not you get it to them at 8:30?

Captain KRAMER. As soon as this 14th part was typed up, which I believe was shortly after 8:00 o'clock, delivery was made to Captain McCollum along with the other 13 parts and the other traffic.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, as I understand it then, about 8:15 Captain McCollum had the full 14 parts message.

Captain KRAMER. I believe that is the case, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the message that Secretary Hull has described in the Foreign Relations book, and Peace and War?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now can you tell me why it was not delivered immediately? Why you did not deliver it? It was your duty, as I understand it, to deliver these messages.

Captain KRAMER. It was my duty subject to modification by my two seniors, namely, Captain McCollum and Admiral Wilkinson, to make deliveries on their instructions. Captain McCollum did not direct me to deliver that at once to the White House. I indicated, I believe, at that time other [10718] messages were coming in which I was in the process of preparing. I returned to my office to complete those other messages.

I believe that a first delivery was made to Admiral Stark's office by me about 9:30 of these supplementary messages, on my way initially to the White House and then to the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, I understand that you said you did not get to the White House with this 14th part until close to 10:00 o'clock.

Captain KRAMER. I went there first before going to the State Department, sir; and I arrived at the State Department on foot by 10 minutes of 10.

Senator FERGUSON. And you went from the White House across the street to the State Department?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would say you delivered it to the White House at what time?

Captain KRAMER. I should say it was between twenty and a quarter of 10.

Senator FERGUSON. Twenty and a quarter of 10. But McCollum had it, and you had it by 8:15 that morning, is that right?

Captain KRAMER. That is my recollection now; yes, sir.

[10719] Senator FERGUSON. Now do you know why McCollum held this 14th part message from 8:15 until 9:30, because that would be about the time you left the Navy Department to go to the White House?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Has it ever been explained to you?

Captain KRAMER. The subject has been brought up for the first time now, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. This is the first time you heard about it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now the only message that you had then, when you went over there at 9:30, 20 minutes to 10, or a quarter to 10, was this 14th part?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; that is not the only message.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, tell me what other messages you had.

Captain KRAMER. I have not made a study of this traffic to see precisely what other ones there were.

Senator FERGUSON. Apparently I am not going to finish with you tonight and therefore you will have over the night to think about it.

Captain KRAMER. There are three or four others, however, in this series, Japanese series 902 through 910.

[10720] The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, we will recess until 10 o'clock in the morning.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., February 7, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m. of the following day, Friday, February 8, 1946.)

[10721]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[10722] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Senator Ferguson, I believe you were examining the witness.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we have something for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel, I believe, have something to put in the record.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, during Mr. Murphy's examination of Captain Safford, he requested Captain Safford to produce the correspondence with Captain G. W. Welker.

Captain Safford has delivered to us the following letter, dated January 15, 1946, which was written to him by Captain Welker. With your permission I would like to read it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; go ahead.

Mr. MASTEN (reading):

15 JAN. 1946.

DEAR CAPTAIN SAFFORD: I was glad to receive your letter of 27 December. I was in Washington during the latter half of December, but never got near the Navy Department. I'm sorry that I never received your letter of last fall. I missed a full month's mail from home and think it was destroyed in the Okinawa typhoon of late September. Your letter must have [10723] been in that.

I recalled having heard of the "winds message" when I saw it mentioned in the papers, but I never did know anything of it at first hand. Kramer evidently had other sources of information and contact than 20-GX, for no order ever went out to stations controlled by us to listen for that, insofar as I know. No information of that kind ever came through my office to Kramer. Of course I know nothing of the stations that were watching for it, how the orders went out to them, or how the information came back. Nor do I know what the FCC was doing at the time or was supposed to be doing. Neither do I know when it came in or what was done with it in or by 20-G.

I'm sorry that I can't be of help in this. I believe if you will get in touch with Daniels, you will find his memory the same as mine, i. e., that that was part of a lot of stuff going on in 20-GY that GX was never in on at all.

When I get up to Washington again I will look you up. It will be good to see you again.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE W. WELKER.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is he?

Mr. MASTEN. Captain Welker, as I understand it, was [10724] under Captain Safford in Captain Safford's section.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the other name mentioned at the end? Danford?

The CHAIRMAN. Daniels.

Mr. MASTEN. Daniels. I do not know who he is.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know who he is?

Mr. MASTEN. No.

We have three other memoranda regarding the watches maintained in the War and Navy Departments on December 6 and 7, 1941. The first is a memorandum dated January 14, 1946, from Lt. Harmon Duncombe, addressed to Mr. Richardson, and is as follows:

Reference is made to Mr. Mitchell's memorandum of 31 December 1945 forwarding Senator Ferguson's request for any records showing who was in charge of the offices of the Chief of Staff and of General Gerow on the night of 6 December 1941.

General Gerow indicated to the committee that as of 6 December 1941 War Plans Division had an arrangement whereby a duty officer was designated for the 24-hour period and, though not required to remain at the office throughout the night, was required to stay within calling distance of a telephone (Tr. 4320-1). The Office of the Secretary [10725] General Staff maintained a similar duty officer arrangement for the Chief of Staff. A thorough search has been made for the duty rosters of War Plans Division and of the Office of the Secretary General Staff for the period including 6-7 December 1941. Those rosters have not been located and apparently it was not the practice to preserve such rosters.

We also have a memorandum dated 31 January 1946 from Lt Comdr. John Ford Baecher, which reads as follows:

1. With reference to the request made on 21 January 1946 by Senator Ferguson for further information as to the working hours in Admiral Turner's office, the following information is submitted.

2. There is no record of the actual working hours which prevailed in Admiral Turner's office (War Plans Division) on 6-7 December 1941, outside of the regular Navy Department working hours which were as indicated on the enclosure.

3. From the recollection of officers who were on duty in the War Plans Division at that time, there were officers who were present for duty until late Saturday afternoon, 6 December, and on Sunday morning, 7 December 1941. All available personnel reported for duty after [10726] news of the Pearl Harbor attack was received.

JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

The enclosure to this memorandum is a circular letter dated November 10, 1941, from the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, to Chiefs of Bureaus, Offices and Boards, Navy Department; Major General Commandant, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, and prescribed the hours of duty.

With the committee's permission, we will have that spread in the record at this point, but I will not read it.

(The circular letter referred to follows:)

[10727]

Address reply to
The Secretary of the Navy
and refer to initials—
and No.—
PS&M-1-NGL

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Washington

CIRCULAR LETTER

From : Secretary of the Navy.

To: Chiefs of Bureaus, Offices and Boards, Navy Department, Major General
Commandant, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.

Subject : Hours of Duty.

References :

(a) Act of June 28, 1940 (Public No. 671-76th Congress).

(b) Dept's. cir. ltr. NN/P18-2 (410226), February 26, 1941.

1. Effective November 24, 1941, the regular hours of duty of all employees of the Navy Department and Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, except employees of the Professional and Subprofessional Services and blueprinters, photostat and rotaprint operations, inspectors and supervisory planners and estimators of the Clerical, Administrative and Fiscal Service, shall be as follows :

[10728]

First Shift

Monday to Friday, inclusive----- From 8 a. m. to 4:30 p. m.
Saturday----- From 8 a. m. to 12 m.

Second Shift

Monday to Thursday, inclusive----- From 4:15 p. m. to 12 p. m.
Friday----- From 4:15 p. m. to 11:45 p. m.
Saturday----- From 11:45 a. m. to 3:45 p. m.

There shall be an intermission of one-half hour for luncheon on the above-mentioned days, except on Saturdays, for each shift.

2. Where regular routine requires the staggering of work hours, the hours of duty for employees shall be adjusted as necessary.

3. Where second shifts are deemed necessary and directed by Chiefs of Bureaus, Officers and Boards and Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, as the case may be, the schedule of working hours for the second shift provides a fifteen-minute overlap in order that the incoming shift may have contact with the outgoing shift for the purpose of receiving any instructions which may be necessary in preserving the continuity of the work being prosecuted.

4. Reference (b) is amended accordingly.

FRANK KNOX.

[10729] Mr. MASTEN. Finally we have a memorandum dated 30 January 1946, from Lt. Comdr. John Ford Baecher to Mr. Richardson which reads as follows :

In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson on 21 January 1946 for the names of the officers in charge of the office of Naval Intelligence on 6-7 December 1941, the following information is submitted :

Officers in Charge of Watch. ONI Duty Officers

Lieutenant (now Commander) Paul L. Hopper, USNR (79836), from 2000 on 6 December to 1400 7 December 1941.

Lieutenant Commander (now Commander) Brockholst Livingston, USNR, (60646) from 1400 on 7 December to 0800 on 8 December 1941.

4012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Special Watch in the Far Eastern Section of ONI

Lieutenant Commander (now Captain) Ethelbert Watts, USN, (58753) from 1200 on 6 December to 0800 on 7 December 1941.

Commander (now Captain) Arthur H. McCollum, USN, (57105) from 0800 on 7 December 1941 to 0800 on 8 December 1941.

Mr. MASTEN. That is all we have.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Kramer, do you have anything you want to add to the record this morning before we start, [10730] other than to answer the two questions that you were to look up?

Captain KRAMER. I have a number of statements or comments that I should like to make at this time; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you proceed then, with those?

Captain KRAMER. My first statement is as follows:

Mr. Chairman, I have always been an admirer of Mr. Fulton Lewis, Jr., and in past years have frequently listened to his news broadcasts.

I have always considered him an objective, unbiased, and accurate reporter and commentator.

Last night I had occasion to listen to Mr. Lewis' broadcast, one of the very few opportunities I have had to do so since returning to Washington several weeks ago from sick leave in Miami, because of the fact that I had no personal radio with me here in Washington.

In the course of reporting the Pearl Harbor hearings of yesterday, Mr. Lewis applied the terms "irate," "antagonistic," and "reluctant" to testimony I gave.

It may well be that he is accurate in this regard, inasmuch as I left this witness chair at 5 p. m. yesterday afternoon, after testifying for approximately 6 hours, with a slight headache, undoubtedly due to the fact that I am somewhat out of condition physically.

[10731] Mr. Chairman, my effort has been to be as objective and cooperative with this committee as I possibly could. In pursuance of this purpose I have been as truthful as I could. I have endeavored to be as precise as possible in distinguishing between what I know to be true, what I don't positively know but believe to be true, as well as what I don't know and what I merely surmise or presume.

If I have created any impression of irrationalism, antagonism or reluctance, I feel I am under obligation to apologize to this committee and assure the members that my only intention in tone of voice or manner was emphasis on points I was making. I will endeavor to amend my tone and manner during further inquiry.

That is the end of my first statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that all you wanted to state?

Captain KRAMER. That is the end of my first statement.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, I heard that same broadcast last night. I want to say that in my opinion Fulton Lewis definitely misrepresented you in your testimony on yesterday.

Captain KRAMER. Thank you, Senator.

My second statement, which will be chiefly extemporaneous, is along the following lines: Yesterday afternoon in reply [10732] to a question from Mr. Murphy I made the following answer, which I will quote from the record which has only been made available to me within the last few minutes. I stated:

It was not until Mr. Keefe, I believe, explained to me that it was his secretary, or someone from his office, that had come out the day before, that I first had any clue as to who my previous day's visitor was.

After the close of the hearing yesterday afternoon my wife indicated to me that she thought I was in error in attributing to Mr. Keefe my information as to the identity of the visitor I had at the Naval Hospital the day prior to our conversations with Mr. Keefe and Mr. Gearhart. She further stated as her recollection that she made that remark to me a few minutes before the arrival of Mr. Keefe and Mr. Gearhart in Dr. Duncan's office where we were waiting and that the tenor of her remarks had been that the previous afternoon's visitor very likely was someone from Mr. Keefe's office which was reported in that effect in the press that morning.

Mr. Keefe, it is my belief it is almost exactly 3 months since that episode. At no occasion after leaving Washington a few days after that episode has that thing been discussed by me or recalled in any manner to my memory. If I have attributed, as I unquestionably have, erroneously [10733] to you statements to that effect, I wish to apologize to you and request the Chair that my testimony of yesterday be amended in that respect.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman. I don't understand you are making any apology to me, Captain Kramer, are you? Did I so understand, you are addressing your remarks to me?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I was not impressed by that statement as calling for an apology.

Captain KRAMER. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony will go in as of yesterday and as of today.

Mr. KEEFE. I think when I get to examining you myself, if I ever do, I think we can very easily clear that matter up, and quite a few other things.

Captain KRAMER. I am sure we could, sir.

My third comment is an item that occurred to me last night during a study of certain files in the Navy Department in compliance with a request of Senator Ferguson. It concerns the question of this blank file number 7001.

I have previously outlined in my testimony four reasons why there should be such a blank file number. Without going into detail I should briefly cover them by mentioning that it might have been:

[10734] (1) A duplication of a previous translation;

(2) A part of a multipart message given a new file number by mistake, and later canceled when given the file number of the first part of the multipart message;

(3) That it might have been a mechanical slip or personnel error in shifting the numbering machine; and,

(4) That it might have been the cancellation of an Army translation. The fifth possibility is this: We had a number of categories of translations which we filed. One category was the JD file, many translations of which appear in Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2, and in various parts of the record.

In addition to this JD file, which meant Japanese diplomatic file, there were five or six other files referring to Japan. They were JM, meaning Japanese military traffic; JN, meaning Japanese naval traffic; JO, meaning Japanese official traffic, other than the three above categories; JP, Japanese personal traffic, meaning private communications of various kinds; JQ, meaning Japanese commercial traffic; and JZ, meaning traffic whose classification could not clearly be determined.

In the clerical process of numbering this traffic in my section, the stack of papers sometimes was as much as a foot high, referring by that remark to the fact that there [10735] were 14 pieces of paper to be given the same number of each translation. There is a possibility, it occurs to me, and occurred to me last night, that there were a number of incidents of this kind previously, that a translation was erroneously grouped in the JD file, given a number and only after numbering the whole stack was it discovered that it should have been in another category.

If this happens to be the case in the instance of File No. JD-7001, there is a possibility that such translation might appear in another category file of the Navy Department with the JD file number crossed out and another category file number now appearing on it.

If the committee so desires, a search for this possibility might be instituted, although it may already have been made since I have no knowledge whatsoever of what searches have been made in this connection. If such a new search is unsuccessful, however, there is not the slightest question in my mind that one or another of the four previous reasons I have given account for this canceled file number.

I have two additional brief comments, one concerning a question by Senator Ferguson on the interpretation or construction to be placed on a dispatch from Tokyo to London concerning evacuation of personnel. It occurred to me last night while I was making the studies I referred to that in [10736] the course of my duty in the Pacific during the war and in interrogation of prisoners and study of captured documents, both originals and translations thereof, we were fortunate from the intelligence point of view on Saipan to capture a Japanese chief petty officer who had been a secretary of what corresponds to our Joint Chiefs of Staff in Japan in the months preceding Pearl Harbor.

This chief yeoman gave us much valuable information concerning the events leading up to Pearl Harbor. The impression I gained from reading the interrogations of this prisoner were that the Japanese military had an extremely tight rein on all events controlled by the Japanese Government, including control of anything the diplomats did or might send out from Tokyo which might, by any possibility, compromise or even disclose to the officials in the Foreign Office or other high Japanese officials not directly concerned anything concerning their contemplated surprise of the United States Fleet in their attack on Pearl Harbor.

I mention this simply in connection, as I have stated, with the construction or interpretation to be placed on that directive to London.

My last comment concerns Mr. Gearhart's questions regarding four dispatches sent out by Naval Operations to the Western Pacific which refreshed my memory concerning the [10737] date of the winds message. I would like to comment in that connection that there is at least the implication in Mr. Gearhart's question that something in this connection had been pointed out to me. I rather categorically, I believe, denied that implication.

I would like to state further that these dispatches were made available to me last fall—not only these, but records of prior inquiries into the Pearl Harbor affair and many other documents—but I never undertook a study of them until about 2 weeks ago. Attention was again directed to these four dispatches by Captain Safford's statement of about a week ago.

Last Saturday while Captain Safford was still on the stand I did not come to this hearing but took time out to go to the Navy Building where these Japanese diplomatic files were held in order to make a study of them for the first time since 1941. It was while studying the files that I first recalled the episode in Admiral Noyes office concerning the drafting of these dispatches. That is in essence primarily the basis for the refreshing of my memory.

The last thing that I should like to bring up now is two pieces of paper I have before me summarizing the study I undertook last night, which was fairly exhaustive, in connection with the question that Senator Ferguson asked me [10738] at the close of the hearing yesterday afternoon. I believe I can answer his question now with some exactitude.

I would like to state, however, that giving this information verbally will undoubtedly appear rather complicated. I have, a few minutes ago, suggested to counsel that it might be better, more readily assimilated, if a smooth copy of this study were prepared and possibly made an exhibit in this hearing.¹

Senator FERGUSON. My only reason for wanting it now is that I would like to ask you some questions on this.

Captain KRAMER. I can read this thing; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you can later file it as a clear copy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, Captain, you may proceed with it as you have it and later prepare a smooth copy and submit it to counsel for inclusion as an exhibit.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Yesterday afternoon when being questioned concerning this so-called pilot message I made the statement that I believed that the pilot message had arrived sometime late Saturday afternoon, 6 December 1941, or Saturday evening, and that I believed it was distributed Saturday evening with the Japanese note and other papers. I find as a result of [10739] my study last night that the pilot message was not disseminated, at least in the Navy, until Sunday morning subsequent to 10 o'clock, at the time when the so-called hidden word message and a number of other short messages, including the 1 o'clock message, were disseminated.

¹ The document appears in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5481.

[10740] The messages disseminated Saturday evening were JD File No. 7138, 39, 40, 41, 42, and 43, the last one being the Japanese note.

Senator FERGUSON. May I just ask the reporter—

Captain KRAMER. These messages, with the exception of two, appear in exhibit 1, on the following pages.

Senator FERGUSON. May I just have the reporter read me the last answer? I missed one of those numbers.

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. The Japanese note?

Captain KRAMER. The 14-part note.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Pardon me there. That was the first 13 parts.

Captain KRAMER. The first 13 parts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of the 14-part note.

Captain KRAMER. Of the 14-part note, that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that was what was distributed on Saturday evening?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you give us the pages of Exhibit 1 that they are at?

Captain KRAMER. The first one, 7138, does not appear in Exhibit 1. I do not know whether it appears elsewhere in this [10741] record or not. The subject is a dispatch from Berlin to Tokyo concerning an interview with Herr Ribbentrop. 7139 appears on page 235 of exhibit 1.

Senator FERGUSON. Page 235; just a moment. That is the long dispatch from Washington to Tokyo?

Captain KRAMER. Concerning an interview on 5 December.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. 7140 appears on page 234 of Exhibit 1.

Senator FERGUSON. Which one of those messages? "In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy"?

Captain KRAMER. It is Tokyo to Washington, serial No. 896.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, yes, the one at the bottom of the page.

Captain KRAMER. Concerning Terasaki going out of this country.

Senator FERGUSON. And Ando?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They were to go out the next couple of days?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. All right.

Captain KRAMER. 7141 does not appear in Exhibit 1 but its subject is a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo dated 5 [10742] December 1941 to the effect that Ambassador Nomura wanted to keep Terasaki for the moment because of work in hand. 7142 appears on page 237 of Exhibit 1.

Senator FERGUSON. What one of those messages?

Captain KRAMER. It is Tokyo to Washington, serial 897, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the one at the bottom of the page.
[Reading:]

What I meant in paragraph 2 of my #867 was that of the two sets of "B" code machines with which your office is equipped, you are to burn one set and for the time being to continue the use of the other.

Captain KRAMER. Exactly, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. 7143 is the Japanese first thirteen parts of the Japanese note.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, that was the Saturday night deliveries?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, does that complete the statement you desired to make before examination is resumed, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. The Senator, I understood, desired to determine what was delivered when on Sunday morning. I am [10743] coming to that now.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. The first delivery, take Sunday morning first.

Captain KRAMER. I find as a result of my study last night that I have been under a slightly erroneous impression during the past four years as to precisely what was delivered when on Sunday morning. I will further elucidate that now.

Prior to the deliveries made by me commencing about 10:30 Sunday morning the only additional material disseminated earlier that Sunday morning, that is, additional to the material of the previous evening, was the fourteenth part Japanese note.

On Sunday morning at 10:30 the following file numbers were delivered: 7144—

Senator FERGUSON. 7144; and where do we find that in Exhibit 1?

Captain KRAMER. I will give all those in a moment, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, thank you.

Captain KRAMER. Through 7151, inclusive.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us where 7144 is in exhibit 1?

Captain KRAMER. It is on page 245 of Exhibit 1, the one concerning a typist in the Japanese embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the typist, all right.

[10744] Captain KRAMER. 7145 is on page 248 of Exhibit 1, Tokyo to Washington, serial 907.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the top of the page; that is the one o'clock message?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. 7146 is on page 249 also.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the next message?

Captain KRAMER. That is Tokyo serial 908.

Senator FERGUSON. That is "Thank you to the two Ambassadors"?

Captain KRAMER. To the two Ambassadors, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. 7147 is on page 249 of Exhibit 1.

Senator FERGUSON. Which one is that?

Captain KRAMER. That is the one, namely, Tokyo serial 910, concerning the final destruction of cryptographic and other classified material.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. 7148 is the so-called hidden word message appearing on page 251.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. 7149 is the so-called pilot message appearing on page 238 of Exhibit 1.

[10745] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. 7150 does not appear in Exhibit 1 or elsewhere in this testimony so far as I am aware.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you seen it?

Captain KRAMER. The subject of it is a very short dispatch Tokyo to Washington, serial 905, concerning U. P. and A. P. reports regarding a message from Mr. Roosevelt to the Japanese Emperor.

Senator FERGUSON. What does it say about it?

Captain KRAMER. It makes inquiries as to its subject and when it was sent.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. How about 7151?

Captain KRAMER. That one is on page 248, Tokyo serial 909, subject, "Thanks to the commercial attaché and members of the embassy staff."

Senator FERGUSON. I thought you gave us that one before under 46?

Captain KRAMER. That was "thanks to the two Ambassadors."

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, I see, yes.

Captain KRAMER. Those were the dispatches delivered at 10:30 on Sunday morning, sir. I would like to point out, sir, additional material I have on this paper and refer also to previous testimony I have given concerning the chronological arrangement of these dispatches.

[10746] File No. 7138 through 7143, inclusive, are chronologically dated 3 December, 5 December, 5 December, 5 December, 6 December, 6 December.

The group 7144 through 7151 are chronologically dated 6 December, 7 December, 7 December, 7 December, 7 December, and then 6 December, 6 December, 7 December.

Those last three which commenced with the pilot message and end with the "thanks to the commercial attache" I now recall specifically for the first time. The first five of these, up to the hidden word message, but not including the hidden word message—I must amend that.

The first four of these were in folders which I was about to leave the office to distribute when the hidden word message came in. At about the same time, to my present recollection, the three messages 7149 through 7151 were delivered to my office by Army. Since, in order to insert the hidden word message which I was dictating to my chief yeoman into the folders I was about to disseminate, the folders had to be broken apart, I directed at that time that the three newly arriving messages from Army also be inserted in those folders. That is the reason for the slight discrepancy in the chronological arrangement of all these dispatches in this folder, which was our invariable practice.

I hope that answers your question, sir.

[10747] Senator FERGUSON. It answers it but I don't know as it makes it any clearer.

Captain KRAMER. I realize that that pilot message apparently complicates previous testimony given here but, nevertheless, that is my present conviction on the time that that pilot message was delivered based on my refreshing of memory of last night.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't want the answer that I made that I said it doesn't make it any clearer to indicate that I am commenting on

the evidence at all, but now I do want to get something about this pilot message.

If you did not know what this pilot message was until 10:30 in the morning on Sunday morning how did you know there was going to be a fourteenth part?

Captain KRAMER. Because, sir, when the first part of this 14-part message was broken down after decryption of the first few lines there appears, as there appeared in every Japanese dispatch, an indication of how many parts were in that dispatch and which part that was. My recollection is that the first part broken down was the eighth part of a 14-part message. The time when that occurred, to my best recollection, was about 3 p. m. Saturday afternoon. That made it immediately apparent that 14 parts were due to come in.

[10748] Senator FERGUSON. How did you know without the pilot message that you were going to get an answer to the 26th note and that is what you were all standing by for and working on?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, at least, know positively but certainly at the time and now presumed from the context of the parts we were breaking down that that must be the reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether message 900 came in on the same teletype as 901, the pilot message?

Captain KRAMER. I have no record of Tokyo serial 900 in the study I made last night, sir. I might add that—

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in the Navy Department—pardon me, I don't want to cut you off.

Captain KRAMER. And I believe Tokyo serials 903 and 906 do not appear as a part of this record. My recollection of a phone call made last night is that we have 906 but never intercepted or received 903.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question. Did you work in the Navy Department last night?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. With whom did you work?

Captain KRAMER. Commander Boone, the custodian of the file I referred to.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was then that you made up the [10749] information that you gave us that morning?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now I will ask you what time 901 came in and what message was on the same teletype?

Captain KRAMER. I have no knowledge concerning that, sir; since I had no direct contact at any time with the incoming teletype traffic except on the rare occasions when I examined it, chiefly during the period of ten days preceding Pearl Harbor, examining plain language traffic.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, what is in that file specifically to show that you did not get 901, which is the pilot message, until after 10 or 10:30 on Sunday morning? What was there in the file?

Captain KRAMER. I am speaking, Senator, in my comments from this study only of the time it was received in the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. What is in the file of the Navy Department to show what time 901, the pilot message, was received in the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. We used no time stamp in my section of the Navy Department, sir, at any time. However, every time a delivery was made by me, and they were frequent, between Saturday noon and Sunday noon, all messages on hand completely translated, either by Navy or Army, were disseminated [10750] at once.

Senator FERGUSON. That did not answer my question at all.

Captain KRAMER. I am sorry, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked you what there was in the Navy Department to show the time of the delivery, or the receipt of 901, the pilot message, in the Navy Department?

Captain KRAMER. I thought I was answering your question directly in my previous comments. I should like to further elucidate by extending my answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Don't elucidate. Just answer that question and then we will let you elucidate.

Captain KRAMER. If that pilot message had been in my section when I left the office at 9:30 I would very definitely have made delivery at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, what—

Captain KRAMER. It was not in my office at that time, namely, 9:30, I am thoroughly convinced now, but arrived not during the intervening period between the time I left my office and returned to my office, but at about the time I was leaving my office for the second time. If it had been in my office when the folders were first made up for my departure on my second trip it would have been included chronologically with the group file Nos. 7144 through 7148 in num- [10751] bering that group of messages.

Senator FERGUSON. What is in your office now to show when the pilot message was received? Now, watch the question. I want to know what I can look at in your office in the Navy Department to show what time 901, the pilot message, was received?

Captain KRAMER. You can look at nothing which will positively indicate when the pilot message was received that I am aware of, sir; except the file which I studied last night, which I am attempting to interpret to you, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, I want that file brought here that we may see how you made that study. Have you got the file here?

Captain KRAMER. I do not have it, sir. I understood that Commander Boone would be here this morning with it. I am not familiar with whether he is here or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Will counsel get in touch with Commander Boone so that we can get this file? ¹

Now, what was there in that file? Tell me from your memory what was in that file to show that the pilot message was not translated prior to your delivery at 9 o'clock Saturday evening?

Captain KRAMER. There is nothing whatsoever in the file, Senator, to show definitely one way or another that point. [10752] I am only trying to indicate that that point is my present recollection and conviction as the result of studying that group of messages.

Senator FERGUSON. But yesterday you had no doubt in your mind that the pilot message was with the 13 parts because you described it and you discussed it with these various men.

¹ See Hearings, Part 8, p. 8800.

Captain KRAMER. I am sorry, sir; if I created that impression. I believe the first time, or the first few minutes that question was propounded to me I was rather doubtful and so expressed myself, as to the time the pilot message was received in the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you be able to get in this Navy file teletype serial Nos. 347 and 348, the initial "S" before it, Tokyo serial 900 and 901, and see whether or not these two messages, one of them being the pilot message, came in on the same teletype and were logged by Davis on the third and fourth messages on his watch?

Captain KRAMER. I will undertake that, sir. I have previously indicated, I believe, that I had no direct connection with such teletype receipts, however, so I have no first-hand knowledge concerning the technicalities of that matter.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. And that that message was [10753] received in the Navy Department about 8 o'clock local time on the 6th day of December 1941 and whether it was not sent to the Army and whether it was not decoded by them and delivered on Saturday afternoon.

"General Miles"—this is on page 3590.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of what, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Of our record. General Miles says, "Senator"—I had better go back and read something. I am examining; the Senator from Michigan is examining Miles. [Reading:]

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to get an answer to this question: If your department was alerted as you expected Hawaii to be alerted by the same message, how do you account personally for the pilot message not being delivered to General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, who was the only man under his testimony that could act, he or the President or the Secretary of War, as I understand his testimony? Now, how do you account for that pilot message that came in separately, not part of the fourteen parts, that that was not delivered on the day it was translated?

Miles says:

Senator, my answer is, first, that I had every reason to believe that General Marshall did receive the [10764] locked pouch which contained this message. I heard this testimony this morning. I think he is mistaken in saying that he did not receive that message on the afternoon of the 6th.

Captain KRAMER. I cannot presume to state anything regarding the Army dissemination of that pilot message, Senator. I was commenting only concerning my dissemination of that pilot message in the Navy Department and to the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, you haven't any idea, the way you testify this morning, that this pilot message which is numbered prior and received at some time early on the morning of the 6th you had no knowledge of that before you had the thirteen parts and even the fourteenth part?

Captain KRAMER. That is my present conviction. That was my conviction at the time I first commented on that point, sir, that at the time we were getting the first parts of that Japanese note we still had no knowledge of a Japanese note coming to us.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, let us take 901 from the information that we get.

Filed by the Japanese 8:56 P. M. on the 6th, Tokyo time: Washington time 6:56 A. M., December the 6th.

[10755] That is Saturday morning, 6:56.

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge Island, Washington) at 7:15 to 7:20 A. M., December the 6th.

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N & A)—

blank time.

Teletype sheet containing Japanese code received by Army SIS from Navy (A) 12:05 P. M. December the 6th.

Decoded, translated and typed at Army SIS (A) on the 6th of December.

Now, that is before midnight?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you account for this important pilot message not getting to the Navy before 10:30 on Sunday morning and after the fourteenth part was translated by you?

Captain KRAMER. Senator, in my reading a few minutes ago from this study of mine I indicated that as a result of a refreshed memory from the study last night that the only additional material disseminated in my first trips on Sunday morning was the fourteenth part of the note from Japan which I finished translating about 8 o'clock Sunday morning.

It is apparent to me now that no deliveries of translations was made to my section by Army until my return from the [10756] State Department after my 10 o'clock appointment there. Six—rather, seven of the translations appearing under these file numbers 7144 through 7151 are Army translations. The only translation in that block is one Navy translation, the so-called hidden word message. If any Army translations had been delivered to my section prior to my return from Mr. Hull's office or, rather, perhaps prior to my departure for Mr. Hull's office I would most definitely have made delivery at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I will come back to this question: What is there in the file that the committee can look at. This has been furnished to us by the services, this information that I told you about, 12:05 on December the 6th, "Decoded, translated and typed at Army SIS on December the 6th." Now, what is there in the Navy file that this committee can look at to show that this message did not get to you until 10:30, which was after the time you had already delivered the fourteenth part message? I want to know what is there in the file that we can look at?

Captain KRAMER. Nothing, sir, except what I have already outlined.

Senator FERGUSON. What is it? Now, tell us, what can we look at?

Captain KRAMER. The file itself, Senator.

[10757] Senator FERGUSON. What is in there that will show us this that you are telling us, that it did not get to you on the sixth?

Captain KRAMER. Nothing more than the translations themselves bearing the various file numbers.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Is the man here with that file now?

Commander BAECHE. You mean 901, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. 901. It shows what he examined last night in the Navy. There is the difficulty we find here, that the Navy—they can examine things down in the Navy and this committee cannot receive them here so that we know what these men are talking about.

Commander BAECHE. Senator, the man has brought the file up here. He is in the phone booth now. We can find out whether it is that one or not.

Senator FERGUSON. See if it is that particular one. I want to know what the witness saw in the Navy Department last night. You saw a file?

Captain KRAMER. A file; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And I want that file brought into the committee room, and then we can find out what you saw instead of you just telling us.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, there was no [10758] reference to this file up until 4 or 5 minutes ago; we have never seen it. We are not clairvoyants, and I don't think the Navy Department is either. It seems to me that if the Senator wants it, and I think he is entitled to it, and I would like to see it myself, that we should possess ourselves in patience until the Navy can get it here. I rather gathered from the Senator's remarks that he was criticizing the Navy in some respect.

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Of course, as far as we are concerned, we don't care.

Senator FERGUSON. But if a man goes in and examines a file in the evening and comes up here and testifies about it in the morning—and, as I understand, there is some conflict between what he said yesterday and now—it would be well for the committee to see what is in the file to ascertain what he saw last night to change his opinion this morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, I agree entirely, and 7001—

Senator FERGUSON. 7001 is what is necessary.

Mr. RICHARDSON. 7001 is here for examination and has been here for a couple of days now.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, the other one is number what?

[10759] Senator FERGUSON. I don't know the number. He did not state a number.

Captain KRAMER. There is simply one file involved, Mr. Counsellor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, we will have that here very, very shortly for you, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked earlier this morning for message 900. I will pass that part for the time being.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. At one time before Admiral Hewitt there were as many as three witnesses present. Why wouldn't it be a good idea to have the Army, or whoever prepared exhibit 41, present so that we would have the Army witness on those times and the Navy witness and then get the whole picture cleared up?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it looks like we do well enough if we proceed with one witness at a time. Go ahead, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I won't take any more time than I have to on this, but I would like to get it cleared up. It is a matter that ought to be at least clear on the record.

Now, you appeared before the Navy court, did you?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I did.

[10760] Senator FERGUSON. And they say in question No. 85:

I show you exhibit 38 of exhibit 63 and ask you if you had this about the 6th of December 1941 and, if so, at what time? This is the dispatch informing the Japanese legation that a long dispatch will be transmitted shortly and setting

forth that a definite time would be given later as to the delivery of the long dispatch.

A. I believe that that was received and delivered the evening of the 6th, along with the first thirteen parts.

Q. Was that one of the dispatches that was referred to in your previous testimony as being some of the other material?

A. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Now, that was back when you testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry.

Captain KRAMER. In that respect, Senator, it is obvious to me now that my memory was faulty after 2 years intervening since I had had contact with that material.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Captain, there was a Commission appointed by the President within a few days after Pearl Harbor, isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. If you refer to the Roberts Commission; [10761] yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That Presidential Commission was to make an inquiry, isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. I believe so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And at that time I assume that you thought you would be called as a witness.

Captain KRAMER. I was uncertain about that point. The fact is, I never was called.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize you were not called but I am just trying to get at that time that at least you expected you would be called because you were one of the men who delivered messages.

Captain KRAMER. I was at no time under the impression that I was likely to be called, although there was the possibility I might be called.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you understand then that the Roberts Commission was not to investigate Washington, that you would not be called because they were not going to investigate Washington?

Captain KRAMER. My only knowledge, Senator, of what took place before the Roberts hearing was and still is the result of a few conversations I had with Captain McCollum who was a witness and the report subsequently published concerning that hearing.

[10762] Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to get at, Captain, is when you knew that this Commission was meeting and that you were one of the interested parties, why you did not review in your own mind this situation and see whether or not anything had happened in your office or in your deliveries that went wrong. Did you do that?

Captain KRAMER. Senator, at no time subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor did I attempt to refresh my memory in that respect until the arrival of Captain Safford's first letter to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, here is the proposition: You had delivered the 14 parts?

Senator FERGUSON. Thirteen and the fourteenth the next morning?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that a message had been sent by General Marshall?

Captain KRAMER. I was not aware of that until after the Roberts hearings were finished, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You then did not go over this in your own mind in any way to know what you had delivered? You were not concerned with it?

Captain KRAMER. I recollect no attempt to refresh my [10763] memory in that respect. My feeling now is that my memory would have been quite clear in the possibility I was called before this hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean before the Roberts hearing?

Captain KRAMER. The Roberts hearing; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I am going to just briefly, if I can, review whom you delivered the 13-part message to and these others that you say you delivered at the same time on Saturday evening.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give McCollum a copy?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I did not. I phoned him, however, about 9 o'clock concerning the note. I would like to comment further——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just suppose you answer his questions, sir, and then later on do the commenting.

Captain KRAMER. Omit that comment.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not give a copy to McCollum. You telephoned to him about it. Now, you next say that the next place of your delivery or telephone to anyone that you reached was the White House, the map room.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You delivered a copy there and left a copy there?

[10764] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There isn't any doubt now in your mind about that?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever and there never has been, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You went out to Secretary Knox, the next delivery?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you made a delivery at Secretary Knox of all this material and he read it all?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you leave any copies of the 13 parts with Secretary Knox?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you went to Wilkinson's home and you found there three men that were entitled to see this, Admiral Beardall, Admiral Wilkinson, and General Miles?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They read all of this material, each of them?

Captain KRAMER. They did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the comments were as you have said, [10765] isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. In that tenor; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, did you leave any copy with them?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, you went home?

Captain KRAMER. I went to the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You went to the Navy Department and you had in your possession then every one of the copies of the 13 parts, except the one you left at the White House?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir, with the exception that by 9 o'clock 7 copies of all this material, so far as Navy translations are concerned, had been or were delivered to the Army Signal Intelligence section.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. In other words, the Navy deliveries had all been made that you could make, and you had delivered them to the Army at 9 o'clock that night, all these messages?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And to whom were they delivered in the Army?

Captain KRAMER. I have no first-hand knowledge of that, [10766] sir. My presumption is that they were delivered to the same section of the Signal Intelligence that all this material was always delivered to.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would be to Colonel Bratton's section?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. Colonel Bratton was in the Far East section, the head of the Far East section of Military Intelligence. All this material was delivered initially to the Army Signal Intelligence section, which then delivered to Colonel Bratton.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, the Army Intelligence. Now, as I understand it, you brought this file back, as far as the Navy copies were concerned, and put them in your safe?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you telephone Ingersoll and—you know who I mean by Admiral Ingersoll?

Captain KRAMER. I do, sir; and I did not telephone Admiral Ingersoll and I can recollect now no occasion during 1940 or 1941 that I did phone Admiral Ingersoll or attempt to make deliveries directly or initially to him except on the few occasions when he was in his office during working hours and Admiral Stark was absent.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did not deliver to Ingersoll that night any of these copies?

[10767] Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Nor the next morning?

Captain KRAMER. Not directly to Admiral Ingersoll; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was not at Wilkinson's?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; not to my present recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was not at the Secretary of the Navy's?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was not at the map room in the White House?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I am now going to ask you if you can explain his testimony on page 59 of the Navy inquiry. This is extracted testimony of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, pages 824 to 842, inclusive, this is on page 829.

Now, Royal E. Ingersoll was the Chief—what do you call him—to Admiral Stark?

Captain KRAMER. That post was at that time, as I recollect it, termed the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. And you told me yesterday that you had not delivered him a copy. You knew who I was talking about yesterday?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10768] Senator FERGUSON. And no one had a copy except the White House, as far as the Navy was concerned?

Captain KRAMER. That night; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you know of any reason why the Army would go out of its way to deliver to Ingersoll a copy of this message?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot comment directly on that, Senator. It is possible, however, that Admiral Ingersoll may have seen a copy of that message pursuant to any deliveries Colonel Bratton may have made that night, in the same manner that General Miles saw the file I was delivering that night.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, he may have been at a place where Bratton had delivered a copy that night?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not have any assistants that night delivering these messages on the thirteen parts, did you?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; except that of my wife, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And she remained in the car?

Captain KRAMER. Most of the time except the latter part of my stay at Admiral Wilkinson's home.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Well, you know that she did not deliver any copy to Admiral Ingersoll?

Captain KRAMER. My wife at no time was ever cognizant [10769] of the precise nature of these messages.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. [Reading:]

56. Q. You have testified that you did see a rather long dispatch. Did you say it was on the night of December 6?

A. It was some time during the night of December 6 or 7. I don't know whether it was before or after midnight.

57. Q. You do not mean the night of December 7?

A. It was some time during the very late evening of December 6 or the early morning of December 7. Whether or not it was before or after midnight, I don't recall.

58. Q. You have also testified that, as you remember, the latter portion of this rather long message was missing?

A. As I remember, the officer who brought the dispatch to the house stated that there was a part of the message missing. I think he told me it was the latter part.

59. Q. Did the tone of this rather long message which you say you received on the night of 6th-7th of December 1941 indicate a friendly or conciliatory spirit on the part of the Japanese?

[10770] A. No; because it merely confirmed the whole course of negotiations from the very beginning. This message was nothing but a smoke screen, eye wash, and window dressing for the record.

60. Q. Did you have any opinion at the time you saw this dispatch that diplomatic negotiations were then broken off officially?

A. So far as the Navy Department was concerned, negotiations with the Japanese had stopped about the 27th of November.

Now, will you account for Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll's testimony in that record, sworn to?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot account for that, sir. I can only presume that it must be attributed to faulty memory.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read that answer, please?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, as I understand your testimony, you telephoned to the department where Admiral Turner was, who was the superior officer to Admiral Ingersoll? You telephoned to that office, the War Plans, the Navy Plans, or what is the name of it?

Captain KRAMER. Admiral Turner was not Ingersoll's superior but his junior, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, that is right; yes, he was his [10771] junior. But you telephoned Admiral Turner and did not get him?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. And you did not get his home. He did not answer the phone?

Captain KRAMER. That is my present recollection; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you account for Turner saying that he got a copy if you did not give it to him as you say here?

Captain KRAMER. The remarks I made concerning Admiral Ingersoll would apply in the case of Admiral Turner.

[10772] Senator FERGUSON. Now I want to read to you—

Mr. KEEFE. May I get that answer?

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it, please?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Mr. KEEFE. Do I understand that to mean that the remarks you refer to that Kramer made, that he can only explain it by faulty memory?

Captain KRAMER. Or the other possibility that he may have seen some copy delivered by the Army.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that you want to say now that it is faulty memory, that you did not deliver to Ingersoll? Is that faulty memory?

Captain KRAMER. I made no delivery to Admiral Ingersoll.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are positive about that?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no faulty memory about that?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you made none to Turner, and you have no faulty memory about that?

Captain KRAMER. I am quite clear on that point, too, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Turner says, on page 5219 of the testimony, while he is being examined by Mr. Mitchell [reading]:

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

[10773] Now this is on page 5219:

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, turning now to the messages that were intercepted between Japan and her Ambassadors here in Washington on the day of the 6th and 7th of December 1941, what are known as the pilot message, the 14-part message and the 1:00 p. m. message, when did you first have called to your attention or see any part or all of those messages? You know what I am talking about?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I think I testified that my recollection is that sometime just preceding the 7th, some night, and I now believe it to have been the night of December 6th, about 11:30 p. m. an officer came to my house and I was in bed and went down and read a long dispatch in several parts. I believe that that was the dispatch in question. I asked the officer to whom he had shown these, and he said, "Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, and Secretary Knox," and I did nothing more about it.

Captain KRAMER. Senator, in that connection I should like to remark that I believe, in my present recollection, that approximately a

week, it may have been more than that, preceding Pearl Harbor I did make a delivery to Admiral Turner's home late one evening. It is possible that Admiral Turner is confusing that incident with this subject.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read on:

[10774] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, when you say that was the dispatch in question, my question was probably too broad.

Admiral TURNER. The first 13 parts.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. The first 13 parts, I believe.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What time did he say he saw it?

Admiral TURNER. 11:30 p. m.

Mr. MITCHELL. 11:30 in the evening at his house.

Admiral TURNER. About 11:30 at night.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of the 6th?

Admiral TURNER. Of the 6th; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Where had you been at about that time?

Admiral TURNER. I had been home.

Mr. MITCHELL. All evening?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. That is confirmed by a telegram which I just received from my wife as to where we were that night. She said we were home and that is my recollection.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, the next day what was the first hour you say at which you saw the 14th part and the 1 p. m.?

Admiral TURNER. I do not recall seeing the 14th part until after the attack I did see the 1 p. m. part.

I had stayed at home Sunday morning and about 10:30, as I recall it, Admiral Stark called up and said there was [10,775] a dispatch from Admiral Hart or a letter, rather, and he wanted me to come down to the office. I went down to the office, arriving there sometime, I believe, about 11:15, it may have been a little ahead of that, and it was quite urgent that a letter be written to Admiral Hart and he gave me the necessary information. I went to my office and started writing the reply and had just about finished and looked over my dispatches for the day and Admiral Stark called me on the interphone and told me to come to his office. That, as I recall, was about 12 or 12:15.

Now there isn't any doubt that Admiral Turner knew what he was talking about, the 13-part message, and that he saw it that night, is there, in your mind, from his testimony?

Captain KRAMER. That appears obvious from his testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. It further, however, obviously differs from my recollections.

Senator FERGUSON. There isn't any doubt now that you say it differs from your recollection?

Captain KRAMER. There is no doubt about that; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it very important in this case, if this committee is ever going to solve these problems, that we can get some kind of reconciliation between this testimony, so we know actually what happened and who had this knowledge [10,776] in Washington? Isn't that your opinion?

Captain KRAMER. That would be my personal opinion, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how this committee is going to get the testimony?

Captain KRAMER. I am afraid I can offer no further suggestions.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't any suggestions?

Captain KRAMER. In that connection to this committee; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it is important as to whether Ingersoll or Turner knew about this on the night of the 6th?

Captain KRAMER. I believe so; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Now do you know, or do you have any information that Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Turner were in touch with the Secretary of the Navy that night, and that somehow they got copies from there, or that the one out of the White House was circulated to anybody after you left it there that night?

Captain KRAMER. Not that I am aware of; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever heard about it?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. •

[10,777] Senator FERGUSON. So the only one, so far as the Navy was concerned, that was outside of your safe—and these were secret documents?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). Was in the White House, in the Map Room?

Captain KRAMER. So far as I am aware; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And here were two men who testified under oath, one before this committee and one before the Navy Board, that they were delivered copies on Saturday night. Have you any way that you can reconcile that? You are the only man that can reconcile that, are you not?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot reconcile that conflict; no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I just wanted to point out that at page 962 of the Naval Court of Inquiry Captain Kramer says that he had not delivered that to Admiral Turner on that evening. The same conflict existed there as it does here.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now we are back—and I am sorry this takes so much time, but I do not know of any other way to get it than to get it from witnesses, if there is even that way. As far as my ability is concerned, I seem to be unable to understand it.

[10,778] Now let us get to the morning of the 7th. I do not suppose that there was any time more important in the history of this Nation than the morning of the 7th of December 1941. Will you agree with me on that?

Captain KRAMER. Certainly during my lifetime, I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So we agree on the importance of this morning. Now you told us that the 14th part message was translated by you and ready for delivery at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 7th.

Captain KRAMER. About that time, or a very few minutes after; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. We will then speak of it as 8 o'clock, and you delivered that to the head of the Far Eastern Section, which was McCollum?

Captain KRAMER. I have a quite definite recollection that the first time Captain McCollum saw any part of this note, the 14th part was included. I had informed him the previous night about the 13 parts and he had told me in words to the effect that he would be down early the following morning and would look at it then.

Senator FERGUSON. Now how early did you see him Sunday morning?

Captain KRAMER. My present recollection on that is [10779] that it was between 8 and 8:15.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore you delivered to him this 14th part and the 13 parts at that time?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; together with other traffic.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; with this other traffic that you have mentioned.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that in your office or his office?

Captain KRAMER. In Captain McCollum's office, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And how far was his office from yours?

Captain KRAMER. Up two decks and two corridors away in the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Two corridors and up two decks. You went to his office, I assume, with this message?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you leave the 14 parts with him?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir. Invariably, a copy of all this traffic was left in the Far East Section for periods varying from a few days to, more normally, several weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you leave more than one copy there?

Captain KRAMER. My present recollection is that I left several copies with him, so that he could make delivery as [10780] soon as he learned that Admiral Stark or Admiral Wilkinson arrived at the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Then between 8 and 8:15 he had copies for Stark and Wilkinson?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. That was Stark and Wilkinson.

Captain KRAMER. Presumably for Admiral Turner, too, who could be shown one of those copies.

Senator FERGUSON. You left two copies with him?

Captain KRAMER. That is my present recollection, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your present recollection?

Captain KRAMER. Yes; that is, two copies in addition to the one for the Far East Section.

Senator FERGUSON. That would make three copies that you left?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; that is my present recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Three out of seven, one being at the White House, that left three in your possession, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now did he say that he had an appointment with Admiral Stark that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I recollect no comment of that nature; no, sir.

[10781] Senator FERGUSON. But you had been told by Wilkinson that Stark would be down at the office?

Captain KRAMER. It was not quite as categorical as that, sir. It was to the effect that Admiral Stark would almost certainly, or very likely, some words to that effect, be at the Navy Department early the next morning and I was to get it to him as soon as he arrived there.

[10782] Senator FERGUSON. Now, as far as McCollum was concerned, he did not mention what time Stark would be down, or

whether Stark would be down—and when I use “Stark” I would like to have the stenographer always put the word “Admiral” before it, because this is no disrespect—

Captain KRAMER. No mention whatsoever that I recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you left the copy there and then you went out of the office. You left the three copies and you left the office?

Captain KRAMER. Returning to my office; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Now, wasn't it your duty at that time to deliver at 8:15 or 8 o'clock a copy of this fourteenth part to the Secretary of the Navy, to the President of the United States, wasn't it your duty to do that? Why did you go to the office and keep your copies there, and not make your deliveries?

Captain KRAMER. Senator, in all my activities concerned with the dissemination or delivery of this traffic, I was acting as a subordinate of Captain McCollum, and Director of Naval Intelligence. Frequent diversions on their direction, were made from routine. I, as a rule, attempted to get all traffic to Captain McCollum, or [10783] Admiral Wilkinson, or both, prior to deliveries to any other recipient. If they had instructions concerning a particular folder, they would give them to me at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am going to get at now. Did they have instructions, did they give you any instructions in relation to that folder, that you did not make a delivery to the White House and one to the Secretary of the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. None that I recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, do I understand that you made no deliveries unless you had specific directions or instructions from McCollum?

Captain KRAMER. That is not correct, sir. Frequently, when unable to contact Captain McCollum, in fact, normally when I was unable to contact Captain McCollum, or Admiral Wilkinson, I made deliveries, as far as possible, to all other recipients, and informed those two officers, as soon as practicable, of who had these copies.

Senator FERGUSON. You had then specific instructions to deliver to the President of the United States the 13 parts on Saturday night, did you?

Captain KRAMER. I had no specific instructions. I made that in pursuance of what I have just outlined.

[10784] Senator FERGUSON. Then I will ask you why the same rule did not apply the next morning at 8 o'clock when you had a copy, and you knew how important the fourteenth part was, because it had at the top of it “Very Important,” even by the Japanese, why you did not immediately take that to the President of the United States.

Captain KRAMER. I informed Captain McCollum of my 1 o'clock appointment—rather my 10 o'clock appointment at the State Department; outlined to him at that time in more detail just what deliveries had been made the night before; indicated to him that I had work in hand in my office, and at least gained the impression that my contemplated departure from the Navy Department a half or three-quarters or perhaps an hour later would be sufficiently rapid delivery of this material, which, I should like to further comment on, was

far more expeditious than had been the case on any other day during 1941, prior to this time.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you what deliveries you had ever made to the Secretary of the Navy at his home at night before; I mean you personally?

Captain KRAMER. I can recollect no previous occasion when I delivered personally to Secretary Knox at his home. In elucidation of that point, I should like to mention, [10785] however, that my initial attempt in deliveries to the Secretary of the Navy was always to get his Naval Aide, then Captain and now Admiral Beatty, who customarily took any copies for the Secretary's perusal.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever delivered personally to the President a message at 9 o'clock, or any time at night, other than on this, December 6?

Captain KRAMER. Not at night, personally, to the President, sir. The only occasion when I did make personal delivery in the late summer or early fall of 1941, was late in the afternoon, as I recollect, 5 or 5:30 p. m.

On another occasion, in fact two other occasions, on the direction of Admiral Stark, I made late evening deliveries to Mr. Hopkins in the Naval Hospital, then located at the west end of Constitution Avenue.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, do I understand Mr. Harry Hopkins was on the list to get these secret code messages? Is that what you are telling me?

Captain KRAMER. He was not on any list; no, sir; but I was given to understand by Admiral Stark that he customarily saw the copy left for the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell me what messages [10786] you delivered to Harry Hopkins on the instructions of Admiral Stark?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall specifically what messages, sir. I might be able to reconstruct that by an examination of the files, although I doubt it. However, it could be determined within limits, by determining the dates during which Mr. Hopkins was in the hospital. My recollection is, in connection with those deliveries to Mr. Hopkins that Admiral Stark indicated, or told me, or asked me rather, whether I had any instructions from the White House to show these copies to Mr. Hopkins during his hospitalization.

On my reply in the negative, he directed me to make such delivery.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, over how long a period did this delivery to Harry Hopkins, or Mr. Hopkins, continue?

Captain KRAMER. My present recollection is, sir, that it occurred twice, about 4 or 5 days apart, during one period of Mr. Hopkins' hospitalization.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom did you deliver that? Mr. Hopkins personally?

Captain KRAMER. I sat with Mr. Hopkins while he perused them; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were in the room, you delivered [10787] them personally, and you waited until he went over the messages? They were magic, no doubt about that?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Purple?

Captain KRAMER. Purple and other systems, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you evaluate them for Mr. Hopkins, or did he evaluate them for you, or did you discuss them?

Captain KRAMER. I commented on them, yes, sir; elucidated references, names, and some background in connection therewith, if that may be termed evaluation; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is some evaluation, is it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did Mr. Hopkins discuss these secret messages with you?

Captain KRAMER. There was a rather extended discussion, not only concerning these messages, but various security aspects of this work during my first visit to Mr. Hopkins.

Senator FERGUSON. And what month was this in, that you delivered these secret codes to Mr. Hopkins?

Captain KRAMER. I am not certain of the month, sir. My recollection is it was the late summer or early fall of 1941.

[10788] Senator FERGUSON. Now, was this a delivery over and above what you took to the White House, or did you not deliver those to the White House when you took them to Mr. Hopkins?

Captain KRAMER. This was a delivery over and above the delivery to the White House. It was the first occasion I had made such delivery to Mr. Hopkins.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, Admiral Stark told you Mr. Hopkins was evaluating these and therefore you should make these deliveries?

Captain KRAMER. I recollect no comment to the effect that Mr. Hopkins was evaluating this traffic, but that Mr. Hopkins customarily saw this traffic in the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, will you tell me, after you remember this conversation about the messages, and so forth, what the messages were?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot recall precisely. My guess at this time is that they chiefly concerned the United States-Japanese negotiations.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that, of course, is what this purple system was, wasn't it, concerning the negotiations between Japan and the United States?

Captain KRAMER. In the purple system, Senator, there [10789] were not only messages concerning our negotiations by messages directed to approximately one dozen other Japanese major diplomatic posts which held this purple machine.

Senator FERGUSON. So this is between the United States and Japan, these messages, on that diplomatic phase of it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did Mr. Hopkins at that time comment on these two messages?

Captain KRAMER. There were not two messages, sir. I did not mean to imply that. There were two folders involved.

Senator FERGUSON. Two folders. Did he comment on the folders, on what was in the folders at different times?

Captain KRAMER. There was conversation, as I have outlined, concerning the various messages in these two folders, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not this rather impress you, delivering this outside the White House and to Mr. Hopkins, so you can re-

member what the conversation was? He was the only civilian outside of the Navy that had ever seen or heard of this magic, isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. The State Department officials saw it, sir, and they were civilians.

[10790] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. Mr. KNOX was a civilian and Mr. Stimson was a civilian.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anybody else besides Hopkins, the Secretary of State's office, and the Secretary of the Navy? Was there anybody else?

Captain KRAMER. I am familiar only in a general way with what civilians in the State Department or in the White House, might possibly have seen this traffic.

In the case of the White House I have no first-hand knowledge other than that I knew that the naval aide, or during the period when there was none, Surgeon General McIntire, was seeing this.

The first definite information to me that Mr. Hopkins was seeing this was Admiral Stark's comment to me.

In the case of the State Department, I knew that Mr. Welles, that Mr. Hornbeck, the political adviser on Far Eastern affairs, and that Mr. Hamilton, the head of the Far East Division of the State Department, were regularly seeing this. I am under the impression that there may have been one or two or more others who were seeing this.

Senator FERGUSON. In the State Department?

Captain KRAMER. In the State Department, although when this material was first introduced to the State Department on a regular basis, it was only after a conference attended by Admiral Anderson, then director of Naval Intelligence, his opposite number in Army Intelligence, Colonel Bratton, Captain McCollum, and myself in Mr. Hull's office, during which conference, chiefly Admiral Anderson, as I now recollect it, commented at some length on the security features absolutely essential to handling this material. [10791]

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did I understand that when you delivered these to Mr. Hopkins, it was only when you had specific instructions from Admiral Stark and that is why you only did it twice?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think of delivering the 13 parts on the night of the 6th to Mr. Hopkins? Was there anything said about that?

Captain KRAMER. I made no deliveries, or I recollect no contact with Mr. Harry Hopkins other than what I mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. Those were the two occasions, and they were on specific instructions?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have given us, as well as you can, all of the instructions that you had about Mr. [10792] Hopkins?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, no one else outside of the ones you have spoken about has ever received magic, that is these intercepts?

Captain KRAMER. Not that I am presently aware of; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you think you would recall deliveries to anyone else?

Captain KRAMER. I can recall no one else; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When you went to the White House on Sunday morning with the 14th part—no; I want to go back to the Navy for a while. We got off on another course.

Now, you left at 8 o'clock or a few minutes after—you gave McCollum the reason that you were busy, as I understand it—or am I correct on that—that you did not feel you ought to go to the White House and the Secretary of the Navy that morning, because you were going to make another delivery at 10:30 to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of State?

Captain KRAMER. At 10 o'clock; yes, sir.

[10793] Senator FERGUSON. Is that right?

Captain KRAMER. That is in general correct, sir; yes sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But we have 2 hours until 10 o'clock, and we have the 14th part which is the summary of the whole thing, and the 13 parts were important enough that you went to the Secretary of the Navy's home at 9 or 9:30, you went to the President and had a message delivered to him of these 13 parts, and then you personally the next morning gave the excuse that you had something else to do and no delivery of the 14th part, which was in a way the key to the whole situation, was delayed for 2 hours in going from the Secretary of the Navy to the President of the United States; is that what you tell us? Is that what you want this committee to understand?

Captain KRAMER. In reply to those remarks and that question, Senator, I should like to state that I had two primary functions in connection with the duties of my office. One was technical. The other was purely a messenger boy function. There, of course, must at times be a conflict between priority to be given those two functions.

In order to be at the State Department to meet my appointment with Mr. Knox I would have to leave the Navy Department at about the time I did so that if Mr. Knox arrived [10794] there a few minutes before 10 o'clock I could get it to him. If at that time, speaking now of approximately 9:15, when I went to Captain McCollum's office, I had taken time to make phone calls to Mr. Knox or to other recipients, which sometimes involved 15 or 20 minutes phoning to various possible locations of these individuals, taken further time to dig up transportation to reach these individuals; my present recollection of the thought processes of that time is that time might be wasted.

My only explanation in answer to your question is that at the moment it was considered sufficiently early for me to leave when I contemplated to make these deliveries.

Senator FERGUSON. You told us yesterday, if I recall, that Admiral Wilkinson made certain that you had made a delivery of the thirteenth part to the President and one to the Secretary of Navy?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, you knew the importance of the President getting this and the Secretary of the Navy getting it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't it occur to you that morning, and to Captain McCOLLUM, that there was more than two persons in the Navy, and that there might be someone else that could [10795] be a delivery man, as you say you were, in this one case, that he could

run it, if necessary, yes, run it to the Wardman Park and run it to the White House to deliver this most important message, the fourteenth part, so that if there was going to be trouble the high, the tops in this Government could act in an emergency, and isn't it true that you felt there was an emergency or you wouldn't have taken the 13 parts at night?

Captain KRAMER. Certainly a crisis; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. A crisis. Now, didn't it occur to you or didn't Captain McCollum say something, such as "This fourteenth part must get to the President and the Secretary of Navy and to Admiral Stark?" You had read it. You had interpreted it. You had translated it. You knew how important it was; isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was more important, wasn't it, than an ultimatum? An ultimatum is usually "You do or else." This was the "else," was it not? It was no ultimatum. It was over.

Captain KRAMER. It was certainly emphatic; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And now you tell us that the reason you didn't deliver it was that you wanted to go back to your office for an hour and a half or an hour and three-quarters [10796] so you could deliver it on the same trip that you went to the Secretary of the Navy; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is not quite accurate, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you get it accurate?

Captain KRAMER. The times involved, as I have stated, was three quarters of an hour to perhaps an hour. At the time the initial delivery was made to Captain McCollum, probably around 8:15, no folders had been prepared with the 14th part inserted yet. There would be time involved in doing that clerical chore. There on the point of making an immediate delivery to Mr. Knox or other high officials I believe occurred to us the possibility that we might pass them on their way to the State Department or to the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand this, this all describes the attitude of your Department and the Navy when they were alerted to war on the Sunday morning?

Captain KRAMER. That is my present recollection of what we thought then.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you were describing as being alerted to war; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. I believe, Senator, that even in the light of hindsight a present perusal of the 14th part cannot be categorically interpreted as a Japanese intention to declare [10797] war on the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. So then you don't agree with Mr. Hull as to what he thought about that message?

Captain KRAMER. I am unaware, except in a general way from newspapers, of what Mr. Hull thought.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't read his testimony?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. So then you were undertaking to evaluate this 14th part but you had previously evaluated the 13 parts as being of such importance that you went at night and delivered it?

Captain KRAMER. I should like to state on that point, Senator, that at no time did I presume to evaluate this traffic. I did, however, offer such comments or opinions at various times as I might have had on this traffic if it were called for or appeared to be called for.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, at 9:15 was Admiral Stark in his office?

Captain KRAMER. Not to my present recollection; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what time he got down there? First, of your own knowledge, and if you don't know that, from hearsay, and who told you?

Captain KRAMER. I am still unpositive of the precise time he arrived, sir. My recollection is that he was there [10798] at about 9:30. I should like to further point out that I have previously testified and it is still my recollection that Captain McCollum indicated to me that he would get this traffic to the Admiral as soon as he arrived at the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. So that he wasn't going out for him, but he was going to wait until he arrived Sunday morning, and now you went back to your office and. I assume, started to work?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what did you do for the next hour or hour and a half?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot recall specifically, sir, except that I unquestionably was engaged in going over traffic; its precise nature I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at least, the pilot message didn't come to you in that hour and a half, did it?

Captain KRAMER. There would be no necessity of my going over a pilot message since it was a complete translation and the only function I would then have would be immediate dissemination.

Senator FERGUSON. It didn't come to your attention during that hour and a half?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; not to my present recollection [10799] and conviction.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. I am going to take that period of an hour and a half, about the time, until the time that you put it in the folder and proceeded to the White House and the Secretary of State. You know what time I am referring to, do you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The 1 o'clock message didn't come to your attention during that period?

Captain KRAMER. It did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The message in relation to the destruction of the last code machine—you know the one I am talking about?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator FERGUSON. That didn't come to your attention?

Captain KRAMER. Not to my present recollection and belief, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The other messages, the 908—I wish you would read 908 and 909 into the record, from Exhibit 1, because they have been referred to so much and they are not in the record, as I understand it.

Captain KRAMER. They are both, Senator, part of Exhibit 1, on page 248 of that exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They are in Exhibit 1. Does the [10800]
Senator desire them read into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I think they are very significant here because they convey an idea of how serious they think it is, because, as I read the two letters, they indicate at least that they are going to be interned here in the United States, that the end has come.

Captain KRAMER (reading):

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 7, 1941.

Urgent.

#908 (to be handled in Government code).

All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations, matters have come to what they are now, despite all efforts you two Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well as for what all the members of the Embassy have done.

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 7, 1941.

(Urgent) .

#909.

[10801] From Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO to Commercial Attache IGUCHI and his staff as well as to Secretary YUKI

I, together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate and heartily thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many months in behalf of our country despite all difficulties in coping with the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue to be in good health.

Senator FERGUSON. Take the last line. Does that mean anything to you? Did that indicate that they were going to be interned?

Captain KRAMER. That is not an unusual expression on the part of a Japanese, Senator. In fact, expressions of that nature appear in most correspondence, personal letters, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't found it in any of these other messages. So you didn't interpret it as meaning anything?

Captain KRAMER. This particular message, which is in the character of a personal nature, would not be unusual in that respect; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what time did you have the file completed to deliver the fourteenth part? As I understand it, this is a special delivery of one part, the fourteenth part; is that correct?

[10802] Captain KRAMER. Special delivery was not made of that one part. It was included with the traffic of the night before.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give me a description of what was with the fourteenth part?

Captain KRAMER. In some detail; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The whole message was with it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So it was 14 parts of the message, the entire message?

Captain KRAMER. The entire message; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any other messages with it?

Captain KRAMER. The messages I have described as being delivered on Saturday evening; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You included what you had in the file of Saturday evening?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you duplicated the 13 parts and those other messages and the fourteenth part. The only new material was the fourteenth part?

Captain KRAMER. Such duplication was frequent, Senator, and my answer, of course, is yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not criticizing. If I get a little insistent it is because I am just trying to get the [10803] facts.

Captain KRAMER. I do not interpret that as a criticism, Senator; I simply wanted to bring to your attention again that frequently earlier traffic references and background were included in these folders.

Senator FERGUSON. The only new material then was the 14th part?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what time of the day did you get that ready for delivery—and I am going to talk about—when I ask you questions now, when I say the 14th part it will include all the others, but I will specifically apply it to that 14th part.

Captain KRAMER. It would be sometime between the time I returned to my office from Captain McCollum's office and my departure from my office approximately 9:30. I do not recall precisely.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were told by Secretary Knox to be at the State Department with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State on Sunday morning that looked to you like a very important assignment, did it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And he instructed you what to bring with you?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10804] Senator FERGUSON. What was that instruction? Did he tell you to bring the 14th part if it came in?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you anything else?

Captain KRAMER. To bring the material that was shown him the night before, and any new material that came in including, of course, the 14th part if it had arrived.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, didn't you convey that to the people who were in the decoding section, so that if anything came in during the night, or up until the time you were getting this, that you wanted it to be in that file so you could take it to this most important meeting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. I do not believe that my instructions to the GY watch officers on departure from the Navy Department that night included any details of whom I had made deliveries to.

It was, however, as I now recollect, the specific instructions that anything further coming in on the Tokyo-to-Washington circuit should be, I should be informed about, should be called to the Navy Department, as I frequently had been on other occasions. I was not so called to the Navy Department.

I indicated, I believe, yesterday, that apparently— [10805] this is purely my present presumption—the GY watch officer exercised his own judgment about calling me, and in view of the fact that that night the Army had translators on duty, sent it over to them rather than calling me down.

[10806] Senator FERGUSON. Did you have all the translators and all of the decipherers, and decoders at work that night because of the fact that you were to meet with the three important Secretaries of this Government the next morning at 10 o'clock and they told you to bring, one of them, Secretary of the Navy, had told you to bring with you all of the messages that came in that night?

Captain KRAMER. That is not my understanding at all, Senator.

My understanding then as I now recollect it, and my present understanding is that no additional watches were put on that Saturday night with the exception of the translator watch in the War Department instituted for the first time that evening.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, the alert, so-called, in your department was not changed, the regular procedure took place on Saturday night and Sunday morning that had taken place on previous Saturdays and Sundays?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So this message, this information that you got from the Secretary of the Navy, really didn't change things at all; it went on the same as in the usual way; isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. The usual way, yes, Senator; but I [10807] should like to point out that we were working then at capacity trying strenuously at the same time to train additional experts in cryptanalysis and translation to amplify the scope of our efforts.

If any additional watch—and this is again purely my present presumption—

Senator FERGUSON. I don't want presumptions.

Captain KRAMER (continuing). Had been instituted that night, it would undoubtedly, unquestionably in my opinion, have disrupted the work of these sections in following hours or days when something extremely important might also have occurred.

There was no clue to the precise date of the culmination of what appeared to be a crisis with the United States. There had been many crises during the course of 1941. I recall now specifically a number concerned during the summer of 1941 with the movements of Japanese forces, military and naval, into French Indochina. There were many other crises of a diplomatic nature during the latter part of 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this true, that there wasn't really a crisis as far as the Intelligence Branch of the Navy of the United States was concerned on that day and previous days?

[10808] Captain KRAMER. The crisis, so far as the United States was concerned, could only be deduced as being perhaps more acute than it had been earlier that year, from a reading of the 13 parts of the 14-part note.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you read the note from Tokyo to Berlin where the two parts came in indicating there was going to be war? Had you read the previous messages that things would happen automatically? Had you read this traffic, or is this true: That the Intelligence Branch was relegated to doing nothing, that the raw material was being delivered to superior officers and that, therefore, the Intelligence Branch of the Navy of the United States was, in effect, functioning on the 6th and the 7th of December 1941; is that a fair statement?

Captain KRAMER. I do not think that is quite a fair statement, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you correct it?

Captain KRAMER. I may have given the wrong impression in my reply to your previous question that our idea of the increasing acuteness of the crisis with the United States was based purely on this 13 parts of the 14-part note.

There were many other clues to that, including the things you have mentioned, namely, the note to Berlin, [10809] but also the movements of the Japanese convoy which was sighted during the week 1-7 December, and on which we had frequent reports from Admiral Hart and in order to keep contact with, special search planes had been ordered into the South China Sea.

There was also, of course, the information we had concerning contemplated Japanese action against British Malaya and Thailand. Those were a number of many clues pointing toward an increasing crisis in diplomatic relations.

There was still, however, in my present recollection of my reaction at that time, no positive clue of a definite Japanese intention to attack the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand, then, that the Intelligence Branch of the Nation only deals in positive things?

Captain KRAMER. That is not correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, why did you say that there wasn't any information which was positive that there would be any conflict with the United States if they don't deal with other things than positive information?

Captain KRAMER. I should say, Senator, in that regard, from my background on Intelligence duties, that at least three-quarters of the information with which Intelligence, at least Naval Intelligence, deals, perhaps 90 percent is [10810] of anything but a positive nature.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is this one of the troubles, that your department and you thought that Japan was going to war with the British and not with the United States; was that one of the troubles? Talking about Sunday morning.

Captain KRAMER. There was certainly a possibility, and perhaps even a probability that the Japanese contemplated hostilities with the United States. It was much more specific and definite in the case of England. The date when such hostilities would take place, however, was not known in the case of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it known as to the British?

Captain KRAMER. It was known within closer limits because of the fact that this convoy we were sighting during the latter part of that week was in a position to effect the scheme we first learned about directed toward the British and Thailand.

Senator FERGUSON. On Sunday morning did you have any doubt the Japanese were going to strike in the Kra Peninsula, and it meant war with Great Britain?

Captain KRAMER. None in my mind, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Because you knew that the Admiralty through Ambassador Winant, had sent at 10:40 the day before, [10811] on the 6th, this message:

British Admiralty reports that at 3 a. m. London time this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers.

Signed "Winant".

Then he goes on in the next telegram that he sends in at 3:05 that Saturday afternoon which we got, that they were 14 hours out. You knew about those telegrams?

Captain KRAMER. I believe, Senator, this is the first time I have ever heard of those telegrams or heard them read to me.

Senator FERGUSON. So you didn't know about these telegrams?

Captain KRAMER. I customarily did not see State Department dispatches, or for that matter, Naval Department dispatches, except occasionally some that Captain McCollum might have shown me.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, you knew from other information that Great Britain and Japan were going to war, and it was usual that war broke out on Sunday? As far as the Kra Peninsula was concerned?

[10812] Captain KRAMER. It was not positive that the Japanese contemplated an actual attack on the Kra Peninsula Sunday morning. It was, however, from an evaluation of the information we had, apparent that it was a very strong probability that they would, in view of the position of that convoy, and its capabilities of carrying out an attack Sunday morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 12:30.

If it is convenient, Senator, the committee will recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[10813]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Senator Ferguson will resume his inquiry.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. I am just going on with the Navy Department now, the fourteenth part message, which was at about 9:30 or a quarter to 10.

Captain KRAMER. It was about 9:30, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How far was it from your office to the map room in the White House?

Captain KRAMER. Between 8 and 10 blocks, I should say, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you drive or walk?

Captain KRAMER. I walked, sir. It was partly almost on the double, I should say.

Senator FERGUSON. Almost a dog trot?

Captain KRAMER. Something of that nature, sir. I at least trotted part of the way.

Senator FERGUSON. At least we have got somebody running on Sunday morning now. Is that right?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To deliver a message.

Captain KRAMER. I believe so, sir.

[10814] Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, before you went there, you went up to see McCollum again with the fourteenth part?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. I thought I stated fairly clearly that the fourteenth part was delivered to McCollum along with the 13 parts.

Senator FERGUSON. That is very clear, as to what you stated, but I understood the other day you said you went up and saw McCollum and drew some kind of a time circle.

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; that did not take place until my return from the State Department, the 10 o'clock appointment.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the second time that you got messages that morning, that you drew the time circle?

Captain KRAMER. The occasion for drawing that time circle—

Senator FERGUSON. Please answer my question, and we will get along a little faster.

Captain KRAMER. At the arrival of the 1 o'clock message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain KRAMER. My first sighting of that.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you this: You made up a file down in your office, you had the fourteenth part, the [10815] 13 parts and the other parts at 8:15.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you kept them on your desk until the time came for you to leave and go over to the White House?

Captain KRAMER. That is my present recollection, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that was satisfactory to at least McCollum?

Captain KRAMER. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When you got to the White House, it was about what time?

Captain KRAMER. I should say about a quarter of 10 sir, because my recollection is I was at the State Department after leaving the White House at 10 minutes to 10.

Senator FERGUSON. A quarter to 10.

Now, who was there to receive the pouch?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know his name, sir. It was left, however, in the situation room.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it a Naval or Military attaché or aide?

Captain KRAMER. It may have been either one or both, I do not recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel—and I think [10816] we have a letter here stating that it is impossible to find out who was the aide on Sunday morning. We know the name of the aide on Saturday night, but we cannot find the name of the aide on Sunday morning.

Now, can you help us?

Captain KRAMER. I am afraid my memory fails me in that respect, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there wasn't any doubt that Admiral Beardall knew that you were to go to the Secretary of the Navy at 10 o'clock the next morning?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, he mentioned that in Admiral Wilkin-son's home.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did he say he would get in touch with the President sometime that night?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall precisely what he said in that regard. My present impression is that he did phone probably the

situation room at the White House. At least my present impression is, and I think was at the time, that I was given to understand, when I left Admiral Wilkinson's home, that the President had seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. So you assumed then, that Admiral Beardall had talked to the White House, and learned that he had seen it, and you learned that that night from Admiral Beardall?

[10817] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever hear that there was a meeting that night and the 13 parts that you left at the White House had been delivered by other officers, or by another officer to Admiral Turner and Admiral Ingersoll? They do not say in their testimony that you delivered it.

Captain KRAMER. I know of no such possible delivery, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard of such a meeting?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, when you delivered this message, this 14th part on Sunday morning, a quarter to 10 to the map room, what did you say to the man who were in charge, the military and/or naval aide, or both?

Captain KRAMER. This is the first time I have had occasion to recollect exactly what I said at that time, Senator. I believe it was in the same tenor as my instructions had been the night before.

Senator FERGUSON. That it was very urgent, and that the President was to see it immediately?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact that Admiral Beardall was not down that morning on this important assignment?

[10818] Captain KRAMER. I cannot, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot account for that?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you are certain he was not there?

Captain KRAMER. I am not even certain of that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do you think Admiral Beardall was there to get that message that morning?

Captain KRAMER. He may have been there. In any case it has not impressed itself on my memory so that I now recollect exactly who received it at the White House that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Whoever it was, was in uniform, either the Army or the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. In those days, sir, the military officers stationed in duty in Washington, except on certain occasions, were in civilian clothes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you know that these men were authorized to receive this for the President Sunday morning?

Captain KRAMER. They were introduced to me in the first instance by then Captain Beardall as his assistants, and the purpose for his setting up the situation room with these watch officers.

[10819] Senator FERGUSON. Then they were watch officers that you had met before through Admiral Beardall?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore you had authority to deliver to them?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10819-A] Senator FERGUSON. Now, how many times did you go to the State Department that morning on the 7th?

Captain KRAMER. Twice, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You went there twice?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The first time you had just this 14th part message and you arrived there 10 minutes to?

Captain KRAMER. 10 minutes to 10, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Whom did you have a conversation with, and what was it?

Captain KRAMER. There was one I know of, and possibly two or three of Mr. Hull's private secretaries there, all of whom had been indoctrinated on the security features involved in this traffic, and customarily received these folders for Mr. Hull. The Army courier was there at about the same time.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Who was he?

Captain KRAMER. I have been under the impression through the past years that it was Colonel Bratton. I am still of that impression, although he states that it is his belief he spent most or all of that morning in the War Department. If it were not Colonel Bratton then it was very likely one of his senior officer assistants, all of whom I knew.

Senator FERGUSON. So you remember the Army officer [10820] being there. Was he in uniform?

Captain KRAMER. We were not wearing a uniform in those days.

Senator FERGUSON. Not wearing a uniform?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you know he was an Army officer?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Because you had seen him in connection with this magic before the delivery of it?

Captain KRAMER. Frequently in the past, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now was he there the second time you went over?

Captain KRAMER. The Army courier was there within almost a minute or two of the time I arrived at the State Department on my second trip.

Senator FERGUSON. On your second trip as well as your first trip?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And on the first trip you had just the new material, the 14th part now, you are certain of that?

Captain KRAMER. That is my present conviction; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see Mr. Hull at all that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I think I saw him, but whether it was [10821] in his office or passing through his outer office going in, I am not at present certain. In the case of Mr. Knox I can be specific, because I arrived there before he did and pointed out the 14th part in the folder which I handed him.

Senator FERGUSON. So you showed Mr. Knox personally the 14th part?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And how long did you remain there? Did you see Secretary of War Stimson?

Captain KRAMER. I think I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did you remain at the State Department that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I do not believe I spent more than a minute after Mr. Knox' arrival in Mr. Hull's outer office before returning to the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You were not over 10 minutes there?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I will ask you whether or not you left these papers there, the 14 parts and the other data?

Captain KRAMER. I left one folder there for Mr. Knox, the only one of the three Secretaries for which I was responsible; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You left it there for him?

[10822] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The other courier was there in relation to Mr. Stimson?

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull, for which the Army then had responsibility.

Senator FERGUSON. Both of those. Do you know whether or not he left the 14 parts, the two folders?

Captain KRAMER. That is my definite impression; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you came back to the office, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did you get back?

Captain KRAMER. My current estimate is about 10:20, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. About 10:20. Then what did you do?

Captain KRAMER. For the first time I saw a few messages, Army translations, which apparently had arrived in my office between the time I left it and the time I returned. As the result of seeing the 1 o'clock message I directed immediate preparations of another set of folders, with a view to departing again for delivery as early as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. And in that folder—and you have told us what was in it, it was the 1 o'clock message, the pilot message, the burning of the last code machine message.—

[10823] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the two so-called "thank you" messages?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did you have that folder completed?

Captain KRAMER. I believe the total time I was in my office was not over 10 minutes. It was probably less than that.

Senator FERGUSON. That let you go out at what time?

Captain KRAMER. About 10:30, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. About 10:30. And you then went to see McCollum?

Captain KRAMER. I went first to Admiral Stark's office, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. And McCollum came to the door of Admiral Stark's office, at which time I pointed out the new material I had in the folder, specifically the 1 o'clock delivery message, and explained

very briefly and hurriedly its possible and probable tie-up with the movement of the Japanese convoy and contemplated Japanese action against the British and [10824] Thailand. My distinct recollection is that McCollum grasped that point almost instantaneously, and I then departed from the State Department, after not more than probably one-half minute's conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you said you drew a time circle.

Captain KRAMER. That was in my office while the folders were being prepared, sir.

[10825] Senator FERGUSON. Just explain that.

You took a piece of paper and put a circle on indicating the earth?

Captain KRAMER. A navigator's time circle.

Senator FERGUSON. A navigator's time circle. And you put on a circle down around, or down through the Pacific Coast?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. Greenwich, Washington—

Senator FERGUSON. Where?

Captain KRAMER. Greenwich, England.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. Washington—

Senator FERGUSON. Washington?

Captain KRAMER. The South China Sea area. I did not take the time to determine the precise time zone involved. And Pearl Harbor, that is the Hawaiian Island time zone, 10½.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now what you did you put on the Greenwich time, whatever it was, and you put on the Washington time, which was 1 o'clock, is that right, and you put on 7:30 at Hawaii?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you put on what time in the [10826] South Sea area?

Captain KRAMER. I simply estimated that point, sir, and it appeared to be, from my estimation, my hasty estimation, probably 2 or 3 hours before dawn. I did not check the time of sunrise out there.

Senator FERGUSON. Two or three hours before dawn?

Captain KRAMER. Yes; which, incidentally, is the normal time to institute amphibious operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you told us this morning that you did not see the Winant note that said they were 14 hours out on the previous day, but you had other information that they were going to attack on the Kra Peninsula, or in that area.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your other information?

Captain KRAMER. I am not positive on just where I got it from. My present recollection is that I was told about those dispatches, of sightings of this convoy, by Captain McCollum during the several previous days.

Senator FERGUSON. So you knew about that. Did you know about the incident of sending the three little men-of-war with the second rate Filipinos on them over into that area to watch? Do you remember that?

Captain KRAMER. I am not familiar with that episode, [10827] no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not familiar with that?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was sent out on the 3d. You did not know about that?

Captain KRAMER. I may be able to refresh my memory. I do not recall at the moment, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. We will get to it in a moment. I will let you see the message. I want you to look at page 39 in Exhibit 37.

(The document was handed to Captain Kramer.)

Captain KRAMER. I believe this is the first time I have read that dispatch, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The first time you ever knew about that?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever had any information as to what this country would do in case of a Japanese attack on the British?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. No information whatever?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, it would not have meant to you at all, about war with Britain, as far as Japan was concerned, it would not have meant anything to this country?

[10828] Captain KRAMER. Not so far as I was concerned; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever seen WPL-46, the war plan?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, you had no information, and you did not interpret this message that you got Sunday morning about the strained relations with Britain as meaning anything at all?

Captain KRAMER. Which message do you refer to, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the one on page 251, the one that you misread and corrected before you gave it to Secretary Forrestal, on top of page 251:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations.

That did not mean anything? How does it come then, that you put it in the file and delivered?

Captain KRAMER. Because that was just another confirmatory item of what appeared to be definite Japanese hostile intentions towards England.

Senator FERGUSON. Why were you concerned with that? You had never heard anything about it.

Captain KRAMER. I do not know that we were more concerned with contemplated hostile action towards England [10829] than towards us. I should say we would have been far more concerned about any contemplated hostile action towards us.

Senator FERGUSON. Then as far as you are concerned, prior to the shells, the bombs dropping on Pearl Harbor, you did not have the least idea or expectation of war between the United States and Japan?

Captain KRAMER. That is putting it in rather superlative language, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You put it in your language.

Captain KRAMER. I certainly knew a crisis was developing and developing rapidly. Whether it would culminate in actual outbreak of war, I did not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what is the purpose of an Intelligence Branch? What is the purpose? Isn't it to do three things—

Captain KRAMER (interposing). To evaluate information received, and pass it to higher authority, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Evaluate it to ascertain first if there is going to be a war, and, second, where that war would break out?

Captain KRAMER. If possible; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Sure, if possible. And third, the strength of the enemy?

[10830] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, where did you stand on the proposition as to whether or not there was going to be a war? What evaluation was there? You had to, as I understand, tell these men, that you delivered the messages to in effect what they meant.

Captain KRAMER. I, on occasion, expressed an opinion when it appeared to be called for, or was invited, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Now, what was your opinion on that morning, as to whether or not there was going to be war—and that is all the United States was concerned in, as I understand it—as you thought, between the United States and Japan?

Captain KRAMER. Senator, the only distinct recollection I have of expressions of my opinion during those two days was one remark I made during the course of my visit at Secretary Knox's apartment, to the effect that I certainly saw no possibility of reconciliation of the differences between the United States and Japan. Other remarks I made during the course of those two days, I believe were of like tenor.

[10831] Senator FERGUSON. Then you anticipated war?

Captain KRAMER. That does not necessarily mean war, sir. It could mean a disruption in negotiations, a break in relations; but, of course, could mean war, too. That would be the extreme view to take.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, during this morning you read this message when you put it in the folder:

After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907, #908 and #909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

What did that message mean to an Intelligence Officer, together with the 1:00 o'clock delivery message?

Captain KRAMER. Both of them struck me as forcibly indicating an acute crisis. Just what its nature was I was uncertain, but certainly a crisis in which the Japanese visualized the possibility of our seizure of their diplomatic establishments in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. And that could only occur under one condition; that was war?

Captain KRAMER. I am not sure that that is the only condition, sir. That is certainly one condition.

Senator FERGUSON. That is at least one condition?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10832] Senator FERGUSON. So if they destroyed their last cipher machine they were through as far as receiving cipher code messages in this country?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And they were cut off from Japan?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; as far as those kinds of messages; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you say that you didn't come to the conclusion that that message, together with the 1 o'clock delivery message, meant war with the United States?

Captain KRAMER. Not to my mind, sir. It did not positively mean war. It indicated an extreme likelihood of war.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, you used the word "positively" this morning, that you need positive information to make up your mind on a thing like that?

Captain KRAMER. I would like to indicate to the Senator again that at no time in my handling of this traffic was I considered responsible for its evaluation.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had to give advice on it and did on occasions give advice?

Captain KRAMER. My advice chiefly and primarily and almost solely concerned references and explanation of the texts of this traffic.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, it was a secret [10833] as far as you were concerned, that the Intelligence Branch of our Navy was not evaluating this evidence, but that the War Plans was evaluating it, they were the evaluator, Admiral Turner's department?

Captain KRAMER. My present recollection is that I had no knowledge of such an understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Captain KRAMER. Or method of procedure.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the people who had a right to evaluate were not in the office as far as you were concerned, you didn't get a copy of it that night or the next morning, the fourteenth part, you left it with Captain McCollum, and Admiral Turner you didn't reach?

Captain KRAMER. I did not reach Admiral Turner; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When you came back to the office did you feel certain they were going to attack Britain that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I felt reasonably certain in my own mind; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Before 1 o'clock our time, that Britain would be attacked?

Captain KRAMER. Probably about 1 o'clock; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you drew this so-called time circle you had Pearl Harbor on it, 7:30?

[10834] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Meaning 1 o'clock here, 7:30 there?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then for the British at Singapore you had a time?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; South China Sea area.

Senator FERGUSON. Two or three hours; you didn't put the Philippines on it?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you had a conversation with Captain McCollum outside of Admiral Stark's office about this 1 o'clock, that it meant 7:30 at Pearl Harbor, because you showed him that map?

Captain KRAMER. I showed him no map, sir. It was purely verbal of a few seconds' duration.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you had a piece of paper with you?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't carry that with you?

Captain KRAMER. I did not; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell him you had drawn one?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. That is normally to determine, unless you have it readily in mind, the time zones involved. It was to determine such relative time zones.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, what did you tell Captain [10835] McCollum about the 1 o'clock in Washington? Just give us it as near as you can.

Captain KRAMER. My recollection of my remarks to Captain McCollum is that it involved only the South China Sea. I do not believe I took the time, since I was in very much of a hurry, to mention or refer in any way to Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you told Mr. Richardson that 7:30 at Hawaii would be breakfast time and that certain watches would be at breakfast. What did you tell him that for?

Captain KRAMER. I commented on that because I had had before coming to Washington 2 years' duty in a ship based at Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this just something in your mind at that time and not expressed to any one?

Captain KRAMER. It was expressed, as I recollect it, only in Mr. Hull's outer office. It was, of course, in my mind when I drew the time circle.

Senator FERGUSON. It was in your mind when you drew the time circle. You didn't tell it to Captain McCollum. You only told him about the one down through the China Sea. Then you went over to Secretary Knox's office?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you met Colonel Bratton?

Captain KRAMER. Either he or one of his senior assistants.

[10836] Senator FERGUSON. And some aides to Secretary Knox?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it—

Captain KRAMER. Secretary Hull.

Senator FERGUSON. Secretary Hull? Was the meeting over then?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. My purpose in hurrying so rapidly from Admiral Stark's office was to get to the State Department before that meeting broke up.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did you get there?

Captain KRAMER. I am less specific on the time I arrived there, but I should say it would be about a quarter of 11.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you walk?

Captain KRAMER. I walked again as I had on the earlier trip.

Senator FERGUSON. So you got there about a quarter to 11, you think?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. It may have been nearer 11 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. And then is when you told this Military Aide and Secretary of State Hull's aide that 1 o'clock meant 7:30 at Pearl Harbor, and that the watches would be eating breakfast there and there would be less men on the ships?

[10837] Captain KRAMER. I made no such comment, sir. The reference which I made to Pearl Harbor there was not emphatic in any way. As I recollect it, it was only a passing remark after these

folders had been delivered and in the few minutes I remained there, as I recollect it—I would like to amend that, sir.

It was part of my remarks when I was explaining to Mr. Hull's secretary the significance, the likely significance of this 1 o'clock time in Washington and its tie-up with the movement of the sun. In other words, time of day in the South China Sea. My recollection is that I mentioned something about the time of day at Pearl Harbor and that point in the conversation. In the few minutes following that my recollection is that I referred again to that purely in passing and I believe primarily for the benefit of the Army officer and these civilian State Department officers who might not be familiar with the ships' routine or Fleet routine on a Sunday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. And you then, as I understand it, mentioned about eating breakfast?

Captain KRAMER. I don't recall referring to that, no, sir. It was a general remark to the effect that 7:30 on a Sunday morning in the Fleet was probably the quietest time of the week. Something along that line. I cannot be [10838] specific.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to get the substance.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You told Mr. Richardson something about this messing at 7:30 and that some of the officers would be there rather than on their actual watch. I was trying to get whether or not you made that same statement or a similar statement to these officers or these people in the outer office of Secretary Hull's office.

Captain KRAMER. That is what I am trying to say, sir; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did?

Captain KRAMER. I did, yes, sir.

[10839] Senator FERGUSON. And now you say that it was only in passing, that Pearl Harbor being attacked never entered your mind?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was only in a passing way that you said that to these officers?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in any way connected with ONI?

Captain KRAMER. I was attached to the Far East section of ONI; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It appears that on December 6 there was a memorandum for Colonel Holbrook. Do you know him?

Captain KRAMER. I may have. I don't recollect him now, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know James F. Perry?

Captain KRAMER. The same applies to him, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the memorandum that went from the War Department General Staff, Military Division, G-2, memorandum for Colonel Holbrook, as follows:

Word has just been received from ONI by telephone to the effect that the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D. C., was reliably reported to have burned a code book and ciphers [10840] last night.

Signed "James F. Perry."

Did you have any information in ONI that that had taken place?

Captain KRAMER. Not that I am aware of; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that have meant anything to you?

Captain KRAMER. We knew that the Embassy had burned many of their systems, because I have seen the directive from Tokyo to that effect. The fact that traffic was still coming to that embassy on the morning of 7 December indicated to me they still had some systems in hand.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it indicate they had at least one machine?

Captain KRAMER. At least some systems, yes, sir; one code machine among others.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Captain, do you reconcile your testimony before the Pearl Harbor Navy Board, the Hewitt committee, and this committee, as far as the winds message is concerned? You know what I speak of when I say wind message. This is the one implementing the wind messages.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you claim that they are consistent?

[10841] Captain KRAMER. I would state in that respect that they are not consistent, that until a few days ago I was testifying purely from memory after several years, that only in the last few days has my memory been refreshed from an examination of these documents in that respect, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you don't claim now, and I am going to ask you later exactly what documents you had to refresh your memory, but you don't claim now that your testimony in relation to the winds message is consistent?

Captain KRAMER. It is not inconsistent in any respect except as to the date involved.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you say that your testimony is the same except as to date?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that is the case, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I just want to take a short time, if I may, on this testimony. This I am taking from the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry of 1944.

Mr. MURPHY. Page?

Senator FERGUSON. On the bottom of page 956:

Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, when such a message came through, I believe either the third or the fourth of December—

[10842] You were not certain. You are not really contradicting the date there.

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

—I was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it as being of this nature, walked with him to Captain Safford's office, and from that point Captain Safford took the ball. I believe Captain Safford went directly to Admiral Noyes' office at that time. Again, because of the fact that this was a plain language message, and because of the fact that special arrangements had been made to handle this Japanese plain language message which had special meaning, I did not handle the distribution of this particular message, the one of the 3rd or 4th.

Now, that is perfectly consistent with your present testimony, is it not?

Captain KRAMER. I believe it is, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Because you used the two dates.

Captain KRAMER. What was that last remark, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. You used the two dates there, the 3d or 4th.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. My impression was a few days before Pearl Harbor, probably about the middle of the week.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

[10843] Q. You say it is your recollection that you received some Japanese plain language words which corresponded with the language set out in Document 15; is that correct?

A. My statement was, not that I received it, but I was shown it.

Q. Can you recall from looking at Document 15, which Japanese language words you received?

That is question 34.

A. Higashi no kazeame, I am quite certain. The literal meaning of higashi no kazeame is east wind rain. That is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United States.

Now, it was not suggested in the question any Japanese words. Nothing was suggested in the question. It says:

Can you recall from looking at Document 15 which Japanese language words you received.

And you answered in that language.

Now, is that consistent with your present testimony?

Captain KRAMER. I believe it is, sir, in the light of what I stated yesterday afternoon in that regard, that until I testified before that hearing I had had no occasion [10844] whatsoever to recall or refresh my memory. I do not believe it was ever discussed as to what country was involved in that wind message which I saw. My reaction at the time when that question was first propounded was that in view of the fact we were in the midst of a serious war with Japan, it of course must have been the United States.

I had well in mind the Japanese expressions referring to the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. But wouldn't it stand to reason that a spontaneous answer made by you at that time, and after you had received Captain Safford's memorandum and had answered him on the 28th or sometime about that time, the 22d of December 1943, your answer that you had been thinking about this, wouldn't a spontaneous answer be correct? Do you now dispute that answer?

Captain KRAMER. I was faulty in my recollection at that time, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you want to now dispute that answer?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. I think I have clearly indicated that fact already in this hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you told me you thought your testimony was correct, that you didn't want to change it except as to date?

[10845] Captain KRAMER. On that point, Senator, I pointed out yesterday, I think, that later on in that hearing I testified to the effect that in all this traffic, which was my primary source of information at the time of Pearl Harbor, there was still nothing to indicate Japanese overt intentions toward the United States, except the message from Tokyo to Berlin at about the end of November.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that was an overt act, was it not; that was a proposition that they were going to war?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you swear, as you did swear, as you did swear before the Pearl Harbor Board, before three of your own admirals, that that statement is false, that I read to you?

Captain KRAMER. That is my present belief; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it any more than your belief? Are you certain about it?

Captain KRAMER. It is conviction, too, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So, then, you contradict your testimony in its entirety as far as that answer is concerned?

Captain KRAMER. So far as that point is concerned; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

[10846] Q. Do you remember in what form this communication was that you saw which contained the words about which you have testified, *higashi no kazeame*?

A. I am almost certain it was typewritten. I believe it was on teletype paper.

Is that true or false?

Captain KRAMER. That is still my recollection on that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. I believe it is; yes, sir.

[10847] Senator FERGUSON. Then you saw those words on the typewritten paper?

Captain KRAMER. I saw certain words on this typewritten paper which I have repeatedly emphasized I do not precisely recall. It was, and this is the only thing on which I am certain of in that respect, of the winds code characters.

Senator FERGUSON. I read you another question, question number 143:

Q. Were you the officer who went to the Communications Officer and said, "Here it is"?

A. I believe I used that expression when I accompanied the watch officer to Commander Safford's office.

Now, is that a true or false answer?

Captain KRAMER. That could very well be true; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. For the record, that is on page 980 of the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you appeared before the Hewitt committee, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you talked to anyone before you appeared at the Hewitt Committee?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. With whom did you talk?

Captain KRAMER. To an assistant of Admiral Hewitt's, [10848] a Lieutenant or Lieutenant Commander Sonnett.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell me your conversation with him?

Captain KRAMER. I saw him perhaps three or four times. The total time of those several talks I do not believe amounted to more than three-quarters of an hour. The nature of those conversations were of precisely the same kind that I had engaged in on occasions in the past when I was involved in legal duties in the Navy, namely—

Senator FERGUSON. Are you a lawyer?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. Every line officer, however, is required to take examinations on Navy law for each promotion in normal times.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did he make any suggestions to you, did he show you any papers?

Captain KRAMER. I recollect being shown no papers, sir, although he may have. I believe some dispatches were shown me. I recollect being shown no copies of the transcript of previous hearings I testified before, Admiral Murfin's. It was chiefly conversation with regard to discrepancies between my testimony and other witnesses before previous hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. And what he did was to discuss with you the discrepancy between your testimony and other witnesses who testified before the Navy Board?

[10849] Captain KRAMER. That is in effect correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore I assume that he pointed out what the other witnesses had testified to and what you had testified to?

Captain KRAMER. The chief subject of conversation was concerning this winds thing in which it appeared my discrepancies chiefly rested.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, he stated to you then that your testimony was not in accordance with other witnesses' testimony and he explained what these other witnesses had testified to as it related to the wind code?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did he tell you who had testified and in what way they had testified?

Captain KRAMER. I don't recollect that any particular names were mentioned. Some may have been. Captain Safford's may have been. The chief point of conversation was the discrepancies themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, to point out the discrepancies he would have to have with him the testimony or would have to tell you what they had testified to and how it contradicted or was not in accordance with your testimony; isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. He would have had to study it, I presume; [10850] yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did he do that?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know, sir. I knew that there were some papers before him. I recollect no copy of the Murfin Court of Inquiry being before him while we conversed at any time. He had various notes before him.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did he tell you he represented?

Captain KRAMER. Before I engaged in any conversations with him I was given a clear assurance that he was fully authorized to discuss radio intelligence, that he was fully authorized as an assistant of Admiral Hewitt's, to discuss with me these matters on which I had previously testified.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, I come back to the point, if he was telling you the purpose of the examination in relation to reconciling your testimony with other witnesses' testimony in relation to the winds message, wasn't it then by necessity necessary for him to tell you what these other witnesses had testified to?

Captain KRAMER. Just what his source of information was in making statements to me I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say to you about the other testimony?

Captain KRAMER. That my testimony differed from other [10851] witnesses.

Senator FERGUSON. How did it differ?

Captain KRAMER. In respect primarily to the existence of any wind-system message.

Senator FERGUSON. I take it then that he stated to you that other people had testified that it didn't exist?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had testified that it did exist?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what did he say about that, what was wrong about that?

Captain KRAMER. Whatever he said about that I do not precisely recall, Senator, but I insisted on the accuracy to my best recollection of what I had previously testified to.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you so testify before him?

Captain KRAMER. I did not testify before him, but before Admiral Hewitt, I believe in his presence.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you kept to that first testimony before Admiral Hewitt; you didn't change?

Captain KRAMER. To my first testimony before Admiral Murfin and his court.

[10852] Senator FERGUSON. In other words, what Sonnett told you didn't cause you to change your testimony and you kept to the same testimony before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain KRAMER. In most respects no change whatsoever, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any relation to the winds message?

Captain KRAMER. The only respect in which it differed—and, incidentally, I might state I never read to date the transcript of either the Court of Inquiry or the Board of Investigation, except certain parts of my testimony in the Court of Inquiry, not all of it, and such parts as appear in the Naval Narrative—I stated that in the light of thinking about that thing since my previous testimony, in which I believe he pointed out to me what you have just pointed out to me, that I testified it referred to the United States, that I believed that recollection was false at the time of these conversations. At the time of these conversations I was still unaware of what my subsequent testimony before Admiral Murfin's Board was, which I have referred to.

Senator FERGUSON. But didn't he tell you what your testimony was before the Murfin Board?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; except in general terms.

[10853] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did he tell you they were only taking testimony of those witnesses that had seen the winds code?

Captain KRAMER. That was not the impression I gathered whatsoever, sir. I gained the distinct impression that the chief purpose of Admiral Hewitt's inquiry or investigation was to fill in the gaps in previous hearings, specifically this I had first-hand knowledge of from being in the South Pacific, to get the testimony of Captain McCollum and Admiral Wilkinson who had not previously testified before a naval inquiry, also to reconcile discrepancies before this previous hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. And he stated that the discrepancies were so that you would have an opportunity to change your testimony if you wanted to?

Captain KRAMER. If I wanted to; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to read from the Hewitt investigation. Your testimony was taken on the 7th and 8th days.

Mr. MURPHY. What page?

Senator FERGUSON. 151. I am going to read the record of the 8th day before Admiral Hewitt. It is the 23d day of May 1945. Your previous testimony had been on the 22d day of May 1945. [10854] [Reading:]

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Wednesday, 23 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. N.; Mr. John S. Sonnett; Lt. Comdr. Benjamin H. Griswold, U. S. N. R.; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, U. S. N. R.

Admiral HEWITT. Careful consideration has been given to the evidence concerning the so-called "winds" message with a view to determining whether or not Read Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. N., formerly Director of Naval Communications, should be called as a witness. It appears from the testimony of Captain Safford that he thought that a "winds" message relating to the United States was received about 4 December 1941 and was shown to him by Captain Kramer and a watch officer and then delivered to Admiral Noyes. It appears from the testimony of Captain Kramer that he believes that there was some such message at about that time, but that he cannot recall whether or not it referred to the United States, and he is under the impression that it referred to England and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States although it may—

and "may" is underscored,

—have referred to the United States also. Captain [10855] Kramer believed that the message in question was delivered to Admiral Noyes. There is yet no other evidence to the effect that a "winds" code message relating to the United States was received.

Upon review of the sworn testimony of Admiral Noyes, given before the Naval Court of Inquiry, it appears that he recalled no such message and that he did not believe that any such message relating to the United States had ever been received by the Navy, although he had some recollection of a "false alarm". Accordingly, I find that no useful purpose would be served by calling Admiral Noyes as a witness in this investigation, and direct that the portions of his previous testimony relating to this subject be incorporated in this record. This decision will be reconsidered should further evidence be developed indicating that a useful purpose would be served by reexamining Admiral Noyes.

(The extracts of testimony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. N., before the Naval Court of Inquiry, follow.)

And then they put in certain questions and certain answers.

Now, is his description of your testimony a fair analysis of your testimony?

Captain KRAMER. I believe it is, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

[10856] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. At page 7969 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, question 96:

Q. Do I understand you to mean that your Section could not have stated categorically that the message meant war or merely a break in diplomatic relations but that all three of those possibilities were available to anyone interpreting that message?

A. That is precisely correct. I can definitely state that I would not interpret that message as meaning definitely war.

That is also in the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you through, Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Coming back to your testimony, Captain Kramer, testifying before Admiral Hewitt, after your memory had been refreshed as to whether or not it conflicted with other witnesses, you said this:

I would like to continue the statement, Admiral, by saying for that reason I am now at least under the impression that the message referred to England and possibly the Dutch rather than the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too.

[10857] Or possibly it may have referred to Russia?—

Hewitt said. Said Captain Kramer:

I just don't recall.

Captain KRAMER. In that connection, Senator, I would like to point out that my only intention in stating that I did not recall was that I did not and still do not recall precisely the wording of that piece of teletype paper.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, I want to read some answers that are in Admiral Noyes' testimony and ask you if you can enlighten me on those answers. Did you ever talk to Admiral Noyes on this question?

Captain KRAMER. I have never seen Admiral Noyes since a few days, possibly as late as a month, after Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to him about Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. I recollect no conversations although there may have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Just recently did you meet with any admirals or any Navy men to discuss your testimony or discuss Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were they?

Captain KRAMER. Admiral Stark, Admiral Schuirmann and [10858] Captain McCollum.

Senator FERGUSON. And where did you meet and when?

Captain KRAMER. At Admiral Stark's home last fall.

Senator FERGUSON. About when?

Captain KRAMER. It was, I believe, the middle or latter part of September.

Senator FERGUSON. That was after this inquiry was started?

Captain KRAMER. I do not believe the inquiry had started then but was directed to be started.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the Senator, as we are going along, to save time later, will you ascertain whether or not this meeting wasn't just before Captain Kramer went to the hospital?

Senator FERGUSON. Was it, Captain, just before you went to the hospital?

Captain KRAMER. It was a few days before I went to the hospital for the second time. The first time I had gone there for a routine check-up and remained there for about a week, following which I was given sick leave and went to Miami.

[10859] Senator FERGUSON. But this second time was before you went back to the hospital the second time?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, how long were you, Admiral Stark, Admiral Schirmann, and Captain McCollum together?

Captain KRAMER. For a period of about 1 hour, perhaps one hour and a half, most of which time we were at lunch.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you discuss Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. We discussed some aspects of it; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What were the aspects?

Captain KRAMER. The principal one that stands out in my mind now, and I have referred to being refreshed on this point before this hearing by Captain McCollum, is with respect to the presence or absence of Admiral Stark's flag secretary, Commander Wellborn, or of Captain McCollum in Admiral Stark's office that Sunday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you get to Admiral Stark's home? I mean were you invited, called up, or by letter or what?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I had a short note from him inviting me to a luncheon.

Senator FERGUSON. At a specific time?

Captain KRAMER. At a specific date and time; yes, sir.

[10860] Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you who would be there?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. I did not know until I arrived there.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, going back to this question, one of the questions brought up was as to what time Admiral Stark got down and whether there was a conference in his office at a certain time Sunday morning?

Captain KRAMER. That was the chief point that now stands out in my memory that we specifically discussed. The other things that we discussed were of a very general nature. It was largely and primarily a social affair and we discussed old times at that luncheon.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at that time Pearl Harbor was rather old.

Captain KRAMER. Of course it was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And do you now tell us that that is all of the conversation that you had at this meeting with Admiral Stark as it related to Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. Senator, at no time during that luncheon do I recall that any details such as this winds message were discussed. It was very general in nature.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find out or ask Admiral Stark where he was Saturday night that you could not reach him on the telephone?

[10861] Captain KRAMER. That point came up, too; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what did he say as to where he had been?

Captain KRAMER. My recollection now is that he does not or did not remember to this date where he was that particular night.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you mention that you had tried to reach him?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. This is Admiral Wilkinson's testimony. I want to see whether I can refresh your memory on this. This is page 4664 of our record. [Reading:]

I am not sure of my own recollection. Captain Kramer tells me I went to the phone and called up, apparently, Admiral Stark, or Admiral Turner. I asked Kramer whom he had shown it to, and he said he left a copy at the White

House, and had shown it in person to Secretary Knox, who had gone over it, made some telephone calls, and told him to bring it back to the Secretary of State the next morning.

This is Wilkinson.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

While Kramer was there, or perhaps after he left— [10852] again my recollection is stimulated by him, but it is not very clear—he said I made some telephone calls. I may have attempted to raise Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner again, on the basis of his information that they were not there. However, both General Miles and myself, and to some extent Captain Kramer, felt that this was a diplomatic message; it was a message that indicated, or that resembled the diplomatic White Papers, of which we had often seen examples, that it was a justification of the Japanese position.

The strain was largely in the fourteenth part which we discussed the next morning.

Now, does that recall to your memory that you discussed with Wilkinson these question?

Captain KRAMER. On the night of 6 December 1941 I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. 6th of December 1941?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, as I assume, you and Wilkinson reviewed this on the night of the 6th and is that when he is telling that you refreshed his memory? Is that what he is talking about?

Captain Kramer tells me I went to the phone and called up.

If you were at his home you would not be telling him [10863] that. This is a later conversation?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; it is.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. When did you discuss that with Wilkinson?

Captain KRAMER. I have seen Admiral Wilkinson since Pearl Harbor three or four times. Three of those times were in the South Pacific. At none of those three occasions were things discussed concerning Pearl Harbor in any way. They were all of very short duration, 3 to 5 minutes, because he was a very busy man, in charge of the Third Amphibious Force. The occasions of those conversations were purely social in nature. In fact, one of them was call by me at his office to meet him again.

On two of those occasions I recollect his introducing me to some of his senior staff officers, one of whom I had known as a midshipman, on a midshipman practice cruise. He was then Captain Doyle.

The next occasion on which I saw Admiral Wilkinson was after he returned to the United States from Japan, I believe around the middle of December 1945, by air after 4 days flight, when I saw him in one of the rooms in the Navy Department made available to contemplated witnesses before this hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that a room where the officers [10864] could get together and discuss the testimony?

Captain KRAMER. It was a room which was made available to witnesses where they could have a desk if they wanted one—I have never requested a personal desk, although in the past 2 or 3 weeks I have been using one—and leave their outer garments and make such studies of the documents as Mr. Baecher, the liaison officer with counsel for this committee, had.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do you remember having this conversation? You gave a long answer, but do you remember having such a conversation with Wilkinson?

Captain KRAMER. There was a conversation with Admiral Wilkinson. In fact, during the course of the conversation—this was the afternoon of the day I arrived back from sick leave from Miami, I can refresh my memory on the precise date; I had arrived after an overnight train ride early in the morning.

During the course of that conversation Admiral Kirk came into the office, too. He is now, I believe, on the General Board of the Navy. Admiral Kirk was Admiral Wilkinson's predecessor in—

Senator FERGUSON. Well, can't you answer that question a little shorter than you are answering? I don't want to cut you off in any way.

[10865] Captain KRAMER. I want to be as clear as I possibly can on the circumstances of that meeting, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a conversation such as he relates?

"Captain Kramer tells me."

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; we did.

Senator FERGUSON. You did have?

Captain KRAMER. We did; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did Admiral Stark or anyone at the Stark meeting have any of the testimony, any particular testimony that you reviewed?

Captain KRAMER. There were no papers whatsoever at that luncheon with Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. And the wind message or any connection with it was not mentioned?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The pilot message or the 14 parts were not mentioned?

Captain KRAMER. Not that I presently recollect; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the only thing that you remember in relation to Pearl Harbor was the fact as to whether or not there was a meeting on the morning as far as McCollum and Admiral Stark were concerned, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. It was at that point, sir, during the conversations we had that my memory was first refreshed on the [10866] fact that it was Captain McCollum and not Admiral Stark's flag secretary who had received those folders from me that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were they trying to refresh your memory on a point like that?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; not at all. It just occurred in the course of our conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was the conversation about Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. There was some conversation about Pearl Harbor; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the other part of the conversation about if this thing just occurred in that conversation?

Captain KRAMER. That point, Senator, is the only one in which I believe my memory was refreshed concerning Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only one that you can give us at this time?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. It is my belief that I did more refreshing during the course of that luncheon to these other officers than otherwise.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to go back to Admiral Noyes, to some of his testimony and ask you about it. Question 144 on page 155 of Noyes' testimony [reading]:

[10867] Did you ever discuss the winds message or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it more important than a later study indicated. The message only said that relations were strained.

Captain KRAMER. Which message?

Senator FERGUSON. Talking about the winds message.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The message of the fourth or fifth, or the third as it is now indicated, the implementing message.

Captain KRAMER. The winds message; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the winds. When I speak of the "winds" message I mean the implementing message.

Now, do you remember any discussion in the Department that it was not as strong as war, that it only said, the message only said that relations were strained? Do you remember a discussion about that?

Captain KRAMER. You are speaking about a discussion in Admiral Stark's office, sir?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think you had better read the question to him.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Captain KRAMER. I recall no specific discussion with [10,868] Admiral Stark concerning the winds message.

Senator FERGUSON. No, no; with Noyes, with anyone about it.

Captain KRAMER. I have previously testified and it is my present recollection that in making deliveries after the winds message was received I very probably mentioned it to recipients, at least some of them; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, a message came from Batavia. Did you see that message?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir, until quite recently.

Mr. MURPHY. May I have the previous question and answer read?

(The question and answer were read by the reporter.)

Captain KRAMER. Although I probably was shown it as one of the exhibits before previous hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. Read the last answer.

Mr. MURPHY. And the previous question also, please.

(The question and answer were read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. Now, this Batavia message indicates that Batavia or the Dutch had anticipated or intercepted the two messages 2353 and 2354—

Captain KRAMER. Not necessarily, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). In another message.

Captain KRAMER. My recollection is that at the time I [10,869] was under the impression that in all probability the British at Singapore had given that information to the Dutch, although there was a possibility that the Dutch themselves were engaged in this crypt-analytical work.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, going back: You said that you talked to the recipients about this winds message and when we are talking about the winds message we are talking about the implementing message.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you have discussed that with them if you had never delivered it to them?

Captain KRAMER. I knew of its existence. I knew in detail, in some detail the special provisions for its handling and it was only natural that I might have mentioned it; very probably did, during the course of deliveries of other traffic that day.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, there was a winds message. Now, let us leave out what was in it.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; there was.

Senator FERGUSON. There was a winds message?

Captain KRAMER. Which I recognized at the time as such.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. Now, we are definite on that one thing, that there was a winds message and you recognized it as such on the day in question?

[10870] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I will ask you this: You mentioned this morning that you might be able to do some searching to find out some questions, and one was—and I am going to ask you to do two things. One was in relation to the file, and what I would like to have you do is to get an expert with you to ascertain whether the typewriter that wrote that "Cancelled" on that file was ever used in your department or in some other. Now, there are Washington people that can help you on that question.

Then I would like to have you do another thing, to try to locate the winds message, I don't care what is in it, that you now say definitely was received and, as you say, it was in line with what you thought on that day as being a reply to those two previous questions.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wait.

Mr. MURPHY. I think I ought to object, Mr. Chairman. I don't see how this committee can assign to any naval officer, a captain who is a witness, the obligation of engaging experts to go over and test papers, and I think if we need an expert the committee ought to engage one.

Senator FERGUSON. Let him try to find this winds message for us and let him then try to find how this file was. He [10871] offered this morning to do that, he thought that he could do it.

Mr. MURPHY. You are assigning the responsibility to a witness to engage an expert. Let the committee engage one if we need one, but don't let the witnesses go around to engage experts on their own responsibility.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel to do the same thing. Let this man look. Maybe he can find some of this stuff.

Now, the next thing is—

Captain KRAMER. Senator, with respect to the winds message, I would like to state that it would be an extremely unusual thing for such a winds message to be in existence for more than a few hours after receipt in the Navy Department unless it came into my section, which it never did. All that plain-language traffic for which special

monitoring was set up about 10 days before Pearl Harbor was burnt, to my best knowledge and belief, as a matter of routine. As soon as it had been scanned to determine whether there was or was not a winds message in it it was destroyed.

As far as the likelihood or otherwise of the existence of such a piece of teletype paper now in the files of the Navy Department, it is my present understanding, and was then, that it would not be preserved unless it came into my section, [10872] where everything that we translated was preserved and filed.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then if it did not come into your section, as I understand the way it was set up that these cards were to be used and, therefore, delivery was to be made by telephone or some other handling than by you, it would not come into your section.

Captain KRAMER. It very probably would not although it might come into my section.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then if it might, see what you can do about it.

Now, let me take you to this message from Batavia. It is dated the 5th of December 1941, according to our copy, and this is not a photostatic copy. It is a mimeographed paper.

The photostatic copy is dated the 5th of December 1941. Now, I want you to look at the so-called date on when it was received, if you can give it to us. On the copy that I have got is "O" canceled through, 310, "O" canceled through, 30 "O" canceled through. You see what I am talking about?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what is that date?

Captain KRAMER. That is 10:30 Greenwich time on the 3d of December Greenwich date.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, does that indicate that it was received here on the third?

[10873] Captain KRAMER. Not necessarily; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what date was it received here?

Captain KRAMER. I see nothing on this piece of paper to indicate when it was received here, sir, except the date "5 December" at the top, which may be that.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, at least when that was received in the War and in the Navy Department and the State Department the Dutch interpreted the setting up of a winds code message, that it meant war, whereas we interpreted it as meaning a breaking off of strained relations, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. I never saw this message, Senator, at the time. I was told about it and the only reaction I recall to this message was in connection with the security aspects of my work, the wider dissemination of this crypt-analytical material than I had heretofore been aware of.

Senator FERGUSON. I am now informed that the Navy records show that this message I am talking about, that is dated the 5th and is shown here as "313" was received at 1:21 a. m. on the 4th of December 1941 by the Navy.

So the Navy knew on the 4th at 1:21 a. m., on the morning of the 4th, that the Dutch interpreted these two messages that we had re-

ceived setting up the code as being a decision of war rather than just strained relations, because it reads this way:

[10874] From Thorpe for Miles War Dept.—

this is OPNAV—

Code intercept: Japan will—

showing that they got it by code, intercepted a code and cipher:

Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain XXXXX United States: North wind cloudy Russia: West wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

Now, the part I was interested in is that the Dutch interpreted it to mean war and the Navy had a copy of that Dutch interpretation.

Captain KRAMER. Senator, I have no first-hand knowledge of how this message was handled, but on that point I should like to remark that the British translation furnished to the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart, I consider a precise and accurate translation now of those Japanese circulars; that from a present scanning of these documents I do not consider it unusual that the Dutch considered this thing as referring to a war decision so far as the Dutch were concerned since, as I recall it, the expression used with regard to the Netherlands East [10875] Indies was the Japanese word "koreauku," which means "occupation."

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then you explain that at least, that it would mean war with the Dutch the way it read?

Captain KRAMER. There had been previous occupations which did not involve war, such as that of French Indochina.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was not Holland.

Captain KRAMER. It was the French, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you surrender it never means war. That is what the French did.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is it fair to say that what I read you from Batavia is a fair translation of message circular 2353, page 154 of Exhibit 1?

Captain KRAMER. I do not consider that a translation, sir. It is apparently a version of that translation which passed through several hands before being drafted by Alusna of Batavia.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Well, at least it was their intelligence that it meant war, that same message?

Captain KRAMER. That appears to be or have been the feeling in Java, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever instructed in any way that certain memorandums, files, and so forth were to be destroyed—not files. I will change that. Any memorandums, [10876] diaries, and things of that nature were to be destroyed or handed over to the service?

Captain KRAMER. Until I arrived in the Central Pacific in June of 1943 I was aware of no such orders to destroy memoranda. Those I became aware of when I arrived there were orders and directives issued by Admiral Nimitz with reference to the keeping of diaries in the Pacific area.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that in the Clausen report this appears on page 253 as far as it relates to the Army, and I will try and get another order of the Navy [reading]:

It is recommended that, for security reasons, the Secretary of War direct all witnesses heretofore and hereafter examined by me—

that is, either Army or Navy witnesses—

to send or give me forthwith, for filing with the records of this investigation, any copies of affidavits made before me and any incidental and related notes or papers which may be in their possession or under their control, they to advise me in writing that this has been done or that there are no such records, and that they be advised that these records will be available in the War Department in the event access thereto is ever required.

Now, did you hear of that instruction?

[10877] Captain KRAMER. I never did; no, sir. I did receive an official letter from Admiral Theobald, Director of Naval Intelligence, last summer or late spring to the effect that Mr. Clausen, then I believe a major, was conducting an investigation and was authorized to take testimony. I was never called before Clausen.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you know of any order in October 1942 in relation to memorandums and papers in the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion did the destroying of codes mean war, if a nation orders its codes and machines destroyed?

Captain KRAMER. That is one construction, certainly, to be placed on it; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, when did we instruct our military and naval attaché in Tokyo to destroy their code machine and, as a matter of fact, it was destroyed?

Captain KRAMER. I am not aware that our attachés in the Far East at any time held code machines, although I am not familiar precisely with what cryptographic systems they held. I do distinctly recall in connection with the drafting of those directives, at least, the first one or two of them in Admiral Noyes' office, shortly after lunch on December 4, 1941, [10878] that Admiral Noyes' remarks while I was present were to the effect that as a precautionary measure he contemplated or intended to have all superfluous material destroyed but that one channel was to be left to these attachés, namely, a private channel between their post and Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. So, then, you did not know that the naval attaché in Tokyo had a machine?

Captain KRAMER. I knew he used cryptographic aids. I never have known just what ones they were; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know that he was instructed on the fourth or fifth to destroy the machine and the codes?

Captain KRAMER. I know that Admiral Noyes contemplated and, in fact, drafted in my presence a message directing destruction of certain or most, at least with one exception, of their cryptographic aids.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't that on Guam where that message was sent rather than to Tokyo?

Captain KRAMER. I believe the second message drafted in my presence was only addressed to Guam, with many other information addressees. Captain Safford was called to Admiral Noyes' office while

this discussion in my presence took place, because Captain Safford was in charge of the registered publications section of the Navy Department, could determine in detail just what systems those attachés held and could [10879] put those messages into final form for sending.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, will you look at Exhibit 37, page 42? Do you know what one was left, or did that indicate that one was left on the 4th of December 1941?

Destroy this system at discretion and report.

Mr. MURPHY. You have taken the copy, Senator. The witness does not have any. Will you read the question to the witness?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Captain KRAMER. What was the question, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. This would indicate that they were just to destroy a part, and that part of the machine was to remain in existence?

Captain KRAMER. That one cryptographic system, whether it was a machine or not I did not and I do not know, was to be kept but could be destroyed at discretion and if destroyed a report to that effect was to be made during the word "Javorach."

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when were the language officers taken from Japan?

Captain KRAMER. In about August 1941, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what part of August?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that we had given Japan [10880] a note on August the 17th indicating that she was not to move any farther south?

Captain KRAMER. I had no first-hand contact at any time with diplomatic notes except what I saw in this decrypted traffic.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not recall that message delivered on a Sunday morning when the President returned from the Atlantic conference? You don't remember that message?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall it specifically now. An examination of those documents might refresh my memory.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know what our policy was in relation to Japan moving south?

Captain KRAMER. As regards high policy here in Washington and of the United States Government most of my information—I cannot state categorically that all of my information, but I say nearly all, was based on newspapers and other periodicals.

Senator FERGUSON. So far as the foreign policy of America was concerned and as far as you were concerned, it was based on newspapers and articles that appeared in the public press?

Captain KRAMER. For the most part; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You were not given any particular briefing in what our policy was so that you would be able to interpret these messages?

[10881] Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will read to you this message and see whether or not you know anything about the part I have in mind. This is on page 556 of Foreign Relations of the United States and

Japan, 1931-1941, volume 2, printed about 1943, after Pearl Harbor. [Reading from Exhibit No. 29:]

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Did you know that that note was delivered on the 17th of August 1941?

Captain KRAMER. If it appeared in this decrypted traffic I undoubtedly would have known of it.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do not recall it; it did not impress you any?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall now on that point; no, sir.

[10882] Senator FERGUSON. Well, having that in mind now, would it mean anything if they were going to strike down in the Kra Peninsula or the British near Singapore the morning of the 7th, after your memory being refreshed on this thing I just read you?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You took a file over to Secretary Forrestal's office while Mr. Knox was out at Pearl Harbor making an investigation, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you know where that file is today?

Captain KRAMER. I doubt very much whether that file existed for more than a day or two, perhaps as long as a week after it was shown to Mr. Forrestal. It was made up from extra copies we still had in our office of this decrypted material not yet destroyed.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, there was then an investigation going on by Mr. Knox and only a little later, about a week later, by the Roberts commission?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did not keep this extra material; it was destroyed later?

Captain KRAMER. It was not kept in a separate folder [10883] that I recall, sir, although Mr. Forrestal may have held it for a few days. I simply do not recall that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you have a conversation with Mr. Forrestal as to whether or not he wanted that for Mr. Knox' knowledge? Was that his purpose?

Captain KRAMER. That is not my understanding of it at all, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why was it taken to Mr. Forrestal?

Captain KRAMER. Because of the fact that it was my understanding, and still is, that he saw practically none of this traffic but Mr. Knox saw most of it or all of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, do I understand Mr. Forrestal was making an investigation of this case?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. The purpose of bringing that file up at all, as I understood it then, and still understand it, was simply to acquaint Mr. Forrestal, who then was Acting Secretary of the Navy in Mr. Knox's absence, with the traffic immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, war had started then. Did he explain why he wanted to see it if it was not an investigation?

Captain KRAMER. He did not explain to me, sir, and it was not explained specifically in so many terms why he wanted to see it. I was told to prepare such a folder. I do not [10884] recall who told me; very likely Captain McCollum.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you look for this wind execute message to put it in at that time?

Captain KRAMER. There was no wind execute message in my files at that time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain KRAMER. Or at any time that I am aware of.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then if it was not in your file you did not look for it to put it into this file for the Secretary of the Navy.

Captain KRAMER. I specifically recall that this so-called hidden word message was included in that file. There was no discussion whatsoever as to the systems these different messages in that file came in. I further specifically recall that I pointed out to Mr. Forrestal that the United States should be included in the wording of that message as typed up.

Senator FERGUSON. Then how do you account for this fact, that we were furnished at this late date the message on page 251:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations—

and that you knew a few days later that that was a wrong translation?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10885] Senator FERGUSON. Why were we not furnished with both copies? Why did we get this copy only that indicated a breach with England?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know who prepared Exhibit 1.

Senator FERGUSON. But that is not a correct translation of the message?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, look on page 204 of Exhibit 1. Did the President ever ask you for that message that he might retain it?

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What is the difference between those two messages that you just inquired about?

Senator FERGUSON. That the "United States" ought to be inserted. To make this clear for Senator Lucas and for the record:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations—

a true translation of that message is what?

Captain KRAMER (reading):

Relations between Japan and England and the United States are not in accordance with expectations.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

[10886] Senator FERGUSON. The corrected one, as I understand it, is in the Hewitt report, but to correct this one—we were handed this one and that is not a correct translation.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know of any other translations that are not correct in this book?

Captain KRAMER. I have pointed out a discrepancy in our translation of Tokyo's circular 2353 and 2354 due to the garbled version of that message we had at the time of the translation. That is the only other one of which I am now aware of any discrepancy in.

Senator FERGUSON. You have pointed that out in the record.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Is this not in the book 251 a correct copy of magic as such? I mean exhibit 1 is supposed to be the magic that was delivered to all of these recipients. It was delivered to the recipients as it is here. The correction was made after he went back to the department. As I understand it, he made some phone calls then and then the war started.

[10887] Captain KRAMER. That is correct, Mr. Murphy.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do you understand that this is only the way it was delivered and no corrections have been given to us if there were corrections?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know just what has been given to this committee, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now look at page 204. Were you ever asked by the President or his aide to leave with him or to return to him that Tokyo to Berlin message?

Captain KRAMER. A day or two after the original version as it appears here was delivered to the President I received a request from the President's aide, Captain Beardall, to the effect that the President desired to retain a copy of this message. I, in compliance with that request, prepared a paraphrase of this message which was turned over to Captain Beardall. It's present disposition I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. To the best of your knowledge what date is that?

Captain KRAMER. Probably about the 2d or 3d of December 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the one that says:

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and [10888] add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

That conversation was to be between the Jap Ambassador in Germany and Hitler and Ribbentrop?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never took it back then to the office after you gave a copy to the aide?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, to make the record clear, we have been furnished a correct translation of that message on page 251 of 142-C and it reads this way:

Relations between Japan and ——— are approaching a crisis, on the verge of danger, England, United States.

Is that a fair translation?

Captain KRAMER. That, sir, I consider an inaccurate translation of the Japanese translation, which in the light of seeing the work sheet just a few days ago I believe reads:

NIHON to ——— TORRO KITAI NI HAN SU.

The essential part of that Japanese sentence is "KITAI NI HAN SU," which means, precisely, and can be determined from this standard Japanese-English dictionary before me, "Not in accordance with expectations," or it means "Disappointment in expectations," or things to that effect. There is nothing whatsoever implying crisis or war in the [10889] Japanese phraseology.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you attend a meeting on the morning of the 6th between some Navy officers who were in consultation about getting news to the Pacific?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that McCollum had prepared a message of information?

Captain KRAMER. I heard about that one during the course of the Roberts hearings from, I believe, Captain McCollum.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you meant while the Roberts hearings were going on. You were not a witness there?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did McCollum tell you that?

Captain KRAMER. In a few of the brief conversations we had my recollection is that I learned at one of those conversations that he had prepared some type of message. I never saw it and am unfamiliar and was unfamiliar at the time with the detailed phraseology used.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you what was in the message?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; not in detail, just in general terms that he had drafted a message about the general situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, isn't this a fair statement, or is [10890] it, that the officers down in the Department, in the Intelligence Department there, were greatly concerned about information going or not going to the Pacific and that they were attempting to get some information out or drafting messages to suggest information? Is that a correct statement?

Captain KRAMER. I believe it is; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked you this before but I want to be sure of this: You had no concern over the question as to whether or not relations were broken between Japan and England?

Captain KRAMER. What do you mean by "concern"?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, grave concern that it would mean war to us.

Captain KRAMER. Naturally, Senator, as a United States citizen I was concerned, as I believe many other citizens were, with a possibility of the collapse of England.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the way it concerned you, not that it meant war between Japan and this country?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, did we have a watch on the Tokyo-England-London circuit?

Captain KRAMER. I am not familiar with the details of precisely what circuits we covered, sir. Certainly, during the period of days and weeks preceding Pearl Harbor we were [10891] getting some traffic addressed to London or originating in London.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I come back to one question that I would like to work out and that is this 901 and 900. I can pass that now and look over it and then come back to it some time later. I will look at that and then I will come back later and ask you some questions.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have at the present time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You are through for the present, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and then I will come back later.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire, Captain.

Mr. KEEFE. Captain Kramer, what is your age?

Captain KRAMER. About forty-two and a half, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You graduated from the Naval Academy when?

Captain KRAMER. 1925, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You and Captain Safford have always been, at least up until now, good friends, have you not?

Captain KRAMER. Unless testimony I have given before this hearing has altered his views I do not think our relations have changed in any respect, sir.

[10892] Mr. KEEFE. That is not an answer to my question. You have been good friends, have you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; office friends, not social friends.

Mr. KEEFE. I was a little disturbed by some testimony that you gave yesterday with respect to a visit by Captain Safford to you in the hospital.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Am I to assume that you intended to convey the impression that that was a gratuitous visit on the part of Captain Safford which your relations with him did not justify?

Captain KRAMER. That is not quite the impression I intended to convey; no, sir. I was somewhat surprised at that visit but not at all too surprised, I believe I expressed myself.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you stated that he had brought you a box of candy.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As though that were wholly unexpected and perhaps had some sinister purpose behind it. Did you mean anything like that?

Captain SAFFORD. None whatsoever, sir. I believe it is customary in making visits to patients in a hospital to bring [10893] things of that nature.

Mr. KEEFE. Why, of course, and you did not intend by that statement that you made yesterday to imply that Captain Safford had any sinister purpose in visiting you at the hospital, did you?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. No. Or that he came out there for the purpose of trying to enlist your aid in connection with testimony to be given before this committee?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He did not even discuss Pearl Harbor with you at the time he visited you at the hospital, did he?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You played a game of chess?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he visit you more than once?

Captain KRAMER. On two occasions, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you stated yesterday that you had about eight visitors, you think, while you were at the hospital.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you tell us who those visitors were besides Captain Safford?

Captain KRAMER. I did not expect to be questioned on that point, Mr. Keefe.

[10894] Mr. KEEFE. If there is anything——

Captain KRAMER. I believe I could refresh my memory in detail on that. Offhand I can recall the name of one of them, Mister—rather, retired Maj. A. B. C. Graves, who is a member of the Washington Chess Divan, of which I have been a member.

Mr. KEEFE. Did any person other than Mr. Gearhart and myself talk to you about Pearl Harbor at any time that you were at the hospital?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely accurate, sir, except one patient in the hospital, namely, a former classmate of mine, a Commander Powell, who was in a room near mine in the hospital. In the course of our general conversations I mentioned the fact that I was engaged at the time of Pearl Harbor in handling cryptographic material and I undoubtedly mentioned the fact and the thought I might be a witness before the contemplated hearing, this hearing.

Mr. KEEFE. Commander Powell was a classmate of yours?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He had been retired from the Navy for some years and had come back into the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; during the war.

Mr. KEEFE. Mrs. Powell and Mrs. Kramer were friends, too, were they not?

[10895] Captain KRAMER. Mrs. Kramer has never met Mrs. Powell until recently, last fall.

Mr. KEEFE. I see, but she met Mrs. Powell then?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Are those all the people that you can recall? Commander Powell was a patient suffering from arthritis, was he not?

Captain KRAMER. I am not sure what the diagnosis in his case was, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in any event he was taking treatment out there?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, you have told us of some General or some man that was in some chess divan. You talked about chess?

Captain KRAMER. There was one other individual from the chess divan. Just which one I do not recall at the moment.

Mr. KEEFE. Of course, the reason that I ask these questions is because the hospital record which I have examined only shows the visit of Captain Safford. You are sure that there were others?

Captain KRAMER. I am positive of that, sir. In connection with the hospital record I would like to point out [10896] that it was not until last month that I was aware of a hospital rule to the effect that patients leaving the hospital during the day should sign out in a book. That, incidentally, Mr. Keefe, is the reason I believe why you were not able to be informed on the occasion of the day before our

interview last fall of where I was. I had apparently violated a hospital regulation in that respect.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, Mr. Gearhart and I did speak to you at the hospital?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And we had about 4½-hour conversation with you?

Captain KRAMER. Which I would characterize as very pleasant in nature.

Mr. KEEFE. A very pleasant conversation. There was no attempt to bulldoze you or change your opinion or anything of that kind, was there?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And Mrs. Kramer was present during the entire course of that conversation?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And Captain Duncan was kind enough to serve us a luncheon while we were sitting in the room?

Captain KRAMER. A brief lunch, yes, sir.

[10897] Mr. KEEFE. You recall that very well?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you had been chafing some because of the fact that you were required to stay out there in the hospital, weren't you, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you had expressed that to your Commander friend and others that came to see you, hadn't you?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I expressed it only to Commander Powell, who was the only patient I had previously known.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, and you gave expression to the fact that you felt if you could get word to Ross McIntire you might be permitted to leave the hospital, didn't you?

Captain KRAMER. I don't recall that statement.

Mr. KEEFE. You don't recall that?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were clothed in pajamas and bathrobe, were you not?

Captain KRAMER. That was customary for all patients.

Mr. KEEFE. Why, exactly. There was nothing unusual about it.

Captain KRAMER. None at all, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were not permitted to eat at the officers' [10898] mess out there, were you?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. The meals were served to all patients in that particular part of the hospital on trays.

Mr. KEEFE. Exactly. Now, the day before Mr. Gearhart and I came out your uniform was restored so that you could go with Mrs. Kramer on a shopping tour?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir. She had arrived just a few days before.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. And there had been some publicity in the newspapers about the speech that had been made on the floor of Congress the day before, hadn't there?

Captain KRAMER. I became aware of that, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. And the next day was the day that your uniform was restored to you and you were permitted temporary leave from the hospital, isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. I am not sure which event preceeded or followed which, Mr. Keefe. I undoubtedly could refresh my memory on that by going over it in more detail. I know, however, that the proximate and prime cause of the uniform being restored was so that I could leave the hospital with my wife who had just arrived there.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. Before that there was no reason for my subsisting out.

[10899] Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, you first went to the hospital in August, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. About the 28th of August?

Captain KRAMER. That may be correct, sir. I believe it is.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, I checked it.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And then you went back to the hospital the 23d of September.

Captain KRAMER. About that date I believe, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And in the meantime had you been down to Miami with your family?

Captain KRAMER. On sick leave, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you, Captain Kramer—and I want this to be said in the record—had, prior to that time, rendered a most distinguished service to your country, there is no question about that fact. That should appear clearly. Now, you would say also that Captain Safford had rendered a most distinguished service to his country, would you not?

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Keefe, I have always had a very high regard for Captain Safford's professional abilities.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, have you had a regard for him in any other respect?

[10900] Captain KRAMER. As a personal friend I had a regard for him which warranted the continuance of that friendship, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. And you feel that way today, do you not?

Captain KRAMER. I do, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, did you express any concern to any of your friends over the fact that you viewed with some apprehension the necessity for your appearing before this Congressional investigating committee?

Captain KRAMER. At no time do I recall making expressions of that nature, sir. I have never been in a state of apprehension that I am aware of in any hearing I appeared before.

Mr. KEEFE. After you left the hospital did you visit the Public Relations Department of the Navy Department?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did anybody visit you from that Department?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you given any instructions as to statements to be issued or not to be issued?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir. If you will recall, during the course of our conversation at the Naval Hospital, Captain Duncan broke into our discussions with words to the effect that the press was outside and champing at the [10901] bits to get an interview from me. I expressed myself in answer to Captain Duncan along the lines that it appeared as though I could not avoid such an interview and that it might just as well take place now.

With that expression of my opinion I ask Mrs. Kramer to leave the room; certain members of the press came in and I extemporaneously dictated a statement. On the completion of that statement I asked the correspondent who took it down what service he represented, turned to Captain Duncan, the medical officer in charge of the hospital, and requested him to obtain a copy of that statement and furnish it to the Navy Department Public Relations Officer because any further statement I might have occasion to make to the press would be of identical tenor.

Mr. KEEFE. I see. Do you recall at that time that when Captain Duncan came in he stated that he had communicated with the Public Relations Department of the Navy and that it was all right for them to take pictures or for you to make a statement? Do you recall him making that statement?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that at one time, either just before or just after that interview with the press, he indicated that the Public Relations Office desired to arrange an interview in the Navy Department that afternoon.

Mr. KEEFE. No; I am asking you that specific question.

[10902] Isn't it a fact before any newspaper reporters or photographers were in that there was some objection expressed by me to the fact of their taking pictures or having newspaper reporters there and did not Dr. Duncan say that he had taken the matter up with the Public Relations Department of the Navy and that it was all right to take the pictures and make a statement at that time?

Captain KRAMER. You are very likely precisely accurate in that respect, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. I don't like this "very likely" and "very probably." Isn't that it exactly.

Captain KRAMER. I used that "very likely," Mr. Keefe, because I do not recall precisely. If I attempted to refresh my memory I probably could.

Mr. KEEFE. Isn't that precisely correct, Captain Kramer?

Captain KRAMER. I think it is, sir.

[10903] Mr. KEEFE. Yes, you think it is, of course.

Well, now, Pearl Harbor happened, and the Secretary of the Navy flew out to Pearl Harbor to see what had happened, and while he was gone the first person that talked to you about the situation, as I understand your testimony, was the Under Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal, then acting as Secretary of the Navy.

He requested you, during the absence of Secretary Knox, to prepare a file showing the intercepts, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Forrestal did not request me. I was directed, as I recall, by Captain McCollum to prepare a folder, which I was given to understand Mr. Forrestal desired to see.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, all right, we will go through the chain of command, then. It went from Forrestal to your superior, McCollum, and from McCollum to you; is that right?

Captain KRAMER. That is undoubtedly correct, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. By virtue of that order, or command, you then assembled the file and went to Mr. Forrestal?

Captain KRAMER. Accompanied by Captain McCollum, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So you and Captain McCollum discussed the intercepts for the first time during the absence of Secretary [10904] Knox with Under Secretary, and Acting Secretary, Forrestal?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, following that, who was the next person that you talked with, that you can now recall, with respect to Pearl Harbor, and the incidents prior thereto, during the month of December, or at any other time, in relation to Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. Other than the usual conversations I might have had with normal recipients of this traffic, the identical type of conversations that I would have had through 1941. The only time I discussed in detail any events connected with Pearl Harbor was when I testified before the court of Admiral Murfin with one exception; that was Admiral Halsey.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Now, you did talk with Admiral Halsey. When was that, and where?

Captain KRAMER. About May 1944, at the headquarters building of Admiral Halsey in Noumea, New Caledonia.

Mr. KEEFE. Was that after you had received the letter from Captain Safford which has been introduced in evidence?

Captain KRAMER. Some months after, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And what was the occasion of your talk with Admiral Halsey?

[10905] Captain KRAMER. A letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Halsey. It was a personal letter.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you see the letter?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Is that letter in existence?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know whether the original is or not, sir. I have a copy of it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, where is the copy?

Captain KRAMER. Here [handing document to Mr. Keefe].

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as I understand it, Admiral Halsey called you to his command post, or office, and told you that he had received a letter from Admiral Kimmel?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. How did you get the copy of that letter?

Captain KRAMER. The letter requests that I prepare answers in the form of a deposition to certain questions propounded in that letter.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you prepare such answers?

Captain KRAMER. I prepared no deposition as such. I did prepare, however, an answer to Captain Safford's second letter, which I felt

was in the nature of a deposition, in case I wanted to comply with Admiral Kimmel's request.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you comply with Admiral Kimmel's [10906] request?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir, other than what I have outlined.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you give to Admiral Halsey the answers to the questions that Admiral Kimmel had asked?

Captain KRAMER. Well, when I went to Admiral Halsey's office, at his request, he showed me the letter, which I read. He indicated that he would leave it entirely to me as to whether or not I should comply with that request.

After reading the letter, I felt that the questions covered in that letter were of such limited character as regarding the events preceding Pearl Harbor, that a broader picture of events should be given Admiral Halsey.

In fact, my idea was to give a pretty thorough picture of the events as I knew them to Admiral Halsey, and request his advice on what I should do.

I did not, during the course of that first interview.

What I did request, however, was that I be given that letter, and I had in mind preparing a full reply to Captain Safford's second letter, which I felt would pretty thoroughly cover those events, that I would like a few days to prepare that reply and would then have something to show him, and would give him a fairly comprehensive picture of it.

[10907] Mr. KEEFE. Now, let us see—

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield for just a moment?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. I wonder if the committee cannot have the letter.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; I am going to read it into the record to facilitate this thing a little bit, without all this rambling around about it.

Now, let us get right down to the facts.

You got the copy of this letter from Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that right?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In order that you might prepare an answer; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. If I so desired; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. If you so desired.

Now, the letter reads:

280 BRONXVILLE ROAD,
Bronxville, New York, 18 March 1944.

Admiral WILLIAM F. HALSEY, U. S. Navy,
Commander South Pacific Fleet,
[10908] c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

DEAR BILL: You have on your staff Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. N., who was on duty in the Communications Office in the Navy Department at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor and for some time prior to that date. I believe he has knowledge of facts and incidents which occurred in the Navy Department which are of interest and value to me. Will you please obtain from him an affidavit and ask him if he will supply me with a copy. I will assure him that I will make no use of the affidavit without his permission so long as he is alive. If he does not wish to supply me with a copy of the affidavit, I would appreciate it very much if he will make the affidavit, put it in a secure place and inform me when I can obtain it.

There was a message received in the Navy Department on December 4th or 5th, 1941, which came to be called the "winds message". I should like to know:

What station first received the Winds Message?

What date was it received in Washington?

When was it deciphered, translated, decoded and delivered to responsible officials in Washington?

What officials in Washington saw the translation of [10909] the Winds Message and when?

What was the substance of the information contained in the Winds Message?

What action towards notification of Field Commanders of contents of message and implications thereof was taken?

There was a note delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to Mr. Hull on 7 December 1941.

When were the first 13 parts of this message received, decoded, and delivered to responsible officials in Washington?

What officials in Washington received translations of the first 13 parts of this message and when did each receive them?

When was the 14th part of the message received, decoded and delivered?

What officials in Washington received translations of the 14th part of this message and when did each receive it?

What action was recommended by you or anyone else of which you have knowledge?

There was a message directing the Japanese Ambassador to deliver a note to Secretary Hull in person at 1:00 P. M., Eastern Standard Time on 7 December 1941.

[10910] When was this message received in the Navy Department?

What agency decoded the message and when was decoding completed?

What agency translated the message and when was the translation delivered to the Navy Department?

What officials in Washington received translations of this message and when did each receive it?

What action was taken as a result of this message?

When Commander Kramer delivered this message to Mr. Knox a memorandum pointing out that 1:00 P. M. Eastern Standard Time was sunrise in Honolulu and midnight in Manila and that the whole thing meant sunrise raid in Pearl Harbor within a few minutes after the delivery of the Japanese note.

Will you please have Commander Kramer answer all of the foregoing questions of which he has knowledge and put them in the form of an affidavit and also request him to include in his affidavit any other matters of which he may have first-hand knowledge. I shall be very grateful to him for this matter will be of considerable interest and value to me.

My kindest regards to you always Bill.

Most sincerely yours,

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

[10911] Now, then, Admiral Halsey showed you that letter?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. On what date?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall the exact date. I believe it was about the middle of May. It may have been a few days before that.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, at that time, did you have in your possession the letter which had been written to you under date of January 22, 1944, by Captain Safford?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you have not replied to the letter that Captain Safford had written you?

Captain KRAMER. Not only not replied, but did not contemplate replying, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You say you did not contemplate replying?

Captain KRAMER. At no time, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Why not?

Captain KRAMER. If it is not apparent from the letter itself, I will go into more detailed explanation, Mr. Keefe.

When I first received that letter, shortly after I arrived in the South Pacific, I was, to put it mildly, somewhat flabbergasted. I did not read through more than the first few paragraphs appearing on page one of that letter, and then put it away with my other papers.

[10912] Mr. KEEFE. You did not read the rest of it?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You decided you would not even answer it?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Now, when Admiral Halsey showed you this letter you had in mind the letter that had been written by Captain Safford?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; as a fairly complete coverage of events preceding Pearl Harbor.

Mr. KEEFE. Did I understand you correctly to say that you told Admiral Halsey that you would like to have a copy of this letter from Kimmel, and go over it for a few days to decide what the answers would be?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; the original letter was given to me. The copy was made only for the purpose of any future preparation of an affidavit, in compliance with Admiral Kimmel's request.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you give any thought at that time to these requests of Admiral Kimmel?

Captain KRAMER. I read through the letter; yes, sir. I was concerned at that time, and for some months afterward, on how any piece of paper covering this subject, whether affidavit or letter, or reply to that letter, could be [10913] returned to Admiral Kimmel without going through normal censorship channels, which, of course, would disclose to unauthorized persons many aspects of this crypt-analytic traffic, to which they were not entitled.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

So you did not make up a reply?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In affidavit form or otherwise?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you discuss the matter with Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. On my second visit to his office, I believe I touched on that point, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you say you believe you touched on that point. That does not mean anything to me, and it will not when I read the record.

Captain KRAMER. My recollection, Mr. Keefe, is—

Mr. KEEFE (interposing). Did you discuss this letter and its contents with Admiral Halsey when you came to see him the second time? That is all I want to know.

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir. I definitely stated, in my present recollection, that I would prepare such a deposition or affidavit for Admiral Kimmel and notify Admiral Kimmel where it was.

[10914] Mr. KEEFE. Will you read that answer, Mr. Reporter? (The answer was read by the reporter.)

Mr. KEEFE. Now, if I read that in the record after this record is printed, it would seem to me that you did decide to prepare an affidavit and to advise Admiral Kimmel as to where it would be obtained.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that what you mean to tell me?

Captain KRAMER. That is what I mean, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you prepare such an affidavit?

Captain KRAMER. No affidavit, as such.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you prepare any paper?

Captain KRAMER. I prepared some pieces of paper.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, have you got them?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right, let us see them.

I would like to have this letter, Mr. Chairman, identified as an exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it has been read into the record.

Mr. KEEFE. I think the letter perhaps ought to be in our file. I would like to have it marked as an exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to inquire, Mr. [10915] Keefe, in addition to this letter being read into the record, as has been done, do you also want it marked as an exhibit?

Mr. KEEFE. I think it would be advisable to do so.

Mr. KAUFMAN. This would be Exhibit 150.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Exhibit No. 150, and it will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 150".)

Mr. KEEFE. If you will pardon me being here next to you, Captain Kramer, it is just so we will understand it. I do not want to run back and forth.

Captain Kramer, if I understand your testimony up to date, with respect to this incident, correctly, you received from Admiral Halsey a letter, which has been read into this record, asking certain questions.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. At that time, you had in your possession a long letter from Captain Safford asking you certain questions?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You also had in your possession a previous letter from Captain Safford to which you had replied?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10916] Mr. KEEFE. The first letter, with its reply, and the letter which you received from Captain Safford, which I have referred to as the second letter, is also in evidence.

Now, I want to know: Did you make any reply to the second letter written to you by Captain Safford? Your answer has been "No."

Captain KRAMER. Correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I ask you, did you make any reply to the questions propounded in the letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. No reply, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you make any memorandum at all for Admiral Halsey, or Admiral Kimmel, or Captain Safford, in response to the questions in both or either of these latter two letters?

Captain KRAMER. Only those pieces of paper in your hand for Admiral Halsey. They have been shown to no one except Admiral Halsey until this hearing commenced.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, let me just take a minute to compare these with these other ones.

In response to the last question, your answer is that you have handed to the member of the committee now interrogating you several papers. [10917] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The first one of which is a typewritten page, dated December 28, 1943, entitled "Memorandum for Captain Safford"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that identical with the December 28 letter, which is in evidence, the "Memorandum for Captain Stafford"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; it is a copy of it. The first part of the piece of paper you are discussing is a copy of my reply to Captain Safford.

Mr. KEEFE. No; it is not.

Captain KRAMER. Except that it is not left in the cryptic form I used in my reply, but expanded for ready perusal by Admiral Halsey.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

In other words, then, am I to understand that, so far as the first 21½ pages of these documents that you have submitted are concerned, you intended to write up for the use of Admiral Halsey, the exact information which is contained in your letter of 28 December, 1943, entitled "Memorandum for Captain Safford," without code language in it, is that right?

Captain KRAMER. That is right, sir.

[10918] Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, there appears also a letter dated 22 January 1944, "My dear Kramer-san."

That is a decoding of the letter of Captain Safford to you?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In plain English?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And is it exactly the same as the letter which was written by Captain Safford to you, with some expansion on your part? Is it identical as you translate his code?

Captain KRAMER. It is exactly Captain Safford's wording with the exception that it expands the code he used into plain English.

Mr. KEEFE. And in this instrument that you have given us now, you have inserted the answers to Captain Safford's questions, have you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. For the benefit of Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, had you answered the letter of Captain Safford which Safford had written you under date of January 22, 1944, and which you had not answered, you would have answered it as it appears in this memorandum which you prepared for Admiral Halsey, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

[10919] Mr. KEEFE. Did you turn this over to Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. I showed it to him and he read it. There was only the one copy made. I have retained it thereafter.

Mr. KEEFE. This is the first time that anyone on this committee has seen this correspondence, is it?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that is correct, sir. Counsel has not been shown it, so far as I am aware, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You have not turned it over to the Navy Department heretofore?

Captain KRAMER. On that point, Mr. Baecher, Lieutenant Commander Baecher, the naval liaison officer with counsel for this committee, requested some days ago that he be permitted to photostat this in case it was called for by the committee while I was a witness, in case the subject came up and those letters were called for.

Mr. KEEFE. How did he know that you had such a letter?

Captain KRAMER. I mentioned that in conversations with Mr. Baecher, chiefly because a reference to that appears in the record of my testimony before Admiral Hewitt, I believe in reply to one or more questions when I referred to Captain Safford's letters.

Mr. KEEFE. When was this written?

Captain KRAMER. About the middle of May 1944.

[10920] Mr. KEEFE. Did you dictate it to anyone to type?

Captain KRAMER. I typed it entirely myself, sir, taking many hours of about four nights to do so.

Mr. KEEFE. And that perhaps accounts for the apparent differences in the ribbons that were used; is that right?

Captain KRAMER. That could well be; yes, sir; or using different typewriters.

Mr. KEEFE. Using different typewriters; is that right?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So this was all typed by you yourself?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And contains the information and the study that you had given to this whole situation sometime in 1944?

Captain KRAMER. That was the second occasion on which I had had occasion to recollect events about Pearl Harbor, the first occasion being my reply to Captain Safford's first letter.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have this before you when you testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Captain KRAMER. I had that in my possession; not before me during those proceedings.

Mr. KEEFE. Then, Captain Kramer, when you came back from the South Pacific and flew in there after 4 days, and all tired out, as you said, you were caught cold when [10921] you testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry, as a matter of fact, you had given long study to these facts and had reduced the story down to writing and had it in your possession at that time, had you not, as you remembered it out there in the South Pacific?

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Keefe—

Mr. KEEFE (interposing). Is that a fact or isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. It is not, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. The witness is entitled to give his answer, I submit, and we are entitled to hear his answer.

Mr. KEEFE. I want to hear it, too.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, let us hear it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The witness may reply.

Captain KRAMER. I have not read that letter at any time to date since our conversations, or my conversations with Admiral Halsey about the middle of May 1944.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you had it, did not you, when you testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry at Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You had it with you in your files, didn't you?

Captain KRAMER. In my possession; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You could have referred to it had you wanted to, could not you?

[10922] Captain KRAMER. I could have, had I wanted to; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The point I am making, Captain, is before you testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry you had, in response to this request of Admiral Kimmel and prompted by Admiral Halsey, made up this statement which you have submitted to me and which I have not had a chance yet to read?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now was that statement supposed to be a full and complete statement of the facts, so as to give answers to Admiral Kimmel's questions in the letter written to Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or was it supposed to be categorically answers to the questions asked of you by Captain Stafford?

Captain KRAMER. For neither purpose, sir. It was simply to apprise Admiral Halsey with a fairly comprehensive picture and to request his advice regarding the request of Admiral Kimmel.

It was further retained by me as a piece of paper probably complying with Admiral Kimmel's request, but I never reached a decision as to just what to do with it. I, of course, could not entrust it to the mail. The only other means of getting that piece of paper to a safe place other than keeping it in my possession would be to send it to the [10923] United States, to my wife, by a personal friend as courier.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I understand some members of the committee have copies of this, and I think all members ought to have it so we can examine it.

Mr. KEEFE. I understood him to say that they had mimeographed it, the Navy had.

Mr. MURPHY. If some members of the committee now have copies, I would like to see one, too.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Perhaps counsel can advise us on that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, there is a matter in connection with this letter and the photostatic copy we have which I think might be discussed with the committee in Executive session.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is why this has not been circulated.

Mr. KEEFE. None of the members of the committee, I take it, have heretofore seen this letter. I did not see it before; I did not know it existed until Captain Kramer just stated so.

Senator FERGUSON. Let the record show Mr. Richardson was sitting here reading it and I asked him what it was; I asked him if I could see a copy of what they were talking about.

[10924] Mr. MURPHY. I think everyone else should get a copy.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to compare it with the original copy, to see what it is.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Until the committee makes a decision I am uncertain whether this is the copy that the committee wants. It should be taken up in the committee. It will not stop your examination at all, Mr. Keefe.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will abide by the advice of counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. I have returned my copy to counsel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This is not a copy.

Senator FERGUSON. This is not a copy, he says.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Captain Kramer, in preparing this memorandum which you handed to me this afternoon, and which I have seen for the first time, which you say you prepared for the information of Admiral Halsey, did you attempt to follow the questions that had been asked by Captain Safford in his letter to you of January 22, 1944?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Has counsel seen this before today?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I never heard of it—oh, yes, Commander Baecher told me yesterday morning that he had some papers that had been exhibited to him by the witness.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, it is mighty funny, it seems to me, [10925] Mr. Chairman, when all the other members down to the last member of the committee has examined Captain Kramer at length, that our counsel has here eventually, at the tail end of this examination, what appears to me a very important and vital instrument which has been in the possession of the Navy and no one knew anything about it.

Now how are we ever going to be sure unless these things are going to be turned over to our counsel in advance, what facts there are? I haven't read it, I do not know what is in it, but it seems to me, if we are to believe what Captain Kramer says, that it represents his idea as to what these facts were when he wrote this in the spring of 1944.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Mr. Chairman, I think a word ought to go on the record at this point, because I have deliberately refused to have any preliminary conversations with either Captain Safford or Captain Kramer, because the testimony was in some controversy at rather high points, and I concluded I did not want to go over it with either one, inasmuch as I had the opportunity to read their earlier testimony.

I was just as surprised as any member of the committee when the letters appeared yesterday, or the day before, that Captain Safford had written including the code, the three letters, the letter of Captain Safford, the reply of [10926] Captain Kramer in the third letter, and the second letter of Captain Safford. I knew nothing about it, and I expressed myself, I think, with exceeding rudeness to Commander Baecher with reference to not having seen it, and he explained to me then he had certain papers that had to do, in part, with certain matters not connected with Pearl Harbor that the Navy was anxious should not be made public, and that those letters and papers would be available if I insisted on seeing them.

That is all I knew about that, and when the Congressman got this letter here that is the first I knew about that.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Let the Chair observe for the record that Captain Kramer has stated that he told Commander Baecher about this correspondence and that Commander Baecher suggested that photostatic copies of it should be made so as to be available for members of the committee in case questions were asked about it or this material was asked for of Captain Kramer.

Captain, is that a fairly accurate statement?

Captain KRAMER. That is a precise statement; yes, sir.

[10927] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record note that there was the letter from Admiral Kimmel—we just learned about that, and Admiral Kimmel was a witness for many days. That was the first we heard of Admiral Kimmel having Admiral Halsey, after the witness refused to answer Captain Safford, call the witness into his quarters.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think this is not difficult to explain. This was personal correspondence that Captain Safford had.

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, may I explain that I had no intention of introducing these letters into this hearing until they were specifically asked of me. I was a little surprised, if I may so state, that the issue came up during the questioning of Captain Safford. At that time Senator Lucas asked the question whether I was in the room.

I stood up in the rear of the room. He asked me the direct question whether I had those letters in my possession or not. I replied at that time that I did, and made them available.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I don't think there is [10928] anything unusual about this. I think the Hewitt report definitely shows that Captain Kramer did testify that he had written such letters. He only prepared these letters for any emergency that might come along in view of his previous testimony.

It is surprising to me that somebody hasn't asked for these before, in view of that testimony. All the captain did was to prepare these in the event any member of the committee wanted them.

Captain KRAMER. I simply had them there.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. There is nothing unusual about you presenting this testimony in view of your previous statement before the Hewitt committee.

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. If the members did want them you were ready to serve with the memorandum you had.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like for someone to point out where Captain Kramer, in his testimony, mentions this Halsey memorandum.

Captain KRAMER. I previously stated in reply to a question of yours, Senator, that I have never to date read the record of the Hewitt investigation except such excerpts as appear in the narrative. I could undoubtedly [10929] locate it by examination of that record.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would show me where it tells about the Halsey memorandum in this Hewitt report.

Captain KRAMER. It was not a Halsey memorandum, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What?

Captain KRAMER. It was not a Halsey memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean in the Hewitt report.

Captain KRAMER. It was a reference purely to Captain Safford's letters.

Senator FERGUSON. Haven't you said something to the effect that this is a memorandum for Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. I prepared it to show to Admiral Halsey, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But never showed it to him?

Captain KRAMER. I did show it to him.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that is in this Hewitt record?

Captain KRAMER. I do not believe there is any reference to any reply of mine to Captain Safford's second letter in that record.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there is nothing in the record anywhere that you had made a memorandum and showed it to Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

[10930] Senator FERGUSON. That is what is surprising to me.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I do not think there is anything surprising about that. There is evidence in the record about a letter that the Captain had received from Captain Safford; that is plain in the Hewitt report.

Now, in view of the chain of events that followed Captain Safford's letter, it was certainly a most natural thing that he would have all the evidence that in any way was attached to or followed that letter in his possession and ready for the committee if it was so desired.

Captain KRAMER. Senator Lucas, I would like to remark on that, that if it hadn't been for the wording of Mr. Keefe's question, Did I discuss these matters with anyone? I would not have mentioned Admiral Halsey in connection with this hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit me, Senator, to ask a question to see if I can clear this for the benefit of the record.

This memorandum that you prepared, as I understand it, Captain, is a reply to Captain Safford's questions?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you showed that memorandum which was prepared in reply to Captain Safford's questions [10931] to Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The memorandum was not addressed to Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. It is not, sir.

It is a memorandum to Captain Safford. In other words, a reply to Captain Safford.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But it was shown to Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, this witness delivered to us certain memoranda, the Safford letter, his first reply, and the second Safford letter and no reply to it.

Now, what I would like to know is this: Is there anything else other than that in the memorandum that you now have given to Congressman Keefe?

Captain KRAMER. There is, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why didn't you give that to the committee when you gave us part of the evidence, and led this committee to believe that that was all of the evidence in relation to that?

Captain KRAMER. Because it was a reply, it is true, but a reply that was never sent, and, therefore, not a mailed reply to Captain

Safford. It was purely a memorandum prepared for Admiral Halsey which not necessarily need have been prepared. I might have covered the same thing verbally, but felt in covering that, that I should take a few days to refresh my memory on those events.

[10932] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, the witness will recall that I was examining in relation to conversations or meetings he had with other officers about his testimony.

Now, you gave me the answer as to Admiral Stark. You gave me the answer on Admiral Wilkinson. How did you avoid giving me an answer on this, of your Admiral Halsey conversation?

Captain KRAMER. There was no discussion whatsoever with Admiral Halsey, sir, regarding the events leading up to Pearl Harbor, except his perusal of that memorandum and my request following that of Admiral Halsey for his advice in the premises and some further remarks of his about his personal relations with Admiral Kimmel and what he was doing himself at the time of Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. So there is nothing in this—I haven't read it yet—there is nothing in it in relation to a conversation with Admiral Halsey about what happened up to the time of the bombing; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is not correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, there is something in there about what happened, what took place here in Washington in relation to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. There is, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then how did you avoid giving me [10933] that discussion when you gave me the Admiral Stark discussion that you had, that you had a conference with officers, and you had had one with Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. There was no discussion.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this one with Admiral Stark? How did you keep that from your answer?

Captain KRAMER. There was no discussion with Admiral Halsey, Senator, sir. It was my disclosing to him a background concerning Pearl Harbor with a view to asking his advice on what I should do in connection with Admiral Kimmel's request. That request appeared reasonable to me to this extent, that in case of my death in the Pacific Admiral Kimmel would not have my testimony in any proceedings which might subsequently take place.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is there any doubt, from now on, Captain, that you are going to give the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but? I mean in relation with whether you are asked a specific question or not. So that the committee might know that there is nothing being held back such as this. I would like to know whether you understand now.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I might say that I was taken to task by the Senator from Maine the other day for making an implication. I submit that if, while any man has [10934] been on the stand here he has attempted to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth, it is Captain Kramer.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not doubting that, but I wanted to know whether or not there was any other thing like this that the witness now has, that we could review over the night. I am not casting any doubts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to suggest that none of us have read this material, let us try to compose our patience until we do read it, to see whether there is anything to it. I think we would make time if we just suspended on this point until we have had a chance to look at it and see whether there is anything that will challenge the interest of any member of the committee and justify all of this discussion that we are having.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I am just beginning to wonder whether the floor has been completely taken away from me or not in connection with the examination.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair was wondering, too, and was trying to protect the gentleman from Wisconsin.

The gentleman from Wisconsin will proceed with his inquiry.

Mr. KEEFE. Captain, so there can be no misunderstanding about it, this memorandum which you have given to me this afternoon was prepared by you out in the Pacific in 1944?

[10935] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As a result of the conference which you had with Admiral Halsey when he showed you the letter that he had received from Admiral Kimmel?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So in order to refresh your recollection as to the events—you sat down with the letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Halsey before you and the letter from Captain Safford of December 22 before you and decided to make up a memorandum?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the idea of making up that memorandum was so that you would have a complete record of the events referred to in those two letters so that if anything happened to you there would be some record or statement from you as to those events?

Captain KRAMER. A fairly comprehensive coverage; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As you remember the situation out there in the South Pacific?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you had completed the preparation of this memorandum you went back to Admiral Halsey and discussed it with him?

[10936] Captain KRAMER. There was very little discussion. In fact, I don't think there was any discussion about the points appearing in that. The discussion concerned things that I have outlined in the past few minutes.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you let him read it?

Captain KRAMER. He read it completely; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then what did you do with the memorandum?

Captain KRAMER. I took it back to my quarters, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And then what did you do with it?

Captain KRAMER. I retained it in my possession until now.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you said something about sending it by courier to Mrs. Kramer.

Captain KRAMER. I was interrupted in my reply to that, sir, in that connection.

Mr. KEEFE. I want you to finish that reply.

Captain KRAMER. Any possible way of depositing such an affidavit in a safe place would require means that I have already outlined or

that of a courier who could be trusted. By that I mean that I would have to give it to some close personal friend who was cognizant or aware or had worked with this material to take back and put it in a safe place in the United States.

[10937] Mr. KEEFE. Did you do that, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. I did not do that, sir, because I did not want to impose on any friendships I might have to the extent of requiring them to perjure themselves.

Mr. KEEFE. Then, there isn't any necessity to go into that discussion, if you didn't put it into execution. That is the only thing I am interested in.

Captain KRAMER. All right.

Mr. KEEFE. You didn't put this into execution?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct. I thought about it in fact all through the summer of 1944, and it was only after my testimony before Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry that I felt no further necessity of even thinking about that.

I simply kept those papers with me.

Mr. KEEFE. And up to the time you testified before Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry you had been giving a lot of thought to this question?

Captain KRAMER. A lot of thought only to what disposition I could make of those papers and to the form of such deposition if other than what I already had. Not to the subject matter of that piece of paper.

Mr. KEEFE. You were satisfied that the statements which you made in this memorandum prepared out there in the [10938] South Pacific were the truth?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, as of that time.

Mr. KEEFE. And you had that memorandum and all of the thought that you could put on the general subject when you testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry out there at Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. I have indicated, I have not read that letter since I prepared it for Admiral Halsey.

Mr. KEEFE. You mean you have had it in your possession all this time, and you haven't read it until now?

Captain KRAMER. I have not read it to this moment, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. I haven't either, so you have nothing on me.

Mr. RIBHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest, in view of that fact, there are one or two matters that ought to be referred to in an executive session, and might we have about a 10-minute executive session?

Mr. KEEFE. I am cognizant of that, as all members are, I assume, and I shall not violate that situation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to suggest, while there is no doubt that is correct, yet counsel has two or three things that he wants to bring to the attention of [10939] the committee in executive session.

It is now almost 5, and some members of the committee have indicated they will have to leave pretty soon.

As I understand, counsel is suggesting that we now go into executive session, rather than wait another 10 or 15 minutes.

The Committee will now go into execution session.

(Whereupon, at 4:50 p. m., February 8, 1946 the committee recessed to meet in executive session and to reconvene at 10 a. m. Saturday, February 9, 1946.)

[10940]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[10941] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Congressman Keefe will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Mr. KEEFE. Captain Kramer, yesterday afternoon just before we recessed, you stated facts with reference to a conversation which you had with Admiral Halsey at his headquarters in early 1944 in the South Pacific?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And just where were his headquarters at that time?

Captain KRAMER. In the center of the city of Noumea, New Caledonia.

Mr. KEEFE. And do you recall the date?

Captain KRAMER. Not the exact date but within a few days of the middle of May 1944.

Mr. KEEFE. You further testified that at that time he discussed with you a letter which he had received from Admiral Kimmel?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And gave that letter to you so that you could go over it with the possibility that you might prepare an answer?

Captain KRAMER. An affidavit, yes, sir.

[10942] Mr. KEEFE. You did not prepare a specific answer or a specific affidavit in response to Admiral Kimmel's request made to Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But you stated that you did prepare a memorandum in answer to the questions that had been asked of you by Captain Safford in his letter of December 28, 1943?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you felt that the answers to the questions propounded to you by Captain Safford would likewise be answers to the questions asked by Admiral Kimmel in his letter to Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. After preparing that memoranda you showed it to Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you retained it with the intention of preserving it for some future reference in the event you were killed or lost your life in the Pacific and wouldn't be available as a witness at some future time?

Captain KRAMER. That was my purpose; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the memoranda which you gave to me yesterday, is that original memoranda?

Captain KRAMER. It is, sir.

[10943] Mr. KEEFE. I believe you further testified that when you were called to testify before the naval court of inquiry at Pearl Harbor you had this memorandum with you at that time?

Captain KRAMER. I had it with my papers, but not at that hearing.

Mr. KEEFE. So am I to understand that prior to your testimony before the naval court at Pearl Harbor you had given considerable thought to all of the questions propounded to you by Captain Safford in his letter of December 28, 1943?

Captain KRAMER. At the time I prepared that memorandum; yes, sir; but not subsequent to that. My only thought and consideration on that subject was the handling and disposition of that memorandum I had prepared.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, I understood you to say yesterday that from the time you prepared it, and I assume put it in a file or envelope, you never looked at it?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. From that time until the present moment?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You never read it before you testified at Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Nor at any subsequent time?

[10944] Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And have never discussed it with anybody else?

Captain KRAMER. Until the commencement of this hearing, no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And then you exhibited it to whom?

Captain KRAMER. Lieutenant Commander Baecher, liaison officer with this committee's counsel, was shown it, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. How did you come to show it to them?

Captain KRAMER. I felt that there was at least a likelihood that I might be questioned by this committee concerning the letters of Captain Safford and all aspects surrounding them because of the fact that I had made reference to those letters in testifying before Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. KEEFE. And you thought that in case somebody happened to accidentally ask you about it you would be prepared with the memorandum?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You didn't volunteer the fact that you had prepared such a memorandum when you testified before the naval court at Pearl Harbor, did you?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you didn't volunteer that information when you testified before the Hewitt investigation, did you?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir. I saw no point in [10945] introducing Admiral Halsey's or Admiral Kimmel's name into my testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. You were given an opportunity to tell any facts that you had in your possession, though, were you not?

Captain KRAMER. I was, sir. However, I further felt and was thoroughly convinced that all that could be elicited from the showing of my memorandum was my understanding of the facts at the time I prepared that memorandum. I am still of that conviction, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, after reading it I am inclined to agree with you.

Captain KRAMER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I never saw it until yesterday. I am frank to say to the committee after studying it last night I think that a lot of undue importance has been attached to it.

Now, I want to go through this with you because of the fact that it appears to be necessary.

In preparing this memorandum you took the questions serially that Commander Safford had asked you in his two letters which are before the committee and in evidence?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The questions are numbered from 1 to 43, inclusive?

Captain KRAMER. I believe they run to 47. However, [10946] the last several I did not answer in that memorandum since they appeared redundant and covered previously in the memorandum.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; I think you are right about that.

So that the members of the committee can follow your memorandum they can observe the questions which were asked in the letter—

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, just for the convenience of the other members, I wonder if counsel has prepared copies for the members of the committee?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, let me finish my statement so that it won't be a blank.

Will you read it?

(The statement was read by the reporter.)

Mr. KEEFE (continuing). Of Captain Safford dated December 22, 1943.

[10947] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you yield there, Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There were certain photostatic copies.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Copies of the Safford letter.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of the Safford letter distributed to the committee.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But I had understood there was going to be a mimeographed copy prepared with the questions in them instead of these code numbers that were set up. Am I in error about that?

Mr. MASTEN. That was read into the transcript.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was done the other day in connection with the examination of Captain Safford, simply covered his letter and that has already been offered, it has been here and copies have been given to committee members.

Mr. KEEFE. I think you will get this quite clearly as we go along.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to observe that if this memorandum is to be the basis of inquiry that it would be a little more convenient for members of the committee to have copies of it, but I do not want to interfere; I do not want to interrupt your examination, but it would be a little more [10948] convenient.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is it your intention to read the memorandum?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; question by question, so that there will be no question about.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that you are going to read the question?

Mr. KEEFE. And his answer.

The CHAIRMAN. And his answer, so that it will be in the transcript?

Mr. KEEFE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. KEEFE. That is what I understood we agreed upon yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, this memorandum, the first question. You have indicated 1510 as "First indications of arrival." That is at the top of your memorandum.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. What does that have reference to?

Captain KRAMER. That has reference to the first indications of arrival of the Japanese 14-part note.

Mr. KEEFE. That is at what time?

Captain KRAMER. That is 3 p. m.—3:10 p. m.

[10949] **Mr. KEEFE.** And then the next entry is:

2100 Completed. Left after phoning to locate Admiral Beardall, Admiral Turner, Colonel Bratton of M. I. D., Admiral Wilkinson, etc.

What does that mean?

Captain KRAMER. That 2100 is 9 p. m. That refers to the time of completion in my section of the first 13 parts of the 14-part note.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, the first question:

No. 1. What time did you see Mr. Roosevelt that evening and show him the papers?

A. Did not, personally, but left with one of Admiral Beardall's assistants in the situation room on Pennsylvania Avenue with positive instructions re urgency (to be delivered at once). He was entertaining at the time, but I learned later in the evening he had seen it.

When did you learn that Mr. Roosevelt had seen those first 13 parts of the 14-part message the evening of the 6th of December?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot be precise on that, Mr. Keefe. It is my distinct impression, however, that I was told that by somebody. Whether Admiral Beardall that night late at Admiral Wilkinson's home or the next morning or the following day sometime, I do not now recall.

[10950] **Mr. KEEFE.** Well, you think it may have been that Admiral Beardall may have communicated with the White House after you delivered the papers to Wilkinson's home?

Captain KRAMER. I think he may. I do not know on that point, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you think that he may have told you that night while you were still at Wilkinson's home making delivery to him, that Beardall had telephoned the White House to find out if the President had seen the message, and you think he may have advised you then that the President had seen the message that night?

Captain KRAMER. That is quite possible, sir. I think, however—

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I don't want to indulge, so far as I am concerned, Captain Kramer, in the realm of possibilities and speculation. Now, if you know that the President actually saw that message that night or if you learned from anybody who had reliable information and can testify to it, I would like to have you do so; but if you do not know, please don't indulge, so far as my examination is concerned, in the realm of speculation. That does not help anybody to determine the issues in this case.

Captain KRAMER. In the light of your remark, sir, my answer must be I do not know.

[10951] Mr. KEEFE. Very well. Question 2:

Was Mr. Hull there or was he called in, or did you see him first and go over to Mr. Roosevelt with him?

A. No, on all counts. Army was taking care of that and I know only that he knew of it by 2230 (see item 9) and possibly had seen it care of Colonel Bratton by then.

That is your testimony today, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. That I think is in effect my testimony today; yes, sir, my understanding now.

Mr. KEEFE. Number 3:

What time did you see Admiral Stark that evening and show him the papers?
A. Did not. (See items 4 and 5.)

That is your testimony today, that you did not see Admiral Stark.

Captain KRAMER. That is my understanding now; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Number 4:

If answer to 3 is negative, how and when was Admiral Stark first informed?

A. Believe Item 5 phoned that ewe (see next). Possibly Admiral Turner did too. I know he saw it as soon as he reached office next A. M. (about 0900).

Now, do you have any knowledge as to whether Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral Stark that night?

[10952] Captain KRAMER. No positive knowledge, no, sir; simply the impression I had with me at Admiral Wilkinson's home that he left the room on one or two occasions, as I did, and that Admiral Wilkinson may well have phoned either Stark or Turner or both during that time. I do not know that he did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not actually see him or hear him?

Captain KRAMER. And I was not told that he did or did not.

Mr. KEEFE. But you have this fact in mind, have you not, Captain Kramer, that Sunday was not usually a day for the big boys in the Navy to assemble at their offices?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And when you got down to your office in the Navy Department the next morning, Sunday, there were 12 or 15 of them assembled, were there not?

Captain KRAMER. There were many there, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Including Wilkinson and Turner and Stark and all of them in the higher echelon?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe, will you yield?

Mr. KEEFE. Just one second.

I understand that it is your impression that the arrangements for that meeting which brought all these people together Sunday morning at Admiral Stark's office must have [10953] been made the night before?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is the reason why you concluded that Admiral Wilkinson must have telephoned Admiral Stark that night?

Captain KRAMER. That, I believe, is one of the reasons; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now I will yield.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I may be mistaken, I just wanted to be clear. Did your previous question state that "At the time you arrived at your office the next day they were there?"

Mr. KEEFE. Yes—no, no, at 9 o'clock.

Captain KRAMER. That was my question when I prepared that memorandum; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is when you got to Admiral Stark's office.

Captain KRAMER. As to the time, approximate time that Admiral Stark arrived at the Navy Department, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You got to your office, as I understood it, about 7:30 in the morning?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. They were not there at that time?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then the next question, No. 5:

[10954] How and when was Admiral Wilkinson first informed?

A. At 2105 by phone to his home where he was entertaining Admiral Beardall and others, told him what I planned to do. His chief concern was getting it to the President and Mr. Hull, which are covered above. Arrived at his home at 2320 where he, and Admiral Beardall also, saw it and were informed re others, particularly the White House. I don't recall whether Admiral Beardall then phoned to the White House to check delivery or not. Believe at this time Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral Stark.

No. 6. Linn remembers that you stayed till after 1 a. m. What time did you leave the Navy Building and go home?

A. Left Admiral Wilkinson's place about 0030—

What time would that be?

Captain KRAMER. That would be one-half hour after midnight, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. [Continuing:]

stopped by, then proceeded—stopped by the Navy Department to drop papers and check on anything new, then proceeded home.

That is as you have testified here before this inquiry?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10955] Mr. KEEFE. No. 7:

What time did you get down to the Navy Building the next morning? (Brotherhood said it was sometime after 0700.)

A. About 0730.

That is correct, is it?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That was your memory then and that is your memory today?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that your recollection when you were out in the South Pacific in your answers to question No. 7 and question No. 6, question No. 5 and question No. 4 is all exactly, practically, as you have testified here before this committee?

Captain KRAMER. With very few minor discrepancies I believe it is sir,

Mr. KEEFE. Question No. 8:

What time did you see Mr. Roosevelt that morning and show him the new papers?

Did not personally, but left first batch about 0945, second about 1100 at the White House care of Admiral Beardall.

That is as you have testified here.

[10956] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Question 9:

Was Mr. Hull there or was he called in?

A. No; at his office. Mr. Knox (first one) was shown it at his home about 2200 previous night and he made a number of phone calls including Mr. Hull. Meeting was then arranged for Mr. Hull, Mr. Knox, Mr. Stimson and others at Mr. Hull's office at 10:00 A. M. where I was instructed to be with it and anything else.

Meeting held at 1000—

Well, he has got it at one thousand as scheduled.

Captain KRAMER. That is 10 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand; it is one thousand. That is a thousand, as I remember it, not being a Navy man. I will read it again.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It would help us to get the time so that we understand it on all dates.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I think I had better because I am all mixed up on all these things, so I will try to get it straight. [Reading:]

Meeting at 1000.

That is 10 o'clock?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

And new items (1st batch) delivered together with [10957] old. Colonel Bratton was on hand there too for Mr. Stimson.

Now, that is substantially as you have testified before this committee?

Captain KRAMER. It is essentially the same I believe, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Question No. 10:

My check shows you had Part 14 plus another paper setting the conference at 1 P. M. Do you recall taking any other papers with you, and can you give me a hint as to their contents?

A. (a) I don't recall precisely how our friend's numbers ran in the hundreds (or thousands) but in units from about 02 to 09 or 10.

What does that mean?

Captain KRAMER. That refers to the Tokyo serial numbers, which not only refreshment indicates—in fact, Exhibit 1 indicates run from 901 to 910—902 is the Japanese note, 901 is the so-called pilot message, 906 or 7 I think is the 1 p. m. message.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

(b) The first few of these messages, not including the one setting the conference for 1300—

That would be 1 o'clock, would it?

[10958] Captain KRAMER. About 1 p. m., yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

were on hand by 0900.

That is 9 o'clock, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Nine o'clock in the morning; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

And were completed and being delivered at 9:45 (to the White House) and at 10 o'clock to the State Department (See Items 9 above). Admiral Stark, Wilkinson, Turner and others got them about 9:30 at a meeting held in Admiral Stark's office.

(c) On returning about 10:20 from Mr. Hull's office the remainder of #02-10 were arriving, including the one setting the one o'clock meeting time and the 'Weather Report'. These were delivered to all hands, including Mr. Knox and Mr. Stimson at Mr. Hull's office with my comments to Mr. Knox on how the hour tied with the sun, and moves in progress, elsewhere.

That is substantially as you have testified before this committee?

Captain KRAMER. I believe it is, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You follow it very closely.

Captain KRAMER. There are some discrepancies in that memorandum from—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, what is the discrepancy?

[10959] Captain KRAMER. Well, my impression at that time was that certain ones of that batch from 902 to 910 had arrived before my 10 o'clock appointment with Mr. Knox. In the light of my study the other night in compliance with Senator Ferguson's request I find my memory was faulty in that respect, that none of those additional ones were seen by me or arrived in my office until after my return from that 10 o'clock appointment.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you say "none of them" you are referring, among others, to the so-called pilot message, are you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, that is one of them.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, if we might digress a while while we are on that question right now for just a moment, that is one of the things that I have difficulty in understanding and I know that other members of the committee are in a similar quandary.

The pilot message, which is found in exhibit 1, page 238, No. 901, according to exhibit 41 was filed by the Japanese at 8:56 p. m. December 6, Tokyo time (A & N); that is 6:56 a. m. December 6, Washington time.

The exhibit further shows that this was intercepted in Japanese code by Navy station "S"—that is Bainbridge Island, Washington—at 12:15 to 12:20 GMT—Greenwich [10960] meridian time.

Captain KRAMER. Greenwich meridian time; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. December 6—Navy, with the parentheses around "S".

7:15 to 7:20 a. m. December 6, Washington time.

In other words, this was intercepted between 7:15 and 7:20 a. m., December 6, Washington time. It was teletyped in Japanese code to the Navy; no showing when it was received.

Now, then, we have this picture, that here is this pilot message, which is one of the important messages in this chain of messages, received by the Bainbridge Island intercepting station between 7:15 a. m. and 7:20 a. m. on Saturday morning, December 6, 1941. Now, that would come into the Navy Department, wouldn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10961] And it would be taken off the teletype almost instantaneously, the teletype tape from Bainbridge, would it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. This exhibit shows that it was teletyped in Japanese code to the Navy. Why did not you get that message that morning early?

Captain KRAMER. December 6 was a day of Army cognizance of Japanese ciphers. It would, therefore have been automatically under the existing arrangements, have been sent to the Army Signal Intelligence Section by our GY watch officers receiving that.

Mr. KEEFE. Then, if I understand it, if it came in about 7:20 a. m. on December 6, it would be immediately taken off the teletype by the watch officer and transferred over to the Army Signal Intelligence Section?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; not necessarily immediately.

Those tricks, however were quite frequent; they averaged about 2 hours apart, and sometimes oftener.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Captain Kramer, here was a pilot message, which indicated the reply was to be made to the Hull note. You were all alerted to watch for that reply, were you not?

Captain KRAMER. We had been looking for it for some [10962] days; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Would the watch officer, when this message came in on the teletype, have any way of knowing what its contents were?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He would have to rely upon the translators over in the Army? First the decoders, I suppose.

Captain KRAMER. Decoders, and then the subject, of course, would not be known until final translation.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you any explanation as to why it took from 7:20 a. m. to 12:05 p. m., on Saturday, December 6, to get that message over to the Army Signal Intelligence Service from the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. I have no first-hand knowledge on the time schedules of handling those things, so I cannot testify on that point, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, this exhibit indicates that this message was received at 12:05 p. m. by the Army Signal Intelligence Service. How long would it take, from your examination and knowledge of that message, to decode it and translate it, normally?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot testify, except from general understanding, how long it might take to decode it.

It might be, for example, that the cipher key for that [10963] day was not yet recovered, in which case it might have taken a week or more to recover. It might further be—

Mr. KEEFE (interposing). Pardon me just a moment. There is no need to talk about "it might take a week or more," because we know it was decoded that same day.

Captain KRAMER. It might be, in a more specific answer to your question, Mr. Keefe, that a cipher key had been recovered which was in error for two or three letters, giving a quite garbled text, in which case it might require considerable reworking before a fairly smooth text were deciphered.

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Mr. KEEFE. In any event, so far as you know, you did not get it in your section from the Army until the next morning, Sunday, December 7?

Captain KRAMER. That is my present belief, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Sometime between 9 and 10:30 that morning?

Captain KRAMER. That is my present belief, from a study of the other night, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Now, question No. 11:

Were Mr. Knox and Mr. Stimson called in that morning, or were they notified in any way?

Answer:

Yes. See 9 and 10 above.

Question 12:

How long did you stay with Mr. Roosevelt?

[10964] Answer:

Did not. See 8 above.

That is as you have testified here?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Question 13:

When did you see Admiral Stark that morning?

Answer:

About 0900 at his office with others, and left night-before matters. First batch of new given—

Well, I don't know whether this punctuation is right. I will start all over again. It appears I read it improperly.

Captain KRAMER. I did not edit that thing after the first typing, sir. There might be typographical errors in it, and very likely there are.

Mr. KEEFE. The answer to No. 13 is

About 0900 at his office with others, and left night-before matters.

Captain KRAMER. That means the material disseminated the evening before, Saturday evening.

Mr. KEEFE. I see. It means you left with him that material which you had received the night before?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I find now, however, that my recollection on that point is incorrect, that it was first shown to Admiral Stark the next morning by Captain McCollum.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, what am I to understand the fact is?

[10965] This memorandum says, "When did you see Admiral Stark that morning?" The answer is "About 0900 at his office with others, and left night-before matters."

Captain KRAMER. Actually I did not go to Admiral Stark's office until about 9:30, sir, when I was starting on my way to the State Department.

Mr. KEEFE. Now you push the matter up from 9 o'clock to 9:30.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You have been refreshed on that since you got to studying this on your arrival at Washington? Is that right?

Captain KRAMER. Chiefly the other night, and since my arrival in Washington; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. What do you mean by "chiefly the other night"?

Captain KRAMER. As to the time when the messages were delivered, the study I made the other night for Senator Ferguson.

Mr. KEEFE. That would not help you any on the matter of time, would it?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I am still a little hazy on precise times. In fact, during our luncheon conversation at Admiral Stark's home in Spring Valley, we were [10966] still unclear as to exact times. The chief point cleared up was the fact it was Captain McCollum and not Commander Wellborn whom I had seen that morning in Stark's office.

Mr. KEEFE. Am I to understand that at this luncheon at Admiral Stark's home you were trying to figure out, and figure accurately, as to what time you did see Admiral Stark and what time you did deliver the papers to him?

Captain KRAMER. That was not the purpose, sir. It was in the course of a general conversation that one or two of those points came up, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Captain Kramer, I have not asked you as to whether that was the purpose of the luncheon or not. You volunteered the statement here, in addition to what you said yesterday to Senator Ferguson about that meeting, that this question was discussed as to the exact time that you delivered papers to Admiral Stark.

Now, either it was or was not. I was not there.

I will ask you the direct question.

At this luncheon meeting with Admiral Stark, was the question discussed as to the time at which you delivered the papers to him that morning of December 7, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. Points regarding the——

Mr. KEEFE (interposing). You can answer that "Yes" or "No," can't you?

[10967] Captain KRAMER. I cannot answer a categorical "Yes" on that point, in the light of your precise wording of your question, Mr. Keefe. No effort was made to determine exact times. In the course of general conversation, the times of arrival of Admiral Stark and Captain McCollum came up in our discussion. In that respect my answer would be "Yes," otherwise, in answer to your question, the answer is "No," if you mean that we were trying to determine precise times.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, all right.

When you prepared this memorandum out in the solitude of the South Pacific, when you were alone by yourself, preparing a sort of a message that was to be used in the event of your death, to state facts so you would leave a clear record as to events, you set down that you saw Admiral Stark at 9 o'clock at his office with others, and left with him then these papers.

Captain KRAMER. That was my recollection then; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now then, since you got to talking it over with people after your arrival here at Washington, your memory became refreshed as to the events, and you now say you think it was about 9:30, is that right?

Captain KRAMER. That is right, sir.

[10968] Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Did Admiral Stark tell you that he thought you were mistaken in saying it was 9 o'clock, that it was nearer 9:30?

Captain KRAMER. He did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did anyone else tell you that?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. That was purely my own presumption and deduction from the fact that I have a recollection, still rather hazy, that I did stop at Admiral Stark's office on my way to my appointment in the State Department.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you leave any papers at Admiral Stark's office that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I apparently did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did not you take any papers to Admiral Stark's office that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I did, definitely, that I recall, after my return from Mr. Hull's office at approximately 10:30. That time I am quite precise on.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, I am getting more confused than ever by your answer. You tried to see Stark the night before, on the 6th, to deliver this 13-part message to him along with others, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10969] Mr. KEEFE. You could not find him home?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you went on and made your deliveries to others, as you testified, and you think Wilkinson called Stark that night, and made an appointment to get all the crowd together the next morning. You so stated?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you had the pouch that Stark did not get, and took it back to the Navy Department that Saturday night?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Did not you deliver that pouch to him in the morning, so Stark would have the same papers you delivered to these other people?

Captain KRAMER. I left several pouches with Captain McCollum early that morning, sir. It could well be that my stopping about 9:30 at Admiral Stark's office was to see and find out for myself whether Admiral Stark had yet seen it.

[10970] Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, I will read on with your answer:

First batch of new given about 0940, second about 1045 (all this was not personal but via his senior aide because of meeting in progress. They were passed in to him promptly however).

Now you say that the first batch of the new stuff that came in was given to him at 9:40, and the second batch at 10:45, and that was delivered to his senior aide.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you must have made three deliveries.

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do I understand this—

Captain KRAMER. (interposing), My present recollection is that I am somewhat faulty on precise times in that memorandum. That 9:40 I now modify to the 9:30 stopping at Admiral Stark's office I have just referred to.

Mr. KEEFE. Then am I to understand that you not only left the material that was in the pouch on the night before, but you also left the first batch of the material that came in on the morning of the 7th at 9:30, is that it?

Captain KRAMER. The first batch, Mr. Keefe, now appears to be only the fourteenth part of that 13-part note. That was apparently the only new material, in the light of my study the other night, that was left on the first trip.

[10971] Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, am I to understand that you left the pouch with the fourteenth part message in it alone?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; that together with the other material disseminated the previous night which Admiral Stark had not yet seen.

Mr. KEEFE. Now why can't we get some simple little fact clear? Am I correct in the assumption that whatever you did deliver, whether it was 9:30, 9:40, or at any other time, the first delivery you made on the morning of the 7th, according to your present refreshed testimony, included the fourteenth part, together with the first 13 parts.

Now did it or didn't it?

Captain KRAMER. It did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. It is easy to say a simple little thing like that if you will only listen to the question.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield? I think I can clear the confusion by showing you this part of the record.

Mr. KEEFE. I do not think there is any confusion right now. I think we have got it clear.

Now question No. 14:

With reference to a certain conference held that morning, do you know who attended it and how long it lasted?

Answer:

There were two I know of, and I believe another c/o Colonel Bratton. The one in Mr. Hull's office was at [10972] least one and one-half hours. Another started about 9:00 o'clock with Op-10, Admiral Stark, 11 Admiral Ingersoll, 12 Admiral Turner, 16 Admiral Wilkinson, 20 Admiral Noyes, and others there, lasting to 1130 that I know of, and probably later.

Is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. It now develops, Mr. Keefe, that there was no formal conference, but many officers were in Admiral Stark's office, and going and coming from his office. My impression, at the time I prepared that memorandum and at the time that Sunday morning, was there was a conference. It was in a similar manner that the normal 11 o'clock conference was held more or less daily in Admiral Stark's office, similarly assembled. That was the reason for my impression that there was a formal conference of that nature. However, it was no formal conference but a continuing discussion that Sunday morning.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Question No. 15:

"Did you ever tell Admiral Wilkinson what you told me?"

Your answers appears to be to 15 and 16:

Reference obscure. Would you clarify? If re-general security (i. e. lack) late in spring, yes.

What does that refer to?

Captain KRAMER. That is rather cryptic, I will admit, [10973] Mr. Keefe. By "spring" I refer to the spring of 1942, regarding a number of security questions that came up at that time. Otherwise I was unaware of what Captain Safford was referring to.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he says, "Did you ever tell Admiral Wilkinson what you told me?" What was it that you told him?

Captain KRAMER. I still do not know what he means by that remark, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you say, "If regeneral security (i. e., lack) late in spring; yes."

What did you mean by that?

Captain KRAMER. I thought I covered that point just now, sir. I referred to a security episode that came up late in the spring of 1942.

Mr. KEEFE. Question No. 17:

When did Admiral Wilkinson first see or learn about part 14 and other papers?

Your answer is:

See Items 13 and 14 above.

There is no question about that, is there?

Captain KRAMER. I do not think so, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Your memorandum then is exactly the same as you testified?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10974] Mr. KEEFE. Question No. 18:

We can't find the original "weather report" (sent on Dec. 5th) and its translation. What became of it?

Answer:

The first weather report was not on 5 December, 1941, but mid-morning of 7 December 1941, as indicated in 10-c above. It went into OP-20-GZ file. Op-20-GL should have it now unless it was among files turned over to Army.

Now there you are referring to the so-called weather report that came in on the seventh?

Captain KRAMER. Which I learned only before Admiral Hewitt's investigation I was mistaken in, and actually that was the hidden-word message.

Mr. KEEFE. It was the hidden-word message instead of the weather report?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Question No. 19:

Can you offer any pertinent remarks?

Your answer:

For the most part covered above, until Item 15 (16) is clarified.

Then your memorandum goes on and sets forth the first four paragraphs of Captain Safford's letter to you under date of January 22, 1944, which is already in the record, and I shall not burden the record by reading it.

Then you put down his questions:

[10975] Please answer the following questions by Item No."

Item 20:

Re your Item #2, is Colonel B. Colonel Bratton?

Answer :

Yes.

Item No. 21 :

What or whose job in the Navy did Colonel Bratton's job correspond to?

Answer :

McCollum's (head of FE Section), and mine insofar as dissemination of this material is concerned.

No question about that?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Item 22 :

Do you know what Army officers were notified or shown the papers by Colonel Bratton, and when?

Answer :

Other than as indicated in 2, 9 and 14 I do not know, but since the Colonel was, on frequent occasions of which I am aware, always prompt and conscientious in handling this type of material I assume that all usual recipients in the War Department were getting everything promptly on 6-7 December, 1941. This assumption is further substantiated the morning of the 7th by the fact that he arrived at Mr. Hull's office about the same time I did on both trips, despite the fact I had a few minutes start each time while delivery was being made to him from my office. He, as you know, was responsible for getting it to State, as well as to Mr. Stimson. I believe his usual practice was [10976] to get it to the Chief of Staff and DMI prior to delivery to Mr. Hull.

No question about that, is there?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (continuing) :

In amplification of my question 15-16 "Did you ever tell Admiral Wilkinson what you told me? Or McCollum or anyone else?" I recall your telling me that you saw Admiral Stark about 0900 (EST) on 7 December 1941.

He looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God! This means war!"

You said, "Admiral, it has meant war for the past three months."

Admiral Stark continued, "I must get word to Admiral Kimmel," and picked up a message blank.

Then another idea entered his mind, and he said "Does General Marshall know of this?"

You replied, "Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part (Part 14) was sent over 10 minutes ago and should be on the General's desk by now."

(End of your tale).

Now, this was what amplified Captain Safford's previous question, which you asked him to amplify in your reply to his first letter?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; that is correct, sir.

[10977] Mr. KEEFE. And he is attempting to tell you what you told him in amplification and asks you to verify it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Item 23 :

Can you verify or correct the foregoing?

Answer :

Cannot verify. (See Item 13.) I may have made the last remark, because quite often during the previous year, not only he, but others would ask similar questions regarding who had it. I therefore frequently answered such questions or volunteered such information at the time of delivery, and may have as indicated in this case.

Now this question and the answer thus far contemplate that you had had a conversation at some time with Captain Safford and had told him that you had delivered these papers, or these messages, to Admiral Stark at about 9 o'clock, and that when he looked at it he said, "My God! This means war!" and you said, "Admiral, it has meant war for the past three months." Admiral Stark then said, "I must get word to Admiral Kimmel," and picked up a message blank.

Now I understand you to say in your memorandum that you cannot verify that as having taken place, except possibly the last sentence.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, sir.

Most of it was sent over to [10978] his office last night. This last part (Part 14) was sent over 10 minutes ago and should be on the General's desk by now.

What were you referring to there?

Captain KRAMER. I was referring in the answer set forth there only to the general character of conversations regarding delivery, which I frequently made and talked about in my answer there.

Mr. KEEFE. You say in your memorandum:

I may have made the last remark, because quite often during the previous year, not only he, but others would ask similar questions regarding who had it.

Now what I want to know is, had you at any time told Captain Safford those facts that he set forth to refresh your recollection?

Captain KRAMER. I am extremely doubtful of that, sir. I had probably three or four conversations, between the time of Pearl Harbor and the time of my departure in the late spring of 1943 with Captain Safford. During those conversations I may have referred, at one time or another, probably in the days just following Pearl Harbor, to what deliveries I had made that morning. I kept him in general apprised of important items in this traffic. I cannot, however, verify that conversation which Captain Safford puts [10979] in mine and Admiral Stark's mouths.

Mr. KEEFE. You do not deny it, do you, that you told that to Captain Safford?

Captain KRAMER. I have no recollection whatsoever of having told Captain Safford of such a conversation.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now Captain Kramer, it would be perfectly the most natural thing in the world for an officer like Admiral Stark to say, "My God! This means war!" when he got these messages, wouldn't it?

Captain KRAMER. In that respect, sir, Admiral Stark, that I recall on three or four occasions, used rather emphatic expressions of that nature.

Mr. KEEFE. It would not be unlike Admiral Stark to make a statement of that kind, would it?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

[10980] Mr. KEEFE. Then as I understand your testimony with respect to this particular situation, it boils down to this, that you just do not verify it. It may have occurred, you do not deny it categorically, but you do not have any present recollection that you told Captain Safford that?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But when you were recording your last declaration, that was to be used in the event of your death in the Pacific setting forth the facts, you did say you may have made the last remark, and I want to quote that, when he asked the question "Does General Marshall know of this?" your reply was:

Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part (part 14) was sent over ten minutes ago, and should be on the General's desk by now.

Captain KRAMER. By stating I might have made the last remark, I was referring purely and simply, Mr. Keefe, to the fact that assuming I saw Admiral Stark at 9 or 9:30 that morning, I may have informed him of who had already received that material.

It was nothing more or less, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Now, I go on with your further answer:

[10981] My recollections and most vivid impressions of that morning almost 2½ years ago are of urgency and perspiration. The latter from dashing through the corridors of the Navy Department and two trips to the White House and State Department on foot (partly on the double), and the former from the certainty that the diplomatic haymakers exchanged since five November, 1941, and particularly since about the 26th, were reaching a climax. The immediate urgency for me was to get back to my office as quickly as possible to see if anything new had come in, and then get it pushed through the breakdown, translation, check for references, typing, arrangement of the 14 copies in folders for dissemination, phoning to see where recipients were, and then to dash out with it again.

Hence, my usual procedure of preparing summaries of the day's traffic and of references, as well as sitting alongside the desk of recipients while they read only the summaries if pressed for time, or the full text of the more important material to which I invited their attention, and so I could clarify obscure connotations, identify names, give background, or outline references, was entirely foregone that morning.

There was no need for any of it because the items were for the most part self-explanatory and the background, so [10982] far as this particular set of traffic was concerned, was well-known to all recipients, especially because the volume of new material during the preceding ten days had been small (though important) and had given opportunity for review.

If I appear to be hazy on some of the details you ask, in particular with reference to the conversation in Admiral Stark's office, the above background which I have given at some length should explain it in part.

More specifically, I recall making personal delivery to only two principals that morning, namely, to Mr. Knox and to Admiral Stark at 0900.

There again, after this long explanation, you say, and I read:

More specifically, I recall making personal delivery to only two principals that morning, namely, to Mr. Knox and to Admiral Stark at 0900,

or 9 o'clock.

I go on with your statement:

In the case of Mr. Knox, I gave him the previous night's material, plus part 14, and one to two less important things when he arrived at Mr. Hull's office about 1000. My remarks then were confined to inviting attention to the new material, because he had studied the previous night's material from approximately 2200 to after 2300 in his apartment.

That would be for an hour, wouldn't it?

[10983] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. It was somewhat less than that.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

Part of this time he talked to me about various phases of the matter, and made phone calls. The rest of the time I conversed with Mrs. Knox, and the

Secretary's Chicago Daily News manager, who was visiting and whom I had known slightly during the period when he was acting as Mr. Knox's personal secretary at the Navy Department.

Right at that point, in this letter, which was written by you out in the Pacific, without the benefit of notes, and without the benefit of all this material, and without the benefit of refreshment from anybody, you told, in pretty meticulous detail, the same story you told before this committee; isn't that true, as to those facts?

Captain KRAMER. I think so, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, I go on.

Again, at about 1100 when I delivered the "1300 msg." the "weather report" and the final orders on destruction of cryptographic aids, I took time only to invite attention verbally to the fact "that 1300 Eastern Daylight Time was 0730 at Pearl—

and that means 7:30 at Pearl, doesn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10984] Mr. KEEFE. "And 0300"—that would be what? Three o'clock?

Captain KRAMER. In the morning; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In the morning.

approximately or shortly before morning twilight at Kota Bharu, where we had been expecting confirmation of the deal with the Thai Chief of Staff for this attack for some days. The implications were so obvious in the light of what we know, that it was not necessary to state that invasion of British territory was undoubtedly scheduled for 1300 (EDT), and that at least a complete break with the U. S. was scheduled simultaneously.

That was clear wasn't it?

Captain KRAMER. I think so, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

In the case of the 0900 delivery to Admiral Stark I was in very much of a hurry. I don't believe I spent as much as a minute in his office.

Now, you refer in this memorandum to the 9 o'clock delivery to Admiral Stark, do you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; in that respect, Mr. Keefe—

Mr. KEEFE (interposing). I have only asked for the "yes."

Mr. MURPHY. I submit the witness is entitled to give an explanation. We want the facts.

[10985] Captain KRAMER. I would like to make a very short further remark, that I was hazy then, and still am hazy. I believe Captain McCollum is not precise, and that Admiral Stark too is not precise as to those exact times. I do definitely recall now, however, that the first delivery of that note to Admiral Stark was made by Captain McCollum where I left the folder for the Admiral.

I may very well, since Admiral Stark's office was up on deck and only one corridor's length away, have gone up there at 9 o'clock with the flag secretary, if he were there, or to otherwise check to see whether Admiral Stark were in and had gotten that.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, of course, the whole thing is only a matter of a half hour's difference.

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. The testimony is only a difference of a half an hour, which was a vital half hour that morning, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. I presume all time that morning was very vital, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Wel, I will go on:

I don't believe I spent as much as a minute in his office.

[10986] A number of other senior officers were standing about or coming in for the meeting. I hardly glanced at them, more than to note that Admiral Turner, Noyes, and Wilkinson, the principal other usual recipients, were also there, and consequently it would not be necessary to run them down in the building for separate and individual delivery.

I had been interrupted in finishing some of the hot new material in my office to make this delivery, and was literally almost jumpy to get back and get it out, and to deliver to the White House as quickly as possible, and also, of course to keep the 1000 appointment with Mr. Knox at the State Department.

I am almost positive I did not remain in the Admiral's office while he read the approximately 15 pages of single-spaced text. There were undoubtedly a few words exchanged with the Admiral, most likely along the lines of the remarks you quote as my last reply.

[10987] I want to stop right there. You say:

I am almost positive I did not remain in the Admiral's office while he read the approximately 15 pages of single-spaced text.

Now what were you referring to there? The whole 14 parts?

Captain KRAMER. That was presuming that I delivered directly to Admiral Stark the 14-part note; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now did you or did you not deliver it to him?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, in my present best recollection, make that delivery; no, sir. Captain McCollum did.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, when you were making that statement that day you were certainly under the impression that you had delivered it to him, and you were setting down in this document, to be used in the event of your death, what you thoroughly understood the facts to be?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you say in this that you are certain that you did not remain in his office while he read the approximately 15 pages.

There were undoubtedly a few words exchanged with the Admiral, most likely along the lines of the remarks you quote as my last reply.

What were you referring to there?

Captain KRAMER. The last sentence that Captain Safford [10988] quotes me as saying.

Mr. KEEFE. We will go back to it. In other words, "Does General Marshall know of this?", and your reply:

Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part (Part 14) was sent over 10 minutes ago and should be on the General's desk by now.

Is that what you referred to?

Captain KRAMER. I referred, as I shortly before have outlined, only to informing Admiral Stark, a recipient, as to other recipients who may or may not have received that material.

Mr. KEEFE. Now let us get a definite answer to my question.

Captain KRAMER. That, I think, is a definite answer, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When you wrote these words:

There were undoubtedly a few words exchanged with the Admiral, most likely along the lines of the remarks you quote as my last reply,

were you then referring to the suggested words contained in Captain Safford's letter to you?

Captain KRAMER. I was not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. What were you referring to?

Captain KRAMER. Only to my general practice of informing recipients who else had received the material I was delivering.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in this memorandum you say:

There [10989] were undoubtedly a few words exchanged with the Admiral, most likely along the lines of the remarks you quote as my last reply.

What did you mean when you set that down?

Captain KRAMER. I have already stated, a few minutes ago, Mr. Keefe, that I did not edit that memorandum after I wrote it. I was under some pressure to confer with Admiral Halsey again, as I had indicated when he first showed me Admiral Kimmel's letter. Despite that urgency, or at least haste, on my part it took me approximately 4 or 5 days before I had this memorandum prepared. I recall now no attempt to go back, during the process of preparing that memorandum, to check in detail what I had said earlier.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, let us go on. The memorandum further says:

The other actions of the Admiral would also be not unusual.

What were you referring to there?

Captain KRAMER. I was referring to an emphatic comment that the Admiral had made on the several previous occasions when I delivered directly to him.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, this portion of your memorandum, Captain, refers to what took place when you delivered this message to Admiral Stark at 9 o'clock on the morning of [10990] the 7th, or whatever time between 9 and 9:30 that you actually did deliver it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I think if you will refer to page 9144 you will find Captain McCollum's explanation on the delivery of the first part of the message.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not interested at this time in what Captain McCollum said. I am asking this witness who is now on the stand.

Mr. MURPHY. May I finish?

Mr. KEEFE. No; I do not care to be interrupted for that purpose. That does not add anything to this examination.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. MURPHY. I am trying to avoid confusion.

Mr. KEEFE. You simply add more confusion to it.

Now what remarks, if any, did Admiral Starke make to you that morning?

Captain KRAMER. Admiral Stark, in my present best recollection, made no remark directly to me, sir. I could be—I have indicated my haziness on precise times prior to 10 o'clock, that is between about 8:15 and 10, at least—that I was in Admiral Stark's outer office at about the time that Captain McCollum arrived there to show that memorandum to Admiral Stark. I am uncertain of that, sir.

[10991] Mr. KEEFE. Then your answer is that, according to your present recollection, after you have been refreshed, as it were, you think you did not deliver this fourteenth part message, together with the first 13 parts, that morning at any time, to Admiral Stark?

Captain KRAMER. Directly; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that you now contend you did not have any conversation with him at all that morning; is that right?

Captain KRAMER. That is my present belief; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Therefore Admiral Stark did not say anything to you about this message at all?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that your present recollection?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that because you discussed it with Admiral Stark and Captain McCollum?

Captain KRAMER. Partly that, and partly by general study of this whole subject in the last few weeks, the last couple of months.

Mr. KEEFE. Since you got back to Washington?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is what you meant when you said repeatedly throughout your testimony that you had been refreshed, [10992] so that your current recollection is so and so; is that right?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. A large part of my refreshing has been due to a study of documents which I had not seen until recent days.

Mr. KEEFE. A study of documents would not help you any on this, would it?

Captain KRAMER. No.

Mr. KEEFE. So if any refreshing at all is to be done, it is because somebody talked to you about it; is that true?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Nothing else?

Captain KRAMER. Nothing else.

Mr. KEEFE. There are no documents that you could study which would determine whether you talked to Admiral Stark or whether you did not?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, let us go on with your statement:

On a number of occasions previously he had immediately phoned General Marshall, or had called the White House to arrange immediate access for me to Mr. Roosevelt if the material were important, and delivery had been to the Admiral first. I definitely recall a certain feeling of [10993] relief that Admiral Wilkinson was there, and consequently I need not be held up from getting back to my office while it was read, because Admiral Wilkinson had studied it thoroughly the night before and could answer any questions the Admiral had.

Now, there again, you say you definitely recall a feeling of relief that Admiral Wilkinson was there. Now, was where? In Admiral Stark's office?

Captain KRAMER. How is that?

Mr. KEEFE. Was Admiral Wilkinson in Admiral Stark's office?

Captain KRAMER. He was quite definitely at my 10:30 visit in Admiral Stark's outer office. It could very well be that he was there at about 9:30 when I stopped by Admiral Stark's office, together with other senior department officers, standing about in his office.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Now, let us go on.

Now, I want you to listen to this. You say you never read this statement before since you wrote it.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So it is quite new to you, too, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. There are some points that are new [10994] to me now, yes, sir. I do not recall just exactly what I put in that memorandum.

Mr. KEEFE. I want you to listen to this next one carefully:

One or more of the other remarks may have been made also. The quoted exclamation of Admiral Stark would have been typical in character, because he had used emphatic exclamation once or twice before during the fall when particularly 'hot' items were being shown him. But climax after climax had been so frequent during the previous several months that even this remark would not have impressed me specifically. I was used to it, with my mind focused on the technical and messenger boys aspects that morning, I simply do not recall the complete conversation in question.

Now, does that refresh your recollection as to whether you told Captain Safford about the exclamations that Admiral Stark had made when this message was delivered to him?

Captain KRAMER. Not in the slightest, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It does not refresh you in the slightest?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Your own words, your own language written by you?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10995] Mr. KEEFE. Now, I ask you again, in the light of your present knowledge, did you or did you not deliver the fourteenth part message together with the first 13 parts that morning to Admiral Stark personally?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

[10996] Mr. KEEFE. Then all this stuff that you have written down here, couldn't possibly have happened, or any inference that it happened, couldn't possibly show that it happened?

Captain KRAMER. It is possible that I was in Admiral Stark's outer office at the time Captain McCollum arrived there. He may have phoned me that Admiral Stark was arriving. That would not have been unusual.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any present recollection that Admiral Stark made any of the statements which are set forth in Captain Safford's letter to you?

Captain KRAMER. I have none, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now Captain Kramer, just so that we may thoroughly understand this, I understood you to say that you prepared this memorandum and intended that this memorandum should be your story of these events in the event you should happen to be killed in your service out in the South Pacific?

Captain KRAMER. That is not quite accurate, sir. My intention in preparing that memorandum was simply to give Admiral Halsey a much broader picture of events preceding Pearl Harbor than would be indicated by replies to Admiral Kimmel's letter. That purpose only. It was only later, after I had promised Admiral Halsey that I would prepare a [10997] deposition or affidavit in compliance with Admiral Wilkinson's request, that I retained this memorandum as being in the nature of the affidavit which Admiral Kimmel had requested. I never reviewed that as to accuracy at any time. I never prepared any such affidavit.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you intend that this should be used in the event anything happened to you?

Captain KRAMER. I, of course, hoped that it would be necessary to so use it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in the event it would have been necessary to use it, did you intend this should be your statement of fact?

Captain KRAMER. It would have been found with my papers; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Sort of a last declaration, or dying declaration or something of that kind; is that right?

Captain KRAMER. I presume so, sir; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you knew that an investigation was on at the time you prepared this, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. I did not; no, sir. I believe I had heard, I am not certain of that point, that a Navy investigation was contemplated.

Mr. KEEFE. And you knew that on the possibility of the findings of that Navy court, the careers and perhaps [10998] the entire lives of individuals depended; you knew that, didn't you?

Captain KRAMER. That undoubtedly was part of my presumption; yes, sir. I did not know just the purpose of the investigation.

Mr. KEEFE. So you were quite meticulous, were you not, when you prepared this statement, to see to it that you recorded the truth?

Captain KRAMER. I was not particularly meticulous. My only purpose and intention when I was preparing that was to give Admiral Halsey a broad picture. I took no time to rehash or attempt to refresh my memory precisely as to details in the preparation of that memorandum.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I read on. Let's see if this refreshes your recollection any. I am trying to refresh it from your own document. Not anybody else's.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. This is your own writing.

In later deliveries—

Get this:

In later deliveries to Admiral Stark that morning, I went only to his office door, which remained open, while his flag secretary took the material from me and gave it to the admiral.

[10999] Captain KRAMER. That was referring specifically to the 10:30 delivery which I quite vividly recall.

Mr. KEEFE. That would imply to me, reading this full statement, that the first delivery you made in person to Admiral Stark and then you say "In later deliveries to Admiral Stark that morning I went only to his office door."

Captain KRAMER. In later trips to Admiral Stark's office. Again, possibly clarifying a point to a slight degree, it could well be that Admiral Stark's door was not closed at the first trip around 9 or 9:30, whenever it was, that I may have made to Admiral Stark's office. It was closed, I recall quite positively, when I arrived there about 10:30, because word had to be sent in to the admiral that I was outside.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, it is quite clear from your testimony given here that you never delivered any papers to Admiral Stark personally that morning.

Captain KRAMER. That is my present belief; yes, sir; before 10 o'clock.

Mr. KEEFE. So when you say "In later deliveries to Admiral Stark, I went only to his office door," the fact is you never went beyond his office door to make any deliveries; is that what you mean to tell us now?

Captain KRAMER. That is what I mean to tell you now, sir.

[11000] Mr. KEEFE. You have then refreshed on that point also since you got back to Washington?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you talk about that at Admiral Stark's luncheon?

Captain KRAMER. I don't believe that came up specifically; no, sir.

[11001] Mr. KEEFE. Then you go on to say:

I believe I also gave him additional folders on one or both occasions for other recipients in the conference. But in these latter deliveries I recollect conversation only for Mr. Knox' benefit regarding the implications of the 1300 hour. I distinctly remember that the tie-up of these times would be apparent to experienced naval officers, but that a civilian (Mr. Knox) might overlook it. Hence the pains I took to point it out at the State Department. I repeated this point at least half a dozen times that morning to others, chiefly subordinates, I think, but including one of Mr. Hull's secretaries who handled this material for him, to one or two of my office workers, and I believe also to Colonel Bratton in Mr. Hull's outer office, probably to Commander Wellborn, the Admiral's flag secretary, possibly to McCollum, and probably to you, too. However, such conversations as I had that morning were more in the nature of rapid comment and abrupt departure to keep up with my chief concerns, the messenger boy and technical jobs. Consequently, any remarks made by others have left practically no impressions or recollections with me.

Now, that is substantially, as to that point, what you have testified before us here?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11002] Mr. KEEFE. On that issue your mind is very clear, it is the same today as it was when you recorded this out in the Pacific in the early part of 1944?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, questions 24 and 25:

Did Admiral Stark get General Marshall on the telephone and what did he say; were there any other witnesses? If so, who?

See 23 above; also 13 and 14.

You mean by that that what I have just finished reading is the story so far as Admiral Stark is concerned and what you know about it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know whether Admiral Stark telephoned General Marshall that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I do not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Question 26:

Did you tell McCollum, or Admiral Wilkinson, or anyone else?

Since I don't recall the story, I rather doubt that I could have told it to these two also, but I could not swear to it.

Well, now comes this next question. That is the one you had reference to, Mr. —

[11003] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who had reference to?

Mr. KEEFE. Counsel had reference to it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. KEEFE. You have seen this, Mr. Murphy. Can you see anything in it?

Mr. MURPHY. I had the benefit of a half-minute glance at it. From what I saw I could see no reason for withholding it.

Senator BREWSTER. I can't understand.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Keefe asked me if I had seen it and I said that I had had the benefit of a half-minute glance at it. From what I saw I saw no reason to withhold it. I did not see all of it. Mr. Keefe had it overnight.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to inquire of counsel: Is there anything about this matter—counsel is familiar with it?

Mr. RICHARDSON. We see no reason for withholding it except the request of Captain Baecher.

Mr. MURPHY. The first part of the question has already been read into the record.

Mr. KEEFE. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Several days ago.

Mr. KEEFE. Most of the facts set forth in the next question and answer are already in the record, having been referred to heretofore.

[11004] Mr. KAUFMAN. Commander Baecher says that the Navy Department requests that it be withheld and before it is made public they would like to make very serious representations to the committee that it should not be disclosed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, in view of that—

Senator LUCAS. Does that have to do with magic?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. If there is anything in there of that character then I can't read English. I can't find it in there.

Senator LUCAS. Does the Congressman think it is material?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't know. I don't want to be quoted as saying that I think it is material except we have a witness on the stand and the materiality of it, in my opinion, could only relate to a search of his memory.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. To determine the possible credibility of testimony which he has given here and his ability to remember details and facts and not remember other details and facts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On that point, hasn't he had a pretty fair test applied to him up to this point?

Mr. KEEFE. I only raise this question, Mr. Cooper, because I like to keep my word, and I stated that I would not refer to anything in this which might by the wildest stretch of imagination be assumed to interfere with the [11005] security of the United States.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I suggest, while I would have no question about its materiality, in view of the representation of the Navy Department I would suggest we defer decision until noontime. We are nearly ready for recess. We might take a little earlier recess and permit the Navy to tell us in confidence why this will wreck our national security.

I am at a loss to understand it, but I think we should defer to their desire.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think in view of the request made by the Navy Department certainly they are entitled to that consideration.

Mr. MURPHY. May I suggest we go to question 28 and then let the gentleman from Wisconsin pass the sheet along and let the committee read it. Questions from 28 to 43 do not violate anything.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to inquire of Commander Baecher: Is the material upon which the Navy Department request is based on this one page to which Mr. Murphy has referred?

Commander BAECHER. I think, Mr. Chairman, it goes over three pages.

Mr. MURPHY. It is one question. Question 27.

[11006] Commander BAECHER. Yes. It begins at the bottom of the page, takes up a full second page and ends on top of the third page.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is it all under one question?

Commander BAECHER. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Would that be agreeable, Mr. Keefe, to skip that one question and go on with your examination?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We will follow the suggestion of Senator Brewster.

Mr. KEEFE. Question 28:

Do you know if any of the following were called as witnesses by the Roberts Commission? Admiral Wilkinson; Admiral Turner; McCollum; Kramer.

I was not called. Captain McCollum was, and he told me a little about it including the fact of the introduction of at least some of the Jap traffic as evidence. I do not know about the others, but presume they did appear.

Question 29:

Were the JD files in GZ custody or any messages from these files ever submitted to the Roberts Commission?

Answer:

See 28. The files from GZ were never called for, but were unnecessary for this purpose since MID had numerous copies of everything, and a complete set for about [11007] a month back was normally in ONI in Op-16-FE.

Captain KRAMER. That is Captain McCollum's section, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Question 30:

Were Admiral Wilkinson, McCollum, or Kramer, or anyone else, cautioned or warned, or instructed not to ever mention the events of 6-7 December 1941, or the investigations conducted by the Roberts Commission? In this connection, I am sending you a copy of the Roberts Report by ordinary ship's mail. I will comment on it in further correspondence.

Answer:

Not that I am aware of. I was not. However, the sessions were, of course, secret, hence cautions or warnings of some kind should have been in order, as in ordinary courts. I cannot conceive of the crypto traffic being introduced in evidence without at least the elementary prudence of cautionary warnings regarding this material. However, I have no knowledge of this, or even of the rules of procedure used by the Commission.

Question 31:

Do you know when and how General Marshall first got news of Serials #901 and #902 (Parts 1-13 inc.), and what action he took?

I do not know, but see 2, 14 and 22. I believe he got it that night. I am unaware of any action taken, but presume that a meeting in War Department the following morning [11008] was arranged that night. Sunday was not an all hands work day at that time.

What did you mean by that answer?

Captain KRAMER. I meant precisely what it says, I think, sir, that Sunday was normally observed as a holiday from working hours, ap-

pearance at the office on Sunday except for special watches set up on a full week 24-hour basis. People did not come to the Navy Department on Sunday except on unusual occasions and as to the War Department I believe it was the same case.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you say that you believe General Marshall got #901 and #902 Saturday night.

Captain KRAMER. I stated definitely above that I did not have any first-hand knowledge on that point, sir; it was just my presumption that he might have gotten it.

Mr. KEEFE. And was that presumption based on the fact that they did have a meeting in the War Department the following morning?

Captain KRAMER. I know nothing about any meeting that may or may not have taken place in the War Department Sunday morning, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that your answer in this case is just pure speculation?

Captain KRAMER. I could have answered simply "No" to [11009] that whole question; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. His answer is covered in his answer above. In No. 22, about what material the Army had.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; I know. He refers to it in this answer.

Question 32:

Same for Part 14 of Serial #902, and for Serial #907 which set up the 1300 delivery time?

Your answer:

See 31.

In other words, you don't know anything about whether General Marshall got it or when he got it if at all?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Question 33:

Re my 14, I meant the conference between Admiral Stark and General Marshall which resulted in dispatch described in Part XI of Roberts Report. I did not know of the other conferences and am delighted to learn of them. Can you add any names to those already given by you for:—

That appears to be the end. There doesn't appear to be any answer to that question. There is a little lapse there and it is hard to follow. Maybe you can explain it to me.

[11010] (The witness was handed a paper and there was a discussion between Mr. Keefe and the witness off the record.)

Mr. KEEFE. In any event so far as this memorandum is concerned there does not appear to be any answer to question 33?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And your explanation to me just given is that it is very possible that you may have gotten up to that night that you were working on it and may have started in again later and forgot to record any answer to that question?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, question 34:

Conference in Mr. Hull's office?

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Answer:

I am quite certain Mr. Hamilton (head of FE Division of State) was there, and believe both Mr. Hornbeck (political adviser on FE) and Mr. Welles were there, since they were regularly seeing the traffic. Probably about 8 persons altogether.

Do you know whether Mr. Welles was there?

Captain KRAMER. I do not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You say you believe that he was there—when you wrote this memorandum.

Captain KRAMER. I believe Mr. Welles was normally called in to conferences between those three Secretaries bearing on these Japanese-United State negotiations, sir.

[11011] Mr. KEEFE. You know that Mr. Welles has testified here that he was not there that morning, do you not?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; this is the first I ever heard that point.

Mr. KEEFE. That was just—

Captain KRAMER. Presumption.

Mr. KEEFE. Presumption on your part, too, wasn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11012] Mr. KEEFE. Question 35:

Conference in Admiral Stark's office?

Then your answer:

Cannot add my name to 14, but there were quite a number, possibly 15 or more standing around, not yet seated when first delivery was made about 0900.

Again you refer to the fact that all of these people were in Admiral Stark's office when you made the first delivery about 9 o'clock.

Now, you don't care to add anything to what you have already said on that question?

Mr. KRAMER. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. KEEFE. Question 36:

Conference in General Marshall's office?

Answer:

Have your information and am not even positive there was a conference. See 14 and 31.

Question 37:

The conference between Admiral Stark and General Marshall?

Know nothing of this.

Question 38:

How much does McCollum know?

I don't know exactly. I presume a good deal. I saw [11013] him only rarely after the new regime took over with delivery of material by young officer "couriers."

No. 39:

Will McCollum come through willingly?

I do not know.

No. 40:

What is your estimate of Admiral Wilkinson in this respect?

I frankly don't know. Our relations have always been most cordial and friendly, and remain so on three occasions I have met him in SOPAC. On two occasions when he introduced me to other senior officers, he introduced me with the remark that he and I had had a rather hectic night before Pearl Harbor.

But we have never discussed any aspects of this case or subsequent developments such as the Roberts' Commission.

What was your understanding that Captain Safford was inquiring about when he said "What is your estimate of Admiral Wilkinson in this respect," and you answered, "Frankly I don't know"?

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Keefe, one of numerous reasons why I did not reply to Captain Safford's letter was the fact that Captain Safford was apparently putting me on some sort of a team. I proposed to be on no team. I referred in that [11014] answer there to that point.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, when you said, "I frankly don't know," you are referring to the fact that you weren't going to be on anybody's team; is that it?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The question is "What is your estimate of Admiral Wilkinson in this respect," and your answer is "I frankly don't know." You want us to understand that is to be interpreted as meaning you weren't going to play on anybody's team?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know that, from your previous conversations with Captain Safford before you went to the South Pacific, that he was organizing a team?

Captain KRAMER. The first intimation I had of any such development was Captain Safford's second letter to me.

Mr. KEEFE. And you just didn't want to get mixed up with Captain Safford?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. So when he asked what you thought about Admiral Wilkinson, you just said, "I frankly don't know."

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When he asked you whether McCollum would come through willingly, you said, "I don't know."

[11015] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then the next question is:

Will he talk for Admiral Halsey?

Your answer was:

I have nothing on which to base an opinion in this regard.

That is the same situation isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Precisely, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. 42:

What about Admiral Turner?

Answer:

I have not seen him since he left Washington, and have nothing on which to base even an estimate.

Captain KRAMER. The same thing, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, there appears on the next page, which appears to be comment apparently by Safford.

This is what it says:

With regard to the quotes of my Item 18 (the Weather Report sent 5 Dec '41) and your reply in 10 (c), you were describing #80 (Circular #2494, a plain language hidden code msg. sent the morning of 7 Dec 41) of which we have copies

of the original and its translation in the GZ files. This was sent and received on 7 Dec 41. I was asking about the "General Intelligence Broadcast" containing false [11016] "Weather Report" which was broadcast at 0403 (EST) on the 4th and 5th of December 1941. (Not sure of exact date). It was heard by "M" and "W" and sent in by teletype. It was unheard by "S", "H", and "C", who listened for it. (I have this from Station "S" files, plus statements of Wright and Mason.) This message (in Morse) included the words:
 "Higashi no kaze ame."—

Captain KRAMER. Very good, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Thank you, I hope I don't fail when the next one comes.

"Nishi no kaze hare."

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, just as good.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

(Negative form of "Kita no kaze Kumori.")

Captain KRAMER. Kumori, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is what I said. Do I get a hundred on that, Professor?

Captain KRAMER. Very close to that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. This has done something for us being on this committee. I got that much out of this hearing anyway.

Now then, going on with this:

The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by [11017] Circulars #2353 and #2354, both of which listed a large number of plain language message texts with corresponding hidden meanings for each, but was a mixture. The GY watch officer was not sure of it so he called you and you came in early and verified it. Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or Brotherhood (?) were waiting in my office when I came in that morning and said, "Here it is!" We had been waiting a week for it and Station "S" had been forwarding reams of P/L messages by teletype.

As a result of this "General Intelligence Broadcast containing false 'Weather Report' McCollum prepared the message described in Paragraph 50 (page 9—XI) of the Roberts Report. It was a very long message ending up with the translation and significance of the warning in the "General Intelligence Broadcast Etc." I read the message in Admiral Noyes' office and was witness to the discussion of it between Admiral Noyes and Admiral Wilkinson. I took for granted that the message to Admiral Kimmel originated by McCollum on 4 December 1941 (or 5 Dec) but never released would be sent and did not know otherwise until 2 December 1943. I learned from Wright that McCollum knew this last mentioned message had not been sent (Wright was informed by McCollum at Pearl Harbor).

Then follows more questions.

[11018] Mr. KEEFE. Question 45.

Mr. MURPHY. 43.

Mr. KEEFE. Is it 43?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. All right, I am glad you read better than I do [reading]:

Do you recall the "General Intelligence Broadcast containing false 'Weather report'?"

Yes, but I did not handle it. Without exception everything I disseminated was written up with 14 copies (7 for Army, 7 for Navy, with two typings). One copy of Navy's went at once into JD or similar category-numerical-file of section Op-20-GZ. After routing and return of remaining 6 copies many items went into two other types of files we kept in varying degrees as needed, namely, a "Subject" file, and a Jap msg serial file at certain times, though the latter was basically taken care of by a carding system of originator's serials.

I do not have a hazy recollection of being called down to the office as you described, a few mornings before Pearl Harbor. I had similarly been called

in by the GY watch officer who had standing orders from me to do so, at various times of the night one to three times a [11019] week since mid-summer.

In the case of these "Weather Reports", however, elaborate arrangements had been made some days (or weeks) previously to have the GY watch officer handle this type of message himself. The arrangements included the typing up of a small card for at least five senior officers of the Navy Department, giving the translation and meaning of these "Weather Reports". I prepared these cards for Admiral Noyes at his direction, but from that point he carried the ball. I believe, but do not know, that he gave these cards to Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and others. At least that was his intention in having them prepared. And I think also that he completed arrangements with you for handling this type of message. I think the arrangement including having the Navy Department communication officer use his couriers at night to get the word to the senior officers in Washington who were concerned, though this arrangement may have consisted simply of phoning, with the Navy Department communication watch officer keeping at it till he got the word through.

The above is given at some length to explain why this item made such a small impression on my memory. I was not to handle it. Complete arrangements to handle it expeditiously were fully set up by the Director of [11020] Naval Communications, when I was replying to your first letter it did not even occur to me as the msg. you referred to, and I in fact had completely forgotten the incident of the arrival of this msg. until your second letter refreshed my memory. The only "Weather" message I handled was the one late in the morning of 7 Dec. The above also explains why you did not find this earlier one in GZ translation files.

That ends your story.

Now, Captain Kramer, Captain Safford started his testimony to this committee by reading a prepared statement and the opening sentence of that statement was, "There was a winds code message," or words to that effect.

Captain KRAMER. I confirm that point, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now you have distinctly and definitely confirmed that fact.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. There was a winds execute code message that came in on either the 4th or 5th of December 1941?

Captain KRAMER. I believe on the 5th, sir, in my present conviction.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, I want to be sure that your answer is there was a winds execute code message that came in, you think on the 5th, Captain Safford has testified on the 4th.

[11021] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; there was a message.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were shown that message —

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (continuing). By which the watch officer who brought it to you and it is your present recollection that that watch officer was Lieutenant Murray?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have a present recollection that it was on yellow teletype paper?

Captain KRAMER. I am uncertain of the color. Two colors were in vogue, both yellow and pink.

Mr. KEEFE. At the time that message was received you believed that that was the message that these elaborate preparations had been set up to intercept and decode, were you not?

Captain KRAMER. I believed that it was an authentic message of that winds system, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then on that most important part of this whole matter you and Captain Safford are in agreement, are you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you never had any other at any time, did you—

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

[11022] Mr. KEEFE (continuing). From that time to this?

Captain KRAMER. Until the last few days when I have—as I have previously explained, I had been making further studies, including the reading of interrogations of high Japanese officials by General MacArthur.

Mr. KEEFE. By the way, where are those interrogations of Japanese officials that you have read?

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is Exhibit 142, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you get it for me? I do not happen to have that in my files. Will you get me Exhibit 142, please?

(Whereupon counsel handed Exhibit No. 142 to Mr. Keefe.)

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request, in view of the readings and interpolations on the paper read by the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin, that it be spread in its entirety, with the exception of question 27, in the record at this point so that those who read the record will be able to see it and tie up the letter with the examination, either that or made an exhibit so that we will have a composite understanding of the letter itself.

Senator BREWSTER. Would the gentleman be agreeable to deferring a decision until after recess, when, as I understand, we will discuss the whole situation?

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will now take a recess.

[11023] (Whereupon, at 12:10 p. m., a recess was taken until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[11024]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything further before your examination is resumed, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair desires to announce for the record that during executive session of the committee at noon that question No. 27 and the answer thereto, appearing in the memorandum of Captain Kramer, was examined and it is the decision of the committee that it is not material or relevant to this investigation and relates to matters after the Pearl Harbor attack, and it will not be included in the record or released by the committee.

The Chair also desires to announce that the committee will adjourn at a quarter to 4 as there is to be an important vote in the Senate at 4 o'clock and Senators will have to be present in the Senate Chamber for that vote.

Mr. Keefe, of Wisconsin, will resume his inquiry. The committee will adjourn at a quarter to 4 until 10 o'clock Monday morning. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, sir; I will proceed.

[11025] **TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)**

Mr. KEEFE. Captain Kramer, on July 24, 1944, you testified before the naval court of inquiry then sitting at Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were duly sworn to testify to the truth at that inquiry, were you not?

Captain KRAMER. I was, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know the purpose of that inquiry at the time you testified?

Captain KRAMER. Other than as indicated in the precept which was read to me, I did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, what impression did you get from the reading of the precept as to the purpose of the inquiry?

Captain KRAMER. I have forgotten the wording of the precept. I recall no distinct impression left on my memory. My general impression, however, was that in view of questions raised since that attack a naval inquiry had been ordered; I do not recall at the moment whether it was initiated by the Navy or instigated by the desires of the Congress. That they were to examine, apparently, all aspects of incidents pertaining to Pearl Harbor. That was my general impression and still is, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you understand at that time that it was [11026] the purpose of this naval court of inquiry to assess responsibility for Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that was part of the precept; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, sir. So you knew when you testified before the naval court of inquiry that the testimony which you then gave might be used by that naval court as the basis, or at least part of the basis for their determination in assessing responsibility for Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. I fully appreciated that point; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you knew that the findings of this naval court, based in part at least upon the testimony that you were about to give, might affect the welfare and fortunes and perhaps the future of many men?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were conscious of that responsibility when you testified?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now I desire to ask you, referring to page 956 of the transcript of testimony taken before the naval court of inquiry, were these questions asked you and did you make these answers?

Q. Commander, I am going to show you some documents and ask you if you saw them on or before the 7th [11027] of December, 1941. The first one I shall show you is document 15 from Exhibit 63?

A. Yes, sir, I did. This was written up by my section.

Q. Can you recall about when you first saw it?

A. The fact that the date "28 November" is on here would indicate that I saw it and confirmed it for writing up on that date for the first time. Also, there is an indication at the bottom that it was received by teletype, which would indicate it was handled promptly after received.

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that is accurate, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And at that time document 15 from Exhibit 63 referred to the original set-up of the Japanese winds code, did it not?

Captain KRAMER. I believe it did; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was this question asked you, and did you make this answer:

Q. Do you know what action was taken with reference to intercepting any communications which would have executed the phases of this code?

On receipt of this particular message, on instruc- [11028] tions of the Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes, I prepared some cards, about six as I recall it, which I turned over to Admiral Noyes. He indicated that his purpose in getting these cards was to leave them with certain senior officers of the Navy Department and I do know that he arranged with Captain Safford, the head of Op-20-G, the section of Communications that handled this material, to have any message in this phraseology handled promptly by watch officers, not only in Op-20-G but through the regular watch officers of the Communications section of the Navy Department, to those people who had the cards. These cards had on them the expressions contained in this exhibit, and the meaning. Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, when such a message came through, I believe either the third or fourth of December, I was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it as being of this nature, walked with him to Captain Safford's office, and from that point Captain Safford took the ball. I believe Captain Safford went directly to Admiral Noyes' office at that time. Again, because of the fact that this was a plain language message, and because of the fact that special arrangements had been made to handle this Japanese plain language message which [11029] had special meaning, I did not handle the distribution of this particular message, the one of the third or fourth.

Was that question asked you and did you make that answer?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was that answer the truth?

Captain KRAMER. I think it is accurate in all respects except that apparently my memory was faulty at that moment as to what was on the cards. My present belief and conviction is that the Japanese expressions did not appear on those cards.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Captain Kramer, you have so previously testified before this board or committee, that you only wrote on these cards, as I understand it, the meaning. Is that it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Meaning of what?

Captain KRAMER. The translations of those expressions and the countries referred to. I think that it would have been a very illogical thing to have put the Japanese expressions on those cards since that would have involved delays in teaching the Navy Communications officers not Section G watch officers, how to pronounce them and to do the same thing for the recipients of such a message.

[11030] Mr. KEEFE. Now, Captain Kramer, again let's be clear about this.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The original winds code message referred to the use of certain Japanese words which had a specific meaning?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were on the lookout for those Japanese words?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, it would seem to me to be perfectly in line with common sense to assume that when you made out these cards you would list these Japanese words on the card, together with their meaning, so

that these top-flight people to whom the cards were directed when furnished with a message in Japanese language would be able to compare it with the Japanese words on the card and then know the meaning of those Japanese words and that is exactly and precisely what you testified to before the naval court of inquiry. Now you say you want to change that testimony. Why?

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Keefe, I can recall no time or incident at any time while I was on duty in that section where the question of the Japanese phraseology used in encoded or plain-language text was ever brought up with any of these re- [11031] cipients to whom I delivered this material. Further, the GY watch officer had additional pieces of paper or a piece of paper giving the Japanese translation, giving its translation and the country referred to and the instructions that were in effect regarding handling this message were to pass on to the Navy Department watch officers only the English translation of those phrases for phoning or sending by courier to the recipients who presumed they would get it.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, Captain Kramer, what did you put on these cards according to your present, current, refresh recollection?

Captain KRAMER. The English translation and the country referred to and that was all, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, let's get that straight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What does he mean by "the English translation"?

Mr. KEEFE. That is what I want to find out. What do you mean by the "English translation"?

Captain KRAMER. "East Wind—rain—United States; west wind—clear—England; north wind—cloudy—Russia."

Mr. KEEFE. Now, that is what you now claim you wrote on those cards?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you seen one of those cards since you [11032] came back to the United States?

Captain KRAMER. I have never seen those cards since leaving them with Admiral Noyes.

Mr. KEEFE. You now say that Admiral Noyes requested you to write out such cards?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And pursuant to that direction you prepared them?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you personally deliver them to Admiral Noyes?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When?

Captain KRAMER. Within a few hours, as I recollect it, of the time he gave me those instructions.

Mr. KEEFE. When was that? That doesn't mean anything.

Captain KRAMER. That, I should say, would have been either the 28th or 29th of November 1941.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Have you made a search in the Navy Department to try to find one of those cards?

Captain KRAMER. I have not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. They have likewise disappeared, have they not?

Captain KRAMER. Apparently; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know, Mr. Counsel, whether or not a [11033] search has been instituted in the Navy Department to try to find one of those cards?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I do not know that there has or has not, but I will inquire.¹

Mr. KEEFE. At least they are not presently available so far as this committee is concerned.

Well, now Captain KRAMER, was this question asked you and did you make this answer:

Q. You say it is your recollection that you received some Japanese plain language words which corresponded with the language set out in document 15; is that correct?

A. My statement was, not that I received it, but I was shown it.

Was that question asked you and did you make that answer?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that is accurate, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

Q. Can you recall from looking at document 15 which Japanese language words you received?

Now, document 15 is the original message setting up the Japanese winds code?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And setting forth the Japanese language as meaning certain things?

[11034] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

Higashi No Kazeame—

I am not so good this time.

Captain KRAMER. I am afraid not, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you pronounce it for me.

Captain KRAMER. "Higashi No Kaze Ame."

Mr. KEEFE. "Higashi No Kaze Ame." Well, that is because the reporters have got it all run together. Now, I will read your answer again:

Q. Can you recall from looking at document 15 which Japanese language words you received?

A. Higashi No Kaze Ame, I am quite certain.

Listen to this:

The literal meaning of Higashi No Kaze Ame is East Wind, Rain. That is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United States.

Was that question asked you and did you make that answer?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was it the truth?

Captain KRAMER. It was not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, is this committee to conclude from that last answer, Captain Kramer, that you testified [11035] falsely before the naval court of inquiry on this very vital and important question?

Captain KRAMER. It was the truth as it came to my mind at the time, Mr. Keefe. I have earlier in my testimony, I think, covered that point fairly exhaustively, that that occasion, namely, the naval court

¹ See letter from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5497.

of inquiry, was the first time that the question of what country appeared in that piece of teletype ever came up in any conversation in which I was participating.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Captain Kramer, the fact that it is the first time, that is an experience that we all have as witnesses in a court room.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But here is a situation where you are testifying under oath and you have already admitted that you knew the purpose of this examination. You have testified that the testimony which you then gave might be used by this commission as the basis for affecting the lives and fortunes and the future of any number of men and still you testified before us this afternoon that the statement which you made, which I have just read to you, was false.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I object to the characterization of the testimony. The witness did not say it was false. He said that in the light of his recollection at that [11036] time that was his best memory.

Mr. KEEFE. No, no, no.

Mr. MURPHY. He is giving us his testimony now and I say it is grossly and manifestly unfair to so characterize it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the record will show the witness' previous answer.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Will you go back, Mr. Reporter, and read the questions and answers? I don't want to treat the witness unfairly and I think he knows I do not.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. KEEFE. All right, stop right there.

Now, did you testify to that? You did testify that that statement was not the truth, didn't you, Captain Kramer?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, sir. And your later answer is an attempt to explain why you did not state the truth at that time; is that not true?

Captain KRAMER. What I now believe to be the truth, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. So that we now have a situation where you make a statement on a vital issue before the naval court of inquiry which you admit was not true because you claim that subsequent events have now convinced you that the answer which you gave was not; is that the fact?

[11037] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that right?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is a fair conclusion, is it not?

Captain KRAMER. It is, sir. I would like to point out at this time—I don't think it has been particularly emphasized before—that despite the fact that I was caught cold on that point when the question was propounded my reaction even then was that only one country was involved on that piece of teletype paper.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Well, now, Captain Kramer, if there had never been any further investigation and this whole incident was stopped with the naval court of inquiry and its findings, then the findings would have been predicated in part, at least, upon a statement which did not reflect the truth, as you testify, at that time, isn't that right?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that is the case, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now I want to ask you some more questions.

Q. Do you remember in what form this communication was that you saw which contained the words about which you have testified, Higashi No Kaze Ame?

A. I am almost certain it was typewritten. I believe it was on teletype paper.

[11038] Was that question asked you and did you make that answer?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you will see again, Captain Kramer, that that question refers to the words "Higashi No Kaze Ame."

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not qualify it when you answered that question either, did you?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you asked this question and did you make this answer:

Q. Can you recall who had this paper in his possession when you saw it?

A. I don't recall the name of the officer who had it. It was, however, the GY watch officer, the man who had the watch breaking down current systems that were being read.

Q. Can you indicate or state the source of the information that was contained in this communication?

No, sir, I cannot positively, but the fact that my recollection is that it came in on teletype would indicate that it was a U. S. Navy intercept station.

Q. And I believe you have testified that you have no knowledge of what disposition was made of the communication after you saw it: is that correct?

[11039] A. No first-hand or direct knowledge. It would simply be inference.

And then was this question asked you and did you make this answer, appearing on page 968 of the Naval Court of Inquiry:

Q. In your testimony with respect to the so-called winds code and the execute message following it you stated that the execute was taken to mean that strained relations or a break in relations or, possibly, war might follow between Japan and the United States. Would you indicate to the court why you phrased your answer that way, that is, indicating that it might mean any one of those three things rather than one of those three specifically?

A. That answer is inherent in the character of the Japanese language in that they habitually speak in circumlocutions and by indirection and by inference.

Q. Do I understand you to mean that your section would not have stated categorically that this message meant war or merely a break in diplomatic relations but that all three of those possibilities were available to anyone interpreting that message?

A. That is precisely correct. I can definitely state that I could not interpret that message as meaning definitely war.

[11040] Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Were those answers the truth?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you were referring in these questions and answers to this winds code execute message, were you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were referring to the words that were in that winds code execute message, were you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And as you have just testified, the words that you remember being in it were the words used in your answer, "Higashi No Kaze Ame", and so forth; that is right, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now you want us to understand when I read your testimony before the naval court that according to your present refreshed and current recollection you were mistaken, that there were no such words in the message that you saw?

Captain KRAMER. No words referring to the United States.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, were there any words at all in it that you remember?

[11041] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you remember what words were in it?

Captain KRAMER. I do not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, that is the point exactly. You do not remember what words were in the message; is that your testimony, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. What I mean to imply by that—I think it has been reiterated many times—is that I do not now and have never known since the time I saw that piece of teletype exactly what Japanese phraseology was in it, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I think you should qualify that except when you testified under oath before the naval court of inquiry. Isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. Repeat that question.

Mr. KEEFE. I will strike it. You pretended to know what words were in it when you testified before the naval court of inquiry, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. That was apparently the impression I created; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, I want to understand what your testimony is today. Am I correct in the assumption that according to your present, or what you have referred to many times as your current, recollection after being refreshed, you are not able to tell this committee what words were in that [11042] code execute message?

Captain KRAMER. My present belief and conviction is that piece of teletype referred to one country and that country was England.

Mr. KEEFE. What were the words used that would refer to England?

Captain KRAMER. "Nishi No Kaze Hare."

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, I will go on a little further. Were these questions asked you and did you make these answers on page 980 of the court of inquiry of the Navy. Question 139:

Q. Now, referring to the winds message, you were familiar with the original winds message, wherein they designated at some future date in a weather report, if they gave execute and used certain words, it meant certain things?

Yes, sir.

Q. Were you standing by for an answer to that message? Did you consider it important enough that when that message was received it would be a most important message in reply? In other words, were you on the lookout for that answer?

A. I am not sure what you mean by "answer."

Q. Well, the execute of the message.

[11034] A. Yes, sir; not only myself but all that Op-20-G organization was very much on the qui vive looking for that. I prefer to refer to that as a warning.

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that is accurate, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that was the truth?

Captain KRAMER. As I saw it then and as I see it now, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

Q. When this execute came in, did you receive it?

A. I did not receive it myself but was shown it by the watch officer who receives the information coming off the teletype.

Q. Were you the officer who went to the communications officer and said, "Here it is."

A. I believe I used that expression when I accompanied the watch officer to Commander Safford's office.

Q. You had that information then?

A. We had, as I recall it, this typewritten piece of paper with the meaning well in mind.

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11044] Mr. KEEFE. And was that the truth?

Captain KRAMER. It was the truth as far as it goes. My present recollection, still keeping in mind that my contact with that piece of paper was of only a few seconds' duration, probably less than half a minute, is that there was some handwriting on that piece of teletype paper in the GY watch officer's hand. There may when it was delivered to Captain Safford's office also have been a correction to his handwriting in my hand.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, is there anything more you want to elaborate on?

Captain KRAMER. Nothing, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I asked you the simple question as to whether the statement which you made, which I have read to you, the answers that you gave in response to those questions was the truth. Was it or wasn't it?

Captain KRAMER. I appreciate that, sir, but it was not the whole truth as I see it now, inasmuch as there was no reference in that answer to any handwriting.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, there is reference to the fact that it is a typewritten piece of paper with the meaning well in mind. What did you mean by that?

Captain KRAMER. Of course, both myself and the watch officer, as well as everyone cognizant of this, had the meaning [11045] well in mind. That is all I meant by that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, Captain Kramer, if I was sitting as a member of this naval court, having heard your first testimony that I have read as to what was on this message and then following this further examination which took place the next day, I necessarily would assume that what you were referring to was the meaning which you had already testified under oath was on that message, wouldn't I?

Captain KRAMER. The question is broad and complicated, sir. I would like to have it reread.

Mr. KEEFE. All right, strike it out. That perhaps is calling for a conclusion. I won't press it. [Reading:]

Q. About what was the time and date when you got that?

A. I am not certain. I believe it was about the 4th of December. It may have been the 3rd.

Q. Who handled it?

A. I left Commander Safford's office as soon as I knew he had the picture and knew what the message was, and I believe he at once went to Admiral Noyes' office. I knew that Admiral Noyes was highly interested in that particular plain-language code because of his previous instructions to me to make out these cards so that he could leave it with certain high officers and the Secretary, all with the view of getting the word to those people promptly, whether it was any time of the day or night. [11046]

Was that question asked you and did you make that answer?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I want to ask you if these questions were asked you and if you made the following answers:

Q. When you took the execute of the winds message in to Captain Safford and, I believe, said, "Here it is," did you mean by that exclamation, "Here it is", that this was the execution of the Japanese War Plan, or did you have any further discussion with Captain Safford which would indicate he thought that this was the message which executed the Japanese War Plan?

A. Nothing of that nature whatsoever. I did not deliver the message myself. I accompanied the GY watch officer on the way to Commander Safford's office, and the expression, "Here it is", simply meant that finally a message in this plain-language code had come through—a message which we had been looking for many days and that we had made special provisions to handle for many days.

Was that question asked and did you make that answer?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was that answer the truth?

[11047] Captain KRAMER. It was, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

Q. To your mind that was of no more significance than "here is the message which indicates a break in negotiations between Japan and the United States"?

A. It meant more than that. This plain language code did not refer specifically to the United States-Japanese negotiations. It referred to the general diplomatic relations between the nations concerned and therefore meant a critical stage in the negotiations or relations which could very well involve a break.

Was that question asked you and did you make that answer?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

Q. Do you recall whether there was any uncertainty in the translation unit with respect to the meaning of the words in either the "Winds" Code, that is the message setting up the code, or in the message of execution?

A. This is very simple language and there was no doubt whatsoever of the literal translation of these terms.

Your section had no difficulty in making the translation?

[11048] A. Not at all. It is very simple, every-day language.

Now, after all that testimony which you gave before the naval court of inquiry you now tell this committee that you do not remember or recall at all what the words were that were in that winds execute message?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, I want to go to your subsequent examination before the Hewitt investigating committee. You testified there under oath, too, didn't you?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was your memory thoroughly refreshed when you testified before the Hewitt committee?

Captain KRAMER. I should hardly characterize it as thoroughly refreshed; no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, before you testified before the Hewitt committee you had had many conversations with Mr. Sonnett, had you not?

Captain KRAMER. Several brief conversations; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, all right; several brief conversations. And Sonnett had talked over your testimony with you, hadn't he?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; some aspects of it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he talked over your testimony with [11049] respect to this winds code execute, didn't he?

Captain KRAMER. He did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you had a chance, then, before you went before the Hewitt committee, to think about that so that you were not cold, as it were, when you went before the Hewitt committee?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So the testimony before the Hewitt committee was more likely to be the truth than the testimony before the Navy court of inquiry, is that right?

Captain KRAMER. On this winds subject I should say it definitely was, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, was the testimony that you gave before the Hewitt committee the truth in full with respect to the winds execute message?

Captain KRAMER. I believe it was the truth in full and accurate in that respect so far as I recalled it up to the time of the Hewitt investigation.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, that is not an answer to my question. Do I understand that you are now changing the testimony that you gave before the Hewitt committee as a result of your refreshing and so on?

Captain KRAMER. Only insofar as I have modified my testimony before the Hewitt board by testimony I have already [11050] given in this hearing.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Captain Kramer, let us go into this further. That is the second time that you testified under oath, before the Hewitt committee, and this was——

Mr. MURPHY. This is the second time before Hewitt or the second time under oath?

Mr. KEEFE. The second time under oath was before the Hewitt committee. I thought that was perfectly clear.

Now, this one took place at the Navy Department at 12:30 p. m., Tuesday, the 22d of May 1945:

President: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lt. Comdr. Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold.

And you were sworn, were you not——

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (continuing). To tell the truth?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11051] Mr. KEEFE. To tell the truth?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you talked with Mr. Sonnett, getting you ready for this examination, were you advised the purpose of the Hewitt examination?

Captain KRAMER. I don't recall precisely in what form he told me the purpose was but the general impression I gathered, whether from him or from other sources, was that the purpose of the Hewitt investigation was to fill in gaps in the court of inquiry investigation, and

further to attempt to reconcile discrepancies appearing in the testimony of that court of inquiry.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you read the testimony before the naval court of inquiry?

Captain KRAMER. Part of my own testimony and such parts as appear in the naval narrative only, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know of any gaps in the testimony as to this winds execute message?

Captain KRAMER. There certainly is, sir; not gaps, but discrepancies in the testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. In the testimony before the naval court of inquiry do you know of any discrepancies?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I was made aware of them when I was talking with Mr. Sonnett.

[11052] Mr. KEEFE. All right. That is exactly it. What did Mr. Sonnett tell you the discrepancies were when he was getting you ready for this examination before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain KRAMER. I believe among other things that he stated to me that no one appeared to recall this winds message except myself and Captain Safford. It was only incidentally in the last several weeks when I read some excerpts from the Army investigation that I was aware that certain Army officers also confirmed the existence of a message considered authentic in this wind system.

Mr. KEEFE. Captain Kramer, the fact of the receipt of this wind execute message, its delivery to you by the watch officer, whom you believed to be lieutenant Murray, your delivery of it or taking it in to Captain Safford, and his going down, as you thought, to deliver it to Admiral Noyes, no one knows anything about those facts except Safford, Kramer, and this man Murray, if he was the one; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. I believe that is true; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So there couldn't be any gap in the testimony or anything strange in the testimony that any other witness could testify to because you were the only three people that knew those facts; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. Except as I presumed, and still presume, [11053] Admiral Noyes also saw it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, up to the time it reached Admiral Noyes he didn't know what had transpired between its receipt on the teletype and its delivery to Captain Safford, did he?

Captain KRAMER. I should think not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I want to read these questions and answers and see if they refresh your recollection any:

Admiral HEWITT. I believe that about the middle of the first week of December there was a teletype message which, to the best of your recollection, one of the watch officers had in his possession and which was subsequently delivered to Admiral Noyes. Will you tell me about that, to the best of your recollection?

Captain KRAMER. I previously testified on that matter at Pearl Harbor, Admiral. I would like to go over that previous testimony again in the light of thinking it over since that time. I had no recollection of that message at the time it was first mentioned to me in the spring of '44. However, after being given some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, I did recall a message some days before 7 December '41, I believe about the middle of the week 1-7 December, and I do recall definitely being shown such a message by the GY watch officer and walking down with him to Captain Safford's office

and being present [11054] while the GY watch officer turned it over to him. A brief conversation ensued and Captain Safford then took it, I assumed, to Admiral Noyes, since that message we had all been on the qui vive about for a week or ten days. That is the last I saw of such a message.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you recall what the general subject of the message was?

Captain KRAMER. It was, as I recall it, a "winds" code message. The wording of it I do not recall. It may have been, "Higashi no kaze ame," specifically referring to the United States, as I have previously testified at Pearl Harbor, but I am less positive of that now that I believe I was at that time. The reason for revision in my view on that is the fact that in thinking it over, I have a rather sharp recollection in the latter part of that week of feeling there was still no overt mention or specific mention of the United States in any of this traffic, which I was seeing all of and which also was the only source in general of my information since I did not see, as a rule, the dispatches from the fleet commanders or going out to them from Operations.

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers?

Captain KRAMER. I consider that accurate, sir; yes, sir

Mr. KEEFE. So as late as the time you testified before [11055] Admiral Hewitt you were of the opinion that it may have contained the words "Higashi no kaze ame," but you were becoming uncertain about it in the light of your further refreshing?

Captain KRAMER. I meant to imply by that specifically that I did not recall, and still do not recall, the precise wording of the Japanese on the piece of teletype paper.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, let's go on:

Admiral HEWITT. Then it is still your belief, the best you can recall in view of that, there was no indication—

And then you broke in and said:

I would like to continue that statement, Admiral, by saying: For that reason, I am now at least under the impression that the message referred to England and possibly the Dutch rather than the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too.

Admiral HEWITT. Or possibly it may have referred to Russia?

Captain KRAMER. I just don't recall.

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers when you testified before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. Now, your answer before this committee is what you finally got to before Admiral Hewitt and that is [11056] you just don't recall what this message said on it; is that right?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So we now get to the point in your testimony here that there was a message, it had something on it, and must have had something on it to designate it as a wind code execute message?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; and further, to warrant my accompanying the watch officer to Captain Safford's office, an instance that I recall no previous occurrence of.

Mr. KEEFE. Then I am to understand, Captain Kramer, that this message, which was considered of top importance by everybody, which everybody was looking for and on the lookout for, and for which you have testified specific arrangements had been set up as in connection with no other message, after this message comes in you see it, you read it, you determine that this is the message you have been looking for, and you can't tell us now what was on that message?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or what it said?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Let's go on a little further. When Admiral Hewitt got through examining you Mr. Sonnett [11057] took you on, didn't he, and asked you some questions?

Captain KRAMER. I don't recollect, sir. The record of the testimony should show that, whether he asked them.

Mr. KEEFE. I will read it to you:

TWENTY-FIFTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 2:15 p. m., Friday, 6 July 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Does that refresh your recollection?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Lt. John Ford Baecher is the gentleman that is here in the room?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He was present at this hearing before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain KRAMER. I did not recall it until you read that transcript, sir, but I believe he was.

[11058] Mr. MURPHY. What page?

Mr. KEEFE. That is on page 576.

Now, I want to ask you whether these questions were asked you and whether you made these answers:

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, referring to the previous testimony concerning the receipt of a "winds" code message relating to the United States during the first week of December 1941, since your last testimony in this investigation, have you obtained any additional information concerning the receipt or non-receipt of such a message?

Captain KRAMER. No first-hand information. Simply I do have some more specific recollection of it than I did when the matter was first broached to me at Pearl Harbor during Admiral Murfin's inquiry. That refreshing goes to the extent that I have already testified about, namely, a positive recollection of having accompanied the GY watch officer with a "winds" message to Commander Safford's office, at which point he carried the ball, taking it, as I understood, directly to Admiral Noyes, who was handling it by special set-up that he had for that type of message.

Did you make that answer to that question?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. There was no refreshing about that, you had always testified to those facts every time you testified; [11059] isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. I may have added more to that in subsequent answers.

Mr. KEEFE. Up to that point that had been your story all the time; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. Precisely.

Mr. KEEFE. On those details there have been no question but you have testified to the same thing every time you testified; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11060] Mr. KEEFE. Now, then the next question:

Mr. SONNETT. And you have now no clear recollection, Captain, as to which country the message referred to?

That is a rather leading question that Mr. Sonnett is asking you. And your answer:

Captain KRAMER. No positive recollection. It may have been any or one or all three of the nations covered by that Japanese code set-up. The fact that we jumped on the ball on that message, however, would appear to me to have been applicable to at least England and probably the United States as well, but I have no first hand recollection of it.

Did you make that answer to Mr. Sonnett's question?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

Mr. SONNETT. Do you mean to imply, Captain, if you found a message in that code, relating to Russia during that period you wouldn't have given it as speedy treatment as you would if it related to England and the United States?

Captain KRAMER. Of course, we would have but there isn't the slightest indication that the Japanese had any intention of attacking Russia.

Did you make that answer?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I did, sir.

[11061] Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Then Mr. Sonnett examined you about a lot of other matters.

Then, Captain Kramer, at the conclusion of the examination of Admiral Hewitt, is it a fair assumption to conclude that as far as your testimony discloses, there was a wind execute code message received in the middle of the week, the exact date of which you were then uncertain, which may have referred to the United States, England, or possibly Russia, you were not certain; you were not then certain, and you are not certain what the message specifically said, but it may have referred to one or both or all three of the countries in the original code set-up; is that what you meant to tell Admiral Hewitt?

Captain KRAMER. That is what I meant to tell him at the time; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And if it did refer to the United States by the use of the words "Higashi No Kaze Ame," if it did use those words, and those words appeared on that winds code execute message, that would refer to the United States, would it not?

Captain KRAMER. It would, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And in accordance with the very simple translation of those words, as you gave it to the Naval [11602] Court of Inquiry, it might mean a sharp break in relations, or it might even mean war; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. With the United States; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. With the United States.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you, as the man in charge of translations of these messages, with knowledge that the whole Government was set up to pick up this very vital and important message, who handled that message, who saw it, who read it, who checked the interpretation of the watch officer on that message, sit here before us today, and say you can't tell us what the message said, you have no recollection of what it said at all; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir. However, I should like to point out to you, Mr. Keefe, that I think that an entirely unwarranted emphasis and importance is being attributed to that message, not only in this hearing but in past hearings, and in the press.

There were many other messages more specific as to Japanese intentions during this period.

Mr. KEEFE. Captain Kramer—

Captain KRAMER. A wind message would have been only one further indication of the general trend of this traffic as well as the general trend of the international situation.

[11963] Mr. KEEFE. Well, I am very happy that you have made that statement, Captain, because I have concluded that, as one member of this committee, a long time ago that there were plenty of messages to have warned those who read them and saw them that war was imminent and just about to break, without this winds execute message.

But, Captain Kramer, the Navy Department and all of the officials in the Navy Department—and I assume the War Department, too—considered that that winds execute message was of supreme importance, otherwise why did they set up this great set-up of cards and treat it as they did, with complete priority over every other message that was received?

Captain KRAMER. It was, of course, a very important straw, if it appeared.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, it did appear, didn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Therefore, Captain Safford made rather extensive preparations to attempt to receive it, not only within this country, but by arrangement with Army and with our outlying stations.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, Captain, let's get down to the mechanics of this thing so that we will understand it a little better. I don't know much about these teletypes. I have seen some of them in newspaper offices. Is that about what it is?

[11964] Captain KRAMER. Just about the same; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The ones that I have seen usually use a sheet of yellow paper about 6 or 8 inches wide.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It comes on a continuous roll.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the teletype types out the characters; is that right?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is what this was?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the roll keeps unwinding and the teletype keeps on working and somebody there is watching it and reading it, and when a message of importance appears, they tear that portion off. Isn't that right?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, this message came in over the teletype, didn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. You saw it?

Captain KRAMER. I saw it.

Mr. KEEFE. And it is of little importance as to whether it was yellow paper, pink paper, or red paper, or any other color of paper; isn't that true?

[11065] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It came over the teletype?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Nothing unusual about it being torn off because they were all torn off?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The watch officer had torn this off the teletype and came to you with it. Now, the thing that I would like to know is this:

There is always a duplicate of that teletype tape, isn't there?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that you had the original and some place there was a duplicate; isn't that right?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. What became of the duplicates of these messages?

Captain KRAMER. I believe, Mr. Keefe, that the purpose of having duplicates for any of this traffic, whether encoded or plain language, was to have an extra copy for systems which we were not reading so that more than one person could work on that system in attempting to break it down.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

[11066] Now, Captain, I have never seen this winds execute message. Of course you saw it, you handled it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you think you may have written something on it correcting the interpretation of the watch officer?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, if there was any interpretation on it at all, it must have been an interpretation of the Japanese words that were on it; is that true?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. There would be no reason for you or the watch officer to write any interpretation on this message unless it was an interpretation of those simple Japanese words that appeared on it?

Captain KRAMER. The very simple translation appearing in exhibit 1 regarding the set-up of this thing would have been all that appeared on that.

Mr. KEEFE. Then, Captain Kramer, there must have been some reason for you to correct the interpretation of the watch officer as you have testified you think you did. Do you have any recollection at all of doing that?

Captain KRAMER. I said I may have. I have no distinct recollection of doing it, sir.

[11067] Mr. KEEFE. The point I am trying to understand is this:

This message must have had Japanese words on it, then; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, and—

Mr. KEEFE. And it must have had the Japanese words on it that were specified in the original winds code set-up, otherwise why would the watch officer recognize it as a winds code execute; that is obvious, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The thing that attracted the attention of the GY watch officer was that in this message appeared the same Japanese-language words that were in the original set-up; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you still want to say to us that you can't recall what those words were?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. They must have been the words of the original code, otherwise, you wouldn't have paid any attention to it; isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Precisely, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And it is because the words on this teletype tape were the original Japanese code words, in the [11068] original code set-up that you determined that this was the coded execute message at that time; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. It is not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, all right.

Captain KRAMER. I should like to explain precisely what I mean by that.

The determination was not made by me in the case of this piece of teletype. On the number of previous times when I had been called down concerning possible messages in this winds system, I had examined long sheets of this teletype paper, had looked for the point of whether or not the expression was repeated or appeared as it was supposed to appear in the middle or at the end, or both.

In this particular case my presumption was that the GY watch officer had made that determination inasmuch as the piece of paper I saw was only a short piece of paper, 3 or 4 inches in length as I recollect, and that presumably he had identified this message as being an authentic winds message, not only from the wording that actually appeared in it, but from its location in the Japanese plain language broadcast. That was a function of the GY watch officer not only as regards this winds system, but as regards all systems to determine its authenticity and to break it down.

[11069] The only reason for having shown this piece of paper to me was in connection with the Japanese words thereon, and that is all, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, exactly.

Now, I want to go back over that once more, Captain Kramer; the GY watch officer brought you a piece of teletype paper which had Japanese language words thereon, which he interpreted as being the code execute message, and showed it to you.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you looked at those words, and looked at the interpretation which he had given them. You may have corrected it in some particular, and you became convinced that the Japanese language words on that piece of teletype made that message the Japanese code execute message and you so determined at that time and went down to Captain Safford's office and handed it to him, or saw the watch officer hand it to him and said, "Here it is." "This is it." "The thing that we have been straining ourselves for and setting up all this intercepting apparatus." That is true, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. It is, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that message went to Admiral Noyes' office because it was to be specially handled and wasn't to [11070] go through your office?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Because the interpretation had been given to Admiral Noyes on 6 cards so that he could interpret those Japanese words himself when they came in; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And those cards were to be sent around to the top flight officials of the Navy Department so that when they saw that message they could interpret it, and determine that it was a code execute message; wasn't that the purpose of the cards?

Captain KRAMER. I don't believe at any time was it intended to send any Japanese text to these other officers.

Mr. KEEFE. No——

Captain KRAMER. But that the translation was to be sent; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You misunderstood. They would get the Japanese words from the message itself, wouldn't they, and then with the Japanese words, you had the translations and gave them the translations on the cards? That is your story?

Captain KRAMER. They had and would get by this special set-up only the translation.

[11071] Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Now, then, so far as this committee is concerned, we have been unable to see that message, and we have been unable to see any of these cards. They are not in existence so far as you know, are they?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you stated a few moments ago that other people down there knew about the receipt of this winds execute message. Whom did you refer to?

Captain KRAMER. I am not aware that I ever testified to that effect, that other people knew about this message. I am reasonably certain that no one in my office saw it, although I believe that undoubtedly I mentioned it after my return to my office.

Mr. KEEFE. Mentioned it to whom?

Captain KRAMER. To some of the people in my office.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, it would be the most natural thing in the world if you had done so, that you had told them that this very vital message had finally come in, isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But you referred a few moments ago—and I do not easily forget testimony because I have been at this for a good many years—you testified that you [11072] had read the hearings or part of the hearings of the Army board——

Captain KRAMER. In the past few weeks in the naval narrative.

Mr. KEEFE. And from reading those hearings you have found out there were others that knew about this code execute message?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Didn't you make that statement a few moments ago?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Whom did you refer to when you made that statement?

Captain KRAMER. Specifically, I recall the name of Colonel Sadtler.

Mr. KEEFE. Col. Otis Sadtler?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You have no personal knowledge as to how Col. Otis Sadtler learned of this winds execute message?

Captain KRAMER. I do not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You have no personal knowledge as to what Admiral Noyes did with this message, have you?

Captain KRAMER. I do not, sir.

[11073] Mr. KEEFE. You don't know whether Admiral Noyes telephoned to any other person in the Navy with reference to the receipt of this winds execute message, do you?

Captain KRAMER. I do not, sir.

[11074] Mr. KEEFE. Did you talk with Colonel Bratton about it?

Captain KRAMER. I have no recollection of having talked to Colonel Bratton about it although it is possible I did since he was frequently in the Navy Building in Captain McCollum's office.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in your testimony before this committee you testified very positively and emphatically that you would not use the word "war" on this interpretation of this winds code message as testified to by Captain Safford?

Captain KRAMER. Most certainly not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In your testimony before the Hewitt committee and before the naval court of inquiry which I have heretofore referred to—

Well, I wanted to specifically refer to your testimony before the naval court of inquiry in which you gave the interpretation of those Japanese words. Let me find it.

Captain KRAMER. At no time, Mr. Keefe, have I attempted to put any construction or interpretation on those words other than what appears in Circulars 2353 and 2354, the Japanese indication of what they meant.

Mr. MURPHY. You read from page 956.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, the point that I wanted to make and get clear, Captain, is this: Certainly there is no need for refreshment or refreshing or change in recollection so [11075] far as the translation of the words "Higashi no kaze ame" are concerned?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The translation remains the same, doesn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Identical.

Mr. KEEFE. It will be the same when you testified at Pearl Harbor, the same when you testified before Admiral Hewitt, and the same when you testify here?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That doesn't change, does it?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So if the words "Higashi no kaze ame" appear on this winds execute message the interpretation would mean "East wind rain"; that is right, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you say that is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation on the eastward, the United States.

Now, that interpretation is the same today as it was when you testified out there before the naval court of inquiry, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Exactly, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that if you had wanted to you could have [11076] indicated that those words meant war with the United States, couldn't you, and be within the interpretation which you had given to the naval court of inquiry? It was one of the three alternatives, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. Only, Mr. Keefe, insofar as you would evaluate the Japanese instructions contained in the set-up of this wind message referring to the destruction of codes and classified papers. An evaluation which concluded that that meant war would then include that interpretation; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, looking at it from hindsight it did mean war, didn't it?

Captain KRAMER. It certainly did; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And we have spent an awful lot of time figuring these things out, when the thing was about ready to break, evaluating and refreshing and all that sort of thing.

Are you certain that on the evening of the 6th of December, when you made delivery to Admiral Wilkinson's home, that General Miles was present?

Captain KRAMER. I still have no positive recollection that he was there but apparently he was. That is something that my memory has been refreshed on only since reading the Navy narrative and other papers in the last few weeks.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, reading that Navy narrative, do you mean to say that that refreshes your recollection?

[11077] Captain KRAMER. By that I simply mean, Mr. Keefe, that General Miles states that he was there. If he so states I believe what he says.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you have no present recollection that General Miles was there?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I do not have.

Mr. KEEFE. You have no present recollection that General Miles read this 13-part message out there at Admiral Wilkinson's house that night?

Captain KRAMER. No present first-hand or positive recollection. He may have very well, however, been there.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, allow me to ask you one question for information, if I may, please.

Was there a considerable volume of this so-called traffic, as you term it, about the time this so-called winds execute message was to have come in?

Captain KRAMER. The enciphered and encoded traffic was somewhat below normal in volume but this plain language traffic was tremendous in volume by comparison 2 days before we started special monitoring of this plain language traffic.

[11078] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was the so-called winds execute message in plain language?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; it was.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And was the volume of the plain language traffic at that time the heaviest it was at any time?

Captain KRAMER. At any time; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Could you give us some idea of about the volume of that plain-language traffic?

Captain KRAMER. Before special provisions were set up to monitor this plain-language traffic it was sampled only periodically, usually when monitoring stations were not too busy on other traffic, or it may be that they undertook themselves to intercept samples of this plain language traffic when their encoded traffic, the circuits carrying it, were low in volume. I would estimate that the plain language traffic normally received during 1941 up to this time amounted to not more than 3 to 5 feet in length of teletype paper per week. During the period of this special monitoring set-up for plain language traffic the volume amounted to perhaps 200 feet per day of teletype paper.

As soon as this paper was scanned to see whether anything in the winds system was in it it was thrown into a waste basket and burned.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you had to examine a considerable [11079] amount of that large volume of this traffic, did you?

Captain KRAMER. Most of the examination was done by the GY watch officers. It was only in a number of cases when weather reports, actual weather reports appeared in this newscast traffic and there was some doubt in the minds of the watch officers as to its authenticity in being a weather or winds system broadcast, that they phoned me at home and called me to the office, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, was it rather frequent that you had to examine this traffic?

Captain KRAMER. At night it occurred, during this period of a week or 10 days, two or three times. During working hours in the daytime, or when I was at the office, I think probably a half-dozen additional times.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you consider it entirely reasonable that you might not now recall the exact wording of any one particular piece of that teletype paper?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas may inquire.

Senator LUCAS. Captain Kramer, from this long and exhaustive examination by members of this committee one could easily conclude that you originated the message, intercepted the message, decoded the message, translated the message, and delivered the message to Admiral Noyes. The [11080] truth of the matter is that you saw this so-called winds message some 30 seconds, as I understand it.

Captain KRAMER. Not over 30 seconds. Probably nearer 10 or 15 seconds.

Senator LUCAS. And under the special arrangement or agreement that was set up between Admiral Noyes and Captain Safford, am I to understand that the responsibility for the translation and the delivery of that particular message was solely within the power and jurisdiction of Captain Stafford?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; his GY section and himself.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, it was by mere chance, under that peculiar and special arrangement set up between Admiral Noyes and Captain Safford, that you happened to see this so-called winds execute message?

Captain KRAMER. It was pure chance that I happened to be in my office as the GY watch officer was passing my door; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, if you had, perhaps had your door closed or had been out of your office it was not necessary for the GY officer to find you to obtain your translation or your confirmation of this message before he took it to Captain Safford?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What its proper interpretation was, or [11081] what it actually meant, or what it actually contained in terms of breaking negotiations with either England, Russia, or the United States was the responsibility of Admiral Noyes and his subordinates under that special arrangement which they had?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, did Admiral Noyes, after he received this so-called winds message, assuming he did receive one, ever call you into his office, either on December 4, 5, 6, or 7, for the purpose of discussing this message with you and asking for your opinion as to the proper translation of that so-called winds execute message?

Captain KRAMER. At no time, Senator, was I called to Admiral Noyes' office in connection with the winds message. I, however, may very well have discussed it briefly with him the next time I saw Admiral Noyes, in making normal deliveries of the other decrypted traffic to him.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, in view of the fact that you were the one individual who had been translating nearly all of this magic code, don't you believe that if Admiral Noyes, after his examination of this message, had concluded that it was the genuine winds execute message that you were all looking for, that he would have sent for you in order that you might confirm his belief along that line?

Captain KRAMER. I do not think that was necessary at all, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Why would not he have sent for you, Captain? You are the one, as I understand it, who had translated most of these magic messages that came in.

Captain KRAMER. That is not accurate, sir. There was only a small percentage that I translated. I edited a large percentage and translated some.

Senator LUCAS. Anyhow, the magic messages that were of significance and tremendous importance, insofar as our relations with Japan were concerned, were delivered by you to the proper recipients?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I will ask you this question. I think it has been answered several times, but was there anyone in the Navy who ever told you to include this so-called winds execute message in the delivery to the recipients that obtained them from time to time?

Captain KRAMER. There never was, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. Now whose responsibility would that have been to have told you to include this message, if they had considered it important enough to send to those high in Government receiving this message?

Captain KRAMER. I should say, Senator, that it would [11083] have been the responsibility of the GY watch officer on watch, or possibly his superior, Captain Safford, to have seen that I got a copy, if it was considered necessary to disseminate it additionally to the special provisions made up for this particular type of message.

Further, the fact that this message never came back into my section for the usual translation and dissemination processes carried on by my office could well be, although I know nothing of this from first-hand knowledge or other knowledge, could well be that Admiral Noyes may have determined that it was simply another of these false alarms on this winds system.

Senator LUCAS. Well, Captain, this winds message comes right down into the hands, the judgment, and responsibility of Admiral Noyes, does it not?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot presume to assign that responsibility, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, under the arrangement that you had, if Safford sent this message, as he testified, by one of his subordinates to Admiral Noyes, would not it be the duty and responsibility of Admiral Noyes to make the determination as to whether or not it was a genuine winds executive message?

Captain KRAMER. I should say Admiral Noyes, or his [11084] subordinate in section 20-G of Naval Communications.

Senator LUCAS. That is exactly what I am talking about. It would have to be, under that arrangement, either Admiral Noyes or Admiral Noyes and his subordinates in that particular section that would finally have to pass judgment as to the type and kind of message they received?

Captain KRAMER. On this particular type of message, yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. In other words, this is the only arrangement that was set up between Noyes and Safford during the first week of December or any time during November of 1941?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall that during the week from December 1 to 7, inclusive, there were other messages that were mistakenly considered, for a short time, to be a winds execute message?

Captain KRAMER. I am specifically aware of being told by Lieutenant Brotherhood of one phone call that he made to Admiral Noyes' home at night concerning something of this winds character, that had been delivered or phoned to him by the Federal Communications Commission monitoring service.

Senator LUCAS. Is that Brotherhood,

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11085] Senator LUCAS. As I understand it, Brotherhood thought, as a result of the message that he had received, that it was one of those implementing winds messages?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know what he thought, sir, but I do know that he did phone Admiral Noyes.

Senator LUCAS. Well, at least there was some discussion and some stirring about at that time with respect to whatever he received?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; apparently he concluded it warranted phoning Admiral Noyes in the middle of the night.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this question, Captain:

Did Sonnett badger or beset you at any time in an endeavor to change your testimony?

Captain KRAMER. He most positively did not, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Captain Kramer, do you know anyone in the Navy, the Army, the State Department, the Chief Executive's office in December—

Captain KRAMER. Or any other time.

Senator LUCAS (continuing). In 1940, 1941, or any other time, who provoked, angered, or tricked those peaceloving and harmless Japs into attacking Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. I do not, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know anyone in the high councils of this Government who, from any information received prior [11086] to the attack on Pearl Harbor, knew when and where the attack was coming?

Captain KRAMER. I do not, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know of anyone in the Army or Navy who maneuvered, conspired, or attempted to lay the sole blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster on Kimmel and Short?

Captain KRAMER. I do not, sir.

Senator LUCAS. From all information you received through magic, including the much-discussed purported winds execute message, was there ever received a single word, line, phrase, or sentence that would lead you to believe that Pearl Harbor was going to be struck by the Japs on December 7, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. There never was, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Are you acquainted with Admiral Noyes, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know of any reason why Admiral Noyes would want to destroy an important message of this kind, assuming that one had been received?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. LUCAS. Do you know of anyone in the department of Admiral Noyes who would want to destroy, conceal, or secrete an important message of this character when everybody [11087] was looking for it?

Captain KRAMER. Most definitely not, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Can you give this committee any reason whatsoever, if this was the genuine winds execute message, why any man that you knew of in the Navy, in a responsible position at that time, would not want to take whatever action was necessary as the result of receiving that message?

Captain KRAMER. I do not, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, there have been a lot of things said in this Pearl Harbor inquiry, a lot of things said before the Pearl Harbor inquiry started. One of the things that was said was this, and this was said by a responsible person long before the hearing started, who could not wait for the evidence:

Everybody in authority in Washington knew late on December 6, 1941, that the Japs had broken relations following the decoding of the 14 paragraphs, a message to their Ambassadors here directing them to deliver the message to the White House at 1 p. m. December 7, dawn in Hawaii.

Is that a true or false statement, as far as you know?

Everybody in authority.

it says—

in Washington knew late on December 6, 1941, that the Japs had broken relations following the decoding of the 14 paragraphs.

Was the fourteenth paragraph decoded on December 6?

Captain KRAMER. It was not, sir.

[11088] Senator LUCAS. It further says:

Every strategist interpreted it only one way, that the first bombs would fall on Hawaii about 7 a. m. Hawaiian time. Kimmel and Short were not advised of this crisis until too late.

Do you know any naval strategists that interpreted the 14 parts message as this statement says, "that the first bombs would fall on Hawaii about 7 a. m."?

Captain KRAMER. I know of none, whatsoever, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know Col. Henry C. Clausen?

Captain KRAMER. I have never met the gentleman, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You never testified, or gave him an affidavit at any time?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I did not, although early last summer I received from the then Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Hewitt, a classified letter to the effect that I was authorized to testify before him if he desired to see me.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman:

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire, Captain.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, in your reply from the South Pacific, the question was asked if you were in solitude [11089] in the South Pacific. Were you at Numea, New Caledonia, when you wrote this letter?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that the time you were still being bombed by the Japs in New Caledonia, or had it ceased by that time?

Captain KRAMER. For some time prior to that, as the result of Admiral Halsey's effort, the Japs were at some distance from New Caledonia, with the exception of one or two submarines that got down that way.

Mr. MURPHY. Right before that, even when Admiral Halsey was living in the home of the previous Jap envoy, there were some pretty bad times there with bombs, were there not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, in that letter which the gentleman from Wisconsin described as your last testament, or possible last testament—I am being facetious about that—that the letter which might have survived you contains the statement that there never was a file in your section in which a winds execute was contained; isn't that right?

Captain KRAMER. Never in my section; no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. So it would be difficult, if it never got there, for it now to be missing from your section? [11090] That is so, isn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Precisely.

Mr. MURPHY. That is exactly what you say in this letter which you showed to Admiral Halsey before you appeared before any particular investigating body; is that so?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So far as files were concerned, you know that Captain Safford had a paper. You know that it went to Admiral Noyes, but you know you never had it for the purpose of filing or distribution; isn't that so.

Captain KRAMER. Exactly; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the question was asked you by the distinguished Senator from Michigan as to Admiral Turner, and apparently, by way of contradiction of your testimony, that Admiral Turner had said before this body, that he had seen the so-called 13 parts on the night of December 6.

I read from page 979 of the naval court of inquiry, the same Admiral Turner speaking: Question 53:

I show you Document 39 of Exhibit 63 which is the long dispatch, and is the reply of the Japanese to the American notes of November 26:

Answer. I remember the dispatch. I did not see that on the 6th of December. I don't remember when I saw it.

Now, there were some questions asked you about Lieutenant [11091] Sonnett. He asked you certain questions prior to your testimony, did he not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt there was nothing sinister or improper about that?

Captain KRAMER. Not in the slightest, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now two members of this committee spent 4½ hours with you before we commenced hearings in this case, did they not?

Captain KRAMER. They did, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. They asked you quite extensively about your testimony, did they not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Nothing improper about that was there?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you in a room or ward at the hospital?

Captain KRAMER. We were in a conference room adjacent to the office of the medical officer in charge, Captain Duncan.

Mr. MURPHY. I mean were you assigned to a room or ward at the hospital?

Captain KRAMER. On my first detachment to the hospital in August, for the routine check-up, I was in a room in the tower of the hospital. After that routine check-up [11092] and ensuing sick leave, on my second return to the hospital, I was in a ward, in a room of a ward.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, there was some question about having clearance with Public Relations before photographs were taken. Is not that the usual and unvarying procedure in the Navy? Even if the Red Cross wanted a picture for a fund campaign, would not they have to have clearance before they did those things? Or do you know that?

Captain KRAMER. I am not sure of the details of that, sir.

I do know this, however, that it has always been my understanding of naval policy in this respect, that the Navy's primary concern is with matters of security. If, for example, a naval officer writes books, or newspaper or magazine articles, that officer himself is held personally responsible for any breach of security. Along that line, the Navy Department, that I am aware of, for many years past, has had a policy of desiring—I cannot state requiring—that any contemplated publication of that kind should be accompanied by furnishing a copy to the Navy Department Public Relations office at about the same time it is sent to a publisher.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, there was some question asked you time after time after time about your being in Admiral [11093] Stark's house for lunch, and then your testifying or stating in this letter from the South Pacific about your having been in his office at 9, whereas your present recollection was 9:30.

I direct your attention to page 9143 of the record:

Captain McCOLLUM. I went over the situation with Watts when I arrived and was trying to digest the 13 parts of this thing when I received word that Admiral Wilkinson, my chief had arrived, and desired to see me.

I went up to Admiral Wilkinson's office and we entered into a discussion of the first 13 parts of this dispatch. I should say that would be nine o'clock or maybe a little later. While we were talking an orderly or someone came in and said Admiral Stark had come into his office, and Admiral Wilkinson said, "Well, come on, let's go and see the chief."

We went down the passageway and went into Admiral Stark's office. At that time there was no one in Admiral Stark's office except himself. None of his aides were present in the outer office. We went in and discussed this thing with Admiral Stark and then came on out. That was the 13 parts.

Captain McCollum was at that same luncheon wasn't he, with Admiral Stark?

[11094] Captain KRAMER. Yes, he was.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, on the night of December 6, you delivered the 13 parts to the White House, and your recollection of the time was that you got there about 9:15 that evening?

Captain KRAMER. About 9:15 that evening, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know whether it was at the time you arrived with the 9:15 dispatch, or before that that the President of the United States dispatched his message to the Emperor of Japan?

Captain KRAMER. I did not know about that until I saw the newspapers the following day.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you saw an account that the President on that very night did dispatch to the Emperor of Japan a message in order to forestall the war, if possible, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you said when you received this letter from Captain Safford, that you were flabbergasted. You were rather surprised and astonished, were you not, to receive such a letter through the mails out in the South Pacific?

Captain KRAMER. I certainly was; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. At one time you were asked about your [11095] testimony at a previous hearing, and I am referring to the examination by the gentleman from Wisconsin.

The question was, "That was false?" And you said "Yes."

Did you mean by that that you were deliberately lying or did you mean that it was your best recollection in the light of the facts before you, and the condition of your memory at the time?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Which does the gentleman mean?

Captain KRAMER. I mean, of course, the last part of that question.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you at any time mean to tell this committee that you have made a false statement anywhere in this proceeding before the Naval Court of Inquiry, before the Hewitt inquiry, or before this committee?

Captain KRAMER. I have never meant to imply that I consciously made a false statement.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, at pages 829 and 828 of the record, when Admiral Ingersoll is speaking about having received the 13-part message on the night of the 6th, his recollection of it, he said he thought he had made some notes of indication indicating that he had received it.

Did you have customarily in your office any kind of [11096] a paper which would indicate by initials or otherwise, who had seen these particular messages?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; we did not, although, through 1941, up to a month and a half prior to Pearl Harbor, there was a gist of the traffic in a particular folder which was often initialed, but frequently was not.

Mr. MURPHY. But it was not the consistent practice to have them all initialed, was it?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you also referred, in your letter from the South Pacific, to the possibility of certain summaries.

Did you retain summaries, or was that just to meet the situation from day to day in order to explain to the recipients of magic what the developments were?

Captain KRAMER. I meant simply the gist that I have just referred to, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I have just this last matter.

You stated in your letter from the South Pacific that there were several different sets of files where a winds execute, had it gone through your department, would have been found. Is that true? Would there have been several different places?

[11097] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; there would have been two places in which that would be found. One would be the translation file, and the other would be a file in which was kept every piece of decoded or deciphered paper that came into my section.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, your best recollection is there never was a file in your office containing a winds execute message?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely correct; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. No further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just one or two questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster will inquire, Captain.

Senator BREWSTER. I understand we will recess early today.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The recess announced at the beginning of this session was we would recess at a quarter to 4. The Senators would have to be on the floor by 4 o'clock.

Senator Barkley had informed me of that proposal.

Senator BREWSTER. Captain, I would like to have a little more clear in the record, and I understand it is not entirely clear, where you kept this memorandum that [11098] you prepared, during the interim.

Captain KRAMER. Constantly in my possession, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Was there only one copy of it?

Captain KRAMER. One copy, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Is that all that you ever made?

Captain KRAMER. Only one, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And was that dictated or did you write it yourself on the typewriter?

Captain KRAMER. Entirely myself, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. On the typewriter?

Captain KRAMER. On the typewriter.

Senator BREWSTER. You operate a typewriter yourself?

Captain KRAMER. I have never prepared any longhand rough version, or that kind of thing.

Senator BREWSTER. And you had a file where you kept this?

Captain KRAMER. I had many classified papers in my possession in connection with my work out there; yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And you brought that file with you when you came back here?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And you brought that file with you when you came back here?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11099] Senator BREWSTER. At what time did you first take this out of your file during the last few weeks?

Captain KRAMER. It was never taken out of my file prior to the commencement of this hearing, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. We began this hearing in November. Do you mean since that time?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Just about what time did you then get it? What were the circumstances under which you took it out?

Captain KRAMER. Since this hearing started those papers have been removed from that file of mine three times, prior to the last couple of days when it was opened, in fact, prior to 5 or 6 days ago, when it was shown to Lieutenant Commander Baecher.

On these three occasions they were shown to Admiral Wilkinson, to Captain Rochefort, and to Colonel Bales, Marine Corps, at that time, and now still head of the Far East Section of Naval Intelligence.

Senator BREWSTER. When did those three examinations take place?

Captain KRAMER. The first time this occurred, was with Admiral Wilkinson, the afternoon I first saw him, since I left the South Pacific, when I arrived in Washington from [11100] Miami, and he had just arrived by plane after a 4-day flight from Japan, and we met in one of the rooms in the Navy Department made available to witnesses.

Senator BREWSTER. How nearly can you fix that day?

Captain KRAMER. It was either the 9th—I will correct that—it was either the 6th or 7th of December, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. You had a conference with him at that time on this situation?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, we had a general social conference. I showed him those papers.

Senator BREWSTER. When you say "those papers" you mean the memorandum?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Or were there other papers that you had?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, simply these letters of Captain Safford, and my expanded reply.

Senator BREWSTER. That comprised all that you had on this matter?

Captain KRAMER. That is all I showed him; yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Will you answer my question?

Captain KRAMER. Sir?

Senator BREWSTER. I asked you if those were all the [11101] papers you had bearing on this matter?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. You discussed this situation then with him?

Captain KRAMER. What situation do you refer to, sir?

Senator BREWSTER. I mean the matter of the contents of these letters and your recollection as to the events with which they were concerned.

Captain KRAMER. There was very little discussion, sir.

I handed these letters to him with some remark to the effect that I felt, as a previous superior of mine, a naval officer, an admiral whom I considered a personal friend that I would like to have him see these letters, so that he might appreciate the possible reasons for some of what I considered entirely unwarranted publicity in connection with my name that had taken place in previous months.

Senator BREWSTER. And this was to show him what your story regarding the situation was?

Captain KRAMER. Not so much my story, sir, as to show him, or tell him what I considered a likely source of the origin of this unwarranted publicity.

Senator BREWSTER. How long were you with him at that time?

Captain KRAMER. Probably about a half hour.

[11102] During half of that time Admiral Kirk came in and joined in some of our discussions. But not on this matter, however. Admiral Kirk has never seen this paper.

Senator BREWSTER. But Admiral Wilkinson read it through while he was with you?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. You did not leave any copy with him; did you?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

[11103] Senator BREWSTER. When was the next conference on the matter?

Captain KRAMER. It was a few days later when, with the identical purpose in mind, I showed these letters to Captain Rochefort, who is also a long-time personal friend and was a language officer in Tokyo, Japan, at the same time I was.

Senator BREWSTER. Where did he see you?

Captain KRAMER. In one of these witness rooms in the Navy Department.

Senator BREWSTER. You met him there by appointment?

Captain KRAMER. Not by appointment. We just happened to meet, and I told him I would like to show him these letters too.

Senator BREWSTER. You were on duty at the Department at that time?

Captain KRAMER. I was still attached to the hospital, had been on sick leave and had been released by the hospital from the necessity of reporting in daily, awaiting the pleasure of this committee, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. What was his comment on this after you showed it to him?

Captain KRAMER. He agreed with some of the comment I made as to the likelihood of that being a possible origin of [11104] some of this publicity.

Senator BREWSTER. Now tell us about the next conference. When did that take place?

Captain KRAMER. That took place early last month, a few days after I arrived in Washington from Miami on sick leave over the holidays, the 9th of January. It was a Sunday morning at Colonel Vale's home in Washington, N. W.

Senator BREWSTER. You went there to see him?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. At his request?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, at my suggestion that I would like to show him these papers at his convenience, and he suggested that breakfast appointment at his home.

Senator BREWSTER. You took the papers there with you?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And he read them over in your presence?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. What comment did he make?

Captain KRAMER. Along similar lines.

Senator BREWSTER. With all of these gentlemen you discussed, to some extent, the problems that you felt you were presented with?

Captain KRAMER. I was presented with no problem, sir.

[11105] Senator BREWSTER. That is what I thought you had previously said, that you were disturbed over these stories that appeared in the papers, that you discussed this with your personal friend the captain and asked to see the colonel, in order to point out to them what you thought was the source of some of these unfounded rumors which were disturbing you.

Captain KRAMER. I, of course, had been annoyed at many of these things being published in connection with my name; yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, Captain, I just want to ask you one final question.

Do you expect that it can be credited that during this month that elapsed from December 6 to January 9, during this period when you were showing these papers to three different men because of your very great concern, apparently, over your name being used in connection with this, asking your friend the captain about it, and asking for an interview with the colonel, that during all that period you never once examined, yourself, this memorandum which you present here now?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. You realize how difficult it is for anyone to credit a statement of that sort, Captain, when you [11106] were really disturbed, that you never once examined this paper which you present?

Captain KRAMER. By "examine", if you mean to infer that I read this paper, I did not.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, that is what I mean.

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. You must realize what a strain that is to a man's credulity.

Captain KRAMER. I have, without question, looked at certain items that I may have pointed out or that they may have pointed out. I do not believe that that occurred, though, sir. I think in each case, Senator, there was practically no conversation throughout their perusal of this paper.

Senator BREWSTER. You were taking this to them without a statement of the background, and your recollection and your action? We are going to recess now over the week end. I wish you would ponder that question, from the standpoint of the difficulties which we face. I can see no reason why you should not have examined it. I do not think you would be subject to any criticism if you had examined it. I have been amazed from the beginning that you insisted that you did not see it, that you base your entire present recollection on the refreshment you received from consultation with officers [11107] who examined that document; that under those circumstances it must have seemed proper for you to refresh your recollection from something you wrote more than a year and a half ago in Noumea. I think it would make it far easier for us to credit your story if we could believe you examined that paper at some time in the last month.

Captain KRAMER. I appreciate, Senator, that that implication might be drawn from what I have previously testified to. However, the fact is that I did not read that memorandum, in whole or in part, beyond glancing at the heading of it, the first paragraph, perhaps, as I was showing these letters to these three individuals, to be sure I was showing them the piece of paper that they were to read in the sequence I wanted to present it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will now recess.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, I wanted to ask you—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We agreed to recess at a quarter of 4.

Mr. GEARHART. I just have a couple of questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He will be back Monday morning, so you will have a chance to ask him then.

Mr. GEARHART. All right.

(Whereupon, at 3:50 p. m., February 9, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Monday, February 11, 1946.)

[11108]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[11109] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time to present?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, do you have anything you desire to present before the examination is resumed?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; in the absence of Senator Brewster, unless he wants any further statement.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you some questions about that.

Captain KRAMER. All right, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire at this point, Captain.

Captain KRAMER. All right, sir.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, Senator Brewster is not going to be here this morning and that is why I will give you an opportunity to explain what he left rather up in the air on Saturday.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As I recall, you told Senator Brewster that you had not read all or parts of the so-called Halsey—I will refer to it as that—memorandum or the Safford letter and Halsey memorandum.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

[11110] Senator FERGUSON. And he indicated that it was somewhat hard for him to understand that a man would have that in his possession so long and show it to several people, three people, and not read any part of it. If you will recall, I asked you some questions about a conversation with Admiral Wilkinson the last time that I

examined you and I asked you for the complete conversation that you had with him and as I understand it you never mentioned that you saw him and showed him this memorandum.

Now, how do you account for the fact that you did not give to me at that time an indication that you had discussed or shown him this memorandum?

Captain KRAMER. Senator, I did not discuss that memorandum with Admiral Wilkinson other than the aspects—I think I have clearly indicated heretofore in my testimony—concerning the possible source of unwarranted publicity concerning me; in other words, primarily concerning Safford's two letters, not my memorandum for Admiral Halsey.

Senator FERGUSON. But you showed him the Halsey memorandum?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, why didn't you disclose that when I tried to get the full information on your conversation with Wilkinson; why didn't you tell me that you had [1111] shown him a memorandum? Was it that, as you say, you were not going to disclose that unless you were asked a direct question in relation to it?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely correct, sir, and in view of your line of questioning, Senator, I feel that I should read this statement I have prepared over the week end in compliance with the request of Senator Brewster that I ponder that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do I understand then that what you do in your testimony on any of these hearings is that you give only those things that are directly asked for and if the examiner does not happen to know that there is in existence a particular paper that it is not disclosed? I am trying to find out why I did not get the information when I tried to get from you everything that was said between you and Wilkinson.

Captain KRAMER. I think that point is fully covered in my statement, sir, if I may be permitted to read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, in just a moment you can. Did you discuss anything with Wilkinson in the last 6 months? On how many occasions did you see Wilkinson to discuss things?

Captain KRAMER. On two occasions, sir, other than a simple greeting in this hearing room when he was testifying.

Senator FERGUSON. On two occasions?

[11112] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You gave me the other day the one occasion and then you gave Senator Brewster on Saturday the one?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That made the two?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, why did you keep from the committee when I examined you about all your conversations with Wilkinson the fact that you had had one about this Halsey memorandum?

Captain KRAMER. The first occasion with Admiral Wilkinson did not bring up this question at all, sir. It was a discussion on our experiences in ONI in general in which Admiral Kirk participated for at least half of the time. The other half we discussed primarily—in fact, almost solely—the introductory remarks with which I presented those papers to Admiral Wilkinson, namely, what I considered the

likely source of publicity attending my name in connection with this Pearl Harbor affair.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, Captain, you gave to this committee two of those papers and only two of those, isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. Three, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Three. But you did not give them the [11113] memorandum, the Halsey memorandum?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you account for dividing them up and giving the two of them—

Captain KRAMER. Three.

Senator FERGUSON. Three of them—pardon me, three letters, two letters from Safford to you and one reply—but there was also a reply to one of Safford's which did exactly or almost exactly what Safford wanted you to do, to discuss it with Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. Senator, how those—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just answer his question, Captain.

Captain KRAMER (continuing). Letters first came up was in reply to a direct question to me on the part of Senator Lucas whether I had in my possession letters addressed to me by Captain Safford. I stood up in this room, in the back of this room, and I said I did. At that time, Senator, I not only produced the two letters but my reply to Captain Safford's letter, which was not asked for precisely by Senator Lucas' question.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, when you gave these three letters, two of the Safford's and your reply, to Commander Baecher did you at the same time give him the Halsey memorandum?

[11114] Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then when he delivered the three letters to the committee did you have to authorize that? Was that an understanding?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir. He had it in hand in case that question of necessity came into my testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, he was holding in his possession four instruments; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And if it became necessary for him to deliver he would deliver only those that he thought were necessary at the time and hold back from the committee the others.

Captain KRAMER. I should like to point out, sir, that he also mentioned the existence of that fourth letter to counsel for this committee, Mr. Richardson.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Captain KRAMER. I am not certain, sir. Baecher, I think, can supply that information.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you have a conversation about that?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how do you know that?

Captain KRAMER. I think I heard Mr. Richardson say that [11115] in this committee while I was testifying last Friday or Saturday.

Senator FERGUSON. You understood that from —

Captain KRAMER. From Mr. Richardson's statement.

Senator FERGUSON. From what was said here?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then as I understand it you personally did not want to disclose to this committee any of these four instruments unless a direct question was asked and the committee somehow out of the magic would uncover the fact, or out of the blue, let us say, would uncover the fact that there was this Halsey memorandum, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely correct, sir, and I think I gave at some length on Saturday my reasons for that position.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. I also cover that in this statement.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were of the opinion at that time that this committee should only get those things that it could find out from some other source and not from you? How could the committee ascertain if—

Captain KRAMER. They found out from me—

Senator FERGUSON. How could the committee members ever ask you about this Halsey letter? You and Baechor and Wil- [11116] kinson and a few others were the only people that ever knew about it.

Captain KRAMER. The man who found out for this committee from me was Mr. Keefe, who asked me the direct question whether I had ever discussed these letters with anyone up to this moment. Your questions to me, sir, were not so phrased.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that they are not direct enough when I ask you about the Wilkinson question?

Captain KRAMER. I do, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, you did not give it?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, will you explain to me how it came by chance that you would have this Halsey letter in your possession down in the Navy Department the day that you met Wilkinson by chance?

Captain KRAMER. I brought it with me from Miami in this case in which it has remained, incidentally, sealed, from the time I left the South Pacific on about December 10, 1944, until my arrival in this city on December 6, 1945, from Miami.

Senator FERGUSON. So it was sealed all the time?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And how was it sealed?

Captain KRAMER. It was sealed in a package referred to in the authorization to me from commander South Pacific area [11117] and South Pacific Force dated 10—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Tell him how it was sealed. That is all he wants to know.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is all I want to know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What kind of a lock it had on it.

Captain KRAMER. It was sealed in a package No. 47,102 by the flag secretary to commander South Pacific under date of 10 September and described on this authorization for me to carry classified papers from this (brown wrapping paper) originated by commander South Pacific addressed to Commander A. D. Kramer by CINC South Pacific, signed by I. M. Mayfield, Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you tell him when you got this memorandum that you had in there a memorandum that you had shown to Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how did he know what he was sealing? Did he seal among the official papers your personal memorandum to Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. Among those; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So, then, this personal paper was sealed among or along with the official documents?

Captain KRAMER. With official documents that were purely for my own use. I carried no official commander South Pacific [11118] mail. It was for use in connection with my work.

I want to repeat again, Senator, that I should like at this point to read my memorandum which covers those points explicitly and fully.

[11119] Senator FERGUSON. You go ahead and read it and then I will ask you some questions later on, because I apparently am not going to get direct answers from you, so you go ahead and read it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Read it, Captain.

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I prepared a statement, in compliance with Senator Brewster's request on Saturday afternoon, which was put to me in the following terms, according to yesterday's Washington Star:

That would put a strain on anyone's credulity. I wish you would ponder over this question further over the week end. I am sure you will appreciate that it is difficult to believe your answer.

I believe I understand correctly that the Senator's credulity applied only to my assertions that I have not read, since mid-May 1944, certain papers, principally and specifically a memorandum answering, in expanded form, the question set forth in Captain Safford's two letters that I prepared for Admiral Halsey's perusal, but it probably also included Captain Safford's two letters and my reply to his first.

I have pondered this request, with the following result, which has become, I am afraid, rather lengthy in text. I have attempted to keep it short, but a question of credulity did not warrant, I felt, leaving out of this summary any [11120] matter I have included.

I have thought that it would not be necessary to bring these papers into the record of this hearing at all. I had no intention of doing so, unless directly asked for them. Such a direct request was addressed to me in this room by Senator Lucas last Monday when Captain Safford was on the witness stand. At that time I considered that furnishing the Captain Safford's two letters and my reply to his first letter was complying fully with Senator Lucas' request.

My memorandum answering, in expanded form, the questions set forth in Captain Safford's two letters would not have been introduced if Mr. Keefe's or other inquiries on behalf of this committee had not been phrased in a form requiring its introduction. Mr. Keefe's question asking, in substance, whether I had ever discussed Captain Safford's letters with anyone required, I felt, the mention at that time of my discussion with Admiral Halsey, the only person who has seen these papers, except Captain Safford and myself, prior to the opening of this hearing.

In the interest of the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, when Mr. Keefe asked his next question as to why such discus-

sion was held, I considered it incumbent on me to produce Admiral Kimmel's letter and my memorandum to explain the discussion.

[11121] I am of the complete conviction that no question propounded by Senator Ferguson to me required such mention of Admiral Halsey or Admiral Kimmel, or this memorandum.

The reasons for my position on this matter, as outlined above, are that I felt the only end that could possibly be served by their introduction was a picture of the events preceding Pearl Harbor as I saw them at the time the memorandum was drafted. That is a year and a half to two years ago. Since both persons involved, namely Captain Safford and myself, were to be witnesses before this hearing, I felt that first-hand, direct testimony would be developed by counsel and the committee and be preferred to any letters or memoranda which may have been written at a time when, at least in my case, initial attempts were made to recall those events without benefit of any files or pertinent documents to refresh the memory.

To cover the question of credulity to be given my testimony concerning these papers, I therefore felt it necessary to explain the history of their custody by me in full.

When I received Captain Safford's first letter at the end of 1943 I considered it a straightforward and proper request for information on matters of which both he and I were cognizant. It will be noted that his letter of 22 [11122] December 1943 is on the official letterhead of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, and uses the official classification stamp "Confidential."

The letter states that he is preparing a secret paper covering events on early December 1941 with the aid of officers and records in the Navy Department.

Three questions arose in my mind at that time. One concerning the classification he had used, namely, "Confidential." I thought it should have been "Secret."

Second, concerning his cautions regarding "unauthorized hands seeing it"; and, third, concerning why such a request for information had not come through official channels and the safeguards thus afforded.

Since the letter had arrived safely, the first question was no longer pertinent. Concerning the second and third, I felt he used this means to keep from disclosing to unauthorized officers and enlisted men in the office where I was stationed at Pearl Harbor matters which had always been and still were restricted to only those people working with it and certain senior officers.

Furthermore, the practice of discussing and reporting official matters in personal correspondence, although abolished in the Division of Naval Intelligence in 1940, continued, I knew, in other divisions and bureaus of the [11123] Navy Department. I, therefore, prepared a reply, couching it in such language, by means of reference to the original letter, that no compromise to unauthorized persons could, I believed, possibly result from the letter going astray, or from examination by censors at Pearl Harbor, or elsewhere.

The letter thus censored by myself, was unclassified and was submitted to the officer in my section who was censoring for my section. It was forwarded under his censorship seal after cursory examination, and assurance from me that it contained nothing likely to com-

promise security. I was fully prepared to answer and assume responsibility for any future questions that might be raised by other censors or the Navy Department regarding this letter.

Captain Safford's first letter and my reply were carried by me to the South Pacific with other classified papers used by myself in my work under an official courier letter of the officer in charge, Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean areas, dated January 10, 1944, the original of which I have before me for presentation, if so desired.

Captain Safford's second letter arrived shortly after I reached the South Pacific. I never answered him for reasons I have set forth at some length in several parts of my previous testimony.

I did not read more than the first few paragraphs [11124] of this second letter until mid-May 1944, on the occasion of the arrival of Admiral Kimmel's letter to Admiral Halsey and my first conference with Admiral Halsey resulted in my preparation of the expanded memorandum reply. This also I have covered at some length in previous testimony.

In the second interview with Admiral Halsey, in which he read all these papers, there was not only no question raised by Admiral Halsey as to the propriety of my retaining Captain Safford's letters and as to the propriety of my reply to Captain Safford's first letter, but he expressed satisfaction with my promise to prepare an affidavit or deposition covering essentially the subject matter of the above-mentioned papers, and then informing Admiral Kimmel, either directly or through Admiral Halsey, regarding where such affidavit could be found in the event of my death.

The only instance when a security point arose during our conversation was when I expressed myself on and Admiral Halsey expressed agreement with the view that Captain Safford was rash in having sent a letter of the character of his second.

I, therefore, felt fully justified in the steps I had followed to date in this matter.

As I have earlier stated in testifying before this committee, the safe handling and eventual disposition of these papers gave me some concern during the summer of 1944, after Admiral Halsey left the South Pacific, about June 15, 1944. [11125]

I never prepared the deposition or the affidavit for Admiral Kimmel that I had promised Admiral Halsey I would. I did, however, continue to hold these papers, more particularly the expanded memorandum reply to all Captain Safford's questions as in the nature of the affidavit requested.

As long as I was in the South Pacific force and area headquarters, which was distant from the combat zone, I felt that the papers were safe in my custody at headquarters.

I left the South Pacific on September 10, 1944, carrying these papers, and other classified papers used in my work in two packages, sealed by the flag secretary to Com So Pac, and carried under the courier designation dated September 10, 1944, signed by the chief of staff, Captain—now Admiral—Mayfield. The original is now before me for submission, if so desired.

Since September 10, 1944, these letters have remained sealed in Com So Pac package No. 47102, mentioned in the above courier designation, until the afternoon of December 6, 1945.

[11126] Subsequent to my testimony given before the Naval Court of Inquiry at Pearl Harbor, I gave consideration, and in fact almost did destroy all of these letter and memoranda. The only reason, as I have already outlined why I retained them to that point was in compliance with Admiral Kimmel's request.

After testifying, however, before the court of inquiry held by Admiral Murfin at Pearl Harbor that reason no longer held, in view of the fact that my story was now a matter of record in the transcript of the proceeding of the court of inquiry.

However, I continued to hold these papers more in the nature of mementos of that occasion, and partly with a view to having documentary evidence of what my reply to Captain Safford's first letter had been.

[11127] I have previously gone into the circumstances surrounding my arrival from the South Pacific at Pearl Harbor around midnight September 12-13, 1944, and the fact that I was not aware I had been called north to testify, before a naval inquiry on Pearl Harbor. I have further testified previously that it was not until a few minutes prior to my appearance before this hearing that I was aware that I would be permitted to testify on matters involving radio intelligence.

In support of this testimony I can only call on Capt. E. T. Layton, U. S. N., at that time and still the intelligence officer of commander in chief Pacific Ocean area, Admiral Nimitz, the said Captain Layton being my informant in each case.

Until the Senator from Maine asked me the direct question, "Who has seen these memoranda and letters since this hearing opened in mid-November," or words to that effect, there was not only no necessity, but not even any occasion for dragging into my testimony the names of three close and long-time friends of mine.

In support of my previous testimony regarding my not reading the letters and the memorandum answering Captain Safford's questions in full when I presented them for perusal to three of my friends since this hearing opened, [11128] I can only call on Admiral Wilkinson, Captain Rochefort, and Colonel Bales, who are the aforementioned three friends.

I have not seen any of these three individuals since some days prior to my appearance in this witness chair, and have not communicated with any of these three individuals directly or indirectly for several weeks past.

At this point, in the interest of precision and accuracy of my testimony in the record, I should like to modify somewhat the testimony I gave Saturday, as to the exact dates I saw and showed these letters to the above-mentioned three friends.

I find that in some notes I kept during December last, an entry for the day I arrived in Washington from Miami was as follows:

December 6, Thursday, p. m.: Bull session with Wilkinson and later Kirk and Wilkinson. Kirk is with General Board. Saw Joe Rochefort briefly in office. McCollum and Layton were here for some days but left yesterday.

December 13, Thursday, 0830: Up and to Department.

1000 (about), showed Wilkinson Safford's letters and what had been done with replies (shown only to Halsey in case of No. 2). This was my explanation to him of all this unwarranted publicity I have been getting.

[11129] 1230: Lunch and bull session with Rochefort.

1430: Bales' office and discussed Saffo letters a little. Will show him these dates.

December 14, Friday, 1430: Had brief session with Safford in his office looking over some of his files of papers. Stated I would look at others tomorrow or Monday.

December 16, Sunday, 0900: Up, bathed, etc. Got to Bales' at 10:15. Cold as hell. Ten degrees last night. Had breakfast and bull session 'til after 1400. Showed him Saffo's two letters and memo.

December 18, Tuesday, 1200: Recessed. To Navy Department and had long bull session with Joe Rochefort and showed him Saffo's letters. This makes three people who have seen them: Halsey; Wilkinson; and Rochefort. Bull session continued 'til about 1530.

This, Senator, ends my quotation from the afore-mentioned notes. In the event Senator Brewster's or other's credulity is strained as to why I have had such notes in my possession and as to their authenticity, I can only assert the following, which is the sole explanation:

In November last year——

Mr. RICHARDSON (interposing). Captain, just a minute.

Is there any need of carrying this on? The only question, as I understand it, that was asked you by Senator Ferguson [11130] was the question of keeping this memorandum in your possession without reading it.

Captain KRAMER. I understood the question, Mr. Counsel, to apply to the credulity to be applied to my testimony regarding the showing of these memoranda, and not reading them while they were being shown.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead. Get through with it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in fairness to the witness, the Senator from Maine did ask him to ponder.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Captain.

[11131] Captain KRAMER. In November last year my wife came to Washington from Miami and remained with me until our departure on November 14 for Miami. On my return alone to Washington in early December to await the pleasure of this committee I determined to keep notes in some detail of my activities, people I met, old acquaintances seen again, and so forth, so that on my expected return to Miami for the Christmas holidays she could read them over and I would thus be able to acquaint her of the above in some detail without depending on memory alone.

Such a set of notes or diary I have never kept since some years prior to Pearl Harbor. The sole reason for keeping it in this instance was because of the deep interest with which my wife was following these hearings and any connection I might have therewith. They cover the period from December 5, 1945, when I left Miami for Washington to December 20, 1945, when I left Washington for Miami. They were prepared by me on my return to the Bethesda Naval Hospital each evening before I turned in. No such notes were undertaken by me during my present stay in Washington for the past months because my wife was with me here most of this time. They consist of about eight and one-half pages and are rather meticulous and complete and mention the names of nearly every acquaintance I saw or conversed with.

[11132] I am confident that Admiral Wilkinson, Captain Rochefort, and Colonel Bales will substantiate my testimony previously given regarding my presentation of Safford's letters to them, as well

as all details of which they are aware with regard to the accuracy of the above-quoted notes and my testimony.

The Senator from Maine and others may have received and may now receive with some degree of incredulity the assertions I have made in the previous testimony regarding my relations with Captain Safford to the effect that up until last week at least they have continued on a friendly basis and so continue unless his attitude toward me has changed in the past week. I have inserted above the quotation from my notes in support of this assertion. I am sure that Captain Safford's secretary, as well as certain officer subordinates of his can support my assertion that during my four or five visits to his office last year there continued to be friendly relations between us despite disagreement on many points. Captain Safford himself can also support this.

The full set of these notes I would be glad to submit to Senator Brewster, or others, for examination if so desired.

In support of my previous testimony that I have not shown this memorandum to other than Admiral Halsey, Admiral Wilkinson, Captain Rochefort, and Colonel Bales, prior to [11133] showing it to Lieutenant Commander Baecher a few days ago, I can only call on all persons with whom I could possibly have had contact since mid-May 1944. I am confident no such peruser of these papers can be found or could ever have been found.

In support of my previous testimony that I have not read these papers, other than to glance at the headings or first paragraphs of each, from mid-May 1944 to this moment, except for certain days and times last December as given above, and a few days ago to Lieutenant Commander Baecher, I can only give my word that this is a meticulously truthful statement of fact.

I hope these comments comply with the wish of the Senator from Maine that I ponder this question further during the week end, namely, the question of assertions of mine with respect to these papers, assertions which may possibly have resulted in straining the credulity to be afforded my previous testimony before this committee on this and other matters.

[11134] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; that completes my statement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I think I will leave that subject for a while now and go to another one.

Will you take Exhibit 2 and turn to page 22.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When is the first that you saw that message either in code or the rough translation?

Captain KRAMER. The first I recollect having seen this message was in the form of a rough translation attached to the decoded Japanese text on Monday morning December 8, 1941. However, I have been informed—

Mr. RICHARDSON. He just asked you when you first saw it.

Captain KRAMER. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the first you saw it?

Captain KRAMER. That is the first I recollect seeing it; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had a Mrs. Edgers in your department?

Captain KRAMER. It was she I was about to refer to, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you see her on Saturday; was she working?

Captain KRAMER. She was; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you know that she translated that in the rough on Saturday?

Captain KRAMER. I did not know she did. She has stated to me she did and—

Mr. RICHARDSON. That answers the question.

Captain KRAMER. And I believe her in that respect.

Senator FERGUSON. These messages in Exhibit 2 were very important, were they not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; they were.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, turn to page 27. That message came in on the 6th and it has this at the bottom:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

It was from Honolulu to Tokyo. That was a very vital message, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. It certainly became one when we knew of the attack on Pearl Harbor; yes, sir. It would have been if we had seen it prior to the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why no particular effort was being made to translate these messages as to where the attack would be—or the same effort that was being exerted to ascertain whether there would be a breach of relations?

Captain KRAMER. Senator, my answer to that will fall in [11136] two parts. In the first place, there is no clue to the subject or importance of a message until a translator has completed a translation. In the second place, this message is dated December 6, a date of Army responsibility, and I know nothing of their handling of this particular message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, turn to page 29. The last sentence of that message, from Honolulu to Tokyo reads:

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet Air Arm.

Captain KRAMER. Precisely the same remarks apply to this message, which was translated, according to the notation at the bottom, and my recollection, too, incidentally, on December 8, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. So as I understand it, our reply is that these were in the Army?

Captain KRAMER. These were Army dates of responsibility to translate; yes, sir, process and translate.

Senator FERGUSON. And not the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that part of the Army, at least part of the Army translators, went home at noon on Saturday?

Captain KRAMER. Normally ours would have, too.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was it true that some of your [11137] translators were on their Christmas holidays as early as this?

Captain KRAMER. They were not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any on furloughs or holidays?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; all six of my translators were on duty.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, notwithstanding the fact that these messages were in and you anticipated a reply to the memorandum of the 26th to the Tokyo Government, certain Army translators went home for the afternoon on Saturday and they had to be called back later in the afternoon to help on the thirteenth part?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know precisely what translators were or were not on duty Saturday afternoon, sir. Furthermore, as regards any possible connection I might have had with these messages on Saturday afternoon, these messages were undoubtedly, unquestionably, in my mind, sent to Army as soon as received.

In fact, I will modify that statement because there is a notation in the lower right-hand corner, a parenthetical note to the effect that the station monitoring this message was station 2, received by teletype. Station 3 was an Army monitoring station. In the light of that, it would appear that this message was seen by Army and detained entirely at all times in the Army Signal Intelligence Section until processed and translated.

[11138] Senator FERGUSON. Were any men in your department on Christmas leave as early as December 7?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall having given Christmas leave, except possibly Christmas Day, to any of my translators, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To anyone in your department, whether translators, or otherwise?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. My department consisted of six translators, one officer besides myself, and two yeomen.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you were responsible for the translations?

Captain KRAMER. Translation and dissemination; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the one on page 27, No. 253. That would indicate that it came from the Army and therefore the Navy was not responsible?

Captain KRAMER. At the bottom, the lower right-hand corner of page 28, is the same notation as appears on the other one, namely, that station 2, an Army station, monitored this message.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that true of No. 245 on page 22?

Captain KRAMER. That is true insofar as the figure 7 in the lower right-hand corner indicates that an Army station monitored this message. Since it is dated the 3d, [11139] an odd date, it would indicate that they sent it over to Navy, to the GY section, to be processed when or shortly after received by Army Signal Intelligence Section.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that the Army or Navy at that time could shift responsibility for translation by merely transferring it over to the other departments?

Captain KRAMER. They could and did, sir, based on the allocation of responsibility for attack on various Japanese systems and ciphers, which allocation consisted briefly of odd days being taken care of by the Navy, even days by Army.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you read Mrs. Edgers' testimony?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that this was translated in the rough on Saturday afternoon?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, translation in the rough would indicate the contents of the message, would it not; show its importance?

Captain KRAMER. Not necessarily, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you responsible to supervise these translators?

Captain KRAMER. I was, sir.

[11140] Senator FERGUSON. Reading from page 5412 of the Hewitt testimony, the testimony of Mrs. Edgers:

Well, at the time it was my work to roughly translate any message which was put on my desk, and this was among the messages that were put on my desk on December 6, Saturday morning, and at the time I had only been working in this section for about a little over two weeks, so at first glance this seemed to be more interesting than some of the other messages I had in my basket.

I am talking about the one about the lights in the windows, on page 22 of exhibit 2; you understand?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

And so I selected it and asked one of the other men who were also translators working on other messages whether or not this shouldn't be done immediately, and was told that I should, and I then started to translate it.

Well, now, is that the way that the importance of the message was determined? If it was interesting to one they would go to somebody else and ask whether they were to translate it? Weren't you in charge that morning and didn't you know that there was a 13-part message coming in in reply to the message that Mr. Hull had given to the Japanese on the 26th that may or may not mean a break in [11141] relations?

Captain KRAMER. Your question, I believe, is a double question, Senator.

I was in charge of that section that morning. I was not aware until about 3 p. m., or shortly after, about the arrival of the message you referred to, the note.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand then, that you didn't know until 3 o'clock in the afternoon that there was a reply coming in to the message of the 26th?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it was not an unusual day in the Navy translation department until 3 o'clock on the 6th?

Captain KRAMER. It was no more unusual at 3 o'clock than it was all that day, and for some days prior to that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't it usual that you would leave at noon on Saturday?

Captain KRAMER. About a quarter of 1; yes, sir. That was the closing of working hours.

Senator FERGUSON. How does it come that you didn't leave on that Saturday, then?

Captain KRAMER. I would venture the guess that probably three-quarters of the days for several months prior to Pearl Harbor I did not leave at the close of working hours but retained in the section either alone or with one or more translators for periods varying from a few minutes to many hours after the close of working hours. [11142]

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you never saw the Winant note which came in at 10:40 to the State Department indicating that there was going to be an attack on the Kra Peninsula on Sunday?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir. However, I knew about that contemplated attack, at least insofar as it was disclosed in this traffic; and, further, I drafted a message, which I referred to a few days ago here, outlining the high points of that attack, a dispatch sent to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. Then up until 3 o'clock on Saturday there was no re-alerting of your department?

Captain KRAMER. Re- what?

Senator FERGUSON. Re-alerting or change, that you were working harder or any different than you were in the normal day, because you hadn't received the Winant message and you had no other information which would indicate that there was any unusual message coming through on that day?

Captain KRAMER. On that point, Senator, the alerting you refer to could not possibly have altered the situation in [11143] my office since not only that day but for many days during that fall we were working at full capacity and over, if I may so state, in my section.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I go on. Mr. Sonnett is examining Mrs. Edgers. He says:

About what time on that day did you complete your translation, Mrs. Edgers?

Now referring to this light message on page 22 of Exhibit 2. She says:

Well, it so happened that there was some mistakes that had to be corrected and so that took some time. That was at 12:30 or perhaps it was a little before 12:30. Whatever time it was we were to go home, it being Saturday. We worked until noon. I hadn't completed it so I worked over-time and finished it, and I would say that between 1:30 and 2:00 was when I finished my rough draft translation.

She was asked:

That is on the afternoon of December 6?

And Mrs. Edgers says:

On the 6th, yes, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record will you describe briefly what that message is?

And the reply:

Mrs. EDGERS. Well, without reading it over again now, [11144] just because of the fact that the message did keep in mind—I would say that it was a message saying how they were going to communicate from Honolulu to the parties interested the information of our fleet movements from Honolulu, and apparently it was something which they had had previous arrangements but they had changed some of the minor details of how to go about it. I think there was something to do with lights, a window of a certain house, and there was also something about newspaper advertising.

Now, here is a girl that is remembering this until 1945 without seeing the message, showing that she understood what it was from the rough.

Captain KRAMER. I think, Senator, on the point of remembering that, I have not particularly read or studied this since I did on Decem-

ber 8, 1941, but I believe I could quote the whole message almost verbatim from memory.

Senator FERGUSON. And you hadn't read it since the 8th of December?

Captain KRAMER. Not in full; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you are having a great amount of difficulty remembering what was in the winds execute message which was only about two lines in length?

Captain KRAMER. And, incidentally, seen by me for a period varying from 10 to 15 seconds and containing information [11145] that was not materially different than information we had already.

In the case of this message here, Senator, I spent several days clearing garbles and working with this message before it was completed in the form you now see it.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you spend that time on it?

Captain KRAMER. December 8-9-10, 1941, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But there was sufficient even in the rough to impress Mrs. Edgers with the facts that she has related in that answer, which would have tipped you off, would it not, that Pearl Harbor was in danger that day if there was going to be an attack?

Captain KRAMER. That attention was not invited to me that I have any recollection of, sir. In that connection I would like to remark that Mrs. Edgers was still unfamiliar with the practices and procedures in my office, that it was the usual if not invariable practice of the three highly skilled and experienced translators in my office to always immediately invite my attention to important traffic they were working on or had completed.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, would you consider that or would you not consider that important traffic?

Captain KRAMER. This particular message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[11146] Captain KRAMER. If I had seen it Saturday afternoon I most certainly think I would have; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the person Mrs. Edgers showed it to not coming to the same conclusion?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot account for that, sir. He probably did.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, the next question (reading):

Do you know whether that translation which you completed in the early afternoon of December 6, 1941, was brought to the attention of now Captain Kramer?

Mrs. EDGERS. It was brought to his attention naturally because it was—well—well, in any case, he knew that I was working on it and I left it, as a matter of fact, in the hands of the Chief, whose job it was to edit messages and write them up, or one that was more complicated and more important, like this, the officer in charge looked it over and edited it.

Who would he be?

Captain KRAMER. That would be myself, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you so edit it?

Captain KRAMER. Not Saturday; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, the Chief would be you?

Captain KRAMER. The Chief would refer to Chief Yeoman Bryant, now Chief Ship's Clerk, U. S. Navy.

[11147] Senator FERGUSON. The first part of the answer would apply to Bryant and the last part of the answer to you, that you would edit it? Bryant would not edit it?

Captain KRAMER. He would edit it as far as putting it in our usual form. The text and contents would be edited by myself so far as the translation was concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand now that your department was alerted to the fact that you were trying to get Intelligence to ascertain if the Japanese attacked where they would attack?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever talked to Mr. Bryant, Ship's Clerk Bryant, covering that, so that if a message came on the 6th indicating a transmission of information from Honolulu or Hawaii about our fleet by using lights in the window, that he would immediately sense that that was a very vital and important message and would take it up with his superior?

Captain KRAMER. Most certainly did not, sir. I knew nothing about lights until I studied that message.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you take up with him the fact that you wanted him to take up with you any messages indicating where an attack might take place?

Captain KRAMER. I at no time was aware or believed that [11148] the Japanese would attack the United States, sir, until they actually did.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we come to this point. On Saturday morning your department was not even alerted to the fact that the Japs might attack the United States?

Captain KRAMER. I am afraid, Senator, that your construction of the word "alert" differs from mine.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Let's take out the word "alert" and say "aroused to that fact"?

Captain KRAMER. We were aroused to the imminent diplomatic crisis, yes, sir, and were working to full capacity.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were you familiar with the fact that there was a movement south which might involve the United States?

Captain KRAMER. I had no knowledge whatsoever that such movement south, of which we had a great deal of information, would involve the United States; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, if you had had information of our policy——

Captain KRAMER. About what, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. About our policy, of what it meant to the United States, a movement south into Malaya, would that have helped you on these messages to determine their importance?

[11149] Captain KRAMER. I believe it would, sir, in that I would have paid far more attention to the details or elicited from Captain McCollum details about our fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know our Fleet was in Hawaii?

Captain KRAMER. I knew it was in the Hawaiian area, but whether in port or hundreds of miles away I had no knowledge of at any time for months prior to Pearl Harbor or in fact for months after Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. So you didn't know whether we were out at sea or whether we were in port?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't know what our policy was, if there was an attack on the British that we might expect an attack on our fleet which was on the flank, you had no knowledge of that?

Captain KRAMER. I had no knowledge of that policy; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore a message such as this fleet movement, this message on page 22, of the lights in the window to indicate when our ships were in the harbor, wouldn't have really meant much to you?

Captain KRAMER. I think——

Senator FERGUSON. Because you didn't know the fleet was there?

Captain KRAMER. I think the message would have meant [11150] much to me if it were in legible form when I first perused it; yes, sir. However, I have already remarked on the fact that to get it into its present form required several days' work, to make much sense of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you treat this message in the same way as you treated the fourteenth part message?

Captain KRAMER. As soon as I saw it I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did your department treat or was it instructed to treat all messages alike on this morning, or were they put to work on the thirteenth part of the 14-part message?

Captain KRAMER. I repeat again, Senator, the so-called 14-part message did not start coming in until the afternoon. There were no specific instructions, except general instructions about certain circuits being pushed through first, but it was the practice of my more experienced translators to glance through hastily the general tenor of all messages put on their desks and then give priority to those that appeared most important. Oftentimes consulting with me on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand it, Bryant had instructions when he saw the rough of this message so that he should have called it to your attention?

Captain KRAMER. Not specific instructions on this message, [11151] no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Any message.

Captain KRAMER. Any message which normally such attention would have been drawn to me in the first instance by the translator so translating it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had never taken up with Bryant or your staff that matter?

Captain KRAMER. Normally, Senator, Bryant did not get this material until I edited it.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account——

Captain KRAMER. Unless a message was of simple form or was perfectly plain as to sense and meaning to the translator, in which case the translator, if it were not something that because of its content and importance should be at once brought to my attention, the translator would feel it should be typed up before bringing it to my attention.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever take up with Bryant or your staff the importance of ship movements as well as diplomatic matters?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your instruction to them? I am talking about these messages on ship movements in exhibit 2, where we find

three or four not translated, at least on the smooth copy, until after the attack, and if translated [11152] before would have given you definite information that there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Captain KRAMER. Every message bearing on ship movements, either of our Navy, our merchant marine, or foreign navies, specifically England, was given high priority in my section and all were translated and disseminated by my section.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that some of these messages were 22 days being translated. How do you account for that? And I find no diplomatic messages held up that long.

Captain KRAMER. I would like to have a specific one pointed out, sir, before commenting on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I wish you would look over them.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I wonder if the Senator knows that that particular message was also in Honolulu on the 5th. I mean as to this signal. They had it there. The lights in the window message was handed over to them on the 5th at Honolulu. It was in Pearl Harbor at G-2 and they did translate it after the 7th but they didn't before.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I am trying to find out what this gentleman knew about it.

Did you know what code machines they had at Pearl Harbor?

[11153] Captain KRAMER. I knew that they had what we call a RIP, meaning Radio Intelligence Publication, in fact a number of them, which included all systems being currently read. I was not aware about the status of the unit at Pearl Harbor with respect to a machine. In other words, the purple machine.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't know whether they had one or did not have one?

Captain KRAMER. I did not know until after Pearl Harbor; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you weren't relying upon Pearl Harbor getting these messages. You were relying upon the fact that you had to get them and give them to these high officials from the President down?

Captain KRAMER. That was my prime responsibility; yes, sir. The Asiatic Fleet, in other words, our unit at Corregidor, I knew did have the purple machine.

Senator FERGUSON. But your job was not to know or to understand what Pearl Harbor had, your job was to get the translations and give them to the President and from him on down in the Navy as you have described?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. The allocation of effort to be carried on by the Pearl Harbor unit was done by Captain Safford and his subordinates other than myself.

[11154] Senator FERGUSON. You were not concerned with what they had at Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. I had nothing to do with what they had or what they worked on; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the fact that they may have had these messages was no concern of yours because your position was to get them translated, give them to the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Turner, Admiral Stark, and the President?

Captain KRAMER. That was my prime responsibility; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was your prime responsibility and that is what you were trying to do?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the State Department didn't call you or get in touch with you and tell you that they had a message at 10:40 indicating that there was going to be an attack on the Kra Peninsula and therefore you were to be alerted to get any message that might come in and get immediate translation so that they could ascertain what might happen other than in the Kra Peninsula where they saw the Japanese were going?

Captain KRAMER. I knew nothing about that State Department message; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had no word from the State Department? [11155]

Captain KRAMER. I did not; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long has Commander Baecher been with the Department? Do you know him?

Captain KRAMER. I first had contact that I recollect only after I returned to Washington from Miami on December 6, last year. I understand, however, that he was one of the assistants to Admiral Hewitt, though I do not recollect his being in those hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. He was an assistant in the hearings to Admiral Hewitt and helped to conduct those hearings?

Captain KRAMER. That is what I now understand.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, he hadn't been in your department?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; at no time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he is a Reserve officer or a Regular?

Captain KRAMER. My understanding is that he is a Reserve officer with legal background, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. This message, extension No. 2027, the one released by Admiral Noyes in relation to the Japanese movement in Thailand, are you familiar with that message?

Captain KRAMER. The one dated December 1, 1941?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11156] Senator FERGUSON. Did you draft that message?

Captain KRAMER. I believe I did, sir; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, why did you draft that message? Wouldn't that be out of your line entirely?

Captain KRAMER. Not necessarily, sir. I drafted that message, as well as the one on Japanese diplomatic post destruction of codes, which was similarly forwarded to Captain Safford and Admiral Noyes' office.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you thought that Cincaf and Cincpac were getting the messages, why did you draft this one for Admiral Noyes to send out on December 1?

Captain KRAMER. I felt that we should insure that they got that picture, sir, even though they may have received it and read it on the Asiatic station, the British also at Singapore, and the unit at Honolulu.

Senator FERGUSON. If you knew nothing about our policy in case of an attack by the Japanese on the British, I am trying to find out, then, from this message, why you would take special interest to send this message, not only to CinCaf but for CincPac, when it has nothing to do with an attack upon America. Thousands of miles away from any possession of America, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

[11157] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator tell me what that policy is?

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out.

Senator LUCAS. The Senator has been assuming with this witness that we had a definite policy, that he didn't know anything about, in the event the Japanese attacked the British and the Dutch.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I am trying to find out from this witness. If he knew nothing about any policy why, I would like to know, would he be sending a special message such as this.

Will you read the message now. Let's see what is in it. Then I can cover it and find out whether or not you knew anything about policy.

Captain KRAMER (reading):

Ambassador Tsubokami in Bangkok on 29th sent to Tokyo as number 372 the following: "Conferences now in progress in Bangkok considering plans aimed at forcing British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as countermove to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Since Thai intends to consider first invader her enemy, Orange"—

which means Japan—

"Believes this landing in Malay would force British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa. Thai would [11158] then declare war and request Orange help. This plan appears to have approval of Thai Chief of Staff Bijitto. Thai Government circles have been sharply divided between pro-British and pro-Orange until 25 November but now Wanitto and Shin who favor joint military action with Orange, have silenced anti-Orange group and intend to force Premier Pibul to make a decision. Early and favorable developments are possible."

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if you knew of no policy that we had—how far was this from American possessions?

Captain KRAMER. Senator, the prime reason for ever having set up a crypt analytical unit at Corregidor and at other times in certain places in China, was to keep the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, at that time Admiral Hart, as fully apprised as possible of political, military and other developments of like nature in his sphere.

Senator FERGUSON. How far was this from the Philippines? You didn't answer my question.

Captain KRAMER. My guess is probably 800 to a thousand miles, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, look at the message in Exhibit 2, the message of September 24, page 12.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where it sets up Pearl Harbor and tells exactly what areas are to be covered in the future. [11159] It asks Honolulu to tell what ships are tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. Are you familiar with that message?

Captain KRAMER. I am, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell me why you would send a message that involved the British and the Japanese a thousand miles from any

of our possessions directly to the information of CincPac, which was Admiral Kimmel, and yet this message, which set up a plan of Pearl Harbor, indicating what they wanted it for was an attack later, you didn't send that out to either the Pacific or to the Asiatic Fleet, and here you were sending one that involved a country a thousand miles from our possessions.

Captain KRAMER. I would like to invite the Senator's attention to a piece of paper which I believe is an exhibit before this hearing, namely, a gist of the traffic disseminated in early October 1941 to all recipients in the Navy Department. That gist was prepared by my section and was asterisked as being an item, a gist of this message, an item of special interest, sir.

[11160] Senator FERGUSON. I would like—

Captain KRAMER. I was not directed, and I do not know whether any briefs of this message were ever to be sent to Pearl Harbor. Your interpretation, Senator, that this was a bombing map, I do not believe, from conversations I had at the time in showing and going over days' traffic with various recipients; I do not believe it was interpreted by any of those persons as being materially different than other messages concerning ship movements being reported by the Japanese diplomatic service.

I recollect that this was interpreted. I am uncertain of the precise wording of the interpretation. This was considered, and I believe it was, approximately, my consideration at the time as being an attempt on the part of the Japanese diplomatic service to simplify communications.

That view is substantiated by many factors.

One is that the Japanese were repeatedly and continually directing their diplomatic service to cut down traffic. They were repeatedly preparing and sending out abbreviations to be used with codes already in existence. Diplomatic codes were frequently asking for additional funds for quarterly allotments, and so forth, to cover telegraphic expenses. Those expenses were usually paid [11161] and furnished in part when so requested by Tokyo. Those and other considerations I think explain probably the handling of this particular message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that later they used this map, this bombing map, in code messages? Say the one on page 14 of November 18?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. They used it for all ship movements subsequently to setting up of this abbreviated system of reporting ships in Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. You brought up a question about an exhibit in this case that indicated that they had given information on this message on page 12, the bombing map message. Will you get it for me? I think that is very important.

Commander BAECHER. I might say, Senator, that that was exhibited to a witness in the early stages of these hearings but was not introduced as an exhibit. I have a copy here on which I would like to write a short note to counsel, and hand it to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it is not in evidence here, that this was ever briefed and sent out?

Commander BAECHER. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And the witness is wrong, and the record in that respect should be corrected.

[11162] Commander BAECHE. At one time this document was shown to another witness. I think Admiral Wilkinson. This witness saw it also and he assumed it had gone into evidence, and I think not improperly because it was passed around.

Senator FERGUSON. But it is not in evidence now, so there is no evidence before us that the contents of this bombing plot map had ever been sent out; is that right?

Commander BEACHER. That is right. Here is a copy of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Captain, will you turn to page 15, the message which was translated on the 5th of December:

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein:—

You notice they want to know what ships are in the harbor. Not what ones are going out and coming in.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N" Pearl Harbor; Manila Bay, and the areas adjacent thereto. Make your investigation with great secrecy.

Then the next message:

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet * * * [11163] bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian Military Reservation.

Next, translated on the 5th:

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

Wasn't that a very significant message, that the Japanese were trying to ascertain what was in the harbor and where they were located; whether there were any movements or not?

Didn't your Department or section evaluate those to mean that they were trying to ascertain what was in the harbor and therefore when you received this 1 o'clock delivery message and as you say you charted the globe time on it, wasn't it significant that it was 7:30 in the morning at Pearl Harbor?

[11164] Captain KRAMER. I have two comments to make on your statement, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not a statement. It is a question.

Captain KRAMER. The little message which you read, I believe that the original Japanese version in ungarbled form if it were available would read: "Please investigate comprehensively" is probably "the fleet air bases."

In other words, that blank refers to or represents a garbled code group and was left blank by the Army translator. It undoubtedly refers to air or other types of bases than fleet bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation. On your other point, Senator—

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

Captain KRAMER. On your point, Senator, regarding evaluation, that was never at any time a function of my section, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, if they were to investigate comprehensively the fleet air bases didn't it even make the message more important that they were concerned not alone with the fleet, where it was moving, but they were concerned with the protection of the fleet in the harbor?

Captain KRAMER. Not in the slightest, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Not in the slightest?

[11165] Captain KRAMER. No, sir. I would like to tell you why I make that reply.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would.

Captain KRAMER. Back in 1940, during the course of negotiations with the Dutch in Java the Japanese shoehorn, if I may use that term, was the delegation conducting those negotiations and ambassador or special envoy, as I recall it, was named Yoshizawa.

Negotiations were conducted for a 6- or 8-month period. During the period of those negotiations the Japanese conducted rather rigorous reconnaissance of all military establishments, not only in Java but in other islands of the Dutch East Indies.

I mentioned that in some detail, but the same thing applies to military establishments, air bases, fleet facilities, in Panama and in part of the Western Hemisphere under United States jurisdiction. The Japanese diplomatic service, as well as their military and naval attachés abroad, were very conscientious people and reported in meticulous detail all facts that they could learn of.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you account for the fact that these ship movements, these locations were being called for in the latter part of November as things were getting more critical between the two countries? You told us about a [11166] long-range program.

Captain KRAMER. Senator, it would have been a most weird phenomenon for the Japanese military to not have paid close attention not only during this week but during previous periods of crisis during 1941 and 1940 and earlier to every detail they could learn concerning the United States Fleet. They reported in similar detail every ship movement into and out of all ports on the west coast of the United States and Panama, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why were they wanting, though, to get the fleet and air bases that you now tell us this message means?

Captain KRAMER. They likewise reported in great detail the air bases in the vicinity of Seattle and Bremerton Navy Yard, sir, similarly on the San Francisco area.

Senator FERGUSON. Show me any such messages in the latter part of November or December in relation to San Francisco and Seattle.

Captain KRAMER. I offhand do not know of any such message. Such may possibly be elicited by a study of the files. It may well be, however, that no further reports in such detail were called for from the west coast of the United States because they already knew everything they wanted to.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you refer now to page 248 of [11167] Exhibit 1? The message is No. 25,850. It is at the top of the page. It is the 1 o'clock message. I want to read you from page 167 of top secret of the Pearl Harbor board in the Navy. Captain Safford is testifying. He says:

Kramer took the message around, possibly the other message which said, "Submit our reply to the U. S. Government at one P. M. on the 7th your time" and reached the Chief of Naval Operations around 10:30 and then next the White House, where he again gave a copy to Admiral Beardall for the President and finally reached the State Department about 11 o'clock with it. There is another matter—

and this is what I want to call your attention to, but I wanted to read it in detail so that you would know what he was talking about.

There is another matter which I would like to add, that at the time Kramer submitted SIS 25,850—

which is the 1 o'clock message—

to Secretary Knox he sent a note in with it saying, in effect, that this means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila.

Now, what do you have to say to that?

Senator LUCAS. Who said it?

Senator FERGUSON. Safford. Do you want to see the original of this record?

[11168] Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I do not. What I am looking for is an item in my reply to Captain Safford's first letter, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that you have a memorandum there that you made of your conversations with Safford, or is that the reply?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. I am merely looking at a copy which I retained of my reply to Captain Safford's first letter.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain KRAMER. I refer, Senator, in answer to your last question to my reply, item 10-c to Captain Safford, to the expanded version of that reply which appears in the memorandum I prepared for Admiral Halsey, which I will now read.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is this to be an answer to my question?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain KRAMER. A specific answer to your question. [Reading:]

10-c: On returning about 10:20 from Mr. Hull's office the remainder of No. 02-10 were arriving, including the one setting the 1300 meeting time and the 'Weather Report'. These were delivered to all hands, [11169] including Mr. Knox and Mr. Stimson, at Mr. Hull's office, with my comments to Mr. Knox on how the hour tied with the sun and moves in progress elsewhere.

All I can say, Senator, concerning Captain Safford's testimony is that he apparently got all his information for that reply from his interpretation of the wording of this reply I just read, or the abbreviated version of it, rather.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you just read that again?

Captain KRAMER. The last part is the pertinent part. I will read that again, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just read that again.

Captain KRAMER (reading):

These—

referring to the messages—

were delivered to all hands, including Mr. Knox and Mr. Stimson, at Mr. Hull's office with my comments to Mr. Knox on how the hour tied with the sun and movements in progress elsewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, with your comments to Mr. Knox, that is what you are reading there?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how did you make those comments to Mr. Knox?

Captain KRAMER. Via his personal aide, a foreign service officer. I would like to point out, Senator, that—

[11170] Senator FERGUSON. Nothing in writing?

Captain KRAMER. Nothing whatsoever in writing, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you told him this?

Captain KRAMER. The word got to him via his foreign service officer, who when I was speaking to him was about 10 or 15 feet away, just outside the closed door of the room, Mr. Hull's office, where the three Secretaries were conferring.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was Mr. Knox's foreign service officer?

Captain KRAMER. There were four, Senator, who were indoctrinated and rotated—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was the one that you gave the message to?

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the one that you gave the message to?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know which one of the four it was. I believe two of these were present that morning. As to their names, I recollect three names of the four, Gray, Stone, and Brown, because they associated with each other.

Senator FERGUSON. You expected that service officer to tell Mr. Knox everything? You would expect that service officer to tell Mr. Knox everything that you said to him?

Captain KRAMER. That is what my intention was, yes, sir.

[11171] Senator FERGUSON. And everything that you said to the foreign service officer for Mr. Knox, that there was something about the men being at breakfast or at mess who were at Pearl Harbor at that time, he would convey that to Mr. Knox then?

Captain KRAMER. Not all those details, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wait a minute.

Captain KRAMER. I have previously specifically covered that point, Senator, by stating that the reference to Pearl Harbor was purely a passing reference for the benefit of non-naval personnel, namely, these foreign service officers and the Army officer present.

Senator FERGUSON. But you just told me in your last answer that you expected this foreign service officer to convey to Mr. Knox every word that you said.

Captain KRAMER. I did not expect him to convey every word but the essential points of my explanation to him, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell him not to convey to Mr. Knox the idea that it was sunrise and these men would be off duty at 7:30 in the morning?

Captain KRAMER. Of course not, sir. My only reason for the explanation was to have the gist or summary of my explanation to convey to Mr. Knox.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell him to only convey the [11172] summary of your explanation?

Captain KRAMER. I did not tell him which words to specifically convey; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, didn't you anticipate that he would convey the entire message to Mr. Knox?

Captain KRAMER. The essential points of it; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why not all of it and let Mr. Knox be the judge as to what was essential or not essential?

Captain KRAMER. In the first place, Senator, I indicated that I was not an evaluator of this material. I felt, however, that the essential points which I covered in that conversation should be pointed out to the foreign service officer, who in the same manner that I did for the

Navy Department high officials handled those documents in the State Department, passing it to the people who were permitted to see it.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Kramer, on many occasions Secretary Knox had asked for your opinion because you were familiar with the messages, isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. Rarely my opinion, sir. My comments in the presence of Secretary Knox almost solely and entirely concerned an explanation on my part, often volunteered, occasionally asked for, regarding particular names appearing in the text, regarding references appearing therein and background concerning obscure points in the traffic.

[11173] Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand it you did have this conversation with this foreign service officer and it was your intention for him to convey it to Mr. Knox?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I am going to ask you this question, I am going to read this again:

That at the time Kramer submitted SIS 25,850 to Secretary Knox he sent a note in with it saying, in effect—

now, that note, as you say, would be a message through the foreign service officer?

Captain KRAMER. That word "note" is apparently Captain Safford's own construction of my sentence.

Senator FERGUSON. So instead of it being in writing you sent it in verbally?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

In effect that—

this is "in effect"—

that this means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila.

Now, do I understand that you swear now that that is not a fact, that last one?

Captain KRAMER. I swear to it, Senator, and have always sworn that I never intended in the least to imply that those remarks I made indicated an attack on Pearl Harbor or, in [11174] fact, any overt intention on the part of the Japanese directed toward the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking you what you intended. I am asking you whether that is a fair substance of what you said to the foreign-service officer?

Captain KRAMER. It is not, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then General Russell asked this question of Safford:

How do you know that?

Reading from this transcript.

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer told me.

General RUSSELL. When did he tell you?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer told me that just before he left Washington to go to Honolulu for duty. He had not dared—

General FRANK. Which was when?

Captain SAFFORD. Which was the spring of 1943—he had not dared to let anybody know that at that time.

General RUSSELL. Are there any further matters about these messages now before we go to December the 7th and the other messages?

Indicating that they had covered that subject. So you see that Safford again has testified that in 1943 that is [11175] what you told him.

Captain KRAMER. That is not what I told him at any time, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. But you told here when Mr. Richardson examined you what you told this foreign-service officer. Your answer to Mr. Richardson was the substance of what you told the foreign-service officer to convey to Mr. Knox, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. I was referring specifically in my last reply to the word “dared.” I don’t know where Captain Safford got that part of it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He is talking about what you told me.

Captain KRAMER. I did convey to Captain Safford, I believe—I do not recall specifically, but to many of my contacts, probably 8 or 10 or a dozen in the Navy Department, chiefly subordinates, the substance of what I told Secretary Hull’s foreign-service officer; yes, sir. I also mentioned it to McCollum that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell them when you testified here in reply to Mr. Richardson’s question—did you tell him what you said?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you testify here about it to me in answer to my questions?

Captain KRAMER. About what question, sir?

[11176] Senator FERGUSON. About what you had told the foreign-service officer to tell Mr. Knox.

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That answers his question.

Senator FERGUSON. How many deliveries did you make of messages on the 6th? You made one at 9 at night?

Captain KRAMER. Two that I recall, sir, it may have been three. I could determine that, I believe, by a study of the files similar to the one I undertook previously for you, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I am going to take that up some with you later. So you made two or three deliveries on Saturday?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the name of the secretary to Mr. Knox that was at the apartment at the Wardman? What was the name of that secretary? You said there was a secretary.

Captain KRAMER. He had been a secretary.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was his name?

Captain KRAMER. I believe it was Mr. Keefe, sir. I am not certain of that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Captain KRAMER. In any case he can be identified as at that time being, I believe, the manager of the Chicago [11177] Daily News.

The CHAIRMAN. John O’Keefe.

Senator FERGUSON. John O’Keefe, the Senator tells me.

Now, have you named all of the officers of the Army, the Navy, or the Marines that you have talked your testimony over with in relation to Pearl Harbor since the time that you testified before the Navy board?

Captain KRAMER. As to details, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, are there any other officers that you have discussed it with not as to detail?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; there are.

Senator FERGUSON. And will you name them?

Captain KRAMER. Colonel Laswell, Commander Rennick, Commander Benedict, Commander Hudson. In any case officers attached to the fleet radio unit at Pearl Harbor who were long-standing friends of mine and working in this kind of work.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever discuss it with Bratton?

Captain KRAMER. Not that I have any recollection of, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have had no conversations whatever with Bratton about the testimony or about the Pearl Harbor matter?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Since the Navy board?

[11178] Captain KRAMER. Either before or after the Navy board, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss it with Baecher?

Captain KRAMER. There was some discussion concerning the availability of records to which I for the first time had access in December last year and chiefly my discussion with Baecher was concerning appointments with counsel for this committee and Mr. Baecher. Details concerning the content of my prior testimony or of testimony I would give I did not discuss with Mr. Baecher.

Senator FERGUSON. And he asked you nothing about any of the points that you have covered?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell me just what the occasion was that you took these letters to him and the Halsey memorandum? Had he asked you or did you just volunteer that?

Captain KRAMER. I volunteered that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There wasn't any request?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; it was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were greatly worried, were you not, sometime in September and October, you were worried?

Captain KRAMER. Of what year, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. This last year, 1945.

Captain KRAMER. About what, sir?

[11179] Senator FERGUSON. Well, I am just asking you whether you were worried?

Captain KRAMER. Not that I have any recollection of, no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Unless it is about Pearl Harbor I think it is an improper question to ask him.

Senator FERGUSON. This is in relation to Pearl Harbor or I would not have asked him.

Senator LUCAS. You said "about anything."

Captain KRAMER. I had some concern about my health. I don't think I recall any worry, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There was nothing worrying you at that time that you went to the hospital?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; there was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that a letter had been written to your wife requesting her to come up on account of you worrying about something?

Captain KRAMER. With respect to my health, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, no, worrying about Pearl Harbor—or not Pearl Harbor but having something on your mind that you were greatly concerned with?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a highly improper question to ask this witness.

Senator FERGUSON. It only relates to Pearl Harbor.

[11180] Captain KRAMER. I am willing to answer that question.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I know, but there is a limit to everything. The Senator from Michigan now is asking this question about whether the witness was worrying about anything.

Senator FERGUSON. No, about Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. But you don't go back to Pearl Harbor. If you confine it to Pearl Harbor, all right.

Captain KRAMER. I would like, Senator Lucas, to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks the witness is willing to answer that question and probably can do so satisfactorily.

[11181] Captain KRAMER. At no time while I was in the Naval Hospital at Bethesda, either for the check-up during August or for my subsequent stay in the hospital in September or October, did I have any worries or concern about what I knew about Pearl Harbor, or any discussions with anyone about either my prior testimony, or what I knew about Pearl Harbor.

I did have a brief discussion, which I have previously indicated in my testimony, with a classmate of mine, namely, Commander Powell, to the effect—and this bears particularly on your question, sir—that I might be called as a witness before the contemplated congressional hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am talking about, Pearl Harbor.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about anything else.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now you had some concern as to whether or not you would be called as a witness?

Captain KRAMER. No concern whatsoever sir. It was simply a conversation in which Halsey mentioned, I believe, as I now recollect it, something to the effect that I was working on things connected with Pearl Harbor in Washington [11182] at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you appreciate at that time that your testimony, that is, your so-called affidavit which you say now you did not swear to, but you considered it as such, that if you died, it was to be taken as your evidence in any case in which it might arise, and what you said at the Pearl Harbor board, that there may be a conflict in those two statements?

Captain KRAMER. I was unaware of any such conflict, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore, there was no concern over the fact that you had a memorandum, and you had also testified in relation to the matter before the Pearl Harbor board?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had also testified before the Hewitt committee. Now, was there any concern over the fact that there may be a conflict between your testimony, that is, your memorandum and your testimony before the Pearl Harbor board, and your testimony before the Hewitt committee?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir. I at no time had concern about the few facts with which I was familiar concerning Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. And, as I understand it, as far as you were concerned, there were no conflicts between those [11183] three?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you concerned over your testimony before this board, that it might conflict with one or more of the testimonies that you had given?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir. In fact, it was not until I began studying these documents in December last, that I was aware of such conflicts.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you discover that there were some conflicts?

Captain KRAMER. I learned of certain minor discrepancies, such as the fact that I had previously testified that Commander Wellborn was in Admiral Stark's office on Sunday morning, but it appeared to be not true, inasmuch as Commander Wellborn was not in the Navy Department on Sunday, or at least Sunday morning at all, during the luncheon engagement which I previously testified to at Admiral Stark's home in talking with Captain McCollum.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want any more detail on that, because you have already covered that; isn't that true?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you present here to the committee the papers and the documents that you say you [11184] have examined, and which have caused you to make some alteration or some change from your previous testimony, or statements?

Captain KRAMER. I can refer in that respect, sir, only to the Navy narrative, all of which I have not read, and part of my testimony as set forth in the transcript of the Naval Court of Inquiry. Nothing else whatsoever, aside from the JD files, which I studied a few days ago, which I saw a week ago Saturday.

Senator FERGUSON. That brings us to the JD files, and I would like to get them now.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where are they?

Senator FERGUSON. Is he in the phone booth again?

Commander BAECHE. Which ones, Captain Kramer?

Senator FERGUSON. 7001, and the ones he refreshed his memory from. I want to see what he used to refresh his memory.

Commander BAECHE. The JD files go back a long way, Senator. They are a vast volume.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to see the files that this witness examined, from which he has made certain alterations.

Captain KRAMER. The 7000 file.

Senator FERGUSON. Are they here?

Commander BAECHE. I will go to the phone booth, sir.

[11185] Captain KRAMER. Probably from 6500 on.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe the files are in the booth.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice in this testimony I read here this morning that Safford says you told him that on Sunday morning you delivered these copies to Admiral Beardall for the President.

Does that refresh your memory that he was in charge of the White House map room?

Captain KRAMER. It does not, sir.

Any implications of that kind may have been gained from the fact that I indicated it had gone to Admiral Beardall's situation room for the President in the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got Exhibit 142 before you?

Captain KRAMER. The material relating to the winds code, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, it is relating to the winds code. Just a few questions on the winds code.

What did you hand counsel?

Captain KRAMER. A brief on that study I showed you a couple of days ago, sir. It is rather not a brief, but a smooth form of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Look at this page, at the 7,023. Will you refer to the 7,024, 7,025, the date of message [11186] 2d October 1941, date of translation 12/4/41.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have that page with those messages on?

Captain KRAMER. I have, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the long delay in the translations? Were they purple?

Captain KRAMER. They were not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would account for them not being translated?

Captain KRAMER. The 7,023, 7,024, and 7,025 that you just read were all in the system known as JIG 19, which required delay in the recovery of keys.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is what accounted for the delay?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; many keys, in fact, we never recovered.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Let me have Exhibit 2 again.

Those messages I show you, do you have the ones from 12 on?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What were they in?

Captain KRAMER. It is not apparent from Exhibit 2, [11187] what system they were in, sir. That could be determined by further study of this JD file, however.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would you not say that the delay in those was due to the fact that you did not have the keys?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot tell without knowing the system, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you can specifically state that on 7,023, 7,024, 7,025, and so forth, that is true?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; because I have on my copy of exhibit 142 a brief notation of the system. I do not know from Exhibit 2 which JD file number these Army translations were, except the last one

Senator FERGUSON. Does anyone from the Army here have the data that they were to get me on 900 and 901, the time of the translation and the other things from the work sheet?

Colonel DUNCOMBE. Mr. Richardson gave you a memorandum on that.

Senator FERGUSON. This only covers 900. I will read this into the record:

11 February 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Examination of the Signal Intelligence files discloses that Tokyo to Washington message #900, dated 6 December, 1941, [11188] was intercepted by Army station No. 7 (Fort Hunt, Virginia) at 1212 GMT—

This is Greenwich mean time, is it?

Captain KRAMER. Greenwich mean time.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing):

on 6 December (7:12 a. m. Washington time). The message was delivered to SIS by courier and was decoded by SIS at 11:07—

And they have then got "m" and at the bottom they have got a star and they say: "Time stamp indistinct—not clear whether 'a. m.' or 'p. m.'"

[Continuing:]

6 December.

So it would be either 11:07 in the morning, or 11:07 in the evening.

The following summary of the message was written on the decode sheet, "Domei chief praises Kato for good reportage". The message was not further disseminated.

Now, that came in immediately. Well, it came in with, as I am informed, with 901, at least it has a number before 901, so it would be very significant as to whether or not that was translated in the morning or in the evening, and if it was translated at the same time that 901 was translated—901 bears the date of translation on December 6.

Now, I come back to the point: How does it come about that this very, very important pilot message, which [11189] is translated on the 6th, was not delivered on the 6th, or early on the morning of the 7th, with the first delivery?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot account, Senator, for the handling of the message by the Army. From the study I made for you a few days ago, my best knowledge and present conviction is that my section in the Navy Department did not receive it until approximately 10:25 or 10:30 Sunday morning, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And when I get the file we are going to go over it so you can tell me what is in the file to refresh your memory. So that you have changed your testimony, as I understand it, that you delivered it on the night of the 6th, your first testimony?

Captain KRAMER. I don't believe I have changed that testimony materially, sir, inasmuch as any testimony on this point previously, including in this hearing, in any such testimony I have indicated my doubt of when that thing was delivered.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any doubt now?

Captain KRAMER. Not after a study of this file; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. That is why I want the file here.

[11190] I am reading from page 17 of the Clarke report, Bratton's testimony:

When we received the Japanese message concerning the code to be used in weather broadcasts, I discussed the matter with my opposite number in the Navy, Commander McCollum, and his assistant, Lieutenant Commander Kramer. They informed me that the matter was with their man in Hawaii, that he had all the information that we had and the same intercepts. They stated that he could explain in detail to the Commanding General, or his G-2 the significance of the code, and suggested that our G-2 in Hawaii get in touch with Commander Rochefort immediately as a means of saving time. In other words, we could get the desired information to the Commanding General in Hawaii or his G-2, much faster and in much greater detail and with far greater security than by means of a long involved explanatory message that we would have been forced to send through the Army communications system.

Do you remember that conversation with Bratton?

Captain KRAMER. I have no recollection of that conversation, nor do I have any recollection of such a message being sent.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see General Marshall on the 6th or the 7th?

[11191] Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Not to deliver to him anything, but just see him?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You know you did not see him?

Captain KRAMER. I know that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I will come to one message, and I will try to be short on it.

If you just try to keep to answers as short as you can, we will get through sooner.

Captain KRAMER. I will try, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that the Army had set up a similar system to yours, not using cards, but using sheets of paper?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; this is my first knowledge of that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know that that was set up the same way in the Army?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, not in the least.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did know that the system being used in the Navy was by means of these cards, and telephone conversations?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever on any other occasion [11192] set up a system whereby you were to deliver messages by means of a card system like this, and telephone conversations?

Captain KRAMER. That was the first and only instance of which I am aware, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was Admiral Noyes able to translate Japanese?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first hear that the winds message that you saw on the 5th—you place it as the 5th?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The winds execute message, when did you first hear that that was phoney?

Captain KRAMER. I never heard that, sir. I reached that conclusion myself, commencing sometime in early December of last year,

after I commenced a study of these documents, including those interrogations conducted in Japan last fall.

Senator FERGUSON. Now wait. Do I understand that you have drawn this conclusion that it was a phoney from the Japanese messages, that they never sent it out?

Captain KRAMER. I have, sir. I thought I had clearly indicated that in previous testimony.

[11193] Senator FERGUSON. In the same message that the Japanese claim they never saw the winds execute message, they deny ever having set up the means of sending it out, and do you now claim—

Captain KRAMER (interposing). I am unfamiliar with that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you show me what you draw that conclusion from?

Captain KRAMER. I believe it is in interrogation No. 11, or it may be No. 10, conducted by part of General MacArthur's staff.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would get me that file, because they deny having sent either 2353 or 2354.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What difference does it make? He said he read it and based his conclusion on it. You have a right to bring that in, of course, but it does not do any good to call his attention to that question, except to have it go into the record.

I agree they say they never did send it.

Senator FERGUSON. You now say you did not see the Japanese deny sending out the original two code messages, that they would set it up in that manner?

Captain KRAMER. That did not impress me at the time, if it is included in that interrogation, sir, because I [11194] know that they did.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore when the Japanese say they did not send out the execute message, you came to the conclusion that it was phoney? The one that you saw?

Captain KRAMER. It was not solely on that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what else was it based on?

Captain KRAMER. On many other aspects of this so-called winds system, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What aspects, solely on this question that this was a phoney that you saw on the teletype?

Captain KRAMER. I have clearly indicated, I think, Senator, that I was thoroughly convinced at the time I saw that teletype that it was an authentic winds message.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think there is any doubt but what that is your testimony.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought it was authentic?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And up until you saw the Japanese messages from Japan to MacArthur, you felt all the time that it was authentic, and then you came to the conclusion that it was a phoney?

Captain KRAMER. That was very likely it, sir. I do not know still whether it was or not.

[11195] Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, we have diluted it so it very likely was, and you do not know whether it was or was not.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now have you any other evidence that weakened it, and brought you down to the conclusion that it may have been a phoney? I would like to see it, if you have any other evidence.

Captain KRAMER. No other specific evidence that I can recall now, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain KRAMER. It was just a general conclusion I came to.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not there were any other winds execute messages, other than the one you saw, that ever came in on the teletype?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; there were a number, which proved to be false alarms in each case.

Senator FERGUSON. And on those occasions, you demonstrated they were false alarms?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But no undertaking was ever made to determine that the one you saw was not a legitimate execute message?

[11196] Captain KRAMER. My understanding was that such a study was undertaken.

I should like to be more specific on that Senator, in case it does not appear clear to you.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want hearsay at this particular time.

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I am talking from first-hand knowledge now, sir.

There were as many as three or four hundred weather reports received during that 10-day period.

[11197] Senator FERGUSON. I am only talking about the teletyped weather reports.

Captain KRAMER. That is what I am talking about, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us keep to that.

Captain KRAMER. Over and above that there were the FCC voice broadcasts.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about that, only about the teletype.

Captain KRAMER. I will leave that out. Those which I examined, which consisted of two or three during night hours and probably a half-dozen during daylight hours, on each occasion I saw the full sheet of teletype, including the whole of the Japanese news broadcasts, and examined the weather report contained therein as to the characteristics called for by the Japanese weather code system. The piece of teletype I saw on December 5 was a short piece of teletype. All these other weather reports I have referred to, several hundred in number, were examined by the GY watch officer and determination made as to authenticity.

In this particular case I was shown a piece of teletype paper torn off of the long strip, and my presumption was that the GY watch officer had made the determination I have just outlined. I remember his showing it to me and accompanying him, and my only check was as to the wording.

[11198] Senator FERGUSON. You have gone over that before.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now what I want to know is whether or not in the Department, prior to the attack, there had been any survey, which you have personal knowledge of, that the winds execute message that you saw was a false one?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, not that I am aware of, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I want to get at.

You have handed me this sheet. As soon as I can get the original file 7001 and the others I want you to point out on the files themselves what there is that caused you to want to make certain statements in relation to a change in your testimony.

Now can I ask Commander Baecher whether we will have this?

Commander BAECHEER. That will be here at 1:30.

Captain KRAMER. I have a photostat of that sheet, if you would like to see it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this an original?

Captain KRAMER. I prepared that.

Senator FERGUSON. I want the whole file, I want to go through it with you. I have no other questions at the present time, except this last final one—

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I make a correction?

[11199] The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other statements now, or any other information that you feel in any way will help or aid this committee in ascertaining the facts in relation to the Pearl Harbor catastrophe?

Captain KRAMER. I have not, Senator. Those papers which have been introduced in the last few days are the only thing, in my best knowledge and belief, that might, by any construction, be considered as bearing on this issue.

Senator FERGUSON. And there are no other papers or memoranda written by you, up until the time you took the witness stand, that are outstanding at the present time?

Captain KRAMER. That is precisely correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So we are not quibbling on that word "memorandum," or anything else?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; there are not.

Senator FERGUSON. And as soon as I can get that file I will close.

Mr. MURPHY. May I make one correction in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 10927 there is reference on two occasions to a letter. The letter I was referring to was the letter written by Admiral Kimmel. The record shows Admiral Wilkinson. I ask that "Wilkinson" be changed to [11200] "Kimmel" on page 10927.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. It is now 12:30, and we will recess to 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[11201]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

**TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES
NAVY (Resumed)**

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Kramer, I spoke to you this morning about the message of the 24th of September 1941 and we left it hang in the balance because you said it had been pointed out in some way where the gist of it was determined and then I left it because I did not know what you were referring to, I had not seen what you were referring to.

Now, at the noon hour I have received three pages and one is a copy of page 12 in Exhibit 2, if I might come near there and refer to this exhibit and we will straight this matter out.

Now, page 12 is the so-called bomb plot of Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that page 12 of Exhibit 2?

Senator FERGUSON. Of Exhibit 2.

Now, I show you what is a photostatic copy of that message with the exception of "Original copy" in longhand writing at the top. Is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the word "Secret" was in black and then there is "Top Secret-Ultra" in red. Is that cor- [11202] rect?

Captain KRAMER. Sir, at the time that message was disseminated the only thing that appeared was the "Secret" at the top and I believe at the bottom. The "Top Secret-Ultra" was not on it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when the words "Top Secret-Ultra" was put on top?

Captain KRAMER. That has presumably been done at some time subsequent to Pearl Harbor, sir, by a new custodian of the files.

Senator FERGUSON. "Top Secret-Ultra." What is the "Ultra"? Is that the purple code?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; that was a code developed in 1942, I believe, applying to this cryptanalytical work.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, at the bottom is a stamp and it has "1012-I, 2-OP-G, MIG, BE, B" what is that?

Captain KRAMER. Pound sign, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Pound sign. "AF, XY, MONO." Is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that stamp on the bottom of that message?

Captain KRAMER. That was a stamp we commenced using in the fall of 1941 to indicate interesting and important [11203] messages. It was stamped on by the yeoman at the same time when he was applying the JD file number to it, but was not always done; there were some days we skipped it for lack of time. When it was on there and again if I had time to do so, I would circle those symbols to insure that items of interest to the people or organs represented by those symbols were apprised.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now on the original page 12 of Exhibit 2 that stamp does not appear?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. This photostatic copy is a photostatic copy of what now appears in the Navy Department as far as page 12 of Exhibit 2 is concerned?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. That was only used by Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, did you circle anything on any of those numbers indicating that they should be of special interest to them?

Captain KRAMER. There is nothing circled on this piece of paper; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next page that was in this exhibit is "Top Secret-Ultra" both in black print and red stamp. Is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "GZ routing system." That would indicate the people that got this message that was attached to it, this Exhibit 12?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; not at all, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is this?

Captain KRAMER. That is simply an explanation, I believe, very recently drawn up of what those symbols mean, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then "1" means special interest to "DNI", is that right?

Captain KRAMER. That is an incorrect interpretation of that explanation.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I am wrong. "1" is the Secretary of the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. Secretary of the Navy; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct, is it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And "10" was CNO?

Captain KRAMER. Admiral Stark; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And "12" was War Plans?

Captain KRAMER. Admiral Turner; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "2X" was what?

Captain KRAMER. I have forgotten what that symbol was used for.

Senator FERGUSON. But it say, "Not used."

Captain KRAMER. Well, apparently we actually used it, sir.

[11205] Senator FERGUSON. "P" for the—

Captain KRAMER. President.

Senator FERGUSON. For the White House?

Captain KRAMER. For the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. "S" for State; "G" for Captain Safford; "Mis." for miscellaneous, is that right?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "B"—"BE—not used." "B-OP-16-BZ," I think. What is that?

Captain KRAMER. That is Wilkinson-Intelligence. That would be in the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Pound sign?

Captain KRAMER. Pound sign—London.

Senator FERGUSON. British, London?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "AF CINCAF, Asiatic Fleet. X-20-G1"——

Captain KRAMER. GX.

Senator FERGUSON. "GX." "Y" is "20-GY"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "MONO" is for files?

Captain KRAMER. That means a monograph file, separate from the numerical file.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I notice you had on the stamp an "AF" which was CINCAF, Asiatic Fleet, is that right?

[11206] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; that is true.

Senator FERGUSON. That was Admiral Hart?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why didn't you have Admiral Kimmel's symbol on that?

Captain KRAMER. Senator, everything that went to CINCAF, Asiatic Fleet, also went either as an action addressee or information addressee to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. Who made up this designation of this so-called code at the bottom? We might call it a code.

Captain KRAMER. I believe the present custodian of the JD file, Commander Boone, quite recently.

Senator FERGUSON. But you knew all the time what these letters stood for?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever personally use "AF" to send messages to CINCAF?

Captain KRAMER. Not that I recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not have any designation for CINCPAC, which was Kimmel?

Captain KRAMER. He was included in that "AF".

Senator FERGUSON. Now I show you the third page and it is October the 10th 1941. Will you interpret it?

Captain KRAMER. One asterisk means interesting messages. [11207] A double asterisk means especially important or urgent messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, number——

Captain KRAMER. No. 236-41 meant the two hundred thirty-sixth gist of that kind made up during 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, what did you list this on page 12 of Exhibit 2 under?

Captain KRAMER. Under JD file, No. 5696.

Senator FERGUSON. And what is on this paper in relation to that message?

Captain KRAMER. "Tokyo to Honolulu, 24 September." That being the originator's date, originator's message No. 83 meaning, asterisks, as an interesting message.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one of them? Just one?

Captain KRAMER. One; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Meaning "interesting message"?

Captain KRAMER. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what was there on that? Read what is on there?

Captain KRAMER. The gist of this message is:

Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, this particular paper that I have [11208] in my hand and have shown you with this written on it:

Tokyo directs special reports on ships with Pearl Harbor——

Captain KRAMER. "In Pearl Harbor" I presume it should have been.

Senator FERGUSON. It says "with."

Captain KRAMER. Yes; "with Pearl Harbor," but it should have been "in Pearl Harbor," I presume.

Senator FERGUSON. (reading):

Which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations.

That particular sheet of paper was delivered to the recipients who received Exhibit 2, page 12?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that when they had Exhibit 2, page 12, showing this bomb plat as we have referred to it here, they had a signal or a flag showing them that it was an important, as you say, interesting message?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell me from your records who received that sheet with the flag on it telling them what it was in your deliveries?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot recall who specifically received that but I must presume that all the usual recipients [11209] did receive that, namely, the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Stark's office, Admiral Wilkinson, the head of the Far East Section and the Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes, who has initialed this sheet, and the Director of War Plans.

Senator FERGUSON. The President?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; we did not send those gists to the President. We sent the original folder with the gist to the naval aide to the President, who I do not believe used those gists in showing things to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, wait. Did you deliver the gists to the aide for the President?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; it would have gone to him, too.

Senator FERGUSON. And he would have it in the folder?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that when he would take the folder to the President he would have not only the message but your flag, being the gist?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know just what he did or did not show the President.

Senator FERGUSON. But that was at least in there?

Captain KRAMER. It was delivered to him; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, can you tell us why we [11210] have been almost 3 months on this hearing and I suppose that we have spent many hours on this one message and we have never known

before that there was such a thing as a gist sheet which went to the various people who received these messages as a flag, calling the importance of the message to the recipient of the message?

Captain KRAMER. I have no knowledge whatsoever, Senator, about what was furnished or has been or will be furnished this committee, except what I have furnished.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you called this to my attention this morning on some question that I put to you.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would not indicate in any way, except that the person who received this had a flag, that this was an interesting message, is that right?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. If I might just look at that: Now, on that flag sheet—let us call it a flag sheet—this flag sheet that carried this message No. 5696-A, Tokyo-Honolulu, September 24, 1941, I assume that is.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No. 83, which is the identical sheet there?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11211] Senator FERGUSON. Together with other papers, is that right?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That flag sheet would indicate that the messages indicated on that flag sheet were all delivered at the same time?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the flag sheet had only a sheet with a flag showing "interesting messages"?

Captain KRAMER. On that page; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, on that page; and there were 12 messages, is that right?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Delivered at that same time?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. There are more than that, of course, but 12 are shown there.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, where is the other? Do you know, Commander.

Commander BAECHE. Senator, this other sheet I can get. I assumed if there are any others they would be in the Navy Department. We were only asked for the sheet showing the distribution of this one particular message.

[11212] Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether or not the 14 parts and the other messages delivered Saturday night had a flag sheet?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, because my section abandoned the preparation of those gists, I believe, in early November or it may have been nearer the middle of November.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, why did you abandon the flag-sheet idea when you delivered to the various parties 12 or 15 messages? Why didn't you flag them on the most important?

Captain KRAMER. Senator, the preparation of these gists required several hours work on the part of one officer and one yeoman in my office. The practice was abandoned in November because of the fact that the diplomatic crises were increasing in acuteness and it was felt by me that delays required by the preparation of these gists could not be accepted and therefore the original traffic without gists were delivered several times a day without waiting for the preparation of gists.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, do I understand that after some time in November everything became important or interesting?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; that is the—

Senator FERGUSON. That is, the gist of it?

[11213] Captain KRAMER. That is the understanding; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. So much of importance that we wanted to get it out fast; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But on this particular message, the September 24 message, this gist that went with it, this gist sheet went with it so that anyone receiving that file on that day would have called to his attention at least two items, his being the first one that was interesting?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now I want to turn you to these files.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you going to put those files in?

Senator FERGUSON. No, that would take too much time.

I want you to point out in those files the things that refreshed your memory that you did not see the pilot message until you had returned from the delivery of the fourteenth-part message to the Secretary of Navy and the Secretary of State in the Secretary of State's office. That was the second delivery on that day.

It will be well to put on the record that these are the files that I started on this morning and asked about. Don't look at your yellow sheets. Don't look at your own memorandum. I want to see on these original records the things [11214] that refreshed your memory that you did not make the delivery of the pilot message as you first stated on Saturday evening?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that if the witness has work sheets which he prepared at the time when he examined the files that it is perfectly proper for him to refer to his work sheets in order to draw his attention to whatever sheets he wants to find in the file.

Senator FERGUSON. I have no objection to him using the sheets to assist him to find the other sheet, but I want to see the original sheet and what he saw. I am talking now about the pilot message.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is 901.

Captain KRAMER. I have transferred to this work sheet, Senator, considerable data from these files. It was not till I made a study of this compilation, the work sheet, that I reached that conclusion that the pilot message was not delivered until the time I have indicated.

Senator FERGUSON. No. Now, we will have to come back. I want you to point on the pilot message or the other messages in these original Navy files the information that refreshed your memory that the delivery was made Sunday instead of Saturday.

Captain KRAMER. Starting with file No. 7137, which is [11215] dated September 5—December 5, rather.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, wait. We had better describe it. It is from Berlin to Tokyo, 5th of December 1941?

Captain KRAMER. Originator's serial No. 1421.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is that in Exhibit No. 1? Will you get Exhibit No. 1 so that we can identify it for the committee?

Captain KRAMER. According to my notes, sir, it is not in Exhibit 1. I compared this file with Exhibit 1 when I made the study.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then will you read it; what is not in Exhibit 1, will you read that in?

Captain KRAMER (reading):

Chief of Office Routing: Re your No. 986. * * *

Asterisks to a footnote. The footnote says:

JD-1:6944. I relayed the general outline of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations to the Germans. The United States will no doubt attempt to bring about a split between Japan and Germany by publishing details at some time in the future. It is quite possible that they will try to utilize them in an extensive propaganda program. I believe that it would be to our interest to advise the Germans and Italians in a very direct manner the [11216] contents of the Konoye message which received much publicity at the time and all other matters that we can. It may be more convenient for you to do this through the German and Italian ambassadors in Tokyo.

[11217] Senator FERGUSON. What was this message, do you know, the Konoye message?

Captain KRAMER. I believe, without referring to it, the message at the end of November disclosing to Berlin the tenor of the United States-Japanese negotiations. We can refer to that letter.

Senator FERGUSON. The next page is what? That helped to refresh your memory that the pilot message was delivered Sunday instead of Saturday?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything on that?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. That is the latest date of a block of about 11 messages, arranged chronologically in this file, preceding that message I just read.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now the next page is what?

Captain KRAMER. The next page is file No. 7138.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that in Exhibit 1?

Captain KRAMER. That is not in Exhibit 1.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you read that?

Captain KRAMER. That is from Berlin to Tokyo, dated December 3, 1941, originator serial No. 1408, Secret.

At the time of my interview with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in my 1407 the Minister told me the following: "Britain and America have been making merry on the German [11218] defeat at Rostov. However, this is all a fabrication. The facts in the case are that the inhabitants of Rostov were so violent in their antipathy and resistance and Soviet Army were so persistent in its attack on the German Army where it had broken through that General Kleist, who had kept the place in order, not to inflict unnecessary losses on his mechanized forces, retired voluntarily to prepared positions in the West. I am in receipt of a report to the effect that operations in Libya are proceeding very satisfactorily and only recently Rommel's Army has completely annihilated one division of New Zealand troops which came to the aid of Tobruk garrison. Also I have the report that the encirclement of Moscow is progressing favorably."

Senator FERGUSON. What is this message 1407?

Captain KRAMER. It is JD-1: File No. 7132.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it in Exhibit 1?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, will you find that message there? What is its date?

Captain KRAMER. December 3, 1941, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, will you read that one into the record?

Captain KRAMER (reading):

From Berlin To Tokyo

[11219] 3 December 1941.

Orig. Serial 1407.

Re my 1405.

In compliance with his request I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the 3rd. He said that Dictator Hitler was at a distant place at the present. He further said that he did not like to use the long distance telephone and because of snow planes could not be utilized. There is nothing for him (Ribbentrop) to do but go to the military headquarters himself and await the Dictator's arrival there. (He is expected to return to the headquarters tomorrow or the 4th, but if he could not be reached on this occasion he would be on the 5th) to establish contact with him. Although it is regrettable, he said the delay cannot be avoided.

RIBBENTROP. "As I have told you before, we cannot make an official reply until the Fuehrer has given his approval. The Japanese Government is undoubtedly very anxious to have our reply as soon as possible. I myself am in agreement with it and have no objections, but will advise your home Government of that fact. Moreover I am of the opinion that the Fuehrer will be in agreement too, but we cannot say so definitely until the Fuehrer's return."

I told him that the situation is more critical than [11220] is imagined and therefore we are very anxious to have a formal reply as soon as is possible. From my previous experience with Ribbentrop I feel fairly confident when I say that you will not be mistaken if you assume there will be no objections. Arrangements have been made for a direct telephone connection between Ribbentrop at the general headquarters and here. However he said that whenever possible he would come back here and contact me.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now what was the message they were talking about?

Captain KRAMER. It is not available, or at least was not at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did not know, "Re my 1405," you did not know what 1405 was?

Captain KRAMER. Not from the reference indicated on this message. It might have appeared later.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you try to find out if it did appear later, before the 7th?

Captain KRAMER. That would have to be done by the present custodian of those index files, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you try to find out if 1405, referred to here, was ever received before the attack, Commander Baecher?¹

Commander BAECHER. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now what was there on any of those [11221] messages that indicated to you or that brought you to the conclusion that you had not delivered the pilot message on Saturday night?

Captain KRAMER. This 7132 I just read is one of the block of 11 messages I previously referred to.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to get at is how do you know there were 11, that block was struck off at that one point?

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5492.

Captain KRAMER. The group of 11 I referred to was the extension back to only what appeared on my work sheet. It extends further back three more messages, so there are presumably 14 in the whole block.

Senator FERGUSON. Now what is your next message in the file?

Captain KRAMER. File No. 7139.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that in Exhibit 1?

Captain KRAMER. On page 235 of Exhibit 1; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the long message and ends on page 236?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now will you go to the next message, the one in 7139? That is the one you just referred to?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And said it was on page 235?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. File 7140.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that in Exhibit 1?

Captain KRAMER. That is on page 234 of Exhibit 1.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is the one at the bottom of the page?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is this writing on that sheet?

Captain KRAMER. That is my penciled notation using a double asterisk next to the name "Terasaki," with the footnote identifying Terasaki and his activities.

Senator FERGUSON. So when this message at the bottom of page 234 was delivered did it have your memo on it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, in the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read what was delivered to the Navy?

Captain KRAMER (reading):

* * * Terasaki, Second Secretary, is head of Japanese espionage in Western Hemisphere. He and his assistants are being sent to South America.

Senator FERGUSON. So you called to the attention of the various people that were to receive this message that the head of Japanese espionage in the Western Hemisphere was being transferred from Washington to some country in South America?

[11223] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was used as a flag, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. Not quite that, sir. It was an additional footnote added after this message was typed.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose initial is on that message?

Captain KRAMER. The initial "J," sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now do you know why that message as delivered was not put in exhibit 1 to be distributed to the committee, calling the attention of the committee to who this man was?

Captain KRAMER. Apparently, Senator, the message appearing on page 234 of exhibit 1 was taken from the copy in the Army files and not the copy in this file.

Senator FERGUSON. Now "this file" is the Navy file?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand that the exhibits in No. 1 were made from the Army file and may not be true copies of what was delivered to the Navy officials, or to the President?

Captain KRAMER. I sometimes added penciled footnotes of that kind, sir. They were rather rare, however.

Senator FERGUSON. But this is an example of one, and is one?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11224] Senator FERGUSON. Now you must have thought at the time that the head of the secret service being transferred to South America was a very significant point.

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the reason for calling it to the attention of the various people that were to receive copies, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir. Primarily domestic intelligence would take action in the premises.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now when was that message delivered to OpNav, Admiral Stark, that is No. 7140, being the one in regard to the head of the secret service?

Captain KRAMER. That was included in the block delivered Saturday evening, which could not be delivered to Admiral Stark. He would have seen it the following morning.

Senator FERGUSON. At least it was delivered to the Secretary of the Navy and the White House, and to the various parties over at Admiral Wilkinson's that night?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. I believe, at least I have brought it out in previous testimony, it was also specifically delivered to the domestic Intelligence Branch of the Navy, who saw occasional items of that nature bearing on domestic intelligence, Japanese agents, their movements and activities.

[11225] Senator FERGUSON. How do you come to that conclusion? Is there something on this particular sheet that would indicate that?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, that is my distinct recollection, however, that I did that.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, Now we will go to 7141. That is the next sheet in the Navy file, is it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And is that in Exhibit 1?

Captain KRAMER. According to my notes on this work sheet, it is not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read that?

Captain KRAMER (reading):

From Washington

To Tokyo

5 December 1941

Serial 1262.

From Kurusu to Secretary Tasiro.

Re your 896. I feel confident that you are fully aware of the importance of the intelligence set-up in view of the present condition of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. I would like very much to have Terasaki, who would be extremely difficult to suddenly replace because of certain circumstances, remain here until we are definitely enlightened as to the end of the negotiations. I beg of you as a personal [11226] favor to me to make an effort along these lines. I shall have him assume his post as soon as his work here is disposed of.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the reference to? To what message?

Captain KRAMER. To the one preceding this, 7140, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is 1245. In the book it is 1245?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, 896.

Senator FERGUSON. 896 at the bottom?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They have got both numbers, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now when was that message delivered to the parties that you have named?

Captain KRAMER. The same remarks that I made regarding 7140 apply in respect to 7141.

Senator FERGUSON. So that was delivered Saturday evening?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The next is 7142, is it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that one in Exhibit 1?

Captain KRAMER. On page 237, yes, sir.

[11227] Senator FERGUSON. The message at the bottom of the page?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you just read it? It is short.

Captain KRAMER (reading):

From Tokyo
To Washington
December 6, 1941.
(Urgent)
#897
Re your #1268.

The footnote indicates that is not available.

To Counselor Iguchi from Kameyama.

What I meant in paragraph 2 of my #867—which footnote indicates is SIS #25640 regarding the destruction of codes and one code machine in the Washington office—was that of the two sets of "B" code machines with which your office is equipped, you are to burn one set and for the time being to continue the use of the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Now this footnote was delivered to the various recipients of these messages on Saturday evening the 6th, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, as part of this message.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And where will we find 25640? Do you know where that one is?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, I could not find it readily [11228] without the JD file number.

Senator FERGUSON. And the JD file number is not on it?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

[11229] Senator FERGUSON. But the gist is here regarding the destruction of codes and one code machine in the Washington office?

Captain KRAMER. That I would guess offhand—and it is probably more than a guess—is the Tokyo directive of December 3 regarding the destruction of cryptographic aids in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. It clearly indicated there was to be one code machine left in Washington?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All others were to be destroyed?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So we knew that on Saturday evening?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Incidentally that is the first time we knew they had more than one machine here.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was delivered Saturday evening with the 13 parts?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, take the next page.

Captain KRAMER. The next page is the first part of the 14-part note.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now 7142 is Army 25835?

[11230] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How does the Army number get on the Navy file here?

Captain KRAMER. That was an Army translation, and was so numbered before being delivered to my section.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when we come to the 13 parts, they are in exhibit 1, but they have no Army file numbers on them, do they?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. We had no Army file numbers on any Navy translations.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that all of the 13 parts of the 14-part message were translated in the Navy Department?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir, except for the rough translations, some of which were done by the Army and sent to the Navy for typing up.

Senator FERGUSON. But if they were done in the rough no number was put on them?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, only our number was used.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, let us come to the fourteenth part. It was made in the Navy also?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11231] Senator FERGUSON. So all of the parts were made in the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All of the 14 parts have got "JD-1 #7143"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Indicating that that is the Navy number?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, we will go to the next page after the fourteenth part in the Navy file, and we get a number 7144.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a Navy translation?

Captain KRAMER. That is an Army translation, 7144 being the Navy file number of it.

Senator FERGUSON. How does it come that the stamp, as we get back on these other Army files—here is the stamp 25835, is it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). And no stamp is on the one that we were referring to, 7144?

[11232] Captain KRAMER. I cannot account for that, except that it must have been a clerical error on that particular copy.

Senator FERGUSON. The leaving off of the Army number?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when was this message in 7144 delivered?

Captain KRAMER. According to my study it was the first of the block that was delivered sometime between my departure for the State Department 9:30 Sunday morning and my return at about 10:20 Sunday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the message that is in exhibit 1, known as not to use a stenographer or typist?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The next number.

Now, you claim that that is the dividing line, because there they were in the book and they were in numbers, and that gives you the idea you delivered the 13 parts and not the pilot message, because the pilot message is not in the group, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir. It is also my distinct recollection, in that connection that there were no file numbers beyond the 13 parts of the 14-part note delivered that Saturday night.

[11233] Senator FERGUSON. Now who would put these file numbers on these pages in the Navy file?

Captain KRAMER. My chief yeoman, normally.

Senator FERGUSON. What is his name?

Captain KRAMER. Bryant. He applied these numbers just before we made up the folders for delivery.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I notice that some of them are in stamped ink and some of them have been copied over. How do you account for that?

Captain KRAMER. That copying over is apparently a development of the last several years, subsequent to Pearl Harbor by the present custodians of these files.

Senator FERGUSON. Not by Bryant, but by the present custodian?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why he would do that?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know, unless he was simply doodling, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How is that?

The CHAIRMAN. Simply what?

Captain KRAMER. Doodling.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, you find him doodling on these official Navy files, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Presumably he was making a study that began to bore him.

[11234] Senator FERGUSON. Well, it makes it rather difficult to read what was under this doodling, does it not?

Captain KRAMER. It is perhaps possible to get another file number, if it exists, with our stamp not written over, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that particular one did not have the stamp of the Army although it was translated by the Army?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, go to the next file, 7145, which has not been doodled.

It has a stamp 25850, does it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that in our book, Exhibit 1, here?

Captain KRAMER. That is page 248 of Exhibit 1.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the 1 o'clock message?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what is the next page? 7146?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that has a number 25853, the Army number?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that in Exhibit 1?

Captain KRAMER. On page 248, sir.

[11235] Senator FERGUSON. That is 908?

Captain KRAMER. That is the second one on page 248.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we will come to the next one, 7147, and that has been written over, and it is difficult to read what was under it, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is Army #25854?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that in the book?

Captain KRAMER. Page 249, sir.

[11236] Senator FERGUSON. That is the top message, or the destruction of the last remaining machine message?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is this last number on here, the SIS number?

Captain KRAMER. 25858, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what that is? It is in pencil.

Captain KRAMER. Presumably it was omitted from this copy at the time it was typed up by Army, but since it appears in Exhibit 1 presumably it was determined shortly after delivery of this message that it applied to their file number and it was phoned over to us.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether that is in the book?

Captain KRAMER. It is on page 249.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the one preceding in the book but not the one preceding in your official Navy files?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now in the Navy files it is back how many?

Captain KRAMER. It is ahead four numbers, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Ahead four numbers?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, in the Navy files.

[11237] Senator FERGUSON. Well, let us go to the next.

Captain KRAMER. The next one is the so-called hidden word message, sir, translated by Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. That is at the top of page 258, is it not—or 253?

Captain KRAMER. 251, I believe, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. 251. And what is the Army number on that one?

Captain KRAMER. It was a Navy translation, and we normally, in fact almost never had an Army file number on a Navy translation.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there was no Army file number on that. Now the next one is a photostatic duplicate of it?

Captain KRAMER. That is apparently an Army copy. I do not know who made that photostat.

Senator FERGUSON. You know nothing about that photostat that is in there?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact there are two photostats.

Captain KRAMER. There are two photostats.

Senator FERGUSON. Now what is the next one?

Captain KRAMER. That is the so-called pilot message, Navy File 7149, Tokyo serial 901.

Senator FERGUSON. Now on the bottom of this message [11238] there is scratched out in pencil "not available." That is in re 902?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is scratched out. Now your file number on that is 7149?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Army file is 25838?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now that is the pilot message?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now just look at the Army one next to it. By the way, when this file is made up is it made up from the bottom up or from the top down? Which is the earlier paper, 7150 or 7149?

Captain KRAMER. 7149, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. 7149?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now the next sheet of paper, the Army number is 25857. 25838 was the pilot message?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the next number beyond it is 25857?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11239] Senator FERGUSON. Going the other way, the number was the so-called hidden word message, one of them, and then we come to the Army file No. 25854, is that right?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now how do you account for the fact that you have an Army No. 25838 between the two sheets 25854 and 25857?

Captain KRAMER. I do not account for that, sir. I know in a general way that the Army system of numbering was quite different than ours at that time, in fact similar to what we had used a year or two before. In other words, I believe it was their practice to assign a file number at about the time a translation was to be worked on and completed. It would, therefore, be quite possible that a much later file number would be completed, because being a short message and delivered prior to an earlier file number which might require considerable work in clearing up garbles, and so forth, in translation.

Senator FERGUSON. But if the testimony later should show that this pilot message was seen by an Army officer, translated by 2 o'clock on Saturday, you would not want any of these hypothetical things you have stated to indicate that it had not been sent to the Navy in the regular channels and as translated on the 6th, would you?

[11240] Captain KRAMER. Not necessarily; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now let us try and find the next number as nearly as we can to 25838 Army instead of 25854.

Captain KRAMER. I have an indication on my study of an Army file number 25835, which is Navy file No. 7142, appearing on page 237 of exhibit 1.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now let us come back to 7142, and that appears before any of the 14 parts of the 14-part message, does it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; it does, because that block was arranged chronologically by my section. The block 7138 through 7143 runs chronologically with the dates of originator, December 3, December 5, December 5, December 5, December 6, and December 6.

Senator FERGUSON. Now there isn't any doubt that this pilot message is shown to have been translated December 6, 1941, which is Saturday, is that true?

Captain KRAMER. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. The only reason why you say that the pilot message was delivered Sunday morning is due to the fact that in the Navy book it appears after the 14-part message and after the 1 o'clock message, and therefore you came to the conclusion that it must have been delivered [11241] Sunday instead of Saturday?

Captain KRAMER. That is the sole reason, Senator, based on the practice in my office of disseminating these things as soon as we got them.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now I want you to look at this pilot message—and that is 7149 Navy and 25838 Army?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now this is the original file of the OP-20-GL. What does that mean?

Captain KRAMER. That is the designation of the section having present custody of this file, sir. In the days about Pearl Harbor it was in the custody of section 20-GZ.

Senator FERGUSON. Now in that same book, or set of papers, we have on the outside of it "JD-1: 7001-7500"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that you started your books on the 100 numbers?

Captain KRAMER. When I had custody of these files they were started with an even number, sir. We have started this file with 7000. There has been apparently some regrouping of these in later custodian's hands.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand then that all of the JD book 6501 to 7000—by the way, so that this record may be clear, what you call a file is the intercepted decoded [11242] messages?

Captain KRAMER. The translations; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The translation is really the file?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. For each of these translations there is another file with the work sheets.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there a work sheet for these exhibits which you have here, that you have been given?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; there is a work sheet file for each translation prepared by Navy. Just what the Army files are in that respect I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would that file come over when this pilot message came over from the Army?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; not at all.

Senator FERGUSON. That would not come over and should be in the Army file?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So someone apparently has remade these files and put on the top 7001, and it should be on the bottom of this other file?

Captain KRAMER. That is my recollection of the way those files were maintained when I had charge of the section. It is probable that Chief Ship's Clerk Bryant can give more specific information on that point, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now what is this sheet [11243] of paper in this file? Is this the so-called JD-1:7001?

Captain KRAMER. 7001; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, 7001. And there is nothing on it, except almost in the center, typewritten, "No initials. JD-1:7001 appear cancelled."

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On the bottom of it in pencil and not in ink, or not in stamp, are the figures "7001"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now if an original sheet was made up at the time for that number it should have a stamped 7001, should it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that stamp was in red ink?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now how do you account for this 7001 having only a pencil memorandum on it?

Captain KRAMER. That blank file number is a sheet inserted by the yeoman who had custody of the files, who added at the bottom of the sheet in pencil obviously—

Senator FERGUSON. (interposing). Now wait. Of your own knowledge do you know this?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; only from the fact that I recognize his handwriting as being very similar and I believe identical with that of my chief yeoman at that time, Bryant.

[11244] Senator FERGUSON. Where is Bryant now?

Captain KRAMER. I believe he is in this room, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when did you first learn that there had been a blank sheet of paper with the exception of what we have read in that file?

Captain KRAMER. I first learned, Senator, a week ago Saturday that there was not only this blank—

Senator FERGUSON. Just stick to this now.

The CHAIRMAN. Let him answer.

Captain KRAMER. Not only this blank file, but a half dozen or more other blank files in the 1941 translation file, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, I will put the question again.

When did you first learn that there was a vacant place in these numbers, and that 7001 had this sheet in it?

Captain KRAMER. From first-hand knowledge is what I was testifying to.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, first-hand knowledge.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just recently?

Captain KRAMER. Just recently, yes, sir. I have heard about this blank file, of course, for a year or more past.

[11245] Senator FERGUSON. Who had custody of these books that could have put this sheet in?

Captain KRAMER. My chief yeoman, Bryant, primarily, who inserted them in that file, although my officer assistant, Lieutenant Harrison, might and did at times earlier in the year, do so, or an assistant yeoman in training by the name of Densford might well have done it as part of his assistance to my chief yeoman.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell us if there are any other blank sheets, we will call it blank because there are not translations in this book, that are not initialed, or dated?

Captain KRAMER. Not that I am aware of, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All others, if they are blank they are dated, and initialed?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the only one not dated and not initialed, is this 7001.

Captain KRAMER. On that point I have testified that earlier in the year Lieutenant Harrison whom I have referred to, used these files in preparing his gists, that if he in the process of preparing the daily gists discovered a duplication, an extra part of a multipart message that had previously been assigned a file number, he would have [11246] removed that extra part, canceled the file number and combined it with the earlier file number of that multipart message, and apparently, in fact obviously, from what appears in these files, in doing so, he wrote the blank file notation out in handwriting and inserted it in the file he was not a typist, in my recollection, except of the "hunt and peck" variety.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, answering my question, I want to know whether there is any other page in this book where there is simply a typewritten notation and with the number in pencil rather than in long-hand and initialed and dated?

Captain KRAMER. Not that I am aware of, sir; no sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any reason why the committee should not have seen this so-called blank page with this memorandum on it that I have read prior to bringing it here in the last few days?

Captain KRAMER. I am not familiar, Senator, with current policy.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking if you know of anything.

Captain KRAMER. I do not; no sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it any part of your duty to know.

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

[11247] Mr. RICHARDSON. I have a question or two, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel wishes to pursue the inquiry.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, I wish you would turn your mind again to the Japanese words which were contained in the original winds code broadcast.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We have been talking here a great deal about the phrase "Higashi no kaze ame."

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Has there ever been the slightest question anywhere by anybody as to what the English translation of those words was?

Captain KRAMER. Not that I am aware of, no, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that translation was "East wind rain"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, "East wind rain" either in the Japanese language or the English language, by itself, was of no significance, was it?

Captain KRAMER. Not without knowing the code referred to, no, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There had to be some additional Japanese language in the instrument which set up the code that placed an understanding that was to follow the use [11248] of the words "East wind rain"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when you turn to the Japanese language contained in that dispatch, which is shown in Exhibit 142 under date of November 6, 1941—do you find it?

Referring now to the dispatch sent to the commander in chief?

Captain KRAMER. Referring to the table of contents, sir, I can probably find it more readily.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There is no paging on this thing.

Captain KRAMER. I have it.

[11249] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, that document, as I understand it, purports to be a document sent to the MacArthur staff in Tokyo about November 6, 1941, and as I am advised it sets forth under the title—

The CHAIRMAN. You don't mean 1941?

Mr. RICHARDSON. 1941 is what it says at the top.

The CHAIRMAN. To the MacArthur staff in Manila?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No. It recites here, November 6, 1941, from the War Department to the MacArthur staff. That may be an error.

Mr. MURPHY. I believe you find that it should be 1945.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is of no importance because it refers to Circular 2353. Does it not, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And Circular 2353 was the instrument that fixed the original winds code?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The winds code which Captain Safford says related to the winds execute which he testified concerning?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, following the phrase "Circular 2353" are some 16 lines of Japanese?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11249] Mr. RICHARDSON. And under the figure 1, about the middle of the Japanese phraseology in that dispatch, occurs, together with other words, the words "Higashi no kaze ame"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The words which you have identified as meaning "east wind rain"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, in order to find out the meaning that the Japanese agents would get from reading from an execute under that code dispatch you would have to go back into the language which preceded the phrase "Higashi no kaze ame," would you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And when you do go back you find, do you not, in the fifth line of the Japanese words, the word "wagahoo"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And then there follows some nine Japanese words?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Ending with the word "wa"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it is true, is it not, Captain, that the meaning of that phrase starting with "wagahoo" and [11250] ending in "wa," constitutes in this dispatch which fixed the code, as to what, so far as the United States was concerned, the phrase "east wind rain," "Higashi no kaze ame," was intended to mean to Japanese agents who read the code execute?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what is the definition of the words commencing with "wagahoo" and ending with "wa"?

Captain KRAMER. "Wagahoo" is the Japanese word literally translated meaning "our side", or in better English, "we".

"No" is a preposition identical in character with our prepositions, a possessive.

"Gaikoo" means "foreign".

"Kankei" means "relations".

In other words, the first four words means "Our foreign relations".

"Kiken ni hinsuru" means "are approaching danger", "kiken" meaning "danger", "hin", meaning "approaching", or "in close proximity to", something of that nature.

"Baai" means simply "when".

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the definition would be "When our foreign relations are approaching danger"?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there any word there or any permissible [11251] translation which would give effect to such a word as "war"?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, except an evaluation which would be stretched to mean that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In other words, unless the phrase "our foreign relations are approaching danger" can be construed to mean "war" there is no "war" permissible under the Japanese translation of this dispatch?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And has there ever been any translation by any of the experts in Washington of that dispatch that differs materially from the translation which you have just given?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; there has not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And when you refer to the translation which appears in the translation which we received from the Asiatic Fleet which is shown in Exhibit 142 as 1 (c) the phrase—have you it before you?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The phrase contained in the dispatch which came to us from the Asiatic Fleet having reference to this same code establishment, the phrase is "If diplomatic relations are on the verge of being severed", do you, as a Japanese scholar, believe that that phrase "If diplomatic relations are on the verge of being severed", is a permissible translation of the Japanese words which you just read and [11252] which you interpreted as meaning "When our foreign relations are approaching danger"?

Captain KRAMER. That is a close proximity to it; yes, sir. It might be translated that way.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. So, Captain, it would be of no significance at all, would it, in determining whether a dispatch was construed to mean "war", it would be of no significance at all that the language of "Higashi no kaze ame" was used?

Captain KRAMER. Not "war"; no, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You would have to use those Japanese words I have just quoted simply as a flag to indicate that here was an east-wind rain message?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And then to determine what east-wind rain meant you would be completely confined to the meaning which had been interpreted of the Japanese language that you have just spelled out for us word by word in the original dispatch creating the code?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So I ask you, again, anyone looking at a dispatch and seeing the words "Higashi no kaze ame" on it would not have progressed in his understanding of what the dispatch might convey by way of meaning unless he went [11253] back to the original Japanese words in the original code message and obtained a translation of what these words between "wagahoo" and "ni", mean in that original dispatch?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, one thing further. There has been some suggestion here that this blank page which the Senator from Michigan examined you concerning, 7001, that that blank page, it has been suggested here, might act as a telltale to the abstraction from the file of what is asserted may have been a wind execute message and, to be more specific, and, as I understand the inference in the testimony, simply for the purpose of bringing you to the point of my next question, the suggestion is that this message which you and Captain Safford have testified came in either on the morning of the 4th of December or the 5th of December, that went to Admiral Noyes, may have been the message which when it was abstracted from the file was succeeded in that file by that master page 7001, which, as the Senator pointed out, has no stamp on it and no longhand writing.

Now, did any dispatch ever go into your files of which these files are a part where the dispatch had not originally come through your office for transmission to the proper recipients?

Captain KRAMER. None, sir.

[11254] Mr. RICHARDSON. And if by reason of a special arrangement entered into by Admiral Noyes, as testified to by Captain Safford, a message was to come from the teletype and be transmitted direct

to Admiral Noyes for dissemination by Admiral Noyes under such system as he might authorized, could there be in your files at any time properly a copy of that message?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, unless by some chance it was sent back to my office for additional dissemination.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would mean, sir, would it not, that it would have to have come back to you from Admiral Noyes, or someone under his authority, the message which Captain Safford says was to go direct to Admiral Noyes and be disseminated by Admiral Noyes without reference to you?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would the return of such a message to you under those circumstances have been in the routine, or would it have been highly irregular?

Captain KRAMER. It would have been unusual in that that type of message was the only instance in which in the set-up directed by Admiral Noyes it ever occurred.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain—

[11255] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like before we proceed further, to read a memorandum—

The CHAIRMAN. Unless there are some further questions of the captain—

Senator FERGUSON. I have a question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This has to do with my examination.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would like to read a memorandum furnished me by Commander Baecher in response to a request made for information regarding the handling of the ALUSNA Batavia dispatch O31030 of December 1941, as to which, just for the information of the committee, I will suggest there has been some reference here, as to the possibility that someone may have read this dispatch from Batavia before the so-called winds execute message came in, and put on the winds message as a result the definition which the Batavia dispatch contained.

The information is this:

(a) As previously stated, the time of receipt of the above dispatch was 040621 GCT 4 December 1941 which was 1:21 a. m. 4 December 1941, local time.

(b) The time of decoding of this dispatch was 050645 GCT, which was 1:45 a. m. 5 December 1941 (local time). [11256] The 24-hour lapse between receipt and decoding is accounted for by the routing designation which was "deferred", the lowest priority in handling.

2. No further information is available regarding the exact time of delivery to a naval officer inasmuch as no written record was kept of delivery times.

That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. In answer to some of Mr. Richardson's questions, and I think sometime ago you stated that the Japanese in their language were accustomed to understatements. That is, they described things weaker than we would.

Captain KRAMER. Often that is the case, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Could that account for the difference here between "war" and the other expressions?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, not in this case, I do not think. However, as I pointed out in the previous testimony in the case of the Dutch East Indies, later on in the message——

Senator FERGUSON. I think you have described that before.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, I have.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one more group of questions on [11257] where these numbers are.

I wish you would look at No. 142. Have you got that page? I can bring it to you.

Go to 7119. Your number, JD number.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have that on the page?

Captain KRAMER. I do, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that is translated—the date is not significant, when the message came in. You can't tell anything about its order that way?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Because you have got December 2, December 3, and then December 2 down under 7122, 7123, and 7124. So let's go to the date of translation 12-6-41. Navy, wasn't it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The next one, 7120, translated 12-6-41, Army; 7121, 12-6-41 Army. Now, following, 7122 12-5-41, Navy. So that is a Navy.

The next one is 7123, 12-6-41, Navy. There you have a Navy translation on the 5th between two Navy translations on the 6th. Isn't that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you have 7124, translated [11258] 12-7-41, Army. So you have a Navy of the 5th between an Army of the 7th and the Navy of the 6th; is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So, it wasn't anything unusual to have a number out of its sequence, was it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you will find all through this, the same thing as I checked on this one.

Captain KRAMER. If you will notice, Senator, from the dividing line just below which is 7110 and the Roman numeral V——

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. The chronological dates run in order from November 18 down to file number 7123, December 3. There should be another dividing line at that point indicating what was disseminated in that batch. All the dates of translation in that batch are December 5 or 6. The 5 would indicate that those were translated late afternoon or evening of the 5th, and they were not disseminated until some of the first translations the morning of the 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. Go over to 7090.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There you have 7.

[11259] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There you have a Navy, 12-5-41. Another Navy 12-5-41. The next one 7092, Navy, 12-41. 7095, Navy, 12-5-41.

So you have a 4 in between two 5's.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The same explanation there?

Captain KRAMER. All that block on that page is of similar character. They are 4 or 5 dates. That block carries through the dividing line after file No. 7109.

Senator FERGUSON. But, there is no dividing line on here that I can see.

Captain KRAMER. On the next page there is, sir, below 7109.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, yes. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 252 of the intercepts, there is a message about which no witness has testified. We have had no word on it. That is exhibit 1.

There was a statement in the press at one time quoting Senator Ferguson, I believe, to the effect that that referred to the European war.

I do not think that we should come to a close of the [11260] hearings without something on that message.

Captain, before you leave, do you know anything about that Budapest message?

Captain KRAMER. My study, Mr. Murphy, the other day for Senator Ferguson, did not extend to file No. 7184. It could be readily done in the next few minutes, I think, since the file is here.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't think the witness understands your question.

Mr. MURPHY. The particular message I am referring to is from Budapest to Tokyo, December 7, 1941, No. 104.

Captain KRAMER. That is the one.

Mr. MURPHY. On the page 252:

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

Relayed to Berlin.

And then:

Army 25866.

JD 7184.

As I said, there has been a reference in the papers quoting Senator Ferguson as saying that that apparently referred to the European war. Am I correct?

[11261] Senator FERGUSON. I don't know what the papers may have quoted.

All I do know, and will state on the record now, is that as I read that message it is the war between Great Britain and Hungary and has nothing to do whatever with Pearl Harbor or the Japanese-American war, or Japanese-British war.

Mr. MURPHY. It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, before we close, we ought to have a definite statement on that, so we can dismiss it from our thinking.

Senator FERGUSON. I think it is clear from the page itself what they were talking about. There was a declaration of war delivered by the British to the Hungarian Government through the Japanese.

Mr. GEARHART. What is the fact? Was war declared on Hungary on the 7th?

Senator FERGUSON. That is true—war was declared between Great Britain and Hungary on the 7th. I do think we ought to have testimony on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Captain KRAMER. Mr. Murphy, a hasty study in the last minute on that point would indicate that Navy File Nos. 7152 run chronologically from November 15, 1941, through December 7, 1941, which is the date of translation [11262] of the message you were talking about.

Immediately following that block is one or more translations dated December 8, 1941. That would indicate to me from further study, my first reaction would be that it was translated by Army on the 7th and disseminated at least so far as Navy is concerned, probably the afternoon of the 7th.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, there has been a request made that the record be cleared on that. Apparently it referred to the European war, and I think the record should be filled in in regard to that gap so that we can dismiss that from our thinking.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, you testified that you had no intention of calling your memorandum to the attention of this committee until you were asked a question about it. Do I remember your testimony correctly in that regard?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Why had you reached that conclusion? Because you thought the paper was unimportant?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; since I was here to testify myself regarding the fact.

Mr. GEARHART. But you have referred to other notes, from which you refreshed your memory, have you not?

[11263] Captain KRAMER. The only notes or papers of any kind that I have referred to are papers since I arrived in Washington around the 6th of December of last year, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Of last year, you say?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Haven't you looked at any papers since you have been here on this particular mission?

Captain KRAMER. I have not.

Mr. GEARHART. Since you have been here to appear as a witness?

Captain KRAMER. None, except as I have previously testified, those shown to me last summer as exhibits before the Hewitt Board of Investigation.

Mr. GEARHART. From the examination that you have had on the subject of this memorandum, it would appear that the members of this committee considered that memorandum a very important document in this proceeding. Isn't that the impression you have gotten after listening to all the questions?

Captain KRAMER. The impression I have gained, Mr. Gearhart, is that apparently at least some members of the committee attach a great deal of importance to the impressions I had of circumstances surrounding Pearl Harbor at the time I prepared that memorandum.

[11264] Mr. GEARHART. Circumstances that are at variance to a certain degree between the testimony you have given before and the testimony you have given now?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. I noticed in the testimony of Captain Safford, that he referred to some messages, intercepts, and so forth, that had not theretofore been introduced in evidence in this proceeding; do you recall that?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you during the course of your testimony referred to any messages of any kind that are not already in evidence or were not in evidence before you mentioned them?

Captain KRAMER. I do not believe I have, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you know of any messages, intercepts of any kind, that have not been introduced in evidence in this proceeding?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, I do not, with the possible exception that from my own memory there are certain things in back traffic of a year or more before that simply parallel and throw some light on interpretation to be put on messages of a nature similar to those immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.

I refer, for example, to such things as messages [11265] concerning ship movements.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, there are some messages on ship movements that have been put in evidence. Do you believe there are others on ship movements that have been withheld from the record?

Captain KRAMER. I do not believe that those in evidence extend back before the beginning of 1941, although I may be mistaken in that respect.

The 1st of January 1941, I mean.

Mr. GEARHART. The ones we have been referring to are rather recent. December 6, 1941. Referring to the exhibits that appear on page 14 of Exhibit 2. Do you mean that there are others that are closer, during the last week, that are not included in Exhibit 2?

Captain KRAMER. Not that I am aware, no. I have not studied the files to determine that point.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you have any in mind that up to now have been withheld from the record of this hearing?

Captain KRAMER. None that I know of; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You are familiar with the President's order of November 7, directed to all chief executives of all executive departments, agencies, commissions, and bureaus, including the General Chiefs of Staff?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[11266] Mr. GEARHART. You are familiar with the fact that it is made the duty of every officer of the Army and Navy and whether presently in the service or out of the service to volunteer any information that may be of importance to this committee?

Captain KRAMER. Fully aware of that; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, if you knew of the injunction the President had imposed upon you to reveal to us whatever evidence may be

brought to your attention, why didn't you call that letter or memorandum that you prepared when in the South Pacific with Admiral Halsey to the attention of the committee?

Captain KRAMER. I considered that by no stretch of the imagination as being considered as better testimony than I could give first-hand now, or better than I had given before previous hearings, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you think it was your duty under that order of the President to state that the testimony you were giving at that time was not the testimony you would have given had you been called at the time you prepared the memorandum?

Captain KRAMER. I am not at all certain I would have given that version in the detail I did if I had been called to testify at that time. That memorandum was pre- [11267] pared under some degree of pressure without any particular attempt to rehash or refresh my memory on it, purely and simply to give Admiral Halsey a broad picture of the situation in Washington at that time, and was not intended to be as meticulously accurate as I could make it at that time.

Mr. GEARHART. Certainly you had no idea of leading Admiral Halsey to conclusions that did not conform to the facts, did you?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. There was no question on that whatsoever raised during our conversations since he simply read that memorandum and we discussed no details concerning it.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, certainly you wanted to be accurate when you were relaying information to your commander, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. Certainly.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, did you not at that time prepare it with the utmost possible care in order that your commander would not be deceived?

Captain KRAMER. I did, sir, keeping in mind the pressure under which I was working to do so, and my previous remarks on this point.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you made every effort at that time to make that memorandum represent your then recollection [11268] of what had transpired during the days preceding Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And you also prepared that paper with the fact in mind that it might sometime aid you in the case of you eventually appearing as a witness subsequently?

Captain KRAMER. Would you repeat that?

Mr. GEARHART. As an aid to your memory in any subsequent proceeding?

Captain KRAMER. At no time, whatsoever, Mr. Gearhart, did I have the conception in mind in preparing that memorandum. In fact, my expectation was when I prepared it that I would destroy it within a few days and prepare the deposition or affidavit which I had promised Admiral Halsey to do.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, there is one other question I want to ask you, and that is about all I have.

Do you remember of having intercepted any messages whatsoever from the civilian government of the Philippines to Washington?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir; I don't believe I ever have seen a message from the High Commissioner or the Philippine government to Washington, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You say you have never seen one?

[11269] Captain KRAMER. I may have been shown one at some time, as an exhibit, or otherwise. I recall none now. I was not customarily shown such messages, however.

Mr. GEARHART. When you are monitoring for Japanese exchanges, you naturally pick up those other exchanges, don't you?

Captain KRAMER. No; our monitoring system kept entirely clear of United States Government or dependency circuits.

Mr. GEARHART. You know nothing then, of a short-wave telephone call between any of the high officials of the Philippine government and of the State Department in the early days of December, December 6, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. Nothing, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you ever hear it discussed among those with whom you were associated?

Captain KRAMER. I may have. I don't recall having heard it previously to your mentioning it.

Mr. GEARHART. Who would intercept messages of that kind if any occurred?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know.

Mr. GEARHART. Wasn't the Government monitoring everything that went through the air, the Army, the FCC?

Captain KRAMER. I don't know what the rest of the Government was monitoring, sir. I only have in a general [11270] way, though I think a fairly comprehensive way, knowledge of what our Navy monitoring system was covering, and to a less degree what the Army monitoring system on foreign intercepts, was covering.

Mr. GEARHART. Was your station in Virginia equipped to pick up all short-wave broadcasts?

Captain KRAMER. I do not know, sir.

[11271] Mr. GEARHART. Would it require different kind of equipment to pick up the dot-dash than oral discussion?

Captain KRAMER. I believe the same radio sets can be used for both, sir, depending on the range. It would require different appurtenances, however.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you have as one of your responsibilities the transmittal of messages to our own commands?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You had nothing to do with the transmittal of messages say to the Naval Stations on the Pacific Coast?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Or to the Coast Guard, for instance, that might be in charge of harbor defenses in different places on the Pacific Coast.

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Who would have to do with that?

Captain KRAMER. Presumably some division of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, possibly War Plans, though I am not certain on that point, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I propound one additional question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[11272] Senator LUCAS. Captain Kramer, there has been much speculation and much conjecture as to the conversation you had with

the foreign service officer of Secretary Knox on Sunday morning, December 7, when you were delivering important magic messages to the Secretary.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, as I understand from your previous testimony you were surprised when you learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. At about a quarter to 2 in the afternoon, yes, sir, very much so.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, there was nothing in the statement that you made to the foreign service officer of Secretary Knox which could give him any impression that you knew or believed that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor at 7 or 7:30 in the morning?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Whatever you said at that time to this service officer merely directed or called attention to the difference in time at the various places in the Pacific in line with what the 1 o'clock message called for?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir; that is it.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, when you first appeared here [11273] you gave in detail your record in the Navy, I don't recall whether anyone asked you about the decoration which you wear upon your breast.

Would you mind telling us what that indicates?

Captain KRAMER. It is not a decoration, sir. It is simply a badge, of pure gold, I understand, presented to me by the Navy Department in 1930 as a result of getting three legs, as required, on this badge, which is known as the Distinguished Marksman's Medal for rifle shooting.

The CHAIRMAN. Had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, none whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee thanks you for your forthright testimony and before you are excused the Chair would like to ask you if there is any other statement or information you have to submit to the committee bearing upon the Pearl Harbor situation which has not been elicited by the "few" questions that have been asked you during your examination.

Captain KRAMER. I think all knowledge I have of circumstances and details surrounding Pearl Harbor have been exhaustively elicited, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee thanks you, Captain, very much for your cooperation.

Captain KRAMER. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are excused.

(The witness was excused.)

[11274] Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I should like to present for examination Admiral Ingersoll.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Ingersoll, come around.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL R. E. INGERSOLL, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, will you state your name to the reporter, please?

Admiral INGERSOLL. R. E. Ingersoll, Admiral, U. S. Navy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you spell your last name, please, Admiral?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I-n-g-e-r-s-o-l-l.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How old are you, Admiral?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I shall be 63 the 24th of June of this year.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy of the United States?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I entered the Navy in March of 1901.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is your present rank?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Admiral, United States Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you in a very brief way detail what your progression has been in the Navy in point of assignments generally during the time you have been with the Navy?

[11275] Admiral INGERSOLL. I graduated from the Naval Academy in 1905. My sea service following graduation was 6 years in battleships, until 1911.

My next cruise was on the China Station, Asiatic Station, 1913 to 1916, most of which I was on the staff of the commander in chief.

From 1919 to 1921 I was the executive officer of the battleships *Connecticut* and *Arizona*.

My next cruise was in the command of a surveying ship.

From 1928 to 1930, I was at that time a captain and was chief of staff of the battle fleet, assistant chief of staff of the battle fleet, and also chief of staff of the United States Fleet.

In 1933 to 1935 I commanded the heavy cruisers *Augusta* and *San Francisco*.

From 1938 to 1940 I commanded a division of heavy cruisers in the Pacific Fleet.

And from the first of January 1942 until the middle of November 1944 I was the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, during this war.

At that date I was detached in order to command the Western Sea Frontier, which is my present duty, which includes command of the Nineteenth Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was your assignment during November and December 1941?

[11276] Admiral INGERSOLL. I was at that time Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Your immediate superior was Admiral Stark?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What were your duties generally speaking in that assignment, Admiral?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations had no duties assigned by law or by Navy regulations. By Executive order he was a member of the joint board which was the forerunner of the joint chiefs of staff. By office regulations prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations he had in general supervision of all officers of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. I had no original cognizance of any manner. As a matter of fact I had no office other than myself. And all heads of sections took up their questions with me usually before presenting them to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Once the Chief of Naval Operations had established a policy, I endeavored then to relieve him of all of the load that I could of the details in carrying out that policy, in signing papers and releasing

dispatches, I kept him informed of correspondence when I thought there was something of which he should be informed.

[11277] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you testified in connection with this Pearl Harbor matter first in what is called the Hart Investigation, did you not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And then after that you also testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are those the only two of the preceding investigations where you have been presented as a witness?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct. I talked to Admiral Hewitt when he passed through San Francisco. I am quite certain that he did not consider me as a witness but I did talk to him. I think he found I had no information which was of value to him for the particular thing he was looking for.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were not sworn except in the two investigations that I have referred to?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, I wish to say as far as counsel is concerned that I have made an examination of your testimony in both of these hearings. I have no further questions to ask you with reference to the general scope of your testimony in those hearings, which I think was rather full and comprehensive, but there has been developed in this [11278] case this matter, by previous witnesses, questions concerning the existence of what has been called an execute or the winds code.

When I speak of the winds code you know, do you not, what I am talking about?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Referring to page 429 of the testimony that you gave in the Hart investigation I should like to read you several questions and answers for the purpose of directing your attention to the particular subject there discussed. The question is this:

68. Q. During November or December, '41, you were cognizant of a special code which the Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform their nationals, concerning against what nations they would make aggressive movements, by means of a partial weather report?

A. Yes; I do recall such messages.

69. Q. Do you recall having seen, on or about 4 December, the broadcast directive, thus given, indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States?

A. Yes.

70. Q. Do you know why that particular information was not sent to the commander in chief, Pacific?

[11279] A. I do not know except it was probably supposed that the intercept stations in the Hawaiian Islands had also received this broadcast. However, it may have been because of a message sent in regard to the destruction of Japanese codes which had been sent to London and Washington which indicated that war with the United States and with Great Britain was imminent.

Keeping that testimony in mind I also wish to read to you testimony which you gave before the Naval Court. I read from page 825; question 33:

Q. I show you document 15 of Exhibit 63. This document has been popularly termed by some witnesses as the "winds code." State whether on or before

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7 December 1941, you had seen or been informed of the contents of this document.

A. Yes; I had been. I remember a message of this character.

34. Q. Will you relate the circumstances under which it came within your cognizance?

A. This document bears the inscription, "Translated on November 28". According to the system, I probably saw that on the following day, on the 29th. I also recall that at the time this message was received, or possibly the execution which is referred to in the message, that there [11280] was some difference of opinion among the translators as to just what was meant. Whether or not what I saw is exactly in the form as it appears there or not I am not certain. However, I did know definitely that they were setting up a code to be used in a weather broadcast.

35. Q. Can you state whether or not this information was discussed by you and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark?

A. I don't remember whether it was discussed with Admiral Stark or not.

36. Q. Did you take any action yourself as a result of the information that was contained in this document 15?

A. As far as I recall, we took no action on this dispatch at that time, because, as I have stated before, I believe there was some doubt in the minds of translators as to just what the translation should be.

37. Q. Can you remember in substance what this doubt was?

A. No; I do not recall, except that there was some doubt as to whether they had an exact translation—a difference of opinion among the translators as to what the Japanese words meant.

38. Q. Can you recall whether this difference of opinion related to the subject of a declaration of war or [11281] whether it related to severance of negotiations, or what the discussion was about—can you remember that?

A. No; I don't remember that point now.

39. Q. On or prior to 7 December 1941, did you receive any information as to whether or not code words had been received in the Navy Department which would put in effect the action contemplated by the so-called "winds" message?

A. Yes.

40. Q. Will you state the circumstances?

A. I recall that sometime I did see the messages which were supposed to put this "winds" message, translated on the 28th, into effect. I do not recall whether I saw them prior to December 7 or afterwards. If I saw them prior to December 7, I am quite sure that would have been considered confirmation of the information which had previously been received and which had been sent to the Fleet on December 3 or December 4 regarding the destruction of codes at London, Washington, Manila, and elsewhere, which indicated definitely that war was imminent.

41. Q. Can you recall whether or not on or before 7 December 1941, any action was taken in the office of Chief of Naval Operations as a result of the information contained in this execution of the "winds" code which you [11282] state you saw?

A. As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer, whether it was on or prior to December 7, or whether it was after December 7. If it was after December 7, there was no purpose in sending it out. If it was before December 7, I think it was not sent out because we considered that the dispatch sent to all Fleets regarding the destruction of codes was ample warning that war was imminent, or that diplomatic negotiations were going to be broken off, and that this dispatch was only confirmatory.

42. Q. Did you have any knowledge of the location of the dispatch or of the information which conveyed to you the execution of the "winds" code?

A. I have no knowledge regarding the location or disposition of any of these dispatches, as I have seen none of them since December 1941.

Now, Admiral, having called that testimony to your attention, what is your present recollection with reference to your having seen any dispatch which purported to be an execute of this winds code which it is agreed had been sent out by the Japanese and intercepted by our interceptors?

Admiral INGERSOLL. During these two investigations the circumstances under which I saw these things were not asked me. I recall

that I was informed by officers who [11283] came to my office and not by the means of the sheaf of messages which was distributed daily that a message supposed to be in the winds code had been received. I assumed that it was correct, that they had the proper thing. I thought that when I testified before Admiral Hart and I thought so when I testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry.

However, inasmuch as it had come in after the dispatches sent to the fleets regarding the destruction of codes it was of no importance. Simply confirmed what we had already sent out.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall whether your information with reference to this so-called execute came to you by reason of some writing in a dispatch or memorandum or by the telephone or orally?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No. I remember distinctly that officers came into my office with it. They had a piece of paper with them which purported to be a message sent in the wind code.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, there has been one discussion here, Admiral, that there were executed in connection with Captain McCollum's office a group of cards which cards were, as I recall, 3 or 4 inches square, and that they contained thereon the English words, so far as the United [11284] States was concerned, "East Wind Rain, United States", that there were no Japanese words on those cards at all, just the English words as relating the United States, the English words as relating to England, the English words as relating to Russia.

Now, do you recall having received one of those cards?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No; I did not have a set of cards.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the paper that you saw in your office was not one of those cards?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am not certain just what the paper was now that the officers brought in to me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you examine that paper?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It is possible that I might have, but I do not recall it specifically.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you speak Japanese?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Had you familiarized yourself with what an execute of the so-called winds code would be?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes; I knew that from the original dispatch which had come in in the latter part of November.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that paper that was brought in to you, that you saw, you accepted as an execute under the wind code?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I understood it to be a message [11285] which had been received in the wind code.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know what became of it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not know except that I know they took it out of my office when they left.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the officers when they went away took it with them?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever hear that made a subject of any conversation or reference thereafter as far as you can recollect?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No; and I paid no further attention to it because of the fact that it simply confirmed, if it was a genuine message,

it simply confirmed what we had already sent out regarding the destruction of codes, which was absolutely positive.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What would be the significance that you, as a high ranking naval officer, immediately below Admiral Stark, who was the head of naval operations, what was your then interpretation of the meaning of the information that an enemy, supposed, was burning, destroying their codes and diplomatic papers?

[11286] Admiral INGERSOLL. I considered that the information which we received regarding the destruction of the codes and which was sent out to the fleets as one of the two most important messages that were sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations during the entire period before Pearl Harbor, the other one being the dispatch stating that, "This is a war warning" in effect and that all hope of negotiations had broken off.

Now, the wording in that winds message did not say that we are going to be in a state of war or that hostilities now exist. It referred to a rupture of diplomatic negotiations or that the situation between the countries was becoming critical.

The importance of the messages regarding the destruction of the codes is this: If you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not necessarily have to burn your codes. The diplomats go home and they can pack up their codes with their dolls and take them home. Also, when you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not rupture consular relations. The consuls stay on.

Now, in this particular set of dispatches they not only told their diplomats in Washington and London to burn their codes but they told their consuls in Manila, in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Batavia to burn their codes and that did not [11287] mean a rupture of diplomatic negotiations, it meant war, and that information was sent out to the fleets as soon as we got it and it made no difference whether we ever got an execute from the winds after that or not, and that is why I think officers in high positions are vague about it. It did not make any difference.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You, then, as the second ranking officer in the Office of Naval Operations at the time you saw this execute, so-called, did not regard it as of primary importance as a basis for information to be sent to the field?

Admiral INGERSOLL. If it had been a truthful message in the winds code the most it could have done was to have confirmed what we had already sent out and it was not as positive that war was coming as we had sent out.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any recollection in your mind that this so-called execute, or any so-called execute had thereafter been determined to be what we may refer to as a false alarm?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I have since heard it but I did not know it at the time and I did not know it when I testified before the investigation of Admiral Hart and the Court of Inquiry.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you communicate the fact of the disclosure of this so-called execute to your chief, Admiral Stark?

[11288] Admiral INGERSOLL. I cannot recall definitely that I did or did not. I may have done so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Any message which came to your attention that you deemed of sufficient importance, it would have been your duty to have seen to it that your chief learned of that message?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It would have been.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you think it at all probable, Admiral, that the fact that you do not remember having acquainted Admiral Stark with the information you had as to this winds execute was because of the little importance you attached to that document?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think I should state it another way, that because of the little importance which I attach to it is the reason I have forgotten whether I did or did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know what officers brought it in to you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No; I cannot remember definitely.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there more than one?

Admiral INGERSOLL. There were several officers for whom it would have been a logical thing to do. There were half a dozen officers who might have brought it in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, let me ask you how definite your information is, Admiral, on when it was brought in, whether [11289] before or after December 7?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am not absolutely positive of that except that I am absolutely certain that it was after we had sent out the messages regarding the destruction of the codes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, in view of the startling commotion caused by the attack on the morning of the 7th it would be fair, would it not, to assume that your best recollection is that it came to you before the 7th?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think that is correct but I can not fix it definitely.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there more than one such so-called execute that was shown to you or discussed with you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I can only recall one occasion on which officers brought in a message to me of that character.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would there have been any duty after acquainting you with that information, a duty to also bring it to the attention of Admiral Stark?

Admiral INGERSOLL. They might have done so, but having brought it to my attention they would have trusted me to give it to him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it would have been your duty to do so?

Admiral INGERSOLL. If I had thought it was of sufficient importance. [11290]

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there any other recollection that you have which throws any light on this so-called winds execute that you are able to state to the committee at this time?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No; none that I can think of.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, in view of my preliminary statement that after an examination I feel that all the other questions I might otherwise want to ask the admiral are covered by his earlier testimony which has been twice presented and is in the record which will be of record in this committee also, I have no further questions to ask Admiral Ingersoll at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has no questions. Congressman Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark?

Mr. CLARK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, there is a message on page 251 of Exhibit 1. Will you hand that to the admiral, please? [11291] Did you ever see that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Which number, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. On the top of page 251, Admiral. Do you recall ever having seen that message?

Admiral INGERSOLL. You mean the one stating:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. I am wondering if there would be any possibility that you might have confused that with some other message, Admiral; that came into the Navy Department on the 7th of December and was apparently submitted to the receivers of magic.

Admiral INGERSOLL. If that came in on the 7th of December I would have normally seen it on the morning of the 8th. I do not recall this particular dispatch now.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I am wondering. You said you saw one winds intercept and that is something that might appear to be a winds intercept and I am wondering if you saw that or if you saw something other than that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not recall it sufficiently well to remember what it referred to, what countries it referred to or the status.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you do not have any recollection now, [11292] then, do you, of what the winds intercept which you feel you saw or had called to your attention, you do not know what country that referred to either, do you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Except that the winds code required definite answers in accordance with the code and as I recall now the general tenor was in accordance with the winds code.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean all three countries?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Or one or two?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think it was all three countries, as I recall it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you say that it was received after the messages had gone out to destroy the codes?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Oh, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You sent those messages out on what date?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I believe the date was the third or fourth, I have forgotten which. It is in the record.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, do you have any recollection in addition to this particular officer handing you—or in calling it to your attention, what did he do after?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I have every recollection that they took it away with them when they left my office and that I never saw it again.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you one of the persons who ever saw the [11293] magic on the regular distribution?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes; I saw them. They were brought to my office.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, do you have any recollection of ever seeing anything like this in magic form in the dispatch case that contained the magic?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not recall having seen it and from what I know of the system it would not have been in the magic because it would have been a copy of a broadcast in plain Japanese.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, what—

Admiral INGERSOLL. It would not have gone through the magic set-up system.

Mr. MURPHY. In fact, if it had not gone through the magic system it would not get into Captain Kramer's hands for distribution as magic, would it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No.

Mr. MURPHY. And if it had not gone through Captain Kramer for distribution as magic it would not be in the magic files, would it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I don't know enough about the magic files to know. It would undoubtedly have gone through his section for translation.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, there has been testimony here [11294] that the Chief of Naval Operations and apparently his group in Washington participated in a frame-up of Admiral Kimmel. Do you know of anything, of any kind of evidence of anything like that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I have not the slightest bit of evidence of anything of that kind, that anything of that kind occurred or was contemplated or was talked about.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, there is a Navy Captain that has testified here to a frame-up. You don't know anything about any frame-up in the Navy, do you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I certainly do not and Kimmel was my candidate for that job when he was appointed. I mean by that when my opinion was asked I suggested Kimmel.

Mr. MURPHY. There has also been testimony here to the effect that someone in the Navy Department, and on one occasion the witness said he had a suspicion of Admiral Stark, although he changed it once or twice, but at any rate at one time he had a suspicion of Admiral Stark that if there was a winds execute message that they had ordered it to be destroyed because they had failed to notify Kimmel, that they were hiding their failure in ordering the destruction of that paper. Do you believe there is any foundation for that charge whatsoever?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I have never heard anything like that, [11295] sir, and I do not believe it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, there is a Navy captain, Safford, who put it in this record. You don't know anything about destroying any papers, do you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I don't know anything about it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, there also has been testimony in the record to the effect that you had a recollection that on the night of December 6 you did receive a copy of the thirteen parts of the fourteen part message. What is your recollection on that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. My recollection is very distinct on that.

Mr. MURPHY. That you did receive it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And who delivered it to you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I cannot recall who delivered it to me. I recall very definitely that some time on the evening of December the 6th or early in the morning of December the 7th that an officer came to my house and rang the door bell and woke me up and I went down and read the first thirteen—read what they told me were the first thirteen parts of a long message.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Captain Kramer—

Admiral INGERSOLL. And I don't know whether it was before [11296] or after midnight.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Captain Kramer testified that about a week or so before the night of December 6th he had awakened you and had taken to your house another message but he said he was rather positive in his recollection that he had not taken it to you and attributed your saying that you received it to faulty memory.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Well, I asked Captain Kramer about that today and he says he did not personally bring it to my house. All during the period before Pearl Harbor I used to be awakened up at least two or three times during the week by officers bringing messages, not only of this character but of every character of operational character to my house and so I could not recall every officer who brought them there.

I seem to recall, and I may be mistaken, it was some other occasion, that the officers that brought this thing to my house that night asked for my identification card, which Captain Kramer would not have done, so that would identify it, if Captain Kramer said he did not bring it out to me, that some other watch officer brought it. I also recall that they told me that the message had been taken or would be taken to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you were familiar with the two documents setting up the winds code originally, were you not?

[11297] Admiral INGERSOLL. The one document setting it up.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, there is one on page 154, if you will refer to it, Admiral. There is one on page 154 which says:

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

Then on page 155:

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcast.

You were familiar, were you, with both of those dispatches?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I remember very distinctly the one which appears on page 154. That is the one which we have been talking about as the "winds." My recollection regarding this other one, which I believe is now called the hidden word, is rather hazy.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, Admiral, when the officer did come into your office and referred to a winds intercept, what did it mean to you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It meant to me that they had received a message which was sent in compliance with this one on page 154.

[11298] Mr. MURPHY. Meaning what?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Well, relations between the United States and Great Britain and—that is, Japanese relations with the United States, Great Britain, and Russia were as stated in the code message there.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you have any understanding that that meant war or merely a breaking off in relations, the message as such?

Admiral INGERSOLL. As stated there on the face it says "rupture of diplomatic negotiations," and that is why it seemed to me that the messages regarding the codes were so much more in place.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, in view of your testimony do you see any reason in the world why anyone in the Navy, large, great or small, would want to destroy any paper which would show any receipt of the winds message?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No; I cannot see any.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster is away. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral, you regarded the code destruction messages, both our directions to our agents in the Far East and the Japanese directions to their agents in our country, you regarded those messages as the most important ones, is that not correct?

[11299] Admiral INGERSOLL. I stated that I thought that the messages which we sent to the commanders in chief that the Japanese were destroying their codes and the message regarding the war warning on the 27th of November as the two most important messages that were sent out. The messages which we sent out to the Pacific, to Guam and Peiping, I believe, to destroy their codes and the authority which we gave to Admiral Kimmel to destroy codes on outlying islands and possessions were, of course, in direct consequence of the messages which the Japanese had sent out, because they indicated that the Japanese expected to be at war in a very short time.

Mr. GEARHART. In addition to that we sent the message to the naval attaché in the American embassy at Tokyo directing the destruction of codes there?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was the same general idea, of course.

Mr. GEARHART. So in your estimation the winds activate or execute was unimportant because the code destruction orders had gone out as far as America was concerned and had been received as far as Japan was concerned?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I considered one of the two most important messages sent out and it made no difference in my opinion whether there had ever been a winds message or whether a winds execute was ever received.

[11300] Mr. GEARHART. Now, your impression now is that the order to our foreign agents in the Far East had been sent out before we received the winds execute?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am sure of that. That is, before we received the message which I thought was a winds execute or was told was a message sent in the winds code.

Mr. GEARHART. And you say that our orders had been sent abroad on the third or fourth?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The message which we sent to the commanders in chief informing them that the Japanese had ordered the destruction of their codes in Washington, London, Manila and other places I believe was sent on the third or fourth. I think the messages to our own people to destroy their codes were a day or two later, although I do not recall the exact dates now.

Mr. GEARHART. But whether or not the winds execute was received before or after we had sent out our notices would render it unimportant after the code destruction messages had gone out, is that not correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is the point I am trying to make all along, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, the point that I am suggesting to you as a companion and not a corollary is this, that the winds execute messages became unimportant, and to use a legal phrase—

[11301] Admiral INGERSOLL. I did not understand you.

Mr. GEARHART. That the winds execute would become unimportant even if received before, after our destruction of code messages had gone to the field, because it would be, as the lawyers say, it would become *functus officio*?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Well, when we received the original message which set up the winds code that became important then because that would be the first indication that we would get of when the Japanese thought they would rupture negotiations or be at war if a broader interpretation were placed on it and steps were taken to monitor that message and, also, Admiral Noyes took steps to insure that he would receive information as soon as it was received in the code, but once we had learned that they were destroying their codes then the winds message lost its importance.

Mr. GEARHART. I agree with you on that, but I am asserting the further idea that it is equally important whether received before or after the order went out for the destruction of our codes in the Far East because if it came in before and the fact of its receipt initiated the order sending out the code destruction orders, when the code destruction orders went out it had served its purpose and it was no longer important. Does that sound reasonable?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am afraid I don't get your point, [11302] sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is what I was thinking, Admiral.

The point is this: Whether it came in before the orders were sent out for the destruction of codes in our far outlying Eastern agencies or whether it came in after we had sent out the order for the destruction of our codes it was after the fact equally unimportant, is that not correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Oh, in regard to the destruction of our own codes; yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Of course.

Admiral INGERSOLL. It made no difference at all and the destruction of our codes was not based on that supposition. It was based on the fact that the enemy had issued orders to destroy his codes.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but it would become an element in the fact that war was about to commence?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Any true winds execute would confirm the other.

Mr. GEARHART. And it would not be any more important if it were received before our orders went out for the destruction of our codes or whether it was received afterwards.

Admiral INGERSOLL. No.

Mr. GEARHART. It would be exactly in the same classification after the order went out.

[11303] Admiral INGERSOLL. For the destruction of our codes.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, that is what the lawyers call *functus officio* if it came in first.

Now, the reason why you knew that the destruction of the codes meant war and not merely breaking off of negotiations was the fact that if they were merely breaking off diplomatic negotiations with us they would not have to destroy their codes?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Not necessarily.

Mr. GEARHART. They could pack them up, as you said with their second suit of clothes and take them home if they were merely breaking off diplomatic relations.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Correct.

Mr. GEARHART. So that it was a dead tip-off, a foregone conclusion in the estimations of the higher ranking military officers that the order for the destruction of their codes within our areas meant nothing but war?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes; and the fact that the consulates were included cinched it in my opinion that it was war and not a rupture of diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic relations.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, the high ranking naval [11304] and military officers all felt that war was coming sooner than it did come. Wasn't there much talk about that preceding the seventh?

Admiral INGERSOLL. So far as the Chief of Naval Operations was concerned war could have come at any moment after the 24th or the 27th of November and it would have been no surprise.

Mr. GEARHART. You knew about the deadline date of the 29th of November?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I recall that dispatch.

Mr. GEARHART. That was a date after which things were going to automatically happen and so when that date passed you began to watch for things and look for things to happen, did you not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Well, in all these things, sir, when you consider a particular dispatch you cannot consider that dispatch alone and nothing else. You have to consider all the other things that you can.

Well, at this time, that is, at the latter part of November, we knew that they were assembling vast forces of ships and men and landing craft in southeast Asia, in China, and Formosa; we knew they were on the move and it would only be a question of a very short time when they would land somewhere. There wasn't any question about it. It was only the exact [11305] spot and when. Admiral Hart was watching them with his planes. We knew they were going down the coast of China and down Indochina. We did not know until the last moment whether they were headed for the Kra Peninsula or for Thailand, but they were on the move definitely, and it was only a question of the hour as to when it would come.

Mr. GEARHART. You knew that Secretary Hull had delivered the American note to the Japanese here in Washington on the 26th day of November?

Admiral INGERSOLL. On the 27th of November the dispatch was sent out stating that all—in effect, I am quoting now from memory—that all efforts for peaceful solution had failed.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. And when you sent it out on the 27th, was it because you felt that the Hull message had been interpreted by the Japanese as an ultimatum?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am sure that Admiral Stark felt that they could not accept it and also, as I say, things were moving in the East, the concentration of troops, did show that war was coming very, very soon.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, as it now appears, as it now turns out, we find that the Japanese fleet sailed from Takan in the Kurile Islands on the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th, a day ahead of their deadline date, but we did not [11306] know that until later, but the 29th went by, and that was their deadline date, and we knew what that deadline date was, and we had been told by the Japanese that things were going to happen automatically. Then when nothing happened on the 29th, nothing happened on the 30th, nothing happened on the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th of December, did that long delay after their fixed deadline cause any discussions among the higher ranking naval officers with whom you were in daily conversation in a search for an answer to the question?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Of course, we had no definite information that a task force had sailed from the Kurile Islands for the Hawaiian Islands but the time of the break, that is, the time of hostilities was indicated would come very soon in the movements of the Japanese in the Far East. It could not go on many days longer or many hours longer. They were approaching a place where they were going to land.

Mr. GEARHART. That is, we knew about the moves of the Japanese fleet in the China Sea?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. We had received reports on that. We knew the deadline date of the 29th, and because of those circumstances and others, perhaps, it was the belief that the Japanese would do something over the week end of December 1, that was the general supposition?

[11307] Admiral INGERSOLL. I cannot say that it was the belief that something would happen over the week end of the—did you say the 31st?

Mr. GEARHART. The week end of—no, the 30th was in November. Over the week end of the 1st of December, after the 30th of November?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No; I think not. The forces had not yet reached a point in the Far East where actual hostilities were implied over that week end.

Mr. GEARHART. But you expected action to follow the 29th. very closely, did you not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. We did not know when it would occur.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, they told you in their own message, didn't they, Admiral?

Admiral INGERSOLL. We did not know how soon after that they would actually start to move. For example, forces were in Formosa and forces were in the Pescadores. They could have gotten to Manila in 24 hours or in 40 hours.

Mr. GEARHART. That is the point. After the 29th they could have gotten there in 24 hours if they wanted to make that attack as soon as they could in Luzon?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. In your conferences with the other high ranking officers did you not discuss the point that they could [11308] have attacked within 24 hours after the 29th and they did not? Did you not speculate on why they had not attacked, give the subject some consideration?

Admiral INGERSOLL. There was a conference in Mr. Knox' office every morning in which the Director of Naval Intelligence presented the whole situation, not only in the Far East but in Europe, the Atlantic situation, everything and everywhere, and the possibilities were discussed. They were sometimes discussed by the Director of War Plans, Admiral Turner, who would point out the implications, and so forth. The situation was reviewed every morning.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you attend those meetings?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, then, I am asking you the question and you are in a position to answer it. Were there in those meetings after the 29th discussions of why after that had occurred, after we had read the Jap intercept that after the 29th things were going to happen automatically?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I cannot recall now, sir, that that particular point was discussed as to why they did not carry out what they said they were going to do in that message.

Mr. GEARHART. All right.

Admiral INGERSOLL. As a matter of fact—

Mr. GEARHART. Pardon me.

[11309] Admiral INGERSOLL. As a matter of fact the messages received in these codes were usually not discussed at the Secretary's conferences and mentioned as such because there were more officers present there than who knew of the existence of these messages.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. The discussions go on. You had had daily meetings on the 1st, on the 2d and the 3d and we find we get further and further away from the deadline date of the 29th. Did anybody in those meetings raise the question that possibly the Japanese were sailing to a distant point of attack?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No; none that I recall.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you are a naval expert, one of the greatest living of naval experts. Didn't it occur to you when the time began to lengthen out into close to a week after the date the Japanese said things were going to automatically begin to happen, didn't it occur to you as a strategist that the Japanese fleet was sailing to a distant point of attack?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The question of an attack on Pearl Harbor, of course, was always considered as a possibility.

Mr. GEARHART. Remote or close?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was considered, of course, as a possibility because there was no other reason for putting [11310] anti-aircraft guns there or stationing fighting planes on the island or having radar installation or anything of that kind except to keep Japanese planes away. That was the only reason for putting them there, so that is why I call it a possibility.

Mr. GEARHART. Why is that your position?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Now, as to a probability as to whether or not they would attack is something else.

Mr. GEARHART. Was that frequently discussed in your conferences, in your morning conferences?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not recall in the few days immediately preceding Pearl Harbor that they expected the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor in the manner in which they did.

Mr. GEARHART. Were you surprised?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I was surprised that Pearl Harbor was attacked but I was more surprised that the attack was not detected, that was my first reaction, and if I express it in the words which I used at the time, it was, "How in the hell did they get in there without somebody finding it out?"

Mr. GEARHART. Then I will ask you if that was in your mind and that was always considered a possibility in your considerations why was Hawaii never mentioned in any of the so-called war warning messages as a place of possible attack? Why were other places in the Far East always stressed as the places of [11311] expected attack?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Because the places in the Far East were the only places of which we had definite information towards which the Japanese were moving.

Mr. GEARHART. Didn't the fact that the Japanese were constantly pressing their Honolulu confederates for reports on the movement of ships in Pearl Harbor direct your attention to the rather acute possibility of an attack at Hawaii?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Now you are referring, I presume, to the dispatch regarding the location of ships in Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; the series of dispatches that reached your desk.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Well, as far as I am concerned personally I have no recollection of seeing that dispatch, so it did not occur to me personally.

Mr. GEARHART. Might I say, Admiral, it is not one dispatch?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Sir?

Mr. GEARHART. Might I say it is not one dispatch? It is seven of them.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I meant that series of dispatches I did not see.

Mr. GEARHART. Didn't they bring you all of them in that [11312] leather case and didn't you open the leather case with the key that was supplied you—

Admiral INGERSOLL. No.

Mr. GEARHART (continuing). And read all of those messages?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No.

Mr. GEARHART. You don't know anything about this inordinate interest on the part of the Japanese in respect to the movement of ships in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGERSOLL. There are two kinds of movements which would afford interest; one which was a movement of departure of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor would excite no interest whatever because we do that all the time and continue to do it in time of peace; that is, to keep track of the strategic location of ships. So dispatches asking for departures and arrivals would excite no interest. I think if I had seen the dispatch which referred specifically to the location of ships in Pearl Harbor, I would have been interested very much.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you see the intercept which divided Pearl Harbor into five areas and the dispatch which called upon the Japanese

agents at Honolulu to report each shifting and visit of ships from one area to another, as well as the ships coming in and out of the harbor entrance?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think I first learned of that dispatch when Admiral Hart asked me about it on his investigation. [11313]

Mr. GEARHART. Well, if you had seen those dispatches and they had been called to your attention, what would you have done?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Well, in the first place I would have wanted to know why they were interested in the actual location of a ship within a harbor as distinguished from whether or not the ship just happened to be in port. My suspicion would be aroused if I had seen that dispatch I am certain.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, there was nobody to ask anything. All you had to do was read these messages and you would have to draw your own conclusions, so if you had seen those seven or eight dispatches, impatient demands from Tokyo that reports be given even if ships did not move—

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not recall seeing that dispatch.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, what would you have done as a naval strategist, what would you have thought as a naval expert if you had seen that message?

Admiral INGERSOLL. If I had seen the dispatches which indicated interest in a specific location within Pearl Harbor as distinguished from being within the Hawaiian area, that would have indicated to me that they had an unusual interest in that place.

Mr. GEARHART. That would have been out of the ordinary, [11314] wouldn't it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, it would have been.

Mr. GEARHART. What would you have done if those messages had been called to your attention?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think Admiral Kimmel should have been informed.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, the fact is he was not.

Now, getting back again to this 29th deadline, the passing of the 29th, the passing of the 30th, the passing of the 1st, the 2d and the 3d and the 4th and the 5th and the 6th and nothing happened, did that not suggest to your mind, and this is back to the same question I asked before, did it ever suggest to your mind as a naval expert that the Japanese Fleet was sailing and steaming to a distant target?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It did not to me; no.

Mr. GEARHART. Why would it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Well, in the first place I did not think that the Japanese would risk an air attack on Pearl Harbor. While it was a possibility and while the defenses for Pearl Harbor had been set up for that purpose, the Japanese had very extensive operations under way at the time. Reports indicated, of course, that they were going into the Dutch East Indies, right into the Malay Peninsula, in the Philippines. Guam, of course, we knew would fall like a ripe plum any time they wanted to take it, which meant that the area of their operations was extended over a considerable stretch of territory.

[11315] Furthermore, if all of the installations at Hawaii had been working, had the planes been on the alert, the attack there, in my opinion, might have been detected, and there might have been very serious damage to the Japanese.

It would have deterred them from making an attack of that kind. Furthermore, if our fleet had not been in Pearl Harbor and it was at sea, in a place where it might have intercepted them, they might have incurred a very serious naval loss at that time.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, my dear Admiral, if you had read the intercept I referred to, you would have known that the Japanese knew that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor and the battleships tied up one next to the other in pairs.

Admiral INGERSOLL. As far as that goes, the Japanese had been reporting our movements of ships all over the world for a good many years. All you had to do was to stand back of the road at Pearl Harbor, and you could see everything that was in Pearl Harbor, where every ship was anchored.

I had no doubt when I was there in 1940 that they were reporting everything at that time.

Mr. GEARHART. You said a while ago, the high ranking [11316] naval officers and military officers were of the opinion that the Japanese would not risk an attack against Pearl Harbor in the light of the great obligations that they were assuming in the event of an attack on the Southwest Pacific; is that not correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think that was the opinion of most of the people in the Office of Naval Operations, that the Japanese would not make an attack on Pearl Harbor, although, of course, it was a possibility.

Mr. GEARHART. Did it occur to you, and the high ranking naval and military officers, that they would not make an attack on the Southwest Pacific if the American Fleet was left on their flank?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I did not understand that question.

Mr. GEARHART. Then I will state it again.

Did it occur to you that the Japanese would not dare to make the attack we expected them to make in the Southwestern Pacific if the American Fleet was left on their flank?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I still did not understand the question, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did it ever occur to you, or was it ever discussed among the officers you have told us about, the high ranking military and naval officers of the United [11317] States, that the Japanese would not dare to launch a major offensive in the Southwestern Pacific if the American Fleet was left in fighting shape on their flank at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGERSOLL. They could have made the attack at that time, in December, on the Philippines and Malay Peninsula, even on the northern part of the Dutch East Indies, when our fleet was in Pearl Harbor, and they could have gotten away with it in time.

Mr. GEARHART. Why?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The question is why they came to attack us. They hoped to cripple us so it never would be a factor in the rest of the war.

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you think, as a naval expert, that they came to Pearl Harbor for the purpose of attacking our fleet and immobilizing it for a time, so it would make it possible for them to complete their conquest of the Southwestern Pacific?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think what you stated was their line of reasoning.

Mr. GEARHART. Did that enter into your conferences with the other high-ranking naval and military officers, that the Japanese might be thinking about immobilizing our fleet so that they could accomplish their objectives in [11318] the Southwestern Pacific?

Admiral INGERSOLL. As I stated before, the result of our estimate was that the Japanese would not do that, that they were fully occupied with what they were doing at that time, and that the risks were too great.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, it was the studied and carefully arrived-at opinion of the high ranking naval and military officers in Washington that the Japanese would not launch an attack on our fleet in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I could not answer it and say it was the opinion of all. I think it was the opinion of those with whom I talked.

Mr. GEARHART. Did Admiral Stark express that opinion?

Admiral INGERSOLL. How is that, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. Was that the opinion of Admiral Stark?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think it was.

Mr. GEARHART. And other people that you were in daily association and frequent conversation with?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think so.

Mr. GEARHART. If you felt there was any possibility of doing that kind of thing, making that sort of attack, you would, of course, have sent special messages to Admiral Kimmel and General Short?

[11319] Admiral INGERSOLL. I think there is no question at all, if we had any information, any definite information that the Japanese ships were moving toward Pearl Harbor or if the Chief of Naval Operations felt that there was a distinct probability, as distinguished from a possibility that there was a distinct probability that Hawaii was in danger, I know he would have told them.

Mr. GEARHART. But you have told us that the destruction of codes, code machines, secret papers by the United States in the Japanese sphere, and by the Japanese in the American and British sphere, you told us that that meant war.

Why did not you sent a notice to that effect and relay that information on to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral INGERSOLL. We did.

Mr. GEARHART. You did?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is, we sent word that they had ordered the destruction of their codes. We had previously told them on the 27th, that war would come at any time.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but you did not say anything in the message of the 27th about the destruction of the codes, did you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. We did not know it then.

Mr. GEARHART. What other messages did you send [11320] about the destruction of the codes before December 7, when it got there too late?

Admiral INGERSOLL. We sent them the instruction, or the information that the Japanese had ordered their codes destroyed, I believe, on the 3d or 4th of December; I have forgotten the exact date. It was on the 3d of December.

Mr. GEARHART. Is that the only message that was sent on that subject, the one of the 3d of December?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That was the only message sent on the 3d of December informing him that the Japanese were ordering the destruction of their codes. Here is the one on December 3 which reads as follows: It was sent to the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, the commanding officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, which was Hawaii, and the commanding officer of the Sixteenth Naval District, which was Panama.

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once, and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

There is another one on December 3 that says:

[11321] Circular 2444 from Tokyo one December ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy machine. Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy all but one code of other systems and all secret documents. British Admiralty London today reports embassy London has complied.

Here is our dispatch to Tokyo, that is, to the naval attaché at Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, Shanghai, to destroy their codes. That was sent on the 3d.

Mr. GEARHART. On the 3d?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

And Peiping and the Marine detachment at Tientsin were ordered to destroy on the 4th. Guam was directed on the 4th, and Admiral Kimmel was instructed on the 6th:

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

Mr. GEARHART. That should be interpreted, and should have been interpreted by Admiral Kimmel, as the most conclusive evidence that war was coming, and coming quickly?

[11322] Admiral INGERSOLL. It was the intention to convey that when they were sent.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. You felt war was coming and coming quickly; and even though you thought that an attack on Hawaii was a possibility, every message in which places were mentioned directed the attention of the Hawaiian commanders to the fact that war was expected in the Philippines, in Indochina, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly Borneo and Guam; is that not correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The information that we had of Japanese forces on the move at that time, was in that direction. •

Mr. GEARHART. And even though all these days passed after the deadline date of the 29th of November, you and the high-ranking officers with whom you were in daily conference, thought that possibly the Japanese were scheming on a distant point as a place of attack?

Admiral INGERSOLL. As I stated before we had no definite information that the Japanese were on the move toward Hawaii, and I do not think it was the opinion of the officers in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations that they were moving in that direction.

Mr. GEARHART. You did not know where the fleet was; did you? Was not this Japanese Fleet lost for a week or [11323] two?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not know. The information regarding the location of Japanese ships was the primary responsibility of the commander of the Pacific Fleet. He was the man who was in charge of the methods of determining the location of the Japanese Fleet through radio intelligence, as it was called.

There were very long periods of time, and at various times, when we never knew where the Japanese Fleet was. They might go to their mandated islands; and they might just as well have been on the moon, as far as we knew where they were.

Mr. GEARHART. There were times when you did know where the Japanese Fleet was?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. You got in touch with the Japanese whenever you could; is that not correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It is like people that talk too much. Whenever they use the radio too much they get in trouble, because then they find where they are; and when you maintain radio silence, you don't know where they are. It was only by means of the radio direction finders and the analysis of the traffic that they could in most cases keep track of where they were.

[11324] There were long periods of time when we did not know where they were, or when we did not know where particular ships were.

Mr. GEARHART. And, as a matter of fact, there were days following the 29th day of November, the dead-line date, when it was known to you, and the men with whom you were in daily conference, that the Japanese were in a position unknown to American Intelligence; is that correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I believe, although I did not keep track of the position of all Japanese ships, that there were some ships at that time that they did not know where they were, but there were a great many Japanese ships that we did know where they were.

We had sighted them off the coast of Indochina, lots of them.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you have to do with the preparation of the war plan WPL-46?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes. As a member of the joint board, that war plan was finally approved by the joint board, before it was sent to the Secretaries and the President for approval.

Mr. GEARHART. WPL-46 was a revised plan, was it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was a result of several revisions.

[11325] Mr. GEARHART. We had plan after plan, and it is the forty-sixth war plan? Does that mean that it is the forty-sixth plan that had been worked out for the defense of the Pacific?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No.

Mr. GEARHART. Were there that many plans, or more?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No. As I recall, there were numerous plans that had been prepared for different situations, and different enemies over a period of many years, and that simply meant war plans volume No. 46.

In the old Orange war plan, which had been in existence 5 or 6 years, there were four volumes, and each one of them had a separate WPL number.

Mr. GEARHART. WPL-46, though had been recently, just a short time before Pearl Harbor on December 7, revised?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I believe WPL-46 was approved in April.

Mr. GEARHART. In April of 1941. Now, that represented the joint opinion of a committee, in reference to the problem which might come on?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It is a little more than that, because WPL-46 was based on another plan, ABC-1, which was the American-British-Canadian joint plan, which had been approved on the highest political levels. Once that plan was approved, then the basic Army and Navy joint plan was [11326] drawn up, and from that the Navy war plan, WPL-46 was evolved.

Mr. GEARHART. Was the high level political plan, the ABC plan, was that the ABC-1 plan?

Admiral INGERSOLL. ABC-1 was the plan agreed upon by the conversations with the British and Canadians, prior to No. 46.

Mr. GEARHART. And was it the adoption of that plan that made necessary the making of the general defense plan which became known as WPL-46?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The existing plan, the number of which I have forgotten at the moment, was to be brought into agreement with ABC-1, which had been approved on high political levels.

Mr. GEARHART. Generally speaking WPL-46 was an offensive plan, was it not? It contemplated offensive action on the part of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral INGERSOLL. On the contrary; no.

Mr. GEARHART. Did it not involve the sending of the fleet down into the Marshalls before the Jap attack, and we became involved in this war?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I haven't the plan here, but my recollection of the plan was that the offensive movement to the Marshalls did not take place until D plus 180, [11327] which was 6 months, and the reason for that was we did not have the auxiliaries or the transports sufficient for the fleet to make an offensive movement.

Mr. GEARHART. But the ultimate purpose of WPL-46 was to capture the Marshall Islands?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No. The principal task in WPL-46 which was in agreement with ABC-1, was to defeat Germany and Italy in the Atlantic, and then defeat Japan. That was the basic decision.

Mr. GEARHART. WPL-46 did not relate to the Atlantic warfare, did it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was it such a wide plan?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was a plan for the United States Naval forces wherever situated. The Pacific Fleet tasks were only one chapter of it.

Mr. GEARHART. What did it provide for the defense of Hawaii?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Sir?

Mr. GEARHART. What did it provide for the defense of Hawaii?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Is the plan here so I can see?

Mr. GEARHART. I was not going into details. Do you remember, generally, the underlying scheme?

[11328] Admiral INGERSOLL. One of the tasks of the Pacific Fleet was to defend the west coast and our possessions in the Western Pacific. That included Hawaii as a part of it.

Of course, the primary responsibility for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands was an Army responsibility and not a Navy responsibility. Under the joint action of the Army and Navy the Army was supposed to defend Hawaii so that the fleet could leave it without any naval ships there. But the fleet was supposed to cover it in its general operations, to prevent the Japanese from sending an Army there to capture it.

Mr. GEARHART. Was not that the underlying theory of WPL-46 that we would defend Hawaii and defend the United States by an offensive action against the Japanese?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The basic task, the major task of the Pacific Fleet in WPL-46, for the first 6 months was largely defensive.

My testimony in the Court of Inquiry has that outlined in particular, where I have enumerated each task, and whether or not it was defensive or offensive. The reason for that was because the instructions which were sent to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel in the war warning dispatch of November 27, directed them to take a defensive deployment [11329] preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

Mr. GEARHART. You have heard the old phrase, the best defense is often an attack, have you not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I have heard that.

Mr. GEARHART. Is that not the theory on which WPL-46 was based?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Sir?

Mr. GEARHART. Is not that the theory on which WPL-46 was based?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No, sir; it was not.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask, while you are getting ready, there is one question that occurred to me with regard to not only the Pacific Fleet, but with regard to all fleets.

Is it or is it not true that the man who has risen to the rank in the Navy that he would be in charge of a fleet of the proportions of the Pacific Fleet, or the Asiatic, or the Atlantic Fleet, is expected to know enough about the situation and keep himself enough informed about the situation to exercise judgment based upon information he gathers on the ground, and it is not necessary for Washington to feed him out of a spoon every little detail [113330] of information that he ought to obtain in the field, on the ground where he is expected to have judgment and use it?

Is that a fair statement of the expectation of all officers?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, sir; that is a very good statement, sir.

Of course, there is sometimes information which exists in the Capital which the commander in chief has no means of obtaining.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Or perhaps an expression of policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Then it is the function of the Navy Department to keep him informed along those lines.

For example, in connection with that I said here before, Admiral Kimmel would have had no means of knowing that the Japanese had sent out instructions to burn their codes, except I have heard that they did see the Japanese consul burn stuff in his back yard in Honolulu, but I mean he would have no means of knowing that the Japanese in Washington or London, were to burn their codes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would there be information that he would obtain in the field, or in the ocean where he was in command [11331] that Washington would not have?

You mentioned a while ago that he had to keep up with where the Japanese Fleet was.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes; because the coordination of all of the radio direction finder stations in the Pacific was under the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and it was his assigned task to make the analysis of radio traffic in order to keep track as best he could with where the Japanese ships were. He was assigned that task because of his physical location and proximity, and nearness to them.

He could do it better than anybody else.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, as I gather your answer, there is information that could be obtained at each end of the line, that the other one could not obtain, and in case Washington obtained information that was important and that the commander in the field could not get, or does not have, it is the duty of the Washington offices in the Navy, and the same in the Army, to apprise the commander in the field of that information, and also it is the duty of the commander in the field to obtain information and act upon it according to his judgment, along the lines, within his discretion that they could not obtain here in Washington; isn't that true?

[11332] Admiral INGERSOLL. That is true.

I mentioned before that we were obtaining information regarding the movement of the Japanese along the coast of Asia.

That information was obtained by the planes which Admiral Hart sent out from Manila.

It was also obtained by reports from Chinese agents and I think they were transmitted to him, and he, in turn, transmitted that information to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[11333] Admiral INGERSOLL. A commander in chief is considered by the Navy as almost a viceroy out in his own field. They tell him in broad terms what he is supposed to do and they do not bother him with asking him how he is going to do it, or keep bothering him with whether he has done it.

The CHAIRMAN. Would not any naval officer worthy of a command of that sort feel that he ought to have discretion and he ought to be depended upon and may be depended upon to act within the field of his own information, and to gather all the information on the ground that it is at all possible from any source, and would there be many sources of such information in Hawaii, or in Manila, or anywhere in the Far East or in the Atlantic on the part of a commanding officer of the Navy?

Admiral INGERSOLL. When you put a commander in chief out there you want to leave him, as far as possible, free to do his job, and you trust that he is going to do it, and you help him in such ways as

you can, where there are things of which he has no knowledge himself.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

The Senator from Michigan may inquire. Pardon the interruption.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all right.

Admiral, is there any question in your mind that the [11334] chief source of intelligence of the United States Navy in the fall of 1941 was in Washington? Is there any question about that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That the chief what; sir?

Senator FERGUSON. The chief source of Naval Intelligence was being assembled and evaluated in Washington in 1941.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I should say the chief source of evaluation was in Washington, but not necessarily the sources from which all of the information was obtained.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate not all of it was in Washington, as far as obtaining information is concerned, but the evaluation of intelligence was centered in Washington?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Generally speaking, I think that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And in what particular office was it? Who had authority, and whose duty was it to evaluate intelligence?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Generally speaking, the evaluation of intelligence was done in the Office of Naval Intelligence. Of course in nearly every case the credibility of the information, or the reliability of the information, was determined there. But in some cases you had to refer, say, to technical bureaus as to whether or not reports on this or that mechanical device, or plane, and so forth, was worth [11335] anything.

In regard to the evaluation of the combined political and military information, particularly as it might pertain to its effect on operations, or the strategic distribution of our own forces, that sort of evaluation was done in the War Plans Division. We did not call it evaluation there. It was the estimate of the situation which the War Plans Division made in drawing up the war plans.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you have two sources of information, or you have two kinds of information, the military, or naval in your case, and political information?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And the political part of the information was never given to the Naval Intelligence, so that they had nothing to do with the evaluation of political information or intelligence, as far as it related to or controlled Naval Intelligence?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am not sure that that is correct, that the political information was never given to Intelligence. I think that is not correct. I think Naval Intelligence had practically the same information that everybody in Operations had, except possibly the direct contact which Admiral Stark had with Mr. Hull, and of course that was as good political information as you could have.

[11336] Senator FERGUSON. And Admiral Stark also had direct contact with the President?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now how did that information that Admiral Stark got from those two men on the political side of our Intelligence

get down into Naval Intelligence that was headed by Admiral Wilkinson?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Well, as I said before, we used to have these conferences in the morning. Admiral Stark discussed matters at those times. He had a liaison officer, Admiral Schuirmann, or Captain Schuirmann at that time, who saw the State Department officials I think every day, and sometimes more than once a day, and Admiral Schuirmann would not only, when he came back from the State Department, report to Admiral Stark, but he would tell the other officers in Operations, War Plans, Intelligence, I am almost certain, and myself, what he had learned at the State Department that day.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what the political policy, foreign policy, was in 1941, in December, in the early part, prior to Pearl Harbor, as far as it related to Japan?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am not sure that I know what you mean by the political policy. I was kept informed by Admiral [11337] Stark as to the more or less general process of our relations with Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then I will ask you this question: Did you know what our policy was prior to Pearl Harbor—and that was on the 7th—that if there was an attack on the Malay Peninsula, what the position would be of the United States of America, as far as the Navy or the Army were concerned?

Admiral INGERSOLL. As far as the Navy and Army were concerned, what we would do was contained in our war plans and had nothing of course, whatever to do with whether or not there would be war between the United States and Japan if Japan went into the Malay Peninsula.

I do not think there was anybody in the Navy Department who knew what would happen if Japan went into the Malay Peninsula, or into Siam, or Thailand.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, as far as the United States Navy was concerned—and I am talking about OPNAV, which was your department—you had no idea as to what the position of the Navy would be in case there was an attack by the Japanese upon the British and/or the Dutch and no attack upon any American possessions?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The position of the Navy would have been the position taken by the United States Government, [11338] and what the President would have recommended to the Congress about declaring war. The Navy's position would have been exactly the position of the United States.

Now the only thing we had to go by was the destruction of codes, which indicated that the Japanese expected to be at war with us soon, and they were moving in the direction of the Malay Peninsula. So the only inference you could draw is that very soon we were all going to be at war and there were going to be hostilities. But the Navy did not know what the President was going to recommend to the Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that there had been war in the Atlantic without any recommendation to the Congress?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I certainly did.

Senator FERGUSON. How does that account then for your answer about war in the Pacific?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Then it was not a legal war, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you, as one of the chief officers in OPNAV, expect the same kind of a war in the Pacific as they had in the Atlantic if there was an attack on the British possessions and not upon America?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No, because the Germans were still here in Washington and they had not declared war on us for all that we had been doing to them in the Atlantic.

[11339] Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand it was because of the burning of the codes that you got definite information that there was going to be war with America?

Admiral INGERSOLL. There is no question about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now when did you come to the conclusion that there was going to be war with America? Will you give us the date as nearly as you can?

Admiral INGERSOLL. You mean when Japan was going to be at war with the United States?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think everybody in the Navy was convinced that we were going to have war with Japan for the last 20 years.

Senator FERGUSON. Can we get a little closer than that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. As the situation got worse during 1941 there was not any question about it, that sooner or later we were going to be at war. The resignation of the Cabinet in Japan in October looked as though it was going to be a very, very serious situation, that there was no hope of a peaceful settlement. Again on the 27th of November, when Mr. Hull, I believe, informed the Secretary of the Navy that there was no hope of a peaceful solution with Japan, there was no question in the mind of Admiral Stark, I know, that war was coming very soon. The destruction of their [11340] codes brought it still closer.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Admiral, you will be back then.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., February 11, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m. of the following day, Tuesday, February 12, 1946.)

[11341]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[11342] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Admiral Ingersoll is still on the stand. Senator Ferguson was examining him when we recessed.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL R. E. INGERSOLL, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Ingersoll, we knew of a great war being conducted in Europe, and we knew how Hitler had gone into Poland and into Denmark, and so forth, that all of the actions of war had changed, and we were unorthodox, did we not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, sir; I have almost humorously called the war in the Atlantic as illegal. It was more in the nature of irregular.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you want to change your language from yesterday, that the war that we were conducting from August in the Atlantic was irregular rather than illegal?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes; I think that is a better description of it.

Senator FERGUSON. You use the word "irregular" after I used the expression unorthodox method of Hitler in his attacks without declaration of war.

Admiral INGERSOLL. In the Atlantic we were doing some things which only a belligerent does. There had been no [11343] declaration of war. We had done a great many things that under international law, as it was understood before the last war, were unneutral, and Germany just did not see fit to declare war on us on many occasions when she could have assumed our acts as unfriendly.

It was apparently to her advantage to have us as a nonbelligerent rather than as a full belligerent.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Now, you say that Germany, under international law, as I understand it, had just cause for declaring war from the overt acts that we had been committing?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know as to any reason why we were doing these acts without a declaration of war? Was it in any way that Germany was to declare war first?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I cannot answer that question, sir. This is a question of high policy, of political policy. The Navy Department was ordered to do certain things, which it did.

Senator FERGUSON. As an officer of our Navy, in fact, next to the Chief, you knew that these overt acts were going on?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And they were all irregular and [11344] not in accordance with the old idea of declaration of war?

Admiral INGERSOLL. And of international law, as it was understood.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, what I am getting at, in asking you these questions is why did not we anticipate the same thing in the Pacific with Japan?

Admiral INGERSOLL. There are two reasons for that. One was that we ourselves were not ready, or as ready as we wished to be to go to war in the Pacific.

As a matter of fact, I think it was in November that the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy wrote to the Secretary of State, and I believe sent a letter to the President, urging that nothing be done which would precipitate hostilities in the Pacific in order that we would have more time to strengthen our defenses in the Philippines, and to get more strength in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Does not that then add strength to the supposition when we were not ready in the Pacific, and knew from all of these messages what was going on, that Japan would take advantage of our unreadiness and attack without a declaration of war?

Admiral INGERSOLL. On the 27th of November, I think it [11345] was, on rather the 24th of November—I am speaking from memory now—Admiral Stark's message to the Fleet stated that an attack could be expected in any direction.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Then on the 27th another message, the so-called warning message, was sent out?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But Japan had notified us on the 25th, the deadline message had she not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I believe that was the date. I am not sure that that was addressed to the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. No, no.

Admiral INGERSOLL. We picked it up.

Senator FERGUSON. It was an intercepted message to her ambassador.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then they altered it to the 29th, which was our 30th, was it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No, we would be one day earlier than she would be.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Their 29th—

Admiral INGERSOLL. Is our 28th.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

[11346] They set the 29th as the date, that is correct, is it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did anything happen between November 29 and December 7 that would indicate to your department that war was not coming?

Admiral INGERSOLL. On the contrary, Senator, the information which we received on the Japanese, or from the Japanese messages, was that they had instructed their embassies and consulates to burn their codes, and that was positive evidence that they expected to be at war with the three nations indicated in those dispatches very soon.

Furthermore, the Japanese forces were on the move, and we had sighted them moving in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. That is just what I want to get at.

Here we find them moving in the Far East. We know that on the 29th, they have stated that that is the last day, and after that they said "Things are automatically going to happen."

Did not that indicate to you that there were other movements on foot and not only those that we could see down in the South Pacific, going to Siam? As a Naval strategist, did not your department see that there was [11347] a movement and anticipate that the movement could have been towards Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGERSOLL. There was nothing in the Japanese movement which we saw which indicated any movement anywhere except in that direction to where we saw them moving.

However, we knew there were troops massed in Formosa, in the Pescadores, and on the coast of China, whose most logical destination was the Philippines.

And there might also have been other forces whose location we did not know, who might be going in any direction, or that might have been going towards Alaska.

Senator FERGUSON. So it is the ones that were going "in any direction" that we did not have the information on, that we should have anticipated their action rather than those that we did know their movements into Siam and into the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That was the reason that Admiral Stark put into the war warning message the words—and I should digress for a moment.

The war warning message was sent to all three commanders in chief. It was sent to the Atlantic, to the Pacific, and to the Asiatic.

It was sent for action to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel, and it was sent to Admiral King in the Atlantic [11348] for information, because the action required by that dispatch was to take a defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks in WPL-46, which was the war plan.

It was not sent to Admiral King for action because he was deployed all over the Atlantic at the time and could not do any more.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to come back to that defensive deployment a little later.

Were you familiar, Admiral, with the fact that on the 2nd of December—

Will you show the Admiral Exhibit 37, page 39?

Were you familiar with that message that the President directed, as to the charter of three small vessels?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes; I am familiar with that message.

[11349] Senator FERGUSON. You released that message, did you not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am not sure whether I released it or not, but I had a large part in preparing the message.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the purpose of that message? It was three small vessels to form a defensive information patrol. They were to go over into the Camranh Bay, Cape St. Jaques, and one off the point of Camau.

Now I have those marked on here, and they are many miles away from the Philippines, in fact they are way over so they can watch the movement into the Malay Peninsula, are they not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us why you wanted to have these three small men-of-war out in the Gulf of Siam watching for a movement on the British possessions?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The reason that we wanted them there is because it says in the beginning of the dispatch the "President directs that the following be done as soon as possible." That was our reason for doing it. Admiral Stark was told by the President to do it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any reason given by the President to do it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Not that he told me. I do not know what he told Admiral Stark, except to do this. I do not [11350] know whether he told Admiral Stark his reason or not.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no reason but you prepared the dispatch?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Admiral Hart was already conducting reconnaissance off that coast by planes from Manila.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the reason for the statement:

Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number Naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam.

Why did they want to use Filipino crews?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The only reason I can ascribe to that is that possibly Admiral Hart did not have sufficient enlisted men to do it, and it simply authorized him to use Filipinos to do it, and he could simply take a ship which was already manned by Filipinos, put naval officers on it, put a gun on it, hoist an American flag on it and it would then be a man-of-war.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you were trying to do at that time?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is what we were told to do, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You took it rather as an order?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is the reason it starts off the "President directs that the following be done."

[11351] Senator FERGUSON. This was not something being done by the Navy as the Navy, it was the Commander in Chief doing it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am sure Admiral Stark would not have done this unless he had been told.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see any useful purpose that could be accomplished by these three small men-of-war as lookouts there?

Admiral INGERSOLL. We did not initiate this movement, sir, and we were getting, I think, so far as Admiral Stark was concerned, sufficient information from Admiral Hart by the searches which his planes were making.

Senator FERGUSON. Now that brings up a certain matter on planes. Admiral, could you tell me as to whether or not these were really men-of-war, so if they had been fired on it would have been an overt act against the United States?

Admiral INGERSOLL. May I read this again more carefully?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It was to have a cannon and machine gun.

Admiral INGERSOLL. It says in the beginning:

Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. men-of-war are command by a Naval officer and to mount a small gun and one machine gun would suffice.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Would that have been an overt act if one of these small boats had been fired on?

[11352] Admiral INGERSOLL. It would have been.

Senator FERGUSON. It would have been?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It would have been an overt act on the part of Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am talking about. And, therefore, we would have been in war?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Is that your idea, Admiral? I mean as far as the overt act was concerned.

Admiral INGERSOLL. It would have been an incident on which we could have declared war had we wished to.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Of course, our men-of-war had been fired upon before, like the Panay incident, and we did not go to war. I do not know whether this would have resulted in war or not, but it might have resulted in war.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield to Mr. Murphy?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at the moment.

Mr. MURPHY. It is already developed anyway.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, I want you to look at page 2 of Exhibit 78. This is on the 30th of November. Would you just read that?

Admiral INGERSOLL (reading):

Indications that Japan about to [11353] attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition x In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this dispatch x Instruct planes to observe only x They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked x Understand British Air Forces will search ARC 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across KRA isthmus near Singora x If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur x British mission here informed.

Senator FERGUSON. The idea there was that we were going to put planes out over this same area to watch for movements into the Kra Peninsula, is that correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And if they were armed it was not to appear that they were doing the attacking, but they were to defend themselves?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. If attacked.

Senator FERGUSON. If attacked. I assume the same thing was true with these three small boats.

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct.

[11354] Senator FERGUSON. With the machine guns and cannon.

Admiral INGERSOLL. They would have undoubtedly defended themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. That would have been the intention, is that correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is a right of self-preservation which you have.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you look at the previous message.

Admiral INGERSOLL. May I enlarge on this one a moment before I go on?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGERSOLL. You have a perfect right to fly planes over the ocean. You have also a right to send ships and men-of-war over the ocean. A plane may also approach a formation if it is a large formation and ascertain what is going on without being sighted. So that the chances of an overt incident occurring in the case of a plane search are very much less than that of a small ship trying to trail a force.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would have anticipated that there would be more danger of an attack on the three small men-of-war than on these airplanes?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Much more.

[11355] Senator FERGUSON. Much more.

Admiral INGERSOLL. We had a perfect right to observe what they were doing.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, look at the previous message.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Do you wish me to read it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGERSOLL. This is from the Commandant of the 14th District of Operations:

Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on one December without ultimatum or declaration in order to get between Bangkok and Singapore. Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing to be made at Songkhla.

Senator FERGUSON. That is in line with the same, is it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, sir, except that it now turns out it wasn't a good prediction.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, attached to the November 29th memorandum of conversations of the Department of State I find this language—it is headed "Most Secret". It comes from—I can't tell. Cordell Hull's initials are on the paper that it is attached to. But this is the significant part:

[11356] R. A. F. are reconnoitering on arc of 180 miles from Tedta Bharu for three days commencing November 29th and our Commander in Chief, Far East, has requested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air reconnaissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days.

Now, that would indicate that that is from the British.

Admiral INGERSOLL. It is from the British, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And it is asking our Asiatic Fleet send out a reconnaissance on the line of Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days.

Now, that is the day that the deadline was placed, the 29th. So we really expected an attack on the 29th, did we not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. We expected an attack when the Japanese forces which were proceeding around the south end of Indochina would land. Whether they landed on the Kra Peninsula or on Thailand we did not know at that time, but depending on the speed they were making and the distance they were away at that time we could predict very closely what day they might expect to land there.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't every message we received after the 29th indicate to you that the attack was coming, that there was going to be war?

Admiral INGERSOLL. After the 27th we were expecting it [11357] any time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were expecting it any time and as it moved on, let's say three or four days, didn't you anticipate that there was a movement on Pearl Harbor, because it was taking the number of days that it was taking, that every time a day elapsed it would indicate more that the movement had been for a longer distance, and therefore anticipate that it was Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The answer to that is no, it was not anticipated. Otherwise they would have told them about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would have told them?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Admiral Stark would have told Admiral Kimmel had he had the slightest idea, I think, that it was probable and that an attack on Pearl Harbor was impending.

Senator FERGUSON. So I take it you did not anticipate, as the days elapsed, an attack of that character?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I testified in the Court of Inquiry that we did expect that there would be Japanese submarines off Hawaii, that there would be Japanese submarines off our Pacific Coast, that they would be on a line of communications between Pearl Harbor and our Pacific Coast, that there might be an attack on our outlying possessions, as there were at [11358] Midway and Guam, and there were submarines off Hawaii, there were submarines off of the Pacific Coast, and they were sinking ships, I believe, on the 7th of December between Pearl Harbor and the Pacific Coast. We did not anticipate—I say we did not anticipate—I am sure Admiral Stark did not anticipate an attack of the character which the Japanese made at Pearl Harbor, although it was always a possibility; but he did not anticipate it as a probability.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you appraise it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I did not expect an attack of that character on Pearl Harbor as I testified yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I wish you would look at these two exhibits. They are from the British Admiralty to the United States on Saturday morning of the 6th.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Do you wish me to read them, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. They are in the record. If you will just refer to them so you will know what is in them, because I want to ask you some questions about them.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that those reports were in the State Department on Saturday indicating that there was to be an attack with 14 hours on the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I don't know whether I saw this particular dispatch and I can't find my initials on it. [11359] However, at that time the Japanese forces were in that area and the attack might have come, I suppose, with 14 hours or any time, depending on what hour they selected for their landing.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you have indicated that Admiral Stark and General Marshall gave to the President a memorandum—I think one is dated on the 5th of November and one the 27th—at least both of them used the statement “to give no ultimatum to Japan”, is that correct? You are familiar with that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I would like to see the document if I could to refresh my memory.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Admiral INGERSOLL. The date of November 28 seems to stick in my craw at the moment.

Senator FERGUSON. 16 and 17 are the exhibit numbers.

While they are getting those exhibits I will ask you some other questions.

This war that we were talking about yesterday and this morning in the Atlantic was, of course, a Government decision? It wasn't the Navy alone, it was the Government, our Government, that had made the decision?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Everything that the Navy did in the Atlantic, except the details of carrying out the various [11360] movements, and so forth, was on direction, I presume, from the President. Of course, there was a certain part which was a protection of lend-lease stuff which we were sending to Europe.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, priority of goods to the Atlantic was being used because of what was being done in the Atlantic; isn't that correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I don't understand what you mean by “priority of goods”, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you have any priority to the Atlantic? I am talking about airplanes, ships. Didn't we send some ships from the Pacific, from Pearl Harbor, out to the Atlantic?

Admiral INGERSOLL. We did. The basic strategy of the war plan in effect, WPL-46, and which was also derived from ABC-1, was to defeat Germany and Italy first and to maintain a strategic defensive in the Pacific until we could defeat Germany and Italy and then concentrate on licking the Japs. And that was the strategy followed in the war.

Senator FERGUSON. We are not talking about the right or wrong of the decision. We are just trying to get the facts.

Admiral INGERSOLL. So far as the Navy Department was concerned, that decision was made for it.

[11361] Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and it followed out the decision?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wasn't this true, that because of what was going on in the Atlantic we had a shortage of equipment in the Pacific?

Admiral INGERSOLL. We had a shortage of equipment everywhere. There were certain tasks assigned to the Atlantic Fleet in that war plan. There were others assigned to the Pacific. There were tasks assigned to the Asiatic Fleet. The Chief of Naval Operations having those tasks in view endeavored to allocate the forces available to him in the proper proportion which he considered as nearly adequate as he could, the forces which were sufficient to carry out the tasks which he had assigned.

For that reason the forces in the Pacific were by no means as strong as they should have been for an offensive war, and I think the whole Navy would not have been, at that time, strong enough to carry on an offensive war in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, if we had had the entire Navy of the United States in the Pacific—

Admiral INGERSOLL. At that moment.

Senator FERGUSON. At that moment, when the war started, it would not have been sufficient to carry on an offensive war?

[11362] Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And, of course, this was all known when the fleet was moved to Hawaii, was it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was.

Senator FERGUSON. And the insufficiency of the equipment at Hawaii was known prior to the time and at the time the fleet was sent to Hawaii?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, as a result of that, didn't that place an extra burden on the Navy, creating a hazard by placing the fleet in Pearl Harbor, to be on the alert at all times to save that fleet?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I don't consider that a hazard, sir. One of the tasks of the Pacific Fleet—I should like to have the war plan here so that I can answer some of these questions a little more accurately—was to defend—

Senator FERGUSON. All right, we will see that you get the war plan.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Was to defend. One of the tasks of the Pacific Fleet was to protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific and prevent the expansion of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying to the enemy the use of land positions [11363] in that hemisphere, the Western Hemisphere.

You can't defend the Western Hemisphere, that is our west coast, from a position on the coast. You can only defend it from an advanced position, which was the Hawaiian Islands. That was the best central location from which the fleet could cover the Pacific coast, Alaska, and the Panama Canal.

If it had been on the coast, and the Japanese had made an attack on Hawaii such as they did, they couldn't possibly have caught them even if they had attacked some place on the Pacific coast. If the fleet had been actually in the place of attack and not damaged, it

couldn't have caught them, because our fleet as a whole was slower than the Japanese Fleet.

[11364] Senator FERGUSON. Now, by virtue of the lack of equipment when the fleet was at anchor in Pearl Harbor, it was in a position of peril, was it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not consider that it was, no.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't consider that it was?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it have plenty to defend itself with while laying in the harbor?

Admiral INGERSOLL. If all of the measures for the defense of Hawaii were operating, that is, if the radar were operating, if the planes in Hawaii had been alerted, if the Army had been deployed, and if antiaircraft in position, if a distant reconnaissance had been conducted in the most dangerous sector by aircraft, or if surface pickets had been sent out so that warning of an attack might have been received in time for the ships to go to general quarters, in my opinion the fleet was safer in Pearl Harbor than it would have been at sea, but I do not wish my answer to be construed that I think it should have been in Pearl Harbor because there were other circumstances which might have caused it to be out of Pearl Harbor.

But purely from the question of safety, I believe it was safer in Pearl Harbor than anywhere else.

[11365] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know at that very time that General Short had previously, on the 28th day of November sent a message to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, which was distributed to the Secretary of War, War Plans, and General Marshall, that he had interpreted the message of the 27th as an alert to sabotage and he was alerted to sabotage and had liaison with the Navy?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that have made any difference in your last answer, if you had known that the Army which was the one to defend the fleet in Pearl Harbor was only alerted to sabotage and had so notified the authorities in Washington?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Well, in order to know whether the Army had taken proper dispositions, I would have had to have known what their plan against sabotage was, but if it had meant that their planes were all lined up, wing-to-wing, that their antiaircraft guns were not in positions which they were expected to be, and that their radar was not operating, then I would have said certainly that that was not a proper condition to defend the fleet and it was their responsibility to defend the islands.

Senator FERGUSON. It turns out that that is just what happened, the planes were wing-to-wing in a sabotage [11366] alert, so they could not be destroyed by sabotage, the guns were not manned and the ammunition was not there.

Now, will you look at exhibits 16 and 17 in relation to the "no ultimatum."

Admiral INGERSOLL. After a hurried glance, remember it.

Senator FERGUSON. You remember it now?

Admiral INGERSOLL. But I should—may I digress for a moment to show you how your memory can trick you?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Because I presented at a joint board meeting on apparently the day before this memorandum was sent, I presented at that meeting the arguments why we should not precipitate a war, and when I came back here to Washington 4 years later, I had forgotten completely that I had ever presented such a memorandum at the joint board meeting. The only satisfaction I had was that it didn't sound silly after 4 years. And this was based on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Sometimes that is the test, isn't it, as to how it does sound 4 years later?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

[11367] Senator FERGUSON. Can you let me see Exhibit 16? I want to call your attention to something in it.

There was the minutes of a meeting. Yes, here it is; on the bottom of page 2 of this Exhibit 16 I am reading:

Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China—At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation.

Were you familiar with that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I probably was but I have forgotten it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Admiral Schuirmann had—here, it says this:

He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression.

Did you ever know that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I cannot recall it now unless it was phrased at the time in some other way in the note which was not at that time called an ultimatum. I have no recollection of anything being called an ultimatum at that time. [11368]

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know in Peace and War that this statement is in Peace and War?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I have never read Peace and War, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will read it to you. [Reading:]

During the August 1941 conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain the situation in the Far East was discussed and it was agreed that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression.

Did you ever know that that appeared in Peace and War published by our State Department on page 129?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I have never read Peace and War, sir. I do not know anything that is in there.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, if you had known that that was our policy and that the President on the 17th, as indicated by Schuirmann—I am just giving the date that Schuirmann indicates—on the 17th of August, on page 556 of Foreign Relations, that the President gave to the Ambassador of Japan a note containing these words, a memorandum containing these words [reading]:

Such being the case, this Government now finds it [11369] necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may

deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I probably did, now that you have read it, but I never considered that an ultimatum, nor I do not think I ever heard it called an ultimatum. I remember what you have read.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but I was only reading what Schuirmann had said on the 3d of November 1941 at a meeting.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I remember that now.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, having in mind what I have read here that the President told to the Japanese Ambassador and also what I have read out of Peace and War, the parallel action statement; then having in mind this note of Winant's coming in to us at 10:20 on Saturday morning, having in mind that we were sending out three small men-of-war over to the Gulf of Siam, having in mind the fact that we had sent planes out, how do you account for the fact that we did not anticipate [11370] that Japan, when she was going to attack Great Britain or in the Kra Peninsula would not at the same time consider that parallel action was being taken and that, therefore, she would attack our fleet which was on her flank and the only deterrent in the Pacific for her movement south? How does it come the Navy did not anticipate that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I have said before that we anticipated that the Philippines, Guam, and our outlying possessions might be attacked by Japan, as they were. We also anticipated that there would be submarines in the Eastern Pacific. We did not anticipate that—at least Admiral Stark and myself did not—that Japan would make an attack on Pearl Harbor of the character that she did.

I do not agree with your statement that the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was the only deterrent that prevented Japan from going into the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the other deterrent?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The Pacific Fleet had no train, it had no transports, it did not have sufficient oilers to leave the Hawaiian Islands on an offensive campaign and Japan knew it just as well as we did and she knew that she could make an attack in the area in which she did, that is, Southeast Asia and the Philippines, with impunity.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, as I understand it, that [11371] we were almost utterly unprepared for war in the Pacific, on your last statement.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not agree with that, that we were utterly unprepared for war. We were unprepared to make an offensive campaign, to undertake an offensive campaign in the Pacific and the task that was assigned to Admiral Kimmel in the war plan stated as follows, so far as offensive action was concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. To make raids on the Mandates, were they not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, but a raid is not a—is only a minor offensive.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, she was to make raids on the Mandates. They had to have a train to make raids, didn't they, of any distance?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Well, he had a sufficient train for minor raids but he did not have a sufficient train, nor transports, nor troops to proceed across the Pacific and establish bases and establish the fleet in the Pacific.

Somewhere in this plan—I cannot put my finger on it—is a provision that he was directed to plan for the occupation of the Marshalls and Carolines and I think that 180 days——

Senator FERGUSON. That was Truk, was it not, that she [11372] was to take Truk in 180 days, or not later, D-day plus 180 days?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think it was confined only to the Marshalls, sir. I am not certain if Truk was mentioned. However, he would have required a long time for such an advance in force across the Pacific because he did not have the force to do it and we knew it and the Japs knew it, too.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know that Admiral Hart had sent a message to OPNAV, which was your department, on the 6th to this effect?

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I probably saw the dispatch but I cannot recall it now.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know that we had assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Only as it was provided in the war plan and in ABC-1, that should the United States be involved in war then we would do certain things, we had certain areas allocated for our spheres, but there was nothing in the war plan which obligated the United States, so far as I know, to go to the assistance of Great Britain if Great Britain was attacked. That was a decision which the Navy Department could [11373] not make.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand the Navy Department could not make it; it had to be made by someone else other than the Navy Department.

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But what I am trying to find out is whether or not the Navy Department had any information along this line so that she could have acted?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I have no information that the Navy Department had any directions to go to the aid of the British, we will say, if the British were attacked.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, that would indicate, then, that all this information about the movement into the Kra Peninsula was of no value in alerting you here in Washington in OPNAV because you knew of no commitments that we had to go to the aid of the British.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I cannot agree with that statement, sir, because all our own possessions, such as the Philippines, were endangered by the concentration of Japanese troops, which still remained in the Pescadores and the coast of China and in Formosa. They were a direct threat there and only 24 hours away from the Philippines; also Guam, which is a little farther away.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not anticipate an air [11374] attack on Hawaii?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I did not think that an air attack would be made on Hawaii; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And when you testified to what was meant by "preparatory deployment" in the dispatch of October the 16th you

said this, and I will read part of your testimony and ask you whether you agree with it today :

I think the preparatory deployment that would not constitute provocative action and disclose strategic intentions against Japan referred more to the withdrawal of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area toward the southeastern Philippines rather than to any particular deployment of the Pacific Fleet, with the possible exceptions of sending out submarines for observation.

Is that correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct so far as carrying out the tasks prescribed in the war plan. The withdrawal from the Manila area was a part of Admiral Hart's plan. Also, "take measures, whatever measures were necessary for the security of the Fleet at Hawaii" might be construed also as a part of a defensive deployment and, as a matter of fact, Admiral Kimmel in his own war plan had just such measures prescribed by him at the time we were not at war with Japan, [11375] in what he called the first phase.

Senator FERGUSON. Now let us come back to Washington on the day of the 6th. Do you remember the 6th of December in relation to your work, anything happening up until the time that you went home that was unusual as far as messages were concerned or information?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Well, all of those days were busy days.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

Admiral INGERSOLL. And I cannot pick out now out of the air a particular thing.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, when did you first learn that there was a message coming in, being intercepted from Japan, that was indicating an answer to the message of Secretary of State Hull of the 26th of November? You know the message I am talking about.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes. I never learned that it was coming in. The first I heard about it was when I was awakened some time on the very late evening of the sixth or the morning of the seventh and, as I said before, I do not know whether it was before or after midnight when I was shown the first thirteen parts of the message that had been translated.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I never learned that that message was coming in and that it was being translated.

[11376] Senator FERGUSON. All right. And I assume that you read it that night when they showed it to you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were there any other messages with it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not recall any now.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there a pilot message with it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I never heard of a pilot message until I heard them talking about it yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know what we are talking about when we are talking about this pilot message?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to show it to you. It is called "pilot" because it merely indicates that there was a message to come and it was to be delivered when they were told to deliver it.

If you will look on the bottom of page 238, it is the message there from Tokyo to Washington, December the 6th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of Exhibit 1, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, Exhibit 1. And it is translated on the 6th of December.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not know whether I saw that or not; I do not recall it. Being dated the 6th the usual thing would have been I would have seen it on the morning of [11377] the seventh, when dispatches of this character were distributed.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, there was a distribution, though, Saturday night.

Admiral INGERSOLL. There was a distribution, so far as I was concerned, on Saturday night, of what they told me were the first 13 parts of a 14-part message and they also told me that those 13 parts had been or would be taken to Mr. Knox and to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. And that being true I assume that you assumed that it would be taken care of and proper action would be taken on the 13 parts.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes; and when I read the 13 parts there was nothing on which the Navy Department as such could that night take action. The gist of the 13 parts was a restatement of the Japanese position which we had known, of course, all along.

Senator FERGUSON. As a matter of fact, the Secretary of State had turned it over to the Navy and said that he was through as far as any negotiations were concerned on the 27th, did he not.

Admiral INGERSOLL. That was correct. That is, I have read that he said so.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you knew that at the time?

[11378] Admiral INGERSOLL. I did not know what the Secretary said at the time but I knew when Admiral Stark sent out the message of the 27th that so far as the State Department and the Navy Department were concerned negotiations were finished, but everything after that was just for the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; just for the record. Now, Admiral, you knew where you had been Saturday evening. You could be reached at your home.

Admiral INGERSOLL. So far as I knew I was at my home from the time I left the Navy Department and I do not know now what time I left the Navy Department. I was there many nights until 8 and 9 o'clock in the evening and I do not remember now what time I left the Navy Department but I was at my home.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you contact Admiral Stark that evening?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know where he was?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not think I did but I am certain that after having seen what this 13-part message had in it that if the officers who brought it there had mentioned Admiral Stark I would have told them not to take it to him that night because all it had in it was a restatement of the Japanese position from way back and there was nothing on [11379] which the Navy Department as such could have taken action.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know it was of sufficient importance that Secretary Knox of the Navy got in touch with the Secretary of State that night and the Secretary of War and called a conference for 10 o'clock Sunday morning?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I did not know at the time but I presume that the reason for the conference was because they were expecting the fourteenth part, which would probably have the meat in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you say that it only indicated what you knew before, the 13 parts; that is, that everything was through, that this was for the record. You read that from the 13 parts?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why wait on the fourteenth part? What difference does it make as to what the fourteenth part said? This was all for the record and you knew what it was saying.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I don't know what the fourteenth part—I did not know at the time what the fourteenth part was going to contain, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then you went back to your home and went to bed. You got up the next morning and what time did you get down to the office?

[11380] Admiral INGERSOLL. I was down there some time between 8 and 9 o'clock Sunday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. And was there a meeting at 8 or 9, between 8 and 9 o'clock?

Admiral INGERSOLL. There was no scheduled meeting. Admiral Stark came in somewhere around that time and the officers began bringing in dispatches. I believe the fourteenth part was delivered to Admiral Stark that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. About what time?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not know; sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you at a meeting with Admiral Stark in his office?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I was in and out of the office, of course, all the time. Our offices were—

Senator FERGUSON. Adjoining?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Not adjoining, but there was an entrance way and the Secretary's room between them and I was in and out all the time. I have forgotten exactly what we talked about when he came in or whether we even talked, whether I even talked to him the moment he came in.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there was nothing happened at any meeting where you were present with Admiral Stark on Sunday morning after the fourteenth part arrived that indicated war?

[11381] Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not recall that Admiral Stark after—in fact, I am certain that Admiral Stark after he received the fourteenth part of the message did not call me at that time. I do not think—or I think that I did not learn of the contents of the fourteenth part and of the instructions to the ambassadors to deliver the whole message at 1 o'clock until after Admiral Stark told me of his conversation with General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. So that was some time after 11:30?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It must have been.

Senator FERGUSON. After 11:30.

Admiral INGERSOLL. But I had on my—when I got down there in the morning I would have a stack of dispatches as big as that and things to go over in connection with other matters of the fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. It had nothing to do with this fourteenth part?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Nothing to do with me. Other matters of the department, which were down in my sphere and not up in the high levels.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether or not Admiral Stark talked to the President that morning?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. After he talked with General Marshall [11382] you had a conversation with him?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes. He told me that he had talked to General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And did you see General Marshall on the 7th?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the conversation that you had with Admiral Stark after he had talked with General Marshall?

Admiral INGERSOLL. As I recall, Admiral Stark said that he had, after seeing the dispatch regarding the delivery of the Japanese message at 1 o'clock, that he had called up General Marshall about it and at first he thought that he would not send anything to Admiral Kimmel because we had already sent him a lot of stuff and then he almost immediately changed his mind and called General Marshall and said he thought they should send it to Admiral Kimmel and to General Short.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the conversation you had with him that morning?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is as I remember it in general terms; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; in substance.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not know whether he used those exact words.

[11383] Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That is it in substance.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. We do not expect the exact language.

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is the substance; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you that morning were working on something else and, therefore, there was nothing unusual except this one conversation with Admiral Stark.

Admiral INGERSOLL. It is difficult to remember all of the details of a day because the officers, the heads of departments would come in to talk over other matters, there were dispatches to release, to send out, there were telephone calls to answer. I cannot recall the details of everything that happened that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least nothing happened that indicated to you about this 1 o'clock message of delivery being dawn at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No. I think that that just did not hit me, that is all.

Senator FERGUSON. That just did not hit you.

Admiral INGERSOLL. As a matter of fact, I do not know when Admiral Stark told me about the delivery at 1 o'clock or delivery—yes, 1 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it was after the attack that he told you about that?

[11384] Admiral INGERSOLL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Some time before?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It must have been; I know it was before. Yes; it was before.

Senator FERGUSON. But when he discussed it with you nothing hit you, as you say, that 1 o'clock meant dawn at Pearl Harbor and that there might be an attack there, because war was unorthodox, as we have found out in Europe, as we had found out in the Atlantic, and you were looking for unorthodox things, were you not, at that time?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I have said all along, Senator, that I personally did not expect an attack of that kind at Pearl Harbor, so it is natural that it did not occur to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know that Admiral Kimmel was not receiving the magic as far as the purple was concerned and the diplomatic messages?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am not sure whether I knew that or not, sir. That was a part of the mechanics of that complicated system, and I do not know whether I knew that Admiral Kimmel was not receiving it or not. I knew, of course, that he was a source of information regarding movements of ships obtained by radio direction finders and analysis of traffic.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGERSOLL. And I am not certain whether I knew [11385] whether he was not getting those dispatches or not. It is very difficult after 4 years to know what you now know as to whether you knew it before that time or whether you learned it after.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that. Well, now, that fact that you knew that he was getting radio messages as far as finding ships were concerned—there had been a dispute between Com 16, which was at the Philippines, and Com 14, which was at Hawaii, and on the 24th—I will ask you to look at the message, whether or not that did not indicate that they were going to take Com 16's word instead of Com 14's word because they were nearer to Tokyo?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am not familiar with the details on which that dispatch was based.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, is this true then, Admiral, that when Admiral Stark was there at the office—

Admiral INGERSOLL. Sunday morning?

Senator FERGUSON. No, when he was able to be reached, that you did not get these intercepted messages and that you did not have full, detailed knowledge of what was going on in the Pacific?

Admiral INGERSOLL. What messages are you talking about, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about these diplomatic [11386] messages in Exhibit 1 there, the ship movement messages that we showed you yesterday, that someone showed you in Exhibit 2.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I saw a great many of those when they were brought around and I am pretty sure that there are some that I did not see.

Just, for example, what I was talking about yesterday: I am certain that I did not see at that time any of the dispatches from Japan directing their consuls and diplomats to destroy their codes. There are half a dozen or more, maybe fifteen or twenty. They brought in to me for release the message to our fleets, informing them that the codes

were to be destroyed. I remember that very, very distinctly because that is important. I am absolutely positive that I never saw the fifteen or dozen messages on which that dispatch was based.

So that when I now say that I do not recall seeing this message, I am not sure that I did see this or that message. I saw a great many, some of which I remember, and I have seen other messages which I now recall that I had no recollection of seeing.

I remember one, for example, which reported the movements of a British battleship up at Puget Sound. I had forgotten it completely until I saw it in this exhibit and then I remembered having seen it. I would have sworn on a stack of Bibles as high as the Washington monument last July that I [11387] never had seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, as I understand it, then, all these messages were not delivered to you and who selected the messages to be delivered to you, or was it on occasions when Admiral Stark was absent that you were shown the messages?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The Director of Naval Intelligence was the one under whom the distribution of these messages was made and the officers would bring these dispatches around and they would sometimes leave the folder on your desk or they would leave it with Admiral Stark's aide and sometimes they would be clipped to show you an important message. There were some times where I might be absent from my office for a good part of the day for conferences or other reasons and I might have missed a day's messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Then what I am getting at, how could anyone evaluate these messages if they were missing some of them?

Admiral INGERSOLL. As I told you before—

Senator FERGUSON. That was not your job.

Admiral INGERSOLL (continuing). When I first started my testimony and when I was describing my duties there, I did not have original cognizance of war plans, nor of Intelligence nor of communications. I was a funnel through which [11388] stuff was relayed to try to take the load off of Admiral Stark of all the details and that I endeavored to do and that was a busy job.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were working then on the details. Could you tell us this: Who would know why planes were not being sent to Pearl Harbor for defense as was being requested by Admiral Kimmel and if they were being sent elsewhere? Who would have charge of that? Would you know about that if you were handling the details?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, I would know about that but the actual distribution of planes between the Atlantic and the Pacific was almost exactly about in accordance with the distribution of forces assigned to the Atlantic and Pacific in WPL-46. Also, the distribution of ships was almost in accordance with that.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the distribution of planes on lend-lease, and so forth? Who had charge of that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I cannot tell you anything about lend-lease, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you do not know what proportion was coming to America for its defense and what was going to lend-lease in the war effort?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I cannot tell you anything about that.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't knowledge of that and [11389] even though you had charge of the details you cannot give us that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at this moment.

Who represented the Navy on this lend-lease?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Admiral Reeves, I believe, was the Navy Department's representative on that.

Senator FERGUSON. But that did not come to you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I want to ask you just a few questions on the winds execute message. They showed you the execute message prior to the 7th, as I understand it; someone came into your office and showed you the message.

Admiral INGERSOLL. They showed me what was supposed to be one at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Admiral INGERSOLL. And I believed it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And you believed it. Now, you never knew until after attack that that was not a genuine winds message?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not know that I ever knew until some time after the Court of Inquiry last year that that was not a genuine message. I believed it was.

[11390] Senator FERGUSON. Yes, you believed it was and, therefore, your conduct was based in relation to that message upon it being a genuine winds message, execute message?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No, because it came in after the destruction of the codes and it did not mean anything, particularly after that. It was not important.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you say, but it was not because you thought it was phoney?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. It was merely because it was considered information, is that correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The use that I made of it was only that it was a confirmation of the other.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, is J. M. Reeves—was he the Admiral in charge of lend-lease?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct, sir. He was retired.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the same man that was on the Roberts Commission, is he not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. He is.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So the Admiral who was in charge of lend-lease, the distribution of these planes to lend-lease or to our defense, was the same as the one on the Commission, there is no doubt about that?

[11391] Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not know to what extent Admiral Reeves made decisions as to who was given what. I simply know that he was the officer in the Navy Department who handled lend-lease matters until they got down to the bureaus for the actual release of material.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, all right. Now I want to talk to you about the code messages that you did not see but which came to you

to be sent out to Kimmel and Short. You remember the destruction of codes?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, does the destruction of codes necessarily mean war, that a country that destroys its codes is going to commit an overt act of war or declare war?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It meant that to us, particularly the destruction of codes in the consulates.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, if that is true, then did it mean the same thing when we sent a message to Tokyo to destroy our codes and our code machines, that we intended to declare war and commit overt acts?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It would have meant to Tokyo had they been able to read the dispatch that we expected to be at war with Japan soon but not necessarily that we were going to declare war on Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, isn't that exactly what it could [11392] have meant here when they were destroying their codes, that no overt act would be necessarily committed but they did not want this country to be in a position to raid their embassy and take their codes whether or not there was war or not? Isn't that true?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I don't know why they sent out the dispatch, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But would you say that all Navy men would come to the conclusion that the moment that codes were going to be destroyed that that meant war between the countries?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That was what we construed it and I think everybody construed it, that it would mean that.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you know of no one in the high command in the Navy that construed the destruction of the codes in any other way than you construed them?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think everybody in the Navy Department construed the destruction of the codes as the fact that Japan expected to be at war very shortly with the three countries that were involved in that series of messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we come to this conclusion, that at least on the 4th—I think that is the date they sent the messages out, was it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Third or fourth.

[11393] Senator FERGUSON. Third or fourth, that everyone in the Navy, as far as the high command was concerned, were alerted that war was going to occur between America and Japan?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Those instructions were sent to certain commanders, to the commanders of the fleet, to the naval attachés in Peiping and to the Marine detachments and others and the purpose of sending it to them was to inform them that we expected to be at war—or that Japan expected to be at war with those countries in a very short time.

Senator FERGUSON. And our country was one of them?

Admiral INGERSOLL. And our country was one of them.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, why didn't you tell them when you sent out those messages that the Navy Department, the high command, had interpreted these destruction of code messages as meaning immediate war? Why did you leave it open for two constructions?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was expected that they would understand it and if they did not understand it nobody asked any questions about it. We never had one inquiry from any commander afloat as to what the dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations meant or what their import was, nor asking for any elaboration and in the absence of those we had to construe that his instructions were understood.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you look on page 45 of [11394] Exhibit 37? That is the message sent on the 6th and I understand was not delivered until Monday. That is the one reading:

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

Did you release or know that that had not been delivered until Monday?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Admiral Noyes—

Senator FERGUSON. At least until after the attack?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Admiral Noyes and I discussed that message yesterday, sir, and I think Admiral Noyes is prepared to give you the answer to it. I cannot answer your question that it was not delivered on the 6th or the 7th or any other date.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now let us go to page 40 and 41 of Exhibit 37.

Admiral INGERSOLL. 40 and 41?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I want to read this and I want to ask you a few questions about them. Now, you told me that [11395] you did not see these messages, that you were only brought in certain messages that you released. When did you release these?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The one on page 40 I released.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then you did see this one?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not see the intercepts is what you had in mind?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It says in here that there were—the consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London. I did not see all of the dispatches that were received on which this dispatch was based.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Admiral INGERSOLL. As a matter of fact, I don't think I saw any of them.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, it says:

Highly reliable information has been received that categorical and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London—
now, this is the important part—

to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

[11396] Didn't that indicate that they were only to destroy most of them and hold on to certain codes and code machines so that they could get more information?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you say that that meant immediate war?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I said that they expected to be at war in a very short time.

Senator FERGUSON. Just the destruction of a number of their codes indicated they were going to be at war in a very short time, was that the interpretation?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It meant that to us.

Senator FERGUSON. It meant that to you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. And apparently that was true because within five days we were at war.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it is proven——

Admiral INGERSOLL. It is proven it was a correct assumption.

Senator FERGUSON. But you knew that they were keeping some of the machines because you were getting traffic over it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, circular 2444, on page 41, from Tokyo, December 1, ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila—not Washington, Washington is not mentioned in this message——

to destroy machine. Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy. All but one copy of other systems and all secret documents. British Admiralty London today reports embassy London has complied.

Now, doesn't that still leave in Washington some code machines and does that mean war?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It meant they were hanging onto something until the last moment, that is all it means.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were waiting for that last moment.

Admiral INGERSOLL. This particular dispatch I did not see. It refers to the details and is largely for the purpose of enabling the various people who were concerned with cryptography to know what had gone out and what systems were being maintained until the last moment.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, this one talked about machines. The previous one only about codes and it did not say anything about destroying the machines here in Washington.

Admiral INGERSOLL. The purpose of this is for the experts who do the cryptography to know what particular systems were being used. The other was for the laity, so to speak, that did not care whether it was a machine or a code [11398] book or what.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of a message being sent out of ONI and the Army to the effect that the embassy here were burning their codes on the night of the 5th of December?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I don't know whether I saw it or not, nor whether I knew it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have anything to do with answering Admiral Hart's inquiry about the Phillips conversation, that he had with Admiral Phillips?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I will say I had nothing to do about drafting the reply because I did not sit in on the deliberations for ABC-1 and so certainly would not—I was not familiar with it. That would normally have been answered in the War Plans Division by

Admiral Turner, who had original cognizance of most of that, of matters of that kind and who was a member of our delegation who sat in on the preparation of ABC-1.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. And you did not discuss with Admiral Stark what our position was in relation to ABC-1 or ABCD?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am not sure whether they were talking about ABCD-1 at that time or ABC-1.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at least you did not discuss with Admiral Stark as to what our position was going to be [11399] if an attack was made in the South Pacific and we were not attacked?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not know whether I discussed it with him or not. We talked about everything under the sun, but, of course, it was perfectly clear in everybody's mind that if the United States possessions were not attacked that there was nothing that the Navy Department could do about it until we got further instructions from somebody.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is what you had discussed with Admiral Stark?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not know whether I discussed it or not but everybody understood that position and I do not know whether a reply was ever drafted to Admiral Hart. War may have come before the question was answered.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Senator LUCAS. I have a few questions.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Ingersoll, I have a faint recollection of reading something in the public prints back in 1940 or 1941 that you were sent on a very secret mission to London by the President. Is that correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. You are correct except as to your [11400] date, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When did that occur?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Just to show again how memory can trick a person, Admiral Richardson, I read in the paper, had testified that I went to London in 1940 when I was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and when Admiral Stark was Chief of Naval Operations. As a matter of fact, I went in December, very late in December of 1937, when I was Director of the War Plans Division and when Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Richardson was perfectly sincere in what he said.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, that was pretty early, before events began to develop.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I got there probably—I believe on New Year's eve of 1937, so if you want to ask me any questions about it, sir, my memory is just that much worse. It is 8 years ago. I will be glad to answer anything that you care to ask me.

Mr. GEARHART. Did your mission have anything to do with anything which later became important and material to the inquiry that is now being conducted?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think it had none whatever. I am perfectly willing to tell you what I can now. I was sent over there for two purposes.

[11401] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I am just wondering as to whether or not this committee has a right to go into what occurred in London in 1937 that has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think it is germane to the inquiry.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if it is germane, all right.

Admiral INGERSOLL. There were two purposes. The primary purpose was to investigate and to talk with the British Admiralty officials as to what we could do if the United States and Japan were to find themselves at war with Japan in the Pacific.

Mr. RICHARDSON. United States and England.

Admiral INGERSOLL. United States and England would find themselves at war with Japan in the Pacific, to explore all the means, what means could be used, what arrangements it would be necessary to make in regard to command relationships, in regard to communicating with each other, of establishing liaison officers and preparing certain codes and ciphers, and so forth.

The purpose next of the visit, the other purpose was to take up with the British the question of getting out of the qualitative limitations of the size of battleships which had been stipulated in the London Naval Treaty of 1935 and 1936.

[11402] There was a great deal of mystery about the visit, according to the News Week, I think it was, in which there was no truth whatever in the story in News Week, except that I had gone to London, and when I came back there was considerable curiosity, I believe, on the Hill as to why I had gone and I think it was finally elicited out of Admiral Leahy that I had gone over there to discuss the London Naval Treaty of 1936 with the British.

I brought back with me a paper called, "Record of Conversations" and that paper was signed by Captain Phillips, who was the head of the War Plans Division, the British Admiral, who was later Admiral Phillips and killed on the Prince of Wales shortly after the war began.

I was in conversation with—I had no conversations with anybody but—I will detail the conversations first.

I saw the charge d'affaire, who was the American charge d'affaire and told him the purpose. He took me to Mr. Anthony Eden, who was the Foreign Minister at that time. He said it was entirely an Admiralty matter and the Admiralty turned me over to the War Plans Division and my only discussions were with the War Plans Division. It was of no higher level than the two Directors of War Plans of the respective Navy Departments.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you mean the War Plans Division of the British? [11403]

Admiral INGERSOLL. The War Plans Division of the British Admiralty staff and our own. Captain Phillips and I were opposite members or parts of our staffs. There were no commitments in this document of any character. It became a dead cat when ABC-1 was agreed upon, because that superseded everything that was in the record of the conversations, primarily, of course, because Germany was in the war at that time.

So that there was nothing in this talk or any agreements between the British and ourselves that you might say that was based on that record of conversations except possibly the original distribution of codes and ciphers because we got up a reserve stock which were distributed in

case they were needed anywhere, which gave the communication officers code and call signs, and so forth.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you establish and agree upon a code for communications subsequent to that visit?

Admiral INGERSOLL. We took an allied code which the British already had. The codes were not distributed to our Navy. They were placed in reserve in various places in British hands. There were a large number here in the British Admiralty so that they could be handled by the communications officers if they had to use them, but they were never distributed to each other. None of the documents that I speak of, I mean call signs and radio intelligence or anything like that—I mean radio frequency organization.

[11404] Mr. GEARHART. Were the assumptions upon which these conversations were based that the United States and Britain would be in war together?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The assumption was that the United States and Great Britain might find themselves both at war with Japan in the Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. And your purpose in going there was to work out a tentative plan as to how each nation would cooperate with the other in the event that should occur?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is right, to find out what we could do, what forces we could expect. The British had to be a little bit careful about it because they did not know at that time whether they were going to have, in a year or two, a European war on their hands, and they could not state definitely what forces they could allocate to the Pacific at that time.

It would depend on whether they were involved in Europe.

Mr. GEARHART. This was in 1937?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I got to London, I think, on the New Year's Eve of 1937, so the discussions were in the first two or three weeks of 1938.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, Britain was not then at war with even Germany.

[11405] Admiral INGERSOLL. That is what I say.

Mr. GEARHART. She was looking very deeply into the future at the time you entered into these conversations, was she not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. At that time was war with Japan considered as being more possible than war in the European Continent?

Admiral INGERSOLL. As I said, this is 8 years ago, sir, and I cannot at the moment tell the exact diplomatic situation that caused the President to send me at that time. I have forgotten just what the international situation as regards Japan was at that time.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you go there to discuss Japan or Germany?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Japan only.

Mr. GEARHART. And because England was more disturbed with the possibility of war with Germany, they could not give you definite answers in respect to what they would do in the Pacific in the event they were involved in a war there; is that correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It referred largely to the numbers of ships that they could send to the Pacific if they were involved at the same time in a war in Europe and in the [11406] Mediterranean. In

other words, they could not say definitely how many battleships or how many carriers or destroyers they could send.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you have said that you discussed the possibility of the United States and England both being involved in a war with Japan. Did you discuss the hypothetical situation of Britain being involved and the United States not being involved, or the United States being involved and Britain not being involved?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No.

Mr. GEARHART. All of your discussions were based upon the assumption that both might be involved; is that correct?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct, as to what we could do together.

Mr. GEARHART. Was there any discussion of the possibilities that the United States might not be interested in being on the side of the British, or the British might not be interested in being on the side of the Americans in the event that hostilities arose in the Orient?

Admiral INGERSOLL. These conversations were on a lower level than that, sir. They were conversations of the two war plans divisions to get down to brass tacks as to what we could do in the way of ships, men, and [11407] planes.

Mr. GEARHART. Was any other nation drawn into the conversations? For instance, the Dutch?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The Dutch did not participate in the discussions. The only way in which the Dutch came into the thing was as to whether or not the Dutch would be allies, or whether we could hope for benevolent neutrality on the part of the Dutch. We did not know what the Dutch would do.

The Dutch were not told about it, as far as I know.

Mr. GEARHART. No representative of the Netherlands sat in on those conversations?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No. The only representatives of the United States were myself and the naval attaché in London, whom I took along so that he could bring along with him what we said, and we could prepare notes when we got through, and we could remember what was said by each party, and there was Captain Phillips, and two other officers, and sometimes three or four other officers of the British War Plans Division.

Mr. GEARHART. The Captain Phillips you refer to was a British officer?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. He was your opposite there?

[11408] Admiral INGERSOLL. He was my opposite over there in War Plans. It was quite a low level conference.

Mr. GEARHART. Were any naval officers of the French Government present in those discussions?

Admiral INGERSOLL. There was nobody present, sir, except two Americans, and most of the time three and sometimes four British officers.

Mr. GEARHART. Who were the Americans that participated with you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Captain Russell Wilsson, the naval attaché, who is now Vice Admiral Wilsson. I took him along to remember what we had said, and what the British had said, and we wrote it down after each meeting.

Mr. GEARHART. You spoke of two or three Americans.

Admiral INGERSOLL. No; two or three British, and sometimes four.

Mr. GEARHART. And yourself and the naval attaché from the American Embassy in London?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is right.

Mr. GEARHART. Before you returned to Washington, did you have any conversations independently with the French, the Belgians, or the Dutch in which you discussed the same general subject?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I never talked about this thing [11409] with anybody except the three or four British officers that I told you about.

Senator LUCAS. How about the Irish?

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Did you have any discussions with the Irish?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Unless some of the British officers were Irish, I do not know.

Mr. GEARHART. That is not always so facetious, you know, because we were having discussions with Ireland later.

Mr. MURPHY. What is going on about the Irish here?

Mr. GEARHART. And you were sent on that mission by the President?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, sir; I was called over to the White House before I went to London, to receive my instructions.

Mr. GEARHART. As you now remember it, will you tell us what those instructions were?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The instructions were to explore with the British what we could do if we both found ourselves involved in a war in the Far East with Japan.

Also to take up the question regarding the limitation on the size of capital ships which was stipulated in the London Treaty of 1936. I am not certain whether [11410] I got the latter instructions from the President or from Admiral Leahy about the capital ships.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, will you say whether or not it was 1936 or 1937 that you made the trip?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I stated definitely, sir, that it was in the latter part of December of 1937 that I arrived in London, I believe on New Year's Eve, of 1937, and the discussions took place the first 2 or 3 weeks of January 1938. I was away from Washington exactly 30 days.

Mr. GEARHART. You have said over and over again you wanted to explore what the United States could do, and what the British could do.

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is right.

Mr. GEARHART. The discussions did not go as far as what the United States would do, or what the British would do?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was not an agreement. There was nothing binding on anybody. It was simply to ascertain what could be done.

Mr. GEARHART. It had only to do with possible cooperative military action?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. I did not know it started so soon.

[11411] Thank you, Admiral.

Admiral INGERSOLL. As I say, that record of conversations became entirely obsolete when the later agreements in ABC-1 were in effect in 1940 or 1941.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire, Admiral.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, you are sure you did not talk about the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, when you were in London there in 1937?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am sure we did not.

Senator LUCAS. Now, Admiral, all through these hearings there has been an implication that there was some sort of wrong that we had committed in this country by having these conversations with the British and Dutch.

I would like to ask you what our position would have been on December 7, 1941, with respect to the English and Dutch if we had not had some preliminary planning with these countries prior to that time, on the theory that Japan might attack both Britain and the United States at the same time, which she did?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It would have been indefensible.

Senator LUCAS. What do you mean by "it would have [11412] been indefensible"?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Rather inexcusable, not to have done so.

Senator LUCAS. Well, would you care to elaborate a little further and give us your reasons, give the committee your reasons as to why it would have been inexcusable? That question has been asked over and over again in these committee hearings, that is, the possibility of having some sort of joint agreement, or the possibility of having some joint warning against Japan has been given here in these hearings, and an inference, at least an implication that it would have been highly improper for us to have done anything of that kind.

That is the reason I want to have you answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield for a moment?

Senator LUCAS. I want him to answer the question first.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and answer it.

Admiral INGERSOLL. The answer is that everybody knew as indicated by this trip that I made to London in 1938, that sooner or later we were all going to be involved in a war in the Pacific which would include the Dutch, the [11413] Chinese possibly, the Russians, the British, and ourselves, and we had to make preliminary arrangements to explore what could be done to arrange for a means of communicating with each other, for establishing liaison, intelligence, and other things, so if war did come, we would not be floundering around for months until we got together.

Does that answer your question?

Senator LUCAS. That answers my question.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

Senator LUCAS. Just a moment. Let me finish. You had a long, long time with the Admiral, and I just had a second or two.

Senator FERGUSON. I consider the insinuations that were made because of some questions that I asked, and I just wanted to make it clear on the record.

Senator LUCAS. You make it clear after I finish, Senator. If the shoe fits on the question I asked, you will have to wear it and explain it later.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not have to make any explanations to you, but I will on this record.

Senator LUCAS. That is all right. I am part of the record here.

[11414] Admiral in the event these plans had not been originated between the English and the Dutch and this country you state it would have been indefensible and inexcusable, and in that I agree with you.

Do you further agree with me that if that had not been done and considering the months that it would have taken floundering around to then prepare a joint defense against the peace-loving Japs, that we would have lost probably many, many men and material, and what not, as the result of our failure to prepare in advance?

Admiral INGERSOLL. There is no question that we should have done just exactly what we did. Of course it was difficult to estimate just what would have been saved or not, but there is no question about it, we would have been floundering about for months until we got together and be able to cooperate and operate with each other successfully.

Senator LUCAS. Now I want to ask you one question, Admiral, with respect to a question that was asked yesterday by Congressman Gearhart. He said:

Did it not involve the sending of the Fleet down into the Marshalls before the Jap attack, and we became involved in this war?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I haven't the plan here, but my recollection of the plan was that the offensive movement [11415] to the Marshalls did not take place until D plus 180.

Can you verify that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I was trying to look for that here.

Senator LUCAS. Is that in the War Plans?

Mr. MURPHY. Section 3212, volume 1, of the Naval Narrative, page 103, subsection B.

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is the joint plan.

Mr. MURPHY. Page 103 of the Naval Narrative, section 3212.

Senator LUCAS. Here is the Navy plan here that was prepared, I think, by Admiral Kimmel, Exhibit 114.

Mr. MURPHY. Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He is looking for WPL-46.

Admiral INGERSOLL. It should be in the Navy Basic Plan.

Mr. MURPHY. Navy Basic War Plan, page 103 of the Naval Narrative.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes. That says there:

Prepare to capture and establish control over the Carolines and Marshall Island area and to establish an advance fleet base in Truk.

But there is another place in the plan where the date is given for that. Here it is. It is on page 30, in section 3215. It says:

The plan for the execution of task B of paragraph 3212, [11416] assuming the availability of approximately 30,000 Army troops in addition to the forces of the Pacific Fleet, and assuming that the Pacific will be scouted on 180 M.

Senator LUCAS. What does that mean?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That means 180 days after the declaration of war, or the declaration of mobilization. There was no mobilization date.

Senator LUCAS. Now do I understand by that plan, or that part of the plan that you have just read, that before any real offensive would

be taken by the Pacific Fleet it would be necessary for them to make proper preparations, and 180 days was required for that purpose?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was not only for their preparation but for Navy Department to acquire the necessary tankers, store ships, ammunition ships, troop ships, to train the troops for amphibious operations, and everything else which was required in an operation of that magnitude.

Senator LUCAS. Under those plans were there any particular reasons why those planes that were under the control of Admiral Kimmel and were equipped for long-range reconnaissance should not have been operating as such after the receipt of the war warning message at least of November 27?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I answered that question yesterday by stating I was very much surprised that the attack was not [11417] detected. If I had Admiral Kimmel's plan I could read you something there as one of the reasons why I expected the planes would be out.

Senator LUCAS. All right, hand the Admiral the Kimmel plan. I want to get that.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Admiral Kimmel had this thing divided up into two phases. The first phase was one in which we were not at war with Japan, and the second phase was when we were at war with Japan.

PHASE I. The initial phase—Japan not in the war.

That would be the status from the time the war warning was sent out, or even before that, until we were at war with Japan.

Phase I—A was the initial task. "Japan in the war," and phase II, and so forth, were succeeding tasks. Now he lays down the following task in his plan for phase I:

Two initial tasks, Japan not in the war: Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations thereafter.

Maintaining all types in constant readiness for distant service.

Maintain Fleet security at bases and at anchorages, and at sea.

Transfer the Atlantic reinforcements, if required.

Assign 12 patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific [11418] Southern and similar forces to Pacific Northeast Naval Coastal Frontier on M-Day.

Assign two submarines and all submarine rescue vessels to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.

Protect communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking forces.

Senator LUCAS. What does he mean by that "striking forces"?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That would be anything sent out in the way of a raid.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral INGERSOLL. One of the principal things he speaks of in here, as to why I expected they would have patrol planes out, was the security of his ships in bases, at sea, or elsewhere after or during phase I, which was Japan not in the war.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in other words, under the plan that was agreed upon by the Office of Naval Operations and Admiral Kimmel in the beginning this was to be a defensive war in the event Japan struck us?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I would like to differ with you a little bit.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

[11419] Admiral INGERSOLL. In the first place, it was not agreed upon with Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Kimmel was told by the Navy Department. Admiral Kimmel did not have to agree to the plan.

He was given certain tasks in the Navy basic plan, so I would not say that Admiral Kimmel agreed to it. He was just told.

Senator LUCAS. He was told by the Office of Naval Operations what to do?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. And, as I understand it, under that plan in the event Japan struck us, at least for 180 days we were to carry on more or less of a defensive war in the Pacific before we started out on an offensive?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct, sir. There is also one other task in here which I did not give. It says:

Guard against surprise attacks by Japan.

That was task M.

Senator LUCAS. Now, Admiral, if we were not going to start a real offensive until 180 days after Japan struck us, can you think of any reason whatsoever that Admiral Kimmel, who under the joint arrangement out there, had charge of the long-range reconnaissance planes, should not have had long-range reconnaissance operating from November 27 on through [11/20] to the time we struck, with whatever planes we had even if it were only three?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I had every reason to expect that he would do that, and I was surprised that he had not done it.

As I stated the other day, I was very much surprised that the attack had gotten in undetected.

Senator LUCAS. What reason could be assigned for not using the planes for long-distance reconnaissance if we were not going to really start an offensive for some six months afterwards?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think that is a question that Admiral Kimmel would have to answer. I expected that it would be done not only because the planes were there, but because this plan inferred that it was going to be done. It never occurred to me that it was not being done.

Senator LUCAS. As I recall, Admiral Kimmel testified that he was training his planes and his fleet ready for war, and I got the distinct impression from his testimony—and I may be wrong—that he was getting ready to move out on a moment's notice, and therefore was training his fleet to fight, and his men to fight.

But there cannot be any question that under this war plan he could not really have taken any kind of a serious offensive in the Pacific until some six months after the war [11/21] began?

Admiral INGERSOLL. His first major operation and the occupation of bases in the Pacific was 180 days. He was not required to do that just then. He had other tasks there.

Senator LUCAS. I see counsel shaking his head, and I do not want to be wrong.

Admiral INGERSOLL. He had other tasks which would fully occupy his forces. He could not undertake a major operation, such as we did later in the war, like the capture of Guam, or the capture of Saipan, or Iwo Jima, he could not have done that with the forces he had at that time.

Senator LUCAS. I agree upon that, too, but in view of the fact that he could not move forward with a major operation of any kind, that would be all the more reason, as I see it, why he should use these planes for reconnaissance purposes, at least do what he could, rather than use them all for training, which he testified that he did.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Frankly, I expected that they were being used for that purpose, and it never occurred to me that they were not used for that purpose after the war warning. I think that is one of the reasons why the Navy did not send out any dispatches and ask them what they were doing. We know more or less, or we expected what they were going to do from their own plans.

[11422] Senator LUCAS. On page 7385 of the transcript this question was asked by myself of Admiral Kimmel:

As I understood you to say this morning, on the question of an appropriate defensive deployment, it did not necessarily mean, in your opinion at that time, that you should use these planes for reconnaissance and search?

And Admiral Kimmel answered:

No, sir. I might say that the "appropriate defensive deployment", and "defensive deployment" used in that letter, I mean that dispatch, was a strategic matter, not a tactical matter. I was a strategic defensive deployment—I mean our understanding was—and that was primarily to make sure that when we deployed the Fleet, or put them in any position that they would not take on an offensive character or anything that the Japanese could consider as offensive.

Do you agree with that interpretation of what "defensive deployment" really meant at that particular time, and what the Navy had in mind when they sent out that telegram?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The methods that Admiral Kimmel took for the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor were his business. It had nothing to do with the strategic deployment, although you might call it defense deployment. If he wanted to send out ships around Pearl Harbor, or the Hawaiian Islands, that was his business. He could have done anything [11423] in order to make his forces secure there without orders from the Navy Department, and we naturally expected that he was going to do that. That is what you have a Commander in Chief out in the distant areas for.

As I said once before, never did the Commanders in Chief question any of the Naval Operations' directives, or ask for further amplification of them.

[11424] Senator LUCAS. Now, in that message of November 27, you state:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46X.

I understand you to say that it was the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel in the Pacific at that time to carry on any immediate defensive deployment that he thought was logical or reasonable or necessary under War Plans 46X?

Admiral INGERSOLL. May I have that plan? The Navy basic war plan.

The first task is:

(a) Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

That is an offensive task, although raids on sea communication positions is not a major operation.

Second task:

(b) Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk.

That is a major operation, and that was the one he was [11425] told he would not have to initiate until 180 days after war came.

The next task is:

(c) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

That is partially offensive.

(d) Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as longitude 155 degrees east.

That is defensive.

(e) Defend Samoa in category "D."

He didn't have to do anything about that, except that Samoa was under him and that was the designation of the category.

(f) Defend Guam in category "F."

That meant it was defensive.

(g) Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

That is a defensive task. He was already engaged in that at the time war came because he had been issued orders to escort some ships carrying Army troops to the Philippines and also some in the direction of Australia.

The next task is:

[11426] (h) Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the western hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

That is wholly a defensive task, although you might have to conduct offensive operations against forces attempting to do that, but the task itself is basically defensive.

(i) Cover the operations of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

He did that by being stationed in Hawaii.

(j) Establish fleet control zones defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require.

That is simply a technical control over ships passing through his area.

(k) Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

That is also of a technical character.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you for that explanation, Admiral.

One more question.

I want to propound one inquiry with respect to codes.

There were a number of questions asked by the Senator from Michigan about codes. There was a message sent on [11427] December 6, 1941, from Commander of the 14th Naval District to the Office of Naval Operations here in Washington. That message says:

Believe local consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your 1855.

In that message the Commander of the 14th Naval District was talking about the codes there, I take it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. The Commander of the 14th Naval District was Admiral Bloch?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did the officials in Washington have every reason to believe that Admiral Kimmel knew of this information that Admiral Bloch sent to Washington about the fact that the local consul had destroyed all but one code?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It would be a logical assumption because Admiral Bloch was a subordinate of Admiral Kimmel.

Senator LUCAS. Was that true of General Short? Should General Short have known that same thing? Should General Short have received that same information from Admiral Bloch under the arrangement they had there?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I don't know, of course, how Admiral Bloch got the information. He may have gotten it from [11428] Army Intelligence, for that matter.

Senator LUCAS. Anyhow, Admiral Bloch knew on December 6, 1941, that the local consul had destroyed all but one system of the codes that they were using in Hawaii at that time, according to this message, that is, Admiral Bloch knew?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. So that is the only reply that is in the exhibits with respect to codes. Those in Hawaii knew definitely what the Japs were doing at that particular point, plus the information that you had sent them with respect to the destruction of codes throughout the world?

Admiral INGERSOLL. They knew that on that date.

There is one thing: I don't know enough about the Japanese system, but it is, I believe, a fact that no instructions were sent by Japan to Hawaii to destroy their codes there. I presume the answer is that it was sent to the Ambassador in Washington and he was required to instruct the consulate to do that, and Hawaii was included in that distribution, although Manila was instructed separately, and I presume it was so far away, that although it was a U. S. possession they did not make Washington responsible for informing Manila to do that.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

[11429] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. The Senator from Illinois refused to yield at the time that he made certain insinuations about certain questions that I had asked this morning, and had previously asked.

His former tactics had been to interrupt when similar questions were asked.

Now, it isn't always possible in a record of this kind to make a statement as to why you are asking certain questions. This is an investigation of the facts to try to ascertain how this great catastrophe could have happened at Pearl Harbor, and we not be prepared both in Washington and in Pearl Harbor for it.

I have asked certain questions. I make no apology for any question that I have asked in this hearing. My sole purpose has been to try to ascertain the facts. But when a member of this committee makes insinuations that I have an ulterior motive in asking such questions, I

feel that it becomes my duty to make on this record crystal clear, not that I have any opinions at the present time on these questions, but as to why I am asking these questions about the agreement with the Dutch and with the British, so the first thing I want to take up—and I will speak from official [11430] documents, I will speak only from official documents—At the present moment I want to cite “Peace and War,” which is a document prepared by the Department of State.

It came out not before Pearl Harbor, but it came out long after Pearl Harbor. I want to read from page 129. And this relates to why I have asked certain questions about whether or not there were agreements. This is on page 129 of “Peace and War.”

During the August 1941 conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain, the situation in the War East was discussed, and it was agreed that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression.

Now, Mr. Chairman, you will notice—and for the record—that it said

it was agreed that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression.

Mr. Chairman, the record should show that on the day the President of the United States returned to the United States that he called in the Ambassador and he made these remarks and delivered this message to the Ambassador:

Such being the case this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the [11431] Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals, and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

On and after that date, certain correspondence was exchanged between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States. Part of it is now in the record. It is clear that we do not have in this record all replies to that information.

Therefore, the record is not complete on that.

The Secretary of War, after the Pearl Harbor inquiry as far as the Army Board was concerned, thought that certain leads were to be explored—and this is not out of my imagination that I am asking these questions, it is out of the official records of the United States that these questions are being asked, and it is because we have been unable to get the answers that I am asking these questions.

Now, on page 10 of the Clausen report:

Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D.,

Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation:

[11432] In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion might advantageously be followed up in order to complete the general picture in this matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not be construed as a directive, or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation.

Now, who is speaking those words? Myron C. Cramer, major general, United States Army, the Judge Advocate General.

And he was speaking those to a man who he was sending out to make certain explorations.

Now, what does he say? On page 11 of this official record of the War Department, I find this. This is one of the unexplored leads and that is why I have been trying to explore it here, because I find nowhere in this record that it has been explored, and I think the facts should all be shown.

What is this unexplored lead? It is this:

k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action Agreement, if any, with Britain and the Netherlands, and whether Japan was officially advised of this agreement, or discovered its existence.

That is one of the leads that I have been trying to follow up and to explore.

[11433] Now, let me go to some other leads in this official document. C on page 12:

Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement in which case they would have known that the "War with Britain" message would necessarily have involved the United States in war.

That is one of the leads that I have been trying to follow here and to get some information on. It is upon the suggestion of the Judge Advocate General of the United States of America that that lead should be followed.

Now, I am going to read another lead, that he also put in here, No. D, on page 12:

Whether the partial implementation "war with Britain" was brought to Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, did not know of the Joint Action Policy.

In August 1941 Mr. Churchill, in a speech, said this:

It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the [11434] utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say: that if these hopes should fail, we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.

Mr. Churchill, on the 27th day of January 1942, made this statement on the floor:

On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic conference at which I discussed these matters with Mr. Roosevelt that the United States even if not herself attacked would come into a war in the Far East and thus made final victory sure seem to allay some of these anxieties. That expectation has not been falsified by the events. It fortified our British decisions to use our limited resources on the actual fighting fronts.

As time went on, one had greater assurance that if Japan should run amuck in the Pacific, we should not fight alone. It must also be remembered that over the whole of the Pacific scene brooded the great power of the United States Fleet concentrated at Hawaii.

It seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt distant invasion of the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, or the attack upon the Dutch East Indies while leaving behind them in their rear this great American Fleet.

[11435] Now, it has been my purpose to try to ascertain what the facts are on this point.

What I have been trying to elicit from these witnesses is to find out whether or not those people feel Admiral Stark and General Marshall knew of these agreements or these understandings, or whatever you want to call them, as expressed by Myron C. Cramer and Mr. Churchill and the various other parties.

[11436] Now, the record should be clear that if all of these facts were known, and I am not now passing upon the facts, but if the agreement was understood and known by all parties, then it is sure that we, as a committee, should inquire into the facts to ascertain whether, if we knew from the message of Mr. Winant to the Secretary of State at 10:40 that an attack was sure to be made within 14 hours upon the Malay Peninsula, then all of our armed forces should have been alerted to the fact that it meant not only war with Britain or with the Dutch, but whether or not it didn't mean war with us.

That being true, I am trying to seek out and just ascertain the truth, what are the facts. If everyone knew about these facts, that there was parallel action, why didn't someone in our Navy, why didn't someone in our Army, draw the same conclusions as Mr. Churchill drew, that there was a great American Fleet, and it seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt—

a distant invasion of Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch East Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great American Fleet.

Now, as I say, I want the record to show why I have been seeking light and facts upon whether or not there was an agreement. That is all that I am trying to ascertain. [11437] And to find out so that this committee can ascertain the facts. I am not passing upon whether or not this was a good or bad agreement. That is not my province as a member of this committee at this particular time. It is to only find the facts and I am not now commenting upon the facts. I am merely stating reasons why I have asked certain questions, to make it crystal clear that in my humble judgment this issue is material as to how Pearl Harbor happened, as to whether or not the Army and Navy really knew, as Admiral Stark said, "God alone knew," as far as he was concerned, and he couldn't find out what we were going to do.

Therefore, I want to place upon the record these facts, not as an apology, but merely to answer these insinuations that there was an ulterior motive in asking these questions. Let the record show that there is no ulterior motive. I have no motive. I have not sat at this table for any other purpose than to get all of the facts that the American people and the world might know how this catastrophe could happen to this great Nation of ours and that it shall never happen again. [Applause.]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Are there any further questions of Admiral Ingersoll?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one statement. [11438]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. I see we still have the same group that come in every day to do the applauding. The committee is very appreciative of that fact. It sounds like organized propaganda of some kind to me.

However, Mr. Chairman, I am deeply appreciative of this lecture that has been given here by the Senator from Michigan. The Senator from Illinois was not born yesterday. The Senator from Illinois does not apologize for anything that he has said either I have

watched this proceeding from the beginning, long before any hearings ever started. I think I know what it is all about.

I, too, want the facts, but there are some folks who want political facts. What the Senator from Michigan said doesn't bother me one iota. I propose to go along from here to the end in the same manner that I have in the past. When I know the background of this thing, when I know of the statements made upon the floor of the Congress, long before hearings were started, and then when I hear about a non-partisan investigation dealing with facts alone, I am tempted to laugh.

I know what the evidence showed with respect to the parallel agreements. I know what some people tried to prove [11439] all the way through with respect to that. So far as I am concerned I don't care one iota if there was a parallel agreement. It wouldn't make any difference to me. I was interested long before Pearl Harbor in my country and the defense of it and I did some things in the way of legislation that didn't please a lot of people at that time.

We had a policy in this country and we followed it through, and a lot of the same people who disagreed with that policy previous to Pearl Harbor still are disagreeing with it here, and that comes from some of those who are applauding constantly when some point is made against what this Administration did. But I will never defend Japan.

That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions of Admiral Ingersoll?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have some questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson is recognized.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is now 12:30, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes. We will take a recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[11440]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Senator FERGUSON.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think it is only right and proper that I should make a few remarks to the last remark of the Senator from Illinois, even though he is not here.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair hopes we can go ahead with our witnesses, Senator, as soon as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. I think it is important, Mr. Chairman. I found nothing in those remarks that was speaking of the facts, but I do not think I should let stand his last remark when he said that he shall never defend Japan.

No one would expect the Senator from Illinois, or any other Senator on this committee, to defend Japan. I know of no question that has ever been asked that was for the purpose of defending Japan.

I realize that that remark was made for headline purposes, and I feel certain that it was made from a feeling that he resented what had been stated here from the official record.

I know that my part here is only to bring out the facts, and I shall always try to be nonpartisan as far as [11441] this hear-

ing is concerned. I have definite ideas on politics, but not in this hearing; because to me this is a hearing for all America, by an all-American committee of both Houses of this Congress; and it certainly should remain such, and, for my part, it shall.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL R. E. INGERSOLL, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record at this time a memorandum that I have from Commander Baecher in answer to an inquiry made by Senator Ferguson.¹

29 JANUARY 1946.

Memorandum.

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

Subject: Opnav dispatch 061743 December 1941.

1. With reference to the request of the committee for information concerning the time of transmission and receipt of the subject dispatch, please be advised as follows:

2. Opnav dispatch 061743 was transmitted from Washington to Radio Honolulu at 5:54 p. m. 6 December 1941 Washington local time (10:54 p. m. 6 December 1941 Greenwich time).

[11442] 3. The records of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, do not indicate the exact time of receipt of this message nor do they indicate the time of delivery to Admiral Kimmel.

4. The commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, has been requested to check the files for this information. If any further information is received you will be advised.

Admiral, there are one or two questions that came to my mind during the examination by Senator Ferguson. There was during part of 1941 and prior to Pearl Harbor what has been familiarly called here a shooting war in the Atlantic.

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct. I termed it an illegal or irregular war.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. And that condition was due to the governmental decision to give aid to the Allies against the Axis Powers in Europe, was it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And as a result of that it was recognized, was it not, by the Navy that the Atlantic and the activities in connection with the Atlantic became the primary theater of naval operations?

Admiral INGERSOLL. In the general concept of the war the Atlantic became the primary theater for the purpose of defeating Germany and Italy.

[11443] Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Admiral INGERSOLL. And that our general attitude in the Pacific was defensive, and the only operations we could carry out in the Pacific of an offensive character were those which our forces there would permit, and in the assignment of forces in WPL-46 the difference in the strategic conception between the Atlantic and Pacific was made on that basis.

I do not wish the impression to be gained, however, that because in the Atlantic the primary aim was to defeat Germany and the strategic conception in the Pacific was defensive, I do not wish to give the impression at any time that the Pacific was not on our minds just as much as the Atlantic, despite the broad strategic plan.

¹ Hearings, Part 6, p. 2890.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am not so immediately interested in what was on your mind; but when it came to sending ships, or guns, or munitions of war, the Atlantic was the primary theater in which the Navy was operating, wasn't it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The distribution of ships between the Atlantic and Pacific was that prescribed in WPL-46, almost down to the last ship. That, in turn, was based on ABC-1, which was a decision made on high political levels.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am not interested in your war plan now, or WPL-46, I am stating, as a matter of general knowledge [11444] to the naval heads, that the primary theater of the war was in the Atlantic in aid to defeat Germany and the Axis?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That was the first object of the war plan.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that area, and the operations in that area, had, in effect, what we may call a priority on the assignment of ships and munitions of war, in order to carry on that activity, is that not true? Is there any dispute about it, Admiral?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It had priority in a great many things; not in everything, no.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As a matter of fact, do you know that up to December 1, 1941, there were 2,000 bombing planes sent under Lend-Lease by the United States in connection with the war against Germany and the Axis in Europe?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I have stated that I have no information of my own as to what was done under Lend-Lease.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you knew that the bulk, the great overwhelming bulk of our munitions of war that we could move during 1941 and up to November was being put into the operations which were being conducted in what we may call the Atlantic Theater?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I knew it from reading the papers; yes.

[11445] Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. That is all I have been asking about.

Now, then, there were no major ships taken out of the Atlantic Fleet and put into the Pacific Fleet before Pearl Harbor, were there?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No. The distribution of ships before Pearl Harbor was practically that in WPL-46.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, in fact you depleted, if I may use that civilian term, the already inferior Pacific Fleet by taking away from it three battleships, four heavy cruisers and a number of other accompanying ships, assigning them to the Atlantic, did you not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That assignment, however, was one made in accordance with the distribution of forces under WPL-46.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I don't care what it was done under. It was done, wasn't it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was done; yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the naval authorities in Washington had control of the war plans, did they not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes; they had control of the assignment of ships between the two oceans.

[11446] Mr. RICHARDSON. And the staff in Washington tried to get another assignment out of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic, according to Admiral Kimmel, and he blocked it. Do you recall that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not know what assignment you are talking about, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral Kimmel testified here that upon his return to Washington in the summer of 1941, he was advised by his Naval superiors that it was proposed to take from the then depleted Pacific Fleet an additional consignment of battleships, carriers, and other ships for assignment to the Atlantic, and he went to President Roosevelt and convinced President Roosevelt that that ought not to be done.

Do you have any recollection of such transaction?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I know of no additional ships that were expected to be taken away from the Pacific Fleet, except the division of three battleships of the New Mexico class, which did come into the Atlantic, and which was in accordance with the distribution of ships under the war plan.

I know of no other ships that we expected to take away from the Pacific.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, was your connection with this [11447] picture, Admiral, of such a nature that any determination by the naval chiefs in Washington that there would be a second division of the Pacific Fleet removed to the Atlantic in addition to the one which took three battleships that you referred to, would your position be such that any move like that by the Navy in Washington would be known to you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I am certain it would have been.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then how do you account for Admiral Kimmel's specific testimony as to his conversation with the President in detail objecting to a plan of the Navy to do just that?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not account for it. I do not know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then that attempted assignment, if it occurred, was unknown to you?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The detachment of the aircraft carrier, three battleships, the division of cruisers and some destroyers, is the only one I knew about, and was the only one which I knew was contemplated. Of course, the object of that, I believe, as has been testified before this committee was for the purpose of conducting an attack on the Azores, or getting ready to do it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you familiar with the fact, Admiral, that one June 10, Admiral Stark found it necessary [11448] to advise the Secretary of the Navy, with a recommendation that no further units of any kind be transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic at that time? That was way along in June, long after the first consignment of ships had been moved to the Atlantic.

What would be the occasion of Admiral Stark objecting if there had not been any move to send some ships out of the Pacific into the Atlantic. Have you any explanation that occurs to you as to how it might have happened?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No; I cannot recall that, because there again it did not happen, and the distribution of ships was in accordance with the plan.

If I did hear it, I have forgotten it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was this plan that you refer to, and which I am rather oblivious of, so sacred that under no circumstances would anybody change it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No. If the circumstances were such that it was to be changed, it would be changed. For example, when the ships were destroyed at Pearl Harbor, they immediately sent back to the Pacific the three ships that had come around in June.

We have to make distribution according to circumstances. There was nothing at that time that I can recall which would have required a redeployment of forces other than [11449] that as prescribed in the war plan.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when the original fleet was sent to the Pacific, it was far too inferior in strength as compared with the Japanese Fleet to undertake a real offensive operation against Japan in the Far East, was it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And when this first detachment that you refer to was sent to the Atlantic, that situation was intensified, was it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was intensified, except that the remaining ships were considered by the Chief of Naval Operations adequate to carry out the tasks which he had assigned to the Pacific Fleet, without those additional ships.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, it was part of the war plan that immediately upon a state of war, Kimmel should move his fleet into a raid on the Marshalls, was it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. May I see the plan?

He was directed, I believe to seize a position in the Marshalls, and to conduct raids there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. That is all I want.

Now, would it be necessary, Admiral, in connection with [11450] such a raid, with the distance that the Marshalls are from Oahu, for that raid to have the protection of patrol bombers?

Admiral INGERSOLL. If somebody can give me the distance from Midway and Johnston and Palmyra to the Marshall Islands, I can answer the question a little bit more accurately.

This is snap strategy now, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Maybe you can tell from that map [handing map to Admiral Ingersoll].

Admiral INGERSOLL. Your distance from Pearl Harbor to Johnston, which is the closest, is 716 miles, and the distance from Johnston to the Marshalls looks to be at least, oh, 1,000 or 1,200 miles.

The radius of patrol planes out there was about 600 miles, or somewhere in the neighborhood of a 1,200-mile flight. They could not have been used in that operation to cover actual operations in the Marshalls area, unless he was able to establish a base in the Marshalls from which the planes could operate.

They could, however, cover the movement of vessels to the westward of Johnston and Palmyra and Wake to the extent that their radius could take them. That is 600 miles from those positions.

[11451] Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral Bellinger testified here that the plan contemplated in connection with the raid was to base patrol planes on Wake and Midway for the purpose of scouting the advance of the raid into the Marshalls, and that it would not be possible, from the standpoint of proper naval strategy, to undertake the raid unless

those patrol planes were available for the purpose of proceeding in front of the raiding squadron for its information and protection.

Now, is that good strategy, or is that good tactics, or isn't it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It is protection for the vessels, to inform them whether there are any enemy vessels or submarines in the area, but if they are based on Wake—or Midway, I should say, and based on Johnston, they could only protect to one-half of their total flight, and that means they would have to go back the minute they had gotten out as far as they could.

If their raid was 1,200 miles, they could protect to 500 miles and no more.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Leaving out the question of how far they could go, was it necessary for the Admiral, in order to make the raid, to use his patrol bombers as far as they would go?

[11452] Admiral INGERSOLL. If there were enemy forces in the area which could have interfered with fast-moving task forces like a carrier group or submarines, it would have been very helpful to have them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In the week prior to December 1941, would you say from your information gained on the General Staff that Admiral Kimmel could have attempted a raid on the Marshalls without the aid and support of his patrol planes?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The answer, of course, is that whenever you undertake an operation, it is desirable to use all the force and strength you have in order to aid in its success. However, when the war warning was sent out, and there was a possibility—I only say a possibility—of an attack, and he was not going to undertake the raid immediately—and I do not know when he contemplated setting out on that—I think the first thing should come first, and I think the security of his fleet was the first consideration.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you told him to get ready to execute WPL-46 in the very dispatch you sent him, did you not, Admiral?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct; yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. WPL-46 would take him nearly 2,000 [11453] miles to the Marshalls, would it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It would for the raids; yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To make that trip to the Marshalls he had to have his patrol planes, did he not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not say that he had to. I say it would be desirable to have had them, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you think the patrol planes should have been left at home if he undertook such raid?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think the patrol planes should have assisted to the extent he could use them; yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was because the use of those patrol planes would offer material protection to such operation?

Admiral INGERSOLL. To the extent that they could fly out and accompany them; yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if they started from Wake, they could fly clear to the Marshalls, could not they?

Admiral INGERSOLL. If they were based on Wake, they could have flown from there to the Marshalls and back.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, if Admiral Bellinger is right in his statement that they proposed that two squadrons of their patrol planes

should be based on Wake, then those patrol planes would be in a position to scout practically the entire trip of the task force in the raid, would [11454] not they?

Admiral INGERSOLL. If the task force had departed from Wake, but it could not possibly have departed from Wake because there is no harbor at Wake.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Oh, no.

But if the task force left Oahu, when it went by Wake there would not be any particular difficulty of the patrol planes joining it, would there?

Admiral INGERSOLL. There is no question about that.

[11455] Mr. RICHARDSON. That seems perfectly obvious.

Now let me ask you this: Was there anything, Admiral, from a naval standpoint, essential to the defense of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor except long-distance reconnaissance, adequate anti-aircraft gun defense, radar and a state of readiness in the Fleet itself to repel an attack? Can you think of any other thing that would be essential out there in the defense of the Fleet at the base than those four things?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Radar, distant reconnaissance, the deployment of the guns and the fighting aircraft?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Admiral INGERSOLL. The Army fighting aircraft on the islands in a state of readiness?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral INGERSOLL. And sufficient warning?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral INGERSOLL. By all of these means to permit the ships to go to general quarters, as we call it, that is man all their batteries, they simply could not stay up all day and night to man their batteries. I think Admiral Kimmel's arrangement whereby he had condition 3—that is what we continued to have all during the war unless an enemy was present—was the proper state of readiness, as [11456] far as his ships, that is the battleships and cruisers, and so forth were concerned.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, the evidence here discloses, I think without contradiction, that Admiral Kimmel had available to him 48 patrol planes of the Navy and six patrol planes of the Army, making 54 patrol planes.

Now you recognize, do you not, that the use of such planes continuously in long-distance reconnaissance wears the planes out?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I certainly do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it requires, in order to conduct a constant reconnaissance, a frequent replacement of crews?

Admiral INGERSOLL. We endeavored to get two or three crews just before the war, so that they could work the plane more than they could the crews.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I know that. In fact they had not been gotten to Hawaii by December 7, had they?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I do not know just what the proportion of crews to planes was at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now do you regard it as essential for Admiral Kimmel to have put his fleet in proper condition to move with a declaration of war under the War Plan?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That was the aim which everybody was trying at, to get in the very best possible state of [11457] readiness both in matériel and training to carry out what they had to do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you contemplate that immediately on a declaration of war, which you sensed was in the very immediate future, Admiral Kimmel should have his fleet in shape to move directly, under War Plan 46, on this raid to the Marshalls?

Admiral INGERSOLL. There was nothing in the War Plan which required him to initiate that movement on December 7, or the date of the declaration of war, or any other date.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I did not ask you that.

Admiral INGERSOLL. No. I say he could have chosen any date, and we did not expect him to move on any particular date, we expected him to move to carry out that task when he was ready.

If I can digress a little bit on that, I do not know that Admiral Kimmel, or anybody, knew what was the state of the Japanese fortifications and defenses in the Marshall Islands. Any movement of that kind I have no doubt would have been preceded by reconnaissance, possibly from carrier planes or possibly from some of the long-range Army planes which were fixed up for photographic purposes, and they would undoubtedly have made a reconnaissance to determine where the Japanese strength was, what islands were fortified, [11458] and so forth, and upon the receipt of that intelligence base their plans.

As a matter of fact, I think we were trying to get out of the Army a reconnaissance of those islands in connection with the flight of Army planes from Hawaii to Australia. I believe it did not take place until after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, do you seriously intend to tell this committee that this language in the dispatch of November 27 where you say "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46," means that Kimmel was to stay cooped up in Pearl Harbor with his fleet in order to make use of the 54 patrol planes he had to defend the space by distant reconnaissance?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I didn't make any such statement and I didn't wish it to be implied.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. What did you mean? You have told me that he could go to the Marshalls when he pleased and that he shouldn't go to the Marshalls, in effect, until everything was ready at home. You have agreed that if he used his planes in long-distance reconnaissance that it would wear them out.

Admiral INGERSOLL. No, I didn't say that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, what happens to planes constantly [11459] used in distant reconnaissance?

Admiral INGERSOLL. You can't use planes all the time continuously without at the end of a certain period, of course, changing engines and replacing the crews. The crews cannot stand it even if the planes could. But I didn't intend to infer that all of his ships should remain in port simply to conduct an aerial reconnaissance. He could also have conducted some sort of a protective screen with his destroyers. He had lots of destroyers and submarines.

I am not trying to state exactly how he should have taken protective measures. I am not trying to state that he had sufficient strength

there even in the most dangerous sector to have a complete defense, but I think he should have done something when the war warning dispatch went out to improve the security of his fleet, and I don't know that he did anything except to station one or two destroyers in the defensive sea area immediately outside of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you, in Washington, representing the Navy chiefs, regard training and preparation of the fleet for war tasks as more important or less important than using the fleet and the planes for base defense?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Up until the time that the war warning dispatch was sent the primary tasks of the fleet out in the Pacific, assuming that the Atlantic was engaged [11460] in war operations, was to prepare itself for war by training and getting itself in the best material condition that it could get. They were engaged at that time in implementing the antiaircraft batteries. Up to that moment the task was training. But once the war warning went out it seems to me, and I have stated before in the Court of Inquiry, that thereafter training was not the primary task and had to go along as operations would permit.

As a matter of fact, all during the war we were doing training, one of the primary tasks was training ships, all during the war, for the Pacific. You can't stop operations for training, but you have to make a reasonable adjustment.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just what training advantages from the Atlantic got into the Pacific?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I mean all during the war after Pearl Harbor we had to continue training. All during the war.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The point of my question is that Admiral Kimmel testified here that he had to make a choice between using his planes for the development of War Plan 46 or using his planes for the defense of the fleet in the base, that he couldn't do both, and that he made the choice to prepare the fleet and not use the planes for distant reconnaissance.

[11461] Now, I am asking you as a naval official if you were confronted with the issue that Kimmel states he was confronted with whether it was permissible for him to reach the conclusion which he reached?

Admiral INGERSOLL. As I have stated before, I think up until the time that the war warning dispatch was sent that his primary mission was to train his fleet and to get his ships in the best material condition. After that dispatch was sent I think training took a secondary importance.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You realized in Washington, Admiral, that the most precious defense position we had in the Pacific was that fleet?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was one of the most important elements.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It was the great important element, was it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was, of the Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. And it was based at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It never had at Pearl Harbor a sufficient consignment of patrol planes to enable 360 degrees proper reconnaissance around the base, did it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. As far as I know it did not, and I don't know that it ever had during the war.

[11462] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, it had very quickly after Pearl Harbor an immense increase in planes, did it not? Nearly 300 percent, wasn't it?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Not immediately.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, within a month; by the first of January?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I don't know what it had by the first of January. I recall we endeavored to replace by depleting the Atlantic the number of planes that were required to be there by the War Plan. We took planes out of the Atlantic and sent them to Pearl Harbor because Pearl Harbor was defenseless so far as Navy planes were concerned. We had to weaken ourselves to a greater extent than we wanted to in the beginning of the war.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The same thing was true up to December 7, wasn't it, Admiral, with reference to fighters for the Army, they never had enough fighters for a proper defense of that base, did they, up to December 7?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I can't answer that question as to whether they had enough. I believe the Army did not have the number of planes in Pearl Harbor that they stated they wanted to have there, that were assigned to that place.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Isn't it also a fact that up to December 7 neither the Army—it would be the Army—never [11463] had the number of antiaircraft guns of various calibers that would be fairly required to efficiently defend that base?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I can't answer whether they had enough to efficiently defend the base. I seem to recall that the last information that we had from the War Department was to the effect that they did not have at Pearl Harbor a short time before December 7 the number of antiaircraft guns that they planned to have there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You recall, do you, Admiral, the letter that Admiral Nimitz wrote in which he advised the forces in the Pacific that they were sitting pretty, that the war, the big war, was in the Atlantic?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I don't think I ever saw such a letter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am referring to—

Admiral INGERSOLL. Was that written while he was Chief of the Bureau of Navigation or Personnel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. The statement is—there is another document that I can't lay my fingers on at the moment—but the statement is:

In fact, a few days after Pearl Harbor we received an official letter stating "I know you would like to have 20,000 men. We would like to give them to you." As I remember the exact wording "The war is in the Atlantic and [11464] we here in Washington think you are sitting pretty in the Pacific."

Would that be in your mind a fair picture, for a layman, at least, as to the attitude in the Navy Department with reference to the Atlantic and the Pacific?

Admiral INGERSOLL. May I ask again who wrote the letter, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Nimitz. That is in the record. Mr. Chairman, that is in the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I tried to find it this noon and couldn't put my hands on it.

Admiral INGERSOLL. If I may answer this way: Assuming that the Chief of Personnel, which was the Bureau of Navigation at that time,

wrote that letter, I assume he is referring only to the percentage of personnel that Admiral Kimmel had on his ships and to nothing else.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, I am only assuming that Washington wrote to Hawaii stating "You are sitting pretty at Pearl Harbor, the war is in the Atlantic." I am asking you whether from your recollection of the picture, Admiral, that is a fair run-of-the-mine definition of the attitude the Navy had with respect to the war in the Atlantic and the war in the Pacific?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The date was what?

[11465] Mr. RICHARDSON. It says a few days after Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. It is dated the 25th of November 1941, Mr. Chairman. It is right in the note there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This is in the testimony and I was looking for the letter.

Senator FERGUSON. It is there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. The examining officer identified the letter as being in the form of a Personnel letter from the Chief of Bureau of Navigation to Admiral Kimmel dated November 25, 1941. A copy now on file in the secret confidential file room, Washington, D. C.

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think, if he is referring only to Personnel, that perhaps that is an accurate statement, although I am just guessing at it now, that the percentage of men on the ships as regards their full war complement was probably as good in the Pacific, if not better, as in the Atlantic. I do not think it reflects the proper attitude, simply because we were at that time engaged in operations in the Atlantic, that the Navy had no concern for the Pacific. As a matter of fact we were very much concerned in the Pacific.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was your concern based at all on the fact that you knew there had been no proper protection supplied for the base at Pearl Harbor?

[11466] Admiral INGERSOLL. The Navy Department had been after the War Department since February to get Pearl Harbor ready and more planes and more ships and radar out there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, it needed all of that for a proper defense of the base?

Admiral INGERSOLL. It was certainly a minimum requirement that they set up at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You recognized, did you not, Admiral, that it primarily would not be the duty of the fleet to provide its own defense in the base, that would be the duty of the Army, would it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is laid down in the joint action as a division of responsibilities between the Army and the Navy. It doesn't mean, however, that if the Navy is present that it should go to sleep and let the Army defend the base. It should use everything it has to help defend it while it is there. But it means, for example, that if a ship going into a place like Pearl Harbor, that you can take the power off of the ship and repair that ship and not have to keep her guns manned in order to defend the place; and also ships like submarines, when they come back from a long cruise, the crews have to rest, and the submarines have to work on them. The crew should not be required to defend their own ship while in that port [11467] al-

though if an attack came they would do all they could. But not have the responsibility for doing it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, that is true, but you were familiar at Washington with the joint defense plan that was built up between the Navy and Army in Hawaii?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Which particular plan are you referring to, the Coastal Defense Plan or the so-called Bellinger?

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is that plan, Admiral, which contemplated that in time of emergency both the Army and Navy would joint their facilities in common defense.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, sir; I am familiar with it. Not only that, but we thought it was so good that we sent it out to the other naval districts as a pattern for them to follow.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That plan was based entirely on the fact that neither the Army or Navy had sufficient equipment at the base to permit the Army to assume its primary duty of furnishing defense?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I doubt if any plan was ever drawn up where anybody thought he had enough to do what he was supposed to do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, that doesn't quite answer the question. I will state it again and see if I can do better.

[11468] The point that I am making is that this joint plan that I talked about was an emergency plan which had its origin in the fact that there had not been supplied to the base in Hawaii sufficient defensive equipment to enable the Army to carry on its full duty of defending that base?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The Army, with the planes that it had, could not have carried out a long-distance reconnaissance with Army planes. I believe they had six.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think that is all the questions I have to ask, Mr. Chairman.

[11469] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we are—

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask one or two questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, was the person who made the delivery of the thirteenth-part message on the night or very early morning of the 6th of December 1941 in Navy clothes? Was he in Navy uniform?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I testified the other day, sir, I couldn't remember who it was. I talked with Captain Kramer and he said that he did not deliver the message to me.

I seem to recall that whoever brought it to my house asked for an identification from me.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate, would it not, Admiral, that he was not from the Department?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Oh, no, it would mean that that particular officer who brought it did not know me personally—in a bathrobe, probably; that he didn't recognize me as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations when I went down in the middle of the night in a bathrobe.

Senator FERGUSON. You can't recall whether he was in Navy uniform or not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think we were not put into uniform until after Pearl Harbor occurred.

[11470] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know the fleet was in Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 7th?

Admiral INGERSOLL. The Navy Department always knew what ships were in the Hawaiian area. We knew when such task forces as Halsey's and Newton's left for, you might say, distant operations, to Midway and Wake. We did not know local movements; that is, we did not know what ships were in Pearl Harbor or might be over at Lahaina or out in an operating area if they were within, say, a hundred miles of Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. That explains it. That is all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have included in the record at this time, the letter from Admiral Stark to the Secretary of the Navy under date of June 10, 1941, being Serial 066912, which has reference to matters that have been taken up by Admiral Stark with Admiral Kimmel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You want it spread on the record at this point?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. Copies have been distributed to the members of the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be spread on the record at this point.

(The letter referred to follows:)

[11471] Op-12-CTB.

A16-3.

Serial 066912.

Secret.

JUNE 10, 1941.

Memorandum.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Discussion of existing strategic situation in the Pacific Ocean.

1. I desire to invite your attention to the fact that the strategic situation in the Pacific Ocean has very recently sharply deteriorated with respect to the combined interests of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies. The particular elements which have recently arisen to favor Japan are the following:

(a) The United States has reduced the strength of the Pacific Fleet by three battleships, four light cruisers, one aircraft carrier, eighteen destroyers, 4,000 marines, and four combat-loaded transports. The truth is probably now apparent to Japan that the United States Pacific Fleet is no longer strong enough for sustaining an effective offensive against the centers of Japanese military power. It is, however, still strong enough to cause serious difficulty for Japan, [11472] and to constitute a threat which will probably not permit Japan to exert its full naval strength in Malaysia.

(b) By its rash naval action around Crete in the Mediterranean, the British Commonwealth is now not able to bring any important strength to India or Malaysia. So long as the British Mediterranean Fleet was intact, Japan could not dismiss the possibility that it might suddenly be transferred to the vicinity of Singapore. Consequently, a Japanese southward offensive at this time would encounter resistance from only minor naval and air forces.

(c) A break-down in Dutch-Japanese trade negotiations seems to have occurred. Forcible Japanese action against at least a part of the Netherlands East Indies is a distinct possibility in the immediate future.

(d) Japan seems to have made progress in her fortification of the Caroline and Marshall Islands. Her position there has been decidedly strengthened.

(e) The Japanese Army has recently had some important successes in China. Chinese morale is considerably lower than it was 3 or 4 months ago.

(f) Definite indications have been received that the continued diplomatic pressure by Germany and Italy [11473] is having an effect in inclining Japan to take positive action to the South.

2. While it would be desirable, in case of war, for the strength of the United States Atlantic Fleet to be greater than it now is, recent British successes against German naval forces in the North Atlantic have reduced the probability of successful German raider action, particularly by regular naval surface units. Furthermore, the situation in the Atlantic would not be particularly improved

by the transfer there of additional capital ships. Without question, additional cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft, could be usefully employed in the Atlantic, but the tasks of the Pacific Fleet in war, so tremendously increased in difficulty by the recent defeat of the British Mediterranean Fleet, require at least an initial strength as great as it now is.

3. It is my opinion that any further weakening of the Pacific Fleet at this time is almost certain to precipitate action by Japan against the British Fleet and the Netherlands East Indies. The difficult tasks that the Pacific Fleet would have on the outbreak of war give an additional reason for maintaining our naval deployment approximately as at present.

4. I therefore recommend that no further units of [11474] any kind be transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic at this time. In this recommendation Admiral Kimmel fully concurs.

H. R. STARK.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There being no further questions, Admiral, the committee thanks you for your appearance and the information you have given the committee, as well as your apparent desire to be helpful in every way you could in this investigation.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Thank you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have any further statement that you desire to make to the committee that would give any information that has not been called for by the questions?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I think I have no further information of my own knowledge that I have not given to the committee, or previously given in the investigation by Admiral Hart, or in the Naval Court of Inquiry.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your appearance and the information you have given us. You may be excused.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Thank you.

(The witness was excused.)

[11475] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes counsel.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, we desire to present Colonel Clausen of the Army.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Colonel Clausen, please come forward.

TESTIMONY OF HENRY C. CLAUSEN¹

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel, when were you separated from the Army?

Colonel CLAUSEN. January 18, 1946.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And prior to that time how long had you been in the Army?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Since June 1942.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And where do you live now?

Colonel CLAUSEN. San Francisco, Calif.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You have been asked to come here from San Francisco to appear as a witness?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. With what branch of the service were you connected?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The Judge Advocate General's Department.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, referring to the Army Board of [11476] Inquiry, the so-called Grunert Board, what was your connection with that Board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was assistant recorder.

¹ Formerly Lieutenant Colonel, Army of the United States. For suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Mr. Clausen, see Committee Hearings, Part 11, p. 5513.

Mr. KAUFMAN. By whom was that board made up?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Lt. Gen. George Grunert; Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Maj. Gen. Russell, Colonel West, Colonel Toulmin, and myself.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And when did that board commence its hearings?

Colonel CLAUSEN. In July, 1944, as I remember.

Mr. KAUFMAN. How long did the board continue to hold hearings?

Colonel CLAUSEN. For about 3 months.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And during the hearings before the board was magic brought to the attention of the board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It was in the, I believe, last week of the board's proceedings.

Mr. KAUFMAN. After the completion of the taking of testimony by the board, were you requested to make a further investigation into the Pearl Harbor matter?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And will you tell the committee the circumstances under which you were appointed, and what you did in furtherance of that appointment?

[11477] Colonel CLAUSEN. That is a rather broad question, but perhaps I can high-light it in this way:

The Grunert board did not obtain the details of the magic until the last week of the board's proceedings. I understood after proceedings had been terminated that on the first hearing of the chief of staff that he did acquaint the general officer members of the board with magic, in general.

It became obvious after the board's proceedings developed the magic phase which was in the last week that further investigation into this phase should be conducted, and there were also other what we called in the office of the Judge Advocate General, unexplored leads.

So I was instructed to conduct the additional investigation for the Secretary of War in conformance and compliance with the Public Law 339.

Mr. KAUFFMAN. And did you hold hearings, or did you go into the field to see the various men that you desired to interview?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The war was then on and as the Secretary of War stated in his public report which was given to the press on the conclusion of the board's proceedings, it was necessary for someone to interview the additional witnesses in the various theatres of active operation, and also, of course in Washington and elsewhere in [11478] the United States.

So I therefore had some witnesses come to see me who were available locally, but for the major portion, I suppose, I went to them.

Mr. KAUFFMAN. And what procedure did you follow in getting information from them? Did you interrogate them, or did you get the information and then prepare affidavits for them to sign?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I talked with them, found out what I could from them as to their knowledge of the facts, and then I proceeded to take testimony in the form of affidavits.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And after you collected your affidavits, did you make a report to the War Department?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I will show you these eight volumes and ask you whether they are photostatic copies of the affidavits that you procured from various persons together with the exhibits?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I prepared a large volume, one similar to that that you have on your desk there, which is what I called the report, together with, I believe eight volumes of exhibits.

There should be eight volumes of exhibits in addition to the large volume.

[11479] Mr. KAUFMAN. Eight volumes of exhibits, plus the—
Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Plus your report and affidavits?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, the exhibits are part of the report.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You will find reference to the volume, this light-covered volume, to the exhibits.

[11480] We now desire to offer in evidence the report of Mr. Clausen, together with the exhibits.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received.

There has been a number reserved for this particular exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the number?

Mr. KAUFMAN. We will state the number as soon as we get the record from downstairs.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That will be agreeable. You may supply it for the record.¹

Mr. KAUFMAN. There has been an indication in the course of the testimony of some witnesses, Colonel, that you made efforts to change the testimony of some of the witnesses that you interviewed.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is not borne out by the fact.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is the fact on that subject?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The fact is that every single witness who may have revised his former testimony to my mind was telling me the truth as he saw it when I talked with him and he certainly, so far as I could tell, told the truth when he testified before. There is not a single person that I interviewed against whom any reflection should be cast on the ground that he may have changed testimony. What he did if he gave different testimony to me was to [11481] honestly and correctly and more correctly state that which he conceived to be the fact.

I can, for example, call to the attention of the committee that some of the witnesses who appeared before the so-called Grunert board at the time they testified stated that they would like to verify or press their recollection by perhaps an examination of documents or in some other form indicated that they would like time to reflect upon some of the answers.

I recall, for example, Colonel Bratton when he testified before the Grunert board did say something to that effect. In other words, I have a very distinct impression that the witnesses, when they appeared before the Grunert board and especially in the last week, were either then not allowed to give the Grunert board the magic features and details or exhibited some indication that they would like to press their recollection further.

I mean to state clearly that there is not a single person who I interviewed against whom any claim should be made of any invidious character because of the fact that he may have given me revised testimony. He either had his recollection refreshed or he was, when he was interrogated by me, permitted to go into the magic features, and that included the high and the low.

¹ Exhibit No. 148.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel, at the beginning of the volume [11482] in front of you is a list of so-called unexplored leads. Did you in the course of your investigation complete the investigation of all of these so-called unexplored leads?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The answer to that will have to be that some of these were later not followed to a final conclusion for various reasons, but in the main they were completed, and by completed I mean sufficient to a point to satisfy the Secretary that he could follow out the request of the Joint Resolution of the Congress which was to inquire into the facts of Pearl Harbor and, as I recall, specific emphasis being placed upon an inquiry sufficient to allow him to decide whether there should be court martial proceedings instituted.

And in connection with this document which you have referred to, 3-page document on pages 10, 11, and 12 of my report, that was prepared on my return from San Francisco where I had gone because my mother was ill. This paper was handed me and after this paper was handed me I had discussions with Mr. Harvey F. Bundy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, as to following out these leads and what should be done first. So that if you will go to the portion of my report that contains by periodical reports to the Secretary of War through Mr. Bundy and to the first one you will find that my method of proceeding with regard [11483] to subjects was as set forth on these subreports, the first one of which was 17 February 1945.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I have no further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair is advised that there is only one copy of this exhibit that has been presented, so it will have to be used by the printer and we will follow the course we did with one other exhibit—

Mr. KAUFMAN. There are two copies, Senator. Senator Ferguson has one copy of the report. There are two copies of affidavits and report. There is only one copy of the exhibits. Senator Ferguson has one copy of the report and affidavits.

Senator FERGUSON. I received this last night from counsel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. One copy of the report and the only available copy, as I understand it, of the exhibits, will have to be used for the printing.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So they will not be available until released by counsel.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Now, Colonel, allow me to ask you this question.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

[11484] **The VICE CHAIRMAN.** To see if I clearly understand the situation.

You were connected with the Army Pearl Harbor board of inquiry?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And at the conclusion of the work of that Board in order for the Secretary of War to be able to comply with the resolution passed by Congress he thought certain additional points

should be investigated with a view of clearing them up so that he could make the type of report that that resolution required?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. Specifically, sir, the magic. We—that is, I say we—the Pearl Harbor board, the Grunert board, I recall had gone to the office of Admiral Murfin and the Murfin board was going to conduct its inquiry. We asked for the Hart report, the so-called Hart report which we knew had been made by Admiral Hart. We were not given this report. We therefore didn't have that before us. Meanwhile we went to Hawaii after conducting hearings in Washington, and when we came back we learned that the reason it had not been given to us was that the, I believe the Under Secretary of Navy, Bard, had ruled against it but Secretary Forrestal had overruled Secretary Bard.

So we then were given the Hart report. And, sir, when [11485] you read that and came to the testimony of Captain Safford you found a great many new aspects to the Pearl Harbor disaster and one of those that especially should be followed down was where Captain Safford in his testimony before Admiral Hart mentions some dozen or so officers as being able to cast light upon this so-called winds code implement message.

Well, somebody should, from the Army, go and talk with these Army people.

Now, if I had that before me, for example, the Admiral Hart Safford testimony, I could show you that those officers listed there by Captain Safford were later interviewed by me and testimony taken by me from them as to what they knew about this wind code intercept.

Then, in addition to that the whole subject of magic, sir, being opened up in the final week of the board proceedings, meant that somebody should go, like to General Miles, to General Gerow, and all of the people that had testified before us at a time when they were under compulsion not to reveal the details of magic and ask them all about magic.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then when you began this investigation under direction of the Secretary of War you found that many witnesses who had appeared before the board were then in the field and were holding responsible positions in [11486] fighting the war; is that the situation?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is the situation, sir. And, for example, counsel has just handed me here the page at which Captain Safford testified before Admiral Hart. We come, for example, to Colonel Schukraft, who was in Conserto. By the time you put the witnesses all together they were all over the world. So I had to go all over the world.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the war was still on and many of these officers were holding responsible positions in the battle areas; is that true?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; including General MacArthur and General Bedell Smith in the European theater.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I recall General Gerow stating that he was then in command of either a corps or an army, or some large body of troops, in the European theater of war.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So naturally it resulted in you having to go wherever these officers were?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. That is what the Secretary of War announced in his public statement which he handed to the press after the Grunert board concluded its hearings. He made reference to the fact that inquiry would have to be made in the various theaters of active operations. That is [11487] in my report here.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then from a practical standpoint, Colonel, it being found necessary by the Secretary of War to have this additional evidence secured from these witnesses, we couldn't stop the war to assemble all the witnesses in a room again and get their testimony, you had to go wherever you found them?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is correct, sir, and also, sir, that by doing it that way, it kept the knowledge of this magic to a minimum.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I assume as you were connected with the Army board investigating Pearl Harbor, the Pearl Harbor attack, that you found that there were a number of things in connection with the evidence presented to that Board that should be clarified or brought up to date, and that this supplemental investigation of the Secretary of War directed you to make was necessary for him to have sufficient information to act under that resolution of Congress?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

[11488] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator George of Georgia will inquire.

Senator GEORGE. You were not a member of the Army Board. You were not a member of the Board, were you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was designated—not a member of the Board, sir. I was designated as being on the Board but in the capacity of an assistant recorder—the assistant recorder. There were two recorders, sir, Colonel West and myself, and in the Army the recorder's job is a job more or less like your counsel here, except that we did not do so much questioning, except that I did most of the questioning when it came to Colonel Wyman.

Senator GEORGE. You did not participate in the conclusions reached and findings of fact?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. My position was very much subordinate to doing a thing of that kind.

Senator GEORGE. Did you make a finding of fact after you had completed your tour of duty about the world?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. My position was subordinate to that. I was the collector of facts, the digger after of facts, not the fact finder. The fact finder was the Secretary. I was in the capacity of the gentleman here from the FBI who might go out and get evidence and bring it into the United States attorney, sir.

[11489] Senator GEORGE. So you reported to the Secretary?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. All right. I have no further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark of North Carolina will inquire.

Mr. CLARK. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas of Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, before you started upon this mission of obtaining additional evidence with whom did you discuss your assignment?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I discussed my assignments with many people, sir. I discussed it with the Secretary himself; with Mr. Harvey H. Bundy, his special assistant; with my superior officer, general Myron

C. Cramer, the Judge Advocate General; with—I see Captain Ford over there. He participated in some of the analyses after the Grunert Board had completed its proceedings. With Colonel William J. Hughes; a great many people, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What was your special mission as outlined originally by the Secretary of War?

Colonel CLAUSEN. To follow up these so-called unexplored leads and they are set forth in subheads in my periodic reports to him through Mr. Bundy.

Senator LUCAS. Was that a written order?

[11490] Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; there was no written directive except in a general way. The Secretary had stated in his public statement of December 1, 1944—do you want me to read that portion of it, sir?

Senator LUCAS. I would like to have it in the record.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right. He said:

In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active Theaters of Operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.

Senator LUCAS. Now, let us take one witness and see how you operated. As I recall, there was some discrepancy in the testimony of General Gerow and the affidavit that he gave to you while he was fighting in France. Do you recall that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I read over, sir, while I was waiting to appear here as a witness very brief portions of General Gerow's testimony, but I recall that he made some reference [11941] to the affidavit that he made before me, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, did you examine his affidavit in line with his previous testimony that he had given, to see where the discrepancy was there?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. What I did when I talked with a person—and it varied some with different witnesses—for example, General Fielder out in the Pacific I took with me to the Philippines from Honolulu and when he returned he dictated his own affidavit and General Bedell Smith called in a stenographer and dictated his own, but with General Gerow, I interviewed him at Bad Hauheim along the Rhine where he had his Fifteenth Army headquarters and we arranged to meet again in a day or so.

Well, when I called him in a day or so he had gone down to the Riviera. I therefore went to him there and since there was no stenographer available, I took down in longhand the answers he made to my questions and then I put it in the form of an affidavit, which would be the same as in making a bill of exceptions after the trial of a case. It is a much more laborious way of getting evidence but it sometimes makes it much more accurate because after I made a draft for General Gerow I gave it back to him to study over to make sure that it was correct and he made several revisions. I personally typed that myself.

[11492] Senator LUCAS. In other words, after he made the revisions, why, you proceeded to retype another affidavit?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Which he finally signed?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, what was there about Gerow's testimony originally which was not full and complete that you desired to get from him when you went to France?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The magic advice, all the magic advice, sir. I had with me the Top Secret exhibit "B" before the Grunert Board. That Top Secret "B" came to us, as I say, I believe in the last week through General Russell, which he had given to G-2 and we had then given him these questions.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, the Board operated throughout the hearings without magic until the last week of the hearing?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And because of that fact you were unable to produce, or you were unable to obtain all of the information which pertained to Pearl Harbor?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right, sir.

Senator LUCAS. So, consequently, when it was decided by the War Department that the magic should become a part of the hearing, then it became your duty under this assignment to [11,493] supplement the evidence that had already been obtained by the Board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; and then, sir, there were some additional leads also in addition to magic.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; you have testified to that in giving us an example with respect to Captain Safford's testimony.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, it dealt with magic, sir, but another unexplored lead was, for example, General Short's 5 November 1941, SCP. I believe the record was confused about it that was in the War Department—as to whether that was in the War Department before Pearl Harbor and somebody could look that up and find it, so that is the reason that we ran that down also, and you will find all of the affidavits here by Colonel Jansen and other references to that.

Another secret file lead was this: G-2 sent a wire to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department on, I believe, 5 November 1941 and General Fielder had I believe off the record given information to General Russell but there was nothing in the record about that and it appeared as though the wire had not been sent.

Now, Colonel Bratton testified that he had drafted it and to all intents and appearances it had gone to Hawaii. Well, somebody could have gone to Hawaii and found out whether it was actually there, whether it had been received and I ran [11,494] it down and find out if all the steps had been taken to send that wire. That is another example.

Senator LUCAS. But in the main magic was the primary reason for your particular assignment?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, before you started this tour to obtain this additional evidence was there any officer in the Army or the Navy who gave you any particular instructions as to what you should do when you interviewed these witnesses?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; except that Mr. Bundy and I discussed the most feasible way of getting the facts in an accurate, objective and impartial method and I had at one time been an Assistant United

States Attorney and I always liked the way the FBI would get the statements from the witnesses in the form of statements and then you could examine the witnesses from those statements. After the witness made the statement the statements were read back and they would sign them. So we discussed as to the method of conducting this additional investigation and it was agreed that I should receive the evidence in the form of affidavits.

Senator LUCAS. Before you started it was obviously necessary that you go over the testimony of each and every one of these witnesses who had testified before the Board.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, they had testified before me [11495] sir. I had been on the Board.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you were familiar with the testimony that the Board had received up to that time?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, in your conversations with the Secretary of War or—who was it, General Bundy?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Secretary of War? Colonel Stimson.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I know, but the next man.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Colonel Bundy.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; he was a civilian. Harvey H. Bundy was a lawyer.

Senator LUCAS. All right. And in your conversations with the Secretary of War or any of these other officers that you had before you started on this assignment was there any particular piece of evidence that was discussed which they thought was vital one way or the other, that they told you to make a particular investigation upon to have it changed?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean to slant the investigation?

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. I would not have conducted it if they had.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, there were no conversations of any kind as to what you should do in the way of attempting to have a witness slant or change his evidence when [11496] you went out there?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, did you follow that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Sir, I was just as accurate and impartial and objective as I could be because I felt that this was an opportunity to get facts for the American nation and I would not have been a party to it; but furthermore than that I am quite sure that Colonel Stimson would never have authorized any such instructions and if he had I would not have carried them out.

Senator LUCAS. Was there a single witness that you talked to in your long investigation that you attempted in any way to influence or to have him change or slant his testimony different than what he testified before the Board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; not in the slightest, but other witnesses told me—and Colonel Bratton, I believe, will bear me out—Colonel Bratton said to me when he finally left me in Paris that I was the easiest lawyer to talk to that he had ever talked to in his life.

Senator LUCAS. That is quite a compliment.

Colonel, it was charged by a member of this committee, and the press carried it as follows:

Colonel Henry C. Clausen was sent around the world by Army to have officers change their Pearl Harbor [11497] testimony given originally to the Roberts Investigating Committee.

Do you care to comment on that statement?

Colonel CLAUSEN. If I was an advocate, sir, I would comment one way but I am in the position here of a witness. All I can say, sir, is that it is not borne out by the facts. The press comment to which you refer I read and when I read it I dispatched letters to the gentlemen who had in the press supposed to have made such statements and I told them that they were not correct.

Now, I am a Republican. I don't suppose that has anything to do with the case.

Senator LUCAS. No; but it is interesting.

Colonel CLAUSEN. And I have always been a Republican, sir. Now, Colonel Stimson is a Republican. The impression that I had of Secretary Stimson was that he was a man who certainly under no stretch of the imagination would at this point in his career have been a party to any such such performance.

I recall one other newspaper comment something like this:

Why did they send a lowly Major all over the world to get this testimony when this lowly Major had all his Army career ahead of him?

At the time I read that the lowly Major was back in San Francisco practicing law. I at no time—they said I was a Reserve officer, I at no time was ever a Reserve officer. I volunteered my services when the war broke out. I cannot talk too much about the fact that I know that Secretary Stimson would not have been a party to any such thing.

As to my own part in this proceeding I can assure you, sir, that at no time did I try to get any witness to say anything but what they thought was the fact and that is one reason why I adopted the affidavit method of interrogation, because I realized that if you give the affidavit to the person to revise and correct or change—and you will find throughout here that corrections were made in their handwriting—that that makes for a more accurate way of getting the testimony. I was not a War Department "Yes man."

Senator Ferguson knows when the War Department was on the pan with respect to the Truman Investigating Committee, the Truman committee investigation of Air Corps derelictions and the Wright Aeronautical Corporation military men at Cincinnati, Ohio, the War Department assigned me to prosecute those men and I had the Senator as one of my witnesses and I also had Senator Kilgore as one of my witnesses and the men were convicted.

Now, the Truman committee proceedings gave the War Department—or, rather, was critical of the War Department [11499] and stated in the same proceedings that they were very well satisfied with the way I had conducted that investigation.

In other words, if you read that, sir, you would see that Clausen was no stooge of the War Department. Similarly with respect to Colonel Theodore Wyman, whom I investigated in connection with the Pearl Harbor disaster. If I was a War Department stooge I would not have conducted the interrogation that you will find in the

proceedings before the Grunert Board and the Board I am quite sure would not have come to the conclusions that were reached by the Board.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, when were you an Assistant United States District Attorney?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I resigned, sir, 8 months after the Democrats came into power.

Senator LUCAS. You came in the Army as a volunteer after the war broke out?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; in June 1942.

Senator LUCAS. And you went directly, I take it, into the Judge Advocate's Department?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you stayed there how long?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Over 3 years, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you are now back in California practicing law?

[11500] Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you do not expect any promotions in the Army from major on up?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Sir, they wouldn't give me any if they could because they would be afraid to.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy is not present. Senator Brewster would be next. He is not here. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. GEARHART. Colonel Clausen, I have the very nice letter you wrote in which you very gently take me to task for saying something about you and I was not conscious that I had said anything about you at all, because I had had no newspaper called to my attention that mentioned your name.

Could you have mixed me up with some other person who is a member of the committee?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, Mr. Gearhart, the press evidently misquoted you.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, let it go at that, but I never read it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. But the San Francisco Chronicle and Call and Daily News carried your name to the accusation which was to the effect Senator Lucas had mentioned.

Mr. GEARHART. All that that he said?

[11501] Colonel CLAUSEN. No, not all but the impression I had was that you thought I had gone around the world with a great, big club in my hand and by force and duress had forced these people to sign statements.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I am not conscious of ever having mentioned your name, Colonel.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I have got the clippings, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire, Colonel.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Clausen, did I understand you to mean that the leads were not in writing? You did not mean that, did you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I meant, Senator, that if you go to my periodic reports you will find more particularly the leads that I explored.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but I am talking about the leads beginning on page 10.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, those are in writing; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They are in writing and signed by General Cramer, are they not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the Grunert Board—
[11502] as you and I will refer to the Grunert Board, we mean the Army Board under the statute, is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, General Grunert was the chairman of the board.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn that you were to continue the investigation of the Grunert board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I believe it was just about this time of the—when I returned from an emergency leave to San Francisco, Senator. It was about the 1st of December or the early part of the next year, I don't remember exactly, and during the interim I had been assisting the Judge Advocate General.

Senator FERGUSON. The investigation of the board had been closed, is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. They were limited, Senator, to 90 days by the order of appointment.

Senator FERGUSON. Not by statute?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, Congress did not limit them, no, sir, but Congress passed Public 339, joint resolution of the Congress. Following that the Secretary, who was required under the law to conduct the investigation, appointed this Grunert board and the order of appointment, Senator, had [11503] "ninety days" in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I understand. The Secretary of War limited his own board to 90 days.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think it was General McNarney that did that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And General McNarney had been on the Roberts Commission?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is the same one.

Senator FERGUSON. So it is assumed that at the time he knew about the size of the investigation.

Now, do I understand that the board had not finished its work and were compelled to close their investigation because of a limitation placed upon them by the Secretary of War.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I would not say that, Senator, for the reason that if the board had felt that I assume as you assume, I assume they would have written in to the Secretary and so stated. In other words, they would have said they could not make their findings because of the limitation of time.

Senator FERGUSON. They did not do that to your knowledge?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; but they did have comments, Senator, in the report to the effect that there should be further explorations of leads.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the board never made any complaint to you or to anyone that you knew that they were going [11504] to

be compelled to file their report without being able to go into this matter completely?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So, then you assumed that when the board did file their report and you were one of their members looking up evidence, and so forth, that they had completed their job as far as they saw their job?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I would rather, Senator, not answer what was in the minds of the general officers but the impression I had was that they were pretty sick and tired of Pearl Harbor and wanted to get finished.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get the same way?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I certainly did. I think it is time to conclude, in the words of the poet.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, on page 15 I find that you had a certain limitation placed upon you. The Secretary of the Navy wrote to the Secretary of War:

It being understood that you have instructed him to limit his inquiry—
talking about you—

to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on that part that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the Navy said to you:

[11505] Now, stay out of this investigation as far as it affects any Navy personnel, any Navy organization or action upon the part of the Navy as to the disaster.

Is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. As I understand, Senator, the Army was to concern itself through me with whatever had to do with Army personnel, action, or responsibility, and Admiral Hewitt on the Navy side was to concern himself with the Navy phases.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, I am coming to the limitation next. The Secretary of War put the same limitation in his directive as the Secretary of the Navy did; that the Navy said that you were not to do anything or find any facts or go into any facts as far as the Navy was concerned.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Secretary of War said that you could not do the reverse, is that not true?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right, Senator, otherwise it would be duplicitous.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, how could you make this investigation when they had a joint command out there in Hawaii, you had joint intelligence to a certain extent here? How could you make the investigation to ascertain the facts had you stayed entirely away from the facts as it related to the Navy?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I didn't have to do that, Sen- [11506]
ator, at all and I do not mean to imply and you could not interpret these instructions in that way.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how should you interpret it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, this way, Senator, this is the way: Wherever it pertained to the Army and went into the Navy I was to go there

and I did go there, and I was to enter on it and I did enter on it. One of the first things that I did when I arrived in Pearl Harbor conducting this additional investigation was to check in with Admiral Towers for the purpose of running down all these intercepts and winds code messages and this super-duper radio stuff.

Senator LUCAS. What was that Admiral's name?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Towers, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did the Secretary of War that I read—no, that was to the Secretary of War. Now, the one to the Secretary of the Navy read almost identically:

I have also been happy to comply with your request that appropriate Navy representatives similarly be given Army information which is relevant to your investigation, it being understood, of course, that the Navy inquiry will be limited to matters which have a bearing on the part that Navy personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

[11507] Senator FERGUSON. Now, what was your interpretation of that limitation?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Why, just the same, Senator. In other words, if the Navy wanted to interrogate Army people that was perfectly all right and they did do so. Admiral Hewitt, for example, went to Hawaii and did interrogate Army people there and you will find on page 2 of my report that I had these Navy people down that I did interrogate. There is Captain Rochefort, Captain Layton, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins, all Navy people, interrogated here. Colonel Woodrum and others.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you able to draw conclusions as to that testimony?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean myself?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; I did not draw any conclusions except the periodic reports that were made which set forth what I thought were running comments of ideas that I had as to the way the investigation was unfolding and what might be pursued as leads.

Senator FERGUSON. That was really conclusions upon your part?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, yes, they were opinions of myself.

[11508] Senator FERGUSON. Major or Colonel—when were you promoted from a Major? When I knew you at Cincinnati you were a Major.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I did not get my promotion, Senator, until the other men in my same group block were promoted and that was about March, I suppose, of 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. 1945. You were still working on the investigation at that time?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I finished—

Senator FERGUSON. The so-called Sonnett investigation or the—

Colonel CLAUSEN. That was the Hewitt.

Senator FERGUSON. (continuing). Started in May, did it not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. The Army had a great deal more investigating in this additional investigation, Senator, than the Navy for the reason that the Navy had this super-duper stuff and the Army did not have it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we are talking about super-duper as magic-ultra?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right. .

Senator FERGUSON. All right .

Colonel CLAUSEN. Colonel Bratton calls it "boogie-woogie."

[11509] Senator FERGUSON. 'Diplomatic messages of the Army that we have. As I understand it, Exhibit 1 is made up from the Army copies.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, Senator; but before the Murfin Board, that is the Navy Board of Inquiry, this magic information came out, it developed into a much finer point and with greater detail than the Grunert Board ever got it. I repeat it was not until about the last week of the Grunert Board's proceedings that we were given this information. The Navy was not in that position.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell me, Colonel, who wrote the unexplored leads on pages 10, 11, and 12? Who is actually responsible for drawing them up?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Oh, I suppose they were drawn up by Colonel Hughes.

Senator FERGUSON. We haven't had Colonel Hughes on the record. Who was Colonel Hughes?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Colonel William J. Hughes is an officer on the staff of—was an officer on the staff—of the Judge Advocate General and these were drawn up by him and others while I was—as I repeat—on this emergency leave to San Francisco.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, where did he get the information, for instance, Hughes? He is a Washington lawyer, is he not?

[11510] Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what firm he is with?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think he is with William Leahy.

Senator FERGUSON. Who drew these charges?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean these leads?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, these leads?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I say I think it was Colonel Hughes and others from the Judge Advocate General, whoever assisted him.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, where would Hughes get these facts?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, he had assisted in the Pearl Harbor inquiry for the Judge Advocate General. Senator, when we, the Grunert Board went to Hawaii, Colonel Hughes was left in charge, sir, sort of in charge of the office during the time we were gone.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, he was really an assistant then to the board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You would not call him an assistant, except in that capacity during the time we were away he was supposed to see that things went all right at home.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, the one I want to talk about is on page 11:

Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint [11511] Action Agreement or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan.

Where would Hughes get that information that there was a joint action agreement?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He would pick that out of the testimony. Here is what happened, Senator: The board wanted somebody to review the testimony in anticipation of a final report, so for that reason

Colonel Toulmin had charge of a group of officers and this group of officers—I don't know, there must have been 20 or 30 all in all, including some Wacs—who went over the testimony from day to day and the information, of course, as to the joint action agreement would, I assume, be brought out from the testimony given in the proceedings before the Board.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you had heard about the joint action agreement, had you not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. General Marshall, it is my recollection, Senator, testified about it.

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion was there or was there not a joint action agreement?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You want my opinion?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I want your evidence if you have got any evidence on it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I was going to point out, Sen- [11512] ator, that there were certain notes concerning the—I think they called it the ABCD bloc. Is that correct?

Senator FERGUSON. At times it was referred to as a bloc.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, if I may have my exhibit number 2 I can point something out.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. One of the men, Senator, I interviewed in Washington was Colonel Bicknell and he told me that it was very necessary in order to get the full facts on Pearl Harbor to get to his former office and there obtain various documents, so I did that.

Senator FERGUSON. Bicknell?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir, Bicknell; B-i-c-k-n-e-l-l.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his position at this time?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, at the time of Pearl Harbor he had been General Short's assistant G-2, he had charge of what was known as the contact office, the downtown office. It would be more or less similar to combat intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, he had some opinions then on the joint action agreement?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, he mentions it here in one of the papers I got out of his office and that is what I was going to show you.

[11513] Senator FERGUSON. Let me see what you have got.

Colonel CLAUSEN. In the way of these exhibits, Senator, that I have got, there are eight volumes that are indexed at the start. Page 51 and 53—from page 51, Senator, to page 53 are excerpts from all the digests prepared in the contact office and you will find a reference there—

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read us what the reference is?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Do you want me to read the whole thing?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I want to get all I can on this joint action agreement.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I am going to start. He started his comment that on "November"—

Senator FERGUSON. We have had great difficulty getting anything on it, so if you will just give me what you have. That is why I have questioned you.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't mind reading it, Senator, but—well. I had better read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right [reading:]

November 29, 1941. (The last issue of the Digest)—

Now, what he is referring to there is a digest that he prepared for the use of the Hawaiian command. He was over there and prepared these digests from time to time based on [11514] sources of information that came to him from many places. This is what he says:

While the international situation centering in the Pacific and directly affecting the United States has been somewhat stabilized near the point of explosion during this period (Nov. 6-25), the situation in several other contiguous areas—Thailand, Indochina and Eastern Siberia—of strong indirect concern to the United States, have continued to deteriorate.

The Japanese government announced on Nov. 5 the appointment of Saburo Kuruasu as Special Envoy to Washington for the avowed purpose of making final diplomatic effort towards a solution of American-Japanese problems and effect an easement of tension in the Pacific. While a certain amount of optimism was expressed in local quarters for the success of the Kuruasu mission, the general opinion was indeed pessimistic.

The consensus of veteran observers seem to be that Japan had taken such a strong aggressive stand that she could not back down without incurring serious internal trouble; and that the United States, on the other hand, had even less reason to compromise its well-known demands which were diametrically opposite to those of Japan, hence the impending diplomatic talks were doomed [11515] to failure before they started. This opinion moreover appears to have been well-founded as subsequent events began to unfold.

Concurrent with the conversations in Washington came reports of extensive Japanese military movements in Indochina, toward Thailand, and elsewhere. The Japanese home press intensified its anti-American attitude. The Japanese Imperial Diet passed a supplementary extraordinary military budget of almost four billion yen with unprecedented speed. Japanese nationals continued to evacuate from potential danger areas (including Hawaii). Total mobilization in Japan proceeded—

Senator FERGUSON. So far I don't follow you. I don't find any evidence about this joint action agreement.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, he comes to it in the next one, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, give us the next one.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is on page 52. He has got here—there is a "2 (Conclusions)" and then he has subparagraph "C-4, Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers."

You have really got to read the whole thing in order to get this.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, read it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I am omitting the part that I was [11516] going to read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it straight through, Colonel. We will get a better understanding of it if you do.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. I thought we would save time.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

Total mobilization in Japan proceeded unabated and with an ever increasing tempo—involving even boys and girls down to 14 years of age.

The foregoing together with many other reported actions immediately aroused grave doubts as to the sincerity of the Japanese government, and led many to believe that the Japanese were merely aping Hitler's favorite strategem of utilizing peaceful gestures to confuse, disarm, weaken, and otherwise destroy effective opposition to an early contemplated military move.

There is no marked change in the local situation. The very nature of the plight of the local Japanese dictates an extreme desire for peace. And while local Japanese commentators keep striking a tune of optimism, their statements

are frequently spiked with a note of despair. They appear to feel that an acid test of their attitude is near at hand.

[11517] It may be well again to emphasize that extreme and eternal vigilance is the only and safest course here in Hawaii.

Then he inserted here, this is his wording here but it is not the digest.

Let us now turn to a few statements in official documents which represent definite action of this office, taken as a result of the foregoing conclusions backed by certain other information at hand.

From the G-2 estimate of International (Japanese) Situation, H. H. D., Army Contact Office—

that means Headquarters Hawaiian Department—

Army Contact Office, Honolulu, 17 Oct. 1941-1200.

Now, this is a quote from that estimate prepared at that time [reading:]

1. *a.* With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the Pacific reached a new high

b. The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, and is still necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has not been completed

c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is fairly certain that Japan's basic [11518] policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will remain unchanged; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might oppose the execution of said policies—irrespective of what means she may choose to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement.

2. *Conclusions.*

c. 4. Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers.

While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above (the principle of defeating one opponent at a time—famous with her Axis partner, Hitler), it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed. An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever points might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents.

Then the next, Senator, is—

[11519] Senator FERGUSON. That is where he mentions the ABCD bloc?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be America, Britain—

Colonel CLAUSEN. China and the Dutch.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). China and Holland?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The Dutch.

Senator FERGUSON. The Dutch. So there was evidence there that there was—some evidence that there was an ABCD bloc?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Senator, would you permit me to inquire?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. Who made that report and to whom?

Senator FERGUSON. Bicknell.

Colonel CLAUSEN. It was from—it was made by General Short's assistant G-2 in Hawaii, Colonel Bicknell.

Mr. CLARK. Made to General Short?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. It was designated to the—I have in other places in these eight volumes copies of at least one or more of

those with General Short's handwriting on it as having seen it. Colonel Bicknell pointed that out to me as being his initials.

Mr. CLARK. That is all I wanted to know.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you thought it was important to find out whether or not General Short knew about this joint [11520] action agreement, is that right?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I used to call it, Senator, the ABCD bloc.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, we will call it the ABCD bloc. It would be important to the investigation to find out whether or not there was an ABCD bloc?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would be true, would it not, to ascertain that if we knew there was going to be an attack upon one of the bloc that we should expect an attack upon all of the bloc?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; just like Colonel Bicknell said.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So that it became a very important question for all of our officials from the top to the bottom to know the contents of an ABCD bloc agreement because it would give them information that if we had direct information of an attack upon Britain we could have anticipated an attack upon America, is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think that is the function of the committee to decide that question, but I am glad to answer, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what you were trying to find out?

[11521] Colonel CLAUSEN. I was trying to find out, Senator, exactly what I am telling you here and that is why I asked General Miles and he said something in his affidavit concerning that same thing.

Senator FERGUSON. General Miles said that he knew that there was an agreement between the American and British and Dutch. Would you get us General Miles' affidavit, if you can?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I am doing that now, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. There is an item on page—I think it is page 215, Senator, of my report.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you just read us what he said about the bloc?

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

Further, concerning the intercepts mentioned as contained in Top Secret exhibit "B" and those which related to joint action by the ABCD bloc or members thereof, I knew at the time about the joint action agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Which gave you some more information that there had been an agreement. Did you ever trace it down as to whether or not General Short knew about it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; I did not get that far.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did not carry out—

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, I assumed that the G-2 estimate of Colonel Bicknell, which was prepared by General Short's subordinate and being read by General Short would, of course, apprise him of the existence of that which his assistant G-2 knew. [11522]

Senator FERGUSON. But you made no further attempt to answer that unexplored lead except the Bicknell matter and the General Miles matter?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir, I did more than that.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, I want to find out what you did.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I remember I reviewed the testimony of General Marshall. He had testified on the subject before the Grunert Board and I suggested at the end that this led to the White House. In other words, the existence of an agreement of this kind would lead to the White House and I was told that it was beyond the scope of my functions to investigate there.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, I understand that you finally got to the door of the White House in this ABCD bloc and you were told that you could not enter the White House as far as your investigation was concerned, is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was told, sir, not that I could not enter—

Senator FERGUSON. Well, of course, we understand each other. [11523]

Colonel CLAUSEN. (continuing). But that the scope of my investigation did not go that far.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, the scope of your investigation did not go to the White House.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I was supposed, as you pointed out, Senator, to be concerned with the investigation that the Secretary of War was conducting under Public 339 and for the purpose of determining what Army officer, if any, should be court martialed.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, was that the only purpose of the investigation, just to ascertain—

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, I said "and." It had two purposes as I read that: First, to get the facts concerning Pearl Harbor and to find out what, if any, Army officer should be court martialed.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, if you will allow me to point out—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I don't want to cut you off. We are both lawyers and we will both be lawyers on this.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, we never had much trouble before.

Senator FERGUSON. No. I meant that—I am not cutting you off; I am not cutting in. [11524]

Colonel CLAUSEN. You were one of my best witnesses, Senator, I say that sincerely. There was a lot of error claimed by the defense about calling two Senators, one being a Republican and one being a Democrat.

Senator FERGUSON. We were bipartisan.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; but you were very good.

Senator, the first part of Public 339 dealt, as you will recall, with the extension of the Statute of Limitations.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The second part of Public 339 would appear to be court-martial proceedings.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, who is the person that told you that you were not to enter into the White House with your leads?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That was General Cramer, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. General Cramer?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Through Colonel Hughes.

Senator FERGUSON. Through who? Colonel Hughes?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Through Colonel Hughes, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, when it came to following an unexplored lead as to the joint action agreement or—we will take that same wording—“or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan,” you [11525] stopped there because General Cramer told you through Colonel Hughes that you were not to go into the White House?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He did not say it in that way, Senator. He said that he did not think that my investigation extended to that point.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. And, therefore, you did not follow it into the White House?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; that is not the only reason.

Senator FERGUSON. What is another reason?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Japan had then been defeated and, in addition, it meant that the Congress of the United States could conduct the investigation itself in perhaps a much more thorough fashion than an independent individual by the Army or by the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, when did you get the notion at the time you got this unexplored lead that Congress would have desisted with what you and the Board had done to conduct its own examination? Because we did not get back here until September of 1945 and we got your report of the Army Board on August 28 or 29 of 1945 and this is back in March or back in the early part of 1945.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, Senator, let me make very clear that this conversation that I had with Colonel Hughes occurred at the tail end of my investigation. In other words, that [11526] was around September 1945 and it was after the Japanese had been defeated, peace had been made and it was then apparent that there was no reason why the Congress itself could not conduct the investigation which the Congress had wanted in Public 339.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, Colonel, did you in any part of this investigation go into the State Department, the diplomatic messages?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I did not get in there, I did not go in the State Department but I had the State Department diplomatic messages.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did you have any correspondence or any information, memorandums between the President and Mr. Churchill?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did not see any, Senator, that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. And you certainly could not go into a joint action agreement which concerned Britain if you did not get to the Executive offices to get your papers, could you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I imagine what I would have done, Senator, if I had been pursuing the lead myself and war had not ended, I would have gone through the regular channels starting with the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't any doubt that if you had [11527] been permitted to go into the White House to make the investigation that you would have used every possible means to get all of the information, I do not question that at all. I am just trying to find out what information you did get on the joint action agreement.

Now, the next thing mentioned in there was the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan. Now, the only place you could get that was in the White House, isn't that true?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I don't know where it might be found, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you would expect to find it there, isn't that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I would expect there would be a copy there if there is such a document, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did you ask anyone for that joint compact?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell me why when it was in your leads?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, for the same reason, Senator, that I just mentioned. In other words, that falls in the same category.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, the same reason that Colonel [11528] Hughes gave you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That plus the fact—this second reason is very important because war had ended and the Congress could conduct its investigation if it had desired it to be conducted pursuant to Public 339.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you know of no reason why Congress cannot go into this question that was not investigated by either the Board or by you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I see no reason, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And it was not investigated by the Board or by you but you had the lead on it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, as I pointed out, Senator, there were certain aspects of that that I had in my papers and I am sure that you can find further references to them, but in answer to your question it was not investigated to finality, surely.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right, you couldn't get the finality, did not get the finality?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, let us go over on page 12. [Reading:]

c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel [11529] Bratton, or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they would have known that a "War with Britain" message would necessarily have involved the United States in war.

Now, did you find out—you did find out directly in the affidavit of General Miles, did you not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That he knew something about it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But wasn't he quite hazy as to what it was?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, there seemed, Senator, to be a unanimity of opinion that the nations who opposed the aggressor nations, such as America, the British, the Dutch and the Chinese, having mutual objectives, would all be overrun, of course, if the aggressor dictator nations were permitted to conquer them one by one.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt about that. That is what Hitler started out to do and was quite successful in the beginning, isn't that right?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Divide and conquer.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So, then, you say that General Miles, having that in mind, that he knew about this agreement.

[11530] Now, let us go to Admiral Noyes. Did you find out as to what his knowledge was about this joint action agreement?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; I did not proceed that far. I will tell you what I did in that respect, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I read over the Navy proceedings for the testimony of some of these incidents, and it more or less boiled down to what the Admiral testified this morning. I cannot recall specifically who said what to who, but that is just about what it amounted to, that there was no binding agreement but that there was an informal agreement. Now, if that makes sense to you, I don't know. It doesn't make sense to me.

Senator FERGUSON. It makes sense to me. We might say, in referring to these kinds of agreements, that the present agreement between Russia and the United States and Britain in relation to the Kurile Islands was not a binding agreement. Is that what you have in mind?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I don't know the details of that agreement, sir. From reading the papers I assumed that it was; oh—

Senator FERGUSON. An understanding?

Colonel CLAUSEN. A moral commitment made from which you could not recede.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, an understanding. Is that [11531] what you have in mind?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No. From my understanding, sir, I would mean a binding agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you distinguish this kind of an agreement? You are a lawyer. Now, what was this agreement?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I don't know what the agreement was, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You never found out?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well—

Senator FERGUSON. You never found out, I understand that, because of what you were told, but did you get any testimony on it as to what it was?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I pointed out some places here—I don't know where it is; it might appear in my proceedings. I don't know where else it might appear in my proceedings.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you come down into this joint action agreement here, "In which case they would have known"—you are talking about these officers—"that a 'War with Britain' message."

What message are you talking about?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, he had in mind there I suppose whether there was an authentic intercept which was an execute message to the winds code.

[11532] Senator FERGUSON. And if it only applied to Britain?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Then it would hook us in.

Senator FERGUSON. It would put us in anyway under this joint action agreement?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't that true?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. That is I think exactly what he said there:

would necessarily have involved the United States in war.

So that if we knew by any means that Britain was going to war with Japan whether it was by a winds code execute message or in any other manner that would necessarily have involved the United States in war; that is what that says, isn't it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what it says there.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. All right. Now, did you follow a lead to find out whether that was true or not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, just like I told you, Senator, and after looking over the situation I am pretty sure it was a—I will say it boiled down to a unanimity of opinion that if England were pounced upon that America would come to her rescue.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You took, then, from what you [11533] found out in this investigation that Mr. Churchill was entirely right in what he said in his speech to the Parliament on the 27th of January 1942 which I read into the record this morning. Were you here when I read it in?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was here, Senator, but I may not have heard it.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at it? It is on page 607 of the official documents of the House of Commons [handing document to witness].

Colonel CLAUSEN. What is the question, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Now the question is, your understanding of this joint agreement as stated by Mr. Churchill in what he says?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, Senator. You want my opinion now and here is what it is.

Senator FERGUSON. From what you found out in the evidence and then we will try to find the evidence.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, it is simply this, that the United States, British and Dutch and the Chinese stood for the free way of life, the dictator nations stood for an opposite way of life. We realized that we had common objectives. Therefore, if we did not stand together we would be killed separately.

Senator FERGUSON. And then we come to that last line then: [11534] Therefore, war with one, with Britain, would necessarily have involved the United States in war and we could have anticipated that, is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, not necessarily. I think that is going too far. If you mean that—

Senator FERGUSON. I am just taking your words.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Those are not mine, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were working under them. They were a kind of directive to you.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't want to quibble with you. Let us say they are anybody's at all. Senator, any opinion given here you don't want to assume that when there is, let me say, unanimity of purpose in stopping aggressor nations, that the President would violate the

Constitution in declaring war or taking steps without going to the Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now go to part "d":

Whether the partial implementation "War with Britain" was brought to Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action Policy.

Now, there wasn't any doubt in your mind that General Marshall knew of this joint action policy, was there?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, my knowledge on the subject [11535] of what the Chief of Staff knew was from his own testimony. He said, you will recall, that there was no binding contract.

Senator FERGUSON. But he said there was a contract, is that right?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, I would rather—I haven't read his testimony from then on. I would rather read the testimony if there is any question about what he said.

Senator FERGUSON. But here didn't you have a personal conversation with him later?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes; I had several, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you had a personal conversation with him about this joint action agreement?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, he told me that it was as he had previously testified.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all he said about it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, that is all I can recall aside from the fact that he mentioned the previous testimony that he had given on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did he say anything about that it would not be necessary to follow any more leads on the joint action?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, no; not at all. In no way did he attempt to——

Senator FERGUSON. I don't mean attempt, but that you had [11536] full knowledge of it, that the Secretary of War had full knowledge on it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. What is the question, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Did General Marshall tell you that the Secretary of War had full knowledge on the question of the joint policy?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot recall that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to Admiral Stark on that question?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. I read the testimony of Admiral Stark over that he had given before the Naval Board of Inquiry.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not question him on it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As to whether he knew about the joint action agreement?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to General Cramer, who signed this instrument that I was reading from?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Oh, I talked with the General many times; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On this question of joint action agree- [11537] ment? You see there are three ——

Colonel CLAUSEN. I must have talked with him, Senator, on numerous occasions about so many things that I do not recall any specific conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel, there are three very important questions which were leads in writing for you. Now, have you taken testimony on them so that there is a report on those three questions by either you or the Secretary of War, or were they later ignored and nothing said about those three important questions?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, whatever testimony I took is in here; and I haven't in mind right at the present time who said what about what.

Senator FERGUSON. I think I have read it all and at the present moment I am unable to discover anything that is said in here other than what you told me about General Miles and several other instances; but did you attempt to make a report, or did the Secretary of War, if I have missed it, attempt to make a report on those three important questions?

Colonel CLAUSEN. What question? On the question of a joint action agreement?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Not that I recall; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They did not?

[11538] Colonel CLAUSEN. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. And that was left to this Senate and House committee to do as far as you were concerned?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, the answers I have given before I think are the correct answers to that question. In other words, the war with Japan had ceased, the purpose of Public 339 could be carried out better by the Congress than having an officer like myself or Admiral Hewitt try to get the information.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss that with the Secretary of War?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I am pretty sure that I discussed it with Mr. Bundy, the nonnecessity of pursuing these leads to finality in view of the changed situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And the Mr. Bundy you have already described was this legal adviser to the Secretary of War?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, he is not the legal adviser. He was a special assistant.

Senator FERGUSON. Special assistant, all right. But he was a lawyer?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He is a lawyer.

Senator FERGUSON. Is he at the Secretary of War's office now—do you know?

[11539] Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. He is practicing law in Boston, Mass.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, it is very difficult to examine anyone in relation to taking affidavits of anyone until we examine the person who made the affidavit; you appreciate that? For instance, if I wanted to examine you on Colonel Bratton's affidavit I haven't the least idea of what he is going to say about it. Therefore, it is difficult to ask you questions on that affidavit. You will agree on that, will you not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, only that Colonel Bratton is here now.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but I don't know what he is going to say about that affidavit. You agree, do you, that there is direct conflict between Colonel Bratton's affidavit and his previous sworn testimony?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I don't like your use of the word "conflict."

Senator FERGUSON. All right, you choose a better word then.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, he corrected, certainly, his testimony that he had previously given to the Board because of a refreshed recollection and examination of documents.

[11540] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, take the 13-part message.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it true that Colonel Bratton originally swore that he had delivered a copy of the 13-part message in a locked bag to Col. Bedell Smith in the Chief of Staff's office on the night of the 6th of December 1941?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what he testified before the Grunert Board, I am sure.

Senator FERGUSON. You were present when he testified to that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And later he made an affidavit that he did not deliver a pouch with the 13 parts on the night of the 6th of December 1941?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right, Senator. He, on thinking it over and being shown testimony of other witnesses which I did for the reason of getting accurate testimony, said that he recalled that on the night of 6 December, if I remember his affidavit correctly, he was more interested in getting the 13 parts to the Secretary of State than anybody else, since it involved a diplomatic matter, and therefore when he testified before the Grunert Board he was [11451] confused and thought that he had actually delivered the 13 parts to the other usual recipients.

Senator FERGUSON. Why were you trying to get testimony, Colonel, on the fact as to whether or not Bedell Smith had given the 13 parts to anybody? What was the point?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, I did not try to get testimony as to any particular point. I wanted to know just who delivered what to whom, and after Colonel Bratton had testified before the Grunert Board, I talked with Colonel Dusenbury, and Colonel Dusenbury happened to be in G-2 at the time that I started this investigation, and told me that he was the one who delivered these 13 parts to these people.

That meant there was then a discrepancy between what Dusenbury said and what Colonel Bratton said.

Now, then, I therefore went to Colonel Bratton and showed him what Colonel Dusenbury said, and said, "Who is correct"?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you had an affidavit then from Dusenbury that he had delivered the 13 parts to Bedell Smith; is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I had affidavits, Senator, from various people, and several of these people had mentioned [11542] things concerning the deliveries of messages.

For example, Colonel Dusenbury, in his affidavit, put it down that he who took these intercepts around more in the latter part of the year 1941, than did Colonel Bratton.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that you took to Colonel Bratton the affidavit of Dusenbury, and the affidavit of General Bedell Smith, who became a general at that time, and took up the question with Colonel Bratton as to whether or not he was mistaken about giving it to Bedell Smith, the 13 parts, in General Marshall's office on the night of December 6?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I took around with me, Senator, so there would be no question about it, the actual paper—that is, in the affidavit of Colonel Bratton, he mentioned exactly what I showed him, so there would not be any question about it.

I see in the affidavit, Senator:

Colonel Clausen has shown me and asked me to comment on certain testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and affidavits of Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, Colonel, General Staff Corps; M. W. Pettigrew, Colonel; Ralph C. Smith, Major General; Charles K. Gailey, Brigadier General; Thomas J. Betts, Brigadier General; Walter B. Smith, Lieuten- [11543] ant General; L. T. Gerow, Lieutenant General; Robert E. Schukraft, Colonel; John F. Stone, and George W. Renchard, which statements and affidavits were given by the above-named persons to Colonel Clausen in the course of the investigation mentioned.

In other words, Senator, I showed Colonel Bratton these affidavits, and said, "Now, what is your comment with respect to what these people say?"

Senator FERGUSON. And those people said, in effect, that Colonel Bratton did not give Bedell Smith a copy of the 13 parts on the night of December 6?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I was only talking about that part. I am sorry, but I misconstrued what you were telling me.

Colonel CLAUSEN. General Smith is the one who could say whether he got the 13 parts on that night or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, you took an affidavit of General Smith to Colonel Bratton and said, "Here I have an affidavit of Colonel Smith"—general at that time—"who says you did not," or showed it to him, and told him to read it, and it, in effect, said "You did not deliver to me these 13 parts on the night of the 6th," is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I showed him that, and I also showed [11544] him these others, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And some of the others, or all of them said that he did not deliver the 13 parts?

Colonel CLAUSEN. On the night of the 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. On the night of the 6th.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, for example, the one of Dusenbury frankly said that he was supposed to have taken them around and did not do it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Dusenbury tell you why he did not take them around?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; he says so in his affidavit:

He did not think it of sufficient importance, I remember that, because he said the next day he found out the importance.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand then that Colonel Bratton thought they were so important that he spent all of his time getting these to the Secretary of State?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I mean, Senator, Colonel Bratton and Henry Clausen agree, I am quite sure, that the most important information that came into the War Department was information that the Jap consuls and their diplomatic representatives were burning their codes. That spells war in any man's language, and we do not need that long, self- [11545] serving hocus-pocus 14-part message to know it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then you are one of the officers in the War Department that came to the conclusion that when you learned that Washington knew that the Japanese were burning their codes, that meant war in any man's language?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And war, in effect, would be on any moment.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; was imminent.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, did you try to find out why an alert was not sent out on those codes?

Colonel CLAUSEN. An elert was sent out on those codes. Colonel Bratton sent the message to General Fielder that General Fielder said he did not get. The G-2 War Department sent it on 5 November, if you read my affidavit, sir. You will agree, Senator, that it went from the War Department to Hawaii, and that Colonel Fielder, General Fielder now, said if he had gotten it, he would have given it to Colonel Bicknell, and Colonel Bicknell who is now in Washington said he saw it on General Fielder's desk, so it is very clear it went to Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean just the Rochfort message, do you not?

[11546] Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. That is the message that Colonel Bratton and these other men had in mind as going out on 5 December.

Senator FERGUSON. Read into the record what message you are talking about, and see whether it is not the Rochefort message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, Senator.

Colonel, in order that we may be clear, once or twice you used November 5 as the date.

Do you mean November or December?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I am sorry sir, I mean December.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think you will find several times you said November 5.

Senator FERGUSON. Look on page 72.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right here; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading). Contact Commander Rochefort immediately through Com 14 Naval District regarding broadcast from Tokyo reference weather. Miles.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes. He pronounces his name "Rochefort."

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

That was the message that Colonel Bratton sent and that Fielder said he never got, but Bicknell said he saw it on Fielder's desk?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

[11547] Senator FERGUSON. I think that is the way you stated it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Except, Senator, when you send a message of this kind, as I understand it, when it comes out on the end of the

recipient, it does not have the same wording. Do you see what I mean? That is for security purposes.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand it is coded, or it is paraphrased even after the translation is made.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that message was not sent "urgent" or "priority" was it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It certainly was. I have the slip here.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me see where on the message it is marked "priority."

Colonel CLAUSEN. Page 73, "Important. Place priority tag on here."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but was a priority tag ever put on it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I did not find the message.

Senator FERGUSON. No; but here we have a copy of it, a photostatic copy.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Do you mind if I ask Colonel Bratton [11548] here?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at all.

(Colonel Clausen and Colonel Bratton conferred.)

Colonel CLAUSEN. I am informed that these went out automatically on high priority.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not understand from the Navy that that was true. They did not have priority unless they were marked "priority" is that right, Commander?

Commander BAECHE. I do not know, Senator, what the Army system is.

Senator FERGUSON. But your system is they have to be marked?

Commander BAECHE. Yes; it is indicated on the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you turn to page 75? That is a little different message.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is a paraphrase.

Senator FERGUSON [reading:]

Commander Rochefort who can be located through the Fourteenth Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once.

Now, did you ever contact Commander Rochefort?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I certainly did.

Senator FERGUSON. To ascertain whether or not he had any such information?

[11549] Colonel CLAUSEN. He certainly did.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the information?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Do you want me to read his affidavit?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Did you know there was—

The VICE CHAIRMAN (interposing). Go ahead and read the affidavit.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what page it is on?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I am going to find it, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. One affidavit he did not sign and one he did.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Pages 52 and 53:

AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does depose and state:

During the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941, I was the Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of [11550] the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I was attached to the headquarters of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily the acquisition of intelligence as directed by the head office in Washington.

At Pearl Harbor there was also a fleet intelligence officer, and a district intelligence officer.

My opposite number in the Army in the Pearl Harbor area was, prior to December, 1941, Col. Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. Prior to and during December, 1941, we had established and maintained liaison for the purpose of exchanging information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area.

For this purpose I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters and in Pearl Harbor. During the fall and including the period up to 7 December, 1941, we maintained most cordial and close relations, meeting informally.

My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to December 7, 1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political or [11551] diplomatic sources.

On occasions, however, I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material.

I have read the various documents shown me by Major Clausen marked "Top Secret Exhibit B." I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December 1941, except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have written my initials and today's date.

[11552] I believe, Senator, those refer to the winds code set-up and the destruction by the Japs of their codes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right on the set-up.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean the authentic implement message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No. He says here what he found.

In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I received concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and which came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our common interests.

Following are examples of such intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and, I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, during the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, [11553] I was informed of the substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to my head office in Washington.

Signed, "Joseph J. Rochefort, Captain, U. S. Navy."

Senator FERGUSON. Now he does not say in that affidavit that he ever had the implementing winds message, is that right?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore he would know nothing about the implementing message to destroy the codes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, these others here mentioned in this affidavit were the ones about the destruction of codes, which was the action contemplated, Senator, when the winds code was implemented, and which winds code, Senator, by the way, set-up was arranged for severance of the telegraph or radio. In other words, the set-up of the winds code, the way I read it, was in the event that you could not send in the normal channels, then they would have this last-ditch way of informing the consuls.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did not the messages that were [11554] sent out there by the Navy, as set up in Exhibit 37, did not they indicate that not all codes were being destroyed, that only part of the codes and part of the machines were being destroyed? That is on pages 40 and 41.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, I do not know what you mean by exhibit 37, or whatever it was that you said.

Senator FERGUSON. Pages 40 and 41 of Exhibit 37. Do you notice the difference in those messages? One refers to Washington as far as the machines are concerned, and the other one does not, and we are intercepting messages showing that they have not destroyed their codes after the receipt of these.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Some of the consuls, Senator, sent in the word "Haruna," you know.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, indicating that they had. Where did that come in from?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That one came from another intercept.

Senator FERGUSON. From what country?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, they went from all over the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it destroyed in Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not know, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You made a very broad statement.

Colonel CLAUSEN. What was it, Senator?

[11555] Senator FERGUSON. That the destruction of these code messages to you meant war.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, you have shown me in Exhibit 37 two documents that I never saw in that form before. If they are the ones, Senator, referred to in Captain Rochefort's affidavit, then I am in harmony with you, but I do not know that they are.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we better find out on that. I think that is where we will have to stop for a moment to find out whether those are the same documents that Rochefort was talking about. The best of my knowledge is, from what we have here, this Exhibit 37, would indicate that that is true.

Now I want to be corrected. Now let us get Exhibit 1. Do you have Exhibit 1? Let us check the SIS number from Exhibit 1.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I would rather see the top secret Exhibit B of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I doubt whether that is in the room.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is the one that Captain Rochefort had reference to, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Can we get that to compare with Exhibit 1? I am sorry to delay it but this is a very important point, as far as I see it. I think you will [11556] agree on that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Very important, Senator. Did not one of those refer, Senator, to the destruction by Washington of the purple machine?

Senator FERGUSON. Not that I know of. I do not think the words "purple machine" were mentioned in any that I have seen.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You see "purple machine" means an awful lot.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that. If these messages had said "destroy the purple machine," that is a different question.

Colonel CLAUSEN. We can find out if you will let me have top secret exhibit B before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Senator FERGUSON. But you see the purple was coming in as late as Sunday morning.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, as I understood it, the purple machine was ordered destroyed.

I am reading here, Senator, from the affidavit of Capt. Thomas A. Huckins, which I took at Pearl Harbor.

He is in the Navy and I wanted to see from the Navy there just what dispatches they had gotten from Washington, so they at that time had preserved them on a microfilm. We [11557] sat down and they ran these things off while I watched to see what dispatches had come in.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment, if you please, until we get these numbers straightened out here.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Here is one, Senator, which says:

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

Senator FERGUSON. What one is that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is on page 209 of this volume of yours, Exhibit 1. Then it goes on to tell them how to break up the machine.

Senator FERGUSON. That is from Tokyo to Washington, the first of December? Is that the one you were reading?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was reading the one from Tokyo to London.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That has been put in evidence. It says:

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

That would indicate there was going to be war with Britain then on the first? You had that knowledge, but that was never sent to Kimmel and Short, was it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It certainly was. There was a dispatch that went to General Short's G-2 stating that the war would [11558] break out with Britain, with America and not with Russia. It was sent on 3 December 1941. It came from the British Intelligence at Manila, based upon this magic traffic.

Senator FERGUSON. That is something new now.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I know it is in my exhibits here.

Senator FERGUSON. I say it is new from this message. This particular message, being Circular 2443, was not sent to Kimmel and Short. Will you show him that? That is the one you just called my attention to on page 209.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, Captain Huckins' affidavit—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). Will help us, will it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, because he has got in his affidavit the intercepts. He looked my intercepts over. I cannot recall, as I am looking at it now, but there is some tie-in between the two.

Senator FERGUSON. Just give me an answer to this one question and then we will go to the affidavit. Just look at that circular 2443 on page 209, Tokyo to London, and tell me, if you can, if you had any information or affidavit that that particular message was sent to Kimmel and/or Short?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sure.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then you are going to find that later for us?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I have got it right here.

[11559] Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Shall I read a portion of it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I should like to have it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, this affidavit that I now have before me is a joint affidavit of Capt. Thomas A. Huckins of the Navy, and Capt. Wilfred J. Holmes of the Navy, taken by me at Pearl Harbor. The reason it is in this form with some statements interspersed in here by a Commander Holtwick was that I had not, when I arrived at Pearl Harbor, been authorized to speak with Commander Holtwick. These things were cleared with the Navy.

Now this is what he goes on to say:

That he, Commander Huckins, on 7 December 1941, and for several months immediately prior thereto, was in charge of the IBM machine room; was assistant to the principal cryptanalyst, and was the administrative assistant to Captain Joseph J. Rochefort; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor concerning the intercepts SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787—

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. Stop right there. With SIS 25787.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the one that we had? That is Circular 2443?

[11560] Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I said.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, just so the record will show it is the same number.

Colonel CLAUSEN. This is tied in further.

mentioned in said affidavit of Captain Rochefort, consist of dispatch 4 December 1941 from OPNAV to CINCPAC concerning report of Japanese circular ordering destruction by Washington of purple machine and papers excepting one copy of certain system, and by London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila of purple machines, which dispatch has been microfilmed and is contained in Incoming Code Book No. 1.

Then I go on with the pertinent messages that come out of Pearl Harbor. Do you want me to read that?

Senator FERGUSON. No, I do not think it is material to what we are looking for.

Now, as I understand it, there was a message there in Hawaii showing that the purple machines were to be destroyed?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Just what this states, Senator. There is some more here about the Japanese consuls.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, give us the rest of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading).

"That the pertinent outgoing messages now available at Pearl Harbor are contained in Outgoing [11561] Code Book No. 1 and consist of dispatch 28

November 1941 from COM14 to OPNAV of communication intelligence analysis, dispatch 28 November 1941, from COM14 to OPNAV of British Consul information that the Japanese will attack Krakaw Isthmus on 1 December 1941, and, dispatch 6 December 1941 from COM14 to OPNAV of opinion that Japanese Consulate at Honolulu destroyed all codes except one system; that the Communication Intelligence daily summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and including 6 December 1941 are included in exhibit "A" herewith attached and made a part hereof, and consist of a resume or evaluation showing the results of traffic analysis based on intercepts of Japanese naval radio communications only, and were prepared for Captain Rochefort with copies thereof disseminated on the dates of preparation, as indicated on the copies in Exhibit "A," only to Captain Edwin Tom Layton, U. S. N., Fleet Intelligence Officer; that on 7 December 1941, and for several months prior thereto, the said unit supervised by Captain Rochefort did not have any facilities for decrypting the Japanese diplomatic radio messages which required the use of a machine and the USN decrypting facilities at Pearl Harbor did not include a purple machine and the only machine available was one designed by Commander Holtwick and covered a Japanese code [11562] which was abandoned in 1938 and not used since that time.

This is then signed by Captain Thomas A. Huckins, Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, and I had Commander Holtwick read and approve it.

[11563] Senator FERGUSON. That indicates at the last that there was no purple machine or method of transmitting purple messages in Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what they told me, yes, sir.

I was very interested, because I had been given various versions of that before I left Washington, and I wanted to run it down.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what code this 2443 was in, the one on page 209 of Exhibit 1?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It should show on top secret Exhibit B.

Senator FERGUSON. I sent out for that Exhibit B. These exhibits which you have here, these eight volumes do not contain these messages that you have been reading?

Colonel CLAUSEN. They certainly do, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you find them in there?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I asked for.

I also, Senator, got from the British, from their secret place, corresponding intercepts when I was in England.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get any information from the British when you were in England that there was a winds execute message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. I had that specific [11564] question put to the British people, and they investigated for me and gave me the report that there was no evidence of an execute message, but they did have two suspicious messages of that type that they would run down, and when I got back to Washington, I had them run these down through our super-duper agency that connected with the British and they got some information from out in the Far East, but they were not the ones that you and I would consider an authentic winds code intercept.

I expect that I have actual copies in my exhibits of these messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there a Morse code execute in the British file?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean with the one code word?

Senator FERGUSON. No, with the three code words, but in a Morse code, or in international code, and not a voice.

I am talking about different kinds of messages. Did you find in the British file any suspicious message that was in Morse code, or international code, rather than voice?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, I would want to review that. They are in one of my exhibits. To me the most suspicious circumstance of a winds code intercept coming in about the time that Captain Safford said was a document that I saw in Hawaii, which was dated 3 December, and which [11565] gave a highly reliable source.

If you knew a winds code set-up, this would flag your mind. It said "War with Britain; war with America," and "Peace with Russia."

Now, when I saw that I thought, "There is the winds code."

Senator FERGUSON. Where is that message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It is in my exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would find that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Let me see if I understood it. You say that message was in Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, that was disseminated to the FBI, to the Navy and to Colonel Bicknell in the Army.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir, that is where I got it. It did not go to Washington.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead and find it.

Senator FERGUSON. Find that one. I want to see that one.

Colonel CLAUSEN. It is in Exhibit 1, and it is also in my affidavit, on the back of the affidavit of Mr. Russell.

I will tell you how I got the lead.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let us get the message first.

[11566] Colonel CLAUSEN. You want to know who Mr. Russell is?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, I want the dispatch first.

Senator FERGUSON. As soon as we find the message, I will try to find out all about him.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Here it is. It is page 87, Senator, in my report.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let me see, Colonel. I want to be clear about it. This is the message that you secured in Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. It is one of many messages sent by the British, sir, to Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Read it slowly so we can understand it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The whole thing?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. It says at the top:

Urgent Cable received from Manila night of December 3, 1941.

We have received considerable intelligence—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. A little slower please.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indochina.

A-1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields [11576] and railways.

2. Arrival since November 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters medium bombers tanks and guns (75 millimeter).

B. Estimate of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington November 21 by American military intelligence here.

C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and United States. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the part that you thought was the winds code execute?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No. I thought whoever wrote this up had before him the winds code execute.

I haven't finished the message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and finish it.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu.

At the bottom, sir, it says:

Carbon copy: Colonel Bicknell, Mr. Shivers, Captain Mayfield.

[11568] Colonel Bicknell being General Short's G-2 in Hawaii, Mr. Shivers being the local FBI agent in charge, Captain Mayfield being the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy.

I have a statement from the man who got it. That was received by Theodore F. Davies, on the strength of which they cancelled some shipments from the Philippines. The British always tied in their magic to the commercial interests of their country.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel, when you say the British always tied it in, you mean that Britain used the messages to take care of and protect her commercial shipments?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. There, you see, this message that I have just read for the Vice Chairman, was one of many sent by a man named Wilkinson, who was in Manila.

Wilkinson was in the commercial business. And if you read the affidavit of General MacArthur and the affidavits of others, you will get somewhat the background of Colonel Wilkinson.

In any event, if you turn to my Exhibit 1, and page 50, you will find that what I did was to run down the source of this subparagraph C, where they say:

Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and United States.

[11569] Senator FERGUSON. I don't quite follow you, Colonel, that "our considered opinion concludes," could mean that the man or person who sent that had seen the winds execute message, because it would be a simple matter to say that he got it from the wind execute message.

Who is signing this memorandum?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I am going to show you.

The source of that information was magic.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and show us that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. At page 50, in my Exhibit 1, is again set forth this same document I have just read.

Now, when I was in London, I talked with the British party in charge of all this magic stuff, and he couldn't find, he said, any connection between what I have just stated and an implement message to the winds code, but after I got back here, I gave more thought to it, and I went to see Colonel Wilkinson who then was working in New York.

I showed him this portion and I said I would like to know——

Senator FERGUSON. This portion is "C"?

Colonel CLAUSEN. "C".

I said:

I would like to know if you know the source of that.

[11570] He said he didn't know. And since it was British, I said, "Will you find out for me?"

And as a result of that request, this came from the British to the Americans in Washington.

Page 51-E.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Read it.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

From London 31 August, 1945.

ULTRA.

You don't want me to read all of it?

Senator FERGUSON. No. I want to get to the part that relates to this message.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

A. Colonel Wilkinson, who was stationed at Manila and is now with 48,000 and temporarily in U. K. was recently approached by Lieutenant Colonel H. C. Clausen, of Judge Advocate General's Department, U. S. Army, in connection with investigation of General Short and Admiral Kimmel for Pearl Harbor disaster. He carried credentials from the Secretary of War.

B. He brought copies of two telegrams from Manila to Honolulu, of November 26, and December 3 which were as follows:

I have already read you the one of December 3d. Do [11571] you want me to read you the one of November 26th?

Senator FERGUSON. Does it have to do with this message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It speaks about the break. It talks about attacking the Krakow Isthmus. I had better read it.

1. "November 26, 1941. Most immediate. Secret source (usually reliable) reports:

"(a) Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on December 1st without any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view getting between Bangkok and Singapore.

"(b) Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing point to be in Songkhla area valuation for above is No. 3 repeat 3 (i. e.), only about 55 to 60 percent probable accuracy. American Military and Naval Intelligence Manila informed."

Now, skipping down to paragraph "C":

Colonel C. anxious to know basic source of para C of telegram of December 2nd.

The one I read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. December 3?

Colonel CLAUSEN. They had December 2. They quote it. There is no question as to what it is.

And in particular whether this was in "special" [11572] category.

They mean whether it was magic.

In point of fact of fact, para C was based on a B. J. Wilkinson was unaware of source and passed information to Honolulu as he appreciated that I possessed no direct communications.

B. J. is magic.

If you want to prove that, you can call General Carter Clarke.

D. As far as can be judged, the earlier information was based on agents reports but Clausen only pressing for origin of para C.

E. You should consult with G-2, as security ultra at stake if this evidence made public.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the information you have on that paragraph C?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there is only one thing that I want to inquire about. That is when I get back to this Exhibit B that you carried with you, I want you to compare it to those numbers so we can find out about this purple machine.

Do you have it now?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

[11573] Senator FERGUSON. If you will show me how the message is different from the ones on pages 40 and 41, of Exhibit 37?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Here is 2578757.

Senator FERGUSON. How does it read?

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait just a moment. This is Circular 2443, Exhibit 1, page 209?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Will you read it?

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

In regard to the disposition of the machine please be very careful to carry out the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to taking apart and breaking up the important parts of the machine.

As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one word SETUJU in plain language and as soon as you have carried out the instructions, wire the one word HASSO in plain language.

[11574] Also at this time you will, of course, burn the machine codes and the YU GO No. 26 of my telegram (the rules for the use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador Resident in England).

That is what this says.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is what this says too. They are identical. That was identified as being in Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. From my affidavit there of Captain Huckins.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, go to page 40 of Exhibit 37.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I think the Senator would be interested in the testimony of Captain Layton on the point of this purple machine.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. He testified at page 228 as follows: Captain Layton was the fleet intelligence officer of Admiral Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. He testified.

On December 3, OPNAV addressed CINCAF and COM16, information CINCPAC and COM14, that Tokyo had ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy their purple machines. The Batavia machine had already been sent to Tokyo. On December 2 Washington had been directed [11575] to destroy their purple machine and all but one copy of other systems. It stated that the British Admiralty that date had reported that the Japanese Embassy in London had complied with its orders to destroy it.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the purple machine, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. It was an electric coding machine.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any discussion with Admiral Kimmel concerning the destruction of the purple machine by the Japanese?

Captain LAYTON. All I recall of it is that Admiral Kimmel sent for me when he received this dispatch I have just mentioned, or one similar to it, and asked what was the purple machine. I told him that I didn't know, that I would find out. I then approached Lieutenant Coleman, the Fleet Security Officer, who had come from Washington, and asked him, and he told me it was the Japanese diplomatic electrical coding machine.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you communicate that to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. Which information I communicated to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you known of that testimony, Colonel, of Captain Layton, in the Hewitt Report?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. He testified before Admiral [11576] Hewitt after I had seen him. I saw Captain Layton at Guam. I took an affidavit from Captain Layton and I notice here on one of my intercepts he wrote this, apparently regarding this same message:

Message not seen but British reported that Japs had destroyed their purple machine in London. 28 April 1945. E. T. Layton.

He signed that. Captain Layton made that statement on that.

I haven't examined the affidavit of Captain Layton that he gave to me on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. The only thing I am not clear on is as to the two messages, 40 and 41, in Exhibit 37. You were going to clear that up for me. How your message differed from those.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I didn't say they were different, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, is there any difference?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I will see now.

Senator FERGUSON. I took it from what you said that there was a difference.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No. I don't want to say that at all. I just said that my top secret Exhibit "B" was the document that I showed the witnesses and that I had not seen beforehand [11577] these papers.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you do not purport to say that there is any difference?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, I don't say there is any difference. I just say that the ones I showed these people were my top secret Exhibit "B."

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have at the present time.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, it is getting rather late and I do not care to ask any questions, but it does seem to me that in view of this examination and the tremendous amount of information that Colonel Clausen has, that this committee ought to have Colonel Clausen review overnight all of the traffic which these affidavits claim was received in Hawaii between November 25 and December 7.

Certainly there has been information brought before this committee that I didn't know anything about up to this time. Probably that is my fault because I haven't been able to read, sir, all of your affidavits. I doubt if any member of the committee has read all of the information that has been obtained through the various investigations that have been made. But you have demonstrated a very thorough [11578] knowledge of what happened as a result of your complete investigation, and as one member of the committee, if you could do that, sir, I would like to have you go over these affidavits overnight and give this committee definitely and completely the traffic that was received from November 25 up to December 7 by Admiral Kimmel or any

of Admiral Kimmel's staff or other subordinates and the same with General Short and his staff or any subordinates.

In other words, we have had the testimony of very few witnesses in this hearing who were in Hawaii outside of General Short. I think he is the only witness that has testified here from Hawaii on the Army's responsibility at Pearl Harbor. Your testimony raises some questions in my mind as to whether or not we ought not to go into that pretty thoroughly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you do that, Colonel, as requested by Senator Lucas?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join in that and I would like to have him tie that in to Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 37 if possible. Or Exhibit 2. If you can do that then we would know in previous testimony what you were referring to.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't follow you because I don't [11579] know your exhibits, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. That is what I wanted to give you. We can have a man with you to help on those exhibits. Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2, and Exhibit 37 have been referred to from day to day here. Now, if you will try to tie those in when you tell us what messages were received from the 25th of November to and including the 7th of December as to where they appear in our exhibits, if they do appear, then that would make our record clear here, so that we could understand this record.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I will try to do that, Senator, but it is a large order. The thing that I thought you ought to have from me was perhaps my opinion as to what of these documents in my exhibits might tie in.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you can tie them in with that we could have one of our men tie them in into some of the others.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Some are important; some are unimportant. But there is a lot of tying in.

For example, the British in their file of intercepts, Senator, have some of the same messages I think that you have, and we also have others.

Senator FERGUSON. That isn't quite the question. The question is to find out what traffic went into Hawaii and [11580] was there and in the hands of any subordinate or General Short or Admiral Kimmel.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You won't think I am trying to put the blame on Hawaii if I do that?

Senator FERGUSON. All we want are the facts.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You can do that, as requested by Senator Lucas?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And as far as you are able you can try to comply with Senator Ferguson's request.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, as 4:50 p. m., January 12, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m. of the following day, Wednesday, January 13, 1946.)

[11581]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[11582] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have something at this time?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, heretofore a request was made by Senator Ferguson with respect to documents relating to the exchange of views with the British Government which was referred to in President Roosevelt's message to Chiang Kai-shek which is Exhibit 16. We have been able to secure a copy of the telegram sent by the Secretary of State to the American Embassy in London under date of November 7, 1941, which is the document we think that the Senator was interested in, and we would like to have it appear in the record as Exhibit 16-B, the Roosevelt message having been given the notation of 16.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. 16-B. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 16-B.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Mr. Chairman, I received a communication from the Commercial Pacific Cable Co. of 67 Broad Street, New York City. It appears that earlier in the hearing by reason of certain, I think, inaccurate testimony the press carried a notation that the transmission of the dispatch to Honolulu known as the Marshall message in relation to the 1 o'clock message which was part of the 14-part message that we have been referring to—

[11583] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the Marshall message of December 7, 1941?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. That, when it went to Honolulu, it went over a, quoting the press notation, "a slow commercial cable." This cable company is the only cable company operating between San Francisco and Honolulu. It is my understanding that the uncontradicted evidence in the case shows the transmission of the message from San Francisco to Honolulu was over RCA and not over any cable system, and I want to make the statement for the record in

answer to the suggestion of this company that the record ought to be corrected because this company had nothing to do with the transmission of this message and, therefore, are not responsible for the way in which it was transmitted or anything with reference to it.

This statement of mine is made to correct the impression which the press gave that the message went out of San Francisco to Honolulu over a cable company which is not correct.

Now, the third thing which I have to call to your attention is this: There appears in the record of the Army Board Investigation some testimony by Major General Henry T. Burgin, which is found at pages 174 to 177, inclusive, of the board record, criticising in some detail what was [11584] conceived to be the difficulties which the military forces had with the business residents of Hawaii in connection, for instance, with the suggestion of Burgin that the owners of land objected to artillery positions and that going into an alert by the Army would have angered the prominent institutions of Hawaii.

Because of that testimony I have had presented to me a document which has been prepared by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters organization, which is a very reputable organization in Hawaii, for the purpose of stating the position of that company and its associated members on the point of the cooperation, assistance, help, effort, which they assert they made in aid of the interests of the United States and of its military forces both prior and during the war.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you permit a question there? Was this company the owner of the land which was alleged to have been wanted, which the Army is alleged to have wanted to use and some difficulty was developed?

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is my understanding that people associated with this organization, its members, were also the landowners that they may have referred to.

Now, it consists of a statement made by the association, and then it is followed by numerous exhibits which are verified by the secretary of the association. I have gone [11585] through it. I find nothing in it that displeased me at all, and I want to have the committee indicate whether it would have any objection to receiving this document as an exhibit as part of the files of the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be received.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I don't know that I want to interpose an objection, but that really seems to me to be foreign to what we are investigating.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am not prepared to argue the point. It is an attempt to lay in paper here what they conceive to be the many efforts of the citizens of Hawaii to aid in the military effort.

Mr. CLARK. It seems to me that if that was developed in the Army Board hearing, it would be a matter for the Army Board to consider. I have the feeling that we have already fixed this record so no human being will ever read it, and I hate to see it go any further with something unless it is pertinent.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, conceivably, Mr. Congressman, members of this committee might be interested in what this document would show as to the cooperation of the citizens of Hawaii in the light of the testimony that alerts disturbed the civil population and might meet with

objection from the civil population. I am not making an argument in favor [11586] of it or against it except that it struck me that it comes from a responsible organization, it is a very well-prepared document, and it seems to me that it might be included as part of the exhibits so that if someone in the future should want to have a source of inquiry as to those facts it would be within the scope of your record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit me to inquire: The testimony to which you referred as given by the Army officer appears in the record of the Army Pearl Harbor Board Inquiry?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is correct; at the pages I indicated.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And raises some question as to objections made by local people in Hawaii as to the use of land the Army thought was necessary for artillery purposes for a part of their defense program?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That, Mr. Chairman, is only one portion, which I used simply as an instance to show you the character of the things which gave rise to this rejoinding compilation. There are other things.

For instance, there is testimony, as you will recall, in this record that certain steps were not taken because they might alarm the civil population and might cause trouble with the civil population. These people are intimately connected with the civil population and state what the civil population was doing at the time in aid of our governmental and military efforts.

[11587] Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I will not object but I want the record to show at least a mild protest on this point.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I feel a good deal as Congressman Clark does about this. This is a very highly controversial matter. I have read three books dealing with this very question. If the brief of these sugar plantation owners and producers is to be offered in evidence it will open an avenue of investigation that we will never finish.

I haven't any objections to reading it but I believe that we will run into serious controversy from the character of the books that I have read dealing with the subject and so far as I am concerned I am going to object to it being offered as part of the record in this case because an ex parte document of that character put in here without a chance to even examine it to know what it is or to know who the people are that prepared it or what their interest is it seems to me is cluttering up the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, does that relate to the request?

Mr. KEEFE. I do object.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The objection is heard. Anything further, counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I feel very distinctly the force of the [11588] Congressman's objections because it is, just as he very pertinently suggested, a brief on behalf of these interests on the point. My only thought was that it would afford some reference indication and I could see no harm if it was not opening a door of a great succession of briefs that might be here pro and con.

I suggest the matter of the document might be left until the committee hearings draw to a close. Still that would not meet the Congressman's suggestion that there may be matters in connection with

this brief that he would like to ask some questions about and then it would be too late to ask them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, in view of the objection, why, you will hold it then, not as an exhibit but hold it available if any member of the committee desires to examine it.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably absent yesterday and Monday and I do not know—I have just had a chance this morning for an hour to read the proceedings of yesterday, but in view of the fact that one of the witnesses before this committee, Captain Safford, occupied a very prominent part for a long period of time as a witness it seems to me that I as one member of the committee would like to have the record show what appeared in the public press as to the award by the Navy Department day before yesterday of the Legion of Merit to Captain Safford for his work as a cryptographic expert from March 1942 to September 1945 and I would [11589] like to have the Navy Department submit the citation upon which that Legion of Merit was awarded to Captain Safford day before yesterday as it was reported in the press.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. For the record?

Mr. KEEFE. For the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request? (No response.) The Chair hears none. It is so ordered.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We will secure a copy.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you secure it and have it inserted in the record at this point, please? I can be obtained during the day, I presume.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Very well, Mr. Keefe.¹

Mr. KEEFE. Thank you.

Mr. CLARK. The only other thing I have on my mind, Mr. Chairman, is that we have got about everything in this record now except Turner's Almanac.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand from some of this testimony that might be a good thing to have in here.

[11590] TESTIMONY OF HENRY C. CLAUSEN (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas was examining the witness when we adjourned yesterday.

Colonel, have you been able to prepare the material requested by Senator Lucas?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; I am prepared to read now into the record from my notes the results of my work last night.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas is recognized.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel Clausen, before you start reading from the memorandum you prepared, do you recall whether or not the Army Board made any investigations of the citizens of Hawaii with respect to the problems presented in this material?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. We went into that in quite some detail in Hawaii. We called on General Welles and Mr. Midkiff and other prominent citizens of Hawaii with respect to that question.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

¹ A press release issued by the Navy relating to Capt. Safford's citation appears *infra*, pp. 4461-4462.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead then, present the material you arranged for.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I first will integrate the intercept numbers in the affidavits I obtained into the exhibits before this committee.

[11591] Referring now to the affidavit of Capt. Joseph J. Rochefort there are references to SIS numbers, Signal Intelligence Service numbers of intercepts.

The one numbered 25392 is your exhibit number 1, page 155. No. 25545 is your Exhibit 1, page 208 and 209. No. 25640 is your Exhibit 1, page 215. No. 25787 is your Exhibit No. 1, page 209.

With respect to the affidavit of Colonel Bicknell, George W. Bicknell, there are references in there to intercept numbers 25392 and 25432 which are in the exhibit I have already indicated.

Then there is a reference to his having seen in Hawaii before 7 December 1941 a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret volume "C," testimony of Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy. That refers to the Top Secret proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the Grunert Board. That is your exhibit 37, page 40.

Then he refers in here to the British SIS documents that he received before Pearl Harbor and those are contained in my Exhibit 6. Now, this Exhibit 6 are the British Secret Intelligence Service dispatches sent from Manila to Hawaii and what I did was to go in Hawaii to the three sources or three recipients. They were not always the same. In some [11592] cases you will see marked on these in my exhibit that the copies went to, perhaps, maybe in some cases just to Captain Mayfield. Now, Captain Mayfield was the District Intelligence Officer. In some instances they went to the three of them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. District Intelligence Officer for Army or Navy?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Navy, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They have captains in the Army and Navy both, you know, so be sure and distinguish those as you go along.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. He is now Admiral Mayfield. The copies in most instances went to the three, that is, Capt. I. H. Mayfield of the Navy, Mr. Robert Shivers of the FBI and this same Col. George Bicknell.

Now, when I found some case—for example, I have here on page 150 of exhibit 1 it says, "Captain Mayfield only." What I did was to go to the three sources so as to get what I thought was the full scope of the dispatches.

The committee yesterday said something about showing what information was available in Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is correct. Go ahead.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The affidavit of Colonel Bicknell is very illuminating on that subject.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, read it then.

[11593] Colonel CLAUSEN. Incidentally, Colonel Bicknell was most helpful to me and he told me some of the sources of information in Hawaii for me to pursue.

Senator LUCAS. Before you read that affidavit am I to understand now that his affidavit contains information that was received at Hawaii from Manila?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And was that same information transmitted on to Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. As I understand it, sir, the prior SIS stuff that is in my Exhibit 6, I did not find it in Washington.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, in the first part of your statement you gave to the committee certain information through code numbers that was received both in Manila and Washington—I mean both in Hawaii and Washington, or at least Washington and Hawaii both knew about it, put it that way. Now you are proceeding from there to give the committee information that was in Hawaii alone, is that right?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, the intercept numbers that I gave you here, sir, with respect to Captain Rochefort and Colonel Bicknell were received in some instances in Washington and in Hawaii. The affidavit would have to be read to get the complete information.

[11594] Senator LUCAS. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, go ahead and read it, Colonel.

Senator GEORGE. And who was Colonel Bicknell?

Colonel CLAUSEN. General Short's G-2.

Senator GEORGE. G-2 of the Army?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Assistant G-2, yes, sir; of the Army.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Shall I leave out the first formal part?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all right. Go ahead.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You just want the information. This is dated 25 February 1945, Col. George W. Bicknell [reading]:

I was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department in charge of counter-intelligence from October 1940 until April 1943. My immediate chief was Col. Kendall J. Fielder. Prior to this service I had training in G-2 work, and in this connection had served under General Nolan.

Before 7 December 1941 and in connection with my duties, I developed sources of information which included very close liaison with the FBI in Honolulu whose offices adjoined mine in the Dillingham Building; then [11595] Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, U. S. N., Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor; the District Intelligence Officer, Captain Mayfield of the Fourteenth Naval District; the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Commander Layton of the Pacific Fleet; the British Secret Intelligence Service, and the various units of the Army. Each Monday I held meetings with Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers of the FBI. I knew at the time of 7 December 1941, and for months preceding this date that Commander Rochefort was in charge of the unit which consisted of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. I caused other sources of information to be available to me such as the FCC intercept radio station, interviews with visitors to Hawaii, the public press, and certain residents of the Hawaiian Islands.

Before 7 December 1941, and during the latter part of November 1941, I learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that when a false weather report was broadcast by Tokyo it would be a signal to know that war or breach of diplomatic relations had occurred between Japan and the United States, Russia, or Britain, or one or more of these [11596] three, and to destroy their secret codes and papers. The intercepts contained in Top Secret Exhibit B shown me by Major Clausen, numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432 which I have initialed, contained the substance of the information given me in the latter part of November 1941. I took immediate action to have the local FCC intercept radio station monitor for the execution message. The FCC later furnished me certain intercepts in pursuance of this request, but which were not the ones for which I was looking.

Later, my attention was again called to this "Winds" code information when, before 7 December 1941 and to the best of my recollection on 5 December 1941, I saw on Colonel Fielder's desk a message from the War Department, Washington, D. C. in substance as follows:

"DECEMBER 5, 1941.

"Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters of Hawaiian Department, Honolulu Territory, Hawaii.

"Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

Miles."

On the day I saw this message I communicated with [11597] Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information, and I was advised that he also was monitoring for the execution message of the "Winds" code. This information was also given me by Mr. Robert L. Shivers, then FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu. The information they had as to the "Winds" code was the same as that which had been given me.

Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941, I learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret "C," testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N. At about this same time this information was discussed with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the chief of staff for General Short-I told those assembled, which included the chief of staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important [11598] papers by Japanese Consuls, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere. I had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates which were mimeographed and distributed to the chief of staff; G-2, Hawaiian Department; G-2, Hawaiian Air Force; G-2, Schofield Barracks; G-3, Hawaiian Department; FBI, Honolulu, and ONI, Honolulu, copies of two of which are set forth between pages 3684 and 3695, Secret Transcript, Volume 30. These weekly estimates reflected the information that I had received from the sources I have previously indicated and were in part the means I adopted of conveying the pertinent information to interested parties.

In the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message between Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent then living in Honolulu, and an individual in Tokyo who ostensibly was connected with some newspaper in Tokyo, and that the conversation had been recorded and translated, a copy of which was given me. Mr. Shivers was alarmed at what he considered the military implications in this message [11599] concerning Pearl Harbor. I concurred in his views and considered the conversation as very irregular and highly suspicious. I recall that the subjects of discussion between the Japanese which caused me alarm were inquiries by the party in Tokyo as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, weather conditions, and references to "hibiscus" and "poinsettias." My G-2 sense told me that there was something very significant about the message. I knew the intricacy and subtlety of the Japanese espionage system, that spies sometimes adopt very innocuous means of transmitting military information, and I had in mind the other items of intelligence I had received, including my prior estimates. I reasoned, also, at the time that while the message from Dr. Mori in Honolulu was ostensibly going by radio telephone to Tokyo still it could be intercepted elsewhere. I also considered the Dr. Mori message in the light of the information I had received concerning the destruction by Japanese Consuls of their codes and papers. This was the action which the Japanese Consuls were to take in execution of the "Winds" code.

[11600] I therefore telephoned Colonel Fielder, it being about 5:15 p. m., 6 December 1941, and told him that it was very necessary for me to come and see him and General Short immediately, that I had something that I considered to be of utmost importance. Colonel Fielder said that he and General Short were going to dinner at Schofield Barracks and since they were all ready to go the matter had better wait until tomorrow. I stated that I thought it was too

important to wait and that I had to see them right away. I was then told that if I could get out there in 10 minutes they would wait for me. I did rush out and make it in 10 minutes and handed the intercepted message to General Short who read it with Colonel Fielder. Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too "intelligence conscious" and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about 5 minutes.

Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short while waiting to testify before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words to the effect, "Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you were right and I was wrong."

[11601] On 7 December 1941, immediately upon commencement of hostilities I caused all action to be taken looking toward the apprehension of Japanese agents for which I had theretofore taken preparatory steps. I caused, also, a search to be made of the Japanese Consulate, his papers seized, some of which he did not have time to destroy, and I had these turned over to Commander Rochefort for our joint investigatory action.

As leads I suggest that the files which were kept under my supervision and custody in the Dillingham Building be thoroughly reviewed, that Mr. Jack Russell of the Theodore Davies Company, Honolulu, be questioned concerning the warning to Short supposed to have been sent on 6 December 1941 by the British SIS, Manila; and that in this connection then Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Wilkinson and then Colonel Field, both of British SIS, be questioned.

Signed, "George W. Bicknell, 25th day of February 1945."

[11602] After this, when I returned from Honolulu and got this additional information, I then consulted Colonel Bicknell and got an affidavit concerning some of this information. That is dated 14 August 1945 and reads as follows: I will omit the first part that has just to do with the formal part.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

I wish to state further that prior to December 1941, namely about October 1941, I made and practised in collaboration with Mr. Shivers of the FBI, elaborate plans for rounding up dangerous aliens, especially Japanese, in the event of war with Japan. These plans were divided into three categories, called A, B, and C. They are specifically set forth in memoranda I prepared which should be in the G-2 and FBI files. Plan C was put into execution immediately on the proclamation of martial law.

In connection with such plans I wish also to refer to my written estimates given to General Short and his staff, including those dated 17 and 25 October 1941. In view of the impending events, I also, on about the middle of October, 1941, recommended to the Hawaiian Department G-2 and Signal Officer that a teletype system be installed which would link all the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian Islands with [11603] the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.

Colonel Clausen has shown me a file containing many of the reports which Gerald Wilkinson of the British Secret Intelligence Service sent to Mr. Harry Dawson in Honolulu. Those in this file which are marked for me, were received by me on or about the dates set forth on the documents. Included in this group are the two documents, dated as having been received at Honolulu 27 November and 3 December, 1941, and in turn delivered to the FBI at Honolulu on 29 November and 4 December, 1941, respectively, and which documents were received by me on the dates they were delivered to the FBI. I have identified a copy of each document by putting my initials and today's date on the reverse sides.

The information which was thus received from Gerald Wilkinson, including that set forth on the two documents stated of 27 November and 3 December, 1941, as well as any pertinent information I received in connection with my G-2 activities, I gave to General Short promptly, in one form or another. Reference is made in this regard to the files of written memoranda which should be available in the G-2 offices at Honolulu and Washington, to my testimony heretofore on the subject, and to my personal conference with General Short on 6 December 1941.

[11604] I come now to the affidavit, sir, of Colonel Rowlett. I asked colonel with respect to the sheaf of intercepts contained in Exhibit B before the Grunert Board, to get for me the sources of interception, the dates of the messages, the dates of the interception, the dates of translation; whether Honolulu had copies; whether the activated message in pursuance of the winds code message was available, so he prepared for me a summary which is attached to his affidavit.

In response to the committee's request yesterday, I find that there are two numbered intercepts which were intercepted at Honolulu, and they are the Army SIS Nos. 27065 and 26158. They are in your Exhibit No. 2, pages 21 and 26.

I suggest that I read them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let us get this clear, Colonel.

These are two dispatches which your investigation indicated had been received at Honolulu?

Colonel CLAUSEN. They were intercepted there and sent on to Washington. My investigation showed that they were the ones which were sent on. The query in my mind, sir, was whether the facilities in Honolulu could decrypt them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is what I was going to ask you, whether your investigation would permit you to state, on the [11605] affidavit of anybody, that Honolulu interpreted these messages.

Colonel CLAUSEN. My investigation showed they did not, sir; but my investigation showed they might have been able to do it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read them, Colonel.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No. 27065 reads as follows:

From Tokyo (Togo).

To Honolulu.

December 2, 1941.

#123.

(Secret outside the Department)

In view of the present situation the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Here after to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with antimine nets.

Now, there is a note which says:

This message was received here on December 23.

Further along in my investigation, I wanted to know why this delay, so I checked down with the Signal Intelligence people, our Army people in Honolulu, and I have here a [11606] statement by General Powell.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What date was that intercepted in Honolulu?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, it would be intercepted, you see, on the 2d of December, the day it was sent.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On the 2d of December?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It did not reach Washington until when?

Colonel CLAUSEN. On the 23d of December.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire now, to complete that record, as to whether or not that was decoded in Honolulu, or could be decoded?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Richardson just asked me that question, Senator, and I told him that my investigation showed that it had not been decoded there. My investigation further showed—and we were attempting to verify this last night, whether this was in a code that they had facilities there to decrypt.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am trying to find out now.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The Army had no such facilities, but it was my understanding it was in a code to a consul, and that the Navy might have been able to do it at Honolulu.

[11607] Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any knowledge on that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I have no knowledge, and I suggest that that be pursued.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What code was it in? It was in PA-K2, was it not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. J-19.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, J-19 and PA-K2 were what might be termed minor codes?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were below the purple?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is the point, sir. You see, the purple machine was, well, the top flight, and highest level machine which would be given to an Embassy, and Honolulu was a consulate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And your investigation was to ascertain whether Honolulu may have had facilities to decode and translate the messages coming over J-19 or PA-K2?

Colonel CLAUSEN. What they could do there in any respect, and I have already read the affidavit of Commander Holtwick, and you have Captain Rochefort testifying he was able to decrypt some of this stuff?

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead now.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this.

[11608] Will you follow through at this point now, and disclose to the committee the reasons for the failure to send this message on to Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I understand, sir, they picked these up and sent them in by mail.

Senator LUCAS. I see.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Colonel.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was going to read the other message, which is No. 26158, and it is in your Exhibit No. 2, page 26:

From Tokyo (Togo)

To Honolulu

December 6, 1941

#128

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123a the movements of the fleet subsequent to the 4th.

You will remember that No. 123 was the first one I read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Then there is a note that that "a" is not available. Then that shows a mark as having been translated on December 12, 1941.

[11609] Senator LUCAS. What code was that sent in?

Colonel CLAUSEN. PA-K2. Now both those messages that I have just read, after the translation date noted thereon, have in parenthesis the number 5. 5 indicated Honolulu as being the intercept point, in other words, where the message was intercepted, and "5" is an Army number, showing it was intercepted by the Army at Honolulu.

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I call the committee's attention at this point to page 5515 of the committee's record where the notation refers to the item on the message just read by the witness:

This message was received here on December 23.

Then appears this:

This decode and translation was based on a copy of the Japanese coded text received by Army SIS on 23 December, by air mail from Station 5, Hawaii (A). It had been mailed from Station 5 on or after 11 December (A). The files also contain a copy of the coded text, which is marked "Dupe" ("duplicate") and therefore appears to have been received by Army SIS later than the airmailed copy noted above; the "Dupe" copy is on a Mackay Radio (Honolulu Office) form, and appears to have been the basis of the airmailed version forwarded by Station 5.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead, Colonel.

[11610] Senator LUCAS. Colonel Clausen, does the evidence that the Army Board took at Pearl Harbor show any arrangement that the Army had with the Navy in the decoding of any of these messages at Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; you see, sir, when the Grunert Board was there we did not know about the magic.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. So we did not go into these details, and this was one of the things I was supposed to do.

Senator LUCAS. So there is no evidence, so far as you know, which you could give to the committee as to any arrangement the Army might have had with the Navy to decode or decrypt any of these messages that came in?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Except through the evidence that I collected, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Senator has inquired about the Army Board, and the Colonel has explained that. Now he made his investigation after that.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The Army Board, sir, in Washington, in the final week, did have testimony from Captain Safford and Colonel Bratton.

Senator LUCAS. From your investigation now, is there any evidence that shows any arrangement that the Army had with [11611] the Navy whereby the Army, in the interception of one of these messages, might transfer it to the Navy for decoding any analysis?

Colonel CLAUSEN. There is evidence from the affidavits that I collected that if you wanted to do it, you could do it; that Captain Rochefort, on special assignment, did do it; that Colonel Bicknell was working in liaison with him; that the arrangements were such even before Colonel Fielder was the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, which I believe commenced about August 1941, where the G-2's of the Hawaiian Department could get the commercial company cables.

In other words, Colonel Pettigrew, whose affidavit is in my report here, which I did not read for the reason that it was taken in Washington and he was not in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack, but he shows in his affidavit, and also now General Marston, whom I interviewed in Hawaii, and who at one time had been G-2, could on occasions, if they wanted to, go down to the commercial companies and get the consulate telegrams and make arrangements to find out what was in them.

Senator GEORGE. Colonel, may I ask, did you take the affidavit of Colonel Fielder?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. He is a general, sir.

Senator GEORGE. He is a general now. Have you that [11612] affidavit there convenient?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Where you can reach it and read it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. Shall I read it now?

Senator GEORGE. I shall be glad to have it now, as far as I am concerned.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Hold your place where you were starting to read and then read the one that Senator George requested. After that you can go back to the other.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I have it here. It is on page 190 in my report. I will omit the first part.

1. I took charge of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, about 4 months prior to December 7, 1941, and had had no prior G-2 experience.

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me just a moment.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I have been listening with some interest to this testimony and I just wonder where it is going to lead us. As I understand it, Colonel Clausen has before him his book of affidavits which constitute his report. It now appears that we are reading into the record as evidence the substance of some of these affidavits.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They are already in the record, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, do I understand that we are to accept [11613] the affidavits of these witnesses, with no chance to confront the witnesses or see the witnesses? That we are just going to offer these affidavits with the explanation that Colonel Clausen may make, with no opportunity to see any of these witnesses who made these affidavits, or to examine them in any sense before this committee?

I thought that that was one of the things that the committee had decided they would not do. Perhaps I am in error.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Congressman, they were offered as an exhibit yesterday afternoon without objection.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I had objected to them continuously. Unfortunately I was not here yesterday afternoon to interpose an objection to offering a series of affidavits, if they are to be accepted as evidence in this case, because I think it is highly irregular. I cannot see any probative value of a lot of affidavits when I have no opportunity to examine the witness, or to see him, or to know who he is by observation, or anything else.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The introduction, Congressman, was not with the idea of foreclosing, as far as we were concerned, the point which you make. It was offered as an exhibit. I still understand that it is necessary for the committee to take a position as to whether the af-

fidavits [11614] noted and identified in the exhibit are to be received as testimony or whether they simply stand as an exhibit.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, what is the distinction between the exhibit, under those circumstances, a lot of affidavits, and testimony?

Mr. KAUFMAN. They are affidavits of witnesses who at one time or another had testified either in the Army Inquiry or the Navy Inquiry, or one of the other inquiries. So that the committee has before it the testimony of all of these witnesses in one form or another, plus the affidavits procured by Colonel Clausen for the purpose of amplifying the testimony with respect to the points that were not covered in the Army Investigation.

Colonel Clausen yesterday explained that the Grunert Board, the Army Board, did not have before it and did not know of the existence of magic until the last week of its hearings, and therefore the hearings were closed subject to the procurement by Colonel Clausen of the supplemental information suggested by the magic that was not before the Board at the time.

It seems to me that these affidavits are in precisely the same class as the testimony of the witnesses before the Board, and so far as this committee is concerned, in its desire to have before it evidence from all sources, it [11615] cannot exclude these affidavits and the exhibits that have been attached to it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me just a moment, Senator, please.

That may be your opinion, Mr. Counsel, but it is not my opinion, I will say very frankly. A witness who testified under oath before either the Army Board or the Navy Board and who subsequently, by virtue of an affidavit, completely changes the testimony he gave under oath before the Army Board or the Navy Board, presents a very difficult situation for me, as a member of this committee, and I certainly do not want to accept affidavits from witnesses who were sworn as witnesses and testified under oath without having an opportunity to see those witnesses and to examine them in person before this committee.

Now the question of credibility and everything else is involved, I think you, as a lawyer, would say.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I think that is so, Mr. Congressman, but I do not think there has been any change of testimony, according to the testimony of Colonel Clausen.

Mr. KEEFE. I am certain there is, and I am prepared to show it in a number of cases.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think counsel is correct. I do not think any changes have developed so far in Colonel Clausen's [11616] testimony here.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I think there is some mistake here about these affidavits, that they are from only people who have testified before the Army and Navy Boards, or some of these hearings. I wish to call to your attention that is not true.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Because General MacArthur's affidavit is in here, and Willoughby's affidavit is in here, and there are quite a number

of affidavits in here that the ones who made the affidavits have not testified before any Board.

Mr. Chairman, I want to correct the record, and I think it should be corrected, that the Army Board did not know about the magic until about the time it was closing. On September 29, 1944, General Marshall testified before the Board, and he had stated to them, in a private session off the record, about this magic, as he said, the first day of the hearing. I read from page 6 on "A," and it says:

[11617] As I stated to you the other day in secrecy off the record, that message became available to me in the neighborhood of, well, about 11 o'clock, or thereabouts, and the circumstances were these:

I was about to leave for the War Department, having been horseback riding Sunday morning, when a message came in that they had a very important document and used the expression "magic" which determined that sort of material, which they thought I should see at once, and they would bring it to me at Fort Myer.

Mr. Chairman, I did not understand yesterday, when we received this as an exhibit, that that was going to cut off or cut short the calling of any witness. As counsel states this morning, that is not his understanding. I think if we are going into these affidavits, we ought to consider the fact that there are alterations in the testimony which I am able to show here, I think, this morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I make just one statement? It is my recollection of the matters occurring before the committee that in connection with any earlier testimony that was to be received here before the committee, any member of the committee would have the right to ask the particular witness be summoned in person for the purpose of giving testimony. That may be the solution of the Clausen matter, [11618] because if, for instance, Colonel Fielder, or any of the other witnesses that appear in these affidavits should be desired here in person by the committee, it is my understanding that they can be produced.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead, Colonel.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to say one thing:

The fact is that we have been here since last November—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We all know it.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to make my statement. I do not mean to be belittled. The fact is there has been only one Army officer called before this committee from Pearl Harbor, only one Pearl Harbor witness, and if we are going to have the rule of the gentleman from Wisconsin, we will know nothing at all about Pearl Harbor, as to what happened with the Army there, and we have only three naval witnesses. So we have to look to the record, necessarily, of previous testimony in order to make an intelligent report.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Colonel. Senator George has requested that you read at this time the affidavit of General Fielder.

Senator GEORGE. What I wanted, Colonel, was his testimony with respect to this information, whether it reached him, whether you gathered any information as to where [11619] it went from him.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That is exactly what I wanted. It is absolutely vital here, because I never have seen his testimony.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Shall I proceed?

Senator GEORGE. Yes; you may proceed.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

1. I took charge of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, about four months prior to December 7, 1941, and had had no prior G-2 experience. The organization of the Section just prior to and on December 7, 1941, was as follows: a small administrative section of one officer, two clerks; a public relations section of two officers and three clerks; a combat intelligence section of two officers and several clerks organized to expand rapidly in an emergency; a counter-intelligence section of approximately twelve officers and thirty agents, known at that time as the "Contact Office", in charge of Lt. Col. George Bicknell and located in the City of Honolulu. Other than the "Contact Office", the G-2 section was at Fort Shafter, and most of the personnel had dual responsibility since the section was small and the duties varied.

2. The G-2 section depended generally for information on Japan and the rest of the world on the War Department, [11620] on the local Navy Command, and on interrogation of travelers. I know now that some was also received from British SIS. No intercept facilities or other agencies were available to study Japanese communications.

3. While the principle mission of the G-2 section was to safeguard against internal disorders and sabotage, the Contact Office did prepare for publication certain estimates based on information obtained from all sources. It was customary for all military personnel to channel information to the Contact Office where summaries and estimates were prepared. Prior to December 7, 1941, the G-2 Section of the Hawaiian Department was mostly concerned with subversive matters since there were 180,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in the Territory of Hawaii, of whom 40,000 were aliens. The warnings that came to me were to take every precaution against possible sabotage and that nothing should be done which might precipitate an international incident, and that the public must not be unduly alarmed. I spent a great deal of time the last week of November and the first week in December of 1941 inspecting the various military establishments to check on sabotage preparations. Likewise this was done by other Department Staff Officers. I also devoted considerable time in the fall of 1941 speaking before various racial groups in an effort to avoid complications should war descend on the United States. Particularly were we worried about friction between local Filipinos and Japanese.

4. The Contact Office was directly under G-2 but it also functioned somewhat as a special staff section: the Contact Officer, Lt. Col. Bicknell, had direct access to the Commanding General and Chief of Staff. Actually, this sub-section of G-2 performed Combat Intelligence duties although another group was known as the "Combat Intelligence Sub Section." I refer to attempting to obtain and disseminate information of the potential enemy. In reality from the Army viewpoint, there is no combat intelligence unless there is combat.

5. It was customary prior to December 7, 1941, to hold weekly staff meetings, usually on Saturday morning; at that time the Contact Officer presented a brief summary of the international situation while the undersigned usually presented the European War situation. The Contact Officer often reported items of information to me or to the Chief of Staff, or the Commanding General, prior to 7 December, 1941. I informed both the CG and C/S of everything that came to my attention regardless of its source. The three of us were in adjoining rooms at headquarters and were in contact many times each.

[11622] 6. My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent, but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii.

7. I have been shown a copy of a message dated December 5, 1941, sent by G-2 in Washington to G-2, Hawaiian Department, which directed that Commander Rochefort be contacted for information concerning a Japanese weather broadcast. This broadcast is commonly referred to as "the winds" message. I have no recollection of having received the War Department radio, but had it

come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close liaison with Captain Mayfield, the Fourteenth Naval District Intelligence Officer; particularly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important. The contents and details of the "winds" [11623] message was never made known to me. It is possible that Colonel Bicknell may have conferred with Commander Rochefort or others about this but I did not and Colonel Bicknell did not tell me if he did.

8. No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believed that the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and assumed that if any information which I needed to know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would have given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Officer of the [11624] 7th AF, Lt. Col. Raley, was in liaison with and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did not come to me and I didn't know of the liaison until after the war started.

9. I have been shown by Lt. Col. Clausen a file containing information received by Lt. Col. Bicknell from British SIS and some few items struck a responsive chord in my memory, but I cannot remember which if any were brought to my attention prior to 7 December, 1941. The source of the information was not brought to my attention.

10. I have read the affidavit by Commander Rochefort, Combat Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District in which he states that certain intelligence was given to me. I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt. Col. Bicknell, who according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt. Col. Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to me direct.

11. Col. Clausen has shown me a file of messages marked Top Secret, Exhibit "B" which are intercepted Japanese [11625] dispatches. I had never seen any of them before nor was the substance of any of them brought to my attention prior to 7 December, 1941, except the destruction by Jap Consul at Honolulu of codes and papers which was related by Col. Bicknell at the staff conference on December 6, 1941. I gave this letter information to General Short the same day. With respect to Top Secret Exhibit "B," had I been given this series of messages prior to December 7, 1941, I believe I would have recommended to General Short that he place in effect Alert No. 2 instead of Alert No. 1. It is my opinion that if General Short had seen these messages prior to December 7, 1941, he would have ordered Alert No. 2 without my recommendation. It is my recollection that the Commanding General ordered Alert No. 1 and then announced it to the Staff.

Signed, "Kendall J. Fielder," on May 11, 1945.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What are those messages, Colonel, that are being referred to there? That is just to tie this in at this moment. He says that he had seen those messages.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Grunert Board.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right then back to the point where you were before you read that for Senator George, at Senator George's request.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

[11626] Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel, that Exhibit "B", is that the messages that Colonel Bicknell stated that he had seen?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, he did not see them all, sir. He referred to certain of them by numbers, and I this morning have already tied in those numbers to the exhibit. The numbers he referred to are given, plus one quoted by Captain Safford in the Top Secret transcript of the Grunert Board, so I had three.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe you concluded with Rowlett.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I had concluded, sir, with Rowlett.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask you a question on that last affidavit of General Fielder?

He referred to certain top secrets that he did not see.

Do I understand that Bicknell did see a part of those top secrets?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, he saw the winds code, that is, if I remember rightly without reading the affidavit again. He said he had the substance of the three given him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was going to point out that Colonel Raley, to whom reference was made in the affidavit of General Fielder, I had taken an affidavit from him at Langley Field, Virginia, where he was then stationed, and he pointed out in pursuance of his duties he did have certain information [11627] given him by Captain Layton in the Hawaiian Islands with respect to intelligence, Captain Layton being the Intelligence Officer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you want to read that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes. This is dated 11 March, 1945 and it is on page 76 of my report.

On 7 December, 1941, and for about one year preceding, I was G-2, Hawaiian Air Force. Shortly after assuming these duties, I established, for purposes of the Hawaiian Air Force, some form of contact with the Navy, through then Commander Layton, U. S. N.

Mr. KEEFE. Whose affidavit are you reading, Colonel?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Colonel Edward W. Raley.

Mr. KEEFE. Who is he?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He just says here, sir, he was G-2, Hawaiian Air Force on December 7, 1941, and for about one year preceding.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

I established for purposes of the Hawaiian Air Force some form of contact with the Navy, through then Commander Layton, U. S. N.

Sir, may I interrupt at this moment on the subject of unexplored leads to point out after I reviewed the transcript of the Grunert Board, I noticed Captain Layton had [11628] referred to Colonel Raley as the man to whom he gave information, and therefore I selected his name, having nothing to do with magic, but as a person who could be interviewed and asked whether he was given information by Captain Layton and what he did about it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead.

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Colonel CLAUSEN (reading): I told Commander Layton that my contact was for the Hawaiian Air Force. During this period of about one year, I had not more than six conversations with Commander Layton concerning the subject of my contact. These conversations were spread out during this period. As nearly as I can recall the last conversation I had with Commander Layton before 7 December, 1941, was about October 1941.

The information given me by Commander Layton was my only Navy source. He stated that if there was any Navy movement by Japan, coming to his knowledge, and which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would inform me. The only specific information he gave me in this regard were studies he made of a possible Japanese Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet installations in the Mandates. I believe this was at least two months before 7 December, 1941.

Any information I received from Commander Layton I promptly gave to my Commanding General, General Martin. [11629] On 1 October, 1941, I conferred with Commander Layton and Colonel Bicknell who was then Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, concerning a conclusion I had reached that hostilities with Japan were possible within a short time or any moment. They apparently shared my view.

I reported this to General Martin.

Attached are portions of a letter written by me to my daughter on 2 October 1941, concerning this conference.

[11630] I recall the General Herron alert of 1940, which I believe was known to the civilian population, but to my recollection there was no alarm of the civilian population.

Signed "Edward W. Raley, Colonel," and attached is the letter.

Then there is an affidavit of Col. Joseph K. Evans with regard again to the point of what information was available to Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it, then.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is on page 83 of my report.

For about two months immediately prior to 27 November 1941 I was G-2, Philippine Department, and for two years prior to said two months period I was Assistant G-2, Philippine Department.

There was very close liaison and exchange of intelligence information between the Army and the Navy at Manila. The Army and the Navy each had facilities for intercepting, decrypting and translating Japanese radio messages. Each Service had a machine for the decryption of Japanese messages which were encoded in the classification known as Purple. The types of messages decrypted at Manila correspond generally to those shown me by Major Clausen and designated Top Secret, Exhibit "B". The customary practice of the Army or Navy at Manila was to inform the Army or Navy at Hawaii [11631] of intelligence on Japanese information thus obtained. More precise information in this regard as to particular messages was probably known to my Assistant for Signal Intelligence, Major Sherr, now deceased, and may be known to Commander "Rosie" Mason, USN. There was also close liaison with the British S. I. S. at Manila. For example, see Lieutenant Colonel Gerald H. Wilkinson, International Building, Room 3501, 630 Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Center.

I left the Philippine Islands on 27 November 1941 enroute to the United States by Army Transport "H. L. Scott". About two days before I left I received information, which to the best of my recollection came from the British Secret Intelligence Service at Singapore, to the effect that hostilities between the United States and Japan were imminent and that large Japanese Naval forces were concentrating in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. For these reasons, the convoy of which the "H. L. Scott" was a part did not proceed in the usual direct route from Manila to Pearl Harbor, but went by a circuitous route south through the Torres Strait which separates Australia and New Guinea. On my arrival in Pearl Harbor on or about 15 December 1941, I for several hours discussed G-2 matters with Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and Mr. Shivers, F. B. I. Agent in charge. During the course of [11632] these discussions I told Colonel Bicknell and Mr. Shivers of the information I had received and was in turn told by Colonel Bicknell that he also had received this information and at the same time.

Signed "Joseph K. Evans."

It was signed March 22, 1945.

Then the next statement that should be read is the one I obtained from the president of the Theodore H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is on page 85 of my report.

Memorandum to: Lieutenant Colonel Henry Christian Clausen.

From: Mr. John E. Russell, President, Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, T. H.

You asked me to recall the circumstances surrounding my receipt of confidential information before December 7, 1941, which was so indicative of coming trouble in the Philippine area that I had acted immediately to cancel orders for shipment to that Territory.

My records indicate that on December 4th I telephoned to Mr. C. V. Bennett, Manager of our San Francisco Office, and asked him to take steps to cancel all outstanding orders for shipment to the Philippine Islands, and to endeavor to stop shipments that were enroute there.

[11633] I personally received no message on this subject from the Philippines, but I saw a copy of a message dispatched to Colonel G. W. Wilkinson (then working secretly for the British Government) addressed to his agent in Honolulu, and he had requested the agent to show me the message. Mr. Harry L. Dawson, the agent in question, is sitting beside me while I dictate this memorandum, and states that after showing this message to me a copy of it was left with Colonel Bicknell, Captain Mayfield and Mr. Robert Shivers, then with the FBI. Mr. Dawson finds that all his records of this instant were destroyed immediately after December 7, 1941.

On December 15th I wrote to Mr. Bennett as follows:

"Thank you for your letter of December 5th about Philippine indent orders. It is certainly interesting to say the least that we should have taken steps on December 4th to stop this type of business. I took some similar precautions here at the same time, but cannot give any logical explanation as to why I had taken such steps. It just looks like one of those lucky hunches that one gets at times."

I do not recall, exactly, what was in the message that was shown to me, but believe it indicated some Japanese troop dispositions which were very illuminating in the light [11634] of diplomatic exchanges then taking place. I do not believe that the message said that trouble would begin on December 7th; but as I told you today the general tone of the message was sufficiently alarming to cause a reaction in the mind of a businessman, strong enough to warrant the cancellation of a considerable volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines.

I am sorry that I have no other data that might throw light on this subject; and in the light of what I have said above in connection with Mr. Dawson's files, he is not submitting a memorandum on this subject; but I can say that his recollection of the incident is substantially in agreement with what I have given you herein.

Dated April 10, 1945.

After I got that I went looking for the message in the sources where he said it had been distributed, namely, the Navy, the Army, and the FBI. I found what I thought was the message and brought it back. It is the same as I had yesterday. And I had him sign this on the reverse side:

On the reverse side of this document is a copy of the message referred to in memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen dated April 10, 1945, which was received by the undersigned and copies distributed to the persons indicated in said memorandum, on December 4, 1941.

[11635] That is signed by Mr. Russell and Mr. Dawson at Honolulu, April 16, 1945.

That is the one that says, "Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and the United States."

Mr. Shivers, the local FBI Agent in Charge, gave me an affidavit in Honolulu.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Read that.

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Colonel CLAUSEN. That is at page 88. There are several amendments to this. The reasons are that one agency would tell me something that they thought the other agency would have. I would go to the agency, find it out, and come back, come back to the original agency and in that way double-check them over there.

The affidavit of Robert L. Shivers reads:

On 7 December 1941 and since August 1939, I was FBI Agent in Charge at Honolulu, T. H.

During the year 1940 I developed close liaison with then Lieutenant Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, Intelligence Officer Hawaiian Detachment, U. S. Fleet. Commencing in the first part of 1941 I developed close liaison with then Captain Irving H. Mayfield, U. S. N., District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. Since August 1939 I had close liaison with then Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, MID, [11636] Army Reserve. About July 1941 I developed close liaison with then Lieutenant Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. This liaison with the foregoing persons continued down to 7 December 1941 and after. I held weekly meetings with Colonel Bicknell and Captain Mayfield. Colonel Fielder would sometimes be present.

I knew on 7 December 1941 and for months preceding that date that Commander Rochefort was in charge of the Navy unit which consisted of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. Commander Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 7 December 1941.

Before 7 December 1941, about 1 December 1941, Captain Mayfield told me he was aware of the code the Japanese would use and announce by radio its war movements and break in diplomatic relations; and said to me if I suddenly call you and say I am moving to the east side of the island (Oahu) or north, south or west sides, it will mean that Japan is moving against the countries which lie in those directions from Japan. I passed that information on to Colonel Bicknell, on that date. At no time did Captain Mayfield give me the code indicating such movements.

On 3 December 1941 Captain Mayfield called me, asking [11637] if I could verify his information that the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu was burning his codes and papers. At that time I thought his surveillance of the Consulate had disclosed this fact, but after 7 December 1941 I learned that he was referring to information intercepted by the Navy that such was being done in Singapore, Malaya and London. This latter information was given me by Commander Rochefort after 7 December 1941. About two hours after my conversation with Captain Mayfield on 3 December 1941, the FBI intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate and a Japanese person in Honolulu, during which the cook told this person the Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. This was about noon on 3 December 1941, and I immediately gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. I was never informed by Captain Mayfield what use he made of it. Colonel Bicknell informed me that he personally gave this information to General Short's staff at the staff meeting on 6 December 1941.

On or about 28 November 1941 I received a radio from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to the effect that peace negotiations between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the alert at all times as anything could happen. On the same day I gave this information to [11638] Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell, each of whom said they had already received similar information from their respective headquarters in Washington, D. C.

About the period 8 December to 12 December 1941, Colonel Bicknell showed me a paraphrase copy of a radio intercept by the Army at Honolulu on 3 December 1941, of a radiogram sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu to the Japanese Foreign Office at Tokyo, outlining a system of signals devised by Otto Kuhn, for the Consul General, through which the movement of the U. S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor could be made known to Japanese submarines off the islands of Oahu and Maui.

Signed April 10, 1945.

This is an amendment:

Concerning the paraphrase dispatch to the Commanding General Hawaiian Department signed Marshall dated 12 December 1941, relating to signals suggested by Kuhn, it is my understanding that the basis for this dispatch was an Army radio intercept. I received this information from Colonel Bicknell. When this dispatch was received by the Army in Hawaii, we had already received a translation of a full text of the message to which it relates. Commander Rochefort furnished this translation, after I had given him a copy of the message, which copy was found at the [11639] Japanese Consulate on 7 December 1941, and a copy of the Japanese code found at the said Consulate also on 7 December 1941. After getting the copy from the Japanese Consulate of the message, we got the original from the Mackay Radio Company.

Concerning the General Herron alert of 1940, the civilian population of Oahu considered it routine Army maneuvers and was not alarmed in any way because of the manner in which the alert was handled. It was designed to give the impression it created.

Concerning the affidavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, dated 22 March 1945, I talked with Colonel Evans, in company with Colonel Bicknell, when Colonel Evans arrived in Honolulu from Manila in December 1941. I do not recall the details of our conversation. I am, however, positive that he did not discuss in my presence the information set forth in paragraph 3 of his affidavit.

Signed "Robert L. Shivers," March 16, 1945.

There is another amendment:

General Wilkinson, the manager for the Theodore H. Davies & Company, Manila, P. I., called on me about July 1941 and stated he was the representative in the Pacific area for the Special Intelligence Service of the British Government, reporting direct to the British Foreign Office [11640] at London; that he had established Mr. Harry Dawson, an English citizen and British Vice Consul for the Hawaiian Islands, as the Operative Representative of the said S. I. S. in the Hawaiian Islands; that Mr. Dawson would be concerned with no internal matters of the Hawaiian Islands, but would be concerned with developing foreign intelligence information pertaining to Japanese, which information Dawson would get from persons returning to Hawaii from Japan; that Wilkinson proposed to furnish the FBI, ONI and G-2 at Honolulu information through Dawson, of information received from other S. I. S. operators in the Pacific area, concerning conditions and intelligence affecting Japan; that pursuant to consent of higher authority, arrangements were made for the receipt of such information by the FBI, ONI and G-2 at Honolulu, and such information was furnished as proposed during the period from July to and including December, 1941; that the files of this information so furnished include copies of cables dated 27 November and 3 December, 1941, upon which appear my initial.

Concerning telephone intercepts at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, I ascertained during the latter part of November, 1941, that the ONI, which for several years had covered what were supposed to be all telephone lines at the Consulate, did not in fact cover one line to the [11641] cook's quarters; I thereupon covered this line, which resulted in information as to the destruction by the Consul of all his important papers on 3 December 1941, about which I have already testified; that I assumed the ONI had all other lines covered up to and including 7 December 1941, and did not receive any information to the contrary until today, when it was stated that the coverage by ONI ceased on 2 December 1941, at the order of the District Intelligence Officer; that had I known such ONI coverage had ceased, I would have caused FBI coverage in replacement.

Signed, "Robert L. Shivers, 20 April 1945."

He attached here a wire that he sent to Mr. Hoover in Washington from Honolulu December 5, 1941, reading as follows:

Japanese activities Honolulu TH Espionage Confile J Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers.

Signed "Shivers."

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, will you return to affidavit No. 1 and read the last paragraph for me?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Affidavit by Shivers; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I should like you to return to affidavit No. 1 and read the last paragraph of that affidavit.

[11642] Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

About the period 8 December to 12 December 1941, Colonel Bicknell showed me a paraphrase copy of a radio intercept by the Army at Honolulu on 3 December 1941, of a radiogram sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu to the Japanese Foreign Office at Tokyo, outlining a system of signals devised by Otto Kuhn for the Consul General through which the movement of the U. S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor could be made known to Japanese submarines off the Islands of Oahu and Maui.

[11643] Senator LUCAS. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. May I ask whether you ever identified that message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I tried to run it down.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean while you were getting up your report.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. What I did last night was to go through the exhibits here to tie in some of these things I am referring to. I thought, in response to the committee where you wanted this outline, that you have the testimony but you also have the documents, and I was faced with conflicts in testimony and considered that documents would be reliable.

For that reason I have all these photos of documents.

Senator FERGUSON. But what was the instrument you were talking about?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The instrument was a—was quoted at length, and in more detail in ONI reports, which were made at Honolulu, some of which are in here, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, have you got the message? Did you ever find that message that he was talking about in that affidavit?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It is in here.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you get it for us. That [11644] appears to be a very important message. I assume that is why the Senator had it read twice.

Did you ever actually find that message? Did you ask Colonel Bicknell or any other person for that message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. As I say, Senator, the message is, I believe, quoted in ONI reports which I have.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you try to find it for us?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that we can identify that message.

Colonel CLAUSEN. My Exhibit 2, page 151, contains an ONI U. S. Naval Intelligence Service investigation report that refers to this whole subject of Kuhn's signals. These were the lights in the dormer windows.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Read that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Let me finish this first.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. In that same connection there should be read from my Exhibit 3, page 91, the U. S. Naval Intelligence Service investigation report. My Exhibit 5 also contains—

Senator FERGUSON. My personal interest at that moment was and still is if we can get the message, actually get the message that was mentioned in that paragraph that Senator Lucas had you read twice.

[11645] Mr. MURPHY. I think the Senator will find it in the record 25 times. It is the same one Mrs. Edgers translated in the rough, and it wasn't translated at Honolulu until after the conflict started.

Senator FERGUSON. From this, it appears that it was translated before the conflict.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Colonel CLAUSEN. It doesn't say that.

Mr. MURPHY. It doesn't say anything about it being translated before the fire started.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you state that the affidavit says it was translated afterward?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, I am saying the affidavit says what it says. You see, I am not going to put my impression on the language. The lead is a very important one, and is very full covered in some of these ONI reports.

That is the reason I mentioned where they are in the exhibits, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I show you Exhibit 2, page 22. Is that the message? That is what I have been trying to find out.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I will have to go through these exhibits and find out.

Senator FERGUSON. Or is there another message about [11646] the lights? Will you just show us the ONI report, and in that way we may save time, that quoted the message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. This is the one. It is in those three places I have told you, Senator. I believe you will find reference to it in the three exhibits I mentioned, and I am now looking at page 151 of my Exhibit 2, which has to do with this subject.

Do you want me to read the portion of this—

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You want the message? Well, I think this is the message here, Senator. It is right here.

Senator FERGUSON. Show it to counsel. Maybe he can tell me.

Colonel CLAUSEN. As you see, this is a very long report.

Senator LUCAS. If this isn't a different message than what we have heretofore seen, then I am not particularly interested.

Senator FERGUSON. Neither am I.

Senator LUCAS. And neither is the Senator from Michigan, I assume.

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Senator LUCAS. I was under the impression it was an additional message.

[11647] Senator FERGUSON. That was my impression.

Senator LUCAS. If it is the same message, we will forget about it and proceed.

Colonel CLAUSEN. It is set up as the lights in the dormer windows. It is on page 153 and 154 of my Exhibit 2, where it is set forth in an ONI report, and it is on page 22 of your Exhibit 2.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. We have it solved.

Colonel CLAUSEN. May I point out that the language is not the same, but the substance of the message is the same?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, do you have anything further at this point you desire to read, Colonel?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean where I left off?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was going to read from the affidavit of Colonel Meurlott, page 98 of my report.

This is dated 16 April, 1945:

Memorandum for Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

Subject: Action taken on WD information concerning possible hostilities with Japan.

1. By direction, the undersigned, accompanied by Major (then 1st Lieutenant) C. W. Stevenson, met in conference [11648] with Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Raley, G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, and the various Air Force Intelligence officers in the Hawaiian area on 29 November, 1941. The purpose of the conference was to acquaint these officers with information contained in a secret radio received by G-2, Hawaiian Department, from the War Department dated 27 November, 1941, which advised that negotiations with Japan had reached a stalemate, that hostilities might ensue, and that subversive activities might be expected.

2. The conference was held in the office of Lt. Col. Raley at Hickam Field at 1430, 29 November, 1941. The assembled officers were advised by the undersigned of the context of the above referred to radio message and it was suggested to them that all practicable precautionary measures be taken to guard against possible sabotage of Air Force installations and equipment.

That is signed by Byron M. Meurlott, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Counter-Intelligence Division.

Now, I come to the affidavit of Captain Huckins of the Navy, page 100 of my report. I was asked to integrate these numbers with your exhibits in the light of my cross-files that I had seen in Pearl Harbor of incoming and outgoing messages to the Navy at Hawaii.

Now, Nos. SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, intercepts contained [11649] in my top secret exhibit "B" I have already indicated tie in to certain of your exhibits, and I asked there what communications they had going in or out of the Navy at Hawaii referring to the subject of those intercepts.

We found various dispatches, and I list those in the affidavit of Captains Huckins.

I find that two of the dispatches you have, one is your item 1 (c) on your Exhibit 142, the other is your item 2 (a) in your Exhibit 142—I find those. I can't find you have any place the dispatch 1 December, 1941, which was dispatch from Com 16 to Cincpac, concerning certain important Japanese news broadcasts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you got the copy of that dispatch?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. I don't have a copy.

Mr. MURPHY. I think you will find it in the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think so, too.

Mr. MURPHY. I read it in the record two or three weeks ago.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I just couldn't find it.

Mr. MURPHY. I read it in the record from one of the Naval Intelligence summaries which was given to us that Com 16 sent to Hawaii, notice about these news broadcasts and setting up the arrangements.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

[11650] With respect to SIS Nos. 2564 and 25787, the only one I could find that you have is the dispatch of 4 December 1941, which is at page 41 of your Exhibit 37.

With respect to the outgoing communications, the only—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Wait a moment there.

How can we identify them? Read the dispatches which your search didn't indicate that we have so we know possibly whether an examination would show we had them or that we didn't have them.

[11651] Colonel CLAUSEN. You have the 4 December 1941, which as I said, is at your page 41 in Exhibit 37.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What identification have you for the others?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I will read what I have here. This will tell it to you better than I can:

Pertinent outgoing messages now available at Pearl Harbor are contained in Outgoing Code Book No. 1 and consist of: Dispatch 28 November 1941 from COM14 to OPNAV; of communications intelligence analysis dispatch 28 November 1941 from COM14 to OPNAV; of British Consul information that the Japanese will attack Krakaw Isthmus on 1 December 1941; and dispatch 6 December 1941 from COM14 to OPNAV. Of opinion that Japanese Consulate at Honolulu destroyed all codes except one system.

Now, the only one I could find of those was the one 6 December 1941 which is at page 46, Exhibit 37.

I come now to the affidavit of General Marston.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you spell that name, please?

Colonel CLAUSEN. M-a-r-s-t-o-n.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Very well.

[11652] Colonel CLAUSEN. This was made before me at Honolulu on April 21, 1945. (Reading):

My attention has been called to the affidavit of Col. Moses W. Pettigrew, dated 15 Feb. 45; and, during the period about September 1939 to July 1941 I was G-2, Hawaiian Department, and had information that the Navy had a crypto-analytic unit; during the time I was G-2 the Army maintained a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for obtaining information derived from intercepts of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the local development of this phase of intelligence; it was possible on occasions to obtain information as to commercial cables sent and received by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, it being my recollection that this was given to the Army by the Navy at liaison meetings.

Concerning the 1940 alert (all-out) ordered by Gen. Herron, from my observations there was no alarm of the civilian population.

That is page 102. Then I have here an affidavit by a Chief Warrant Officer named Louis R. Lane, on pages 103 and 104 of my report, who went over the records at Honolulu to see if he could find the 5 December 1941 G-2 warning sent from Washington to Hawaii. He could not find it any [11653] place but he found that the number which it had, 519, was missing from the microfilms; that preceding numbers, 517 and 518 were found, the following numbers, 520 and 521, but the number 519 that would have been this G-2 warning was missing from the microfilms.

Senator LUCAS. Who testifies to that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. There is a Louis R. Lane, Chief Warrant Officer, who had to do with the papers and records, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. He was in Hawaii at that time?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He was in Hawaii and was about the best man for the job of running these down.

Senator LUCAS. Were there any other missing micro films outside of this one?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, sir, I was just interested in the one message. I wanted to see whether the 519, the G-2 warning from Wash-

ington, got to Honolulu and that is why I asked over there for their copies. I had been told by General Dunlop, who was in Hawaii at the time of the attack, he told me that the copy should be in Honolulu.

Senator LUCAS. Was there any explanation made to you by anyone with respect to this missing file?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, except that—I went to the then Adjutant General over there, I mean when I was there, who [11654] corresponded then to the position that had formerly been held by General Dunlop—I have a statement from him as to the fact that they destroyed certain messages and I do not know why this one would not have been micro filmed.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman? Did anyone testify, make an affidavit that they destroyed this message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The G-2 message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that affidavit there state that 519 did contain that G-2 message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir, except that that was the number, 519 was the number of the message, Senator. Let me see if the message attached as an exhibit to the affidavit—

Senator FERGUSON. It did carry the number 519?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; it is right on here. It is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Pettigrew given me on February 13, 1945. There is "519" written right on it, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. So that is why you went to look for 519 and it was missing?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Sure, because I was told—you see, I traced it down through Washington first because Colonel [11655] French said if it had not gotten over there that according to their system of call-back the numbers—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I understand those affidavits.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Senator Ferguson, if you will refer to your inquiry as to the date when the 3d of December message, the setting up of the light code, was translated, the witness testified that there was a reference to it in the ONI report.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the report says it is paragraph 3 on page 153 of Exhibit 2.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 2 of the Clausen report?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Of the Clausen report. (Reading)

Efforts to develop the meaning of such messages were commenced immediately, but this testimony was not completed until the morning of 11 December.

which corresponds with the testimony already in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. In Exhibit 2 here, page 22 is Navy translation 12/11/41.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, Colonel, did you follow through on all of this?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I haven't finished, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Oh, you haven't finished yet?

[11656] Colonel CLAUSEN. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. I just wanted to ask you a question at this point, if it is agreeable.

Did you follow through on all of this testimony and all of this evidence and all of this information as you have indicated by what you have given us so far?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I finished last night like you asked me to.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you followed through on all of the witnesses?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. With respect to all information?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir, and also documents.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And documents, just as you have indicated by what you have given us so far this morning?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have something further that you want to present now?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I would just as soon take a recess until after lunch.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, we usually run till 12:30.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right, I will go on.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I have here a statement by the Navy, [11657] given me at Honolulu by Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, Jr., W-o-o-d-r-u-m, United States Naval Reserve. (Reading)

"This statement has been prepared at the request of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board. The statement is based on a personal recollection of events which occurred over three years ago, and on my personal understanding of what occurred at that time. To my knowledge, there is no documentary evidence available to support this statement.

"The telephone surveillance of local espionage suspects at, or centering around, the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, was maintained by the District Intelligence Office. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, cognizant of this activity, received almost daily transcripts and translations of conversations monitored.

"About 1 November 1941 the FBI, with the cognizance of the DIO"—that is the District Intelligence Office—"began a telephone surveillance of a suspect in its own office building. To the knowledge of the writer, this was the first such surveillance conducted by the FBI itself in Honolulu. This one surveillance was accidentally uncovered by some employees of the telephone company making routine installations. They reported their discovery to their superior, and subsequently this in- [11658] formation was casually passed on to a member of the DIO by the DIO contact at the telephone company. In a spirit of cooperation, the information that their surveillance had been exposed was in turn passed on by the DIO man to an FBI agent. On receipt of the information, the FBI agent in charge apparently went directly to the telephone company and made accusations there that an FBI confidence had been breached by the DIO's having been given information concerning an FBI tap.

"When Captain Mayfield, then District Intelligence Officer, learned of the FBI protest at the telephone company, he was not only incensed at their failure to consult with him before taking such action, but he considered that action to be a serious breach of security. Cognizant of his instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations to avoid any possibility of international complications, and thoroughly aware of the explosive potentialities of the surveillances being conducted, Captain Mayfield ordered the immediate discontinuance of all telephone surveillances. This was on 2 December 1941. Surveillances were not resumed until the morning of 7 December 1941, following the Japanese attack.

"It should be added that very few of the personnel attached to the District Intelligence Office were in any [11659] way aware that such surveillances were being conducted, and considerable pains were taken to prevent that knowledge from gaining any currency in the organization."

Senator LUCAS. Who made that last affidavit?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That was made by a Navy officer, Donald Woodrum, in the 14th Naval District Office at Honolulu.

Senator LUCAS. Was there any question in your mind as a result of your investigation and these affidavits that are in this record that the Office of Naval Intelligence around December the 2nd discontinued the obtaining of information from the Japanese because of the taking away of these phones?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir, except that I have an affidavit here from, I believe, a Ship's Clerk, a manual, which gives some date around December. That, in my opinion, is erroneous. In other words, I think—

Senator LUCAS. Just what do these affidavits disclose as to the reason why they discontinued this surveillance work over there?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Woodrum gave the reason here. What happened is the telephone company employee found out about the tap and the FBI became incensed at the disclosure. As he says here, "It is one surveillance." In other words, the Navy claimed that the FBI tap was discovered by the phone company man, the phone company man reporting it to his [11660] superior reported it in such a manner that it came back to the Navy and the Navy say here:

In a spirit of cooperation, the information that their surveillance had been exposed was in turn passed on by the DIO man to an FBI agent.

In other words, the Navy found out from the phone company that the FBI tap had been uncovered, so the affidavit told me, and then the FBI got peeved because that exposed their position and then the Navy got scared and took out their taps. That is what it amounts to.

Senator LUCAS. But the FBI continued on?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The FBI continued the one they had on and, as I read you this morning, Mr. Shivers said had they told him this he would have covered all the taps and I have here, sir, in my documents photostats of the last day's work by Navy, where the Navy man said he had been doing it for twenty-two months and he bids good-bye, after twenty-two months, and 2 December was this date, from which we knew they quit on December 2nd.

Senator LUCAS. They quit on December 2nd after having done this surveillance work for twenty-two straight months?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean there was surveillance for twenty-two months at the Hawaiian Department?

[11661] Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Why did they say they quit it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Just what the affidavit says here. Mayfield got peeved.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They quit it because somebody else did not like it that they were doing it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He says right here:

When Captain Mayfield, then District Intelligence Officer, learned of the FBI protest at the telephone company, he was not only incensed at their failure to consult with him before taking such action, but he considered that action to be a serious breach of security. Cognizant of his instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations to avoid any possibility of international complications, and thoroughly aware of the explosive potentialities of the surveillances being

conducted, Captain Mayfield ordered the immediate discontinuance of all telephone surveillances. This was on 2 December 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator LUCAS. So the Navy just turned the work over to the FBI?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, they did not turn it over. They just quit.

Senator LUCAS. They just quit and let the FBI handle it [11662] alone?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, they didn't do that. They did not tell the FBI. They just quit and said nothing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They just quit, period, then?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Period.

Mr. GEARHART. The FBI continued their taps of the kitchens or cook's quarters?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

Mr. GEARHART. And if the FBI had known that the Navy had withdrawn they would have extended their taps to cover the other parts of the consulates?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. I have heard of that.

Senator LUCAS. It looks like the Navy could do no wrong.

Commander BAECHE¹. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the testimony of Admiral Mayfield before Admiral Hewitt may be considered of interest, in this connection.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, Colonel.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I come now to the affidavit given me by Captain Edwin T. Layton of the Navy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, read that then.

Colonel CLAUSEN. This affidavit is an example of the reason I had to travel. Captain Layton was on Guam, which was the headquarters of the Commander in Chief and could not [11663] come to Honolulu, could not be spared from his station, so I went to Guam and, as the Captain pointed out in, I believe that last paragraph of this affidavit, he would have liked to have been at Pearl Harbor when he testified before me because he then would have had records before him and have more accurately been able to testify. He says—

Mr. KEEFE. May I inquire what is the specific question that is being developed before this committee by the reading of these affidavits?

Senator LUCAS. Congressman, last night Senator Ferguson and I requested that the colonel give to this committee all of the information that he had with respect to traffic that came into the Hawaiian station between November the 25 and December the 7 in view of a certain piece of information that was developed here by an affidavit that this committee had heretofore known nothing about.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead, Colonel.

[11664] On 7 December 1941, and for one year prior thereto I was Fleet Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet. My duties consisted of the following: To receive, correlate and evaluate, and to distribute various intelligence matters to designated members of the Staff, and to Units of the Pacific Fleet; to provide Plans and Operations Sections with essential enemy intelligence for preparation of current estimates; to supervise counter-intelligence and counter-espionage within the U. S. Pacific Fleet; to maintain strategic and other plots of potential enemy Naval forces and to keep apprised of the general distribution or disposition of Fleets of potential Allies; to supervise projects concerning aerial photographic reconnaissance.

¹ Navy Department liaison officer to the committee.

Liaison with other Government Agencies, including the Army, would normally be effected through established channels, i. e., the Naval shore liaison or representative in the area in which the Fleet was to move or to be based. To clarify the interlocking yet independent status of Fleet Intelligence Officer (myself), the Combat Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Commander Rochefort), and the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Captain Mayfield): Captain Mayfield was the District Intelligence Officer and responsible to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and to the Director [11665] of Naval Intelligence for all intelligence matters, including counter-espionage and counter-sabotage ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison on Naval matters with other Government Agencies in the Fourteenth Naval District. Commander Rochefort was the Head of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, working under direct orders of the Chief of Naval Operations, but under the administrative jurisdiction of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison in matters of Communications Intelligence. My intelligence field was limited to the vessels and forces of the U. S. Pacific Fleet and I was under the direct command of the Commander in Chief of that Fleet. Were the Fleet to proceed to San Francisco, for example, I would then contact the District Intelligence Officer, Twelfth Naval District, there and conduct any business with the Army or other Government Agencies through that officer.

About 3 months prior to 7 December 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, then Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Raley, called at my office and informed me that he had been directed to establish with me an Army liaison and requested all information we possessed on airfields in Australia, Netherlands East Indies, Australian Manated Territories, and any other Pacific Ocean [11666] airports and airways information. I furnished him with all the information we possessed, confidential and secret, including Dutch "Airways Guide" and Australian Air Force "Airports Directory." Thereafter he, or his assistant, Lieutenant Brown, would request various items of intelligence material and as mid-November approached, the meetings between those officers and myself and my assistant, Commander Hudson, USN, increased in frequency.

By mid-November 1941 a series of intelligence reports from various sources, including Dutch, British, Chinese, and American, collectively indicated that Japan was on the move in a southerly direction. These consisted of Consular Reports, Attache and Agent Reports, Ship Master's Reports, and reports from other Intelligence Agencies that there was a greatly increased movement of Japanese Army transports, Naval auxiliaries, and Naval vessels southward along the China Coast, with concentrations being seen in French Indo-China and South China. The general tenor of these reports was imparted to Colonel Raley and we informally discussed and exchanged opinions on the general significance thereof. In a period for about 2 to 3 weeks prior to 7 December 1941, as my recollection serves me, I talked with Colonel Raley on a general average every other day.

Now, in connection with that paragraph, it ties into [11667] your Exhibit 1, pages 202 and 203, and the testimony given before your committee at your transcript number 11,157.

During the period of about ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941, without authorization from higher authority and on my own initiative, I imparted to Colonel Raley certain "Top Secret" intelligence from sources that had previously been found to be completely reliable and from other sources previously determined to be generally fairly reliable. I did not inform him of the true source and concealed its true origin, in keeping with the Top Secret Oath by which I was bound. I explained to Colonel Raley that I was not authorized to give him this information but would do so if he would promise that he would make no copy or written memoranda of it and would impart it only to his Commanding General, Major General Fred Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, to which Colonel Raley agreed. In pursuance of this agreement, I imparted certain "Top Secret" intelligence to Colonel Raley in person as follows: One item had to do with an intrigue in Thailand, in which the pro-Japanese Thailand leaders were, by circulating a false report of a Japanese landing on the East Coast at Singora, to get the pro-British faction of that Government to request immediate assistance from British Forces in North [11668] Malaya, so that as soon as the British Forces crossed the border into Thailand, the pro-Jap-

anese element would declare Great Britain an invader and call upon Japan for assistance, thereby facilitating Japanese entry into Thailand and an invasion of Malaya.

To my best knowledge and recollection, I told him as "Top Secret" information that we were listening for certain cryptic weather messages to be included in the Japanese broadcasts which were to signal the breach of diplomatic relations or opening of hostilities between Japan and certain powers, namely, America or Britain or Russia. (No such message was ever intercepted or received at Pearl Harbor.) I do not recall positively, whether or not I told him of the message we had received stating that certain Japanese Diplomatic Officials were destroying their Purple Machines.

In connection with the reports of movements of Japanese amphibious equipment, transports, troops, and Naval vessels to the South, in addition to informing Colonel Raley of these reports I informed him we had other reliable information which seemed to substantiate a general movement to the South of a considerable portion of Japanese Naval Forces, including probably some battleships and carriers as well as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. I distinctly recall that I informed Colonel Raley of the [11669] special searches being conducted in late November or early December of Camranh Bay and the French Indo-China coast by Naval seaplanes based in the Manila area, and that these planes had sighted Japanese submarines, cruisers, transports, and destroyers in Camranh Bay and along the French Indo-China coast. This search, in itself, was a very strict secret.

Prior to 7 December 1941, I received no information from dispatches sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu by Commercial Cable or otherwise.

I was not apprised of the so-called "Mori" telephone message. I received a telephone call from Captain Mayfield on Saturday evening, 6 December. He said he wanted to see me the next morning at my convenience. I asked if I should come down immediately as I was free, and he replied: "We cannot do anything about it now, as I do not have the material and will not have it until tomorrow morning."

In connection with the Japanese activity in the Japanese Mandated Islands: Commencing in late December 1940 and until December 1941, and subsequently, I made it one of my principal tasks to follow the increasing Japanese activity in the Marshalls, Carolines, and the Marianas, including Marcus. That the Japanese were rapidly building air bases, garrisoning key islands, was very apparent. As [11670] Fleet Intelligence Officer, I wrote and disseminated several bulletins concerning this activity and also the organization of the Japanese Naval Surface and Air Forces stationed in the Mandates, for distribution to Fleet High Commands and the Chief of Naval Operations.

When the U. S. Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of certain of the Japanese Mandates in late November 1941, I held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley and furnished him with the latest Intelligence Bulletin (#45-41) concerning these installations and developments, with the proviso that the publication be not reproduced nor circulated except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and Commanders of the Army Squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway, with the further stipulation that the document be not carried in aircraft. Colonel Raley also requested, and I acquiesced, to sit in on all conferences after the arrival of the photo planes, and that I brief the pilots on all matters relating to the Mandates prior to their take-off. This reconnaissance did not materialize due to delays in arrival of the planes. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is my memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, apprising him of these conferences concerning the projected reconnaissance flights over the Mandated Islands. Exhibit B is one copy of Pacific Fleet intelligence Bulletin #45-41.

[11671] I do not specifically recall the term A. B. C. Block or discussions with Colonel Raley concerning it. I believe there may have been conversations concerning a geographical limit beyond which Britain and the Netherlands could not permit Jap penetration.

My only relationships with Colonel Bicknell was having met him at Colonel Raley's quarters at Hickam Field in mid- or late November, where the three of us discussed, in general terms, the world situation and the situation in the Far East, in particular. Normally, I would have no occasion to undertake direct liaison with Colonel Bicknell, as that was carried out by the authorities of the Fourteenth Naval District through whom the Fleet dealt on all matters pertaining to shore-side business.

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From time to time prior to December 7, 1941 when Task Force Commanders returned to Pearl from sea, I was called into the Commander-in-Chief's office to give a brief summary of the general intelligence picture at the time in question. I cannot state positively that General Short was present at these times, but I believe he may have been. At other times when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, I was called to present the intelligence picture to them. During these intelligence briefings, I discussed the general disposition, location and activity of the Japanese Fleet and [11672] Major Japanese Naval Air Units as was known or inferred from all available intelligence, including Top Secret. I also discussed in considerable detail the Japanese militarization of the Mandated Islands, their building of Air Bases, Naval Bases, and facilities there, with particular emphasis on the Marshalls.

I had no official liaison with Colonel Fielder, as I had presumed from Colonel Raley's remarks when he first came to me and suggested setting up the liaison that he was then representing the Army, as the Hawaiian Air Force was a subordinate Command of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. His statement at that time was, in effect, that as the Navy and the heavy bombers of the Hawaiian Air Force were the offensive weapons for carrying out the war plans, he was directed to establish this liaison as it was felt that the Hawaiian Department was a defensive garrison. I gathered from his remarks that other liaison had been established with the Fourteenth Naval District in accordance with the existing directives for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. I knew there was a specially designated Naval Liaison Officer, Lt. Burr, U. S. N., from Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District, permanently attached to the Headquarters, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. Inasmuch as I had no direct liaison with Colonel Fielder, I did not impart to him any [11673] of the information that I gave to Colonel Raley. Colonel Fielder did not contact me nor request any intelligence from me prior to 7 December 1941.

I desire to state that being without my files and notes, which I had access to at all previous hearings concerning Pearl Harbor (the Roberts commission in December 1941, the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor boards in 1944), I am unable to make as clear or concise statements from memory as might be possible with the assistance of my files, notes, and memoranda.

I have read the various documents shown me by Colonel Clausen, marked top secret, exhibit B. I did not know of the substance of any of these prior to 7 December 1941, except those marked SIS 25432 and SIS 25787 on which I have written my initials and today's date.

[s] E. T. LAYTON, *Captain USN.*
Combat Intelligence Officer.
Staff, Commander U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[11674] Now, those two exhibits in exhibit B, SIS 25432 and SIS 25787 I have already tied into your exhibits, except it should be pointed out with respect to 25787, referring to the destruction of the purple machines, that my copy of that intercept contained in top secret exhibit B has written there in the handwriting of Captain Layton these words.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Could you make a note of that, Colonel, and locate it and have it when we come back?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you one question now to try to get it clearly in mind. Captain Layton was G-2 of the Navy?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He was the fleet intelligence officer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Fleet Intelligence Officer?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Didn't he state there that he had not had any conferences with General Fielder?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was G-2 of the Army in Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He had not had any conferences with him?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. The committee will recess now until 1:30. [11675]

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m. a recess was taken until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[11676]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

TESTIMONY OF HENRY C. CLAUSEN (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you ready to proceed, Colonel?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

I was looking for the reference on the intercept 25787 which Captain Layton referred to in his affidavit, and I find it here in Exhibit 7. On it he has written in his handwriting:

Message not seen but British reported that Japs had destroyed their purple machine in London.

And he puts 26 April, 1945; signed E. T. Layton.

The next thing I was going to call to the attention of the committee are the exhibits following the affidavit of Captain Layton in addition to the memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, concerning the projected reconnaissance flights over the Mandated Islands, and the fleet intelligence report.

There are some very, very important communications which indicate the work that we being done at Hawaii by Commander Rochefort. I understand the committee has been furnished copies but these cover the period 1 November, 1941 to 7 December, 1941, and show the progress of intelligence with respect to the unit under Commander Rochefort. And you [11677] will find in here references to the Japanese carriers, radio silences, where the Americans tried to find the Japanese ships and were unable to do so, et cetera.

I then come to the affidavit of General Powell.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Colonel, you are familiar with that. Do you think there is anything in that which you have just referred to that you should read to the committee, or especially call attention to?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you see, sir, I am not an expert in analyzing these, and it is very easy, with the benefit of hindsight to pick out certain portions and say that they were very suspicious.

Mr. CLARK. These were made by Rochefort?

Colonel CLAUSEN. They were made by Captain Rochefort's unit at Pearl Harbor and he had the facilities for decrypting and decoding this type of traffic primarily, as I understand it.

You see, for example, the one of December 6, contains this information:

Combined Fleet. Still no traffic from the second and third fleet commanders.

You see, they were losing fleets, losing carriers.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Losing Japanese fleets and Japanese carriers? [11678] Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right. And if you read these over, you will see this information also, the increasing activity in the Mandates. Very important piece of intelligence.

Mr. CLARK. Those were made in his office?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. He would be the responsible head of the division or set-up that made those memoranda?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Of course, Mr. Chairman, you have to keep in mind at the time that when the Japanese fleet came, it didn't come from the Marshalls, but it came from the Kuriles, north of Japan; so that while these ships may have appeared to have been listed, and there was activity in the Marshalls, when the blow came, it didn't come from either of those places and had we depended upon our information from the Marshalls, it wouldn't help us on this.

It further illustrates the uncertainty with reference to trying to find where fleets are by this form of intelligence.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I understand that the intelligence reports I have indicated are your Exhibit 115?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. We come down now to the affidavit [11679] of General Powell, page 179 of my report, and he states in here what he did to try to locate the intercept 27065 to which I have made reference.

Also No. 8007.

With regard to why the delay in sending that in; he also has some references. I asked him to also check on this G-2 message sent from Washington on 5 December No. 519.

Does the committee want me to read this?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

1. With reference to the message sent No. 519 December 5, 1941, which you handed me, I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief, there are no copies of clear or coded traffic of this particular message on file in the signal center, Fort Shafter. In fact, there are no copies of clear or coded traffic in the signal center prior to 1 July, 1944.

Mr. CLARK. Will you identify that message for me otherwise than by number?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is the message that the War Department G-2 sent on 5 December, 1941 to the G-2 Hawaiian Department, and said "Go see Captain Rochefort regarding the weather broadcast."

Mr. CLARK. Thank you.

[11680] The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was that you just read about no message being available prior to July 1944?

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

In fact, there are no copies of clear or coded traffic in the signal center prior to 1 July, 1944.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

All coded traffic prior to 1 July, 1944 and all clear traffic dated prior to 1 March 1945 have been destroyed by burning. There are no records including the logs in the signal center which would give us any information as to whether or not this message was received at Fort Shafter. Search and inquiries have been made within the signal center as to whether this message had been received, and they have been negative.

2. You have asked me to recall the circumstances concerning intercept numbered Army 8007 and dated 2 December 1941. The procedure with respect to said intercept at the time stated was as follows:

Search has been made as to whether such intercepts were intercepted by the Army SIS at Honolulu and transmitted to Washington. As to whether they were intercepted, I have this to report:

There are at this time no records in the Hawaiian [11681] Department to show whether or not these intercepts were made by MS-5. The fact that Washington gives an intercept date-time group tends to show that the intercept was made by MS-5, but the lack of a receiving operator's personal sign is an indication to the contrary.

As to how they were transmitted to Washington, I have this to report.

Intercepts of this type which were to be forwarded to Washington via airmail were handled as follows; on the day following the date of intercept, each message was given a log sheet number, and entered on an index sheet. The entire lot of airmail traffic for that particular date was then fastened together to await the next scheduled departure of the *Clipper*.

Upon notification of the impending departure of the *Clipper*, all accumulated airmail traffic, together with a letter of transmittal, and a classified document receipt was taken to the classified files section of the Department Signal Office for packaging and was then forwarded to the classified files section of the Department AGO. The AGO forwarded this traffic via officer courier to the outgoing *Clipper*. The *Clipper* departed for the mainland approximately once each week, but this schedule was frequently interrupted because of weather conditions. It is known that [11682] this traffic was at times forwarded by ship, because of the long delayed departure of a clipper. The only messages transmitted to Washington by radio were those specifically selected in accordance with instructions from the chief signal officer.

The message in question was not within the first priority mission and therefore is not believed to have been included in the special instructions.

My search in this regard included:

A search of all signal intelligence files including Communications Service, Central Pacific Base Command, and Monitor Station No. 5. Such records as have been found pertaining to the assigned mission of Monitor Station No. 5 at the time in question, show that this station was intercepting traffic between Japan, Asia, and Europe.

In this connection, I inquired of Washington on 14 April, 1945, concerning the originals of intercepts, which I understood are or should be on file in Washington and received this information.

Mailing date of traffic was 11 December. Receiving operator's sign does not appear on the intercept. Log sheet No. 014037 appears on traffic and listed on log forwarded under signature of C. A. Powell. Intercept time shows 0707 on December 2, 1941.

[11683] A copy of the forwarding letter cannot be located and no receipts for traffic forwarded are available previous to 1943.

Then he talks about a scrambler phone. I don't think that is important.

Senator FERGUSON. A scrambler phone to Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I will read the whole thing:

3. Concerning your inquiry as to the testimony I previously made relating to the commercial scrambled phone between Honolulu and the mainland, we did not monitor the commercial radio telephone. Previous to December 1937 inverters were used on the trans-Pacific radiophone circuit between Honolulu and the mainland. The same type inverters were used on the radiophone circuit between Tokyo and San Francisco. Because these inverters were of the same type and design Tokyo could monitor the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit.

In December 1937 a new San Francisco-Honolulu radiophone circuit was commissioned using a new type of privacy which was called the A-3 privacy. At the time of this installation there were only two such A-3 privacy built; one for the Honolulu terminal and one for the San Francisco terminal. This type of privacy is much more complicated and furnished much more security than the previous old inverters.

[11684] The old inverters were still used on the Tokyo-Honolulu circuit as the A-3 privacy was for use only on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit.

Shortly after the installation of this new Honolulu-San Francisco circuit the Tokyo technical operator asked the Honolulu technical operator what kind of a new inverter was in use on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit as he was not able to understand the conversation.

Tokyo technical operator was advised that the equipment had just been installed and the only person who knew how this privacy worked was the Bell laboratory engineer who had just made the installation. This was proof that

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Tokyo had in the past been monitoring the Honolulu-San Francisco radiophone circuit.

Signed "General Powell".

Now, I come to the statements of Commander J. S. Holtwick, U. S. Navy. I interviewed him at Honolulu after I had been there en-route to the Philippines. I asked would he investigate and see whether he could find a winds code intercept by interviewing personnel who had been on duty at the Intercept Station before 7 December 1941. So this is what he gave to me:

Memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel H. C. Clausen.

Subject: Information.

[11685] 1. I regret that results of search for amplifying information on the subject we discussed immediately prior to your departure has been quite disappointing.

2. The officers concerned with the monitoring watch were (present ranks given) Commander F. R. Biard, U. S. N., Commander J. R. Bromley, U. S. N., Commander A. Cole, U. S. N., and Commander G. N. Slonim, U. S. N. In charge of the radio station at the time was Lieutenant Lankford.

3. Commander Cole is the only officer currently present and available for questioning. He states that, as nearly as he can remember, a program issued by the Japan Broadcasting Company was obtained from the District Intelligence Office and used as a basic list. A few other frequencies were found by searching, but in practically all cases, they were merely duplicate transmissions of the listed broadcasts. Generally speaking, there were seldom more than three or more programs of the character being monitored on the air at the same time. In those cases, split-phone watches were used.

4. All broadcasts that were regularly monitored were the Japanese Government Japanese language voice news broadcasts, with particular attention devoted to those schedules on the hour and half-hour which usually contained weather information.

5. No positive results whatsoever were obtained from [11686] this monitoring at any time during the period under consideration. The monitoring which was naturally secured immediately after it became obviously redundant.

That is at page 182.

Now, I come to the affidavit of Ship's Clerk Theodore Emanuel given me at Honolulu on April 17, 1945:

Prior to 7 December 1941, and for over four years, I was assigned to the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District. About the year 1938 I became acquainted with Colonel George W. Bicknell. When Colonel Bicknell was called to active duty, about 1940 or 1941, I discussed with him and Lieutenant Colonel Muerlott matters of mutual concern relating to the Army and Navy intelligence activities. It is my understanding that Colonel Bicknell was cognizant of my functions and activities. These included the obtaining of the telephone conversations originating in and going to the Japanese Consulate and persons therein at Honolulu. Such conversations were obtained by me during the period from January 1941 to and including 7 December 1941 by means of covering some five or six lines. My procedure was to have these conversations recorded, translated and reported to the District Intelligence Officer. These reports were written. This traffic would average about 50 to 60 in and out telephone calls a day. The translator was Commander [11687] Denzel Carr, N. S. Navy Reserve.

Signed "Theodore Emanuel, Chief Ship's Clerk".

I later talked with Commander Carr and got from him what is a wind code execute message dated 8 December 1941, after the attack. I have that in the exhibits and I am going to come to it. It is in a voice broadcast, in the middle and at the end, and it would be the one of war with Britain or breach of relations with Britain.

Senator FERGUSON. The United States was not in that one?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. From this Commander Carr that Emanuel mentions. Commander Carr was the translator who translated the telephone intercepts for the Navy during this time.

Senator FERGUSON. In Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The next affidavit I come to is that of General Sutherland, which I got at Manila.

You remember that some of the affidavits I read this morning said that Manila was sending information on to Hawaii and I was anxious to find out whether that was so. That is one of the reasons I went to General MacArthur and General Willoughby and General Sutherland. In other [11688] words, what information, if any, they sent on to Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Colonel CLAUSEN. This is dated May 6, 1945:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Chief of Staff, USAFFE.

U. S. Army Forces in the Far East.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated top secret exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. To the best of my recollection, I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof, before 7 December 1941, except possibly some of those relating to negotiations at Washington, D. C., of Kurusu. I did not see the messages described as the "winds code", nor any activating or implementing message. I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the headquarters.

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelligence, other than it appears to have been disseminated by a Major Gerald Wilkinson, British Army, who had liaison status with the headquarters and, as such, had contact with Major General (then Colonel) Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, [11689] operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before December 7, 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code which were intercepted by the Signal Intelligence Service were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated, were delivered to the Signal Intelligence Service officer who delivered them to the Headquarters, USAFFE.

Among the messages picked up by the Signal Intelligence Service were reports by the Japanese Consul at Manila requesting the arrivals and departures of ships in Manila Harbor.

Headquarters USAFFE did not disseminate any ultra information. All dissemination was effected through Signal Intelligence Service channels.

Signed, "R. K. Sutherland."

[11690] Colonel CLAUSEN. Then I have the affidavit May 7, 1945, to General MacArthur [reading]:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Commanding General, USAFFE.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit "B," consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I have no recollection of having seen any of these before. I did not see the messages described as the "Winds Code," nor any activating or implementing message. I believe I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the Hq. USAFFE.

I have not previously—

Senator FERGUSON. Are you rereading that affidavit or is that another one? It sounds the same to me.

Colonel CLAUSEN. It is not, Senator; it is not the same at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't that the same language that was used?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, go ahead.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I have [11691] no knowledge as to the basis or source of this intelligence, and I did not know that these or similar messages were being transmitted to persons at Honolulu, T. H.

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code, intercepted by this SIS were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated, were delivered to the SIS officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE. The decrypting and translating of these messages was a function of the Navy. The Army SIS monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this intelligence. Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the Army I do not know. All transmission of this subject material was entirely in the hands of the Navy.

Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

[11692] Then his G-2, Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby, on May 8, 1945—

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, is it the purpose to read into the record all of this mass of affidavits, is that the purpose?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the request to the committee yesterday, the request of Senator Lucas and Senator Ferguson was as stated this morning, may I say to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I read that request in the record but it does not seem to me that reading these affidavits is the identifying or the tying-in; as I understand that request, it was references in the affidavits or to messages to identify them with our record. Now, it appears that list itself—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No, the request was that Colonel Clausen bring to the attention of the committee all of the messages and information received in Hawaii between November 25 and December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, this MacArthur affidavit does not put any of the messages in Hawaii, does it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, how is that material to the action?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I have no desire to read that, [11693] Senator. If you don't want it read, I don't want to read it.

Senator FERGUSON. It did not put any messages in. The Sutherland affidavit put in messages in Hawaii.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Sutherland?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The explanation was that there had been language indicating that information had come from Manila to Honolulu and his investigation went to Manila for the purpose of ascertaining if any such information came, what it was. Presumably, in reading these affidavits it was for the purpose of tracing some information that moved from Manila to Honolulu.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the way I understood it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, if there was nothing in those affidavits that had anything to do with the transmission of evidence, then, Congressman, it would not be responsive to the original question.

Senator FERGUSON. And as I understand that is what the witness now says, that there wasn't anything in those two. I suppose we ought to have something from Willoughby.

Mr. KEEFE. We are taking up time. I am perfectly willing to sit here and listen and I suppose the Colonel is willing to read all of this stuff.

[11694] Colonel CLAUSEN. I will if you want me to.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, it seems to me that it is an awful burden on him to ask him to read all these affidavits.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Keefe, as I understood it there was a question raised by somebody in one of the other affidavits as to what Manila did regarding the transmitting of information to Hawaii. These apparently prove the negative.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You understood the request of the committee yesterday?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes. I worked last night getting out the information for you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead then, please.

Senator FERGUSON. I think the Willoughby affidavit will explain Wilkinson further.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I thought, Senator. I repeat, I have no desire, I, Henry C. Clausen, to sit here and read this stuff but there are some things in the Willoughby that tie in with the Wilkinson.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I think that is true in the Willoughby, there is something that ties in with the Wilkinson.

Mr. CLARK. Merely by way of divertisement, you have enlightened me in a good many respects. I don't think it has been in vain.

[11695] Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I am perfectly willing, sir, to take whatever time is necessary for anything that the committee may want.

General WILLOUGHBY (reading):

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was ACofS, G-2, USAFFE.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof before, except isolated fragments of the Korusu diplomat message series. Concerning those which are known as the "Winds Code" messages, neither I, nor anyone else in the USAFFE to my knowledge, received any information as to any activating or implementing message, nor any notice that such a message had been transmitted or received.

Concerning the British SIS messages dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941, these were not seen by me before 7 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelligence, other than that it appears to have been disseminated by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, subsequently appointed Major, British Army, who had some liaison status with the Philippine Department, later, Hq. USAFFE, and as such had contact with me and my predecessor, [11696] in 1941. (See Appendix A).

I might add that another reason for going to the Philippines was I had run across this British thing in Honolulu and it would have come from Manila, so I wanted to go to Manila to the G-2 and ask what they knew about this British set-up (reading).

Various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages were received by the Army in the Philippines (Hq. USAFFE) before 7 December 1941. The decrypting, translating and processing of these messages were functions of the Navy. The Army monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decrypting and translating. Under this system the intercepted Japanese code

messages were given to the Navy at Corregidor where the Navy had a "purple" machine and other crypto-analytic facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for decrypting and translating these messages. It was customary for the Navy, after these messages were decrypted and translated, to give the Army (Hq. USAFFE) such portion of the sum total of this intelligence, and the details and source thereof, as the Navy considered necessary to the functions of the Army. (See Appendix B). Those which were shown me before 7 December 1941 were handed to me by Colonel Shearer, S. C., now deceased, who was the Army [11697] liaison with the Navy for that purpose. Certain of these messages concerned inquiries from Tokyo and replies by the Japanese Consul at Manila as to United States military and commercial ships in Manila Harbor. No record was made by the Army of the dissemination or substance of this intelligence, and the papers on which the intelligence was recorded have been destroyed.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Army did not transmit any of this intelligence to the Hawaiian Department, since the dissemination thereof was exclusively a Navy function.

(Signed) C. A. WILLOUGHBY.

Appendix A refers to the Wilkinson material. This is it [reading] :

The British SIA messages, their purport and evolution and the curious role played by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson in Manila and Hawaii are an integral part of this investigation, in my opinion.

The whole story is one of duplicity, evasion, bargaining, horse-trading of information and a sort of E. Philipps Oppenheim international intrigue.

Wilkinson married into the Davies family and represented his father-in-law in Manila as a sugar broker for many years; hence, the casual reference to a "Colonel [11698] Wilkinson," that appears in the affidavits of Mr. Russell and Dawson, suggesting a perfect stranger are obviously intended to be misleading. Wilkinson combined the convenient status of a respected local business man, with that of a secret agent, reporting to the British Ministry of Information; contrary to U. S. law, he never registered as a foreign agent. He apparently came out of hiding, in Manila, and contacted or obtained tolerance by the then G-2's Philippine Department, Colonels O'Rear, retired, and J. K. Evans, MID. When I took over, he approached me, quoting Evans, etc. I was not impressed; the intelligence material he desired to file with me, they contained mimeo reprints of old Jap military data and some sprinkling of China-based reports. It became apparent to me, though, that Wilkinson had dealings with Hawaii and the local Navy, that he possessed his own cryptographic systems and decoding clerks, etc. I became convinced that his main purpose was to ingratiate himself into some official Army-Navy recognition, that he was willing to trade information for that recognition but that he was and still is an agent of British authorities, reporting thereto and executing orders therefrom. This net of potential spies is world wide; it is still in operation; I employ both SIA and SOE, British, and [11699] find them loyal to no one but themselves and the Empire.

My intelligence evaluation of his messages to Hawaii is not high—a horse trading proposition, pure and simple; I am convinced that this bundle represents not all of the messages sent; the commercial deductions are obvious; Davies cancelled sugar shipments in the nick of time.

Wilkinson is a completely untrained civilian. His government gave him a military status to protect him, in case of capture. He attached himself to us at the outbreak of the war, leaving his wife and children to fend for themselves, in the Japanese-occupied city; they were promptly interned, in Sto Tomas, for the duration.

We made use of him and his cypher system, to send an occasional message to Wavell and Singapore; he continued to report "home" through his stuff was severely edited by me; the General finally sent him to Wavell's Headquarters, as a sort of liaison, utilizing his cypher system; he then made his way deviously to Washington and London, where he capitalized heavily on his "status" with GHQ, USAFFE: he was "promoted" to Colonel and attempted to return to our Headquarters, as a "liaison"; he even had the support of the Prime Minister; with a complete lack of military knowledge, such a position had its ludicrous side, except for local espionage, and we declined to have him. He was promptly demoted and attached to duty with the British Office of Information at Washington—New York.

(Signed) C. A. WILLOUGHBY.

Appendix B has reference to what we call the "ultra," what was called the "magic" (reading) :

In 1941, the Navy obtained and maintained a highly efficient crypto-analytical service, specializing in Japanese material; though the Army had notably participated in the development of this subject, the Navy appears to have obtained a lead; consequently, it can be said that the Navy enjoyed an almost monopolistic privilege. In an otherwise meritorious desire for security (though every modern nation knows that crypto-analysis is going on), the Navy has shrouded the whole enterprise in mystery, excluding other services, and rigidly centralizing the whole enterprise. At this date, for example, this same system is still in vogue; as far as SWPA—

That is Southwest Pacific—

is concerned, the crypto-analysis is made in Melbourne, forwarded via Seventh Fleet D. N. I.; the Melbourne station is under direct orders of Washington, is not bound by any local responsibilities, forwards what they select, and when it suits them. The [11701] possibility of erroneous or incomplete selection is as evident now as it was in 1941. The only excuse the Navy has is that its field is primarily naval intercepts, but there is a lot of Army traffic or other incidental traffic. This collateral traffic is not always understood or correctly interpreted by the Navy, in my opinion.

The solution to this vexing and dangerous problem is a completely joint, interlocking intercept and crypto-analytical service, on the highest level, with the freest interchange of messages and interpretation.

The sequence of messages referred to, had they been known to a competent intelligence officer, with Battle Order and tactical background, beginning with November 14th, would have led instantly to the inescapable conclusion that Pearl Harbor naval installations were a target for attack, with November 25th or November 29th as the deadlines, suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was involved, for some sort of naval seaborne sortie.

(Signed) C. A. WILLOUGHBY.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman?

What credit did you give that part of the report where he analyzed that if he had had that information it would have been clear to him that an attack was going to be made upon Pearl Harbor?

[11702] Colonel CLAUSEN. The credit that we gave it was, of course, Senator—I mean it is sort of presumptuous for me to say so and it is so easy to say so in hindsight, but he pointed out to me at the time that it showed target attack possibilities, target attack information.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, is that referred to in any report either by the Secretary of War or the Adjutant General?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or by you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. Colonel Stimson in his report pointed out that the Hawaiian command, he spoke only so far as the Army was concerned, that the Hawaiian command and that the Washington command were not operating in the highest degree of efficiency and he said that with regard to this type of information, especially the ships in harbor reports, that they should have been analyzed by a man with more analytical and imaginative insight to see the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that is in the report?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It is in Secretary Stimson's report, sir, which he made after he had this report of mine.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were getting this affidavit from the top General of Intelligence in the Philippine Islands?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

[11703] Senator FERGUSON. And he was making this comment when you showed him the exhibits of what they had in Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. My top secret B.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Just like he said, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. He made this comment on what they had in Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you tell us again just who Willoughby was?

Colonel CLAUSEN. C. A. Willoughby was a major general who was one of those that left with MacArthur after the fall of Bataan and then returned with MacArthur as his G-2 during all that time, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead, Colonel.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I come now to—

Mr. CLARK. Let me get one point straight. Is your secret B, I believe you call it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Exhibit B, sir?

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is the one that General Russell brought to the Board.

Mr. CLARK. Does that contain these intercepts only from Washington?

[11704] Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. It contains the file of intercepts that were here in Washington in part.

Mr. CLARK. Did it contain anything that you picked up at Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. You see, I referred by numbers to these other people in Hawaii who had them. In other words—

Mr. CLARK. The Senator's question to you was whether or not what was in this B-2 came from Washington. I want to know whether there is anything else now other than from Washington in it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, the top secret exhibit B that we have referred to were a sheaf of intercepts that General Russell had obtained from G-2. Now, the intercepts were intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages that had been received in Washington and some of those—as I have pointed out here now in other affidavits—the substance of them at least were known to some people in Hawaii.

Mr. CLARK. I understand now. Thank you, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask one question? Did General Russell also have the dispatches in regard to the Aleutians and in regard to Panama and in regard to the Philippines?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Murphy, I do not know. When the [11705] board got the winds code last week—

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, the one that General Russell concentrated upon was those segregated particularly as to Hawaii, is that right?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I understand.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The next affidavit is that of General Fielder which I have read already for Senator George.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Now, in looking over the Hart report, Captain Safford in there said that General Betts was one of the people that would know about the winds code execute message, so I got ahold of General Betts at Frankfort-on-Main, in Germany. This is his affidavit. June 13, 1945. [Reading:]

During the months of November and December 1941 I was the Executive Assistant of the Chief of the then Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.

In that capacity I was required to have a general knowledge of the major intelligence problems confronting the Military Intelligence Division and with reference to the Japanese situation I generally obtained this knowledge from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, who was in [11706] charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch and to whom was decentralized the handling of all Ultra messages concerning Japan which came to the War Department. Colonel Bratton was assisted by Major Dusenbury, GSC. I know that Major Dusenbury, as Colonel Bratton's representative, received certain Ultra messages concerning Japan both from Army and Navy sources. I think that on occasion Colonel Bratton employed Major Dusenbury to transmit messages so received to authorized persons in the War Department.

In consequence I have no first hand knowledge of the handling of these messages, from whom they were received or to whom they were shown. To the best of my knowledge and belief I received no Ultra messages either in written form or by oral transmission on behalf of the Military Intelligence Division during the period in question. I believe, however, that during the period in question Colonel Bratton either showed me or informed me of the gist of most of the Ultra messages which he handled. I am certain that Colonel Bratton informed me of the message which established the so-called Japanese "Winds Code." I further recall inquiring of him on several occasions whether any message implementing the message on the "Winds Code" had been received. I do not [11707] recall that he informed me at any time of such a message being received and I further believe that if he had received such a message he would have told me and I would have remembered it. To the best of my knowledge and belief no other person informed me prior to 7 December 1941 that an implementing message had been received.

(Signed) THOMAS J. BETTS,
Brigadier General.

He was on the staff of General Eisenhower.

Next is an affidavit of Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, which I obtained at Frankfort-on-Main on 15 June 1945, Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, and it had to do with some testimony of Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler and it had to do with whether or not he had received on the night of 6 December, as had theretofore been testified, the pouch containing the thirteen parts.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that the fellow that is sometimes referred to as Bedell Smith, as General Bedell Smith?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is the same one; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The same one?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. Do you want me to read this?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Ferguson asked you questions about this. Do you want the affidavit read, Senator?

[11708] Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything in it in relation to Hawaii?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. While your attention was directed on something there, Senator, Colonel Clausen stated that it related to the delivery of the thirteen part message, something in that connection.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The general nature of the delivery of the Ultra to the chief of staff. General Bedell Smith at that time was secretary to the General Staff here in Washington in 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. And this is an affidavit, this is not the Bedell Smith affidavit?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, all right. Yes, I think you ought to read that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. May I inquire here the date of that affidavit?

Colonel CLAUSEN. June 15, 1945.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have that affidavit when you contacted Colonel Bratton?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I showed it to him, sir, so that he could see what the others had said.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you already had that affidavit at the [11709] time you took the affidavit from Colonel Bratton?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes. Let me just make sure because, Mr. Keefe, I showed Colonel Bratton various papers and I listed them down in the first part as to just what I showed him. Yes, I did, I showed him that affidavit.

Mr. KEEFE. All right, that is all I wanted to know.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Do you want the list of those that I showed him?

Mr. KEEFE. Not now.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right.

Mr. KEEFE. I may want to ask you about that later.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right. [Reading:]

During the months of November and December 1941, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., as Secretary of the War Department General Staff. In that capacity and during the period mentioned, I received from representatives of G-2, for delivery to the Chief of Staff, containers carrying especially secret information which I later learned included various intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, and were then called "Magic". These were also delivered on occasions for the same purpose to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff was on duty in the office of the Chief of Staff.

[11710] Mr. KEEFE. Now, may I inquire, Mr. Chairman, right at this point? General Smith had not been a witness before the Army Pearl Harbor Investigating Board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. This is his first statement?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I had about 15 witnesses that testified before the Grunert Board that I interviewed and got additional affidavits or testimony from and then there were 35, about 35 entirely new witnesses.

Mr. KEEFE. Of which he is one?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Of which General Smith is one.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

I did not personally see these intercepts. I did not know what messages were delivered to the various distributees, nor the method of distribution or screening, nor to whom or when they were delivered. They were always given to me in a locked pouch, the key to which was not available to me. I would always give the locked pouch to the Chief of Staff as promptly as possible. If received in the Chief of Staff's absence, these pouches were given him as soon as he returned to the office. I recall several occasions when the pouch was delivered to [11711] him at his home when the A. C. of S., G-2, considered the contents urgent. The Chief of Staff would occasionally mention to me matters

connected with these intercepts, but I do not recall ever having seen a complete one, nor do I recall specific details.

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the general effect:

1. On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, after receiving information from Admiral Noyes, then Chief of Navy Communications, that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal rupture of diplomatic relations or war between Japan and Great Britain, and after talking this over with General Sherman Miles and Colonel Rufus S. Bratton of G-2, gave the information to General Leonard T. Gerow of WPD, and asked him to give the Hawaiian Department more warning. General Gerow stated, "I think they have had plenty of notification." Colonel Sadtler then gave the information to me, and made the same request of me. I replied that since the War Plans Division had acted I did not want to discuss the matter further.

Now, do you want me to skip down to where he answers that No. 1?

[11712] Mr. KEEFE. Read the whole affidavit as long as you are about it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you see I went down from 1, 2, 3, 4 and then he answered 1, 2, 3 and 4, so if you want me to I will answer one by reading one.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Colonel CLAUSEN. This is in response to what I just read. He says:

My recollection of the facts concerning these subjects is as follows:

I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2 and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of my rather minor province.

Number 2. This is what the general testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board was: [11713]

Colonel Bratton delivered the pouches containing the radio intercepts always in person to the officers concerned; and, when the Chief of Staff was not there, he delivered the pouches to be for delivery to the Chief of Staff.

This is his answer. Number 2:

Not only Colonel Bratton, but at least one other officer of G-2 delivered the pouches referred to. These were delivered not only to me, but to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff happened to be on duty at my desk in my absence. When delivered to myself or to one of my assistants, our standard procedure was to place it immediately on the desk of the Chief of Staff if he were in his office, or, in his absence, to lock it in the safe until his return unless instructed that the contents should reach him at once. There were several occasions when we were so informed. On these occasions the Duty Officer of the General Staff Secretariat would take the pouches to General Marshall at his quarters or wherever he happened to be. On at least several occasions I recall definitely that I personally sent the G-2 officer to deliver the pouch to General Marshall at his quarters in the absence of a Duty Officer.

[11714] Number 3:

During November and December 1941, Colonel Bratton reminded me that the intercepts were of such value and importance that they should be shown the Chief of Staff without delay.

Answer to Number 3:

Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries understood that these pouches contained information of such value and importance that they should be shown to the Chief of Staff without delay, and the officers of the Intelligence Division

who handed them to us were aware of the procedure followed in the Chief of Staff's office as indicated above.

Number 4 of general testimony before the Board:

On December 6, 1941, before midnight, Colonel Bratton delivered to me for the Chief of Staff 13 parts of a 14 part intercepted radio message from the Japanese Government which in terms terminated peace negotiations with the United States. (I understand this testimony may possibly be qualified by other testimony to the effect that instead of giving these to me it "may have been one of others.")

Answer Number 4:

To the best of my recollection, I left the office [11715] at the usual time on the evening of 6 December 41, that is, about 7 P.M., turning over to the Night Duty Officer. I am quite certain that I was not at the office after 10 P.M. If the intercepted radio message referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or to the Night Duty Officer, it would have been delivered in the locked envelope which I have previously described, and unless the officer who received it were so informed by Colonel Bratton, he would have had no definite knowledge of its contents as neither I nor any other officer of the Secretariat was classified as "Ultra". If he had been informed of the contents or of their urgent nature, it would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either by the officer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself.

(Signed) W. B. SMITH.

I come now to the affidavit of General Gerow.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe that has already been read into the record, unless some member wants it read again.

Senator FERGUSON. I have no desire to have it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right. May I just say that the number of the intercepts referred to there—that there are two that have not already been referred to by myself. One is Number 23570, and you have that as your Exhibit 1, page 68, [11716] and the other is Number 23859 and you have that as your Exhibit 1, page 81.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Gerow's affidavit, as I recall it, was read into the record while he was testifying before the committee.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right, sir. Now, another that has been mentioned by Captain Safford before Admiral Hart as being a person that would have some light to shed on the winds message was Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, so I reached him at Casserte, Italy, June 26, 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Schukraft is present in the room—do you know whether he is present in the room?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He is right here, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, is there any need of reading his affidavit, Mr. Chairman?

Senator LUCAS. There is unless we are going to call him as a witness.

Senator FERGUSON. I understood he was to be a witness.

Colonel CLAUSEN. This is a short one.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, read it. Maybe we can read it in less time than we can talk about it.

[11717] Colonel CLAUSEN. On 7 December 1944, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., in charge of radio intercepts for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department. As such, my duties included the direct supervision of radio intercept stations operated by the Chief Signal Officer. In the course of these duties I saw at various times some of the intercepts which had been decrypted and decoded and translated.

Regarding the so-called "Winds Code", I recall seeing, at about the time of their translation, the intercept in Top Secret Exhibit "B", number 25432. When I saw this message I directed the San Francisco intercept station to intercept all

plain text Japanese messages and to pick up the news reports from Tokyo. The station did this and sent the messages and report in to me. To the best of my knowledge none of these containing the code words were ever picked up. I did, however, see an intercept of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and a person in Tokyo, who I believe was Yamamoto, similar in form to the intercepts in Top Secret Exhibit "B" number 25349 and 25497—

Now 25349 is your Exhibit 1, page 179, and No. 25497, is your Exhibit 1, page 206.

I continue:

[11718] —but in which the person at the Tokyo end gave to Kurusu the "Winds Code" signal indicating breach of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. Kurusu in reply said something to the effect that he was sorry to hear this. The message to which I refer came to the Signal Intelligence Service from the Navy, as a Navy intercept or translation, during the period about 28 November 1941 to 6 December 1941. I think this message also contained some code words translated as "It is a boy." I did not know the meaning of this latter code. When the message mentioned was received from the Navy the Signal Intelligence Service sent it immediately to G-2.

As additional leads in connection with the foregoing, I suggest interrogation of my former superior Colonel Minckler; also especially Lieut. Colonel Rowlett and Miss Prather. Additional information may possibly be obtained from Colonel Doud, Miss Ray Cave (wife of Sgt. Liparini), and Mrs. Hazel Adams."

Signed, "Robert E. Schukraft."

Now then, the next affidavit is that of George L. Renchard, and following that is the affidavit of John F. Stone, whom I saw in London, and who at the time of Pearl Harbor was assistant to Secretary Hull. I do not think there is any reference there to Hawaii, unless the committee [11719] wants them read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead with the next one.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The next affidavit is that of Major General John R. Deane, which is a very short affidavit. It has to do with the fact that he was one of the assistant secretaries to the General Staff in December, 1941, and he said:

On 6 December, 1941, I was not on duty after 5 p. m., and did not receive from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, nor from Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, or any other person, any pouch for the Chief of Staff.

Then he says on the next morning he got down to work about 9 or 9:30 a. m.

The next affidavit is that of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. I will read that if the committee wants. So far as Hawaii itself is concerned, it refers to the fact that he sent the 5 December Rochefort message.

Mr. KEEFE. He has been here for several weeks and he is in the room right now. He is going to be a witness, so I see no object in reading it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, Colonel, the reading is off.

Colonel CLAUSEN. He refers in here to intercept 25483 which you will find at page 239 of your Exhibit 1, and also [11720] to intercept 25850, which you will find at page 248 of Exhibit 1. He also refers to the ABCD Bloc.

The next affidavit is that of Colonel Otis K. Sadtler.

Mr. KEEFE. Colonel Sadtler is going to be a witness isn't he?

Mr. KAUFMAN. He is scheduled to be a witness.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right. I will skip that.

Next is the affidavit of Major General Charles D. Herron.

Major General Herron preceded General Short as commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, and in this affidavit he tells of his briefing of General Short concerning the matters that had to do

with the Hawaiian Command. It may be important for the part that had to do with the 1940 alert, and as to what he told General Short concerning subjects of that kind.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does any member of the committee desire that affidavit read?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I would think that it would directly involve General Short, if this consists of directions which were given to General Short by Herron on Short's succeeding to the command out there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it, Colonel.

Colonel CLAUSEN. This was given to me in Washington, [11721] D. C., on August 13, 1945.

Referring to my testimony given the Army Pearl Harbor Board on 9 August 1944, I wish to state further that when arrangements had been made for General Short to relieve me as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, which command I had held since October 1937, I desired to acquaint him as fully as I could with my experience and knowledge of the affairs pertaining thereto. Since he was to arrive and I was to depart on the same ship, there was only a limited time in which to do this by personal conferences, namely, two and one-half days. Accordingly, in order that he might be prepared for his conferences with me, I sent to San Francisco for delivery to him there certain papers and material relating to the command, for his preliminary review on the ship's journey of five days. These papers and material comprised in effect an agenda and exhibits. Upon my meeting General Short when he arrived at Hawaii, I asked him whether he had received the data at San Francisco and whether he had read the papers and material. He replied that they had been received by him at San Francisco but that he had not given them much time while en route.

I did what I could in the limited time of two and one-half days then remaining to brief General Short personally on matters pertaining to the command. This included my giving [11722] him my opinions on the officers and men. I told him of my estimate as to the efficiency of the staff officers and, with respect to G-2, that Colonel George W. Bicknell, a Reserve Officer, was an experienced and qualified, efficient man for that position, and that it had been my intention to make him my G-2. I further told him of the G-2 work being done, of the liaison with the Navy, the FBI and related sources of information, of the defense plans, of my experience and measures taken in the all-out alert of 1940 which I had ordered on receipt of a communication from the War Department, dated June 17, 1940, reading as follows:

"Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to the greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge."

I also told him of the relations and cooperation which had existed with the Navy, of the civilian population, of the Japanese situation, of the assumption that alien agents conducted espionage for the Japanese Government. I took him around the Island of Oahu, showing him the installations [11723] and gave him my ideas of possible attack and defense of that Island.

Following my talks with General Short at the time mentioned, in Hawaii, he did not ever ask my opinions or for information or correspond with me on the subject of command or related problems.

Concerning your question as to whether correct military practice, current in 1941, permitted a Commanding General of an overseas department to revise a War Department estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department, my answer is that the Commander may and should take whatever action he believes dictated by necessity but must so report to the War Department at the earliest possible moment.

Signed, "Charles D. Herron, Major General, U. S. A."

The next affidavit is that of General Miles.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He has already appeared as a witness.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right, sir.

In his affidavit he refers to quite a series of intercepts which I have looked up and tied into your exhibits.

If you want, I will read them and show where they are in your exhibits.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN, 24573, on page 100 of Exhibit 1.

[11724] 25322 on page 126 of Exhibit 1, 24878 on page 137 of Exhibit 1, 25432 on page 154 of Exhibit 1, 25138 on page 165 of Exhibit 1, 25435 on page 180 of Exhibit 1, 25445 on page 195 of Exhibit 1, 25496 on page 199 of Exhibit 1, 25552 on page 204 of Exhibit 1, 25553 on page 204 of Exhibit 1, 25554 on page 205 of Exhibit 1, 25555 on page 206 of Exhibit 1, 25727 on page 213 of Exhibit 1, 25545 on page 208 of Exhibit 1, 25640 on page 215 of Exhibit 1, 25785 on page 227 of Exhibit 1, 25836 on page 236 of Exhibit 1, 25838 on page 238 of Exhibit 1, 25843 on page 239 of Exhibit 1.

The General in this affidavit also referred to the ABCD Bloc, and his assumption that the Navy in Hawaii was doing some decrypting, and refers to some studies he had made on what he called an "out of the blue" attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read what he said about the ABCD Bloc?

[11725] Colonel CLAUSEN. I will read it, Senator.

Further concerning the intercepts mentioned as contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", and those which related to Joint Action by the ABCD Bloc or members thereof I knew at the time about the Joint Action Agreement.

The next affidavit is also by an officer who was referred to by Captain Safford in his testimony before Admiral Hart, and that is Colonel Rex W. Minckler.

Shall I read that?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

[11726] Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

On 7 December 1941, and for some months prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., as Officer in Charge of Signal Intelligence Service. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Colonel Harold S. Doud were my subordinates in the Signal Intelligence Service at the time, and Colonel Otis K. Sadtler was my superior. My duties included the direct supervision of the receipt and dissemination of intercepted radio messages. In the course of these duties I saw at various times most of the intercepts of Japanese radio.

Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall having seen, and at about the time of its translation, the intercept numbered 25432 in Top Secret Exhibit "B", before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I recall the action which was taken under my supervision to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the "Winds Code". I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent. Before 7 December 1941 there were one or two "false alarms", one of which I think discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy, and which was to the effect that a possible execute message had been received indicating a breach of Japanese and British relations. My opposite number in the [11727] Navy was Captain L. F. Safford. I was in almost daily contact with Army and Navy representatives who were also on the lookout for such an execute message, and it is my belief that if an authentic execute message had been received, some of these persons would have discussed it with me.

The normal procedure in the reciprocal sending of messages by the Army and Navy, one to the other, was to send six copies.

Concerning the two messages shown me by Colonel Clausen, Army Serial numbers 25874 and 25877—

and they are to be found on page 29 of your Exhibit 2 and pages 27 and 28 your Exhibit 2. I will continue:

which appear to have been intercepted on 6 December 1941 and translated on 8 December 1941, I believe the time indicated for decrypting and translation by the Army was normal and then required for decrypting and decoding Code PA-K2. The Navy time was about four days. The Code indicated was not top priority and involved manual processing. When the intercepts were received by the Signal Intelligence Service they were sorted into categories of priority, and then after being decrypted and translated, one copy was retained by the Signal Intelligence Service and additional copies were then sent to G-2 and the Navy ONI for dissemination.

[11728] Signed, "Rex W. Minckler, Colonel, SC."

The next affidavit I have is that of General Marshall.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, do I understand in that last affidavit Colonel Minckler was the opposite of Captain Safford?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. The next affidavit is that of General Marshall.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Marshall has appeared as a witness.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right, sir.

Now the next is another man mentioned by Captain Safford in his testimony before Admiral Hart as a lead on this winds execute business, and that is Colonel Harold Doud.

On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., in charge of the B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section. My duties included the supervision of the solution of Japanese radio diplomatic and military messages. In the course of these duties my section solved and translated at various times many Japanese messages which had been intercepted.

Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code" I recall seeing at about the time of its translation the intercept in top secret Exhibit B, No. 25432—

that exhibit was the [11729] code—

I recall that when this intercept was translated arrangements were made to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the "Winds Code". I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department. My attention has been called to certain testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, USN, to the effect that I may have some knowledge concerning such an execute message. I do not know the basis for this testimony of Captain Safford as I did not have any information of an execute message.

My attention has also been called to the testimony on the subject of 13 parts of a 14-part message, which 13 parts was received the afternoon and evening of 6 December 1941 and is numbered SIS 25848. I recall having seen the message but do not remember the details connected with its receipt and solution. I went on duty on the afternoon of 6 December and came off duty sometime on the 7th of December, the exact times, however, I do not recall.

Concerning the time required to solve and disseminate the Japanese radio diplomatic messages in Code PA-K2, it is my present belief that the average time required was at least two days.

I have been shown top secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The translation dates indicated [11730] thereon were not always the dates of receipt. Reference to the records of the Signal Intelligence Service should be made to show the time required between the dates of receipt and the actual solutions and disseminations.

Prior to 7 December 1941, according to my recollection, we did not solve any current Japanese military codes.

Signed, "Harold Doud, Colonel, Signal Corps."

The next affidavit is an additional affidavit by Lt. Col. Frank B. Rowlett, whose other affidavit I read this morning in connection with my giving the top secret exhibit B and was asked to find out the

points of interception. Now it developed that there were two additional messages which are referred to in the affidavit of Colonel Minckler. I understood those were intercepted at San Francisco on 6 December. So I wanted to know why they were not decrypted sooner than 8 December, because those two were very significant ones pointing to Pearl Harbor, talking, I believe, about barrage balloons—maybe not barrage balloons but antitorpedo nets and barrage balloons. Colonel Rowlett was the man to see on that and I interviewed the Colonel and he gave me this affidavit. It relates to that subject, if the committee wants to hear it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it.

[11731] Colonel CLAUSEN (reading).

The average length of time required for processing—

These two messages I mentioned came in a code called PA-K2.

The average length of time required for processing the messages in the Japanese system known by us as PAK-2, calculated on 19 messages for the period of 1 November to 6 December 1941, shows 3.5 days as average. Only messages which were actually published were included in the data on which the average was calculated.

No military systems which were in use by the Japanese Army or Military Attaches previous to the date of 6 December 1941 were readable. Some intercepts were available but not in sufficient quantity to permit the solution of any military system.

a. No written record has been discovered which would indicate positively the exact hour at which intercept traffic was received by teletype from San Francisco by the Signal Intelligence Service in the Munitions Building.

Where that question mark occurred with regard to those two messages, was whether they were sent in by mail or sent in by teletype. I have been given conflicting stories and that is the reason that point was run down.

My recollection is that the first call to initiate [11732] the use of the circuit with San Francisco was placed sometime after 6 o'clock in the evening of 6 December 1941. The response from Station 2 at San Francisco indicated that they had already forwarded by air mail the messages intercepted that day and that it would be necessary for them to use the station file copy for preparing the intercepts for transmission by teletype. This preparation required some time because tapes had to be punched for the material to be forwarded. To the best of my recollection it was not until after midnight that actual intercept traffic was received by the Signal Intelligence Service from San Francisco.

b. Since this was the first time the Army had used teletype facilities to forward traffic to Signal Intelligence, my recollection is very clear. Also, I actually helped to operate the teletype equipment in the Munitions Building in both the preliminary discussions in which traffic was requested and also in receipting for the traffic. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Miss Mary Jo Dunning were present and also operated the teletype equipment. The conditions under which we operated were very unusual in that ordinarily we operated only day shifts, and this also tended to impress the matter on my memory.

Signed "Frank B. Rowlett, Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps." That was dated September 12, 1945.

[11733] On the same subject, an affidavit of Captain Howard W. Martin:

At approximately 8:00 p. m. PST on 6 December 1941 I was in my quarters at Fort Scott, Presidio of San Francisco when the telephone rang and the man on duty at the station (MS #2) said Washington had called us on the teletype machine and had requested we transmit immediately all the day's intercepted traffic. It being Saturday night I had only one man on duty and other personnel could not be reached readily. Therefore I went down to the station

immediately and began transmitting all of Saturday's traffic using our retained copy, as the original traffic had been airmailed to Washington at approximately 4:00 p. m., on the same day. Because the following day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor I have always associated the two things in my memory, and am certain that the TWX machine was not used for traffic prior to 6 December and the hours as given are approximately correct.

I was NCO in charge of MS #2 at that time.

Signed "Howard W. Martin, Captain, Signal Corps."

On the same subject, the affidavit of Mary J. Dunning:

On 6 December 1941 I left the Munitions Building around 1 p. m., the regular hour for the close of business on Saturdays. Between 2:15 and 2:45 that afternoon, [11734] I received a telephone call from Colonel Minckler's office requesting me to report for work as soon as possible. I fixed the hour by the length of time it takes me to drive from my home to the Munitions Building and by 3 p. m. I was in Colonel Minckler's office ready to work. I remember the hour because later in the evening when I was asked to report at the same time on the following day I asked to be allowed to report at 5 p. m. instead, since I had made plans to spend the day out of town.

I can't recall being told why we were called back to work, but the general assumption was that we wanted to process traffic without delay since the Japanese Ambassador was in conference with the President.

I was asked to work in the "cage" (a room where machine traffic was processed, so called because of the grille work at its entrance to restrict admittance) where I had not worked for some time. I think that as I entered the room, I was surprised to see a teletype machine. How long it had been installed, I don't know, but I thought it could not have been there more than a few hours, since I often had occasion to go to the door of the cage and it was clearly visible from the door. It must have been roughly around four o'clock that representatives of the teletype company came to instruct us in the operation of the machine. After that we [11735] spent some time practicing.

It is difficult to fix the time very definitely because time spent in waiting always seems longer than it really is, and we were expecting traffic from San Francisco at any moment. I remember that I was getting hungry but could not leave the room to get supper since we were waiting for S. F. to call. When Colonel Minckler came into the cage, I spoke to him about getting someone to relieve me just long enough for me to buy a sandwich. This conversation I remember because we joked about my teaching him to operate the teletype. To the best of my knowledge, we were in communication with our intercept station in S. F. not later than 7:00 p. m., although I cannot say whether or not they actually had any traffic for us at that time.

I believe I went home around midnight or 1:00 a. m. and I recall processing some traffic during the course of the evening before I left. I cannot say, however, whether it came to us by teletype, or not, since the Message Center had been asked to deliver traffic to us as soon as it arrived. That was traffic from Honolulu and the Philippines.

I did not return to the office until five o'clock on 7 December 1941.

Signed, "Mary J. Dunning."

[11736] The next is on the same subject, the affidavit of Louise Prather:

To the best of my knowledge, the teletype machine was used to transmit traffic from San Francisco for the first time during the night of 6 December 1941.

This particular point is clear in my memory because of the unusual circumstances. In the evening of 6 December I was called at home and told our unit was being placed on a 24-hour basis immediately and that I should report for work at 7:00 a. m. the following morning, 7 December. When I arrived at the office at this unusual hour I learned that the teletype was being operated and the reason for the urgent call had been to process this, and other, traffic as rapidly as possible. Since for some months, the highest priority had been given Japanese traffic between Washington and Tokyo by our unit, the transmission of such traffic by teletype seemed to me to be a matter of major importance. This further served to impress the event on my memory.

Signed "Louise Prather."

That is the end of the testimony.

Then the committee asked that I—

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, before the witness leaves that subject, I would like to ask a question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark will inquire.

[11737] Mr. CLARK. This seems to refer to the magic that had some reference in it to the submarine nets and the balloons, or something of that kind?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Just what was the sense of that message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You will find them in your Exhibit No. 2. If you will let me have Exhibit No. 2, I will find them. That is on page 29, and is Army No. 25874, and this is the message:

From Honolulu.

To Tokyo.

December 6, 1941.

#254.

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were—and there is a blank line—

and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were four light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

The other one is on page 27 and 28 of the same exhibit 2. That is SIS No. 25877. From Honolulu to Tokyo:

[11738] December 6, 1941.

#253 Re the last part of your #123-a.

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results [11739] of my investigation.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Does the record show whether or not it was received, and when it was translated?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It was translated on December 8, 1941, as was the one I first read.

Senator FERGUSON. Do any of your affidavits, Colonel, show when they were transferred here, or came here to Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Those that I just read, sir, were supposed to have been sent in on the teletype.

Senator FERGUSON. Saturday night?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And they were supposed to be sent in, as I understood those affidavits, so they could be decrypted and decoded immediately?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, it was in PA-K2, and those other witnesses said that not being the highest priority they took that length of time for the messages to get out.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ascertain at any time why they put this teletype work on at Saturday night, called these people back, sent these two messages over from San Francisco to Washington, and then did not translate them that night?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No. I understood, Senator, that [11740] the two messages in question were in a volume. In other words, they were merely two of many that constituted the day's work on the 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that, but they put people to work that night, called them back, and had this traffic sent in to Washington Saturday evening.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Just like those people said.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That included these two messages?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then they were not translated or decoded or deciphered until after the attack.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did not go in to find out in the Navy Department here why they were not decrypted and decoded?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I certainly did.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the affidavit that relates to that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Those that I read, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What ones? I want you to name them.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Those of Prather, Dunning, Rowlett, and those other people, because we wanted to find out just what you have in mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

[11741] Colonel CLAUSEN. Why these two very significant ones had taken this long. I understood the PA-K2 code was an easy code to unravel, and I asked these people those questions.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find out how many they did translate that night and the next morning?

Colonel CLAUSEN. They translated these two on the 8th.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about the night of the 6th and the morning of the 7th. Did you find out how much of this traffic that they had sent from San Francisco on the new teletype machine to Washington that they actually decoded and deciphered?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I understood from what they told me, Senator, that they did not have any of it finished until the 8th. That is what I gathered.

Senator FERGUSON. So then the fact that they wanted it sent in did not mean they wanted it translated that night?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I understand.

Senator FERGUSON. Or the next morning?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I understand the arrangement, Senator, for the teletype equipment had been made sometime before. In other words, the telephone company had been asked to set this up for sometime before and that there had naturally [11742] been delay in

having the equipment installed, but that the first working operation was on the night that they have indicated.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel Clausen, as I understand it, from your investigation that was made, the people in the Department were decoding and translating, but they were working on a code that had a higher priority than the one that came in from San Francisco.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, that is what they told me, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. That is the time they were working on the 13-parts message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The purple, yes. Here is what they also said: You get a bunch of intercepts and you segregate those into their priorities, and you naturally put into one pile for decrypting those relating to the purple, you get to work on them first, and then you put in a pile those that have priority and you go to work on those, but there is no way to tell until the child is born what it is going to be.

Senator LUCAS. Shortage of manpower was one of the things that was involved in the translation and decrypting of these important messages?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, that is what they said.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel, did you inquire as to whether [11743] or not they knew in the Department here in Washington that this traffic in relation to the ships was coming in on this priority and in this code, and that they knew that the diplomatic messages were coming in in the purple?

Colonel CLAUSEN. They knew that.

Senator FERGUSON. What?

Colonel CLAUSEN. They knew how the messages were coming in because they would decrypt them, Senator, and naturally they would read it as they decrypted it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not they have different people on different codes?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Oh, they had quite a set-up. Some of these people here that I mentioned worked on the different phases of that, just like the girls mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. Now the diplomatic messages would have a tendency to show where it was coming from, and these other messages coming in this other type of code would indicate where they were coming from, isn't that true?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I prefer to say they speak for themselves, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Certainly they speak for themselves. They show that, as I read them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark had not quite finished, Colonel.

[11744] Mr. CLARK. I am interested in these two messages, but you read about three affidavits and I may be a little confused. I wish you would state in your own way, from the affidavits and your examination of the facts, where and when these messages were intercepted, translated and transmitted, giving the dates.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. They were picked up out of the air by a station at San Francisco on 6 December. The messages in question were from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, and when the intercept station picked them out of the air at San Francisco, following their usual routine they mailed them into Washington, and these

had been included with the mail. Later on that same day the intercept system for sending in material to Washington was augmented by the teletype system, so the San Francisco station was requested to teletype the material in, and they replied, "Well, we have already mailed it to you, but we will also teletype it to you," and they did that.

Mr. CLARK. Do you have any information now as to what time they reached Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Nothing except from what I have seen here, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, there was read into the record some time ago the facts relating to these two messages, [11745] and I have before me, called to my attention by Lieutenant Boskey, message No. 25877, dated December 6, translated 8 December, sent in code system PA-K2, intercepted by the Army Station 2, San Francisco 0022 GMT, 7 December (7:22 Washington time December 6), sent by teletype to Army SIS.

Mr. CLARK. Hold on a moment. Will you go back to 7:22? What did you say about that?

Mr. KAUFMAN. 7:22 p. m. Washington time, December 6.

Mr. CLARK. You say p. m. now, as I understand it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, 7:22 p. m. December 6 Washington time. Sent by teletype to Army SIS. Teletype sheet does not show the time sent by teletype.

Another copy sent by courier by Army Station 7, Fort Hunt, Virginia, was received by Army SIS not later than 7 December. Time not shown, and is marked "Dupe" (A), indicating that teletyped copy had arrived previously, decoded and translated by Army SIS. That is with respect to the first message.

[11746] Mr. CLARK. Before you leave that, does that mean that that message got to Washington 7:22 p. m.?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, on December 6th.

Mr. CLARK. Now see if you can fix it for the other one.

Mr. KAUFMAN. SIS 25874 is dated December 6, translated December 8, sent in code system PA-K2 and is exhibit 2, page 29, intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, at 0574 GMT, 7 December, 12:42 a. m. December 7, Washington time. That is early in the morning, Washington time.

That was 18 minutes of 1, December 7, in the morning. It was sent by teletype to Army SIS (A). Teletype sheet does not show time sent by teletype.

Another copy sent by Station 2 by airmail was received by Army SIS at 2:33 8 December and is marked "Dupe (A)," indicating that the teletype copy had arrived previously.

The Congressman asked me as to whether or not the times given here were the times of receipt in Washington. The time shown here shows the time of interception at San Francisco. The first one was intercepted at 7:22 December 6, 7:22 p. m.

Mr. CLARK. I thought you said that is the time they arrived in Washington?

Mr. KAUFMAN. No, that is the time they were intercepted [11747] in San Francisco.

Then I proceeded to read that the sheet does not show the time that it was received in Washington. It must have been after 7:22 p. m.

Mr. CLARK. I did not understand that the affidavit showed any interception at San Francisco, as late as 12 o'clock.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The affidavits show interception of the messages on 6 December, but not the precise time of the interception.

Mr. CLARK. Well, 12-something p. m., would be 7 December.

Mr. KAUFMAN. 12:42 a. m. 7 December. That is 42 minutes after midnight.

Mr. CLARK. If there is any way that you can fix here definitely when these messages arrived in Washington, I would like to see it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The record from the Navy Department says the teletype sheet does not show when they arrived in Washington. All they have is the interception time in San Francisco.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Can you give us any help on that, Colonel? Did you secure that information?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Nothing more than I have given to [11748] the committee.

Each message is dated December 6, so it would have to be intercepted on December 6, if that is the date it went from Honolulu, because the time at Honolulu and the time at San Francisco are both the same day.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel Clausen, did you investigate as to why the Navy apparently did not use a time stamp on any of these messages when they came in?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, I went into that question. There is no doubt, Senator, that some of these matters could have been handled this way:

• Perhaps the receipts could have been copied and the time when people got the intercepts indicated, they could have put numbers down and the distribution accurately recorded, but those were all things which were not done. The fact is they were just not done, and I was getting what the facts were.

Senator LUCAS. That question has arisen several times in connection with the hearing. We have never been able to ascertain the exact time when they arrived in Washington.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. We had the date of the interception but not the time of the receipt.

Senator FERGUSON. Is the same thing true of the Army?

[11749] Colonel CLAUSEN. No, they kept records there. I do not want to make a broad, sweeping statement, Senator, about the time of receipt, because the Signal men would be able to give more accurate information on that.

Senator FERGUSON. These messages were not to the Navy. They were to the Army.

Colonel CLAUSEN. They were Army messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but I understood the counsel was reading from a Navy record.

Mr. KAUFMAN. No, Army.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Army.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Army keep the hour of receipt of the messages?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did not get more than what Colonel Rowlett fixed for me on this sheet here.

Senator FERGUSON. You answered Senator Lucas that the Navy did not keep the hour. Now, did the Army keep the hour?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I said I did not know, Senator. The dates of receipt of some of these I tried to get from the standpoint of time. I understand there is some system, but what I did was to get the dates.

[11750] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Senator FERGUSON. I am through with that, but I have some questions along other lines.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Have you finished, Colonel?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask you a question, if I may, in connection with these two messages we have been discussing here with you and also with counsel.

As I got it from the information given by counsel, the first of these two messages was intercepted in San Francisco about 7:22 p. m. December 6th.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the other one shortly after midnight, December 6.

Mr. KAUFMAN. December 7.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Shortly after midnight.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Of December 7.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of December 6, or very early in the morning of December 7. They were intercepted at the monitoring station in San Francisco, is that it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, did that monitoring station in San Francisco have facilities to advise Hawaii about those messages as well as it could have advised [11751] Washington here?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think not, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It did not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you find out why not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, it was an intercept station, as I understand, that sent the traffic in to Washington for decrypting and decoding.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is it something like 1,000 miles closer from San Francisco to Hawaii than it is from San Francisco to Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I understand that the decoding and decrypting, sir, involves an intricate problem of security and personnel, and a great many people required to do that work.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not understand then that they had the required facilities?

Colonel CLAUSEN. At San Francisco?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At San Francisco to send it to Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it was sent to Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Did you get through [11752] Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you get through, Mr. Clark?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I have some questions.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was going to go through the exhibits, if you want me to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. There are some general questions that I want to ask him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You are not through, then, Colonel?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You asked me to pick out in my study what they had in Hawaii, so what I was going to do was go through my exhibits and show the documents that I got out of the G-2 office in Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. I am sorry I misunderstood you.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I have concluded with the affidavits and I am now going to the exhibits. They are set forth in my report as exhibit C, and in this volume is contained the index of each volume of exhibits, so I go first to Exhibit No. 1.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead in your own way, Colonel.

Colonel CLAUSEN. On page 11 of No. 1, the first exhibit in this No. 1, is the Japanese operation orders which we [11753] captured, showing that they had set up the big Y-day of 7 December 1941, a month in advance. I think that has already come before the committee.

The following papers after that in this Exhibit No. 1 are documents that were obtained in the main from the files of the headquarters and of the contact office, Hawaiian Department, unless I otherwise indicate.

In other words, in Hawaii they had these papers—

The VICE CHAIRMAN (interposing.) In other words, everything you are going to bring to the attention of the committee now is documentary evidence that you secured in Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Colonel CLAUSEN. On page 11, I just merely noted the fact that General Short had initialled what we call in the Army the buck sheet regarding the information in regard to the Burma Road for the reason it tied in with his testimony. That is, whenever you have a paper that contains his initials it shows his familiarity with the subject and the procedure that was followed, I presume.

Page 27-E is a document which we got in Washington and which I identified in Hawaii, that was sent in by General Fielder 6 September 1941, to the War Department G-2, [11754] in which it says:

It has been noted that many of the summaries of information received from your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District and have already been furnished this office by the Navy.

The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.

Signed, "Kendall J. Fielder, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is from Colonel Fielder to whom?

Colonel CLAUSEN. To the War Department, Washington.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask right there, what was he discussing in particular there?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The summaries of information. He calls for summaries of information received "from your office [11755] originate with Office Naval Intelligence." I will show you a few examples of what he has in mind when I come to them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. 6 September, 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In other words, on the 6th of September, 1941, G-2 of the Army in Hawaii notified the War Department in Washington that he wanted this information discontinued?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes. He said (reading):

The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

In other words, he was saying it was duplicating the work.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And asked to have it discontinued?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He recommended that such notices be discontinued in order to avoid duplication of effort.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Then on page 30-E there is the start of an estimate of the international (Japanese) situation, prepared by the G-2, Hawaiian Department, signed by Col. George W. Bicknell, obtained from his office. He had told [11756] me to go to his office and get these papers. That was referred to yesterday when I spoke of what he called digests. In other words, this G-2 estimate was prepared in the so-called contact office under the direction of Colonel Bicknell. He speaks of the ABCD bloc and other things in here, and the "mounting situation."

I read portions into the record yesterday.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Then on page 41 is a similar digest signed by Col. George W. Bicknell, and this contains the initial at the top of General Short, showing that it came to him, in which there is a continuation. This is a carry-on of the one I just referred to of October 17.

On page 48 there is one of these summaries of information from the War Department to Hawaii, and this is the type of thing that was sent out. This has a covering letter transmitting information to Hawaii, and in this case it sent along an analysis of information it received from the Orient on a one-page document dated November 3, 1941, and it says:

The following information received from the Orient, dated August 28, 1941, is considered reliable:

1. Mr. Hirota, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon Society, told of an order issued [11757] by War Minister Tojo (now premier) "to complete full preparation to meet any emergency with the United States in the Pacific. All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. The full preparation to be completed in November."

2. Hirota and others are said to have stated: "War with the United States would best begin in December or in February."

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would likely start war within sixty days."

And there is a G-2 note:

Full name of individual mentioned above is Koki Hirota, who is reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former Premier of Japan and director of the Bureau of Intelligence, U. S. Section.

Then it has an evaluation placed on it as to the source, it is reliable; as to the information credible.

Senator LUCAS. Who sent that out?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The War Department sent it to Hawaii.

Senator LUCAS. Did that come under G-2?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That was sent by the War Department, G-2. Incidentally, that contains at the top what appears to be again the initials of General Short. If you compare that with the others at the top you will see it is very similar.

[11758] Senator LUCAS. Now do I understand this is one of the messages that G-2 in Hawaii said they did not care to receive?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Some recent information; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not say this is the type. It may not be exactly the type. I will come to some soon. This is of a special category.

Senator LUCAS. This is one of the examples that you proposed to give to the committee?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of this?

Colonel CLAUSEN. 3 November 1941, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You referred back to a message sometime in September, and this is related to that, that this was not to be sent out, is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did not say this is the type not to be sent out. This, I believe, was a special type.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not include this in the type not to be sent?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; I do not include this in that type.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you read it then?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Because this went from the War Department [11759] to Hawaii.

Now at page 50 in this exhibit 1 is the 3 December message that I showed came through Colonel Wilkinson to Honolulu. I already tied that in yesterday. In other words, that should be further identified by some papers in some of these other exhibits, Exhibit 5, for instance, at pages 214 and 232 of Exhibit 5, regarding the Wilkinson set-up.

Now this, I think, should be read, because it refers to the same subject of the authenticity of Wilkinson that was mentioned by General Willoughby, if you want it read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it.

[11760] Colonel CLAUSEN. This is a communication that I came across in the Office of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District at Honolulu and it is from the District Intelligence officer to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Office of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.

Subject: British Secret Agent in Manila, Exchange of Information With.

Reference: (a) DIO conf. 14th ltr. dated 27 June, 1941. Subject Mr. Gerald H. Wilkinson.

(b) OpNav dispatch on same subject.

(c) DIO conf. 14th ND ltr. dated 22 August, 1941. Subject, British Secret Agent in Manila, Information Received From.

1. Subject: British Agent in Manila continues to forward information via Lock Box in Pan American clipper planes to the District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. Much of this information is of value to the Military Intelligence in Hawaii, and to this office as well as to the Office of Federal Bureau of Investigation. Reference (c) listed by numbers some of the cards containing this

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information which have been disseminated by the Office of the DIO, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. Paragraph five of reference (c) stated that the District Intelligence Officer considered this information [11761] to be valuable and requested authority by dispatch to permit the sending of information by the local representative of subject agent to Manila in the lock compartment of Pan American Airways planes.

3. The dispatch reply requested in paragraph five of reference (c) has not been received to date.

Signed "I. H. Mayfield."

On page 232, also obtained from the Navy in Hawaii, referring to this subject is a letter dated August 22, 1941, from the District Intelligence Officer to the Head of Domestic Intelligence Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence.

In reference (a), the District Intelligence Officer outlined the proposal of a Mr. Wilkinson, a British secret agent in the Far East, that an arrangement be effected whereby correspondence between him and his Honolulu agent, Mr. Harry Dawson, be carried in the special locked compartments of Pan American Airways clippers flying between Honolulu and Manila, in return for which accommodation Mr. Wilkinson would furnish the District Intelligence Officer and the Military Intelligence Division with information gathered by himself and his aides in the Far East, and of particular interest to the United States Army and Navy. It was proposed that the District Intelligence offices of the 14th and 16th [11762] Naval Districts should make the necessary arrangements with Pan American Airways.

Reference (b) stated that the Department could not authorize the above plan at this time because of the status of the matter and the small amount of information submitted. The District Intelligence Officer informed Mr. Dawson of the Department's decision, and has decided to forward any further correspondence from Mr. Dawson to Mr. Wilkinson. However, every clipper from the Orient brings confidential mail from Mr. Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, forwarded by the District Intelligence Officer, 16th Naval District.

By dispatch from the District Intelligence Officer, 16th Naval District, the Commandant, 14th Naval District was informed that Mr. Wilkinson was thoroughly reliable and trustworthy. Investigation in Honolulu discloses that Mr. Wilkinson is the properly accredited branch manager in Manila for Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., and that his wife is a granddaughter of the original Mr. Theodore H. Davies. This company is one of the five largest corporations in the Territory of Hawaii and, although incorporated as an Hawaiian corporation, the majority of its stock is held by members of the Davies family who are British subjects and live in England.

[11763] Mr. Harry Dawson, above mentioned, is manager of the steamship department of Theodore H. Davies & Company, Ltd., a British subject, and British Vice-Consul for Hawaii.

The District Intelligence Officer considers the information received from Mr. Wilkinson to be of value and requests authority by dispatch to effectuate the arrangement proposed by Mr. Wilkinson.

Information so far received by this office from Mr. Wilkinson has been furnished the Director of Naval Intelligence on 14th Naval District dissemination cards . . .

[11764] Now, on page 57 of my Exhibit 1, I have three examples of how they got these phone intercepts, recordings, in Hawaii. This all came from Hawaii. These three were done by the Navy. You will find them on page 57, starting at page 57, going through 57, 58, and 59.

The last remark on page 59, as I said this morning, it says:

At 4 p. m. Honolulu time in the 1941st year of Our Lord, December 2d inst. I bade my adieu to you my friend of 22 months standing. Darn If I won't miss you!!

And then there is some Latin. I will look to Mr. Gearhart.

It means "rest in peace."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is where the Navy quit?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is when they quit.

Now, then, the same thing, that is, phone intercepts, and, incidentally, they are here if you want them read, but there is hash and conversation going back and forth, but on page 60 of this same exhibit I quote three from the FBI. You see they send these around to the FBI and the Army. The FBI have three. The last one was November 30.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think you made it clear, Colonel, that after the Navy in Hawaii quit, the FBI continued.

Colonel CLAUSEN. With the one.

[11765] The VICE CHAIRMAN. With the one that it had.

Colonel CLAUSEN. To the cook.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. To the cook's quarters.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Now, there is at page 75 in Exhibit 1 some memoranda which I quote from headquarters of the Hawaiian Department showing some notes made by the people there at the time as to why this message from General Marshall took so long to reach General Short on 7 December, 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Let's have that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. They run over to page 80 and page 81. These look like rough drafts. These were rough drafts, apparently, in part of a proposed answer to Washington.

Washington had sent a wire, which is on page 80, on December 9, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our No. 529 December 7 at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to Staff and by what Staff office received.

Now, in answer to that, the Hawaiian Command, who were drafting some radios and one on page 75, which says:

[11766] Radio War Department 529 received filed at Washington D. C. 12:18 P. M. Washington Time (or 6:48 A. M. Hawaiian Time) (as RCA 1549 WS) received by RCA at Honolulu 7:33 A. M. Delivered to Signal Office at 11:45 A. M. Not marked priority other priority messages handled first delivered to decoding office 2:40 P. M. Decoded and delivered to Colonel Dunlop 2:50 P. M. Delivered to Captain Trueman in office of Chief of Staff Headquarters Hawaiian Department at 3 P. M.

On the following page, page 76, there is an account by Capt. William B. Cobb with respect to that message and what he did in taking certain action.

In other words, he confirms some of the things that I said about the message getting to the headquarters about 3 p. m., and what they did when they got the message. That was after the attack. I will read it if you want me to.

Now, page 84—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that on the same thing?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. I am passing to a different subject.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Going back to that, I would like for you to give me those times again.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I got the impression that the Marshall message arrived in Hawaii at 7-something.

[11767] Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what it says:

Received by RCA at Honolulu 7:33 a. m.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. You gave one time as 6:28. What was that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. 6:48.

Senator GEORGE. Oh.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Hawaiian time is the same as 12:18 p. m., Washington time which this says was the time the message was filed.

Senator GEORGE. Oh, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this question, Colonel:

Did your investigation there in Hawaii disclose any information similar to that given to this committee by Mr. Justice Roberts when he appeared here to the effect that the Marshall message arrived at the radio station office, the RCA office, I think it is—is that the proper designation?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The RCA office in Honolulu, and the agent on duty there was unable to raise General Short's headquarters and couldn't get the message to him, couldn't get any response from General Short's quarters, and got a [11768] boy on a bicycle to deliver the message and the boy was on the way with the message when the first bomb fell and he took to the bushes, and stayed in the bushes until the raid was over and then proceeded to deliver it.

Did you secure any information similar to that given us by Mr. Justice Roberts?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, sir, while you have been asking the question I have been trying to read the statement of Captain Cobb. He had something to do with the message and he may refer to that.

Senator LUCAS. I don't believe they had any means of delivery there on Sunday morning, did they?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; he doesn't mention that—those details. He was there when the message came. He had been assigned to the office of the chief of staff and this message came while he was there. He says it came in at 3 o'clock.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I don't have Justice Roberts' testimony before me, but I have a recollection that for some reason, either because they couldn't raise General Short's headquarters, or couldn't get into communication with it for some reason, he had to get a boy on a bicycle to deliver the message.

Mr. MURPHY. He said the teletype wasn't working on Sunday.

[11769] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that the way you recollect it? The teletype wasn't working and he had to get a boy to deliver it. Did you get any information on that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I got no further information; no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, before you leave that episode will you give to me the exact amount of time that ensued from the time that message left Washington until it arrived in Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean these dates that I have referred to?

Senator LUCAS. It left at 12-something. 12:18. How many minutes was it before it actually arrived?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You see, what I found in the Hawaiian Department, were these rough notes on the subject so I had the photostats taken. It appears in response to the wire from Washington inquiring about times this message was sent by General Short:

Re your 549. Radio 529 delivered Honolulu via RCA 7:33 morning seventh received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty-five morning paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren seventh stop Deciphered message received by Adjutant General Hawaiian Department two fifty eight afternoon seventh Short.

[11770] Senator LUCAS. In view of the fact that I am not familiar with the various timetables between Hawaii and Washington, I would like to know from you the number of minutes it took after that message was sent from Washington before is actually arrived in Hawaii.

Colonel CLAUSEN. This data, page 75-E, says:

Radio War Department 529 received filed at Washington D. C. 12:18 p. m. Washington time (or 6:48 a. m. Hawaiian time.)

Senator LUCAS. I understand that, but all that I am asking for and maybe I haven't made myself clear, I was asking how many minutes it took this message to go from Washington to Hawaii.

Colonel CLAUSEN. 7:33 a. m.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Forty-five minutes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Forty-five minutes.

Senator LUCAS. Is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. Colonel French so testified, it was about 45 minutes.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this:

Did you make an investigation as to why it took 45 minutes for that message to get through?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Colonel French testified before the Grunert Board that [11771] he thought that was pretty good time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As I remember, evidence came to this committee that General Marshall, or somebody inquired how long it would take to get that message out there, and was told about 30 minutes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. About 30 minutes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So that wouldn't be over 10 or 15 minutes difference.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. Colonel French thought it was pretty good time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask:

Did you make inquiry, Colonel, as to whether or not there was a teletype from the radio station in Hawaii to the Army.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time of the sending of this message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; but it is my understanding there was, but it was not working.

Senator FERGUSON. Had it been completed?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't know, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not working because they were asleep, or because it had not yet been installed?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I don't know, Senator.

[11772] Senator FERGUSON. You didn't inquire about that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Justice Roberts led us to the inference that it was not working because it was Sunday morning, but I think we ought to clear that up.

Senator FERGUSON. But it hasn't been cleared up yet.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Colonel CLAUSEN. On page 84 of Exhibit 1, there is a buck sheet with an attached copy of wire to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, General Short, from Merle Smith. The significance of that, the reason I picked that out to include here, is because we had testimony before the Grunert Board that Australia, where Merle Smith was, I believe the attaché, sent a warning message to Hawaii, and the warning message forecast some action, some military move by Japan. And I remember that the question was raised before the Grunert Board as to whether Hawaii could decode the message, and I remember the witness who testified said that it could.

So, when I saw this in the files, at Hawaii, it substantiated the fact that Merle Smith had made direct communication to the commanding general at the Hawaiian command with respect to the information. And you can tell from this, on page 85, the type of information that he would send. He is reporting [11773] on changes of situations in the Malay Peninsula, and speaks of military information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Message from where?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Merle Smith is in Australia.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And sent the information to the Commanding General in Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That was, well, this only came in after December 7, but it indicates to me, it tied in with what went into the Grunert Board proceedings, and as testified, I believe, in the last few days, by a lieutenant, I think, O'Dell, this should tie in with Lieutenant O'Dell's testimony before the Grunert Board.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is all for Exhibit 1.

Passing now to Exhibit 2. This exhibit, as I have noted on the cover sheet, contains the following papers, obtained by me from the files of Contact Office, Hawaiian Department. It says:

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets A through H.

Pages 51 and 53 I have already read yesterday. That is a portion where I read the excerpts [11774] from the digest.

Here is an interesting document, pages 56 and 57; the G-2 gives the situation as of 7:30, 7 December.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let's have that. That is the G-2 in Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. G-2 of the Army?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It is on stationery, "Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.," 22 December 1941.

That is when it is made. But it is a summary of the situation as of 7:30, 7 December 1941.

Do you want me to read the whole thing?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[11775] Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

A. NAVAL OPERATIONS:

No knowledge—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute, please. Was that the division that was in charge at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; this is made by—it is not signed. This is a carbon copy. I was told to look for this by Colonel Bicknell, and it is made for the signature of Lieutenant Fielder.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

A. NAVAL OPERATIONS:

No knowledge of Japanese Naval vessels in waters farther east than the China Sea, although it was known that they had bases in the Mandate Islands and in all probability had naval craft in those waters. Nothing had been received from the Naval Intelligence, between November 27 and December 7, to indicate any movement of carriers east of the Mandate Islands.

B. AIR OPERATIONS:

No information to indicate operations of Japanese aircraft other than on the Asiatic Mainland and areas adjacent thereto. It was known that no land based Japanese aircraft [11776] could operate from nearer than the Mandate Islands (approximately 2,100 miles). It was also known that no nation possessed aircraft which could operate from that distance and return to its base.

C. LOCAL SITUATION:

Instructions from the War Department announced that the International situation was critical and directed precautions be taken against possible sabotage and subversive acts.

(1) DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES:

On Saturday, December 6, it was learned through local investigative agencies that the papers at the Japanese Consulate were being destroyed by burning.

(2) CONCENTRATION AND MOVEMENTS OF LOCAL ALIENS:

None. The entire local population was quiet and no indications of domestic unrest appeared.

(3) SABOTAGE:

Warnings were prevalent that acts of sabotage were impending but no action on the part of the residents of the territory indicated that subversive acts would be committed.

On Saturday evening, December 6, at about 6:00 p. m., a transcription and translation of a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between a local alien and an unknown party in Tokyo was received. This conversation had taken place on [11777] December 5th. There were certain features about this conversation which were suspicious, although the communication in its entity appeared innocuous. Efforts were made Saturday night to evaluate this conversation but it was impossible to reach any specific conclusion as to the meaning thereof.

D. PRECAUTIONS TAKEN:

Alert No. 1 was in operation and had been since November 27, 1941, with the counter-subversive section of the G-2 office in a fully alerted condition. In addition thereto the Aircraft Warning Service was in operation from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn each day.

CONCLUSION:

A. CAPABILITIES:

(1) There was a possibility that disruption of relations, or war, might result at any time from overt acts by Japan either in the form of military action in the Far East, sinking of transports enroute to the Philippines or other similar acts.

(2) With the large part of the American Navy based in the Hawaiian waters the probability of an attack by the Japanese carriers was believed to be negligible.

Page 69, I got a copy of a wire from General Short to the Adjutant General giving his estimate regarding the Nomura [11778] mission, just tying in to the intelligence over there that passed back and forth.

Page 77, part of the files of the Contact Office, and there is a memorandum for Colonel Bicknell dated 1 August 1941 giving high lights on the Japanese activity in the islands and in general the diplomatic and impending picture.

Page 78 is that cable of 27 November, 1941 from Wilkinson to Hawaii.

Page 79 is a buck sheet apparently signed by General Short concerning the general Japanese situation, information relative to the Japanese situation.

Page 82 is a War Department transmittal of information to the G-2 Hawaiian Oepartment.

This was the type of thing from Washington.

This was a letter that Washington sent to Hawaii, copy of a letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, July 28, 1941, which says:

As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a confidential source, the reliability of which has not been determined, to the effect that if Great Britain were to suffer a major military set-back, the Japanese military party would force Japan's entry into the war, in which case Shanghai and Tientsin would be immediately occupied by the Japanese Army and would be completely [11779] blockaded by them.

That is on page 83.

Now, page 85 is a military attache report from the buck sheet initialed by General Short.

Special Intelligence Report regarding Tojo, giving his background.

And pages 91 and 95 contain what I think they call the summaries from Washington. This is one that was sent from Washington to Hawaii and it is a document that sets forth that they have received from a party in Mexico certain information which says in part:

If and when war comes between Germany and the U. S. or Japan and the U. S. the plan is to at once use this small fleet of submarines for lightning attacks on the U. S. Navy Fleet anchored Pearl Harbor.

That is at page 95.

Senator LUCAS. What is the date of that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is June 1941, from a military attache in Mexico City. June 17, 1941.

This same subject of midget submarines referred to in this dispatch from Washington is tied in in other ways because when that came to General Short he sent it to Admiral Bloch and there was an exchange of correspondence and after the attack there was a re-examination of this [11780] intelligence to see whether it related to the attack.

So you will find those references in my exhibit 3.

Also pages 15 and 20.

Page 105, there is some intelligence that passed back and forth regarding a George Paish—

Senator LUCAS. Before you get to that, Colonel: You said that there was a re-examination of this intelligence between General Short and Admiral Bloch?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I said that after the attack—

Senator LUCAS. After the attack.

Colonel CLAUSEN. At the time it was received, Senator, the intelligence was sent by General Short to Admiral Bloch.

Senator LUCAS. Well, they re-examined it for one purpose and that was to ascertain whether or not the intelligence gave them any information that they had overlooked, I take it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What was their findings on it, do you know?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I will read it.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I see a note here on the buck slip, Senator, on page 91 of my exhibit 2:

Subject: Military Attache Report entitled "Activities [11781] of Foreigners in Country. Mexico."

1. The appended report is forwarded for re-evaluation in the light of developments since December 6, 1941. This matter formed the basis for requests to Commanding Officers of the outlying districts for close surveillance of near offshore waters soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

[11782] Then in handwriting this appears.

This is like a Rube Goldberg cartoon, but is of interest to read. No particular significance. Believe informer got a tip on pigmy submarines and let his imagination run wild. Navy does not attach importance to theory. Searching could have been continued to extent of personnel available anyway. Return for file after anyone interested has read it.

Senator LUCAS. What do you make out of it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I make out of it that this party who reported this information from Mexico, Senator, gave the information that when war would break out between the United States and Japan, Japan would strike us with submarines at Pearl, and the attack having happened they sent it out for re-evaluation, and they didn't think there was any connection between the two. That is what they say.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not quite clear as to who wrote the instrument that you just read.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, it looks to me as if it is in the handwriting of General Fielder, but I am not sure. I say that because I seem to see here, "K. J. F."

Senator FERGUSON. Whose initials would those be?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That would be Kendall J. Fielder. But I am not sure. And he was G-2 after Pearl Harbor.

[11783] Senator FERGUSON. Has it a date on it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. This is the 30th of January, 1942, and it refers to the information which I have indicated came in in June, 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. In addition, wasn't there some talk about them seeing those midget submarines around the Islands?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That was sometime before the 7th of December?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Now, this instrument, in the photostating, is very hard to read. If the committee desires to read it, they should get the original, I mean the original from which the photostats were made.

The general idea was that these submarines would be planted in Pearl Harbor waters, and would there lurk to strike when the attack was about to commence.

Senator FERGUSON. That information, as I understand it was sent from someone in Mexico?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

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Senator FERGUSON. To Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It was sent from the War Department at Washington to Hawaii. It came to Washington and then went to Hawaii.

[11784] Senator FERGUSON. Came to Washington from Mexico in June of 1941?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Somewhat similar to Captain Zacharias's theory.

Senator LUCAS. That is nearly as good as the Bellinger-Martin report.

Colonel CLAUSEN. At any rate, when the information came there was an exchange of correspondence and you will find the additional data in my Exhibit 3, pages 15 and 20.

Now, page 105, regarding a warning that Mr. Paish had given the President—

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. who?

Colonel CLAUSEN. George Paish, P-a-i-s-h.

Senator LUCAS. Who was he?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He was a lecturer that came through the Hawaii Islands and wrote a letter to the President regarding what he called the inadequately guarded installations. That correspondence went back and forth between. Then the FBI was in the picture, and also G-2.

Now, these documents came from various officers, and for that reason some tie in to this and are in some of the other exhibits.

For example, this subject is page 105 in Exhibit No. 2 [11785] and there is also something on the same subject in Exhibit 3, page 6; Exhibit 1, page 18.

Page 105 is dated November 28, 1941, to the Hawaiian Department, G-2, transmitting a report by the FBI regarding this subject, and referring to previous communications.

Mr. KEEFE. Regarding what subject?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The subject that I stated, sir, the fortifications being what he said were inadequately guarded.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that referring to this letter of this man Paish?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That you are talking about?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was he?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He was a lecturer. Do you want me to read the FBI report?

Mr. KEEFE. No.

Colonel CLAUSEN. He was a lecturer.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, these last two or three exhibits that you have been talking about, I don't quite follow you with respect to the importance of the subject matter that we are trying to elicit from you.

Do you consider these last three or four exhibits you have given to the committee of any importance?

[11786] Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; except that it was in the office, and Colonel Bicknell suggested that they be preserved, obtained and preserved.

[11787] Senator LUCAS. Well, I am primarily interested in information that involves any informatiton that Hawaii had out there that appraised them, that they did not get in Washington. I think that was the gist of the question last evening.

Colonel CLAUSEN. These other documents, Senator, are documents that I have entered on my notes, documents of the same general character. In other words, they had been sending some information to Hawaii. You understand, sir, that one of the things General Short said before the Grunert Board was that he got no information from Washington.

Senator LUCAS. I understand.

Colonel CLAUSEN. So that was tied into that.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, do I understand now that that is what you were investigating then?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To find out what he did get? Was that one of your tasks?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Not exclusively, Senator. The files of the G-2, Hawaiian Department, and the other files over there showed that he had a great deal more information, Senator, than he testified before the Board regarding this general subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever take an affidavit from [11788] General Short?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever confront him with any of the information and take an affidavit from him?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have a reason for that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. I just assumed that the hearings that had been conducted before the board and the other information that I gave to the Secretary was sufficient. I mean I was not told to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you told to do these other things, to interview these other people?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was told what, in general, to do and reported back, as I said yesterday, from time to time as to the progress of my investigation as shown in the report.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But as I understand it now General Short had made a statement before the board about the information he got. You went out to find out what information you could find that was around in the files, is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you did not go back to Short and give to Short—and inquire of Short as to whether or not he actually got the information?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

[11789] Senator FERGUSON. Now, why not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, one reason, Senator, was as I explained yesterday, that in my own mind the Congress was going to conduct its own investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh.

Colonel CLAUSEN. So far as I was concerned—I mean I was willing to do anything that would be required but with the end of the Japanese War and with the opportunity of the Congress to confront General Short with whatever it wanted and to go into the matter it would seem to me that the entire subject then could be taken up at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then, as I understand it, you did not

complete your investigation because you understood and it was your understanding that Congress would complete it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; no, sir; that is not correct, sir. The investigation that I conducted was for the purpose of assisting the Secretary and if he wanted the additional testimony of General Short I assume he would have told me to do it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did he tell you he wanted this other information, did he directly tell you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The additional information that I got here in this form was the information and all the affidavits and the data that I have referred to here presented to the [11790] Secretary and my job was from time to time to make reports as to what I was doing and what I had done and what I was going to do, so these periodic reports do appear in here—these periodic reports which appear in my large volume contain that progress information, these interim reports.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get any statement or any affidavit from Admiral Kimmel?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. I have a memorandum—

Senator FERGUSON. From Admiral Bloch?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. Senator—

Senator FERGUSON. No; I just want to know whether there is anything else in any of those books.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean that I got?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. I had been on the board and they testified when I was on the board.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were satisfied with their testimony?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you see, so far as the Navy was concerned, as you pointed out yesterday, my functions were to extend to the Army personnel, responsibility and actions.

Senator FERGUSON. And not the Navy?

Colonel CLAUSEN. And not the Navy except insofar as they were tied in with the Army, like the officers whose affidavits [11791] were read this morning and today.

Senator FERGUSON. This is what I am getting at: Rochefort was a witness as well as Bloch before the Board.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you went and took an affidavit from Rochefort, but did not take one from Bloch.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, the reason for that, Senator, was that Rochefort was in the decrypting work at Honolulu and when he testified before the Grunert Board he did not give us any information concerning the magic. He was one of the witnesses who did not do that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask him about it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I have—

Senator FERGUSON. Did the board ask him about it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; the board did not ask him about it. I assume the board did not know the details.

Senator FERGUSON. I will inquire later.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Colonel.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask one question of Colonel Clausen first as a result of the questions asked by the Senator from Michigan.

As I understand, what you are testifying to at the present time is merely documentary proof that has been taken from the files in Hawaii?

[11792] Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. And the documentary proof speaks for itself. It would not be necessary under those circumstances to obtain affidavit of General Short?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Colonel.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand now that all you are giving us is documentary proof? You are giving us a lot of other statements in affidavits besides reading out of a document.

The Vice Chairman: Well, probably, Senator, your attention was detracted there. He announced that he had completed the affidavit part of the evidence in response to the request of the committee and he was then taking up the documents and going through them.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not my question. As I understand, his last answer to Senator Lucas would indicate that all he has been giving us, his whole investigation is based just upon documents.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Not the whole investigation, Senator. What I have been giving you is just stated in the record. I have in the last memorandum here been reporting primarily to documents, referring primarily to documents.

Senator FERGUSON. Primarily to documents, yes, but much [11793] of your other evidence is from statements.

Colonel CLAUSEN. From affidavits.

Senator FERGUSON. From statements of witnesses in affidavits.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not take any such statements from the three men that I have named.

Colonel CLAUSEN. General Short, Admiral Kimmel——

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Bloch.

Colonel CLAUSEN (continuing). And Admiral Bloch?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, permit me to inquire. Inasmuch as I was not here yesterday, this examination has been sort of a round robin, questions being asked by everybody of the witness. Have we reached a point where I can understand that at some time I will be permitted to inquire?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, you will be recognized, Mr. Keefe, after Colonel Clausen finishes. He is now intending to read all of the documents that he secured in Hawaii.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So go ahead, Colonel.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Incidentally, these documents were as- [11794] sembled over a long period of time and it is like if you sent somebody out in an orchard to get some fruit and he came back with some that it too ripe and some that is no good and you cast that

out and somebody makes the selections. It is necessary, Senator Lucas—I don't want to go over those, but Exhibit 3, page 17, contains some information of the same general type that I referred to which was in the Hawaiian Department. Page 28—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. More information of what general type, Colonel?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Intelligence information, Mr. Vice Chairman, regarding—well, for example, at page 17 is a—I just have my rough note here—is a book slip, apparently acquired by General Short, which refers to a book.

Now, the Grunert Board I remember asked him various questions, whether he read various books about this and something else, and this is one of the books that was passed upon, that showed the intentions of Japan in the mind of one of these authors. It is entitled, "Three-Power Alliance and American-Jap War" by Kionoaki Matsuo and he predicts there is going to be a final battle of the world.

Now, on the Japanese consul's desk pad on the day that the winds code message was expected, he thought that there were some references to a weather broadcast. That is on page [11795] 120 and I just offer it to the committee for what it is worth. I don't know what it means. It might be probably he got the winds code and he put it on his desk pad himself. This is page 120 of this Exhibit 3 and he has there, in parentheses "J—Foreign radio program," and then he has the times at which a station will broadcast a news broadcast, so it looked to me as though he had gotten his winds code set-up and put it down on the desk pad.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the date?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is November the 19th, which was the date of one of the winds codes set-up.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Now, Exhibit No. 4 contains translations and photographs of the Japanese log book or register from the consulate as gotten together after the attack. Also, there is a check against this winds code in there because it refers to the information that came into the Jap consul. In other words, after the attack they took these various dispatches and decoded them and one of them is the winds code.

Exhibit No. 5 is the District Intelligence Office information from the Fourteenth Naval District and that contains the winds code intercept which was the nearest I came to finding an implementing message; I means actually conforming to the [11796] formal set-up. This page 120 of Exhibit 5 is a—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the date?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you see it came in on the 8th of December.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. 8th of December?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. And on page 120—this was a recording. It says:

Here a weather forecast was made—this is in the exact words he gives—
"Here a weather forecast was made as far as I can recollect, no such weather forecast has ever been made before. His exact words were "Allow me to especially make a weather forecast at this time, 'West wind, clear'." Since these broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy, it may be some sort of code.

In other words, a man is putting this down on the 8th of December. Then in addition to being in the center at the end he has this: "At this time allow me again to make a weather forecast 'West wind—clear'" and then in parentheses "Repeat this broadcast."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was on the 8th of December 1941?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. Now, exhibit No. 6 is a complete file of those British dispatches from Manila.

[11797] Exhibit No. 7 is from top secret exhibit "B," plus those two that we refer to as having been intercepted at San Francisco; and then my Exhibit No. 8 is a series of the intercepts that I got in Great Britain which covered the period of time immediately before 7 December 1941 and contains some intercepts similar to those that we had picked up.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your presentation of the documents you secured at Hawaii?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do counsel have any questions now?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No. I was just going to suggest that it might be feasible to regard the Colonel's testimony in the same way in which you regarded the written statements which were offered by certain witnesses, evidence that then would be open to examination, exactly the same as you carried on the examination before by members of the committee. That would make his appearance here and the evidence that he has given appear on the record in the same general way that other witness' testimony has appeared.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Well, as I recall now, the committee had questioned him some, had begun the examination of Colonel Clausen yesterday. I asked some questions and Senator George then asked some and Mr. Clark did not have any. Then Senator Lucas was recognized and was questioning [11798] the Colonel at the time he and Senator Ferguson made the request for what we received here today.

Senator FERGUSON. And he has been answering all day the one question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He has been answering all day Senator Lucas' request, which was joined in by Senator Ferguson, so technically Senator Lucas still is recognized.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I think I will pass in view of the fact that it has taken him all day to answer that one question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel Clausen, did you have here the Summary of Far Eastern documents?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. It was our top secret exhibit "A" before the Grunert Board.

Mr. MURPHY. The committee has two copies furnished to it, one copy of which has been in Senator Ferguson's possession since November or October and one in Mr. Gearhart's possession since November and I would like to take a look at it. Do you have it in any exhibit where I can take a look at it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It should be readily available here.

Mr. MURPHY. If you have it I would like to see it. I have no other questions.

[11799] Colonel CLAUSEN. I just haven't seen it here, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to see it for the first time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through now?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, I am through.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster being absent Mr. Gearhart will inquire at this time. Well, Mr. Gearhart is absent.

Mr. MURPHY. I am looking for the Summary of Far Eastern documents prepared by one Moses Pettigrew and from a glance on Colonel Bratton's testimony he does not seem to have any familiarity with the facts in the record and I would like to see it. I don't know why it has not come in. There have been two copies furnished. Two members of the committee have had it all the time and now we are going to get to it definitely, so I ask now is there a copy of it that I can examine?

Senator FERGUSON. I don't know that I have it.

Mr. MURPHY. You have had it since October 25th and Mr. Gearhart has since November 17th.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it has been mislaid in my office then.

Mr. MURPHY. I am not making any insinuations or anything. I am trying to get it. If we are going to read it we ought to reach it sooner or later.

[11800] Senator FERGUSON. Summary of Far Eastern Documents?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. You never went into that, did you, the Summary of Far Eastern Documents? It was not prepared until 1943.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir, it was introduced as an exhibit before the Grunert Board.

Mr. MURPHY. But you did not file it and have it as an exhibit here so that I can look at it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no other questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with Exhibit 63?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Your Exhibit 63?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you show it to him? It is on page 48, top secret. It is "Unexplored leads" and it is signed by Myron C. Cramer. I will read it to you:

In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain further inquiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the same time in order to complete the picture and in fairness [11801] to certain personnel these leads should be further explored. I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.

That is signed by Myron C. Cramer. You have the document?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes sir, I have it before me now, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose language is that? Who drew that up?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, that is signed by General Cramer, so it is assumed to be his language.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you know that in the Army they don't always do the work, the General that signs the order does not do the work.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I really cannot say offhand, Senator, whose

work it is. I know that there were various assistants to General Cramer in the preparation of the document.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you help prepare this with Hughes?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, Hughes, myself, Colonel—I mean Captain Ford, there was a Captain Eblen and I suppose Major Burkhart. I just don't know all who worked on it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I know that my contribution, Senator [11802] to the cause of—I mean of assisting the Judge Advocate General was in light of my experience in finding papers and documents, and so forth, and conferring for that purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to get those words;

And in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored.

Who were the personnel that in fairness to them certain leads should be explored?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, I really could not say. I mean I wouldn't say that because I wouldn't know who General Cramer would have in mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, here: General Cramer—that is not General Cramer's words. Isn't that what you say? This was prepared by other men and you had been one of them.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, I didn't say that. This was prepared by General Cramer and he has other assistants.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, this was given to you as an aid to ascertain certain facts, isn't that true?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean the——

Senator FERGUSON. The document.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The document itself, Senator, the document itself I had knowledge of and I have a copy of it in my report as an exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You would not start out on an [11803] investigation when you were given an order such as this, "Unexplored leads" and "in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be explored" without knowing who the personnel were, would you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, by reading the document through, Senator, and having in mind those involved in this catastrophe and especially as I recall this document, I believe he took to task people like General Gerow and people of that kind, I would read the document and find out exactly what was in the document.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, Colonel, you were assistant recorder and someone was not satisfied with the Board's report where you were an assistant on, isn't that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The answer is that more investigation was certainly required by the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait. Somebody was not satisfied, somebody at the top was not satisfied with the investigation that was made by a Board of which you were a member in the capacity as an assistant recorder.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Not satisfied implies something that might be misconstrued, Senator. You might be not satisfied with the result of a board, you might not be satisfied with the conclusions of the board. It might be the essence of the conclusions that would be unsat-

isfactory. I might read an [11804] opinion of the Supreme Court and be dissatisfied with it because it might find against my client, but that might be only one ground. Maybe I might be dissatisfied and thought the Judge rambled too much. Now, maybe—

Senator FERGUSON. Your answer reminds me of a rambling answer on this question. Let me get back. Is it true that someone was dissatisfied for some reason with what the Board had done? Is that a clear question?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you ask such a broad question. General Grunert, who was a member of the Board, was not dissatisfied with myself as assistant recorder.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You ask these broad questions, Senator, that it is hard to answer specifically. Now, I don't know just what you mean. When I testified yesterday I tried to point out that the Secretary of War felt there should be an additional investigation conducted. Now, if you mean by "dissatisfied" that he felt that the leads given by Captain Safford to Admiral Hart should be pursued, that these magic phases should be gone into and that some of the additional things that I have mentioned, such as, query, did the 5 December 1941 message from the G-2 War Department get to Hawaii, why, yes, that is a type of dissatisfaction.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. But here was the Secretary [11805] of War who had a report of three Generals. You were the assistant recorder on that Board.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They made a report, this Board did. You interviewed witnesses before they went into the chamber to testify, isn't that true?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to the witnesses?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever interview any of them before they testified?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I handled—Senator, on the Grunert Board my major activity was preparing for and interviewing and questioning those concerned with the allegations against Theodore Wyman, Jr., having to do with the House Committee report of 14 June 1944, which charged a connection between derelictions of Colonel Wyman and the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever re-investigate the Wyman report?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did also conduct an additional investigation with respect to some of the witnesses concerning Colonel Wyman.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do I understand then that [11806] you did not have anything to do with the investigation of the Grunert Board except as to the Wyman end of it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Absolutely not, that is not what I said. I said my major functions on the Grunert Board. Now, Senator, certainly by "major functions" I do not mean to say that all my functions were. I had many requests made to me by the Generals of the Board. I sat next to General Frank. I on many occasions prepared questions for them to ask.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, will you tell me what the duties of an assistant recorder is in a Board such as you were serving on?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Ours was a rather special Board, Senator, and I wondered myself. We did what we did and what we did were our duties.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that is a very, very definite and clear answer. That, I know, gives the committee a lot of information. Let us go back a little. You were a lawyer. You were sent down on the Board because you were a lawyer.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, why I was put on the Board I don't know but by being put on I am here today. Now, why was I put on I think probably was because somebody, including President Truman and Hugh Fulton, thought that I did a good job on the Cincinnati prosecutions and because I did that they put me on the Hawaiian assignment, on the Colonel Wyman [11807] case and then somebody thought that since the Colonel Wyman case was of grave import that that should be handled by the Grunert Board and since Clausen had been asked to do something on the Colonel Wyman case, I am selected to be assistant recorder of the Grunert Board and am called again today here.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. That is as near as you can get as to why you were on the Grunert Board, but you did interview the various witnesses on occasions before they went in to testify before the Grunert Board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I don't know what witnesses you have reference to.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you interview any of them?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Before they went before the Board, as I said, I have interviewed some. I remember I interviewed General Reybold, for example.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, this Board didn't do a satisfactory job of which you were assistant recorder.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think the Board did a very fine job myself if you are asking me my opinion of what it did. I think it did a fine job, and I think not only a fine job but I think a most courageous job.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, why did you have to go out as an assistant recorder afterwards and spend many days?

[11808] Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I don't know, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, many many days. You interviewed how many witnesses?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I interviewed about a hundred witnesses.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, coming back, you had as one of your directives unexplored leads, "In fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored." Your senior officer, General Cramer, had signed a document that you were to use as carrying out your duties and that was one of them. I am just trying to find out who these people were.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, Senator, I would like to answer your question but I cannot say that when General Cramer signs a document that it is or that he means to say more than what it says. I cannot put in his words about something he signed.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, you don't know who in fairness to you were to go out and get certain affidavits?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I can let my imagination run and I can guess.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't want you to guess. You were the man doing the job and I wonder whether or not you had any information from which you could draw the conclusion that some injustice had been done to someone because there are those words, "In fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored."

[11809] Colonel CLAUSEN. Well—

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Now, just a moment. I would like to have him answer that one question.

Senator LUCAS. I want to help if I can.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you are trying to get me to say, Senator—

Senator FERGUSON. No, I am not trying to get you to say anything except to answer.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I want to finish what you are trying to get me to say. Senator, you are trying to get me to say who General Cramer had in his mind when he signed the document and I am telling you I cannot answer your question more specifically than to say it means what it says. There is no ambiguity in it to me.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Then there were no names ever mentioned by anyone and you had no specific people in mind under that command, is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. There were names mentioned in the document to which you refer, there were names mentioned in the press, there were names mentioned in the Roberts report and there were names in many sources as to people involved in the Pearl Harbor disaster. Now, query: When you have in the [11810] last week of a Board's proceedings a situation where we start back ends first—now, you know, Senator, from what you know now of magic, that if you were going to start this thing from what you know now, and suppose you had gone on up to this point today knowing nothing about magic, and you now know about magic, what would you think? Why, the most important place to start would be on the magic.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then under that view I am wondering what your conversation was with the Secretary of War, why he did not extend the time of this very able Board that you are talking about, who had all the knowledge that they had at that time, instead of having a major or a colonel do this job, why he did not have the three generals—there were three, were there not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why he didn't have the three generals do this very important job instead of having the assistant recorder go out and do it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I can only apologize for being a major. I don't know. I am a major. If they wanted to pin a star on my shoulder I would have been satisfied, it would have been all right with me, Senator, but I was a major and I have to apologize for being my age. I mean I can't help that. Now, you ask why they did not go out. All right. General [11811] Frank—

Senator FERGUSON. I asked for your conversation with the Secretary of War.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, do you want me to answer you?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let him answer, Senator.

Colonel CLAUSEN. General Frank had been given an important assignment by General Arnold. If you want I will tell you what it is; I know. Colonel Toulmin was on the Board and he was being let out of the Army at his request. Colonel West, who was the recorder, was professor of law at West Point and the general at West Point was clamoring and hollering for him to come back. This was taking him away from his school. General Grunert was the commanding general of the Eastern Defense Command and we are in war. So, naturally, he would go back there.

I do not delude myself. They selected me, of course, because I was the fellow they could spare the most.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, was that your conversation with the Secretary of War? That was my question.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. The Secretary of War, as I understand, by his personal choice, by recommendations, no doubt, of which I know nothing, selected myself.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 5 o'clock.

[11812] Senator FERGUSON. I am not through.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We will recess until eight o'clock this evening.

(Whereupon, at 5:05 p. m., a recess was taken until 8 p. m. of the same day.)

[11813]

EVENING SESSION—8 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think Mr. Masten has something.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we would like to offer as Exhibit 151, the collection of memoranda that Captain Safford left with us for duplication in accordance with the request of the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the number?

Mr. MASTEN. 151.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 151.

(The memoranda referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 151.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will continue his inquiry.

TESTIMONY OF HENRY C. CLAUSEN (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Clausen, when you were conducting your examination, did you confer with the Hewitt investigators?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

[11814] Senator FERGUSON. And who worked with you as far as the Hewitt investigation was concerned?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, all I did in that regard, sir, was on one occasion I met and talked with Admiral Hewitt and on several occasions met and talked with the commander who I see in the room here from time to time, John Ford Baecher.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he in Navy uniform at that time?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Commander Baecher?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes. He was then Lieutenant Baecher. And I met and conferred with then Lt. Comdr. John Sonnett, later a civilian, and now the Assistant Attorney General of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Lieutenant Baecher doing for the Hewitt committee?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I don't know what he was going for Admiral Hewitt, Senator, but for me he dug out several references. I returned from Europe and from Hawaii, and on those two occasions I wanted to find out what some of these Navy men had testified concerning the winds code, et cetera. So I examined some of the testimony before Admiral Hewitt, and also had discussions with these people concerning the witnesses in whom I was interested.

[11815] Senator FERGUSON. What was it that made the winds code an outstanding matter?

Colonel CLAUSEN. To my mind, it was important. I don't mean to answer your question and have you think that by you saying it was outstanding that I agree it was outstanding. To me it was an important link in the chain of circumstances pointing to what happened before Pearl Harbor. But I always assumed from the wording of the set-up where it said in there that it was to be used in the event that there were no regular channels of communication, and since there were regular channels of communication and those channels were used, to me it was not the outstanding piece, but it was important to me in this way, that if you had an implement message to that before Pearl Harbor obviously it would mean just what the implement said.

Senator FERGUSON. The reason I asked about its importance is that I notice in your affidavits you probably spent more time on the winds code as far as volume is concerned than any one other item.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't think so, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the other big item?

Colonel CLAUSEN. What was the other big item?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Let me have my report, please.

[11816] Senator FERGUSON. You cannot give it from memory?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I can give you a lot of things from memory, Senator, and I have given some.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you about the pilot message.

What did you spend on the pilot message? What time and who did you get affidavits from?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I never used the term "pilot message."

Senator FERGUSON. It is the message that said that there would be an answer to the 26th of November message of Secretary Hull, and that there would be a time of delivery of that message.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That was one of those in top secret exhibit B?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I can't segregate my mind at that time, Senator.

[11817] Senator FERGUSON. Look at 901 on page 238 of Exhibit 1.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was on the point of saying, Senator, that I cannot at this time disentangle from a mass of material that was in my

mind as important leads, one, and say that that was the important piece. That was one of many in top secret exhibit B, and General Russell had collected those from G-2 and brought them to the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at this particular message.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Surely.

Senator FERGUSON. I will talk with you about that. I want to ask you what you did in relation to finding out when that came in and when that was delivered.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Page 238?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the bottom of the page, message 901.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I took all the messages, Senator, and asked Colonel Rowlett to run those things down for me, and he made a compilation, which I referred to this morning, as to all those messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, have you anything in your report in relation to this pilot message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. My report refers to top secret exhibit B, and so what I did was to include that when I [11818] handed top secret exhibit B to the various people whom I interviewed, and this was in there, it was there.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you try to ascertain when it was delivered?

Colonel CLAUSEN. When it was delivered to the various people?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the recipients, the White House, the Secretary of War, and so forth.

Colonel CLAUSEN. They all fell into a certain pattern with me, Senator. In other words, I tried to run down each of those. I think everyone in the top secret exhibit B was an important message, or else General Russell wouldn't have selected them. The most important to me in that whole batch was the one that set up Pearl Harbor, carved it into sections, and asked that the consulate at Honolulu report regarding the ships, because I didn't see anything like that regarding any of the other ports.

Senator FERGUSON. That is Exhibit 2, page 12.

Colonel CLAUSEN. If you say it is—I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see the flag, the gist?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The flag or a gist?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you know what I am talking about?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Is that in my top secret exhibit B?

[11819] Senator FERGUSON. No. You said this was a very important message, this one laying out the duck pond.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, to me it was, and General Willoughby said that one like that definitely would indicate target areas for an attack. He called it an attack target.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, did you ever try to find out what attention was paid to that particular instrument?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I surely did, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a few days ago we developed here for the first time that there had been a gist which went with this. A flag, in other words, so that no one would miss it when it was delivered. It was the top one that was flagged.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is the first time, Senator, I heard of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got the flag, counsel?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Show me one of these flags. I will be glad to see if I know about it.

Senator FERGUSON. I will try and find one.

Now, did you try to find out what attention had been paid to that Exhibit 2, page 12? That is the duckpond chart.

Colonel CLAUSEN. If you don't mind, Senator, I will get the actual document, so that I can tell what we are talking about.

[11820] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, I did. And some of the people whom I interviewed, people like General Gerow, General Miles, said that since this pertained—I am quoting from memory in answer to your question and, of course, if I misstate something it is because I am doing that, and recourse to the affidavits would show the actual wording used—but the substance of what they told me was that since this pertained primarily to the Navy that they assumed it was primarily a Navy matter, and since they knew that this was going to the Navy that they assumed that the Navy would take the proper cognizance of the message.

I might state further that some people did not recollect getting that message.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it now, and as you understood it, did you not, the Army's job was to defend Pearl Harbor? In other words, if there were ships in this duckpond that had been located it was the Army's job to defend them in there. Did you understand that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, now, Senator, I mean, a quick curbstone answer to your question is that the Army's mission in Oahu was defend the Navy. That is the gist of the Army's mission. But, obviously you know how these military things are, the Army and Navy have things written [11821] down, and the Army mission was stated somewhere explicitly, just like General Short's mission was to do certain things, and his mission is stated.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to go back to that sentence in the Kramer memorandum, General Kramer's memorandum, in order to complete the picture, in fairness to certain personnel, these leads should be explored.

You indicated in one of your answers that certain names got into the newspapers somewhere.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Into the newspapers?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you remember, in your answer?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't remember, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. About 5 o'clock this afternoon.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I say there were involved in the disaster many people in Hawaii and in Washington, and the people who were involved, their names got into the newspapers, obviously.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you have in mind about the names that were in the paper, I didn't follow up at that moment, but you indicated that this personnel that you were talking about were people whose names had been connected in some way with the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Don't you recall that?

[11822] Colonel CLAUSEN. A great many people from time to time have been mentioned in the newspapers connected with the Pearl Harbor disaster and I said I can't single out any name that General Kramer may have had in mind.

[11823] Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, you cannot after thinking it over over the dinner hour—

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did not think it over during the dinner hour, no, sir, Senator. I went home and took a rest.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to read this flag to you. The gist of this message is—he called it a gist.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Where is that, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. It is on page 11207 of yesterday's testimony.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Of my testimony?

Senator FERGUSON. No, of Monday's testimony. That is right, you were here yesterday. Here is what is on the flag. It is really a sheet of paper attached to this message on page 12 of Exhibit 2. [Reading:]

Tokyo directs special reports on the ships in Pearl Harbor, which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact location.

That is a pretty good description of that exhibit, isn't it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, senator, it speaks for itself.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but isn't it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Let me say this. You are speaking now—I see what you mean. You are speaking of testimony given by a Navy—

[11824] Senator FERGUSON. No, no. This was a flag attached to Exhibit 2, page 12. Look at the page.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, but the mistake you are making, Senator is this: You are speaking of something, as I understand it now, that was testified by a Navy man. Correct?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, yes, it is correct but it was attached to this exhibit.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I understand but, Senator, listen: The Army, as I understand it, did not do that and I am not investigating the Navy. The Army, as I understand it, took the magic material around in a certain way, in the raw, unevaluated, because that stuff is right out of the horse's mouth; you don't have to evaluate it.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell me how this could be investigated and only investigate the Army?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, Senator—

Senator FERGUSON. Did you feel that it could be done? Weren't you handicapped?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir, because I will tell you, where the Army went into the Navy I had no trouble at all in getting my information. I did have trouble only in telling the Navy that I was entitled to see the magic stuff and I had the same trouble in the Army. Even when I had the high-powered authority that you people have seen here, where Secretary Stim- [11825] son told me that I could get top secret stuff, I was told there was stuff above top secret.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, what was that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, that was the superduper magic and before I could ever get to see that stuff I had, according to the order of General Bissell, the head of G-2, to go in and to be, what he called, given the works by General Clarke and that giving the works meant that I had to go in and repeat all the dire things that would happen and be told that my head would roll if this stuff got into the hands of the enemy and then have to swear, take an oath that I would not reveal this to a single solitary person, and after I took that I remarked to

General Bissell that it is easy for me to see that no matter who asked these people concerning magic they could not tell it unless it was released.

Senator FERGUSON. So that is the reason, because you had that much trouble, you call it the super-duper magic?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, you know our military successes in a large part in many parts of the world were brought about through that magic material. The Japs just kept using it and using it and using it and chattering like monkeys about things going on in Germany, so if you wanted to find out what was happening in Germany you listened to the Japanese Ambassador talking to Tokyo.

[11826] Senator FERGUSON. Now I want to ask you again: After you found these various things that you now say conflicted with General Short's testimony you did not go to General Short and get an affidavit from him. I want to know just why?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, you asked me the same question.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and I did not get what I thought was an answer.

Colonel CLAUSEN. And I said I did not get an affidavit from General Short, that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You got one from General Marshall?

Colonel CLAUSEN. There is no argument, Senator. Yes, sir; I got it.

Senator FERGUSON. You got one from General MacArthur?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir, but you see, Senator, General Short was interrogated by the Grunert Board. Now, here is a very important thing: General Short was interrogated by the Grunert Board after the Grunert Board got the magic.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't General Marshall?

Colonel CLAUSEN. After?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you get an affidavit from Marshall?

Colonel CLAUSEN. For the simple reason that I had these [11827] points to be covered that are in his affidavit.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, aren't there points here that you wanted to find out about from Short? One of the questions you were to ask him was whether or not he knew about the joint agreement.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Joint agreement?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I found out it was in all the G-2 stuff over in his command, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, they had the ABCD bloc in their G-2 estimates. You didn't have to know more than that to know that if your G-2 knew, Senator—says that a certain thing is going to happen next to the ABCD bloc, whatever it might be.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you tell me then what the ABCD bloc was?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The ABCD bloc, as I understand it, was what I said it was yesterday in my own conception but I have never seen more than what I said yesterday I saw, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you ever find out whether Short—did you ever go to Short to get an affidavit as to whether or not he ever saw it?

[11828] Colonel CLAUSEN. No. As I said, Senator, I did not get an affidavit from General Short.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is your only reply, the only thing that you have in mind now, that you did not go to Short at that time?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, my other answer would be that I would assume it would not be necessary.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell me why the Board did not go into magic?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean the Pearl Harbor Board?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Because it did not know about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, just a moment. I will read you from the first hearing, where General Marshall met with the Board off the record and discussed magic with them.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, sir, he gave them the general picture that there was magic, as I understand that testimony. In other words, here is what happened. The three general officers were asked by General Marshall to confer with him and everybody else went out of the room and then the three general officers must have talked there for over half an hour and then we continued with the hearing.

Now, as I understand that situation he told them about magic, what magic was and did not go into the full details [11829] and that it was not until we found it out from the Hart report in the latter week about of the Board's hearings that we knew the details of magic.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn about magic?

Colonel CLAUSEN. When we knew about it in the last week. I had no idea that such a thing existed until the thing came out with Colonel Bratton and General Marshall in the last week of the Board's proceedings and at that time as I remember General Marshall was saying Colonel Bratton was here and that we could interrogate Colonel Bratton concerning the subject and that, I believe, was in the last week, it was about the last week, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. So the Army kept from the Board any reference to magic until the last week of the hearing. That being true didn't it—

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did not know it, Senator, until the last week.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. That being true didn't it destroy all of your previous testimony because you did not have the one thing that opened the door to much of your testimony and that was magic?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think, sir, that you are essentially correct in what you say and that it was a very integral part of this whole picture and should have been pursued.

[11830] Senator FERGUSON. But didn't it destroy your work because you did not have magic and did not go into it as you say?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, no; it did not destroy my work. My work was assistant recorder of the board and the work I did later on was for the same source. In other words, Senator, you have to go back to your Public, 339. You told Stimson to investigate—first you extended the statute of limitations. The law even is entitled to extend the

statute of limitations. Then you have one paragraph known as the extension.

Then your second paragraph is to ask Colonel Stimson and Mr. Forrestal to conduct several investigations. In other words, each department conduct its own and that is the reason you should not put an invidious implication upon my not going into the Army, or the Navy going into the Army, because you put in there the word "several." Now, it would have been better, I think, if you had it all amalgamated and called everybody up and had sort of an adversary proceeding, but that law says "several."

Senator FERGUSON. All right, but with that picture and the Army working with the Navy in the intelligence, going from one to the other, was it not necessary that you go into both to solve the problem?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; because the thing that Colonel [11831] Stimson had in mind was to comply with your Public, 339, and he could not court martial Kimmel, he doesn't have any jurisdiction over Kimmel to court martial Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see the diary of the Secretary of War?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He read excerpts, Senator, into the record before General Grunert's board.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but I am asking you did you ever read it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean to—

Senator FERGUSON. When you made your investigation did you ever look into his diary?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you mean I should investigate the investigator? That would be like the grand jury investigating the grand jury. You told him to do the job. If you wanted somebody else to investigate Stimson you should have said so in the law.

Senator FERGUSON. Stimson was Secretary of War?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And if he had anything relevant to the issue and the issue was how did this Pearl Harbor catastrophe happen, wasn't it material to the issue and why [11832] should you not have looked into it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. There is a very pertinent question, Senator, on the face of it, but if you get down to the essence of your question it is this: He would know what was in his diary since he wrote it.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the reason that you did not look into it so you would have a complete record?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; because he would know, since he was doing the investigating and I was just his assistant, like one of your FBI boys would be to J. Edgar Hoover.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand this then, that Colonel Stimson was doing the investigating and you were only one of his assistants?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; he was complying with your Public, 339, and you did not say in there how he should do it. You did not say there that he should not take affidavits or that he should take affidavits.

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You did not say that he should appoint a board or not appoint a board and if you wanted him to have three high-ranking generals on a board you should have said so.

Senator FERGUSON. But no one would expect that he would start out with an investigation by three generals and then in the middle of their investigation he would switch to the as- [11833] sistant recorder of that board to complete the investigation.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, you are misconceiving, sir, because the Board finished its job. They were glad to be gone. They were gone and they were finished and they made their report and then came the question of pursuing these additional leads and it would have been all right with Henery C. Clausen if he had picked somebody else.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you say that you did not know about magic early in the hearings.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn about the 13 parts of the message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Until the last week of the Board's proceedings. As a matter of fact, Senator—

Senator FERGUSON. You had not even heard up until that time about the 13 parts of the 14-part message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; I had not heard of it, and our Board, incidentally, Senator, was so afraid to touch it that it delegated General Russell as custodian of the material and he alone had the combination to the safe in which this was kept and even the recorder and the assistant recorder were not given those documents to handle because it was such a vital and integral part of the intelligence for the war then being prosecuted.

[11834] Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn in the Board about the code destruction?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, in that same—

Senator FERGUSON. In that same period?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And not until that time?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The whole general subject of magic, Senator, was brought up in the last week, about the last week of the hearings of the Board.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever read the Roberts' testimony?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And how did you account for the report of the Roberts commission on page 12 [reading]:

The United States being at peace with Japan, restrictions imposed prevented resort to certain methods of obtaining the content of messages transmitted by telephone or radio telegraph over the commercial lines operating between Oahu and Japan.

Colonel CLAUSEN. What page is that?

Senator FERGUSON. That is page 12, and you say today the Navy were tapping wires for—what was it—22 months?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Twenty-two months is what I read; yes.

[11835] Senator FERGUSON. Well, how do you account for this in the Roberts report?

Colonel CLAUSEN. They should have corrected that, shouldn't they?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you told us the Navy was tapping wires for 22 months?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes. It should be corrected—the Roberts report. I went out and found this out.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And there wasn't any doubt in your mind that that was a fact that they were?

Colonel CLAUSEN. My heavens, no.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know in that report that they mention the code destruction, on the bottom of page 8?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean in the Roberts?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. We were told—let me say another thing, Senator. We were told in this last week, after the people had revealed to us, that if you read this Roberts report carefully—I mean an astute intelligence officer read it—he might detect in a way that we had broken their codes but I certainly did not detect it and I went over the Roberts transcripts as well as the report and the exhibits.

I noticed at one place in the proceedings before the Roberts Board that the Justice asked, I think General Fielder [11836] or Mr. Shivers or Colonel Bicknell, about those three code propositions, I mean the three words, but if you knew there was magic then you might think that that was the winds code afterwards, I mean if somebody told you, but not before. I didn't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. There wouldn't be any doubt that if you read it now you would know that he was talking about the wind-code message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, I don't think so, Senator. Even if you knew it now you wouldn't know that, but it would tip you off maybe. I say if you were an astute intelligence officer that might open the door to the subject, but on reading the transcript, I mean as I read it, I do not associate in my own mind—and that might be wrong—what the witnesses call the winds code today.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, on page 294 Colonel Fielder—

Colonel CLAUSEN. Of what, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. When he talking in the Roberts testimony said this about the burning of the codes—

Colonel CLAUSEN. Burning?

Senator FERGUSON. The burning of the papers, which you describe in his affidavit.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to read what he said there:

[11857] It was suspicious.

The CHAIRMAN said:

Did you attach any significance to the fact that the consul was burning his papers at the time?

Colonel FIELDER. It was suspicious but we burn secret papers every day in the world and we have a can out there that does nothing but burn secret papers. I discussed that, I think, with the FBI.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with the fact that when a consul or diplomatic representative is about to make his get-away that the first sign is the burning of the consulate papers?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. We were quite suspicious of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Wasn't the department commander convinced by that fact that was was imminent?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, apparently not. We knew war was imminent, sir.

But the burning of the papers did not seem to impress Fielder at all, did it, from that testimony?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, it means just what it says.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is that what he told you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No. Senator, that testimony should be considered in the light of all his testimony.

[11838] Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. In other words, his testimony before the—well, before anyone whom he may have testified before.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. I will read you the testimony of Fielder on the same question from page 2986 of the Army Board transcript, and Colonel Fielder says:

The information came to us that the consulate was burning papers and if I am not mistaken that came from sources other than the FBI. I think it came from the War Department but it also came from FBI sources and that was reported to the staff meeting and it was discussed but that in itself, while significant, was not in any way conclusive because there isn't a day goes by that we do not burn secret papers right out here, for instance, and it was quite possible that the Japs have been directed to burn up certain codes. In fact, we know now from the material that was captured at the consulate that they were destroying their codes and a lot of their files of messages at that time.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes; but, Senator, it is very unfair to take the testimony of a man who has not been authorized to reveal magic information and say that he testified so and so before so and so.

Now, as I understand it, the then Colonel Fielder was not. [11839] authorized when he testified before the Grunert Board to testify concerning magic, nor when he testified before Justice Roberts. Now, therefore, you have to be considerate and appreciate that fact.

[11840] Senator FERGUSON. Then what you are telling us is this, that we should disregard, in effect, the testimony before the Army Board and before the Roberts commission because these people were not in a position to testify to the truth?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; I do not say that at all. I say that with respect to certain subjects that you may cover, that if those subjects are such that they could not testify fully before the Boards, that you must make allowance for the fact that they were bound by oath not to reveal it to a soul.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you think the burning of the codes was such a matter that the man was not authorized to tell the truth about the burning of the codes?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, I never said that anybody did not tell the truth. I think every single person that testified anywhere concerning Pearl Harbor told the truth as he then saw it.

Now, you cannot say that when he is under oath not to reveal things, like General Miles, that he did not tell the truth. You cannot gag him with one hand and say, "Oh, you did not say that to the Board."

Senator FERGUSON. What I am getting at, as I understand it, these men were sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, [11841] and nothing but the truth, and at the same time they were sworn by someone superior to them, those people in the hearing, the three generals, to not tell about magic. Is that where we stand?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think that is pretty fairly set forth there in the affidavit of General Miles, because he mentions in there the instructions he had received.

Senator FERGUSON. And those instructions, according to Miles, came from General Marshall?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; I understood him to say they came from General McNarney; didn't he?

Senator FERGUSON. No; he does not say that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. As I understood, he said later on they came from General McNarney. Not that the Chief of Staff would not back it up, you understand.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn about the message of the 27th to Short?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean 27 November?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, 27 November.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That, I believe was in the Roberts hearing exhibits, and I must have seen it there, Senator, and that would be about July 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know that after that, General Miles, on the 5th of December, 1941, after the sending [11842] of that message to Panama, General Miles sent a message on the 5th of December, 1941, in which he promised to give them a warning, "if and when there would be imminent danger of a breach of diplomatic relations with Japan."

Colonel CLAUSEN. He promised to do what, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. "If and when there would be any imminent danger of a breach of diplomatic relations with Japan," he would give them a further warning.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean General Miles sent that wire?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. When? on the 5th of December?

Senator FERGUSON. On the 5th of December, 1941.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I thought he sent that Rochefort message on that day.

[11843] Senator FERGUSON. He also sent this message. I want to read what you took from General Miles in the affidavit:

Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 8 August 1944, as corrected by my letter, 18 August 1944, I wish to add that I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called "magic", or any intimation that such sources existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board, Brigadier General Russell A. Osman and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke, of G-2, War Department, transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed that instruction.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I remember that going in the affidavit.

Senator FERGUSON. All right; now, was the Chief of Staff General Marshall or was it General McNarney?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I seem to think, Senator, that it was General McNarney, especially for this reason: On the Grunert Board we dealt with the Assistant Chief of Staff, McNarney. That was the procedure of dealing with the [11844] Assistant Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Anyone reading that affidavit would certainly say that it was General Marshall; would he not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what General Miles said. I certainly was not going to tell General Miles to say anything different than what he had in his own mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Miles told you it was Marshall?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; I did not say that.

Senator FERGUSON. The Chief of Staff?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Did not he say that the man said it was the Chief of Staff?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right; he did not say it was the Chief of Staff; he said the man said so.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, in other words, he was telling you what someone told him?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It just says so there. That is what it says.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at this message of Miles? It is at the top of the page.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is to the Panama Canal.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I thought you said it went to Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. No, no; I said, to the Panama Canal.

[11845] Colonel CLAUSEN. I misunderstood.

Senator FERGUSON. Does not that entirely conflict with the information that was sent out to Hawaii in the message of the 27th to General Short?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Oh, you would not want my opinion on that now, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Why not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. In the first place, I did not investigate the Panama Canal. In the second place, what other messages went to the Panama Canal? Do you think you can single out one message, out of a whole series of messages, and ask me for my opinion? Where are the rest?

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to find out is what you knew about this warning message to Short. I thought you made an investigation of the situation.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if we are investigating the investigator instead of Pearl Harbor? Justice Roberts resented being investigated, and now we are investigating the man who should not have been sent because he was only a major.

Senator FERGUSON. I have not yielded. I want to say this: We should know, if we are going to receive as exhibits the testimony of the various people in these hearings, we should know what the people were authorized to swear to, and [11846] what they did swear to; and if we are going to receive affidavits and not have the men here to examine them so we may ascertain their full knowledge, after what we know about these facts, then we have a right to examine those persons who took the affidavits.

Now the record is clear, as far as I am concerned, on that.

How do you account for the fact that in MacArthur's affidavit, for instance, if these men drew up their own affidavit, that his name was misspelled?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, Andrew Jackson once was twitted for his poor spelling and he said:

It is a damned poor mind that cannot think of two ways of spelling a word.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that a comment on General MacArthur?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I probably made a mistake. I did make a mistake in spelling that distinguished man's name wrong. But, Senator, I had three long conferences with him, I sat down with him and the thing was gone over very carefully by the general, he wanted me to sit alongside of him, and he went over the thing. If he did not find his own name misspelled then surely don't blame me for doing it.

Senator FERGUSON. I am getting at who drew up the affidavit.

[11847] Colonel CLAUSEN. Who drew up the affidavit?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That was drawn up, Senator, in this way: The thing was given me in longhand, I mean I took down the information in longhand and I wrote it up and presented it to him, and he made revisions in that, and that was the final draft.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I want to go to the last sentence in his affidavit. First, before I go to that, I want to know whether or not you learned that Japanese scouting planes for a number of days prior to the attack on the Philippines had flown over the Philippines so that General MacArthur knew they were scouting these airfields in various places. Let me have that statement.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean his airplanes had flown over the Philippines?

Senator FERGUSON. No, no, the Japanese were photographing and scouting over Manila and the airfields on the Philippines prior to that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did not hear that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to General MacArthur about it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes; I had about three long talks with him.

[11848] Senator FERGUSON. Did he say that he got his alert warning from messages sent from here in Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, especially that 27 November warning, which was the same as the one that went to Short.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what you were talking about here, Colonel, "complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis?"

Colonel CLAUSEN. I meant the war dispatches, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Just that which he received from Washington, or what he received from Willoughby in G-2 there?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, I can answer your question this way: After he got through reading all the magic stuff that was in Washington, he volunteered that statement that he did have from the War Department dispatches ample and complete information to alert his command for war, and that he did alert it for war before 7 December, 1941.

[11849] Senator FERGUSON. Now was that from what he received from his G-2 and from Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or solely from Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. From Washington, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember an instruction that you received from the Secretary of War that all of the witnesses were to turn over to you all memoranda and all papers and notes that the witnesses may have?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; he never gave me such instruction Senator. I made a recommendation to that effect, because I was worried, since I had been all over the world, whether any of these witnesses might have notes and papers and so forth connected with my work which might fall into the hands of the enemy, and in that way involve, or compromise the security.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not I find that somewhere in your report?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You read, Senator, a recommendation. My instincts as a lawyer led me to want to give to everyone who made an affidavit before me, a copy of that affidavit, but since many of them pertained to magic, I thought the most advisable thing to do would be to collect in one place in the War Department, copies of all these documents, [11850] so if at any time they wanted to see the documents, or have copies, they could come to the War Department.

I thought, since I heard wild rumors here and there that somebody had collected something, had secreted something in a safe deposit box, and if you haven't the key to open that box, you haven't the whole secret of Pearl Harbor, I thought it would be good to have everything together.

You have one example of it when Captain Kramer testified. In other words, that instruction went out "If you have got anything with regard to Pearl Harbor you send it in, and we will have it in this depository of the War Department."

That was my recommendation, but the end of the war with the Japanese surrender made it unnecessary, because then the security was not involved.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is the recommendation:

It is recommended for security reasons the Secretary of War direct all witnesses heretofore and hereafter examined by me to send or give me forthwith for filing of record in this investigation any copies of affidavits made before me, and any incidental and related notes, or papers, which may be in their possession or in their control, they to advise me that this has been done or that there are no such records, and they will be advised that these records are available [11851] in the War Department in the event access thereto is ever required.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That was my recommendation.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it that never was carried into effect?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I went down and talked with Mr. Bundy, and he agreed with me, we agreed as lawyers that these men who had their careers in the Army should have copies of these documents. Then he said, "Take it up with General Clarke." So I went down to see General Carter Clarke and he said, "No."

Then I had the recommendation there in mind, but the whole thing became unnecessary when Japan collapsed.

Senator FERGUSON. And as I understand it now, that was never put into effect?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did not collect any papers or memos, and so forth?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I collected various documents and related papers.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did anybody have any memorandum as to what happened here on the 6th and 7th?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Oh, numerous people; for example: General Miles had a memorandum from which he refreshed his [11852] memory, and General Bedell Smith had one.

Senator FERGUSON. I have never seen the Bedell Smith one.

Now, what happened to that one?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not know. He thought there was one which he had made. At one time, as I understand it, search had been made for it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever find it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; I could not find it. I went to the secretary to the General Staff when I got back from Frankfurt, and looked for it.

Senator FERGUSON. He had some papers in a safe?

Colonel CLAUSEN. In a safe deposit box?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That was Colonel Sadtler.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Sadtler told you that he had some in the safe deposit box?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; he did not have them in a safe deposit box. He had them home.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get them?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where are they now? Do you know?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Does he still have the papers, as [11853] far as you know?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not collect them?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And he told you that he had some papers?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he describe what was in those papers?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He gave me information there in his affidavit to the effect that these papers did not add anything to it.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not ask him to see the papers?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. A lot of these people, like Captain Safford, I remember he testified before the board and I got the impression from him that he had made collections of papers or recollections of people.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, this is what I want to read to you and find out why you did not get this information from Willoughby, Sutherland, or General MacArthur:

During the period December 2 to December 6, for four consecutive nights an enemy aircraft was sighted over Clark Field at approximately 5:30 a. m. After the first sighting [11854] instructions were given to force the aircraft to land, or destroy it. On the three succeeding nights it was impossible to make the interception due to inability to see the aircraft in the dark, or the aircraft not getting close enough to be picked up by the searchlight.

On the fifth morning all the aircraft were kept on the ground and anti-aircraft alerted for the interception. However, no aircraft was located.

During the same period enemy aircraft were tracked over Iba by the radar set.

That is from December 2, 1941, to December 6, 1941, the narrative of the activities of the Twenty-fourth Pursuit Group in the Philippine Islands.

And here in Washington we have the joint board's meeting, the minutes of the joint board's meeting of November 26, 1941.

Weekly meeting of the Joint Board scheduled for November 26, 1941, was held in room 2003 Munitions Building, 11:35 a. m. Members present: Admiral Stark, General Marshall, Rear Admiral Ingersoll, General Bryden, General Arnold, Admiral Turner, General Gerow, Captain Ramsely, Colonel Scoby.

The Board next engaged in a discussion of the Pacific situation. The Navy had information that Japanese airplanes had been making reconnaissance and photographic flights over [11855] the United States Islands in the Western Pacific.

Then they took up the question of having our planes take photographs.

Now, what I read you from General MacArthur, that there was a plane over Clark Field from the 2d to the 6th, did he mention anything about that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not recall that he did, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Would not that have been a very significant point, that they were scouting over there, as far as alerting him?

How could he be unalerted and have that going on?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean General MacArthur?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. He said he was fully alerted by the War Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Would not this alone alert him?

Colonel CLAUSEN. If you are alerted for war, you are alerted for war, whether you get a thousand alerts or not. If you are going to press a button, button No. 3 for Honolulu, you might have the impelling impulse from one of several messages. What difference does it make, Senator?

I cannot see it.

Senator FERGUSON. He at least did not tell you about this scouting plane?

[11856] Colonel CLAUSEN. I did not say that, Senator.

I said I do not recall that he did. I knew I was not investigating General MacArthur; I was not investigating the Philippine Islands, but I did know there was a great deal of Japanese activity, military activity in the Mandates, in the Philippines, all over. That is the reason, of course, why the basic mistake was made of thinking the Japs were going to strike in the south.

It is not a question of not knowing the Japs were going to strike, but where.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever make an examination as to just what equipment and facilities they had for decoding the various messages in the Philippines?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; that is one of the things that I ran down; and you will find in the three affidavits I mentioned references to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us the names of those affidavits now?

Colonel CLAUSEN. MacArthur, Willoughby, and Sutherland said something about it, and did not Col. Joseph K. Evans?

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any particular one? From these affidavits, what is your conclusion? That they had full facilities for getting magic of all kinds?

[11857] Colonel CLAUSEN. From those affidavits I have a hazy curbstone opinion, certainly, that the Navy had a purple machine at Manila; that the Navy short-changed the Army at Manila, if you want to use the word "short-changed" to mean that they did not give everything to the Army.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, as I understand it, the claim was there in the Philippines that the Navy was short changing—and you and I understand what is meant by that word—the Army, as far as intelligence was concerned, prior to the attack?

Colonel CLAUSEN. On this magic information?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what General Willoughby says in his affidavit. He said it existed down to the time of the Philippine campaign; after the reconquest of the Philippines, and for that reason he wanted an integrated, one over-all agency to handle this stuff, so you did not in the future have one service monopolizing the information to the detriment of the other, and neither one may be knowing what the other is doing.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I think we had better get on the record a definition of this "short changing." It was holding out some of the magic?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right. In other words, if I [11858] have a basket of magic here, and I am the Navy, and you are the Army over there, then I would pick these up and determine in my mind what would affect you.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, you would give me what you wanted to give me?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I would give you what I wanted to give you and obviously that would be wrong, because I, as a Navy man, would not know what the military implications may be to you.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find that that same thing took place here in Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. In Washington, sir, I think there was far more cordial and freer exchange, but the same thing applies, Senator.

For the sake of the country it should be known that there was evidently some jealousy between the services, and this thing existed prior to Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. And it existed in Washington, Hawaii, and the Philippines?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I understand. In other words, what a ludicrous situation is presented if you have a fleet intelligence officer, Captain Layton, saying he gave information to Colonel Raley but would not tell Colonel Raley where it came from! How would Colonel Raley know [11859] how to evaluate it?

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I was going to get at for many days in this hearing here in Washington.

Colonel CLAUSEN. If I can make one simple contribution to this case, and if anything came out of this hearing, it would be that you pursue the idea of having one agency and let that thing be coordinated on a

business basis, so you do not have monopolistic agencies trying to hide the information for themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, we found it in three places, Washington, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

On that basis did you find any supervising head who was able in any of the services to really evaluate the intelligence, so that it could be used by the United States?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Now, you hit the nail right on the head.

If one thing more should be done, it is this: You ought to train people to look at this stuff and be able to read it.

Just like lawyers can pick up a case and find the pertinent part of the case in a short time; you can do that by training people. You cannot do it by going through normal communications, and so forth. Have I found such a man? I [11860] do not know.

I knew that in the Philippines there was a man by the name of Shirer who was in charge and he was killed.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about an over-all head that really coordinated the various officers in the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands, and in Washington.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Of course not. Then you would not have the ludicrous situation of Admiral Turner saying that he thought Hawaii was getting this stuff based on what Admiral Noyes told him. What a silly thing that is! What kind of a set-up is that?

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am trying to find out here.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did not find any such thing, and I hope that the future sees a different picture. Otherwise we are liable to have Pearl Harbor all over again.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I have a summary here of interrogations of Captain Takahashi on October 20, 1945, and if it was not for the fact that we had some other evidence here on the same thing, I am very loath to accept Jap information, but I will read it in, because it is here in a summary, and there is other evidence to the same effect:

The primary mission of the Japanese Force in Formosa, composed of about 300 fighters and bombers, was the annihilation of the American Air Force in the Philippines. In this [11861] it was successful partly because complete information relative to the American Air Force was obtained by Aerial Reconnaissance prior to commencement of hostilities.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Speaking of the Philippines?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So the Japanese themselves claimed they had reconnaissance over the Philippines.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I suppose they flew down from Formosa.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Now, I will give to the reporter the entire page that this is on, so that he can copy the entire page. I will not undertake to read the rest of it into the record.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[11862] INTERROGATION OF CAPTAIN TAKAHASHI ON 20 OCTOBER 1945

I. POSITIONS HELD BY CAPTAIN TAKAHASHI

May 1941–December 1942: On staff of Eleventh Air Fleet in Philippine Islands and Dutch East Indies. This was the duty period on which Captain Takahashi was questioned.

4440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

January 1943-June 1945: Senior member of Navy Aeronautical Bureau, Tokyo.
July 1945-August 1945: Senior staff officer of Fifth Air Fleet and senior staff officer of Third Air Fleet.

20 October 1945: Chief of Sendai Naval Personnel Bureau.

II. SUMMARY

* * * The primary mission of the Japanese Force in FORMOSA, composed of about 300 fighters and bombers, was the annihilation of the American Air Force in the PHILIPPINES. In this, it was successful partly because complete information relative to the American Air Force was obtained by Aerial Reconnaissance prior to commencement of hostilities.

III

"Q. What gave the Japanese impression that there were 900 planes in the area and how did you discover that there were 300 instead of 900?

"A. The Navy received on 20 November 1941, a report [11863] from the Foreign Affairs Department that there were about 900 planes in the LUZON area. A photographic reconnaissance plane conducted a search on the 24th or 25th of November over that area and discovered that there were only 300 planes. One reconnaissance plane made flights at that time."

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand, you left us with this idea this morning, that the best man you knew to give us the information as to what they could translate in Hawaii and what they could decode and so forth, as far as the Navy is concerned, was Commander Rochefort.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Rochefort?

Senator FERGUSON. Rochefort.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He was in charge of the unit there, and certainly a very keen man in that position.

Senator FERGUSON. And you would not undertake to tell us what equipment they had there from the information you had?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, except I have in mind a talk with Captain Rochefort here, and then I went over there and talked with the men who worked in his department, [11864] like Commander Holtwick, and tried to find out that information. I especially wanted to find out this:

The type of equipment, the kinds of messages that they could decrypt, and just what could be done by the Navy at Hawaii that would give the impression in the minds of people like Admiral Turner, Colonel Pettigrew, Colonel Dusenbury, that Hawaii could decrypt this stuff.

Senator FERGUSON. And you found no basis for Admiral Turner's so-called ideas that they could decrypt?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, they could decrypt, but they did not have the purple machine. That is the key thing, as I understood. If you could decrypt this PA-K2, of course you could decrypt what the consul was sending out at Honolulu.

Senator FERGUSON. Could they actually decode? Did they have the codes there?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I am not sure about that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I want to get at. If you are not sure we will try and get Rochefort.

Now, who in the Army out there would be the best witness in your opinion as to what they were able to decipher, and decode?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I understood from my witnesses, the affidavits that we mentioned this morning, that the Army [11865] did

not have any facilities for doing that, that they were solely at the mercy of the Navy.

According to Colonel Fielder—I mean General Fielder—he says in his affidavit that he had asked the Navy for information and they would not give it to him, because he was with me when I went to Guam to talk with Captain Layton.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find any written orders in Hawaii that compelled the Navy to give to the Army all the intelligence that they had?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, Senator, I did not find any such written order in Hawaii. A lot of this stuff was done sub rosa. I mean the phone taps of the consul's office. Not only the consul, but they tapped the phone of the Jap steamship lines and the consul's home. That was all not supposed to be done, but it was done. When Roberts came out there—he was the man who wrote the opinion—he said “You will go to jail for a long, long time, if you do that.”

Senator FERGUSON. He did not know that was going on?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I guess he did not, but you will find in his proceedings off the record quotations, and what occurred at those times, I do not know.

[11866] Senator FERGUSON. So you found nothing definite that the Navy had given in Hawaii all the information they obtained in intelligence to the Army?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, as I size it up, the Navy was not doing it. In other words—well, it just comes down to that.

Senator FERGUSON. It just comes down to the answer they were not doing it. And you said before there was some jealousy between the two services?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No question about that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And you found it rather evident?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I agree concerning that subject with General Willoughby. Here is a man fighting the war in the Philippines, mind you, when I was there, with guns booming, and he at that time is having this vexing problem of trying to get the information from the Navy then when the war was going on!

Senator FERGUSON. How long after Pearl Harbor was it that Willoughby had this difficulty?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The date of his affidavit there, 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. That is May 8, 1945?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

[11867] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe from Wisconsin will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. KEEFE. I have a couple of questions of Colonel Clausen.

Will you turn to the affidavit of Lieutenant Woodrum?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I want to see if I understood correctly what you read when you read that affidavit.

Colonel CLAUSEN. If you will pardon me just a moment, I will get the book. I guess you have the book.

Mr. KEEFE. You perhaps can find it a little quicker than I can.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the only copy the committee has now, as I understand it. You better let him have the copy.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I have it, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you read that affidavit into the record?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Just let me see it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You want me to read it?

Mr. KEEFE. No, not yet. Maybe I misunderstood when you were reading it. I just want to see it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I call your attention to the fact that [11868] the statement of Lt. Donald Woodrum, Jr., USNR., in the first sentence reads as follows:

Statement for proceedings supplementary to U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board. This statement has been prepared at the request of Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, that is an error, Mr. Keefe. The statement was prepared for me by the lieutenant, and I corrected it up here where I inserted the words, or told him to insert, "Supplementary to the Army Pearl Harbor Board". I should have had that put in that sentence, too.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the trouble with this whole hearing, Colonel. At least I find a lot of difficulty with it. There is a statement in which the witness sets forth that it is prepared at your request, Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the United States Army Pearl Harbor Board. Did you represent to Lieutenant Woodrum at that time that you secured that statement that you were representing the Army Pearl Harbor Board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir, I could not, Mr. Keefe, for the reason you will see the correction in the heading of this.

[11869] Mr. KEEFE. I see the correction.

Colonel CLAUSEN. "Proceeding supplementary."

Mr. KEEFE. It says, "Statement for the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board", and somebody has written in "Statement of Proceedings Supplementary to the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board."

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

[11870] Mr. KEEFE. Then follows the statement of Lieutenant Woodrum which clearly states that it is prepared at your request for the United States Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, Mr. Keefe, the point is minor because the authorization for this man to talk to me was based upon a directive that came from the Secretary of the Navy to the Navy people out there that sufficiently told them that they were giving me this information and were to give it to me as conducting this inquiry for the Secretary of War.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, of course, you may infer that, but the man who makes the statement says he is giving it to you.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, he has corrected it in the title, "Supplementary to the Board".

Mr. KEEFE. Well; of course, I don't want to split hairs on that, the instrument speaks for itself.

Is there some place in this report of yours a receipt that you issued for certain documents?

Colonel CLAUSEN. A receipt that I issued?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Let me see if I can find it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't know what you mean, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I will see if I can find it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe, do you want us to go ahead? Perhaps some other member can inquire while you are [11871] looking for that.

Mr. KEEFE. Are you in such a hurry?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I don't know how long it will take you to look through that big book. I thought some other members might be asking questions to expedite the matter.

Mr. KEEFE. I think you will admit that I haven't taken very much of the time of the committee with this witness or any other witness. I have been a spectator, sitting here through weeks of this investigation without opening my mouth, and when I do open my mouth I am told to get going. And we took a day for this witness to answer one question.

Knowing the man that preceded me, the Senator from Michigan, I didn't anticipate he would be through so early.

Well, am I to understand, Colonel Clausen, that each time you interviewed one of these witnesses you made it perfectly clear to him just who you represented?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I showed him, Mr. Keefe—I will show you the document. I showed all the witnesses this document here. I carried that document, dated February 6, 1945.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1941, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

[11872] Colonel CLAUSEN. That statement is in the book, too; that public statement.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, you didn't let any of these people get the misconception that you were actually doing this for the Board, did you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No.

Mr. KEEFE. And this Lieutenant Woodrum, when he wrote his statement, he seemed to be under the impression that you were, and did you correct him?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I corrected the very document. The document looks to me like he did that himself. I recall the incident because I called it to his attention when he handed it to me. His superior officer was a Commander Burr and the district intelligence officer was away, I think he was out of town, anyway he was away, so they gave me his office there to work in, and Commander Burr gave me some facts that coincided with what Lieutenant Woodrum put down, and after I asked for a written statement to that effect. I wanted to know all about this taking out of the taps on the 2d of December, and I wanted a written statement, so they introduced me to this lieutenant and instead of Burr making it, Woodrum made it, which was all right with me, except he had in there that statement that you called attention to and I corrected him at the time. There could [11873] be no question about it, though, because all Navy witnesses were authorized direct by the Secretary of the Navy to give me the information.

In other words, the basic document that authorized them stated I was conducting this investigation for Secretary Stimson.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I notice here a memorandum for the files, January 24, 1945, subject, interview of General Fielder. Was that in connection with your supplementary investigation?

Colonel CLAUSEN. General Fielder?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. F-i-e-l-d-e-r.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I assume so, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I notice that you signed that Henry C. Clausen, major, JAGD, assistant recorder, APHB.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right. Assistant recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I was told to continue that designation after the Board had given its report for administrative purposes.

In other words, a lot of witnesses had to be paid and vouchers made out and things of that kind, so I continued in those matters sometimes to use that title.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, when you were conducting this investigation, were you conducting it as assistant recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, or as Maj. Henry C. Clausen, [11874] investigator for Secretary Stimson, which?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I told you, Mr. Keefe, that I conducted it in the capacity as shown on that letter of authorization from Secretary Stimson, and prior to that he had given me another one, which was to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, which I took down to General Bissell. That is the one that authorized me to get top secret stuff and they told me there was a level above top secret.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I confess that in reading the report I became somewhat confused and I wondered if that confusion was also in the mind of some of these witnesses whom you examined.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think not.

Mr. KEEFE. And that they may have been under the impression that you were conducting it in your capacity as assistant recorder—

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think not, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Rather than under a quite positive direction of the Secretary of War.

Colonel CLAUSEN. It might seem so but the main point was the fact I was permitted to get that secret stuff. The mistake that you refer to couldn't happen if the affidavits are read because in almost each instance in the first paragraph is set forth the capacity in which I was then [11875] appearing before the witness. In other words, the witnesses were told that I was acting for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Board.

I think you will find that to be true in each case there with the various affidavits. In some cases there I have just a statement there from the witness.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall signing a receipt for some files out at Pearl Harbor?

Colonel CLAUSEN. What was that?

Mr. KEEFE. Did you sign a receipt for some files out at Pearl Harbor?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Oh, I don't remember. I think I know what you mean. You will find attached to one of my periodic reports two receipts from the Hawaiian Department. I could find that for you. And those documents are those which I referred to this morning.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I read it some place in here. This mass of stuff isn't indexed.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Sure it is indexed. You have to really see the index. It is very simple. The first page gives the lead. I signed for the Army stuff and the Navy.

Mr. KEEFE. Here is what I had in mind. Here is a receipt for all this stuff here and it says Henry C. Clausen, lieutenant colonel, JAGD, United States Army, for Army Pearl Harbor Board.

[11876] Colonel CLAUSEN. The Navy drew that up. They made the mistake on the other one.

Mr. KEEFE. There seem to be a lot of mistakes here.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you found two. Don't measure me by the scale of perfection, please.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, well, now, maybe before we get through we may find some more, but I am not criticizing you, Major, because you made some little infinitesimal mistakes. But, as a matter of fact, somebody had the impression that you were representing the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Now, if you were so meticulous to tell everybody just who you were representing, it is strange to me that here there would be receipts which you signed, to the Navy, and signed as lieutenant colonel—you were a colonel then?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Lieutenant Colonel.

Mr. KEEFE. Lieutenant colonel.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I don't want to get mixed up on these titles. You were a lieutenant colonel then.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was a lieutenant colonel then, yes. Mr. Keefe, you will find sometimes, I think, the men who I talked to knew that I had been to Hawaii with the Board and they perhaps assumed I was still with the Board. In either event, I was working for the Secretary.

[11877] Mr. KEEFE. Well, I think that definitely appears, that you were working for the Secretary, but what attracted my attention was the fact that these receipts were signed by you as lieutenant colonel, JAGD, United States Army, for Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Now, that is a mistake, isn't it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. What is the date of that?

Mr. KEEFE. April 19, 1945, page 271 of your report.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was then conducting the investigation under that directive of the Secretary supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Mr. KEEFE. Infinitesimal and small as the mistake is, it is nevertheless a mistake.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't concede that it is a mistake in this way that after all what difference would it make, when you are working for the Secretary, whether you are his assistant recorder, or for the Board as assistant or for the Secretary in some other capacity.

Mr. KEEFE. My experience on this outfit here is that some people you talked with perhaps might feel that there was a difference as to who you were in fact representing.

Now, I want to make it clear, because I had that in the back of my head some place when I went through this report, that I couldn't quite understand why you would set [11878] forth this material in

that way, and which is quite contrary to the precept by the Secretary of War issued to you when you went out.

Now, you have explained that completely to my satisfaction.

Prior to your obtaining this commission from Secretary Stimson the Judge Advocate General, Cramer, I believe—

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Had made a survey of the Army Board's report; had he not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that opinion was rendered to the Secretary, Mr. Stimson, on the 25th of November 1944; was it not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Is that the date on that, Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. That is the date, I am certain of that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't remember the date.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not trying to make any point of the date, but he made the report and as a result of that report Secretary Stimson and also General Cramer decided that it was necessary to make some further investigation to clear up certain problems that were referred to in General Cramer's decision or opinion or brief or summary, whatever you may call it; isn't that true?

[11879] Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I don't know whether it is as a result of the recommendations of the Judge Advocate General or whether he had his own independent judgment in that sustained. I remember his public statement said something to the effect that in accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General he was going to conduct his own investigation. I got the impression, I don't have the exact language in mind, there was something about he was going to do something then and that the Judge Advocate General had in some way recommended this.

Mr. KEEFE. I want to quote from paragraph 1 on page 48 of Exhibit 63 before this committee, from the Judge Advocate General's opinion, dated November 25, 1944, in which he says:

In order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be explored.

Do you recall that language?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I want to ask you who were the individuals or the personnel to whom General Cramer referred?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I wouldn't be able to say. I would say that General Cramer should be asked, I mean, I can't tell what was in his mind. As I said before, the main subject of unexplored leads was that of magic, and I mentioned [11880] yesterday that Admiral Hart's investigation showed that Captain Safford had mentioned the winds code and he gave a list of people who should be interviewed, and there were other leads, also, unexplored leads that should be run down.

Mr. KEEFE. I have referred to a statement which appears in the Judge Advocate General's opinion and I have quoted correctly from his statement in the record and it states:

In fairness to certain personnel certain leads—

He used the words "these leads should be explored."

Now, it seems inconceivable to me, Colonel Clausen, that you would undertake an investigation to explore those leads without discussion with the Judge Advocate General under whom you served and perhaps with Secretary Stimson as to the individuals who were involved.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, the individuals involved, of course, would be the persons who were concerned with the additional leads.

Mr. KEEFE. Who were the persons?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you had 15 people, Mr. Keefe, who had, I believe, testified before the Board, who I reinterviewed and got affidavits from.

Now, for example, I remember very distinctly Colonel [11881] Bratton stating before the Board something to the effect that he could not recollect, that he could not verify, that he could not prove, and then the Board pressing him to answer the questions. Well, certainly in fairness to Colonel Bratton the matter should be clarified. And all the people, including General Gerow, General Miles—well, there were 15.

In other words, in the last week of the Board's proceedings we had just these few comments, I mean, concerning the magic, and it would be unfair to limit the inquiry, for two reasons, certainly for the reason of the persons who testified, and from the standpoint of getting all the facts.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in the statement of December 1, 1944, released through the press branch of the War Department, the Secretary says:

I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows:

[11882] Then he goes on and says:

The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions.

So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.

Was that perhaps the reason that you didn't interview General Short at all?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No. I assumed, as I said before, that what I had investigated, to the point that you have seen there, Mr. Keefe, was sufficient to satisfy the Secretary, that he could then make a decision.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he had made a decision then.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No. That is tentative, isn't it?

[11883] It would be, in its very nature. It says that in the last paragraph, where he says he is going to continue his investigation and reexamine then his decision when he had completed this additional investigation,

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he said:

This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.

Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army.

In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result.

Now, then, I have heretofore referred to the statement [11884] in the Judge Advocate General's opinion which the Secretary of War refers to in this press release from which I have just read.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Keefe, didn't he say in the press release also that he was going to reexamine his decision later in the light of the additional evidence?

Mr. KEEFE. That is all he said.

Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active theaters of operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I thought; yes.

Mr. KEEFE. That is what he said.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. I have no desire to withhold anything.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; I know that. I just seemed to have remembered that point was in there.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. What I am getting at is this: He refers to the opinion of the Judge Advocate General.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I quoted from the opinion of the Judge Advocate General in which he stated that in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be explored. I have now asked you whether or not [11885] you had any discussion either with your chief, who was General Cramer—you were in the JAGD office?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He was your chief?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well you have a chain of command. My more immediate chief was General Thomas Green and he was the attorney for General Short.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you were in that office, in the JAG Office, weren't you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was in the Judge Advocate General's office; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. We call it the JAG office.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is a good name for it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't want to cast any reflections upon the office. Colonel. I happen to have had at least one of my boys serve all during this war in that office and with some distinction, in the marine end of

it, and I know he always referred to it to me as the JAG office. I don't think that he meant they all got on jags, or anything of that kind, but that is just the short term.

Now, did you have any talk with General Cramer or with Colonel Stimson, Secretary of War, as to who these people were that you should be fair to in this investigation?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Not in that way, Mr. Keefe. I have [11886] discussed with General Cramer at great length the whole picture presented by the investigation, of course, and just what the leads were leading to from time to time. And, as I pointed out before, the best way to see exactly what is the type of lead being pursued is to go to my periodic reports because they were reviewed by the Judge Advocate General and Mr. Harvey H. Bundy.

Mr. KEEFE. That is just exactly what I thought the situation would be. I couldn't conceive of you starting out on this world tour to interview witnesses until you had a pretty good idea from talking it over with General Cramer as to what you were going to do and what your purpose was in setting out and who you were going to see.

What I would like to know is did you have in your mind as a result of your talks with General Cramer that it was to be your purpose to investigate the leads which he had pointed out in his report and do it with the spirit of trying to be fair to the personnel that was involved?

[11887] Colonel CLAUSEN. I certainly had it in my mind to be fair, Mr. Keefe, to all people involved. In other words—

Mr. KEEFE. That does not answer my question. Were there any specific people involved?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The only specific people involved as I repeated before were those who were involved in these leads. Now—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the leads must have tended to lead somewhere. Now, we had the report of Secretary Stimson. He made up his mind that certain things should be done. He did something to Short, he relieved him of his command and he read the Army Pearl Harbor Board report that was critical of General Marshall, that was critical of General Gerow and that was critical of other people; was it not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, then, when you talked with General Cramer wasn't it considered that these leads that you were to follow up were to be followed for the purpose of seeing if it could not be made easier for those people that were named by the Army Pearl Harbor Board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Keefe—

Mr. KEEFE. Now, that is what I am getting at.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I, for one, would never be a party to such an instruction.

[11888] Mr. KEEFE. But that is not a matter of instruction at all.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Now, listen—

Senator LUCAS. Let him answer the question.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The Secretary would not be a party to it. I always had a high regard for Mr. Stimson because if we had followed his advice in 1932 you would not have had Pearl Harbor, there would not have been a war; when he wanted the Nine Power Pact enforced and the Kellogg-Briand Pact enforced we would not have had a war.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, that is a nice statement and I am in complete

accord with it, but that is not getting to my question, I am sorry, Colonel Clausen.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Certainly, you bring up a motive now.

Mr. KEEFE. No; I bring out the fact that General Cramer himself stated in his report to Secretary Stimson that in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be explored. Now, what personnel did he have in mind when he talked with you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. As I said before—

Mr. KEEFE. That is clear; it is in his report.

Colonel CLAUSEN. As I said before, the persons involved in the leads that I had in mind when I started out were those that I have mentioned. Now, if you gave me the book I could [11889] mention those who testified before. There were 15 people who had testified before the Board at a time when I assume they were gagged so far as this magic stuff was concerned.

Mr. KEEFE. You were aware when you started out, because you stated on the record that you knew what the findings of the Army Board were as to General Marshall and as to General Gerow and as to others.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Why, yes, of course.

Mr. KEEFE. You knew that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Surely.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did general—

Colonel CLAUSEN. I also know the findings of the Board with regard to Col. Theodore Wyman and I agree 100 percent with those findings regarding Col. Theodore Wyman.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, didn't you agree as to the findings as to the others?

Colonel CLAUSEN. So far as the others were concerned, Mr. Keefe, if you want my opinion on the findings, my opinion is very much in the category of being presumptuous I think, but when you come down to the Theodore Wyman case, where he had derelictions charged to him in that particular category, I recommended court martial for him.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he was not court-martialed, was he?

[11890] Colonel CLAUSEN. No. That is why it might be a good thing now for you people to recommend the case be turned over to the Attorney General because in my opinion he lied before the Board and this Board was constituted pursuant to statute, so you might concede that there might be something to that.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, I don't know all the facts about Colonel Wyman but from what I have read in this record I am inclined to hazard a guess that perhaps you are not far from the truth in that respect, but I do not have Colonel Wyman specifically in mind. He was pretty thoroughly castigated by the Army Board in this report, wasn't he?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes; and that, Mr. Keefe, was—

Mr. KEEFE. You agreed with that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes. I assembled a great deal of the evidence concerning that subject.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, now, then, Colonel Clausen, did you have any talk with reference to the castigation, if I may call it such—I don't want to use that term—the report, I will say the findings of the Board with respect to the derelictions of General Marshall or General Gerow?

Colonel CLAUSEN. We had discussions, Mr. Keefe, concerning all the people, as I have said before, that were involved in these leads and from time to time the matter would be re- [11891] examined and what should be done and what should not be done and what further progress could be made in this direction or that direction and that was mainly reported, as I have said several times, in my periodic reports.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, what bothers me is the fact that Secretary Stimson stated in his press release that he agreed with some of the findings of the Board and he disagreed with others and because he disagreed with the others had decided to conduct further investigation and that was suggested also by the Judge Advocate General, so you went out to conduct the investigation.

Did you conduct your investigation as to those individuals against whom findings were made by the Board that he may have been satisfied with or that he expressed to you that he was satisfied with the findings that were made by the Board against any individuals?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Keefe, I at no time went out with any preconceived idea to slant any investigation. I would not have been a party to it, Mr. Stimson would not have authorized it if he had and so far as my work with the Board is concerned, I have a letter here from General Grunert in which he commends me for my work on the Board.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not criticizing you for your work on the Board.

[11892] Colonel CLAUSEN. You assumed, though, in your questions that I was some kind of a stooge sent out by the War Department to—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, you are just jumping at conclusions.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I am glad to hear you say that.

Mr. KEEFE. I haven't assumed any such thing. I have asked you a simple question as to whether or not you discussed any of these individual personnel that are referred to in the report. Now, either you did or you did not.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I say, Mr. Keefe, we discussed all the personnel involved and if I had—

Mr. KEEFE. Did you discuss General Marshall?

Colonel CLAUSEN. We discussed General Marshall in these leads.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you discuss General Gerow?

Colonel CLAUSEN. General Gerow in these leads.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you discuss General Marshall? What did you discuss as to General Marshall?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Marshall generally, yes. We discussed all the people who are involved in these leads and whose names came up from time to time.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to know what that discussion was, that is what I am trying to get at, what was the nature of the discussion?

[11893] Colonel CLAUSEN. The discussions, Mr. Keefe, revolved around the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and their testimony and my assistance in finding papers and documents and as to who said what about this and who interrogated so and so.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, but that was all in the report, wasn't it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, but it is like you, Mr. Keefe, asking me to find an exhibit in there. I can find a thing if I can find it in the report.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, Colonel Clausen, you and I are both lawyers and we have had some experience and I don't want to be splitting hairs nor engaging in double talk at all. I would like to get right to the point.

Now, when this investigation started on your part, General Cramer had made an exhaustive study of the findings of the Army Board and he had before him all of the evidence that had been taken before that Board, did he not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He read all the evidence—I believe he read all the evidence.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. So it was not necessary to go searching around much for papers unless it was a matter of previous exhibits. He pretended to have the whole thing because he very carefully analyzed it in a long report which he made to [11894] the Secretary of War.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Keefe, you cannot just read, as a matter, transcripts, long transcripts involving the number of pages that represent the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the Grunert Board, and have everything in your mind.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now let us get down to—

Colonel CLAUSEN. I mean one thing dovetails into another, one thing dovetails into another from that point to some place.

Mr. KEEFE. Let us get right down to my question, and if you can answer it, all right, and if you cannot, all right. What did you talk with General Cramer about General Gerow?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Oh, I cannot recall, Mr. Keefe. General Gerow came up in so many aspects, whether he saw the reply by General Short and where it was and whether he knew of the liaison with Navy, what liaison with the Navy meant and what that meant from the war plans and who got the war plans and where can we get the war plans and how about looking into this, it went into so many directions, and then there were exhibits to tie in.

Mr. KEEFE. Was there any talk or suggestion that the Army Board had dealt unfairly in its findings with General Gerow?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, that was a matter that he, General Cramer, would decide. It would be presumptuous for me to say.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in his talks with you did he indicate [11895] that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, so far as I was concerned, Mr. Keefe, I assumed that he said there in his final written decision and opinion is the essence of what he would, perhaps, in some way mention but to say that, "This is what I am going to find, Clausen," I do not recall that.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Colonel, you had a talk with General Cramer?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I had many talks with him, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. What?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I had many talks with General Cramer.

Mr. KEEFE. Of course you did. Did you talk with Stimson, too?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I had about three or four conferences with Colonel Stimson.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, in those conferences did you discuss General Marshall or General Gerow or any of these other people that the Army Pearl Harbor Board had found derelictions against?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, as I repeated before, Mr. Keefe, we discussed the persons involved in the leads. Now, I brought to the attention of the colonel all these people who had testified; that the Board had gotten the magic in the last week and we mentioned some of the names; I am quite sure I mentioned the names of people that testified when we did [11896] not have the magic.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, did you help prepare this report for General Cramer?

Colonel CLAUSEN. In the way in which I said; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. It is quite a voluminous report, isn't it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you are speaking of the one of—what is the date of that?

Mr. KEEFE. I am speaking of the report under date of November 25, 1944.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you will find it documented there with references to the exhibits and transcript pages. That represents some of my work and we had other officers, too, assisting in doing the same work, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as near as I have been able to understand in reading this report—you have been referring all the time to the fact that there were unexplored leads. Now, this is what appears at the top of page 48 of Exhibit 63 under the heading of "Unexplored Leads." This is General Cramer's report to Secretary Stimson. [Reading:]

In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain further inquiries have suggested themselves to me, which, in my opinion, might advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in all [11897] probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the same time in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored. I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.

In the event you approve of this suggestion I will discuss these matters in detail with the officer selected by you.

Recommendations:

As to General Marshall I have already expressed my opinion that the conclusions of the Board are unjustified and erroneous.

As to General Gerow I have stated my agreement with the conclusions of the Board (a) that he erred in not sending to Short more information than he did, and (c) in not checking on Short's reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." In my opinion these errors do not warrant disciplinary action against General Gerow. General Gerow admitted the error of his division in not checking Short's reply, for which he frankly took the blame. The nature of the errors and the fact that he has since demonstrated his great qualifications for field command indicate that his case is now far removed from disciplinary action. [11898]

As to Short I have concurred in the conclusions of the Board—and so on, about two and a half pages.

Now, those are the only ones that he referred to in his report. Now, then, I am asking you these questions because in General Cramer's own report to Secretary Stimson he says, "In the event you approve this suggestion," namely, that he send out an individual officer, "to explore leads, I will discuss these matters in detail with the officer selected by you."

That is you, and you did discuss it with him.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; many times.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Well, now, what were the leads that you discussed? They are not set forth in this report.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, if you will let me have my volume I will be glad to.

Mr. KEEFE. Let me withdraw that question for just a moment, please, Colonel Clausen. I want to ask you this question:

Now, in view of the fact that General Cramer refers specifically to General Marshall, General Gerow, and General Short, and agrees in part and disagrees in whole or in part with the findings of the Board as to these three individuals, is it a fair assumption on my part that these are the ones that he [11899] referred to when he said that, "In order to complete the picture and in all fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored"? Is that the personnel that he was referring to?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Don't you see, Mr. Keefe, that is the same question that Senator Ferguson asked, and I said to him and I will now say to you, that I cannot presume to say what General Cramer had in mind when he put that statement down. It speaks for itself. What I should think I would do in trying to be fair to everybody would be particularly those people, all the people who testified before the Board when they were gagged with regard to magic. Now, there were 15 of them. I can give you their names if you wait a minute. Do you want me to give you the names of those that had testified before the Board and who I reinterviewed?

Mr. KEEFE. No; I haven't asked you for that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right. I thought you did.

Mr. KEEFE. If you want to do it you can; that is not what I asked you at all.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; but I mean that would be fair to do because they had gone before the Board, Mr. Keefe, at a time when magic was not open for discussion.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, do I understand that the leads that you were out on then was to go out and get these people [11900] to supplement their testimony before the board and testify to what they know and understood about magic?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, Mr. Keefe, not in toto at all, because the whole scope and subject of magic was unexplored with regard to certain of the witnesses. I did not know, for example, that this big sheaf that General Russell had obtained called the top secret B, whether General Gerow ever saw one of them, whether General Miles had seen them, whether they knew about this cutting of Pearl Harbor into sections and area, and in order to be fair to a man like General Miles, for example, I thought, "Certainly you ought to ask him, 'Well, here, did you ever see these before?'"

Mr. KEEFE. Well, what specific leads were indulged in or sent out with respect to General Marshall, or did you have any specific leads?

Colonel CLAUSEN. With General Marshall?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The whole scope of the subject. He testified—for example, if you want to take General Marshall, he testified, I think that he had in the War Department, he thought, SOP of November 5, 1941. Now, query? Did he have that? I could not find it any place, and these are the things that General Cramer asked me to ask him. He would say, "Did you have the SOP of 5 November 1941" and I would say, [11901] "Well, General, I remember

that General Marshall thought he did, and I remember that General Gerow thought he did not. "I will look and see." And by the time you ran a thing like that down it would take an awful lot of time. Finally it developed that the thing was mailed in from Hawaii after November 5, 1941, and after Pearl Harbor. It did not come in, I believe, until January or February of 1942. Now, that is the type of thing that we talked about from time to time.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, was one of the leads that you were running down to find out whether or not Colonel Bratton actually delivered the first 13 parts of the 14-part message to Bedell Smith on the evening of the 6th of December?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you had Bratton's testimony then, didn't you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I did also notice—

Mr. KEEFE. Now, just a minute. Now, he did testify—

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, just a minute. I don't mean to cut you off but don't cut me off.

Mr. KEEFE. I shall not do that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Now, listen: Colonel Bratton testified that he was trying to recollect and I sat there across the room from the man. We were in a little room, this was a very informal sort of thing, this Grunert Board, and I saw the colonel [11902] brought back and brought back, I think he came back three times, I believe he was our last witness because General Grunert made the same remark, "When we have got nothing else to do, Colonel, we bring you here."

Well, I could see the colonel being given additional documents to refresh his recollection and if I had been his lawyer I would have said, "You don't have to answer a question just because it is put to you." In other words, I would have forced him to protect himself more. He was a very cooperative fellow. But for the Pearl Harbor he would be a major general. He was en route to the—

Mr. KEEFE. What do you mean "but for Pearl Harbor"?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Because he was en route to Fort Benning with other men who had been carefully selected and would have gone down there in all probability and have gotten a division; because he, in loyalty to his chief, General Miles, stayed when his general said, "Please stay here for a few days"—this was before Pearl Harbor—"I can't relieve you right now," Colonel Bratton acquiesced, so don't be too harsh on Colonel Bratton.

Mr. KEEFE. What is this, a sort of a preliminary instructions to me?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you seemed to think that because Colonel Bratton gave me a different story than he gave the [11903] Grunert Board that he lied either one of the times. He didn't do any such thing.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, no, no, you have just got some false notion, you have just got something in the back of your head. I never had that in the back of my head at all. I know Colonel Bratton and I have got a different opinion of him than that. Now, don't be putting that stuff in the record and don't be putting into my mouth or into my head something that is not true. I will take care of it when the time comes. I have seen poor, old Colonel Bratton sitting around this room pretty nearly since this hearing started, waiting to tell his story and they wouldn't let him tell it until after you got on the stand. The man

has been here for weeks waiting for a chance to tell his story and I am sure he will tell the truth.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I want to know who the gentleman means by "They wouldn't."

Mr. KEEFE. No.

Mr. MURPHY. You are making accusations that they would not let him tell his story. Who is the "they"?

Mr. KEEFE. Time; lapsation of time.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Mr. KEEFE. Circumstances.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

[11904] Mr. KEEFE. That includes you and me and everybody else that has taken up so much time in this hearing.

Senator LUCAS. You wouldn't include Senator George, would you, in that?

Mr. KEEFE. What is that?

Senator LUCAS. You wouldn't include Senator George in that?

Mr. KEEFE. No; I wouldn't include Senator George.

Senator LUCAS. I will speak for the Senator. He won't speak up for himself.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, as a matter of fact, Colonel Bratton did testify, didn't he?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you thought it was necessary to interview him in order to clear up some discrepancies?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, he had testified to the delivery of these messages and then after I got to interviewing people also involved in this magic thing, I think one of the very first ones told me that he had delivered the messages with Colonel Bratton.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was the first one?

Colonel CLAUSEN. One of the first ones, Mr. Keefe. That was Colonel Dusenbury.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he say that he had delivered them that [11905] night?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Oh, not that; I am not talking about the 13 part deliveries.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I am talking about the 13 parts. Now, let us not go all over the bush. Let us stick to that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. He said he delivered that the next morning; in other words, the morning of the 7th.

Mr. KEEFE. Who did?

Colonel CLAUSEN. This Colonel Dusenbury.

Mr. KEEFE. Did Colonel Bratton say that he delivered it the night before?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I understand the Colonel did say in general effect that he had given one to—a locked pouch to a Colonel Bedell Smith and deliveries had been made to these other people.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he did say it pretty clearly and plainly, didn't he, before the Army Board, that he delivered that 13-part message in the locked pouch to General Bedell Smith?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is my recollection; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is my recollection and it is right here in the record. I won't take time to go and read it because everybody on this board has read it and knows that it is a fact.

Now, that was one of the things that had to be cleared up, wasn't it, that testimony?

[11906] Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that was the reason why it had to be cleared up? What did Kramer say that had to be cleared up for?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, he didn't say that.

Mr. KEEFE. Who did?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, it was obvious, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Obvious to whom?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It was obvious to me.

Mr. KEEFE. It was obvious to you because you set there as recorder or assistant recorder?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; it was obvious to me that the leads regarding the magic should be carefully explored as to who got what, when, and so forth, because one of the things that Captain Safford said in the Hart report was that in order to find out about the winds code message you would have to see these various officers. If I am not mistaken, he had listed down the several Army officers and I later, Mr. Keefe, did interview all those people. In other words, the whole subject as to who got what and how it was brought around and when, if you could find who had, and so forth, should be gone into.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, prior to the time that you started on your investigation was there any evidence anywhere before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that would indicate that the first [11907] thirteen parts was not delivered in this regular routine of delivery by Colonel Bratton to the people who were entitled to receive it on the evening of the 6th of December? Can you point to a single witness that testified before the Army Board that cast any doubt upon that question?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean before I commenced—

Mr. KEEFE. Before you started out on your search.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean if there was a conflict right in the testimony before the Grunert Board?

Mr. KEEFE. Exactly.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, yes, in Colonel Bratton's own testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. What is that? Where is the conflict?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, he said he could not verify or prove it. At one place I remember he said he could not verify or prove certain things and then at another place he said with regard to giving it to Bedell Smith that he thought that he had given it to him. There was some qualification, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. And you thought that was a lead, a sufficient lead, Colonel Clausen, is that right? Then you went over to Europe and saw Bedell Smith.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Oh, no, Mr. Keefe, I saw people before I ever went out there. The first man that I saw was—I mean one of the first people that I saw was a man who had [11908] been a subordinate of Colonel Bratton's. That was Colonel Dusenbury; and he told me that he had had the job of delivering these things himself.

Well, Colonel Bratton had said in his testimony that he personally took it around. Now, here was Dusenbury saying this other thing. And then next I had various people who were supposed to have gotten them on the night of December 6 and various people who were supposed to have gotten other messages before.

I think the most important thing after I got into it was who got that one of September or October which cut Pearl Harbor into areas, five areas, because that—

[11909] Mr. KEEFE. You see, we are getting way off the subject. It is getting late and maybe that is the reason you are not sticking to the question. I am talking only about the 13 part message that was alleged to have been delivered to Col. Bedell Smith, according to the testimony of Colonel Bratton, on the evening of December 6, 1941.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You claim that Bedell Smith was not quite conclusive in his testimony on that, and you thought that was a lead that ought to be investigated?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You mean Colonel Bratton?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; Colonel Bratton.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That he had not testified to that.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you took the testimony of Bedell Smith over in Europe, didn't you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, I did.

Mr. KEEFE. You got his affidavit?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Then after you got the affidavit of Bedell Smith, you sent for Bratton, and had him come to Paris, I believe.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I went to Berlin. I was there for several days, and they would not send this stuff up there.

[11910] Mr. KEEFE. Where did you met Colonel Bratton?

Colonel CLAUSEN. What is that?

Mr. KEEFE. Where did you met Colonel Bratton?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I met him when I was en route going into Berlin. I happened to see him as I was traveling along in a British car. A British colonel had arranged for me to meet him in Berlin.

Mr. KEEFE. Where did you meet him? In Berlin, or on the road some place?

Colonel CLAUSEN. En route. Then he took me to his home where he was living in Berlin with the Chief of Staff of the Berlin Military District, General Ransome, and General Matchett, and they gave me a room there.

It was my intention to have the memoranda sent up by courier from Paris, and they would not send it up.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you then submit these affidavits that had been given to you by Bedell Smith to Colonel Bratton?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. Mr. Keefe, I have been looking at this. You are asking about telling Gen. Bedell Smith about the 13 parts delivery on December 6, 1941, before midnight.

I put down what Colonel Bratton had testified concerning that, and then I put down in parentheses—or, rather, this is his affidavit, of course, but I quoted the testimony, [11911] “I understand this testimony may possibly be qualified by other testimony to the effect that instead of giving these to me it ‘may have been one of the others.’”

In other words there was a qualification, you see, right in the testimony of Colonel Bratton. So that you did not have to talk to other people or with other people in order to see that there was some qualification.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

You think you had this affidavit from Gen. Bedell Smith?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That was one.

Mr. KEEFE. What other affidavits did you have with reference to this episode?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Colonel Bratton says in his affidavit—I can read it, it is in the second paragraph—he says:

Statements in affidavits of Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, Moses W. Pettigrew, Ralph C. Smith, Charles K. Gailey, Thomas J. Betts, Walter B. Smith, Leonard T. Gerow, Robert E. Schukraft, John F. Stone, and George W. Renchard.

[11912] Mr. KEEFE. What did he say about it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I showed it to him. The statement says:

“Colonel Clausen has shown me and has asked me to comment on certain testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and on statements and affidavits of” naming these people. Then it says, “which statements and affidavits were given by the above-named persons to Colonel Clausen in the course of the investigation mentioned.”

Mr. KEEFE. Did you let him read those affidavits?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he read them?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. In other words, I wanted him to see what the others had said about the entire subject.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he write out his own affidavit?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; I borrowed a typewriter from the headquarters of the military there in Paris, and Colonel Bratton and I sat down together in our hotel, and I typed——

Mr. KEEFE (interposing). Hotel where? I thought you were in Berlin.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, when they would not send the papers to us in Berlin we had to go to Paris, and we did that.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you were in Paris?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

[11913] Mr. KEEFE. You took Colonel Bratton back to Paris?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; he came himself. I went 1 day ahead of time. He had to stay for some work. He could not come back with me.

Mr. KEEFE. It took you a long time to get back to Paris where this job took place. Now you are in Paris and you are in a hotel room; is that right?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. You finally got your papers together?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You borrowed a typewriter from the Army?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you had the typewriter up there?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. And then after showing these affidavits of all these people to Colonel Bratton, letting him read them, as I understand it, you discussed the matter with him?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He told me what to put down, and I put it down.

Mr. KEEFE. He just dictated the affidavit, and you took it down in longhand?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. I do not know whether I took it down in longhand or not. He is here, and you can ask him. I got so many

of these. Maybe I did take it down in [11914] longhand. I do not remember that; I really do not recall.

Mr. KEEFE. At any rate, either from the conversation or longhand, or something else, you drew up an affidavit?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I acted as the stenographer, you might say, for Colonel Bratton in preparing this after he had his memory refreshed.

Mr. KEEFE. He had his memory refreshed. I have heard that before.

That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Any further questions of Colonel Clausen?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I would like to propound some questions tomorrow.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to ask some questions, too.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will now stand adjourned until 10 o'clock in the morning, Colonel.

(Whereupon, at 10:20 p. m., February 13, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m. of the following day, Thursday, February 14, 1946.)

[11915]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION,
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[11916] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, yesterday Congressman Keefe requested the inclusion in the record of the so-called Safford citation. It has been furnished to me, and my suggestion is that it be handed to the reporter to be included in the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The citation referred to follows.)

Immediate release press and radio.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
February 11, 1946.

CAPTAIN LAURENCE FRYE SAFFORD, U. S. NAVY, RECEIVES LEGION OF MERIT

Captain Laurence Frye Safford, U. S. N., 52, today received the Legion of Merit from Vice Admiral Richard L. Conolly, U. S. N., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Administration. The award was made at ceremonies in the Navy Department.

Captain Safford was cited for his work as assistant director of Naval Communications for cryptographic research from March 1942 to September 1945, during which machines for encipherment were perfected.

Text of the citation accompanying the award reads:

[11917] "For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the Government of the United States as Assistant Director of Naval Communications for Cryptographic Research from March, 1942, to September, 1945. A dynamic leader combining strong purpose and creative imagination with a profound knowledge of mechanical and electrical science and their cryptographic applications, Captain Safford was the driving force behind the development of the perfected machines which today give the United States Navy the finest system of encipherment in the world. By his devotion to the tasks of rendering the Navy's dispatch communications safe from analysis by the enemy and of perfecting the operational characteristics of cryptographic aids to

achieve greater reliability and speed, Captain Safford contributed essentially to the successful prosecution of the war."

Home address of Captain and Mrs. Safford is 2821 Dumbarton Avenue, Washington, D. C. He is on duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Captain Safford was born in Somerville, Massachusetts.

(Biography available, Biographies and Research Section, Office of Public Information.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Colonel, do you have anything to [11918] present to the committee before your examination is resumed?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire.

TESTIMONY OF HENRY C. CLAUSEN (Resumed)

Senator LUCAS. Colonel Clausen, when the night session closed you were being examined by the Congressman from Wisconsin with respect to unexplored leads as found in the Army Board report or, rather, in the statement made by Myron C. Cramer, major general, and one of the statements in his opinion is as follows:

The answer to these inquiries will not, in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result. At the same time, in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored.

Now, many questions have been asked by the Senator from Michigan and the Congressman from Wisconsin on that one point, "fairness to personnel." Do I understand you to say that the reason for that statement was primarily because the Army Board went along for 3 months without the benefit of having an opportunity to examine these witnesses with respect to magic?

[11919] Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. As I told Senator Ferguson and Mr. Keefe, I don't know what was in the mind of General Cramer when he used that language; but the necessity for the additional investigation, or what I termed, as I interviewed people, "the supplementary investigation," was primarily because of what you state as the fact, namely, that in the course of the Board's proceedings extending over some 3 months it was not until the last week that the Board received the magic details.

Senator LUCAS. All right. In the beginning of these hearings, when it was not permissible for the Board to use magic in the examination of any witnesses, I presume that in so examining these witnesses it was necessary from time to time to get very close to the question of magic; and when that time came, that was when many of these witnesses began to wonder as to how far they could go and resolved every doubt against giving any information which would do away with, or which would give to the public, that secret?

Colonel CLAUSEN. There is no question about that at all, Senator, and my experience as a trial lawyer led me to see the various witnesses as they testified; and there seemed to be, in two instances, at least, a sort of—as though they were on the brink of saying something and wanted to stay something and could not say something; and after the magic picture was unfolded [11920] in the last week of the Board's proceedings it was very apparent to me why that occurred.

Senator LUCAS. And those leads, or that personnel affair being discussed by Cramer, necessarily dealt primarily with the fact that magic up to that time had not been explored in any sense whatsoever?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The additional leads; yes, sir; primarily magic.

Senator LUCAS. Then, in addition to that, you had other leads that have testified to which had nothing to do with magic, which you felt, under the directive that you received from the Secretary of War, was necessary for you to follow through?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I mentioned some of those.

Senator LUCAS. And that is the reason why you took this tour all over the world?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, it is the reason why I went all over the world. I don't like to fly, and I had to fly over 70,000 miles. I don't like the use of the word "tour." When I tour after this, I am going to tour on the ground.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that is the reason that you went where you did, and it was because you were delegated to do that under an order that was issued by the Secretary of War?

[11921] Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, there was much to do in the testimony on yesterday about a couple of statements that were made by certain witnesses, as though it appeared that you were still operating under the power and authority granted to the Army Board, as I recall.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, I ask you this simple question: Who, in your opinion, had more power and authority at that time on the question of investigation or anything else having to do with war matters, Secretary of War Stimson or that Army Board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The Secretary of War, who was the person designated under your Public Law 339 to conduct the investigation. As I pointed out yesterday, Senator, there was no form prescribed by that law as to how that investigation would be conducted.

Now, that is a very important point. In other words, you told the Secretary to conduct an investigation, and he was conducting the investigation. If he used me as an assistant or if he picked up a book at home himself—

Senator LUCAS. Well, in other words, it didn't make any difference, as far as the witness was concerned, whether Henry Stimson was carrying on the investigation or the Board [11922] was carrying on the investigation.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. The Board was an assistant to him for that purpose.

Senator LUCAS. Certainly. Now, the Congressman from Wisconsin interrogated you at some length with respect to the conversations that you had with Colonel Bratton in Europe.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, as a matter of placing this in the record, I want to read what the Congressman from Wisconsin said on the floor of the House November the 6th, 1945, before we started this hearing on that point, in answer to, or following, a statement made by Congressman Gearhart.

"Mr. Keefe"—well, I will read Congressman Gearhart's statement also.

Mr. GEARHART. I agree with that. Colonel Rufus Bratton is a very important figure in this investigation.

Mr. KEEFE. And that Colonel Bratton testified at length before the Army Board. He testified from memoranda which were made at the time of the incidents prior to Pearl Harbor and he testified clearly and to the point and without equivocation; that thereafter this Colonel Clausen at the instigation of the War Department and the Secretary of War went to Colonel Bratton along with all the other witnesses and browbeat him apparently into signing an [11923] affidavit a year later in which his testimony is subject to some change. The gentleman and I want to talk to Colonel Bratton—

and so forth.

Now, that is a pretty serious charge against you, Colonel Clausen.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I considered it so after having served in the Army and went back to my practicing law and picking up the newspaper and reading such stuff as that when it is not true and correct.

Senator LUCAS. The only reason I am reading this—I am not attempting to embarrass anybody in this investigation—but a witness who held the position that you did and in view of your record which has been placed before this committee, it seemed to me that it was necessary that I should read this in order for you to make an answer one way or the other to that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes. I, of course, say that I treated every single person whom I interviewed with as much fairness as I knew how. I certainly did not conduct an inquisition. I went to them and in all cases where I could, showed them what other people had said about the subject.

Now, one example, General Fielder. General Fielder had been the G-2 for General Short in Hawaii. He was a very important figure because he was the man who would obtain infor- [11924] mation in Hawaii and pass it on to his chief. There had been statements and you know how it is in an inquiry of this kind, you hear some wild rumors here, there and elsewhere.

Well, there had also been testimony about the Navy giving the Army all information. That immediately put General Fielder on the spot and in order to be fair to him I took him with me to Guam and there confronted him with Captain Layton, who was the fleet man and who had the information of this super-duper character and Captain Layton said that he did not give it to General Fielder. Now, that is the kind of investigation I tried to conduct.

[11925] **Senator LUCAS.** What I want to specifically know is whether or not your browbeat this 225-pound Colonel here into giving evidence that was other than what he considered at that time the truth.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you browbeat him into signing this affidavit?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Since I have seen the Colonel here I would not want to attempt to browbeat him into anything.

On yesterday, Colonel, you testified about some things that happened in Hawaii which, frankly, I was amazed and startled at. I confess that I had not had an opportunity to read your report. I tried to get it a couple of times, but it was being used by some other member of the committee. In view of the fact there are only two copies it was difficult for us all to get it. But I cannot see how this committee can conclude this hearing without calling a couple of wit-

nesses from Hawaii. We have been investigating Washington all this time. Because some of the affidavits have been filed here, it seems to me we ought to have a couple or three of these witnesses come in and testify, and I refer primarily to Captain Dickins, Captain Mayfield, and Captain Rochefort.

[11926] One of the things that intrigued me was your testimony on yesterday that for 22 months, as I recall, the Navy had been tapping Japanese communication lines.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; telephone lines running to the Consul, and then they had some taps on lines running to the Japanese Consul's home, and some taps running to the line of the Jap steamship company.

Senator LUCAS. Then on December 2, 1941, because of the fact that they were under the FBI, which was also tapping wires—am I right about that? What was that, Colonel? Give me that again, because I want to get that clear in my mind, just briefly.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Perhaps the best thing to do is to read Lieutenant Woodrum's statement rather than to take mine, because it is a very serious matter and I do not like to be quoted—I mean I do not want my quotation to be misconstrued.

Senator LUCAS. All right, read it again.

Colonel CLAUSEN. It is on page 105 of my report.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. He says here:

About 1 November 1941 the FBI, with the cognizance of the DIO—

Senator LUCAS. What is that?

[11927] Colonel CLAUSEN. That is the District Intelligence Office of the Navy at Honolulu.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

began a telephone surveillance of a suspect in its own office building.

In plain language, the FBI tapped the phone running to the cook's quarters in the Jap Consul's home.

To the knowledge of the writer, this was the first such surveillance conducted by the FBI itself in Honolulu. This one surveillance was accidentally uncovered by some employees of the telephone company making routine installations. They reported their discovery to their superior, and subsequently this information was casually passed on to a member of the DIO by the DIO contact at the telephone company. In a spirit of cooperation, the information that their surveillance had been exposed was in turn passed on by the DIO man to an FBI agent. On receipt of the information, the FBI Agent in Charge apparently went directly to the telephone company and made accusations there that an FBI confidence had been breached by the DIO's having been given information concerning an FBI tap.

When Captain Mayfield, then District Intelligence Officer, learned of the FBI protest at the telephone company, he was not only incensed at their failure to consult with [11928] him before taking such action, but he considered that action to be a serious breach of security. Cognizant of his instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations to avoid any possibility of international complications, and thoroughly aware of the explosive potentialities of the surveillances being conducted, Captain Mayfield ordered the immediate discontinuance of all telephone surveillances. This was on 2 December 1941. Surveillances were not resumed until the morning of 7 December 1941, following the Japanese attack.

Senator LUCAS. I thank you for that.

Now I want to read Captain Mayfield's testimony that was given in the Hewitt Report, page 570:

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, did any information come to you prior to December 7, 1941, of military significance which had been obtained from tapping a telephone line to the Japanese Consul?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. None that I recollect and I do not believe that any information received by this method was considered of military or naval importance by me or my assistants.

Mr. SONNETT. You have, Admiral, examined at my request, have you not, Exhibit 38-A and 38-B, the transcripts from October 1, 1941, to December 2, 1941? Can you state whether [11929] having examined those transcripts, there appears to be anything of military or naval significance contained therein?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I do not believe there is anything of military or naval significance contained therein.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, Admiral, why there are no transcripts after December 2, 1941, and up to December 7, 1941?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. On or about December 2nd, it was reported to me by one of my assistants that employees of the telephone company had discovered a jumper put across the connections in a junction box by a member of the FBI organization, and that an employee of the telephone company had reported this discovery to one of my assistants. It was further reported to me that one of my assistants reported this matter to one of the agents of the FBI. It was further reported to me that a member of the FBI organization, name unknown to me, had taken the matter up with the telephone company. What representative of the telephone company I do not know. To the best of my recollection, I discussed the matter with Mr. Shivers and the report made to me did not agree with the report made to him by his assistants. My organization long before my arrival had worked up a contact with an employee of the telephone company and through this contact was able to obtain any telephone interception [11930] desired by my office. Because of the highly explosive nature of such practice, I did not desire to enter into an argument or controversy as to the merits or demerits of the case since I was afraid that by doing so, the fact that such interceptions were being made might be discovered and thereby jeopardize the future of any further interceptions. Furthermore, since the interceptions to that date had revealed nothing of particular value, I considered the wisest thing to do was to cease all interceptions of whatever kind and so instructed my assistants.

[11931] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 39 of this investigation—

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I would like to add that later along—the exact date I do not remember, but I believe after December 7 the whole matter was satisfactorily straightened out and we were again able to resume interceptions.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 39 of this investigation which has been previously identified as a transcript of the so-called Mori conversation. Will you state whether that conversation and transcript came to your attention and fully the circumstances surrounding that?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection a transcript of this exhibit was brought to me by Mr. Shivers on the morning of December 6. I believe it was very late in the afternoon. We discussed the transcript and were unable to determine that it did have any definite or particular significance. It was thought desirable to have Lieutenant Commander Carr listen to the recording and give us his further opinion as to the value of the contents of the transcription before decision was arrived at as to whether or not it should be reported to the Commandant of the District.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it brought to the attention of the Commandant, or to any other superior officer prior to the [11932] attack?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection it was not.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether or not it was brought to the attention of General Short prior to the attack?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have no knowledge of that.

Now, is that the same message that we are talking about now, that was delivered by Captain Bicknell?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is Colonel Bicknell—brought the Mori message out to General Short.

Senator LUCAS. That is the message we are talking about that Colonel Bicknell telephoned General Short about on Saturday evening, December 6, 1941.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And Short told him that he was going out to dinner, that if he could get out there in 10 minutes he would hear him?

Colonel CLAUSEN. General Fielder, I think, said that, relaying it for General Short.

Senator LUCAS. All right. He finally got there and this was the one in which General Short told us he could not see anything wrong in?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He could not see anything wrong with it.

[11933] Senator LUCAS. Later on, General Short admitted that this fellow was right, and he was wrong?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That message, Senator, is Exhibit 84 in this proceeding.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you.

Now, continuing:

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the transcript of the telephone conversation between Mori and a person in Japan which you have before you, it appears, does it not, that after a question from Japan concerning the United States Fleet and the number of ships present, the person in Japan inquired what flowers or whether the flowers were in bloom, and that that question was answered by Mori, who pointed out that poinsettias and some other flowers were in bloom?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It does. The question from Japan asks "What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?" The reply from Honolulu was to the effect that flowers in bloom were the fewest out of the whole year, but that hibiscus and poinsettias were in bloom.

Mr. SONNETT. When you studied that transcript on December 6, 1941, Admiral, did that particular portion of it come to your attention?

[11934] Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It did.

Mr. SONNETT. What were your thoughts concerning it at the time?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Our thoughts at the time were that it was somewhat curious but that it was a disconnected conversation in which Mori seemed to be somewhat at a loss, and, according to my recollection, that was the reason for our desire to study it further and have Dr. Carr listen to the recording itself.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any knowledge at that time, or have you now any knowledge, as to the establishment by the Japanese of a code in which by the broadcast of trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation references to flowers would signify movement of United States ships from Pearl Harbor?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I think that is rather a complicated question to answer, did I have then or do I have now.

Mr. SONNETT. Would the answer be different?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Let's make it, did you have then? Then we will ask you the other.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I did not have knowledge of any such code at that time.

[11935] Mr. SONNETT. Have you knowledge of any such code at this time?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Of my own personal knowledge of the existence of such code, I have none. I mean I have heard or read something about it, but then—

Mr. SONNETT. Well, I think you might just state that.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have heard or read something to the effect that such a code may have been in existence. I have no personal knowledge of the existence of such a code.

Upon that point, had any of your inquiries been as to whether anybody in Hawaii, either in the Navy or Army, did have knowledge of the existence of such code?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. The point was in Colonel Bicknell's mind that these words to him, as G-2 officer, might be code words. That was his thought on the night of December 6.

You remember in his affidavit, Senator, he said he had been trained under General Knowland; General Knowland was in charge of that G-2 in the European war, and he had always instructed his men no matter how insignificantly the detail might appear, the information might have some important bearing.

Colonel Bicknell was especially alarmed because of the [11936] use of these two words, poinsettias and hibiscus, and he testified before the Grunert Board that the next morning when the attack was going on, he stood on the veranda of his home, repeating automatically to himself, as the Japs were dropping bombs on the ships, "poinsettias and hibiscus."

He said those two words stood in his mind. He was almost automatically doing this at the time the attack was going on.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was doing that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Colonel Bicknell, sir, George Bicknell.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He is the man who took the message to General Short?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir, the preceding night.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator LUCAS. That is all I have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. GEARHART. Colonel Clausen, I have in my hand what purports to be a memorandum for Maj. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, from the office of the Judge Advocate General, the first part of which reads:

Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.

[11937] In order to assist you in the investigation you are now to make, I am suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which in my opinion might advantageously be followed up in order to complete the picture in this matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not be construed as a directive, or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation.

Then follow three pages of suggested subjects of investigation.

During any course of other examinations by other members of this committee, there was a similar memorandum in slightly different words that was also handed to you; is that not correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean what you read is different than the other, Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. I thought that there were some lines in the second one which I heard read about "protect the reputations and justice to individuals who had come under criticism," that you should follow a certain line.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think what you are reading there, Mr. Gearhart, is the three-page memorandum entitled "Unexplored Leads." What they were referring to, Mr. Gearhart, was part of General Cramer's critique of, well, I think it was about November 1944.

[11938] Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. They were reading from a page in General Cramer's memorandum, and Senator Ferguson also referred to that memorandum.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, my purpose in calling attention to that is you were expected to investigate the entire picture, to tie up all the loose

ends, and to pursue any avenues of investigation that might be revealed to you during the course of the investigation that you were conducting; is that not correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, Mr. Gearhart. As I said in answer to, I think, a question of Senator Ferguson's, my mother became ill; she had pneumonia, and I went to San Francisco on emergency leave. When I returned I was given that memorandum, and after I got into the investigation to find out what it was all about, on these unexplored leads dealing especially with magic, what I was supposed to do, Mr. Gearhart, was to get additional facts, so that the Secretary could make his decision, which he did make at the conclusion of my investigation.

For example, that memorandum that you read from there, in the first part it has something to do with the Navy.

Well, after I got going on my own investigation, I was given to understand that letters passed between the [11939] Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War to the effect that where it concerned only naval matters, having nothing to do with the Army responsibility, that I was not to investigate that.

It was always my understanding that I was to get sufficient facts for the Secretary to make his ultimate final decision, which was made, so that he could comply with your Public, 339.

As I said many times in this hearing, and nobody has followed it up, I have included in my report an exhibit D, which contains my periodic reports; in other words, running reports on just what I did, starting from the start to the finish, and that sets up more accurately than anything else the leads I was to pursue, and what information should be obtained in this additional investigation. It was always primarily something revolving around magic.

As I mentioned before, the main thing was magic, and we had, in the last week, been given the magic picture.

[11940] Mr. GEARHART. Now, reading from the document referred to, I will call special attention to this sentence:

The answers to these inquiries would not in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result. At the same time in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored.

I was interested in the part of that sentence "in fairness to certain personnel." Did you not follow up leads that you encountered for the first time during the course of your investigation and carry your investigation of these leads through to their logical conclusion?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes; but, for example, I always had a hunch that in Hawaii they must have tapped phone lines. When I got over there to Hawaii I went first to a man who was a ship's clerk. I had been given his name by Colonel Bicknell. Well, when the man sat down and said that he was a Navy agent I, of course, said, "What do you do"? I had no knowledge of phone taps. He said, "I am a technician."

Well, you know, Mr. Gearhart, when a fellow is secretive and says he is a technician, and a private detective, we, as lawyers, immediately think of dictaphones, et cetera. When I found out he was a technician, why, then that was very interesting. And the more I talked to him the less he [11941] wanted to talk. When he finally did say that his technique extended to phone taps; when I put the question to him direct, he didn't even want to sign the paper.

Now, that is an example of some of the things that were brand new.

Mr. GEARHART. That is the point I wanted to make. That is, to bring out that you were under an injunction to bring out new evidence as well as to eliminate the uncertainties of old evidence. Isn't that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, but, Mr. Gearhart, I was just as free as the wind as to what I could do so far as uncovering evidence was concerned. I mean by that, Mr. Gearhart, and I want you to believe this, there was no compulsion, no restraint, nothing put upon me except that in which I agreed. I agreed it didn't seem to me to be my province to go into the Navy to find out whether Admiral Kimmel should be court-martialed by the Navy. My functions revolved around, Mr. Gearhart, as I read your Public Law 339, I agreed with that scope of my investigation completely.

And let me point this out to you, Mr. Gearhart, because I think you, unknowingly, assumed something of the character that Senator Lucas mentioned this morning, my immediate superior officer was General Short's lawyer. That is, then Deputy Judge Advocate General Thomas Green. He is today [11942] the Judge Advocate General.

Now, if you are going to assume that because people represent people and they are over you that you are going to slant your investigation there would be more hypothesis to suspect that I was slanting it in favor of General Short.

Mr. GEARHART. I am trying to bring out by these questions that you were a free agent.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That you had the right to pursue any investigation, follow anything to its logical conclusion, anything that you felt was worthy of investigation.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

Mr. GEARHART. That is what I want to bring out. I am not casting any aspersions as to the motives behind making any investigation, that some people were trying to control your investigations, somebody in higher position.

Now, you have told us in answer to questions that have been propounded by other members of the committee that you have gone quite thoroughly into the so-called winds message trying to find out all you could about that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You have laid great emphasis upon your efforts in that regard. I wondered why, because the winds message is just one of many, many bits of evidence that [11943] point to the same conclusion. Why should we get so excited over the winds message when you have other messages, the dead-line message, when you have the ship movement message, and all of the others which are pointed to almost immediate commencement of hostilities. So I wondered why in the world you spent so much time on that particular item.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I quite agree with you that the winds message, the implement, and all that, is magnified out of all proportion to its connection with Pearl Harbor. I came to that conclusion, however, after I went into the investigation myself. In other words, when I started out, you see, Mr. Gearhart, I had been shown the Hart examination. In other words, Admiral Hart's examination. And we had

in the Hart examination—understand now, this is very important in answer to your question—Captain Safford's testimony, but he didn't testify, Mr. Gearhart, that he got message so and so which was the winds set-up message. He testified that war information was received in Washington to the effect that war was going to break out at once. And then when you pressed him down to find out, well, where was this information, why, he was evaluating the winds code set-up.

In other words, he was putting his evaluation on it. So if you took Captain Safford's testimony before Admiral. [11944] Hart and analyzed it you would find many assertions of a broad sweeping character, even going so far as to say, I believe in one place, that all the Japanese intentions were known on December 6. Well, that would imply that you even knew that Pearl Harbor was the attack target, you see. But when you get underneath, what he was doing was evaluating, giving his opinion of the messages.

Now, therefore, that distinction being borne in mind, and realizing that Captain Safford said this, and yet it is based on the wind code, that is one reason why it is magnified out of all proportion.

Another reason was the dramatic thing about the missing implement message, whether somebody swiped it and whether somebody destroyed it. That gave rise to a matter of importance.

Mr. GEARHART. And it gave suggestion to others to deny that there was a winds execute message and some people have done so, isn't that so?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't know what suggestion may have been given to other people, what suggestion may have been created in their minds, but I agree with you, Mr. Gearhart, the winds code set-up and the query and implement message is magnified out of all proportion to all the aspects of this tragedy.

[11945] Mr. GEARHART. The most that could be said of the winds message, if there was a winds message, is that it added one more element of evidence to an abundance of evidence to the same result already in the record and not denied by anyone?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right, that war is going to happen between the United States and Japan imminently.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I think there are some questions very, very much more important than the winds message. I am just wondering if you investigated them with the same zeal that you did the winds message.

For instance, the greatest mystery of all of these Pearl Harbor investigations is the mystery of where the Chief of Staff of the Army was and where the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy was on the night of December 6, 1941. Did you go into that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He told us, I think—I am not sure now—that he couldn't recall. I am not sure.

Mr. GEARHART. That is the amazing evidence before this committee and that was before every other committee that has investigated this thing back to the very event of Pearl Harbor. "I don't remember where I was Saturday night the 6th of December 1941." That is the amazing assertion of all of these investigations and no one seems to have [11946] been interested enough to try to find out how it happened that these top men in both the Army and the Navy don't remember where they were on the night of December 6, 1941, though

they remember where they were all during the day of December 6 and everything they did on the day of December 7 of 1941.

Colonel CLAUSEN: Well, you see, Mr. Gearhart, the 13-part message that gave the 13 parts of the Jap reply to the Secretary of State's answer to the Japanese, that came in the night of December 6. I showed by my affidavit of General Miles that he knew about it that night.

Mr. GEARHART. That who knew about it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. General Miles.

Mr. GEARHART. General Miles knew about it. There were a lot of high dignitaries of both the Army and the Navy that knew about it because they received the message that night, the first 13 parts.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, Mr. Gearhart, if I remember General Miles correctly, he testified before me that he was dining I think with Admiral Wilkinson—

Mr. GEARHART. That is right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. And somebody brought it out to Admiral Wilkinson's home and so it was purely, you might say, accidentally that he, being there at the time, was [11947] apprised of it.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right. He got it from the message that was brought by Captain Kramer that night.

Now, here you were under an injunction to do something about the personnel that were under a cloud as a result of investigations to look into it further and see if you couldn't clear some of that fog away.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir, Mr. Gearhart, it is not the way you ask the question.

Mr. GEARHART. I don't want to have you draw any invidious conclusions. I want you to understand that I think you were under injunction to do justice to those people by revealing evidence in their favor or evidence against them what the facts were as to those people that were under a cloud; isn't that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Not those under a cloud. As I said yesterday I don't want to try to forecast what General Cramer may have had in his mind, but what people I had in mind were those participants, in any way remotely connected with Pearl Harbor and, as I answered to Mr. Keefe, the people involved, and who they were are set forth in my exhibit here. There were some 15 who had testified before the Grunert Board and some 35 who were new witnesses. And if you turn to my exhibit C and see the leads and run it down you see what leads I was working on.

[11948] Mr. GEARHART. What I thought you were supposed to do, I thought you were given a free hand and told to go out and clear up these mysteries and I wondered why you hadn't given your first attention to the greatest mystery of all.

Colonel CLAUSEN. What is that, Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. GEARHART. Where General Marshall was and where Admiral Stark was on the night before when things were happening with such rapidity.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Gearhart, when a man tells you he can't recall where he was on a certain night, I mean, if that is his answer, that he can't recall where he was on a certain night, and you have got all of these other things to do, I mean, you have got magic to go into—

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; magic figures very largely in this question.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I mean.

Mr. GEARHART. Where General Marshall was on the night of the 6th?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, Mr. Gearhart. Listen——

Mr. GEARHART. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Just take, Mr. Gearhart——

Mr. GEARHART. Go ahead.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Let me answer you. You are saying that where General Marshall was on the night of the 6th [11949] of December is the most important.

I am telling you that to my mind—and you may be right, I don't know—the magic was the most important to me, because here we had sat for over 3 months, mind you, I preparing questions and asking questions and finding out about SOP's and war plans, and going to Hawaii, holding hearings in San Francisco, Washington, and Hawaii, and not knowing a blooming thing about magic.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you considered magic the most important?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; to me it was.

Mr. GEARHART. I think magic has a very, very direct connection with the absence of General Marshall on the night of the 6th, and for that reason in order to emphasize that, I will read you a paragraph from the report of the Army Board, from page 56 of the United States News.

We have here these words:

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

Subsection C:

To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though [11950] there was ample time to have accomplished this.

That is the finding and the conclusion and the indictment, if you please, of the Army Board itself, and that ties in the absence of General Marshall with magic as closely as any two ideas could be associated.

Did not that paragraph, with which you were thoroughly familiar, generate in your mind the thought that you should look into it as deeply as you could, as to where General Marshall was on the night of December 6?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Gearhart, to be entirely fair now——

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I say, to be entirely fair, you must realize that the Board when it made its findings and conclusions, not only the report that you are reading from, but the top secret report, did not have the benefit of this magic information. Now——

Mr. GEARHART. You had heard about the magic information during the last 2 or 3 weeks of your Board's investigation, hadn't you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. I think it was in the last week.

Mr. GEARHART. In the last week, and now we know more [11951] about magic.

Colonel CLAUSEN. We know a lot more now; yes.

Mr. GEARHART. We know that there were a great many intercepts translated on the night and during the day of the 6th day of December 1941; don't we?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I don't know what you mean by a great many.

Mr. GEARHART. In Exhibit No. 1, I have found over 20 messages.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is the reason I don't like to answer. I don't know what you mean.

Mr. GEARHART. Over 20 messages were decoded, intercepted, and decoded on the 6th day of December.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I say, I don't like to answer—

Mr. GEARHART. And during all of the night up from the evening hours, rather, straight through the 13 parts and the pilot message, they were coming in one after the other, being decoded, information which General Marshall should have had.

So you, in spite of that evidence of the tremendous volume of intercepts that were dealt with that night, you did not feel it was incumbent upon you to try to find out by independent evidence where General Marshall was on that occasion?

[11952] Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, as I said before, Mr. Gearhart, in the first place, I don't like to answer "Yes," when you say "great volume," because I don't know whether your mind and my mind have the same thought as to what a great volume means.

Mr. GEARHART. I fixed that by saying 20 intercepts appear in exhibit No. 1, as having been translated for the first time on the 6th day of December. How many other intercepts are printed in the other exhibits as having been intercepted or decoded on that day, I don't know. But 20, over 20, is considerable in my estimate, and among those 20 was the 13 parts and the pilot message, on the Japanese answer to the Hull proposals. And the Board condemns General Marshall because he wasn't around on the night of December 6 receiving and acting upon such intercepts.

Didn't that suggest to you that you should try to look into it and try to find some independent evidence?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did, but listen, Mr. Gearhart, you can't have a chief of staff be a superhuman man, in 20 different places at one time. Mr. Gearhart, you have got the tremendous magnitude of a world to consider. You have got—

Mr. GEARHART. That is correct, but—

Colonel CLAUSEN. Just let me finish, please.

[11953] Mr. GEARHART. You were in the Judge Advocate General's Department—

Colonel CLAUSEN. Let me finish, Mr. Gearhart.

You have got the world to consider. You have got global consideration. You have got first and foremost a G-2 when it comes to information of that kind. So I did follow it down. Nobody had shown that General Miles had this thing.

In other words, the 13-part message.

Mr. GEARHART. You were in the Judge Advocate General's Department, and were supposed to be familiar with Army Regulations; were you not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, Mr. Gearhart, you are not going to catechize me on Army regulations now; are you?

Mr. GEARHART. Well, doesn't a member of the Judge Advocate General's Department have to do with regulations?

Colonel CLAUSEN. From time to time; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you know that the Chief of Staff of the Army is on duty for 24 hours a day; do you not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what we are supposed to be. We are supposed to be on duty. I don't think that means that you can't go out and take a horseback ride or exercise.

Mr. GEARHART. It means that his office is open for 24 hours a day; doesn't it?

[11954] Colonel CLAUSEN. The office; yes.

Like the Supreme Court—I think it never closes—our California Supreme Court. Isn't that right?

Mr. GEARHART. That is right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. But I bet the justices go out to play golf on Sundays once in a while.

Mr. GEARHART. I will get to that, but answer my question.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You are asking about 24-hour duty.

Mr. GEARHART. He is on duty for 24 hours a day.

Colonel CLAUSEN. It is obvious, Mr. Gearhart, that you have got to sleep. You can't sit at a desk 24 hours; that isn't what it means.

Mr. GEARHART. But it means you must be in touch with your office, in touch with your command, for the full 24 hours of the day, doesn't it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It means what it says.

Mr. GEARHART. That places upon the Commander in Chief—

Colonel CLAUSEN. Let me go on. One of the things it means, it means that you must have a staff functioning, and he had G-2's, G-3's, G-1's, G-4's, all the G's.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. His G-2 got the information the night of December 6.

[11955] Mr. GEARHART. But isn't it a fact that the personnel of the Army, that is on duty for 24 hours a day by Army regulations, should always leave word, the Chief of Staff should always leave word as to where he can be found every minute of the day if necessary?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't know of any such regulation.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you mean to say that General Marshall came to his office and stayed there when he pleased, and when he left, never left word where he could be contacted if anything should arise?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I mean, Mr. Gearhart, he did just the opposite. You were asking about regulations.

Mr. GEARHART. Of course, it is logical to reason it out, isn't it, that he left word at the office where he could be found in case of emergency at all times; isn't that correct, whether in the city or out of the city?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The way they have things set up in the Army they just overdo what you are talking about.

In other words, you have to sign in and you have to sign out. I assume that if anybody wanted to get ahold of General Marshall, the night of the 6th of December they could have easily done so.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you in your efforts to investigate the subject and assist the General in recollecting where he [11956] was, query or make any investigation of the office of the Secretary of the Chief of Staff of the Army, to find out whether they kept any records of where the Commander in Chief could be found?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think you will find, Mr. Gearhart, in some of the affidavits given before me, some statements, to the effect that the Chief of Staff could be reached. Something to that effect.

[11957] Mr. GEARHART. Well, you knew that the Chief of Staff was in Washington on the day of the attack, he was in Washington the day before the attack, and we know also from the testimony of Justice Roberts that General Marshall and Admiral Stark were assisting him within 2 or 3 days, up to 10 days after the event in the gathering of the facts together concerning Pearl Harbor. Certainly he ought to be able to remember at that time, the time of the Roberts report, as to where he was, but strange to say he didn't remember at the time of the Roberts investigation where he was the night before Pearl Harbor.

Then there came a succession of other investigations in all of which General Marshall participated and in none of them was he able to refresh his memory.

I was wondering what you were trying to do in your investigation to bring out some facts by which General Marshall's testimony might have been refreshed as to where he was on the night of December 6.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Gearhart, you see, the best way to get the answer to the question about the availability of the Chief of Staff on the night of December 6, is to read the affidavits. I pick up at random the one of his secretary, and he is talking about the 13-part message, the last sentence. He says:

[11958] With regard to the secretariate if he had been informed of the contents or of their urgent nature—

They are speaking of the 13 parts—

It would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either by the officer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself.

I assume that means what it says. In other words, they could have gotten the Chief of Staff.

Mr. GEARHART. If that is true then Gen. Bedell Smith knew where General Marshall was the night before. Certainly he has learned that General Marshall has forgotten.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is a nonsequitur that you are saying.

Mr. GEARHART. Let us talk English for the present.

Mr. MURPHY. "It does not follow."

Mr. GEARHART. I know what it means.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You gave us, Mr. Gearhart, *defunctus officio*.

Mr. GEARHART. I thought you would enjoy that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is California Latin. They did not understand it, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, then, if that is true, if General Smith did know where General Marshall could be reached on Saturday night, how does it happen he has not reminded General [11959] Marshall where the general was?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is not what he said.

Mr. GEARHART. He said he could have gotten it to him.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Here is what he says:

It would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure either by the officer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself.

Mr. GEARHART. But that presupposes that somebody knew where General Marshall was.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I am trying to say—that it would seem to me, based on this, that if the Chief of Staff needed to be reached on the night of December 6 he could have been reached.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, he is bitterly condemned by the Board because he wasn't around on December 6 when these messages were coming in.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Gearhart, let me point out—be fair—you are speaking of a board report, the Grunert board, and which I am proud to have been a member of, in a subordinate, very minor, capacity, say, as an assistant lawyer—but they didn't have the magic information; they didn't know that General Miles the night of December 6 had the 13th part.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Now, since General Marshall [11960] couldn't remember, and has not been able to remember or refresh his memory during all of these 8 or 9 or 10 investigations, and when he comes here in 1946 and says that he cannot remember where he was, did you try to find out by a search for independent evidence as to where he could have been?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Where General Marshall was?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

[11961] Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you see, Mr. Gearhart, I interrogated all the witnesses on the aspects of magic. I am just trying to thumb through here and find a few references.

I found General Smith's recollection. I thought General Gerow said something about it.

Mr. GEARHART. General Smith's testimony presupposes, doesn't it, the assumption that somebody knew where General Marshall was on that night?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No. It presupposes this—that the Chief of Staff, according to the procedure set up in his office, would have had machinery so that if you pressed a button you would ipso facto see the Chief of Staff. I see here where General Gerow said something about a December 4 incident. He says:

I believe the Chief of Staff was then available for that purpose.

In other words, for a conference.

I think you will find through here, Mr. Gearhart—I think you will find through here plenty of evidence that according to the procedure then in operation, if it became necessary to see the Chief of Staff the night of December 6, he could have been seen.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, now—

[11962] Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't know—Mr. Gearhart, let's prove the negative—I don't know of anybody that tried to see the Chief of Staff the night of December 6 and could not find him.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, maybe there will be some testimony that they were trying to deliver to him, as they delivered to other people, these intercepts.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Colonel Bratton testified before me that he gave the 13 parts to Colonel Dusenbury to bring to the Chief of Staff at his home at Fort Myer, Colonel Dusenbury living in Arlington, or that side of the Potomac, and I believe Colonel Bratton said he gave it to Colonel Dusenbury to bring to the Chief of Staff on his way home, and then Colonel Dusenbury told me in his affidavit that he didn't deliver them to the Chief of Staff then; that he didn't deliver them until the next morning.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, now, did you ask General Smith what the basis of his assertion was that he could have contacted General Marshall that night?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Oh, I asked about the procedure, and I talked with General Deane; I interviewed him, got an affidavit from him at Potsdam. He was there during the Peace Conference.

Mr. GEARHART. But you didn't do anything to find out?

[11963] Colonel CLAUSEN. I did all these things, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. General Marshall has testified that he had three orderlies that served 24 hours a day at his home. Did you interview those orderlies as to whether they had any remembrance of where the general was on the night of December 6?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. General Marshall had an automobile assigned to him and a series of chauffeurs. Did you ask any of those chauffeurs as to where General Marshall was on the night of December 6, 1941?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Gearhart, if the thought had occurred to me—I mean, if it had come into my mind—to go and see the orderlies, or the chauffeurs, I would have dismissed it from my mind as attacking one of the tiny twigs on the tree when my job was to attack the roots.

Mr. GEARHART. The great mystery of this whole Pearl Harbor investigation is where the Chief of Staff was on the night of December 6 and where the Chief of Naval Operations was on the night of December 6, 1941.

Now, if you had been able to find some evidence which you could have brought to General Marshall to refresh his memory, would you have considered that beneath your dignity in your special capacity as a special investigator into this [11964] great catastrophe?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Gearhart, I tried to tell you that I had no dignity. My dignity was comparable to that of a major, and in this man's Army a major is very, very low, and a lieutenant colonel I don't think is much higher. I apologize for that.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I rather resent you speaking so disparagingly of colonels, since I was a second lieutenant once. Where does that put me?

But the point is this: Here for 6 years we have gone on with the same mystery, and no one seems to have made a common ordinary district attorney investigation to assist General Marshall in remembering where he was, when there are, in my imagination's eyes, perhaps a hundred people who might have been able to throw some light on that question.

For instance, the chauffeurs for General Marshall's automobile; the orderlies in General Marshall's home; the cook in General Marshall's home; and the office staff here were supposed to keep a record of what the Chief of Staff of the Army is doing at all times.

None of these people seem to have been interrogated by anybody in any of these investigations. There is the mystery of where he was.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Gearhart—

[11965] Mr. GEARHART. The mystery still remains—the big mystery of the Pearl Harbor investigation after 5 years of investigation. How do you account for that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you want me to answer your opinion. I can't very well argue with you; I means, it isn't my function. I am here as a witness. But I don't agree; in other words, I don't think that is the big mystery of Pearl Harbor at all.

The big mystery—there are some big high lights.

Query: What information did Washington have?

Query: What did Washington do about it?

Another question: What information did Hawaii have?

Another question: What did Hawaii do about it?

I mean, those are basic big questions. Those are the things I had in mind.

Mr. GEARHART. Those are the big things, but this question of the whereabouts of the Chief of Staff of the Army is so important in the mind of the Grunert Board that they make it a specification upon which to condemn the general.

Colonel CLAUSEN. And I say to you quite frankly, Mr. Gearhart, I am very proud to have been a subordinate member of the board; but, Mr. Gearhart, again remember the board made its finding at a time when they did not have the magic.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but—

[11966] Colonel CLAUSEN. Did not know that General Miles knew the night of December 6 about the 13 parts. I would suggest, Mr. Gearhart—

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you see that the subsequent discovery of magic and all its ramifications merely intensifies and makes more important the basis of the specification upon which the Grunert Board condemns General Marshall?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; you are not correct, Mr. Gearhart. I would suggest to you that you get the actual transcript volumes of the Grunert Board.

In other words, what we called before the board; the secret volumes. Not the top secret; the secret volumes. Read that testimony. Read, for example, the testimony of General Miles.

Here is a man—I remember how he sat there when he was not allowed to give magic information, and we were asking him all kinds of questions about what he knew in Washington, and whether he got his information from spies, and why didn't he have spies out in the islands; and, of course, when the magic picture was unfolded, it was a different story. We knew what he was getting. We got that right out of the horse's mouth.

You find out the enemy's intentions, because they speak their intentions..

[11967] Therefore, I do not think that the Army Pearl Harbor Board report should be read word for word, because they did not have before them the magic.

Mr. GEARHART. That is just the point that I have been making. They had slight knowledge of the magic when they wrote that report.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; that is not fair.

Mr. GEARHART. Wait a minute. You said they only in the last week of their investigation—

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Gearhart—

Mr. GEARHART. Of the existence of magic. Didn't you say that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Not exactly. That is not the sum total. I understand that the three general officers were told by General Marshall in a general way at the first hearing about the magic. Now, the lawyers—that is, Colonel West and myself—weren't told about it. We didn't know anything about it. They didn't tell us, because there was a war going on. I am not drawing any comparisons, or making

any assertions that by reason of the fact we weren't told it was wrong, but the fact is that we did not know about this magic. We were so scared of it that finally, when we did know, it became a frightening aspect as to what to do with these papers; and we gave General Russell—I mean, the board gave General Russell—the job to take care of the Hart report.

[11968] Mr. GEARHART. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. And they got a special file; nobody but he was supposed to have the combination.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. With the very, very limited information of the Grunert Board in respect to magic, they nevertheless condemned General Marshall in these words:

to get to General Short on the evening of December 6 and the early morning of December 7 the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan.

That is a reference to intercepts, isn't it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. And let me point out—now, be fair—

Mr. GEARHART. Don't raise the question of my fairness. I am trying to get answers.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let him answer the question.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I say that to be fair you must consider in connection with your question, sir, the fact that there was testimony, positive testimony, before the Board that there had been delivered to General Bedell Smith the 13 parts, and certainly the indication that they went the night of December 6 to the Chief of Staff. Later on, the witness who made that assertion corrected his testimony that he, the night of December 6, was more concerned with getting the 13 parts to the Secretary of State; that that involved a diplomatic matter, those were diplomatic questions; and [11969] the Chief of Staff said that he didn't get them, and it was borne out by the fact that the man who was supposed to have brought them around, Colonel Dusenbury, frankly and honestly told me that he didn't do the job.

Mr. GEARHART. I must comment you in being so ingenious in turning the question, but the question is that the specification condemning General Marshall is based upon the fact that he did not pass on to General Short critical information.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well—

Mr. GEARHART. Now, wait. You say that that critical information was very limited.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No—

Mr. GEARHART. And it was so far as the Board knew at that time—now, wait a minute; hold your horses. After and during the course of your investigation you learned all about the critical information, and you find that there is a tremendous amount of that critical information that was subject to dissemination in the Army and which should have been called to the attention of the Chief of Staff of the Army. So this specification in condemnation of General Marshall becomes more significant and is sustained by the subsequent knowledge that you acquired of all about the intercepts.

[11970] Colonel CLAUSEN. No; that doesn't follow, Mr. Gearhart, for the reason, as I said before, that the last week of the Board's hearings they first found out the details of magic, and as to who it

went to, what it was, what it consisted of, who got it, et cetera, was not thoroughly pursued and explored by the Board.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; I admit that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Whose function is it to send out G-2 information?

Mr. GEARHART. There was the function of taking it to the Chief of Staff of the Army and to other persons on the list as distributees. One of the persons who was supposed to get all this information doesn't remember where he was on that night and didn't get it that night, and therefore didn't act on it that night, and therefore is condemned for it.

I say in justice to that individual you should have directed your investigation to all of the collateral information that could have been collected for the purpose of assisting him in recalling where he was in order that he could better defend himself against these accusations.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Gearhart, if you and I in Fresno were trying a damage action involving automobiles, we are going to be following, according to the judge, the rules of the road. We are going to square our proof to certain . [11971] rules, certain standards.

Now, in assessing responsibility against Army officers you can't just discard all the rules of the military. You have to consider the military rules. They are contained in books. There is nothing secret about it. The functions of the staff officers and what they are supposed to do. And your proof here, or in any other case involving the military, must be by the standards of the military.

Mr. GEARHART. And that, you think, foreclosed you from interrogating General Marshall's chauffeurs or his orderlies, his office staff and any other persons who might know where he was and from whose statement his memory might be refreshed?

Colonel CLAUSEN. If I found him the night of 6 December, he still didn't get the 13 parts, and his G-2, the man supposed to be charged with certain aspects and obligations, just like the Chief of Staff, he did know.

Mr. GEARHART. But no one had any right to act except the Chief of Staff.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, I don't consider that to be so. There again it brings up what I mentioned. What are the military rules? What do the rules say? Who was supposed to act on what, what question? There is no secret about those things.

[11972] Mr. GEARHART. The one supposed to act is the one who must do something about information that has been brought to his attention.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I remember some testimony by General Marshall to the effect that in his absence other people could act. I don't recall the precise details.

Mr. GEARHART. He made a specific order requiring them to send him the intercept itself and not to send him alone the interpretation of any other Government officer.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I understand. I understand he wanted them, as I say, in the raw.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. He wanted the intercepts in the raw, unevaluated.

Mr. GEARHART. When he did get this information on the late morning of the 7th he acted on it, it was General Marshall who acted on it, wasn't it, but unfortunately acted too late?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you are asking me for my memory as to the testimony. As I recall it on the morning of the 7th he had on his desk the 13 parts I believe with the 14-part message, and he also had the 1 o'clock message. When he got down to the 1 o'clock message, why, he saw that there was a great significance. I mean, he assumed there [11973] was a great significance concerning that because he thought it was an ultimatum date or time, rather.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, strange though enough it may seem the same lack of memory as to where he was on the night of December 6 is the story of the Chief of Naval Operations, too; is that not correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, can't he remember where he was?

Mr. GEARHART. No, neither the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations can remember where they were on the night of December 6, even though they were in their offices during all the day of December 6 and were on the job on the early morning of December 7. That is the greatest mystery of this investigation.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't agree with you, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. If you did you would have investigated it, wouldn't you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I can't put it in more graphic form.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. I not only yield but I surrender the witness.

Mr. LUCAS. I suggest to the Congressman that the committee is still functioning and that we might get those orderlies, those chauffeurs, those shoe clerks, and one thing and another.

[11974] Mr. GEARHART. You will find them all over the world and some of them, perhaps, under the sod.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel, as I understand it before the Grunert Board they had in the last week certain information about the 13 parts. Did they know what the 13 parts were of the 14-part message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; General Russell finally got from G-2 a sheaf of these intercepts, Mr. Murphy, and they were then introduced before our Board as Top Secret Exhibit "B".

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, the Board had the 13 parts so they could read it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; we had the 14 parts.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I am talking about the 13 parts because the 14th part didn't come in until Sunday.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Did the Board have any information before it on the pilot message? The pilot message was the one that came in saying there would be a long message and it would be in 14 parts.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, the Board had that in its Top Secret Exhibit "B," but I want you to understand that they hadn't run down as to who had gotten what, and so forth.

[11975] Mr. MURPHY. That is what I am coming to. Did the Board have any information concerning the pilot message, that is the preliminary message saying there would be a message in 14 parts, did the Board have any information as to when it was delivered to General Marshall?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Oh, I think in the testimony——

Mr. MURPHY. I don't want any guesses now.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean that 1 o'clock?

Mr. MURPHY. I want to know whether the Board knew when the pilot message, not the 1 o'clock message now, the so-called pilot message, the message that said there will be a message in 14 parts, a long message—do you know anything about that particular message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I know the one you are referring to.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, did the Board have any definite information as to when it was delivered, if at all, to General Marshall?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The answer is hard to give for the reason that the testimony in that regard was—well, it just was by, I think, one or two witnesses and the details, Mr. Murphy, were not clear at all.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate there has been much said here about where General Marshall was on the night of the 6th. General Marshall told this committee in this record that he [11976] felt he was at home, in his own home, and we have had no evidence to contradict that, not a single word of evidence in this record that the General was not at home on that night.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't know that he said that. That just proves further what I said before, that I haven't found anybody who brought it to him on the night of 6 December and could not.

Mr. GEARHART. Will the gentleman yield? That is another strange statement. The General said that he may have gone to a picture show, that he had not seen a picture for a long time; that he went to look at his wife's social book and it didn't show that he had been out for dinner that night and therefore he concluded that he was at home. He didn't say that he was at home but he didn't remember any place that he might have gone to that night.

Mr. MURPHY. He said that he didn't know whether he was out or whether he was in.

Now, as I understand it, you did not inquire whether he had grape-nuts or grapefruit for breakfast.

Mr. GEARHART. If that would have been relevant, I would have asked him.

Mr. MURPHY. Just a moment. You were assigned to do important things, you were assigned to investigate important matters.

[11977] Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And that is what you did?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. As a matter of fact, when this Board made its report they said this:

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall——

Mr. RICHARDSON. What page are you reading from?

Mr. MURPHY. Page 56 of the United States News. [Reading]:

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars.

Mr. Gearhart read subsection C:

To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan.

Now, then, do you know, sir, what information General Marshall would have sent to General Short on the night of the 6th?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; that would be speculative.

Mr. MURPHY. On the night of the 6th there were 13 parts of an incomplete message. Do you know whether or [11978] not the Board felt that he should have sent the 13 parts out to General Short to read them? I mean is that what the Board meant?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I don't know. I don't know what the Board meant.

Senator BREWSTER. I think you will find very clearly what the Board felt on that if you will refer to page 62 and read what the Board said, because they discussed that matter very thoroughly.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you through?

Senator BREWSTER. Well, it is there if the gentleman is interested in that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will be in order.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, at the time of the interruption you said you did not understand.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I said I did not like to answer what the Board may have felt.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, they also include the early morning of December 7 and I assume there they are speaking of the 14-part message or the 1 o'clock message. Did they have information about the 1 o'clock message, the board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. We had some testimony before the board as to the 1 o'clock message. The exact details I do not know. I tell you what we had, Mr. Murphy. As I said before, [11979] we had the Hart examination and we had Colonel Bratton testify, Colonel Sadtler testify, Captain Safford testify.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any further questions? If not—

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have another question, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, more than one.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Clausen, did you make any investigation as to who saw General Short's reply to General Marshall's message of the 27th of November?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The reply being the alerting against sabotage, liaison with Navy?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, that he alerted against sabotage.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I believe it was gone into to some extent. I cannot remember, Mr. Ferguson, whether I have got comments on that, whether I had that in mind. I remember that in one particular I wanted to know whether that was sent over to the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that was one of the things that was—

Colonel CLAUSEN. I am in the process of answering, Mr. Ferguson.

[11980] Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I noticed in the Navy Court of Inquiry proceedings that there was some admiral, I don't like to put the name down definitely, whether it was Turner—I don't recall, but some admiral saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. But who in the Army saw it? It was very vital as to who saw it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, accepted responsibility, in my opinion, of seeing that. In other words, he had a stamp on it and said he presumed he saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Then there was General Gerow. I think he initialed it, I am not sure. I would like to see it if I am to be tied down.

Senator FERGUSON. You are right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. And then there was Mr. Stimson here, I think his initials were on it and I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, the fact that General Marshall accepted the responsibility of seeing it, that ended it as far as you were concerned?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, no; he said he presumed he saw it, Mr. Ferguson.

[11981] Senator FERGUSON. Now, did he ever deny to you that he saw the 13 parts on the night of the 6th? Did you ever question General Marshall about whether he saw the 13 parts on the night of the 6th?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The whole subject was gone into and there was testimony, you see, from the General. I should have included him in the former answer. The General testified to magic, too. In other words, he was quizzed as to what he knew and you will find his testimony at several places in what we call the Top Secret Report of the Board, I mean the Top Secret testimony, transcript.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is what I am trying to get at: You did not question him to get an affidavit from him as to whether or not he ever saw the reply, this reply, because you say he assumed that. Now I am going to the 13 parts. You never questioned him about whether or not he saw the 13 parts on the night of the 6th?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I talked over the subject with him, Mr. Ferguson, and he couldn't add anything to his testimony on that subject before the Board.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, why didn't you put that in the affidavit then, in the Marshall affidavit?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was not proving negatives. I mean I had the Top Secret transcript of the Board for that purpose. [11982]

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you try to follow the so-called pilot message at all? Did you ever question Bratton about when he delivered the pilot message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I questioned them all, Mr. Ferguson. That is the reason I took the things around and you will find the references in the affidavits to—

Senator FERGUSON. Where is there any reference in any affidavit that you took in relation to the pilot message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Why, it is in almost everyone, where I refer to these intercepts, because it is part of the top secret exhibit B and my procedure was to ask them concerning the papers in the top secret exhibit B, so what I did was would be to ask the various witnesses, for example, like General Gerow, I would hand him these papers and I would say, "Do you recall seeing these?" Lots of times they would say they couldn't remember, you would get varying answers.

Senator FERGUSON. But the pilot message is a specific, very important message, because it indicated that this message——

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I think they are all important in there, Mr. Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, don't let's go around the bush too many times. Let's keep on the pilot message.

[11983] Colonel CLAUSEN. It is not fair because your characterization, Mr. Ferguson, honestly on the one message as being the important one but to me I thought everyone that General Russell selected and put down were important.

Senator FERGUSON. Coming back to the pilot message, did you know that the pilot message was decrypted, decoded, and translated by 2 o'clock on the 6th of December 1941?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean 2 o'clock in the afternoon?

Senator FERGUSON. Afternoon.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I assume it is in there, wherever we have it. I mean if you say that is a fact. I went over to get the affidavit and tried to find out and run down those things, too. I mean by that I went over their proceedings and there seemed to be some confusion. There would be confusion as who got what and who translated it and during these last days——

Senator FERGUSON. Where is the evidence on the confusion? If you found it wouldn't that be important to give to the Secretary of War, about this confusion?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You have got the actual transcripts. In other words, for example, one place, I think it is Captain Safford said that the Army translated the message. I remember Colonel Bratton said it was the Navy and during the last days there when they were supposed to be working back and [11984] forth there on odd and even days, the Navy were doing it on odd days, the Army on even, they would also cut across that line. In other words, you could not depend on that as a rigid guide.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Clausen, if the pilot message was in the Army, as I say, translated and ready for delivery at 2 o'clock p. m. on the afternoon of the 6th, did you investigate as to why General Marshall had not at least seen that message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I say to you, Mr. Ferguson, that I do not know what the record and the evidence shows on that. I do not like to be tied down to these times.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make any investigation as to whether or not the pilot message was or was not delivered to General Marshall on the afternoon or evening of the 6th?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I give you the same answer, Mr. Ferguson. In other words, I cannot recall just what there is in there on that subject. I do know that I tried to find out in general about who got what messages when.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Show me——

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator Ferguson, there was no sure way; I mean by that every statement on receipt had said that when a person receipted for that the receipts were later destroyed. In other words, I ran it down. I am not sure now [11985] but I think Colonel Bratton gave some testimony in his affidavit because I wanted to find out if I could just how it was done.

Senator FERGUSON. But in the Dusenbury affidavit, in the Bratton affidavit do you mention the pilot message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It is included in top secret B.

Senator FERGUSON. No, no. Show me where you include the pilot message in the Bratton affidavit, where you asked him specifically about the pilot message? You asked him specifically about the 13-part message.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, what I said before will have to stand, I am sorry, because I had these intercepts in what I called top secret exhibit B and my procedure was to show them to the people. Now, I have before me the affidavit of General Gerow. He says here—

Senator FERGUSON. Let us get back to this pilot message.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I want to answer your question, Mr. Ferguson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just read him the question and see what it was. I have been lost for 5 minutes on this. Read him the question.

(Question read.)

Senator FERGUSON. Don't get to Gerow. Let us keep to [11986] these two. In either one of those affidavits do you mention to those gentlemen the pilot message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think you will find I have if you refer to what I said.

Senator FERGUSON. Point it out.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I have reference to top secret exhibit B.

Senator FERGUSON. No; point out where you mention any pilot message to either one of those gentlemen.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The whole is composed of its parts and if the top secret exhibit B had the pilot message in there it was done in that way.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't this true? Did you go to Bratton and specifically question him about the testimony that he had already given before the Board that he had delivered the 13-part message? There isn't any doubt in your mind that he testified before the Board and you heard him testify, that he had delivered the 13 parts on Saturday night to Bedell Smith and told him they were important? Is there any question in your mind about that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I refer back to what I said before to Mr. Keefe concerning my interview of Colonel Bratton, that I mentioned to him the whole subject that we are talking about now and then I wanted to show him the papers. I had these [11987] papers with me, so he was shown these. Now, if he had—

Senator FERGUSON. What was he shown? Tell us now.

Colonel CLAUSEN. He was shown the statements and affidavits of Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, Moses W. Pettigrew, Ralph C. Smith, Charles K. Gailey, Thomas J. Betts, Walter B. Smith, Leonard T. Gerow, Robert E. Schukraft, John F. Stone, George W. Renchard. Now—

Senator FERGUSON. Just there. Did you show him at the same time his testimony before the board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I had a transcript with the testimony taken down.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question. Did you show it to him?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. I had other notes.

Senator FERGUSON. Please answer my question. Did you show him a copy of the testimony he had given before the board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I say I did not show him that but I did have with me and read to him my notes on the testimony, given before the board. In other words, I had taken a brief of the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, isn't this true, Colonel? Isn't this true that Clausen, being asked in an affidavit to change his sworn testimony—

[11988] Colonel CLAUSEN. Clausen? You mean Bratton.

Senator FERGUSON. Bratton, being asked to change his sworn testimony before a Board of Generals appointed by the Secretary of War—

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is not so and never was so and never would be so in my case because I did not ask him to change anything.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you go to him?

Colonel CLAUSEN. For the reason that I wanted to find out about this. The other men, Mr. Ferguson, who testified concerning the same subjects that Colonel Bratton testified about gave great details and those details were different than Colonel Bratton had testified about and I remembered that Colonel Bratton when he testified stated that he was pressing his recollection, that he could not recollect, that he could not verify.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think in your experience as a lawyer that when Bratton was before that board testifying that he gave Bedell Smith these papers on the night of the 6th, did you think that he was mistaken and did not know what he was talking about in that testimony before the board where you were the attorney and assistant recorder?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did not say that he was—I mean I don't think that conclusion came to my mind. That was not [11989] my point, that was not my purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. No; but you were the record and the attorney there. Why didn't you tell the board that you did not believe Bratton before the board?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Why didn't I tell the board?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. What do you mean, I did not believe him before the board? You are assuming something that is not correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you believe him?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I believed every witness before the board. I said before that I thought all the witnesses told the truth as they knew it at the time, but you cannot drag a man in during the last days of a hearing and have him come in there under the circumstances that we were operating under and expect that that testimony in this vital testimony should not have further verifications. If he said at the time that he can't verify, can't prove certain statements, which I think he said, that would mean that you would have to go out and get further proof in verification.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did Bedell Smith actually swear that Bratton did not deliver the messages to him?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, he said what he said in his affidavit.

[11990] Senator FERGUSON. He had no definite recollection that he did not or that he did. He said he thought he went home.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is his recollection, Mr. Ferguson. That is all any witness can do, is give his best recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go back to Bratton to get him to confirm his testimony or to change it in line with the affidavits of Dusenbury and Smith?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; I did not go with any such purpose as that. I went to him and stated what these men had stated and to get the further details, because I was pursuing all the leads.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on page 52 of the report of the Board, the Board made a finding on the testimony of Bratton.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Page what?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 52, and this is the United States News edition of Official Reports concerning attack on Pearl Harbor. The Board made a specific finding on Bratton's testimony. [Reading:]

As elsewhere related in detail, when vital information of December 6th reached G-2 of the War Department, not later than nine o'clock the evening of December 6, it was placed in the locked pouch and delivered to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel [11991] Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen. Smith, with a warning from Colonel Bratton, Chief of Far Eastern Section of G-2, that it contained a vitally important message. In fact the message implied war and soon.

Now, there is a specific finding by a Board of three generals appointed by the Secretary of War that Bratton had delivered these 13 parts to Bedell Smith for delivery to the Chief of Staff. Now, why were you going to Bratton with affidavits or papers which showed that he did not deliver it and take an affidavit from Bratton that he did not so deliver that message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I cannot do more than to say what I stated before. One of the very first men that I interviewed in Washington was Colonel Dusenbury and when I showed him these Top Secret exhibits and to try to get the details from him he said it was he who was charged to deliver those particular 13 parts. Then he says in his affidavit—or whatever he says in his affidavit. Now, apparently, then, either one or the other were mistaken.

Senator FERGUSON. No; but what I am trying to get at; why did you go to Dusenbury and to Colonel Bratton? There was a specific finding of facts by the Board.

Colonel CLAUSEN. My heavens—

Senator FERGUSON. Was it because General Marshall objected and the Secretary of War objected to that finding? [11992]

Colonel CLAUSEN. Why, of course not. Sir, I went to Dusenbury as I went to the other witnesses, in pursuance of investigating unexplored leads, the major portion of which and the most important of which were magic and we had to pursue that because in the last week of the Board's proceedings was the only time we had been given the magic, which had theretofore been withheld, and that meant that it was a very vital link that should be explored.

Senator FERGUSON. Now there wasn't any doubt that the board knew about the 13-part message and the delivery date was not involved, because here a board had made a specific finding and you were one of the attorneys of the board.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, would you want me to just stop with the inquiry at that particular point, because there was a finding by the board, when I knew the circumstances? When, by my experience,

my knowledge of the facts, that I had sat on the board for over three months that we had taken testimony and we heard witnesses and we were not interrogating on magic?

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first have doubt in your mind that delivery had not been made on the night of the 6th to the Chief of Staff's office?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I cannot assess any particular moment that I got down to it. I do recall Colonel Dusenbury was one of the first men I talked with.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you question Dusenbury to find out if the 13 parts had been delivered?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I had been told by some one, I do not know who, Senator, that Dusenbury was one of the men involved in this ultra picture before the 7th of December, that he had been charged with this knowledge, and it was [11994] all right for me to talk with him about it. So I just called him and had him come to the office.

Senator FERGUSON. Here are some of your other leads, and I want to know if you took any testimony on them. I will pick out just a few of them. It says:

2. In the War and Navy Department in Washington the following matters can be investigated:

a. Whether Kimmel notified the Navy Department and the Navy Department notified the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, and the reason for such order.

Did you investigate that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I believe that was one of the leads that was considered not necessary to the Army's viewpoint, except that I recall having found—I mean I cannot recall getting any——

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). Now who had the conference and who decided that that was not to be looked into?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I had many conferences, as I said yesterday, with General Cramer, and I had conferences with Mr. Bundy, Harvey H. Bundy, special assistant to the Secretary. You have to again, I repeat, go to my progress reports to find out just what I did. I set it all down there so there would not be any question about it.

[11995] Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us whether or not Mr. Bundy, or General Cramer, actually told you, other than on the ABCD, and the so-called joint agreement, which you told us why you did not investigate. You were specifically told not to go to the White House on them.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was told it was not within the scope of my investigation, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That was after the investigation had been completed abroad and I was back and the war with Japan had been concluded.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. You were told not to go into the White House. Now, were you told by any of these men not to investigate any of these specific items?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Bundy had in mind the injunction of the Secretary that my investigation was not to investigate purely Navy responsibility, personnel or action.

Senator FERGUSON. You see these first items have nothing to do with magic. You do not get to magic until you get to No. 3, concerning the magic intercepts, the ABCD, and so forth.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. These first have nothing to do with magic. For instance, the next one, No. b, did you investigate [11996] this, "What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor?" Did you look into that one?

Colonel CLAUSEN. What was that?

Senator FERGUSON. "What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor?"

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; that is one of the leads on which purely naval aspects appeared to be involved. I do recall, though, having read certain testimony. I went over the Navy proceedings to pick out the Army features. I do not remember exactly. It seems to me, from a sort of curbstone statement, that the Navy condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor was somewhat on the same plane as the Army's. I do not remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand you that when you got this mandate to make this investigation you read over the testimony and if you were satisfied with the testimony you did not make any further investigation?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No.

Senator FERGUSON. If you were not satisfied you went out and got further affidavits?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, that is not it at all. As I said before, I was an assistant to the Secretary and I showed the results of my work from time to time to the Judge Advocate General, to Mr. Bundy, or the progress, what I had [11997] done, what I should do and what I was going to do, and then supplemented that with written reports.

Senator FERGUSON. This is the mandate to you:

Memorandum for Henry C. Clausen, JAG.

Unexplored leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.

Signed by Kramer.

Whether Kimmel had any order from Washington requiring a large part of the Fleet to remain in Pearl Harbor.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is one of the same character. My only recollection on that subject is from having familiarized myself somewhat from the Navy proceedings. It just seems to ring a bell in my mind that he was in command there; he was free to take all the ships from the harbor if he wanted to.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not my question. Did you get any affidavits on that point?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir, I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

"g." This is not the Navy.

Whether the June 1940 alert message to Herron—
that is General Herron—

was specific and indicative of an established War Department policy of being specific when war alerts were believed required by the situation.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I investigated that and got an affidavit from General Herron and attached to it, or quoted [11998] in the affidavit, the specific alert, so there would not be any question about it.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not the question at all. Herron would not know this. This was whether it was indicative of an established War Department policy of being specific when war alerts were delivered, or when war alerts were believed required by the situation. That would have to come out of the War Department here in Washington, not out of Herron in the field.

Colonel CLAUSEN. So far as that is concerned, the most important thing that appeared to me in that connection, Mr. Ferguson, was to get the actual alert, and go to General Herron and have him identify it, and ask him what happened at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Clausen, are you answering my question?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. To find out what the established War Department policy was?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Sure.

[11999] Senator FERGUSON. You said all you wanted to do was to get a copy of the alert and ask Herron if he got it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. It speaks for itself.

Senator FERGUSON. It certainly does. What this question here was, "Was it an established War Department policy?"

Colonel CLAUSEN. If you get the actual document it shows what the policy was.

Senator FERGUSON. And is that the answer now to that question?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is was the policy to be specific?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. I am saying my scope, Mr. Ferguson, did not extend to matters of an analytical military nature.

For example, the Secretary, or the people higher than I, surely would be able to tell from an actual document as to what happened at a certain time, as to what the policy was.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand that you left this question out and did not investigate it, because you thought General Marshall and the Secretary of War would know what it was and there was not any use of you looking into it?

[12000] Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. General Marshall stayed right clear of this whole investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. Why was that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. What is that?

Senator FERGUSON. Why did general Marshall stay clear of this whole investigation?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He did. This was the Secretary's investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it because the Secretary knew what the established policy was and therefore you did not look into it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, he would certainly know.

Senator FERGUSON. And is that the reason you did not look into it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did look into it. I got the documents. Suppose you made a contract in 1936 with a governmental agency and you wanted to find out what the policy was, you would find out what it was by reading it.

Senator FERGUSON. Don't put that in. I am trying to find the policy. You do not find policy by an instrument, do you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Sometimes you do.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you do not say it was the policy to be specific?

[12001] Colonel CLAUSEN. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to have that affidavit of Colonel Dusenbury.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. KEEFE. The affidavit of Colonel Dusenbury that you have repeatedly referred to, Colonel Clausen, in reference to the 14-part message, reads as follows:

During the time in question I was assistant to Colonel Bratton, having reported to him in August, 1940, and continued as his assistant until and after 7 December, 1941. For the four or five months immediately following August 1940, Colonel Bratton received from the Signal Corps, the translated intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages, and delivered certain of these to Colonel Harrison, aide of the Secretary of War; John Stone, Secretary to Secretary of State Hull; Colonel Ralph C. Smith, Executive Officer of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Colonel Bedell Smith, and Colonel Thomas T. Handy, or Colonel Bundy in OPD.

The procedure followed by Colonel Bratton and myself as his assistant was to destroy all copies of the translated intercepts received, except such as were thus distributed, [12002] and those distributed were inserted in binders and delivered to the recipients who receipted for them. These receipts and the intercepts which were covered thereby were then later returned to Colonel Bratton or myself as the case might be, and the receipts and the intercepts were then destroyed, except one copy of the intercept which was retained by G-2.

At the expiration of the four or five months period referred to following August, 1940, Colonel Bratton and I alternated in assembling and delivering these intercepts and continued this practice until about 7 December, 1941, although towards the end of this period I handled the sorting and delivering almost exclusively. No record is now available in G-2, to my knowledge, of the messages which were thus sorted and delivered, and none was kept because of the top secrecy requirements.

While I cannot recollect specifically each message which I delivered, I believe that this information can be obtained elsewhere than in the War Department.

For example, the State Department may have briefed and recorded the intercepts. Normally, we would receive daily about 50 to 75 of these intercepts which would be sorted to about 25 for distribution.

I recall the intercept Tokyo to Washington, consisting [12003] of 14 parts SIS No. 25843, which started coming in the night of 6 December 1941, when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received.

Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p. m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The 14th part being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night. Thereupon, I left and went home. I returned the next morning to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the 14 parts and I began the distribution of the 14 parts comprising this intercept

about 9 a. m., on 7 December, 1941, and finished the delivery to the State Department as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State.

When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Colonel Thomas T. Handy who, upon reading it, said to me, "This means war," or words to that effect. None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December, 1941, because the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night; furthermore, it being late at night when the final part was received, I did not wish to disturb the usual [12004] recipients who probably were at home asleep, as I did not see the implications of immediate hostilities.

It is to be noted that the intercept translation SIS 25843 was received by the Army from the Navy and which indicates that the contents thereof were known to the Navy prior to receipt by the Army.

I recollect that the intercept Tokyo to Washington SIS No. 25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver the reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on 7 December, 1941, was received by G-2 the morning of 7 December, 1941. It is my impression that it was received by Colonel Bratton after he arrived that morning, between 9 and 10 a. m.

I gathered, from listening to your testimony and the conclusion that you had in your mind that after talking with Colonel Dusenbury, you came to the impression in some way that Colonel Bratton had given him this folder with the idea of taking it over to Fort Myer that night, because he, Colonel Dusenbury, lived over in Arlington.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Mr. Keefe, that is what Colonel Bratton said in his affidavit.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you did not get that from Colonel Dusenbury then?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, no. Colonel Bratton said that he, [12005] Colonel Bratton, gave the information to Colonel Dusenbury to take to the Chief of Staff on his, Colonel Dusenbury's, way home.

Mr. KEEFE. Then the further we get into it, the more complex it becomes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is a fact. You said something very true there. There were a lot of inconsistencies and confusions in this thing.

Mr. KEEFE. From reading this affidavit of Colonel Dusenbury, it appears that Bratton went home about 9 p. m., before the first 13 parts were finally assembled.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, and you see, Mr. Keefe, that is one of the reasons I showed that and the other affidavits to Colonel Bratton, because I wanted, in fairness to Colonel Bratton, for him to see what the others said.

Mr. KEEFE. Yet, in the face of Colonel Dusenbury making this one statement that Bratton went home before the 14 parts ever got in, Bratton makes an affidavit to the effect that he delivered the 14 parts to Dusenbury with instructions to deliver them out to General Marshall, because Dusenbury lived over in the general direction of Fort Myer.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You say he delivered it to Dusenbury. I thought that Dusenbury and Colonel Bratton were working together. You see, they were in the same section, Mr. Keefe.

[12006] Mr. KEEFE. I understand that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. If you will read the affidavit of Colonel Bratton you will see precisely what he says.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, this also says that the fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night, and "thereupon I left and went home."

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what he told me.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, the evidence up to date is, as I recall it, that that fourteenth part did not come in, or did not start coming in until about 5 o'clock in the morning, and was finally decoded and translated about 7:15 on the morning of the 7th.

Now, you had that information before you, did you not, when you were taking this affidavit of Dusenbury?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir. The fact that you mention I am not aware of yet, even, but Colonel Dusenbury was one of the first witnesses whom I called on, and he was leaving for Chungking.

Mr. KEEFE. Obviously he did not add very much to the clarity of the situation. He fumbled it a lot more than it was even before you took his affidavit, it seems to me, and we are still in a fog on the facts of the situation.

Colonel CLAUSEN. In fairness to these men, Mr. Keefe—

Mr. KEEFE. What is that?

[12007] Colonel CLAUSEN. I say, in fairness to these men, I was asking them questions in 1944, concerning what happened in 1941.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I understand that thoroughly, but this committee has got to determine from all of this evidence what the facts are, and the more the investigation is proceeding, instead of assuming clarification, we get into more difficulties in connection with the matter.

Now, you showed this affidavit, I understand, to Bratton in Paris.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You let him read it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And he and Bratton disagree then as to what the transaction was.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I will tell you really what I thought might be a good idea some day, and that is to get all of these people together—they are all honest people—get them all in a room, get them together—

Mr. KEEFE. Give them some refreshment, is that it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not like the way you say "refreshment" like it might connote something wrong. If two people cannot remember something, if they get into a room and discuss it, it might help them by someone saying, "So and so [12008] happened," and thereby refreshing the memory of the other.

Mr. KEEFE. The difficulty is this. I very carefully read the testimony of Colonel Bratton, given under oath, before the Army Board, and he certainly testified with clarity, and with distinctness and with definiteness, as to the delivery of this 14-part message.

Now, as the result of your investigation, the thing is up in the clouds. Nobody would be able to determine, from reading these affidavits, what the fact was as to that particular incident.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; that is not it, Mr. Keefe. Colonel Bratton is here, and any other witness that you want to reinterrogate, you can surely do so, because, as I understand it, they are available on any questions of doubt.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, how did you reconcile it, as the investigator for the Secretary of War?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I told you before, Mr. Keefe——

Mr. KEEFE. How did you reconcile it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. It was not my function to reconcile, to weigh, decide, and act as a judge. I was merely the gatherer of facts. The facts disagree. A man who goes into the orchard to pick a bunch of fruit says he picked so many and another man who brings them out gives another figure.

[12009] Mr. KEEFE. I heard that before.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You heard it because I said it. I think it is a good analogy. It is exactly what I did.

I was like an FBI agent working for Mr. Hoover.

Mr. KEEFE. The Army board had made a finding against General Marshall based upon Colonel Bratton's testimony, that these 13 parts were delivered that night, the 6th of December.

Now, as the result of your investigation, what did you recommend to the Secretary of War as to what the facts were? Could you determine from your investigation what the facts were, as to whether the 14 parts were or were not delivered?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You will find, Mr. Keefe, in the volume there of my report, that there are two additional critiques by General Cramer.

You will also find that there is that volume the final report of the Secretary of War, and those men decided the facts.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you discuss this particular incident with them when you came back, after you got the affidavits?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Oh, yes; I discussed it periodically, Mr. Keefe, with Mr. Bundy and with General Cramer. I discussed the results of my investigations, what the affidavits showed, [12010] and I showed them the affidavits.

You see, I was working for the Secretary of War.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, I understand that.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, you asked the question, did I discuss it, and I said I showed the affidavits.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you state to the Secretary, or to General Cramer, the conclusions that you, as this special investigator desired to draw from the affidavits that you had taken with respect to the delivery of this first 13-part message?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did not do more than to state the facts, Mr. Keefe, and make those periodic written reports.

[12011] Mr. KEEFE. What facts did you state with reference to this particular matter?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The fact that the men had given the affidavits, and I gave them the affidavits to read.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, you said:

I have taken an affidavit from Dusenbury and in the affidavit it says so and so I have taken an affidavit from Bratton. Here is Bratton's affidavit. It says so and so. Now you fellows make up your mind as to what the fact is.

Is that the way I understand the situation?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; that is not the way it operated at all. I say from time to time the progress of my investigation was given to these men in the form of affidavits, and the periodic reports, and then from the picture as a whole you would find that the facts sometimes, of course, would be in conflict. Well, now, if I said one thing or another thing I cannot recall at this time, but the affidavits were the best proof of what the witnesses themselves said.

Mr. KEEFE. You said this volume was indexed. Can you put your hands on the affidavit of Colonel Bratton?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I find some difficulty in looking for it. I have to paw all through it to find it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. There is an index. Col. Rufus S. [12012] Bratton is No. 42, so you just go to 42.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

(No response.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Like other witnesses who appeared, Colonel, I will ask you, do you know of any other information that you think would be helpful to this investigation, that has not been called for by questions asked you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not know of any other information, sir, except I would like to say that I did not know the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War, and I met them only in the course of the Board's work here. I think I have already mentioned the fact that certainly I acted with the utmost fairness, in my own mind, to get accurate, impartial testimony. Since the questions have arisen, I thought, in fairness to myself, and especially in line with what Senator Lucas asked me this morning, it is only fair to myself to make a part of the record of these proceedings a letter that I had from General Grunert commending me for my work on the Board, and the fact that I was a free agent, which is certainly indicated by the letters of commendation I have had from the then chairman of the Truman committee, the then counsel for the Truman committee.

I think it is only fair to myself to make these part [12013] of the record at this time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, they will be received.

(The letters referred to are as follows:)

[12013-A]

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM.

April 29, 1944.

In reply refer to:

H-429-F

Maj. HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Trial Judge Advocate,

Office of the Judge Advocate General, War Department,

Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR MAJOR CLAUSEN: Permit me to express my congratulations upon the effective manner in which you presented the evidence at the court martial proceedings in Cincinnati. Some time when you are free to do so, I would like to have lunch with you.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Hugh Fulton,
HUGH FULTON,
Chief Counsel.

4498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[12013-B]
SPJGE

[1st Ind.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ASF, J. A. G. O.,
26 May 1944.

To Major HENRY C. CLAUSEN, J. A. G. D.
(Through the Chief, Litigation Division.)

I have noted with pleasure the very fine letter of commendation of Senator Harry S. Truman relative to your work in connection with the court-martial proceedings at Cincinnati. The original of Senator Truman's letter has been made a part of your official record and you may retain the attached copy. I want to add my commendation for the good work you did.

/s/ Myron C. Cramer,
MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

[12013-C]

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM,
May 23, 1944.

Major General MYRON C. CRAMER,
The Judge Advocate General,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL CRAMER: The Committee has followed closely the proceedings of the court martial at Cincinnati relating to the conduct of three officers at the Lockland Plant of the Wright Aeronautical Corporation.

Major Henry Clausen did an exceptionally good job in preparing a most difficult and complicated case, and in presenting it fairly and in such manner as to enable the court thoroughly to understand the issues and facts involved.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) Harry S. Truman,
HARRY S. TRUMAN, U. S. S.

A true copy.

[12013-D]
SPJGE

[1st Ind.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ASF, J. A. G. O.,
26 October 1944.

To Major HENRY C. CLAUSEN, J. A. G. D.
(Through the Chief, War Crimes Commission, Office of the Judge Advocate General).

1. I have noted with pleasure the remarks contained in the attached copy of letter of Lieut. General George C. Grunert in connection with your work as Assistant Recorder of the Pearl Harbor Board. Your good work reflects credit on our department and I wish to express my own gratification.

2. A copy of General Grunert's letter has been placed on your personal file.

/s/ Myron C. Cramer,
MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

[12013-E]

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEFENSE COMMAND,
Governors Island, New York 4, N. Y., 21 October 1944.

Subject: Appreciation of Services.

To: Major Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD, Room 4747, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

1. Upon completion of the strenuous work of the Army Pearl Harbor Board I wish personally and as President of that Board to thank you for your excellent services as Assistant Recorder of the Board.

For nearly three months you labored most diligently without regard to hours and were of great assistance to the Board in ferreting out witnesses, in assisting

in their interrogation, and in the preparation of that part of the record as pertained to your assignment.

The Board wishes you every success in your future endeavors.

For the Board:

/s/ George Grunert,
 GEORGE GRUNERT,
 Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
 President.

[12014] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator BREWSTER. I would like to ask a question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I asked twice if there were any other questions.

Senator BREWSTER. There was some commotion going on to my left about matters that I will not mention that made it impossible for me to ask for the opportunity to ask any further questions.

I have not been here through all the testimony, but I have been here this morning. You yourself recognize after the completion of your inquiries, that the situation was not an entirely satisfactory one, from the standpoint of reconciling the various affidavits?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You want my opinion? If you want my opinion I certainly believe, Mr. Brewster, that it was sufficient for the decision of the Secretary of War.

Senator BREWSTER. I was not asking you that. You indicated to Mr. Keefe that you thought it would be a good idea to get these witnesses all together in a room, to see if they could not straighten these stories out, from which I take it you yourself were not satisfied with what you were able to do.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I was satisfied, so far as I was personally concerned, that my work was sufficient for the [12015] Secretary. The essential discrepancies were all mentioned. If you will read, Mr. Brewster, the critiques prepared by the Judge Advocate General I think you will find that those discrepancies are mentioned in there.

Senator BREWSTER. As I understand, you were going out to conduct the inquiry, and, as you know, after all of the investigations and reports it was the considered opinion of the Congress, without dissent, a unanimous opinion of Congress that the matter did require a very much further exploration, in which we have been engaged ourselves for some 3 months here.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I always felt, Mr. Brewster, that the Congress could do a far better job than anybody else.

Senator BREWSTER. You felt it certainly was not a waste of time to try to get all the information available on this matter?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean this proceeding?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think it is a very, very fine thing. I also think that the basic recommendation that can come from this committee is a very fine one if you make it that never again shall magic, this information, be monopolized by one service or the other service, but have it distributed by one agency on an over-all basis.

[12016] Senator BREWSTER. The Army Pearl Harbor Board had criticized General Marshall and some other high officials rather vigorously, had they not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes. The Board's proceedings show what they said.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The actual reading of it would be a matter of opinion.

Senator BREWSTER. The net result of your unilateral investigation was to considerably modify the conclusions of the Secretary of War, as far as the Army Pearl Harbor Board was concerned? Is that a fair statement?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not think so. In the first place, I do not think my investigation was unilateral. It was more supplementary. In the second place——

Senator BREWSTER. Just a moment.

Colonel CLAUSEN. The Judge Advocate General——

Senator BREWSTER. Just a moment.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let the witness answer, Senator. He has a right to answer.

Senator BREWSTER. It is a divided question. He said it was not unilateral. I would like to know why he does not consider it unilateral.

Colonel CLAUSEN. As I was starting to finish my answer, [12017] I think you will find, Mr. Brewster, that the net result, as stated by the Secretary in his opinion, was that he did not change his opinion. So mine was more supplementary.

Senator BREWSTER. You are through answering?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Why would you not call your inquiry a unilateral inquiry? Nobody accompanied you, did they?

Colonel CLAUSEN. If you mean I was the sole man, no.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is the point I make, Mr. Brewster. You are making a mistake if you think it was only mine, because I was assisting the Secretary of War.

Senator BREWSTER. You were representing the Secretary, and you took what documents and what notes you thought were useful, and you went to these various men and showed them to them and then you got an affidavit. Certainly an attorney would not consider that an inquiry in which anyone else who might have been blamed was in any way concerned. There was no representative of General Short present.

Can you answer that question?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You mean along with me or at the Board proceedings?

Senator BREWSTER. With you.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did not have any representative of [12018] General Short, but let me answer further, I at no time, Mr. Brewster, was asked by General Short, or his counsel, who was my superior, Brig. Gen. Thomas Green, to accompany me.

Senator BREWSTER. Were they fully advised of the circumstances?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not know.

Senator BREWSTER. You do not know about that?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Now you have this morning repeatedly placed great stress on the fact that the primary purpose of your inquiry was because the Army Pearl Harbor Board did not have the material in magic. You said that several times; is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes; that is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. The implication being that that particularly required further exploration.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. I find a little difficulty reconciling that with this affidavit taken by you from Gen. George C. Marshall, in which he says:

On my second appearance before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 29 September 1944, I discussed with the Board at length the general problem concerning the method of including [12019] "magic" in the report of the Board and also the availability to the Board of any officers concerned for the purpose of giving testimony on the Top Secret "Magic" phases of the investigation. I informed the Board, for example, as indicated on pages 18 and 37, of the top secret transcript mentioned, that Colonel Bratton was available in Washington for that purpose.

How do you reconcile that with your repeated statement that the Army Pearl Harbor Board did not have information or did not have the means of information available, so far as they thought it advisable and desirable, regarding magic?

Colonel CLAUSEN. You are making a mistake. You are assuming that this refers to the Pearl Harbor Board proceedings except in the last week.

Senator BREWSTER. I do not care when it was.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, it was in the last week.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, that is all right, it was the last week, but the Army Pearl Harbor Board had either the information or the full means of information offered them by General Marshall that they considered material for the purpose.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You were not here when I testified before, but that same point was brought up. These are the facts on that: At about the last week of the Board's [12020] proceedings General Marshall testified, as he indicated there, and I recall very distinctly he said what he refers to there about Colonel Bratton. That is how we got him. The top secret report shows all that.

But the Board had a 90-day limit, Mr. Brewster, and this limit might even have expired by then, or been very close to the edge, so the 90 days was the limitation in the order of appointment.

[12021] Senator BREWSTER. I think, from what I heard here this morning, you were hanging your most extraordinary procedure upon a very slender peg.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not agree with you at all.

In the first place, it is not an extraordinary procedure, and it is not hanging on a very slender peg. You are wrong.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one statement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Senator Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Maine has just said the witness is hanging his conclusions on an extraordinary peg, as I understand it.

Senator BREWSTER. His procedure, I said, his most extraordinary procedure upon a very slender peg.

Mr. MURPHY. Speaking about a slender peg, I see where the Senator from Maine, in an interview in Chicago, said—and I am reading from the Chicago Tribune of Saturday, February 9—

Senator Brewster said yesterday that much of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster must rest upon the late President Roosevelt, and figures in his

administra- [12022] tion who sought strenuously to fasten the blame exclusively on Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

I would say that is based upon an extremely slender peg, because there is not one word of evidence in this record to justify it.

Senator BREWSTER. Since the interview has been brought into the matter, I should just like to have it corrected to this extent:

What I actually said was that very much more of the responsibility for Pearl Harbor rested upon the people in Washington in the upper echelon, than had certainly been indicated in any of the four preceding years. I did not name individuals, but I think that statement I made is a very fair one.

If the paper interprets it as President Roosevelt, that will all have to be considered when the time comes for an opinion.

Mr. GEARHART. At least the Senator from Maine has not foreclosed himself.

Senator FERGUSON. I have another question from the witness.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Colonel Clausen, this is a fair conclusion, is it not, that the person responsible for [12023] keeping magic from the Board was the Chief of Staff's office, either the Chief of Staff, General Marshall himself, or General McNarney, his Deputy Chief?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think that is a fair statement Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a fair statement?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes; for the reasons given by the witnesses.

Senator FERGUSON. But here was an order from the Congress to the Secretary of War, and the Secretary had appointed a Board to look into this matter fully.

Then his Chief of Staff was responsible for blocking the testimony going to that Board, which would have given the Board fuller information. That is a fair statement, is it not?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not like the use of the word "blocking," Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, they could not do it without the magic, and they were not allowed to get the magic because the Chief of Staff's office would not give it to them?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Under the policy set up at the time, there is no doubt that the Board did not get the magic until the last week.

[12024] Senator FERGUSON. And that required the Secretary of War to take the recorder, the assistant recorder on that Board and send him out personally and alone, without any representative of General Short, Admiral Kimmel, or anyone else, to take ex parte affidavits? Isn't that a fair statement?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; it did not require him to do that. The Secretary could have done his investigation in any manner he chose. If he wanted to, he could have called another board; he could have had myself; he could have gotten an assistant of another kind, or he could have conducted it himself in some manner.

Senator FERGUSON. But he actually did do that. He sent you out to get ex parte affidavits?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, he sent me out to do what I said I had done.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell us whether your affidavits disclosed when the 13 parts were delivered to the Secretary of State, it being the duty of the Army to deliver to the Secretary of State?

Colonel CLAUSEN. The night of December 6, Colonel Bratton says in his affidavit, he took the 13 parts to the Secretary of State, and I believe the reason he made that statement was that it was, in his opinion, a primary [12025] diplomatic or State Department matter, and for that reason his main interest that night with respect to the 13 parts was to bring them to the attention of the Secretary of State.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you reconcile that with the evidence that you have brought in here in the affidavit, that Bratton went home before the 13 parts were drawn up? How did Bratton get the 13 parts to take them to the Secretary of State?

Colonel CLAUSEN. He must have had the 13 parts to bring to the Secretary of State, Senator. So that the recollection of Colonel Dusenbury in that regard, if it indicates the contrary, is probably mistaken.

In any event, it is one of the things I ran up against, just what you are mentioning.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did Dusenbury say in his affidavit that Bratton went home?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think Mr. Keefe read that and said about 9 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. About 9 o'clock. Did not he say he went home before the 13 parts were completed?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think he said when about one-half had come in.

Senator FERGUSON. Does not he say "Thereupon he left for home," or "went home about 9 p. m. I stayed so he could [12026] go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder."

Did not he also say the fourteenth part of the message was received at 12 o'clock that night? However, I am now talking about the 13 parts.

How do you account for the fact that Bratton said he took the 13 parts? I will read it again:

Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received.

That is certainly not 13 parts out of the 14 parts.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I say, Senator, that is one of the things, one of the confusions in the case.

Now, by that information, and by all the other information maybe you people can resolve this.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not find any facts that made it impossible for this man to take it over to the Secretary of State, the 13 parts by 9 o'clock, and did not also take it to Bedell Smith or someone in his office?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, he said he did not do it. I mean Colonel Bratton is the one who said he took it to the Secretary of State. Then he also said that he did not take it to Col. Bedell Smith, that he did not take it to Colonel Gailey, that he did not take it to these other people.

[12027] Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about his testimony before the Board. He swore absolutely that he took it to Bedell Smith.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, he corrected himself.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to find out who was in charge of the Chief of Staff's office on the night of the 6th?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was in charge of it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I tried to find out. I remember that I asked Lt. Gen. Bedell Smith, and he gave me the name. That is what you run up against. He said he was pretty sure it was General Deane, whereas General Deane was in Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. He never said—

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, if you will let me conclude.

When I was in Berlin, I found out that General Deane was over at the Peace Conference, so I went over there, and got an affidavit from him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say he was in charge?

Colonel CLAUSEN. His affidavit is not in accordance with the thought that was in the mind of General Smith, and that is the situation you run up against. In other words, these men were trying to recollect, and you could not get, on [12028] these points, on some of these points, you could not get a reconciled answer from all the witnesses.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you never did find out, you never followed it up to find out who was in charge of that office that night, and go and see that person to find out as to whether or not he got the 13 parts that night, did you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I did run the information down, I did follow it up.

Senator FERGUSON. Answer that question.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, Gen. Bedell Smith thought he made a memorandum which he thought was very helpful, and I could not find that. He said he thought it was in the office or the Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to make this question specific, so we will get a short answer.

Did you find out who was in charge of the Chief of Staff's office that night?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I cannot recall, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Don't you think that is a very important question? Would not you remember that, if you did find out who was in charge?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, I cannot recall, I am sorry.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you take an affidavit from any [12029] person who was in charge of that office, who swore that Bratton did not deliver at that office the 13 parts that night?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think General Deane. This is a pure recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't want any guesses on it.

Colonel CLAUSEN. You want me to do some recollecting. General Deane, as I said, recalled that he did not get any pouch such as contained the 13 parts.

Senator FERGUSON. General Deane said he was not in charge of the office that night?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Did he?

Senator FERGUSON. You just told me he did.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I say the affidavit is the best proof of what General Deane said.

Senator FERGUSON. Then get it. Let us find out what he said. I understood you to say from his affidavit he was not in charge on that night.

Colonel CLAUSEN. What I told you, Senator, was when I talked with General Smith he at that time said he thought General Deane would be able to give me some information.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not in Smith's affidavit, is it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. In Smith's?

[12030] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not know if it is in there.

Senator FERGUSON. He does not mention Deane.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Lots of times, Senator, these people that I talked with would give me leads themselves, as to people that might be able to shed some light on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Get the affidavit.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I do not have it. Mr. Keefe is looking at it.

Senator FERGUSON. When you get the affidavit, will you give us the page number in that exhibit?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. It has got an index. Affidavit No. 41.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I see it is past the hour.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I would like to finish with this witness.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Page 205. It says:

During the month of November and December, 1941, I was on duty in the War Department, Washington, D. C., as Assistant Secretary, General Staff.

On 6 December, 1941, I was not on duty after 5 p. m., and did not receive from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, nor from Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, or any other person, any pouch [12031] for the Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Then he specifically says he was not on duty that night?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And Bedell Smith says he was not on duty?

Colonel CLAUSEN. General Smith, as I recall, said he did not think he was there after 10 o'clock, that he might have been up there up to 10 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was in charge of the office that night? Did you ever find out?

Colonel CLAUSEN. General Smith was there. He was the headman. In other words, General Smith was the secretary of the General Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you indicated General Greene, who was then Colonel Greene, was counsel for Short.

Colonel CLAUSEN. He was brigadier general then.

Senator FERGUSON. He was brigadier general?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever discuss with you these affidavits, as far as Short was concerned?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or anything in relation to your investigation?

[12032] Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, he got some papers in once, that he sent over to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any of the memoranda that you had when you saw Colonel Bratton?

Colonel CLAUSEN. In connection with your previous question, we conferred concerning some corrections that General Short wanted to make in his testimony before the Board.

[12033] Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but that was before you started out on your tour.

Colonel CLAUSEN. I cannot recall when that was. I think it extended on quite some time because I wanted to put the corrections at the pages in the transcript so that the corrections would be noted.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do not claim that he was representing Short and, therefore, working with you in getting all the affidavits?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator Ferguson, we don't do that in the Army.

Senator FERGUSON. That answers that. So you don't do that either, do you, in the Army?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I say in the Army you have courtmartial proceedings and you might be a defense lawyer and you might be a prosecutor. You are supposed to do your duty. The mere fact that you are assigned to do a certain job does not draw any inference from that that you are going to slant anything.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any of the memorandums that you have spoken about that you took from any of these witnesses outside of what you have delivered here?

[12034] Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, that is all.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, there is one question, Mr. Chairman.

In reading the Army Pearl Harbor Board testimony, Colonel Clausen, I was impressed with the fact that right here at the beginning of General Marshall's testimony there appeared to be a lapse when the Board went into a sort of executive session and General Marshall testified or made a statement for about an hour, according to the proceedings of the Board, in which he made a statement off the record.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you present at that time?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; that is the period, Mr. Keefe, I referred to as off the record proceeding when he conferred only with the general officers.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in his affidavit General Marshall says this, and that is why I have been wondering if the testimony that you have given here all along to the effect that this Board did not have any information about magic until the last 2 weeks is correct. General Marshall in his affidavit states this:

I did not see General Miles, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler, officers of G-2 and the Signal Corps, who were some of the officers concerned with "Magic", [12035] prior to or after their testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Though I personally and secretly informed the voting members of the Board of the existence and important part played by "Magic", it was not until it developed that the "Magic" papers were being disclosed before the Navy Court of Inquiry that the Army officers concerned were authorized to go into all the details regarding "Magic" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as a matter of fact, in that off-the-record talk right at the beginning of his statement General Marshall took an hour out

of his testimony according to the report of the Board, they gave the specific time limit when the recess came and when they reconvened and during that period of time he discussed with the voting members of the Board this subject of magic.

Colonel CLAUSEN. Well, I don't think you should assume, Mr. Keefe, that the only thing he talked about during that time was magic. I don't know.

Mr. KEEFE. He did not say that but I am reading his affidavit in which he says that he did.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I testified, Mr. Keefe. I testified very clearly on the fact that in the first meeting of the Grunert board that we were not there but I found [12036] out later that he then at that time in general told them about magic and it was only when the Navy, you see—while we are in Hawaii the Navy released this magic to the Navy court of inquiry and when we came back then the Army gave it to us.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, you sort of gave me the impression that the findings of this Board were made without particular reference to or knowledge of magic. Now, General Marshall states this in his affidavit [reading]:

Concerning testimony I gave the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I wish to add that, as indicated on page 6 of the Secret Transcript of Proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the General Officers comprising the voting members of that Board, namely, Lt. General George Brunert, Major General Henry D. Russell and Major General Walter H. Frank, participated in a closed session with me from 11:10 A. M. to 12:07 P. M. on 7 August 1944. As indicated on pages 4 and 6 of the Top Secret Transcript of the Proceedings, during this closed session I informed the General Officers mentioned the character of information which had been derived before 7 December 1941 from Top Secret sources then called "Magic". I told them, among other things, that the source of this information included intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which were decrypted, decoded and translated under the [12037] supervision of the Signal Corps and G-2. I further stated that neither this information nor the source thereof should be made public because it would result in at least temporarily, if not permanently extinguishing that source.

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I said.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as a matter of fact, he gave them the information about magic in the record?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Not all—not the information. If you mean by that the information that you have or that I got—as I understand he gave them in general the information that there was magic and the important part it played in the war.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you were not there, were you?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No; that is what I say.

Mr. KEEFE. You are just guessing at it, but here is his affidavit.

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, I am not guessing; I mean his affidavit. What I have read is in his affidavit, that he said the magic was opened up to the three general officers, in general.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you don't want to give the impression that this subject of magic was not before this Board, do you? It was before the Board but not all those specific telegrams and all that sort of thing.

[12038] Colonel CLAUSEN. Just what I said before.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Colonel CLAUSEN. It certainly was not known to myself, as I say.

Mr. KEEFE. All right; that is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your appearance, Colonel, and the information you have given the committee and your apparent desire to be helpful in every way you could. You may be excused.

(Witness excused.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel, please call the next witness.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel Bratton.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Colonel Bratton, will you please be sworn?
(Colonel Bratton was thereupon duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will now stand in recess until 1:45.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p. m., a recess was taken until 1:45 p. m. of the same day.)

[12039]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:45 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Colonel Bratton has been sworn as a witness before we recessed at noon. Counsel will please proceed.

TESTIMONY OF COL. RUFUS S. BRATTON, UNITED STATES ARMY

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is your full name?

Colonel BRATTON. Rufus S. Bratton, colonel of Infantry, United States Army.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you state for the record your experience in the Army?

Colonel BRATTON. I was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1914. From 1914 to 1917 I performed the usual duties of a lieutenant of Infantry with the First Regiment of Infantry on Oahu. From 1917 to 1919 I performed the usual garrison and field duties of my grade in the continental limits of the United States.

In 1919 I was detailed as an instructor at the Military Academy at West Point, N. Y. From 1921 to 1922 I served as a student at the Infantry School at Fort Benning. From 1922 to 1924 I was a student officer of Japanese in Tokyo. From 1924 to 1926 I was assistant military attaché in Tokyo.

From 1926 to 1929 I commanded a battalion of Philippine Scouts in the Forty-fifth Infantry in the Philippines. From 1929 to 1931 I was a student at the command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. From 1931 to 1932 I was a [12040] student at the Japanese General Staff College in Tokyo. From 1932 to 1934 I was military attaché at the American Embassy in Tokyo. From 1935 to 1936 I commanded a battalion of the Seventh Infantry at Vancouver Barracks, Washington.

For 6 months in 1936 I was professor of military science and tactics at the University of Idaho. In the fall of 1936 I was ordered to Washington, to the War Department General Staff. From 1936 to 1937 I was assistant to the chief of the far eastern section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff. From 1937 to 1943 I was the chief of the far eastern section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff.

In 1943 I went to the Third Army, which was then in Texas. I accompanied the headquarters of the Third Army to Europe and stayed with General Patton's headquarters until the headquarters

reached Luxemburg, where I was detached and made G-2 of a planning group which under the auspices of SHAEF was planning the occupation of Berlin.

I went into Berlin as G-2 of the United States district headquarters. I returned from Berlin in September of 1945 on transfer orders to the western Pacific. I was about to take off for my new station when I was notified that I would remain in Washington waiting the pleasure of this committee, and I have been here since.

[12041] Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you tell us in greater detail your assignment during the month of December 1941 and what your duties were at that time?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. At that time I was chief of the far eastern section of the Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff. As such I supervised the general work of the far eastern section, and was the custodian and processor of the material known as magic from the time it reached the Intelligence Division on.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you were the opposite number to Captain McCollum in the Navy?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you combined the duties of both Captain McCollum and Captain Kramer, did you not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And in connection with the delivery or the dissemination of magic, did you do it all yourself, or did you have assistants?

Colonel BRATTON. Toward the latter part of 1941 this material had increased so much in volume and so much time was taken up in putting it into pouches and delivering the pouches to the various recipients that I found it necessary to have help, so with the knowledge and approval of my chief, General Miles, I did utilize two or three selected officer assistants [12042] of mine in processing this material.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, let us direct your attention to the 6th of December 1941.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And I will direct your attention to exhibit 1, page 238, to the so-called pilot message that is printed on that page. Do you recall when that first came to your attention?

Colonel BRATTON. Sometime around about 2 o'clock of the afternoon of Saturday, December 6, 1941.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, you heard Captain Kramer testify here, and he testified, as I recall it, that his attention—or he did not receive the so-called pilot message until later on Saturday night.

Colonel BRATTON. I recall that statement, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But so far as you are concerned, you did receive it at about 2 o'clock on Saturday, December 6?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, coming to the 13-part message—

Mr. KEEFE. Counsel, would you inquire at that point from whom he received it and where he got it?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

From whom did you get the so-called pilot message?

Colonel BRATTON. It came over from the Signal Intelligence Service with the usual envelope full of assorted material. [12043]

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that pilot message was translated by the Army?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Do you know where that message was intercepted according to the records of the War Department?

Colonel BRATTON. It was intercepted by the Navy at Bainbridge Island at 7:20 a. m. December 6, 1944, Washington time. The teletyped copy intercept was delivered to the SIS, that is Army Signal Intelligence Service, at 12:05 p. m. December 6, Washington time. It was translated by the SIS, typed and delivered to me the same date at about 2 o'clock.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Does that answer the Congressman's inquiry?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Turning now to the first 13 parts of the message, do you recall when they commenced to come in?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. Now, before answering your question I would like to state that this is the fifth time I have appeared as a witness in this Pearl Harbor investigation, I hope it will be the last time, but it is also the first time that I have had an opportunity to examine files, records and documents in the War Department to refresh my memory as to the details of various events and it is the first [12044] time that I have had an opportunity to talk to the people that I worked for and with at that time. In consequence my memory as to the details of certain events have been greatly improved. As to the details of certain other events it is foggy than ever for the reason that I have heard and seen so many conflicting arguments and statements here and elsewhere since my return to Washington.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, now, for the record will you state the times when and the places where you have testified in connection with the Pearl Harbor matter?

Colonel BRATTON. I appeared as a witness with General Miles before the Roberts committee.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you personally testify?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not recall having to testify. I was more or less in the nature of a paper carrier for General Marshall.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that was only in connection with informing the Board as to so-called magic?

Colonel BRATTON. Correct, sir. I should have said General Miles instead of General Marshall.

Mr. KAUFMAN. According to the record as I have examined it it is not recorded that you ever testified before that Board.

Colonel BRATTON. And I do not recall having actually [12045] testified, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that was in December of 1941?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When was the next time that you testified with respect to Pearl Harbor?

Colonel BRATTON. The next time was in the fall of 1944 before the so-called Clarke Board. I had been flown back from the advance command post of the Third Army some 50 miles east of Verdun on a first priority order to report to the A. C. of S. of G-2, War Department, Washington.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that is the first time that you testified before any board regarding Pearl Harbor?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that was nearly 3 years after the happening of the event?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And at the time that you were sent for you had been on duty with the Third Army in Europe?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you were flown back to this country and did you have an opportunity at that time to examine any of the papers or records?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not, sir. As I remember it, I arrived here on a Wednesday afternoon tired, cold, and dirty, [12046] and started testifying early the following morning.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And how long did your testimony continue?

Colonel BRATTON. I appeared before the Clarke Board several times covering a period of from 5 to 10 days. From there I went to appear as a witness before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, known as the Grunert Board.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that was in what month, do you recall, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. September 1944, September and October.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And then did you go back to Europe after you had completed testifying before the Grunert Board?

Colonel BRATTON. I did, sir. My commanding general had paid me the compliment saying that he wanted me to come back as soon as I got released from duties in Washington, and as soon as I was so released I caught the next plane that could accommodate me and returned to the Third Army Headquarters. I did not have time to review the testimony that I gave before the Grunert Board, not that the right was denied me at all. I simply did not have time to do it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And we have it also that not only did you not read the testimony that you gave before the Clarke Board but that you did not have an opportunity of examining any of the papers or records in connection with what happened in December of 1941?

[12047] Colonel BRATTON. I did have an opportunity to read the evidence that I gave before the Clarke Board.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But you did have no opportunity to examine the papers or the records of the Department?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, what was the next time that you gave any testimony respecting Pearl Harbor?

Colonel BRATTON. The next time was in August, I believe, of last year, when Colonel Clausen reported to me in Berlin.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you heard Colonel Clausen testify here during the last few days?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And at that time you did not have any of the papers or records from the War Department to refresh your recollection again?

Colonel BRATTON. I was thousands of miles away from them.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And this is the fourth time that you are actually called to testify?

Colonel BRATTON. The fifth time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You include the Roberts Commission as the first time?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But we have it that at the Roberts Commission you did not give any testimony, according to the record.

[12048] Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, waiting to be called as a witness here, have you read the testimony of other witnesses before this committee and in other proceedings?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; in great volume.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And do you believe now that your memory has been refreshed as to many of the details?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Let us come now to the first 13 parts of the message of December 6. I asked you before as to what time that day, according to your best recollection, did that message begin to come in?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That begins on page 239 of Exhibit 1, does it?

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is correct, sir.

Colonel BRATTON. That message began to come into my office in the late afternoon or early evening of Saturday, December 6.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Do you recall which part came in first?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not, sir. They were all mixed up; they did not come in in any numerical sequence.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You recall Captain Kramer testified that his recollection was that part 8 was the first part of the message that he received. Does that refresh your recollection as [12049] to which part of the 13 parts you received first?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; I do not remember.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you tell us to the best of your recollection what time of the day the last of the 13 parts came in?

Colonel BRATTON. The last of the 13 parts came into my office some time between 9 and 10 that night. I was there at the time when the last part came in.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Let us go back a moment, Colonel, to the pilot message.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You testified that that came to you about 2 o'clock in the afternoon?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that was before any one of the 13 parts had arrived?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you tell the committee whether you made distribution of that so-called pilot message and when you did so?

Colonel BRATTON. Distribution of the so-called pilot message was made that afternoon about 3 o'clock. I do not now recall whether I did it in person or whether one of my assistants did it, but I do recall discussing the subject both [12050] with General Miles and General Gerow Saturday afternoon.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then we have it that the so-called pilot message was disseminated around three o'clock that day?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, will you give us the list of the persons to whom that pilot message was disseminated?

Colonel BRATTON. Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of the War Plans Division, G-2, and my own section.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you deliver to the White House?

Colonel BRATTON. No; I was not delivering to the White House during this period.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Who was delivering to the White House?

Colonel BRATTON. Captain Kramer.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that as between Captain Kramer and your department you took the State Department and he took the White House?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, you say that you recall having talked to General Gerow and General Miles about the pilot message some time on the afternoon of December 6?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you tell us your conversation with General Miles first and then later your conversation with [12051] General Gerow?

Colonel BRATTON. Unfortunately, I cannot remember it in any great detail. It was to the effect that here was an indication that a reply to the State Department's note to the Japanese Government was on its way. There was at that time no indication as to when we would receive that reply, but I wanted them to know that we could expect this message at some time in the near future and that as soon as it started coming in I would acquaint them with its contents. That, in general, was the substance of my conversation both with General Miles and General Gerow.

Now, I have discussed this matter with both of these officers since that time, recently. They have no recollection of my conversation with them or, if they have, it is very vague.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Your recollection is that you did talk to both of them?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, come back to the 13 parts of the message and you began to tell us before that it was completed some time between 9 and 10 o'clock.

Colonel BRATTON. Thirteen parts of the message had arrived by that time; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And what did you do with that message, the 13 parts?

[12052] Colonel BRATTON. There are several details as to what I did during the remainder of that evening that stand out very clearly in my memory; others do not. I will recount those that I remember very clearly first, if you will allow me to do so.

First, I called up the SIS, got the officer who was on duty there that evening, to ask him if there was any likelihood of the fourteenth part coming in later that night.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Do you recall who that officer was?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember who the officer was; no, sir.

After some discussion in the SIS this officer returned to the phone and he said:

No, there is very little likelihood of that part coming in this evening. We think we have gotten all of that message that we are going to get tonight.

I did not ask him why or discuss the matter with him at all. I accepted his statement. So I, realizing that the Secretary of State was primarily interested in this message, it being a diplomatic one and it being a reply to a message that he had sent to the Japanese Government, gathered up his folder, put it in the pouch, locked the pouch and personally delivered it to the night duty officer in the State Department some time after 10 o'clock that night. I told the night duty officer whose name I have forgotten that this was a [12053] highly important message as far as the Secretary of State was concerned and that I would like to have it sent out to his quarters. He assured me that he would do so. I left it with him, securing from him a receipt for what I had given him.

I then returned to my quarters, and as I remember it now about 11 o'clock called up General Miles to report to him about leaving a part of the message and what I had done with it. My recollection is that some one answered the phone in General Miles' home, said that he was out at dinner but that he was expected back any moment. I left word that I would like to have him call me when he came in, which he did.

I described in guarded terms to General Miles the context of this message, told him that the fourteenth part, the most important part, had not been received, told him that I had delivered the first 13 parts to the Secretary of State. I remember his saying yes, that he had seen the 13 parts where he was a dinner guest.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did he tell you where he was a dinner guest?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember that he did, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did he tell you he was at Admiral Wilkinson's home?

Colonel BRATTON. I must have known that that is where he was because it was our practice at that time to tell each [12054] other where we could be found on the phone.

The next point that sticks out in my memory that I am positive is that when I found General Marshall in his office at 11:25 Sunday morning, the 7th of December 1941, he had in front of him on his desk in a folder similar to this not only the 13 parts of this message but all 14 of them. I had not put it there.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, now, let us go back to the night of December 6. You told us that you delivered the 13 parts to the Secretary of State's office.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You have told us that you talked with General Miles on the telephone.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you ask General Miles as to whether or not delivery of that should be made to the Chief of Staff that night?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did General Miles instruct you at that time that it was unnecessary to deliver the 13 parts to the Chief of Staff that night?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not recall that he did, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I direct your attention to the testimony of General Miles at page 4118 of the record where he testified [12055] regarding the 13 parts of the message as follows:

I had a conversation on my return from Admiral Wilkinson's house, as I testified, with Colonel Bratton. I take full responsibility for that thirteen part message not going to the Chief of Staff that night.

Does that refresh your recollection as to whether or not you were instructed by General Miles not to make delivery of that to the Chief of Staff that night?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; I remember no instructions of that nature from General Miles, and I would like to say further at this point that if there was any error of omission or commission with respect to the delivery of the 13 parts of that message Saturday night of the 6th of December 1941 to Army personnel the error was mine, and I accept full responsibility for it. That was my error.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Who were the persons in the Army who customarily were to receive this information, this magic?

Colonel BRATTON. The Chief of Staff, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Chief of the Military Intelligence Division.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And do we have it now that no delivery was made to any of those persons other than to the Secretary of State and excepting General Miles who had already seen it at Admiral Wilkinson's house?

[12056] Colonel BRATTON. This is the point at which my memory begins to go bad on me. I cannot state positively whether there was any delivery made that night or not at this time.

I testified before the Grunert Board that I had made delivery to the Secretary of the General Staff, to the night duty officer, or to General Gerow and to General Miles. That was my normal procedure. I tried to make simultaneous delivery to all of these people.

Since making that statement before the Grunert Board—I withdraw that statement.

At the time when I made the statement to the Grunert Board I had not remembered, or I did not remember, that Colonel Dusenbury was working with me in the office that night. Now, since making this statement to the Grunert Board I have been shown a number of affidavits by various officers, General Smith, Bedell Smith, General Ralph Smith, General Gailey, General Gerow, and others, to the effect that they did not receive the 13 parts of this message from me or from anybody else Saturday night.

Now, I know all these men. I do not doubt the honesty and integrity of any one of them, and if they say that I did not deliver these pouches to them that night, then my memory must have been at fault.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And to that extent you want to correct the [12057] testimony that you have given before the Grunert Board?

Colonel BRATTON. I would prefer to put it this way: Starting from the point which I explained to you are quite clear in my memory, any other statement that I now make would be a reconstruction of events based upon my knowledge of what was standard operating procedure in my office under various sets of circumstances.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Have you any explanation at this time as to why the standard operating procedure was not followed on this occasion on December 6?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; except that at this time and when I testified before the Grunert Board I was convinced that undue emphasis was being placed upon two messages. One the so-called winds message; the other the 13 parts of the 14-part message.

Upon my second appearance before the Grunert Board, I tried to explain to them why I considered these two messages were being given undue importance by the Board, and we got lost in the ramifications

of the winds message and I never did get to explain to them why I considered the presence of the 13 parts in Washington relatively unimportant militarily that evening.

I did so consider it upon their receipt and I still consider it now. They contributed no information, they contri- [12058] buted no additional information to the matters that we already had from magic and other sources as to the impending crisis with Japan.

The message was incomplete. It ended on the note, in the thirteenth part:

Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

This was primarily of interest, immediate interest to the Secretary of State, not to the Secretary of War or the Chief of the General Staff for it was not an ultimatum, it was not a declaration of war, nor was it a severance of diplomatic relations.

[12059] Mr. KAUFMAN. You knew, of course, there was another part to come, did you not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you couldn't anticipate by seeing the first 13 parts what the fourteenth part would contain, could you?

Colonel BRATTON. Quite the contrary, sir. As a matter of fact there was a possibility that the fourteenth part might have contained another proposal from the Japanese Government.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And it might well have ended with a break in diplomatic relations or a declaration of war?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Didn't you think that that was of sufficient interest to point out to General Miles and General Gerow, the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, that night?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't think it was necessary to point that out to those gentlemen. They were capable of arriving at their own conclusions on their own.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that we have it now, Colonel, that on December 6 you delivered to the Secretary of State, you talked to General Miles who had seen the message, and you made no delivery either to the Secretary of War, the [12060] Chief of Staff, or the Chief of War Plans?

Colonel BRATTON. As far as I know now that is correct, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When did you return to duty on the morning of December 7?

Colonel BRATTON. I got to my office on Sunday morning the 7th of December sometime between 7 and 8 o'clock, sir, in the morning.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And at that time did you get the 14th part of the message?

Colonel BRATTON. No; the fourteenth part of the message was not delivered to me until between 8 and 9 o'clock; around 8:15 or 8:30. Now, that message was delivered immediately to the State Department. Whether I took it or not I don't know. It is entirely possible that I may have gotten a car and rushed over there with the 14 parts so that the Secretary of State's book would be complete. On the other hand, I may have given it to Colonel Dusenbury to deliver. All I know now is that the Secretary of State had all 14 of the parts before 10 o'clock that morning.

Mr. KAUFMAN. About the time that you met Captain Kramer there about 10 o'clock on the morning of December 7?

Colonel BRATTON. I couldn't possibly have met Captain Kramer at the State Department at around 10 o'clock. The [12061] only time he could have seen me there would have been between 8 and 9 a. m. that morning, for from that time on I was busily engaged in something else in the War Department.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What time did you return to your office at the War Department after making this delivery to the Secretary of State?

Colonel BRATTON. If I made the delivery to the Secretary of State I was back in my office before 9 o'clock.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And when did you deliver the 14 parts of the message, together with any other traffic, to the other persons entitled to receive it?

Colonel BRATTON. As I remember it now, sir, I believe that all those deliveries within the War Department that morning were made by my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury. And I can give you the reason.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you give us the reason.

Colonel BRATTON. For the reason that at about 9 o'clock or shortly before 9 o'clock there was placed in my hands the so-called 1 p. m. delivery message. This immediately stunned me into frenzied activity because of its implications and from that time on I was busily engaged trying to locate various officers of the General Staff and conferring with them on the exclusive subject of this [12062] message and its meaning.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The so-called 1 o'clock message?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Who did you talk with that morning about the 1 o'clock message?

Colonel BRATTON. Colonel Dusenbury, my assistant; General Miles, after he reached his office—

Mr. KAUFMAN. What time did he reach his office?

Colonel BRATTON. General Miles reached his office, as I remember it, sometime around 10 o'clock, after I had called him on the telephone.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Who else did you talk with that morning about the 1 o'clock message?

Colonel BRATTON. General Marshall; General Gerow; Colonel Bundy. In the office of General Marshall.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What time did you talk with General Gerow about the 1 o'clock message?

Colonel BRATTON. I didn't see General Gerow until he joined us in General Marshall's office.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What time did you see General Marshall?

Colonel BRATTON. 11:25 a. m., immediately after he reached his office. I may say that there are two doors going into General Marshall's office. One opens directly into the hall and the other goes in from the office of his secretary. [12063] He went in through the door that opens off the hall and I went in through the door that opens off the secretary's office.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was General Gerow there?

Colonel BRATTON. Not at that time but he and Colonel Bundy joined us a few minutes thereafter.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was it at that time that General Marshall proceeded to write out a message to be sent to Hawaii?

Colonel BRATTON. Not immediately; as I have stated he had this 14-part message arranged in a book in front of him. When General Miles and I walked into the room he was reading the 14 parts. I had the 1 p. m. delivery message in my hand. General Miles and I attempted to interrupt General Marshall to get him to read this 1 p. m. message but were unsuccessful and he didn't read it until after he had gone all the way through the 14-part message.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And then after he had read the 14 parts you gave him the 1 o'clock message?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And then what happened?

Colonel BRATTON. He read it and asked General Miles and myself what we thought it meant. General Miles and I both said that we were convinced it meant Japanese hostile [12064] action action against some American installation in the Pacific at or shortly after 1 o'clock that afternoon. At about this time General Gerow and General Bundy came into the room and there was some discussion of the 14 parts, which were then regarded in the light of an ultimatum, and of the 1 p. m. delivery message.

General Marshall asked us each in turn starting with General Miles for an evaluation of the situation. We all concurred in reiterating the statement that General Miles and I had previously given him to the effect that it was our belief that the Japanese intended to attack us somewhere in the Pacific at or shortly after 1 p. m. that afternoon.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was there any discussion that 1 p. m. meant 7:30 Hawaiian time?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was it at that point that General Marshall began to write a message to be sent to Hawaii?

Colonel BRATTON. It was at that point, after we had all concurred in urging that our outlying possessions be given an additional alert at once by the fastest possible means, General Marshall drew a piece of scratch paper toward him and picked up a pencil and wrote out in longhand a message to be sent to our overseas commanders. When he reached [12065] the bottom of the page he picked up the telephone and called the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. I couldn't hear the other end of the conversation at all, but General Marshall, in a guarded way, told Admiral Stark what he had in front of him and what he proposed to do, in effect that he was going to send a warning to Hawaii, Panama, the Philippines and so on.

After some conversation with the Chief of Naval Operations he put down the phone and said:

Admiral Stark doesn't think that any additional warning is necessary.

There was some few minutes discussion on that point. The telephone rang again and it was apparent that it was Admiral Stark calling because General Marshall, when he put the receiver down, said:

Admiral Stark requests that we add to our message "Inform the Navy."

So he added a short sentence at the bottom of his pencilled message, gave it to me and told me to take it to the Message Center and see that it was dispatched at once by the fastest safe means.

As I went out the door there was some discussion as to priority and General Gerow called out to me as I was leaving the Chief of Staff's office.

If there is any question of priority give the Philippines first priority.

I went into the Army Message Center, which was down the hall from us, found the Chief, Colonel French, handed [12066] him the message and said:

The Chief of Staff wants this sent at once by the fastest safe means.

He looked it over and said:

Well, will you help me get this into readable script. Neither I nor my clerk here can read General Marshall's handwriting.

So I took the thing back from him and stood beside a typist while he typed what I read from what General Marshall had written. It possibly took a minute. I then gave it to Colonel French, who immediately started processing the message. I looked at my watch at that time, and, as I remember it, it was about 11:58 a. m.

I returned to General Marshall's office and reported to him what I had done. He said:

Go back and find out how long it is going to take for this message to be delivered to the addressees.

I went back, got ahold of Colonel French, told him what I wanted to know, he did a little figuring mentally, and he said:

It will take about 30 or 40 minutes for it to be delivered to the persons to whom it is addressed.

I went back and reported that fact to General Marshall.

[12067] Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you know at that time that the message was going to be relayed to San Francisco, and then over the RCA lines?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you know whether the Army had direct communication with Hawaii?

Colonel BRATTON. By what means?

Mr. KAUFMAN. By radio or telegraph?

Colonel BRATTON. I didn't know it. I assumed that we always had had up until that moment.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When did you find out for the first time that this message went by Western Union to San Francisco and then by RCA to Honolulu?

Colonel BRATTON. Several days after the attack took place.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, Colonel, let us go back to the so-called winds message. You are familiar with the—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will counsel permit an interruption?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It would be helpful to go back to the so-called 1 o'clock message and find out what the colonel did with that. If it has been covered, I didn't catch it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I think that that has been covered, but, [12068] sir, we will do it again.

Colonel BRATTON. That is the message that I have been talking about, Mr. Cooper. The one that I handed in person to General Marshall in his office.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood that, but how about other recipients of magic; what was done with respect to them as to the 1 o'clock message, if anything?

Colonel BRATTON. All the other recipients were right there at the time, except the Secretary of War, who had an adjacent office to the Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of State.

I personally called up one of the assistants to the Secretary of State by telephone prior to my meeting with General Marshall to tell him about this 1 p. m. delivery thing. He said that he would inform the Secretary of State right away.

I don't know whether the Secretary of War was in town that morning or not. I didn't see him all day long.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you.

Mr. KAUFFMAN. Now, let us go back to the so-called winds message. You are familiar with circular 2353 and——

Colonel BRATTON. What page is that?

Mr. MURPHY. 154.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Pages 154 and 155, Japanese circulars [12069] 2353 and 2354.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; I am familiar with those messages.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you tell us, if you know, what was done by the Army to get any implement to these two codes?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Upon receipt of 2353 on the 28th of November, I made arrangements through Colonel Sadtler of the Signal Corps to have the FCC monitor this broadcast for us through their station on the west coast, and through Colonel Sadtler I got in contact with a Mr. Sterling, I believe his name was, of the FCC, gave him my office telephone number, my home telephone number and those of my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, and arranged with him to have me called on the telephone at once upon the receipt of any implementation of this code.

Colonel SADTLER. I believe, explained to him in detail what it was we were looking for.

During the period November 28 and the first week in December, we got from the FCC a number of false alarms on this thing. Incidentally, I told the Navy what I had done, and they told me what they had done. We agreed to pool our results.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When you say you told the Navy, who did you tell it to?

[12070] Colonel BRATTON. Captain McCollum and Captain Kramer.

So that ONI and G-2 were working hand in glove trying to pick this thing up from whatever sources were available.

I know that the Navy got a number of false alarms too, from conversations with Captain McCollum and Captain Kramer.

I received three or four. I was waked at all hours of the night on several occasions by the FCC who repeated what they had picked up, believing it to be a part of the implementing message.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Do you recall on the 5th of December whether or not Colonel Sadtler communicated with you and told you that Ad-

miral Noyes had told him that the winds implement message was in?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you tell us about the circumstances and the talk that you had with Colonel Sadtler at that time?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Sometime around 9 or 10 o'clock on the morning of the 5th, I was called to General Miles' office where Colonel Sadtler and General Miles and his Executive Officer, Colonel Roderick were discussing some matter, and General Miles turned to Colonel Sadtler, and said, "Tell Bratton what you [12071] have just told me."

He said, "Well, Noyes has just called me up to say that it is in." The winds execute message.

I said, "Well, what does it say, in English or Japanese?"

He said, "Well, I don't know, he didn't tell me."

So General Miles, at my suggestion, requested Colonel Sadtler to go back, or to go to Admiral Noyes, and get a copy, either of the Japanese text or of the English translation, so we could look at it to determine whether or not it was what we were waiting for, or another false alarm.

So Colonel Sadtler took off and some while later came back and reported to General Miles and myself that he couldn't get access to Admiral Noyes, that he was in a board meeting, something of that sort. We requested Colonel Sadtler to go back and keep on the trail of Admiral Noyes, or talk to one of his assistants, or get somebody from over there who knew what they were talking about a copy of what they had received, so we could satisfy ourselves that this was really the execute message and not a false alarm.

Colonel Sadtler went off and I never saw him again that day, to my recollection, or in connection with this matter.

I called up the Navy upon my return to my office and [12072] got either Captain McCollum or Captain Kramer on the phone, I don't remember which at the moment, to ask them if they had gotten in the winds execute message and they said "No."

I said, "Please let me know if you have one anywhere in the Navy."

They said they would.

I then called up the SIS and asked them if they knew anything about the arrival anywhere in Washington of an execute message of the winds code, and they said "No," they knew nothing about it, and I repeated my request to them, if anything came in to please let me know, and then put the matter out of my mind.

Senator LUCAS. Whom did you call in the SIS?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Whom did you call in the SIS?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember now, sir. It was either Major Doud or Captain Schukraft, or one of the other officers on duty there.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, you began to tell us before that you felt that the winds code message was expanded all out of proportion to its real value.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I asked you to tell us about it when we got to the winds code situation. Will you tell us what [12073] statement you want to make about it now?

Colonel BRATTON. Even if we had received an execute message of the winds code after the third of December, it would only have contributed

or confirmed information that we already had. It is perfectly obvious from an examination of this code and the messages in connection therewith that it was a device figured out by the Japanese for informing their diplomatic agents around the world of danger in the breach of diplomatic relations with certain powers if other means of communication failed.

Well, it never failed in Washington right up to the last minute. They could always communicate with their ambassador here.

On the 3d of December we intercepted a direct order given to the Japanese Ambassador to start burning his codes. That was the purpose of the whole thing. That was it.

Any winds execute message received after that would simply just be another straw in the wind confirming what we already knew.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And by the 5th of December you had already received intercepted messages from consuls in various parts of the world advising Tokyo by the word "Haruna" that they had complied with the request to burn the codes?

Colonel BRATTON. I remember seeing a number of those [12074] messages; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And they are in the record in this proceeding?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. After the date when Colonel Sadtler told you that Admiral Noyes had advised him that the winds message was in, did you continue to monitor for winds execute messages?

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, yes, sir; we continued to monitor for the winds execute message and a variation of it was delivered to my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, on the afternoon of the 7th or 8th after the attack when it was utterly immaterial and useless.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When Colonel Sadtler made this report to you, did you communicate with the Federal Communications Commission?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; I don't remember that I did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You have talked about a message delivered to your assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, on the 7th or the 8th. Is that the message in Exhibit 142, page 3 (a)?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir, I believe that is the message.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I direct your attention to Exhibit No. 142A, the record of the Federal Communications Commission [12075] that they telephoned you at 7:50 on the night of December 5, and that you were advised—you stated:

Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means that we have that much more time.

Do you recall that conversation?

Colonel BRATTON. Not in that detail, but it is in the nature of similar conversations I had with those people during that period.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I ask you to look at a record given to us by the FCC which records the substance of a conversation that you had on the 5th of December at 7:50 that night, and ask you whether that refreshes your recollection as to the conversation that you had with the Federal Communications Commission on that day?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; I remember that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, will you tell us as nearly as you can the conversation that you had with the Federal Communications Commission

on the 5th of December, after using this memorandum to refresh your recollection?

Colonel BRATTON. As nearly as I can remember, it was to the effect as stated in that document.

Senator LUCAS. Will counsel read that?

Mr. KAUFMAN. The memorandum from the Federal Communications Commission, which is part of 142-A, is as follows:

Phoned Colonel Bratton and gave him the message at 7:50 p. m.

Remarks by Colonel Bratton:

"Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. (Asked if I should communicate the information to Portland concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.)"

Colonel BRATTON. That latter part is a bit garbled, according to my present recollection. I don't remember making any such statement as is contained in that last sentence.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You wouldn't say that you didn't make it?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It goes on to say:

No. I will have a conference with Lieutenant Colonel Dusenberg in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard.

With regard to communicating with Portland.

Colonel BRATTON. I don't recall making that statement, [12077] but it is quite possible that I did, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. This is a record made by the Federal Communications Commission at the time.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It is part of their diary records, apparently.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Colonel Bratton, about what was the difference in time of the receipt of the fourteenth part of the 14-part message and the so-called 1 o'clock message?

Colonel BRATTON. About a half-hour, as I remember it, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About a half-hour?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You received the fourteenth part of the 14-part message—

Colonel BRATTON. First.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. First.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About what time?

Colonel BRATTON. Sometime between 8:30 and 9 o'clock as I recall it, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then about 30 minutes later, you received the 1 o'clock message?

[12078] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That would put both of them into your hands at about what time?

Colonel BRATTON. Between 8:30 and 9 o'clock that morning, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, did you do anything during that 30 minutes between the receipt of the fourteenth part and the 1 o'clock message about getting word to any of these recipients of magic?

Colonel BRATTON. Word of the receipt of the fourteenth part you mean, sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember that I did, sir, for the reason that I took the fourteenth part, assembled it with the remaining 13 parts, and started reading the whole thing off to see just exactly what it meant.

While I was doing that, the 1 p. m. delivery message was placed in my hands.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I believe you stated that after receipt of the 1 o'clock message you then became very much concerned?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. I washed my hands of all other matters, turning them over to my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, and proceeded to take steps with the 1 p. m. [12079] delivery message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About what time was the 1 p. m. delivery message ready in your hands for distribution?

Colonel BRATTON. I made no distribution of it except to the Chief of Staff. I kept his copy in my hands until I gave it to him in his office. Any other distribution that was made that morning must have been made by my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then what did you do in the way of trying to contact the Chief of Staff from the time you had the 1 o'clock message ready to deliver and the time you actually saw him?

Colonel BRATTON. I discovered that neither the Chief of Staff, Chief of War Plans Division, or G-2, were in their offices, so I immediately put in a phone call for General Marshall at his quarters at Fort Myer. One of his orderlies answered the telephone and informed me that the General had gone horseback riding.

I said, "Well, you know generally where he has gone. You know where you can get ahold of him?"

He said, "Yes, I think I can find him."

I said, "Please go out at once, get assistance if necessary, and find General Marshall, ask him to—tell him who I am and tell him to go to the nearest telephone, that it [12080] is vitally important that I communicate with him at the earliest practicable moment."

The orderly said he would do so.

Then I called General Miles at his home, and told him what I had done and urged that he come down to the office at once, because I felt that General Marshall would want to see him and talk with him.

There was some discussion between General Miles and myself as to who was to call General Gerow. I don't remember whether I called him or whether General Miles called him but he was summoned to his office by telephone by one of us.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Allow me to interrupt for a moment, Colonel. Just what was the time that you delivered this message to General Marshall's orderly?

Colonel BRATTON. Shortly after 9 o'clock. That is, shortly after my reading the message. The message was placed in my hands at about 9 o'clock. As soon as I had read it and realized its import, I immediately started calling General Marshall. That was sometime between 9 and 9:15.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So it was between 9 and 9:15 that you talked to his orderly at his home.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12081] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And urged him to get hold of General Marshall and ask him to contact you as promptly as possible?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you did not get any call from General Marshall then?

Colonel BRATTON. Not until sometime after 10 o'clock.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After 10 o'clock.

Colonel BRATTON. General Marshall called me in person sometime between 10 and 10:30. I explained to him that I had a most important message that he must see at once, and that if he would stay where he was, I would get a car and bring it to him.

He said:

No, don't bother to do that. I am coming down to my office. You can give it to me then.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That, you think, was about 10:30?

Colonel BRATTON. Between 10 and 10:30; sometime closer to the half-hour.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Between 10 and 10:30.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So, naturally, you followed his instructions and waited until he got to the office?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was 11:25?

[12082] Colonel BRATTON. That was 11:25 when I reached him in his office.

Prior to talking to General Marshall in his office, however, I did discuss this whole business with General Miles in his office, who in the meantime had reached the War Department. So that General Miles was thoroughly conversant with the entire matter before he and I went together into General Marshall's office.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How soon did you get to talk to General Miles and acquaint him with what you had?

Colonel BRATTON. I called General Miles immediately after talking to General Marshall's orderly, and requested him to come down to the office, that I had some very important matters to discuss with him, and that I felt that the Chief of Staff would want to see him too.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe you stated General Miles arrived at his office at about 10 o'clock?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You showed it to him promptly then?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were about to say something about General Gerow, when I broke in.

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember seeing General Gerow [12083] that morning until he joined us in General Marshall's office.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was at 11:25; the 11:25 meeting?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Colonel Bratton, you are familiar with the September 24 message? I believe it is the one that divided Pearl Harbor into areas.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir, I am familiar with that message.

Senator GEORGE. Did that come to you also, or was it handled entirely by the Navy?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir, that came to me, and my record shows that I delivered it to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division.

Senator GEORGE. To whom? I didn't quite get it. Delivered it to whom?

Colonel BRATTON. The Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division.

Senator GEORGE. The Chief of the War Plans Division was General Gerow?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12084] Senator GEORGE. Did you also handle the messages beginning December 3 relating to the burning of codes, destruction of papers?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you get those messages?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Your duty was to distribute the information?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you have any further duty to perform with regard to any of those messages, say the code burning messages?

In other words, did you issue any orders on them?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, upon receipt of the intercept directing the Japanese Ambassador to start burning his codes and ciphers, I requested the Signal Corps to prepare a message which G-2 could send to its attachés and observers in the Far East directing them to burn certain of their codes and ciphers.

I took these messages when prepared up to General Miles, secured his O. K. for sending them out.

Senator GEORGE. Those messages regarding the burning of codes went to General Short at Hawaii and—

Colonel BRATTON. Not from my office, sir, and not, as [12085] far as I know, from G-2, because we were informed that the Navy was transmitting that information to the naval commander in Hawaii, the Philippines, and elsewhere, and that they would pass this information on to their Army opposite numbers.

I accepted that as being sufficient because, as you know, it is inadvisable to send the same message in two different codes when it can be avoided.

Senator GEORGE. What knowledge did you have of the facilities and means available in the Hawaiian Islands to intercept and decode and translate these messages?

Colonel BRATTON. I knew that they were capable of breaking in Hawaii, certain low-grade diplomatic messages. I knew that they did not have the purple machine, but through my contact with my opposite number in the Naval Intelligence, I knew that extracts from the more important magic messages were being sent to the Navy in Hawaii, and that by mutual understanding, that is, what ONI thought was an un-

derstanding, the substance of those messages was available to the proper officials in the Army.

Senator GEORGE. Colonel, I understood you to say that as you now recall, or as you now recollect, you are not able to say to whom you did make delivery of the first 13 parts of the 14-part message on the evening of December 6, beyond the point where your recollection was positive; [12086] is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Do I understand that you simply do not recollect whether you made delivery, or whether you, according to your usual course of operations, you assume that you may have made the delivery? In other words, are we to understand you have no positive recollection on that at this time?

Colonel BRATTON. I have no positive recollection at this time, Senator.

When I testified before the Grunert Board, I didn't realize that Colonel Dusenbury, my assistant, was working with me in the office that evening.

Now, when I processed this material alone, I did it a certain way. When he and I worked together we did it another way. We had a standard operating procedure, so to speak.

Now, if I had remembered when I was testifying before the Grunert Board that Dusenbury was with me there that evening, I would probably have said he and I made the normal distribution that evening. That is when I went to the Secretary of State, he delivered to the War Department officials because that was our standard operating procedure.

We had done it over, and over, and over again, that way.

[12087] On numerous occasions when I went to deliver pouches to the Secretary of State late at night, he would stop off at General Marshall's quarters on his way home to see that General Marshall got copies of these messages that were of sufficient importance to deliver late at night.

Senator GEORGE. Colonel, as I understand it, you considered the 14-part message when it had been completed as a message of supreme importance, of very great importance? That is, with the fourteenth part in hand?

Colonel BRATTON. It was an important message, yes, sir; but if I may go back to the so-called pilot message and discuss it for a moment, and my reaction to it, the gist of it was that the Japanese Ambassador was to take this 14-part message and without the aid of a stenographer, and in great secrecy put it in nice shape, preparatory to delivery, lock it up in his safe and keep it there pending further instructions.

This, if anything, meant that we probably had a little bit more time before the shooting war started.

After the receipt of this pilot message, the vital factor in my mind was the date and hour of delivery of the 14-part message. Its physical presence in Washington had little significance.

Senator GEORGE. And as soon as you saw the 1 o'clock [12088] message, the message directing delivery, you realized then the importance of the message?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; because it was peculiarly worded, and the implication was inescapable that it was of vital importance.

Senator GEORGE. And you shortly thereafter undertook to locate General Marshall?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You did locate him over the phone as you told the committee, but you actually saw him at 11:25 on the morning of December 6?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. December 7.

Senator GEORGE. December 7. And at the time you saw him, all others to whom you were obligated to make distribution were present except the State Department, and you have already described that the fourteenth part and the 1 o'clock message had gone to the State Department, I believe?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

All concerned in the War Department were present except the Secretary of War.

Senator GEORGE. All except the Secretary of War.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. In the War Department?

[12089] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Colonel, is your recollection positive with respect to the so-called winds execute message? That is, positive that you never saw such message?

Colonel BRATTON. It is most positive.

Senator GEORGE. That is, until after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

I can state most positively that no execute of the winds code was ever received by me prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I find it hard to believe that any such execute message could get into the War Department without passing over my desk.

It is inconceivable to me. I might have missed it but I had some assistants who were on the watch for it, and there were some people in the Army SIS who were also on the watch for it. They couldn't all have missed it. It is simply inconceivable to me that such a message should have been in the War Department without some one of us knowing about it or seeing it.

Senator GEORGE. Your recollection is that you never handled such message, never saw it?

Colonel BRATTON. No sir; most positive.

Senator GEORGE. If it came?

[12090] Colonel BRATTON. Most positive.

Senator GEORGE. No further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark, of North Carolina, will inquire.

Mr. CLARK. I want to ask you, Colonel, one or two brief questions.

You mentioned taking a receipt when you delivered the 13 parts to the Secretary of State's office.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Did you keep that receipt or was it destroyed shortly thereafter?

Colonel BRATTON. It was my practice during this time, sir, as far as the State Department was concerned, to take a receipt by serial number, that is, by the SIS number at the bottom of the page, from the confidential secretary of the Secretary of State.

I would take the bag over to him, unlock it, and we would thumb through these things bound in a book like this, check the numbers at the bottom of the page, and he would give me a receipt, a signed receipt, for SIS number so and so, to number so and so. I kept that receipt in my possession until after all of these flimsies were returned to me from the State Department, generally within a day or so.

[12091] Mr. CLARK. You had no further occasion to keep the receipt after that?

Colonel BRATTON. I then destroyed the receipt and the intercept itself.

Mr. CLARK. I believe you said you have been reading this record we made here, and I have not, but is there any controversy about the fact that you delivered the 13 parts to the Secretary of State at that time?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't see how there could be.

Mr. CLARK. There has not been any conflict of testimony here that you recall?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir, none that I know of or have heard of.

Mr. CLARK. Taking the 13 parts along, was there anything in that upon which military action of any kind could be based?

Colonel BRATTON. Not as I interpreted it, sir. As I look at it, I see nothing in it which would have prompted General Marshall or General Gerow to take any action on the night of Saturday the 6th of December 1941. And I would like to remind you, sir, if I may, that all the high officials of the Navy Department saw those 13 parts on the night of Saturday the 6th of December 1941, and they took no action other than to decide to have a conference [12092] at 10 o'clock the following morning.

I don't think that General Marshall or General Gerow would have done otherwise under the circumstances even if they had had these 13 parts. Their first reaction would have been to call up General Miles and ask his advice, General Miles saw nothing alarming from a military point of view in these 13 parts, and I think he so would have stated to General Marshall or General Gerow on that night.

Mr. CLARK. The contents of the 13 parts that had come in, as I understand you, really didn't change the existing situation any?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't believe I understand, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I mean, was the situation or the intelligence that you had, or the action you would take, any different after you received the 13 parts than it was before?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir. We had known for some time that this message was coming. We surmised its contents, and we knew that the Ambassador had been told to polish it up, put it in his safe, and wait further instructions. That didn't alter the picture that we had.

Mr. CLARK. So there was nothing significant about that message until the fourteenth part came in?

Colonel BRATTON. There was nothing even after the arrival of the fourteenth part; there was no military significance [12093] to its presence in Washington as long as the Japanese Ambassador kept it locked up in his safe.

Mr. CLARK. Did you see the reply of General Short to the message that you spoke of General Marshall sending?

Colonel BRATTON. Not until after the attack, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I was referring to General Marshall's message of the 27th.

Colonel BRATTON. I understand, sir.

There is no reason why I should have seen it. I was on a lower echelon in the Intelligence Division. This was an operational matter, and a matter of countersabotage which was another division of intelligence. I was in the intelligence branch.

The counterintelligence branch would have been the one to see that, if anybody in G-2 had seen it upon its arrival in Washington.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I was prompted to ask you that question because you and so many others were present and intensely interested in what General Marshall was doing. That message was sent out on the 27th.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, but I didn't see the message until after the attack.

Mr. CLARK. Did it occur to you to look up the reply to that message?

[12094] Colonel BRATTON. These things were being handled on a higher level than my own, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. CLARK. Well, that isn't exactly what I asked you, Colonel, quite.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I must say that I was quite perturbed and anxious and very much alerted all during this period, and I, of course, was anxious to find out what was going on, what was being done.

We were feeding all this intelligence up to higher echelons, and I naturally wanted to know what was being done with it.

I was told that a warning message had been sent out by the Navy on the 24th and another warning message by the Army on the 27th, and a warning against sabotage also.

I knew that those messages had gone out, but I didn't read them at that time. I knew only in a general way what their contents were.

Now, General Miles has testified that he did not see General Short's reply.

Mr. CLARK. Who?

Colonel BRATTON. General Miles.

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Has testified, and it is in evidence here that he himself did not see that reply when it came in, [12095] and if he had seen it, he would have taken immediate action to point out that it was not a reply to General Marshall's message.

Well, if General Miles never saw it, I certainly wouldn't have seen it either because the only way I could have seen it would be through him.

Mr. CLARK. Well, it just seems a little strange to me, as a layman, as far as military affairs are concerned, that the intelligence set-up you had down there wouldn't have been checking to see the response from General MacArthur and General Short and from Panama and the west coast to this most important message of the 27th.

Now, you are saying that it was not your duty or in your line of duty, and that you did not check on it.

Colonel BRATTON. They were not given to me to read, sir. I was told that they had been sent, and I was told their general contents.

Mr. CLARK. Would you have been permitted to look up the replies if you had wished to do so?

Colonel BRATTON. I think I could have gotten access to them.

Mr. CLARK. Then why didn't you look to see what had come in in response to this message of the 27th from the Chief of Staff?

[12096] Colonel BRATTON. Well, I had confidence that my Chief General Miles, was handling that situation adequately.

Mr. CLARK. If you had seen the reply of General Short at that time, what do you think your reaction would have been?

Colonel BRATTON. I could only speak from hindsight.

Mr. CLARK. No, let's not do that. Let's go back to the day that message came into the War Department saying that he was on a sabotage alert. What would have occurred to you about that?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I think my reaction would have been the same as General Miles has testified. I would have noticed, I think, that it was not a reply to General Marshall's message, because he quoted the number of General Marshall's message, said "in reply to your No. so-and-so," and it wasn't a reply to General Marshall's No. so-and-so at all; he was talking only about sabotage.

Mr. CLARK. I see.

Colonel BRATTON. I think I would have checked that discrepancy. I can't say with any degree of positiveness.

Mr. CLARK. Do you think it is a little strange, Colonel, that with all the money we have spent and the precautions we have taken in the Hawaiian Islands to make it a strong outpost, and with this crucial situation developing, [12097] that no one in War Department should discover the reply of General Short showed completely that he hadn't appreciated the gravity of the situation?

[12098] Colonel BRATTON. Well, I think it is most deplorable.

Mr. CLARK. Well, where does the fault lie?

Colonel BRATTON. I understood that was the duty of this committee.

Mr. CLARK. I am afraid you are right. I am not really trying to get you to pass on the conduct of some fellow officer, or something of that kind. You say the fault in this case does not lie in the G-2 Department; is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. The fault did not rest in the G-2 Department?

Colonel BRATTON. Definitely not, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Or the War Plans Division?

Colonel BRATTON. I think General Gerow has already accepted full responsibility for that error.

Mr. CLARK. Is that where it belongs, as a military matter?

Colonel BRATTON. Will you repeat that, sir?

Mr. CLARK. I say as a military matter, is that where the responsibility belongs, in the War Plans Division?

Colonel BRATTON. Are you asking for an expression of my opinion, sir?

Mr. CLARK. Here is what I am asking for, sir: It has been almost conceded that the reply of General Short to [12099] this important message was admittedly inadequate, and that if that had been discovered additional action would have been taken.

Now what I am asking you, as a military man who understands all the ins and outs of this procedure and this organization, where does the responsibility rest for not having discovered the inadequacy of the Short reply to General Marshall's message of the 27th?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, might I just suggest, it strikes me as being rather improper to ask this witness to make an answer which constitutes a direct criticism of another branch of the service of which he was not a part.

Colonel BRATTON. Not only that, but it involves my making a criticism of officers who are far superior to me in rank and experience. It does not lie within my province to fix the responsibility for this blunder.

Mr. CLARK. This what?

Colonel BRATTON. It does not lie within my province, and I am unable to fix the responsibility for this blunder. General Gerow has already assumed full responsibility for that error.

Mr. KEEFE. So has General Marshall in his testimony.

Mr. CLARK. I will try to get around to my point this way: Was it the duty or responsibility of anybody below the [12100] chief of staff in the War Plans Division to have examined the replies to General Marshall's message of the 27th of November?

Colonel BRATTON. That was the duty of the War Plans Division.

Mr. CLARK. That is what I am trying to get at. I am not trying to get you to reflect on your superiors.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I appreciate your position.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; but I want to emphasize the fact it was not the duty of the Intelligence Division. This was an operational order.

Mr. CLARK. Of course, not knowing all about those things, I did not know but what the Intelligence Division should have examined these messages from time to time and seen what was going on.

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; that was an operational order which implemented a war plan.

Mr. CLARK. And it belonged in the War Plans Division?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I want to make it very clear to you that I have no disposition whatever to embarrass you in any way.

Colonel BRATTON. I understand, sir.

[12101] Mr. CLARK. I have admiration for your record and your apparent frankness before this committee.

That is all I have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire.

Senator LUCAS. Was General Miles present when the message was prepared by General Marshall that went out to General Short originally?

Colonel BRATTON. You mean the message of the 27th of November?

Senator LUCAS. The message of the 27th of November.

Colonel BRATTON. I have no first-hand knowledge of that, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I have forgotten whether he testified that you were present at that meeting or not. Anyhow, you made very clear to this committee that there is a distinction between an operational order and one that comes through the Intelligence Division, where it is merely an evaluation of information that has been received from time to time.

Colonel BRATTON. Very, very different functions, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. And you told the committee that in this inverse chain of events, where Stimson saw the message, Marshall saw the message, and General Gerow saw the message, that under the war regulations General Miles would not see that message.

[12102] Colonel BRATTON. I think, in view of the fact that the reply dealt with sabotage measures, a copy of the message should have been routed to General Miles. We know from his testimony that it was not. Now sabotage and countersabotage are all definitely in the province of the Intelligence Division. Now a mistake was made—by whom I do not know—in the routing of this message. It clearly stated in the message that it was a reply to a certain numbered message from General Marshall. It obviously was not, if you read the body of the thing. The body of the thing dealt with something that was an intelligence matter. For that reason the message, or a copy of it, should have gone to General Miles.

Senator LUCAS. When General Miles sent his sabotage message on November 28, I presume he did so without knowing anything about Short's reply.

Colonel BRATTON. I presume so, sir. I am not the best witness on that.

Senator LUCAS. I thought perhaps you had something to do with the preparation of that message and knew about it.

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know anything about the message that General Arnold had sent out?

Colonel BRATTON. Not until after the attack, sir.

[12103] Mr. KEEFE. Will the Senator yield, to clear the record here?

Senator LUCAS. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. KEEFE. So we will not get confused. My recollection of the testimony is that the message which was sent by General Miles to General Short was sent on the 27th and not the 28th.

Senator LUCAS. I think perhaps the Congressman may be correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And there was a question, as you recall Senator, that came up as to whether or not General Short got the Miles message before he had replied to the Marshall message. My recollection of the testimony is he said it came in shortly after he had sent his reply to the Marshall message, on the same day, November 27.

Senator LUCAS. The Congressman is correct on that. General Short testified that he sent the reply to Marshall's message about 30 minutes after it was received, and a short time after the sabotage message came in.

Mr. KEEFE. The Senator will recall the message that was sent by the Adjutant General and the message by General Arnold. They went out on the 28th.

Colonel BRATTON. They went out on the 28th, and General Miles' message went out on the 27th.

[12104] Senator LUCAS. I stand corrected.

Now one question further with respect to the magic that came in dividing Pearl Harbor into five different sections. You told Senator George that you were familiar with that, as I recall.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did Miles ask you for your opinion as to what you believed that sort of a message meant?

Colonel BRATTON. No, but I was prepared to give it to him if he had, because I had discussed this message and similar messages with my opposite number in the Navy at some length on numerous occasions.

I would like to explain that "enemy order of battle."

Senator LUCAS. The what?

Colonel BRATTON. The "enemy order of battle." I will explain the term, sir. This information about the strength, disposition, location, commanders of major units of the Japanese Army and of the Army Air Force, Intelligence along those lines, and countermeasures, that is measures that we would take to prevent the Japanese from securing similar intelligence as to our ground and air forces, were a function of the Intelligence Division of the Army, and, by the same token, information about enemy fleet movements and countermeasures are a function of Naval Intelligence.

[12105] I felt that the Japanese were showing unusual interest in the port at Honolulu, and discussed this matter with my opposite numbers in the Navy on several occasions. They were securing information in as great detail as possible on the Japanese Navy. They had a great big map up on the wall that showed the location of every battleship in the Japanese Navy, as far as they could find out. All Intelligence units had that sort of thing.

Senator LUCAS. They traced the fleet, as best they could, from day to day on this map?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. Now this business about dividing up Pearl Harbor was explained to me by my opposite numbers first as a device to reduce the volume of radio traffic, they had a code, to reduce the volume of the thing in making these reports.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How would they do that, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. By substituting numbers or letters for entire sentences.

Next, that it might be a plan for sabotage of such ships as were in Pearl Harbor, or it might be a plan for a submarine attack, or it might be a plan for an air attack. But—and I was assured of this on numerous occasions—when the emergency arises the fleet is not going to be there, so this is a waste of time and effort on the part of [12106] the Japanese consul. Nobody in ONI, nobody in G-2, knew that any major element of the fleet was in Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning the 7th of December. We had all thought they had gone to sea.

Senator LUCAS. Why did you think that?

Colonel BRATTON. Because that was part of the war plan, and they had been given a war warning.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, who in the intelligence branch of the Army here in Washington had the custody of these files of magic?

Colonel BRATTON. I did, sir. That is, as far as any existed outside of the SIS.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Well, there have been a number of messages that have been introduced in evidence, and contained in one of these exhibits, which show the amount of traffic that came from Tokyo to Hawaii and from Hawaii to Tokyo.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You recall I examined General Miles at some length with respect to the number of messages that went direct from Honolulu to Tokyo.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. As I recall, it was some 22 or 23 messages between the early spring and around September 23, [12107] and then for the first time in September a message came from Tokyo to Honolulu. As I recall, some 5 messages came after that from Tokyo to Honolulu.

Now you were familiar with all of these messages that came, I take it?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did that make any different impression upon you, the fact that Tokyo started sending messages to Honolulu in September 1941, when for months before that they had been silent, as far as sending any messages to that point is concerned?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not recall that it made any impression on me at the time, sir.

Senator LUCAS. How long did you stay in G-2 after December 7, 1941?

Colonel BRATTON. Until the fall of 1943.

Senator LUCAS. Then where did you go?

Colonel BRATTON. Headquarters of the Third Army at Fort Sam Houston.

Senator LUCAS. And from there?

Colonel BRATTON. To Europe.

Senator LUCAS. You were in Europe when Colonel Clausen took your affidavit?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12108] Senator LUCAS. Well, there has been some question about what Colonel Clausen did or did not do over there in Europe. Were you ever mistreated by Clausen in the way of being browbeaten into signing the affidavit?

Colonel BRATTON. Not in any manner whatsoever, sir. My relations with Colonel Clausen were cordial in every respect.

Senator LUCAS. Did he seek, at any time while he was there, to have you change your testimony from what it was in previous hearings?

Colonel BRATTON. No. He asked me to comment on certain papers that he had brought with him to Europe, most of which were in the form of affidavits from various officers bearing on certain parts of magic and their delivery.

Senator LUCAS. How long was it after Pearl Harbor that you first testified before any board?

Colonel BRATTON. Three years.

Senator LUCAS. Three years. And did you know at any time during that 3 years that you might be called to testify before any board of inquiry?

Colonel BRATTON. I suppose that I would be, if they ever had one.

Senator LUCAS. Did you immediately following Pearl Harbor make any memorandum or notes of your activities around [12109] the 5th or 6th of December?

Colonel BRATTON. The one that has already been introduced by General Miles in evidence as a memorandum of the events of the morning of the 7th of December 1941. I read over what he had written and offered a number of suggestions and recommended a number of changes based upon my recollection of what had happened, and we got together in the preparation of the thing. That is the only memorandum that either he or I made at the time, that I can remember now.

Senator LUCAS. And then it was some 3 years before you were again called upon to testify?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Where were you at that time?

Colonel BRATTON. What time, sir?

Senator LUCAS. When you testified before the Grunert Board?

Colonel BRATTON. I was at the advance headquarters of the Third Army, 50 miles east of Verdun, in the midst of a campaign.

Senator LUCAS. You were in battle?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I was on the commanding general's staff.

Senator LUCAS. I say you were up there fighting the Nazis. I think that is all.

[12110] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel Bratton, do you have any memorandum or any recollection as to the delivery of the pilot message?

Colonel BRATTON. I have no memorandum as to the delivery, sir, but my recollection is fairly clear that that pilot message was delivered at about 3 o'clock on Saturday afternoon and that I did discuss its contents with General Gerow and General Miles.

Mr. MURPHY. Did the pilot message come from the Navy or was it translated by the Army?

Colonel BRATTON. It was intercepted by the Navy at Bainbridge Island at 7:20 a. m. December 6, 1941, Washington time. The teletype copy of the intercept was delivered to the SIS at 12:05 p. m. December 6, Washington time. It was translated by the Army SIS and delivered to me, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What time was it translated by the Army?

Colonel BRATTON. There is no record of that, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I understood Captain Kramer to say he did not get the pilot message from the Navy until Sunday morning.

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; he said he got it late Sunday evening.

[12111] Mr. MURPHY. Later on he came back and said to Senator Ferguson sometime Sunday morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not mean to say "late Sunday evening," did you?

Colonel BRATTON. Late Saturday. I heard portions of Captain Kramer's testimony myself.

Mr. MURPHY. After he made a check, at the request of the distinguished Senator from Michigan, it is my understanding he then placed it as having not been delivered until Sunday morning.

Colonel BRATTON. I cannot account for that.

Mr. MURPHY. I wonder where it could have been, if he got it on Sunday morning and delivered it to a Navy man and you say you think it was delivered at 3 o'clock Saturday afternoon.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I am not the best witness on that procedure, sir. It was automatic between the Navy code and cipher people and Army SIS. They exchanged this stuff in bulk.

Mr. MURPHY. Do they have any record at all in SIS as to the translation of this particular message?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not think there is any such record at this time, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. They had no time stamps either then?

[12112] Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Mr. MURPHY. They had no time stamps as to the receipt of these important messages, as to when they came in and went out?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have any distinct recollection of discussing the pilot message on Saturday afternoon?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. When did General Marshall get that, and under what circumstances?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not discuss that with General Marshall. I do not know where he was at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Who delivered it to him and when did he get it; do you know?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not know, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Who does know? Do you know that?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Is there anybody in the Army who has got a record or who could tell as to when these things were delivered? Kramer said he could tell by the numbers that were assigned to them approximately what pouch they were contained in. I would like to know, and I think the record should show, if General Marshall got that pilot message on Saturday night, and if he got it, whom did he get it from?

[12113] Colonel BRATTON. I do not know of any record that could prove that which is now in existence, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then I would like to go over with you a bit, your testimony before the Grunert Board, on page 58:

General RUSSELL. Not by you. Now, did you ever get information, from any source, relating to this, I will call it, weather intercept about which you have testified that you made some requests on the FCC?

Colonel BRATTON. As I have stated, sir, I got several reports from the FCC about an intercept of a weather broadcast which they thought might be what I was looking for. The message that I was waiting for, that is, the one which, deciphered, would indicate a break in the relations between Japan and the United States, never reached me from any source whatever prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

That was what you testified to today, was it not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

I had conversations on one of two occasions with Colonel Sadtler of the Signal Corps, with Lieutenant Kramer of the Navy, and with Commander McCollum of the Navy, the latter being my opposite number in ONI, concerning messages that had been picked up, either by the Navy or by the FCC, containing weather broadcasts and containing phrases similar to those that we were waiting for.

[12114] Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever hear from any of them about any weather implementing message having been received up to December 7?

Colonel BRATTON. Not any implementing message, but the Navy got a number of false alarms, just as the FCC did.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you said on page 59:

On the morning of December the 5th I have a vague recollection of a meeting in General Miles' office where Colonel Sadtler was present, in which he said something to the effect that the message had come through. Questioning developed the fact, however, that the message he was talking about was one which indicated a break in diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Japan.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, do you have any recollection as to just what it did mean?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; I remember now that that is what he said.

Mr. MURPHY. Between Great Britain and Japan?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, to go further:

That was beside the point at that time because it was our belief that relations between Japan and [12115] Great Britain were on the point of rupture and had been for several days. The message that we were waiting for was one which would indicate a break in relations between Japan and the United States. I never received that message from any source prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

And again at the bottom of the page:

General RUSSELL. Colonel, I am going to show you a discussion of this message of December 4. I think we can take it up about here [indicating] and read down to that point.

That was referring to the Safford testimony, was it not? The Safford testimony is contained on page 361 of the record.

Will you please read that, and after which I will ask you a question or two.

I understood he handed you a paper at that time.

Your answer:

This message never reached me, sir, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor nor, to the best of my knowledge and belief, did it reach any other official of G-2 or the War Department.

You were then referring, were you not, to the testimony of Captain Safford?

Colonel BRATTON. I think so; yes, sir.

[12116] Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, on the bottom of page 60:

Colonel BRATTON. As to the first phrase, "Higashi no kaze ame", that has been correctly translated.

General RUSSELL. And what was that translation?

By the way, were you here during the testimony of Captain Kramer when he talked about the translation of that particular set of words?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. What page are you reading from now?

Mr. MURPHY. Page 60 at the bottom of the page.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have it there?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General RUSSELL. And what was that translation?

Colonel BRATTON. War with—it meant a break in diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States.

Captain KRAMER said that he would not have translated that as meaning war. You are a Japanese student, are you?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, but the Japanese has got nothing to do with war or diplomatic relations, or anything else.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, these words would mean "East Wind Rain"?

Colonel BRATTON. It simply means "East Wind Rain".

[12117] Mr. MURPHY. "East Wind Rain"?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, if it was translated that is all it would mean, is "East Wind Rain".

Now, then, "Higashi no kaze ame" would mean strictly a reference to the weather itself?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And then to decide what particular significance that had you would have to go, would you not, back to the basic message, to the code itself on page 154 of Exhibit 1?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And what did that say on page 154? That was a strained diplomatic relation, was it not? Will you give us the exact words?

Colonel BRATTON (reading):

In case of a Japanese-U. S. relations in danger.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. Now in your testimony you said:

General RUSSELL. And what was that translation?

Colonel BRATTON. War with—it meant a break in diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. The code message that we intercepted and deciphered did not say that when this "winds" message came through it meant war. It did say that it meant a break in diplomatic [12118] relations. Stop.

Now when you were saying "Stop" there, you were referring to the hidden word message, were you not?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not remember saying "Stop", sir. I think that was the stenographer's contribution.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you see it there?

Colonel BRATTON. I see it there.

Mr. MURPHY. There was a winds code, a hidden words message that would also indicate a break in relations that had a stop in it?

Colonel BRATTON. It was not referring to that at all.

Mr. MURPHY. You just put a "Stop" in there to mean stop, is that it?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now on page 61:

I believe that the second phrase, "Nishi no kaze hare", is correctly translated: War with Britain: That is, a break in diplomatic relations between Japan and Great Britain.

Did you mean it meant war with Britain?

Colonel BRATTON. No, it simply meant diplomatic relations were in danger.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I go to page 62. On the 5th, after you had your conversation in General Miles' office with Captain Sadtler, here was a message sent at that time, [12119] was there not, on Hawaii, the so-called Rochefort message?

Colonel BRATTON. That was sent on the 5th, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now in that connection you said on page 62:

There were several codes sent out by the Japanese Foreign Office at about this time, to their diplomatic officials abroad, which they hoped to use in the case or in the event of a sudden rupture of communications. There were several versions of this wind and weather code sent out. I discussed these codes with my opposite number in the ONI, Commander McCollum, on a number of occasions. Learning from him that they were monitoring the Japanese communication system in Honolulu as a function of Naval Communications, and learning also from him that their expert there was a Commander Rochefort, who was thoroughly familiar with the whole matter, I deemed it advisable, on or about the 5th of December, to have our G-2 in Honolulu contact Colonel Rochefort, with the end in view that the latter could explain to G-2 what it was we were waiting for, and could explain to him orally, with complete security, the significance of this message. G-2 did send a message.

Now why did you send that message? Let me refresh your recollection. Shall I read your answer to that question at that time?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12120] Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General FRANK. G-2 in Washington?

Colonel BRATTON. G-2, the A. C. of S. G-2 in the War Department, then General Miles, upon my recommendation, did send a message to G-2 in Honolulu, on or about the morning of the 5th of December, directing him to contact immediately Commander Rochefort with respect to the significance of certain weather broadcasts coming from Tokyo. That document is available in the files of G-2 now, sir. The message did go out. I did it this way as a means of saving time and for security reasons.

Now, why was the message sent?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, as I have stated here, as a means of saving time and for security reasons.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you giving information or seeking information?

Colonel BRATTON. I had had a discussion with Commander McCollum, now Captain McCollum, as to the amount of knowledge that the Navy had in Hawaii. He assured me his man Rochefort there at that time knew practically everything that there was to be known about the U. S.-Japanese relations through one means or another. I knew that suitable warning messages had been sent out to Hawaii and elsewhere. I had not read the messages and did not know their exact contents. I wanted to make sure that our G-2 in Hawaii got in touch [12121] with the ONI man in Hawaii, to get from him all the intelligence that he had in his possession, and I knew that if they got together on the subject of this winds message—I did not know, but I felt that they were going from there, and that there would be a complete exchange of intelligence and that the Army G-2 would then be in possession of just as much intelligence as Rochefort, the ONI man, had.

Mr. MURPHY. Did the Army at any time up to December 5 send to their G-2 in Hawaii the material on the winds message set-up?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Fielder said he never heard about it, didn't he, at Hawaii?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not know.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is, I believe you will find from the record, the Navy had it and did not give it to the Army, and Fielder knew nothing about it even though the Navy knew about it for days at Hawaii.

Colonel BRATTON. I felt, and I know my opposite number in the Navy felt, there was much closer liaison between those two people than actually existed. We had the very closest liaison and cooperation in Washington between ONI and myself with respect to the Far East. I was told on innumerable occasions by my opposite number in ONI that [12122] they were giving all this stuff to the Army.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, if you had seen General Short's message "Liaison with the Navy" you would expect just that, would you not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You would not expect the Navy to have something in Hawaii that the Army would not know about, would you?

Colonel BRATTON. I was told if the Navy was informed that the Japanese Ambassador was burning his codes and ciphers, and other diplomatic officials in this country and American possessions were doing the same, that the information would be transmitted to the Army.

Mr. MURPHY. The difficulty there, Colonel, was that the FBI, who apparently supplied the information, informed Washington that the Japanese consul was destroying most of his important papers and yet the Navy and Army felt it was a routine process, just burning some papers, one of these day-to-day transactions.

Colonel BRATTON. What I meant is this: A message did go out from Naval Operations or Naval Intelligence informing Admiral Kimmel that the Japanese were burning certain codes and ciphers in Washington and elsewhere. That is the message that I was told would be repeated to the [12123] Army, so I felt that it was not necessary for us to send the same message in a different code, because that jeopardized the security of the code.

Mr. MURPHY. You have learned from these records, have you not, that Admiral Kimmel did not give that information to General Short?

Colonel BRATTON. I have heard that in the testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. Now when you sent this message on the 5th, as I understand it, you wanted to have Fielder contact Rochefort and go over the whole situation.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you mean, as I understood Captain Safford to indicate, that you were informing Hawaii that there was a winds intercept?

Colonel BRATTON. No.

Mr. MURPHY. And that that information would be available there?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now then, I go to page 64. On page 64 you were discussing with the Grunert Board the question of the necessity of secrecy in connection with these codes, and particularly the one setting up the winds code. This is at the bottom of the page:

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. I think, if I understand [12124] your question, if the Japanese knew today that we were reading any of their codes or ciphers, they could so effectively change them as to make them unreadable from now on over a period of considerable time.

By the way, this is on September 30, 1944.

General RUSSELL. Two to six weeks?

Colonel BRATTON. Such an act on their part might well prolong our war with Japan much longer than necessary.

Would you think it would be proper, Colonel Bratton, as an Intelligence man, during the month of September, 1944, to be sending through the mails in English letters describing the winds code and discussing it in detail?

Colonel BRATTON. No, I think it would have been very inadvisable to indulge in any such practice.

Mr. MURPHY. Now continuing:

General RUSSELL. If they knew, therefore, that we had intercepted these messages and had broken that code at that time, it would convey to them no information as to whether or not we had broken the code which they are using today, would it?

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, yes, sir, it would, because these code phrases are a code within a cipher. I didn't make that clear. The whole message about this "wind" signal was in a very secret cipher, and these code expressions [12125] were contained in that. This was their most secret cipher, and it contained a code which was to be broadcast as part of a weather broadcast.

General RUSSELL. And they are continuing to use that cipher?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. And this would disclose the fact that we did have information on that secret cipher which they do not know that we have, if they should learn that we have picked this up?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

General RUSSELL. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Therefore, the danger of any leak exists now as much as ever?

That is September 30, 1944.

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

General GRUNERT. Therefore, the danger that any leak of this thing might affect the war effort exists now as it has in the past?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

You made those answers to those questions at that time?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now on page 66:

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, there is this point to it: My [12126] recollection is very definite to the effect that I did not get it prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It may have been made available to me thereafter, and it would not have made much impression on me at that time because the attack had been made; it would no longer have as much significance in my mind.

* * * * *

Colonel BRATTON. My recollection of that is very vague, General, and I have discussed the matter with General Miles and his memory is equally vague. I have seen a statement made by Colonel Sadtler to the effect that on the morning of the 5th of December 1941 he went to General Miles with the oral statement that the "winds" implementing message had been received by the Navy. He says that General Miles then sent for me and the three of us discussed it in General Miles' office. Colonel Sadtler further stated that he got this information from Admiral Noyes of the Navy, and it was to the effect that the phrase had come through which meant a break in the diplomatic relations between Japan and Great Britain. I don't remember the incident. Colonel Sadtler is so positive in his statement, however, that something of the sort must have happened. But the point I wish to emphasize is this: We knew that relations between Japan and Great Britain were on the point of being [12127] broken at any minute. We had been telling everybody so. That is not the message that we were waiting for. The one we were waiting for was one which would indicate a break between Japan and the United States.

General FRANK. Since you were waiting for this, and you did have some information on a message that did come through, so far as you remember you did not investigate it further to find out if the "winds" message concerning the United States had come through; is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, I did make further inquiries about this message, but prior to investigating the thing more thoroughly I had dispatched to G-2 in

Hawaii the message that I have previously referred to, so that if this "winds" code implementing message did come through, they in Hawaii would be alerted just as quickly as we were.

Now, that leads to the possible inference that on the 5th of December you felt that there should be special precautions taken about Hawaii. Did you mean to create that inference?

Do you understand me?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir, I do not understand you.

[12128] Mr. MURPHY. Colonel Bratton, you say here:

Yes; I did make further inquiries about this message but prior to investigating the thing more thoroughly, I had dispatched to G-2 in Hawaii the message that I have previously referred to, so that if this "winds code" implementing message did come through they in Hawaii would be alerted just as quickly as we were.

Which, I understand to mean that after the event you felt Hawaii at least had as much information as you did. Is that what you mean?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, everybody was making such a hullabaloo about this winds business, I thought, to be on the safe side, we might as well alert Hawaii to this thing, to let them listen in and get it, just as soon, if not sooner than we did.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you send the message to the Philippines? I mean it was Hawaii you were alerting now, you were singling them out. How about the Philippines? How about the Panama Canal, and how about the Aleutians? Or was it that you were going to Rochefort, because you understood he was an expert?

Colonel BRATTON. That was one of the reasons; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. If it was an alert, the question is why [12129] did not it go to the Philippines where there was more danger? Why would not you alert them?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not know from what source I got the information, but my feeling at that time was that the Philippines had been adequately alerted, and that the replies from the Commanding General there were satisfactory.

Mr. MURPHY. This is on the 5th.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What replies? There were no replies then—I see. The replies that came in to the message of the 27th. All right.

Now, then, I would like to ask you some questions about this paper here, called Secret Summary of Far Eastern Documents. What do you know about that? Who prepared it and why?

Mr. Chairman, there is something of immediate importance that has just come up. I ask permission to pass the question and pass the examination, with the right to ask a few question after I return. I mean, after the others had completed their examination.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Colonel BRATTON. This was prepared as the result of [12130] a letter written by the President of the United States to the Chief of Staff on the 14th of July 1943. I have a copy of the letter here, sir, if you would like to have me read it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Suppose you just hold that until Mr. Murphy is able to return, Colonel. He had to go to answer a roll call in the House.

Senator Brewster would be next. He is not present at the moment.

Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. GEARHART. You have listened to the testimony, Colonel, of Captain Kramer?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you understand his testimony in reference to the deliveries he made on December 6, that he delivered one to the White House and left it there in what they call the plan room?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The situation room.

Mr. GEARHART. The situation room.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That he delivered another one to Colonel Knox, that he read them and returned them to him?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That he delivered a third set to Admiral [12131] Wilkinson and General Miles who were dining together in Alexandria?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Those are the only three deliveries he made of the 13 parts on the 6th day of December?

Colonel BRATTON. I believe so, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, on the 6th you made how many deliveries of the 13 parts?

Colonel BRATTON. One that I can positively recall. That was to the Secretary of State, through his night duty officer.

Mr. GEARHART. Are you positive, in your present memory of your deliveries, that you did not make a delivery to the office of the Secretary of the Chief of Staff of the Army?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; I am not positive. Neither am I positive that I did. The only thing that I am positive about in connection with the copy that went to the Chief of Staff is that he had it on his desk in front of him, all 14 parts, when I reached him Sunday morning. I am quite positive that I did not make that delivery, and I did not put it on his desk.

Mr. GEARHART. You say now that you are positive that you did not make a delivery of the 13-part message to the [12132] office of the Secretary or to General Marshall himself on the night of the 6th?

Colonel BRATTON. I am not positive, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You are not positive?

Colonel BRATTON. I am not positive whether the delivery was made or not.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you on a prior occasion testified that you did?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. But today, as you look back through the years and consider all that you have learned in the meantime you are now not positive that you made that delivery?

Colonel BRATTON. My memory must have been at fault when I made those statements before the Grunert Board, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, do you remember the testimony of Admiral Kramer, as to the morning of the 7th?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain Kramer.

Mr. GEARHART. Or Captain Kramer?

He testified, did he not that he delivered a full set 14 parts, to the White House at about 9 o'clock in the morning; is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes. That was a duplication of my effort. There was no necessity for his doing so, and that [12133] was my task at the time.

Mr. GEARHART. To deliver to the White House?

Colonel BRATTON. Not to the White House, but to the State Department.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but he testified, as you remember, and I think you will verify my memory of it, he testified at these proceedings he delivered at 9 o'clock a full set of 14 parts to the White House.

Colonel BRATTON. I believe I remember that statement, yes.

Mr. GEARHART. And around 10 o'clock he delivered a full set of the 14 parts to the Secretary of State's office.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did he testify—I am not sure about this—that he made any other deliveries on the morning of the 7th?

Colonel BRATTON. Captain Kramer?

Mr. GEARHART. Captain Kramer. They are the only two, is that not correct?

Colonel BRATTON. My recollection is that he testified that he delivered the 14 parts to the Chief of Naval Operations in his office sometime that morning.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right. I remember that.

As you remember it, that is all?

Colonel BRATTON. I haven't any clear recollection about what Captain Kramer did, Mr. Gearhart. His evidence is before the committee.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you listened to it, just as I have been listening to it.

Colonel BRATTON. I listened to an awful lot of evidence here. I remember some of it, and some of it I do not.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, what deliveries did you make on Sunday morning of the fourteenth part?

Colonel BRATTON. I may have delivered the fourteenth part of this message to Mr. Stone, the confidential secretary of the Secretary of State, over in his office sometime between 8 and 9, but I do not remember doing so.

I do remember calling Mr. Stone on the telephone to make sure that the Secretary of State had all 14 parts that morning.

Now, Captain Kramer has testified that he saw me over in the State Department sometime around 10 o'clock. Captain Kramer's memory is at fault in that respect, because he could not possibly have seen me there at that time of day. I was busy doing something else.

Mr. GEARHART. But you know that the State Department [12135] got its fourteenth part?

Colonel BRATTON. I know that because I verified it by telephone.

Mr. GEARHART. And you know, from hearing Captain Kramer testify, that the White House got the fourteenth part?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. At 9 o'clock?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Delivered by Captain Kramer. Did you deliver the fourteenth part to the secretary of the Chief of Staff in his office?

Colonel BRATTON. I have no recollection of making any delivery that morning, except of the 1 p. m. delivery message which I handed to General Marshall in person.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you rang up General Marshall and told him you had a very important message, that you could get it to him in 10 minutes if he would wait there. That was 9 o'clock in the morning.

Colonel BRATTON. Shortly after 9 o'clock; between 9 and 9:15 I would say, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did not you talk with General Marshall himself?

Colonel BRATTON. Not until he called me back sometime after 10.

[12136] Mr. GEARHART. You first talked to the orderly; then he called you back and you said to General Marshall that you would bring out to him a very important message if he would stay there, that you would get out there in 10 minutes.

Colonel BRATTON. I did not mention how long it would take me to give it to him. I said if he would stay where he was I would bring the message to him.

Mr. GEARHART. Did not you, at sometime in your testimony, use the phrase "10 minutes"?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not think so, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You could have gotten out there in how short a time?

Colonel BRATTON. I could have gotten there in 10 minutes, I think.

Mr. GEARHART. But he said he was coming in and you would meet him in his office.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. When did you enter his office?

Colonel BRATTON. After my conversation with General Miles, I went up towards General Marshall's office, and stood around there in the hall, or in the office of the secretary of the General Staff, waiting for General Marshall to arrive.

[12137] Mr. GEARHART. You got there ahead of General Marshall then?

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, I had been there ever since half-past 8 in the morning.

Mr. GEARHART. And waited for the general to come in?

Colonel BRATTON. I was waiting for him to come in after he told me he was coming; yes.

Mr. GEARHART. And you were in the reception room of General Marshall's office?

Colonel BRATTON. In the office of the secretary of the General Staff.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Either there or standing in the door or out in the hall.

Mr. GEARHART. And General Marshall entered from the hall directly into his office; is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12138] Mr. GEARHART. And when you went into General Marshall's office it was about what time?

Colonel BRATTON. 11:25.

Mr. GEARHART. So although you could have gotten out to him in 10 minutes, it took General Marshall from 9 or 9:15 to 11:45 to get in to his office; is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not see him until 11:25, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And when you saw him he was sitting at his desk reading that 14-part message?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That was a long document?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And you had to wait awhile until he completed reading it?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And he had all 14 parts?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And the only places that the 14 parts had been delivered before that meeting at 11:25 was at the White House and the State Department and to Admiral Stark?

Colonel BRATTON. That was by the Navy, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is the Navy and Army together making deliveries of the 14 parts.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to break in [12139] on the Congressman—

Mr. GEARHART. I would just as soon suspend for a few minutes.

Senator LUCAS. The assumption is wrong.

Colonel BRATTON. I know the fourteenth part got over to the State Department shortly after it reached me. I do not know whether I took it or sent Colonel Dusenbury over with it.

Mr. GEARHART. You heard Captain Kramer testify he delivered one at 9 o'clock or shortly after 9 o'clock to the State Department, too?

Colonel BRATTON. That means by that time the State Department must have had two complete sets.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. And you heard Kramer testify he delivered one to the White House?

Colonel BRATTON. I think so, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And you have heard Kramer testify he delivered one to General Stark—I mean Admiral Stark?

Colonel BRATTON. I think I remember his saying that he delivered one to him in his office that morning; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You did not deliver one to General Marshall's office?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not remember delivering anything to General Marshall that morning except the 1 p. m. delivery message.

[12140] Mr. GEARHART. It took General Marshall 2 hours and a quarter to make the trip that you could have made in 10 minutes, and when you saw him he had the 14 parts in his hand?

Colonel BRATTON. That is very definite, sir. He had it on the desk in front of him and was reading it. I think if you will go back and look at General Miles' testimony you will find that he supports me in the statement that we tried to interrupt him with this 1 p. m. delivery business but he would not be interrupted, and he went right ahead with his reading until he got to the end of the 14 parts.

Mr. GEARHART. Then the sum total of this is that General Marshall, at 11:25, had the fourteenth part and 13 other parts in his possession. You did not deliver it to him, and the only place he could have gotten it would be from the State Department, from Admiral Stark, or from the White House?

Colonel BRATTON. No; it could have been delivered to his secretary by Colonel Dusenbury, my assistant, because Colonel Dusenbury

reached the office, oh, sometime after 9 o'clock that morning and he could very readily have grabbed up all these pouches, assembled them together, locked them up and made his rounds in the building, as well [12141] as in the State Department. But from the time that I received this 1 p. m. delivery message I just wiped everything else out of my mind and let him run the rest of the office.

[12142] Mr. GEARHART. Did Colonel Dusenbury ever tell you that he had made such delivery?

Colonel BRATTON. Colonel Dusenbury's memory is worse than mine. He doesn't remember what he did that morning.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, then, you have been very definite on these questions I have been asking you in reference to where deliveries had been made by you and Captain Kramer, have you not? Your memory is pretty good on those deliveries so far as your testimony is concerned now?

Colonel BRATTON. Fairly good, but I have heard these statements by Captain Kramer within the last day or so. All this happened 5 years ago.

Mr. GEARHART. Is Colonel Dusenbury in the city now?

Colonel BRATTON. He is on duty in G-2, War Department General Staff.

Mr. GEARHART. In Washington?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. What makes you think his memory is so vague?

Colonel BRATTON. Because I have talked to him since his return from Chungking trying to get this thing straightened out in our two minds.

Mr. GEARHART. And he has told you that he does not remember about what he did on the morning of the 7th of December [12143] 1941 in reference to the delivery of the fourteenth part of the message?

Colonel BRATTON. He has no definite recollection as to what he did on the night of the 6th or the morning of the 7th.

Mr. KEEFE. So that I can relate that last remark, did you say, Colonel, that Colonel Dusenbury has no recollection of what he did on the evening of the 6th or the 7th?

Colonel BRATTON. I mean at this moment, Mr. Keefe, or, rather the last time I talked to him, which was some 3 weeks ago, he did not have a definite recollection at that time as to the details of what he did on the night of the 6th or the morning of the 7th.

Mr. KEEFE. I was interested because we have Colonel Clausen's affidavit in here.

Colonel BRATTON. It interested me, too.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you haven't any explanation of what caused General Marshall to spend two hours and a half, approximately, in making a trip that you could make in 10 minutes?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman—

Colonel BRATTON. I haven't any idea.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest to the Congressman that the testimony of the witness is that he called [12144] General Marshall's home, his orderly, at 9:15; that General Marshall called him back somewhat after 10 o'clock and the time between the time General Marshall called Colonel Bratton and 11:25 is the time, not the 2 hours, I think.

Mr. GEARHART. Is that correct, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. What time did you receive a call back from General Marshall?

Colonel BRATTON. Some time between 10 and 10:30; about 10:25 I would say.

Mr. GEARHART. An hour before you saw him at his office?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Can you account why it took him an hour to make a trip that you could have made in 10 minutes?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When you told him there was a very, very important message that you had to deliver to him?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; except that I remember hearing General Marshall say that he was taking a bath some time that morning. He may not have been fully dressed at the time.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I was relieving the gentleman from Pennsylvania who was examining some papers and I have completed my examination at this point and will let him make his own examination.

[12145] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Would it be agreeable for me to ask a question while you are getting your papers together, Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, surely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As I recall General Marshall's testimony, Colonel—you doubtless were present when he testified about that. As I remember—see if you can help straighten me out—didn't he state that he had returned from the horseback ride and was in the act of taking a shower when he got word that you wanted to come out to see him?

Colonel BRATTON. That is my recollection of his testimony; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That is what he said.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And when he got this message while he was in the act of taking a shower, that you wanted to come out there and see him, he then told whoever it was that delivered that message to you that he was coming right on to the Department and he stated that he thought he got there within about 10 minutes.

Colonel BRATTON. That is my recollection of General Marshall's testimony; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But in the light of what he stated it is still your recollection as you have given it to us here?

Colonel BRATTON. As I have given it to you today, sir.

[12146] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That you called his home and talked to an orderly about 9:15?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And left the message that you were very anxious to talk to General Marshall and that General Marshall called you about 10:25 and you told him that you wanted to see him and he told you that he was coming on to the Department and about 11:25 you saw him in his office?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, a possible explanation for this may lie in the fact that the orderly did go out to look for him and missed him and did not contact him until the general himself had gotten back to

his quarters and was taking a bath. That is the only explanation I can think of to account for this long gap.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But as I recall General Marshall's testimony, he did not indicate that he talked to you on the phone that morning at all.

Colonel BRATTON. I know that, sir, but my recollection on that point is very clear.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That you talked to him on the phone?

Colonel BRATTON. I did talk to General Marshall in person. He called me at my office.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, General Marshall stated, as I recall, that he was called at his home and was in the act of [12147] taking a shower bath and whoever talked to you on the phone told him that you wanted to come out there and see him and that he told them to tell you that he was coming right in to his office.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, of course, there is a conflict between General Marshall's recollection and mine but mine is just as positive as his was.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see, all right. And you do definitely remember that he did call you back and you talked to him on the phone?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that that was not later than 10:30?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you waited then till he came in and you saw him at 11:25?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. GEARHART. You cannot offer any explanation, however, as to how General Marshall got that fourteenth part?

Colonel BRATTON. Other than I have given you, sir, I have no explanation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy will continue his inquiry.

Mr. MURPHY. I now refer to page 76, Colonel, of the testimony before the Grunert board and— [12148]

Colonel BRATTON. What page is that, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Page 76. You were talking there about the memorandum. [Reading:]

General RUSSELL. Yes. Now let us consider the long memorandum which you stated a moment ago that you placed on the Chief of Staff's desk that morning. From what source did you get the long memorandum?

Colonel BRATTON. I would like to correct that statement at this time if I may, sir. That is not in accordance with my recollection.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, before the Grunert Board you said you placed it on the Chief of Staff's desk and now you say your recollection is that you did not?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now, down at the bottom of the page you say:

May I refer to some notes that I made at the time, sir?

Where are the notes?

Colonel BRATTON. You say where are the notes?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

May I refer to some notes that I made at the time, sir?

You said:

I handed it to him in person.

[12149] **General RUSSELL.** About what time?

He was referring then to the 1 o'clock message.

Colonel BRATTON. May I refer to some notes that I made at the time, sir?

Where are the notes?

Colonel BRATTON. These are the notes that General Miles and I compiled together some time between the 10th and the 15th of December, as I understood it at the request of the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff asked General Gerow and General Miles both to prepare memoranda as to what transpired in his office on the morning of the 7th of December. General Miles wrote it out and then asked me to edit it for him and make such corrections as I thought were necessary based upon my own recollection.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you restricted your notes entirely and exclusively as to what happened at Marshall's office after his arrival, is that it? If you were going to cover that morning and you thought it important enough to cover some of the high lights, I am wondering why you did not make a memo——

Colonel BRATTON. As I recall it now, sir, it was the events that took place after his arrival in the office.

Mr. MURPHY. But you did not include anything as to what happened before?

[12150] **Colonel BRATTON.** Not in that memorandum; no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you make any memoranda yourself when you knew that this was the day that war started, and being an expert in intelligence and knowing the importance of notes and knowing in all likelihood you would want to refer back to it, did you make any memorandum of the events of that morning, if for no other reason, for historical purposes?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Mr. MURPHY. If for no other reason, for historical purposes, did you make any notes?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; I don't remember making any notes.

Mr. MURPHY. Then the notes you referred to there were the notes, the memoranda as to what had happened in Marshall's office?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; and as I remember it, I then read to General Russell the statement that I had made before the Clarke board, which was a direct quotation from the combined notes that General Miles and I made.

Mr. MURPHY. You then read:

The message in question was delivered to me from the Navy some time between 8:30 and 9:00 that morning. It was immediately apparent that it was of such importance that it ought to be communicated to the Chief of [12151] Staff, the A. C. of S. G-2, and the Chief of WPD with the least practicable delay. Neither of these officers were in their offices at that time.

Now, did you go to their offices or did you call them?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I seem to have contradicted myself here, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In what way, Colonel? I don't think you did, but if you can tell me how you think you did, I may be able to help you out. What contradiction do you find there?

Colonel BRATTON. Down to line 4 on page 77 I was quoting from my memory. From there on I think I was quoting from the combined memorandum that General Miles and I made.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, you got this message between 8:30 and 9 o'clock, and you told the board that you called Marshall's quarters around 9 o'clock. You told us that you called General Miles about the same time. Now, there was some—

Colonel BRATTON. No; not about the same time. I called General Miles to report to him what I had done with respect to trying to get ahold of General Marshall.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you found out that when you could not locate General Marshall—that would take about 2 or 3 minutes, wouldn't it, to make a phone call?

Colonel BRATTON. Five minutes at the most.

[12152] Mr. MURPHY. Well, that would make it, say, 9:15.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you called General Miles?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Why did it take from 9:15 to 11:25 for General Miles to get down, do you know that?

Colonel BRATTON. It did not. General Miles got down to his office some time around 10 o'clock, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Let us go into that:

I called General Marshall's quarters by telephone and was informed that he had gone horseback riding. I requested his orderly to go out and find him at once and ask him to call me on the telephone as soon as practicable, as I had an important message to deliver to him. I then called General Miles and reported to him the step that I had taken, and recommended that he come down to the office at once. I do not remember whether I called General Gerow or whether General Miles called him, but we had some discussion as to which one of us would do it, and I don't remember now which one of us did, but in any event General Gerow was summoned to his office.

I waited for the telephone call from General Marshall, which I received some time between ten and eleven.

As I understand it, when you are testifying to us you [12153] made it a definite time, did you not? Do you recall what time it was you said you called Marshall when you were testifying to us?

Colonel BRATTON. I said a little while ago that it was about half past 10, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Well, here you said between 10 and 11 [reading]:

I informed him that I had a message of extreme importance which he should see at once, and told him that I would bring it to his quarters if he so desired. He said to report to him in his office, as he was on his way there. I reported to him in his office at about 11:25, immediately upon his arrival. Shortly thereafter General Miles arrived.

Now, where did he arrive from?

Colonel BRATTON. That statement in the light of my present recollection is incorrect. General Miles and I went in together.

Mr. MURPHY. Now it is quite important. You said that you called General Marshall around 9:15 and that it took from then until 11:25 in order for him to show up at his office; that you talked to him about 10:30 and it took from 10:30 till 11:25 for him to show up at his office.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12154] Mr. MURPHY. You say that you talked to General Miles about 9:15 and then he shows up at 11:25.

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; General Miles got to his office at 10 o'clock.

Mr. MURPHY. Where do you say that? You say:

He said to report to him in his office, as he was on his way there. I reported to him in his office at about 11:25, immediately upon his arrival. Shortly thereafter General Miles arrived.

Now, do you mean arrived from his office or from his home?

Colonel BRATTON. I meant there that General Miles arrived in General Marshall's office.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Colonel BRATTON. And the statement is incorrect because General Miles and I went into General Marshall's office together.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know when General Miles got to his office that morning?

Colonel BRATTON. Do I know when General Miles got to his office?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. I think it was about 10 o'clock, sir, because I had a conversation with him in his office before we went up to see the chief of staff.

[12155] Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, you meant that he arrived and you were incorrect on that because he went with you instead of arriving?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. After you got there?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you were incorrect in that detail. Now, then, General Miles at page 78 [reading]:

General Miles and I stated that we believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply, 1 p. m., an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand but that it might be into any one or more of a number of other areas. General Miles urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, Washington time, and that they, the Commanders in the areas indicated, should be on the alert.

Is that your recollection at present?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, at the bottom of the second paragraph [reading]:

[12156] There was some discussion at this time, I believe, as to whether or not the Philippines should be included.

Why would there be any doubt about the Philippines when the war warning said they were going to raid there, or that they would? Would that be because—

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I believe—my recollection as to the details of this conversation between General Gerow and Colonel Bundy and General Marshall are not very clear, but my recollection is that General Gerow mentioned the fact that the Philippines had been adequately alerted and that General MacArthur's reply indicated that he was on the alert.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, right there: If you saw MacArthur's reply why didn't you see Hawaii's reply?

Colonel BRATTON. If I saw what?

Mr. MURPHY. You are here discussing the kind of replies that were received and that the Philippines were on the alert. You said you knew that because you saw the reply. Why would you see one and not the other?

Colonel BRATTON. I never testified that I had seen any of them.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you say that General Miles said they were adequately alerted.

Colonel BRATTON. I said General Gerow said that.

Mr. MURPHY. General Gerow. Well, did you discuss whether [12157] Hawaii was adequately alerted at that time?

Colonel BRATTON. Not that I remember; no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Gerow said that the Philippines were adequately alerted. Was there some doubt about that?

Colonel BRATTON. I prefaced my remark, Mr. Murphy, with the statement that my recollection as to the details of the discussion about the Philippines was not clear.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I am just wondering why—

Colonel BRATTON. Now, if there was a discussion about whether or not the Philippines should be alerted it must have stemmed from the facts that I have stated.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, isn't it rather singular that there should be some discussion about the Philippines being adequately alerted and that would lead to the inference that Hawaii was not adequately alerted if you were going to send it to Hawaii and not to the Philippines? Isn't that a pretty fair argument or thought to follow, or are you in doubt?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I have no explanation to make at this time as to why Hawaii was not discussed, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, on page 79 you said:

General Miles said he thought it probably meant an attack on Thailand but that the timing had some significance, and that warning messages to our people should be sent. General Gerow, Colonel Bundy, and I, concurred.

[12158] Now, then, on this question of sending the message, you testified that your recollection was that it would take 30 to 40 minutes to send a message. I direct your attention to page 80—well, the bottom of page 79 first. [Reading:]

I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps officer in charge of the message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall's desire that the message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe means, giving the Philippines first priority. Colonel French said that he would give it his personal attention and processing of the message would commence immediately.

I then returned to the office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the addressees. I returned to the message center and talked the matter over with Colonel French, who informed me that the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes.

Now, would that be your best recollection, or would 30 to 40 minutes be?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, it is about 30 to 40 minutes. [12159]

Mr. MURPHY. But he did tell you that it would be encoded in about 3 minutes, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And he told you it would be on the air in about 8 minutes?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, too.

Mr. MURPHY. And be delivered in Hawaii in Short's hands in an over-all period of 30 minutes?

Colonel BRATTON. He didn't say that. He said it would be delivered—

Mr. MURPHY. He said—

in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes.

That is what you said, isn't it? Will you look at the top of the page? I am reading your words in this record—

and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes.

Did Colonel French tell you that?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; but that does not mean that it would be in General Short's hands. This message would be sent out in secret cipher. It had to be deciphered, then decoded and delivered to General Short so that he could read it.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me read the line here:

And in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes.

You meant what you said there, did you not? Isn't that [12160] English and doesn't that say, "In the hands of the addressees" and wasn't General Short an addressee?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not mean and I don't think Colonel French meant that this message would be in General Short's hands in readable form in that time.

Mr. MURPHY. What does it mean, "In the hands of addressees"? Who was the addressee? Wasn't it Short?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, a message that goes out in code and cipher addressed to the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, first goes to his Signal officer for decoding or deciphering, then it is typed up, and it goes to the adjutant general for delivery.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you say anything like that before General Marshall, or anything like that before the Board?

Colonel BRATTON. It wasn't necessary to say anything like that to General Marshall. He is just as familiar with Army procedure as I was, or more so.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me see exactly what you said in English:

And in the hands of the addressees in thirty minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 11:50 A. M. I returned to the Chief of Staff's office and reported to him the information as to speed of delivery that had been given me by Colonel French.

Did you so testify before the Army Board? You did so [12161] testify before the Army Board, did you not?

Colonel BRATTON. I did return to the Chief of Staff's office and report to him on the information that I had gotten from Colonel French; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you also testified that it would be in the hands of the addressees in about 30 minutes, did you tell him that?

Colonel BRATTON. I told him just exactly what Colonel French had told me.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

Colonel BRATTON. I told him just exactly what Colonel French had told me.

Mr. MURPHY. Isn't that what you said?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I mean, is that it in the record?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I now direct your attention to page 82—well, I will pass that. That is just that you made your memorandum on the 10th of December. You did not make any memo on what French had told you? I mean, you did not make any memoranda covering your recollection of what Colonel French had told you when you went over to him?

Colonel BRATTON. I cannot remember at this time, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

[12162] Colonel BRATTON. I would like to correct that last statement I made, sir. I think that this whole business is incorporated in the memorandum that General Miles read into the record when he testified and was part of the combined memorandum that he and I prepared.

Mr. MURPHY. How does it compare with what you told the Grunert Board, do you know, about the 30 minutes, being in the hands of the addressees in about 30 minutes?

Colonel BRATTON. I think it is the same thing; that in, in other words, about 3 minutes to encode and 30 minutes to be in the hands of the addressees. I think you will find that in the memorandum that General Miles submitted in evidence.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I go to page 85. I come back to Miles. You say that General Miles came to his office at 10 o'clock. I direct your attention to the bottom of page 84. [Reading:]

General RUSSELL. Well, when did G-2 get to the office that morning?

Colonel BRATTON. My recollection is, sir, that he came in at about the same time General Marshall reached his office.

Colonel BRATTON. That statement is incorrect, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You were off an hour and a half on that one, [12163] weren't you?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You say:

I had been waiting in the anteroom or in the hall so I could catch them the minute they got there, and my recollection is that General Miles came in right on the heels of General Marshall, and I followed them both to the latter's office.

That is what you told the Army Grunert board, wasn't it?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir, and I was giving my best recollection at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. I am not quarreling with you. I am just trying to find out what time they did come in. At any rate, in September 1944 that was your testimony about General Miles' arrival?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I come to page 87. On page 87 General Russell places in the record the following:

On November 26 we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States.

What information did we receive of that intention on the 26th of November, do you know? He said:

Independently of records, do you know whether or [12164] not such a message as that was received by the War Department from the Navy Department?

And you say—

Colonel BRATTON. I think General Russell was reading there from some statement made by Captain Safford, sir, and I notice that I have a notation here in this evidence in my handwriting which says, "Wrong".

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I wish you would refer to page 87 and see what General Russell put in.

Colonel BRATTON. I am looking at page 87.

Mr. MURPHY. He said to you:

Independently of records, do you know whether or not such a message as that was received by the War Department from the Navy Department?

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to find some place along in these notations where it says "Right". All the testimony is being completely shifted about now in so many of the important things. I am getting disturbed about it.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean right, r-i-g-h-t?

Mr. KEEFE. R-i-g-h-t, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to find one of those things.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, at any rate you say:

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. On page 34 of this [12165] Summary of Far Eastern Documents you will find under "G-2 153" this statement—

and then you refer to a statement, but is there anything at all there that shows the United States is going to be attacked?

Colonel BRATTON. This whole thing stems from the fact that there was a misunderstanding between General Russell and myself as to this document that he was reading from. If you go on further down the page you will see where General Grunert says:

Let the record show that that is continuing quotations from the document.

Well, General Grunert is referring to the Summary of Far Eastern Documents and General Russell was talking about something else. We never did get that thing straightened out until—

Mr. MURPHY. You think the board was confused?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Mr. MURPHY. You think the board was confused? I mean if they are both—if General Russell is talking about one thing and General Grunert is talking about another there was some apparent confusion.

Colonel BRATTON. There was; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, do you know now of any record of November 26th that gave specific evidence then of Japan's [12166] intention to wage war against the United States?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; of course not.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I have been looking for that in this record and I am wondering where it is and here we have been here 3 months or more and I have seen nothing like that. I would like to know what they were referring to, if you know?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I have gone over this thing a number of times trying to figure out what it was that General Russell was refer-

ring to and I cannot place it. I don't know what the document was.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, he says:

On December 1st we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States.

What were those sources, do you know?

Colonel BRATTON. Captain Safford.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain Safford?

Colonel BRATTON. I think now—

Mr. MURPHY. I will pass that.

Colonel BRATTON. I think what he was reading from was a statement from Captain Safford, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean Captain Safford presented something about us having information we were going to be attacked?

Colonel BRATTON. They had in their hands at this time [12167] some of Captain Safford's evidence about Japan's intentions to go to war with us on a certain date and all that sort of thing. He was reading from that document and I was trying to read from another document and we got rather confused.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 5 o'clock. We will recess until 8 o'clock this evening, Colonel.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., a recess was taken until 8 p. m. of the same day.)

[12168]

EVENING SESSION—8 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Murphy will resume his inquiry, Colonel.

TESTIMONY OF COL. RUFUS S. BRATTON, UNITED STATES ARMY
(Resumed)

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel Bratton, I would like to direct your attention to a message which you sent to Pearl Harbor in the month of November 1941 referring to a meeting of the Black Dragon Society. Do you remember that? I will get the page for you. It was in the last appearance October 6, 1944. Do you recall that?

Colonel BRATTON. I think I do, sir. I think it is quoted in full in part of my testimony before the Grunert board.

Mr. MURPHY. It is quoted in full at page 289 of your testimony before the Grunert board. You did, did you not, send that message to Hawaii under date of November 3, 1941, in which Hawaii was notified of a meeting of the Black Dragon Society and of the fact that the Japanese were to have full preparations completed in November and that war with the United States would begin in December or February? That is on page 290, under paragraph 2:

Hirota and others are said to have stated that war with the United States would best begin in December or February.

[12169] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir, I see it.

Mr. MURPHY. That letter was sent to Hawaii.

Now I direct your attention to page 292 which shows that you received a letter from General Fielder and General Fielder suggested you stop sending summaries of information to Hawaii, did he not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; and this first letter that you have mentioned is typical of the type of summaries that we were sending him.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you had been sending him material which you felt was pertinent to Hawaii and then under date of September the 6, 1941, received September 17, 1941, General Fielder said:

It has been noted that many of the summaries of information received from your office originated with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already been furnished this advice by the Navy—

and in that letter he asked you not to duplicate it by sending copies to him, isn't that true?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir. The important paragraph of that letter, to my mind, was paragraph 2.

Mr. MURPHY. Paragraph 2:

Cooperation of contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the [12170] Military Intelligence Division in this Department is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So after the receipt of that you took it, as I understand, that there was complete liaison between the departments of the Navy and the FBI and the Army at Hawaii?

Colonel BRATTON. I had it right here in his own words.

Mr. MURPHY. That was from General Fielder himself.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I direct your attention to the testimony of General Miles before this committee. On page 4118 General Miles said:

I had a conversation, on my return from Admiral Wilkinson's house, as I testified, with Colonel Bratton. I take full responsibility for that 13-part not going to the Chief of Staff that night.

Do you recall the conversation with General Miles?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; I recall it in a general way, not in detail.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, he says at page 4119:

I returned to my house and telephoned Colonel Bratton, and my recollection is that he said the message [12171] was not complete. I knew its substance. I did not consider that it was necessary to arouse the Chief of Staff at that time of night for that message.

And again—

Senator LUCAS. Is that Miles testifying?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; General Miles.

And again at page 2438:

General MILES. These thirteen parts had little military significance. They concluded only with a Japanese refusal to accept the American proposal of November 26 as a basis of negotiation—a result which had been expected and discounted for some time. I therefore contented myself that night by calling Colonel Bratton at his home about 11:30 P. M., and assuring myself that the full reply would be disseminated the next morning on Sunday, and that he and I would be in our offices then.

And then again at page 2464:

General MILES. I do remember telephoning Colonel Bratton when I returned home that evening. I do remember what I have testified to, and what I wrote out eight days after Pearl Harbor as to what happened on Sunday morning. Beyond that I cannot recall.

And again at page 2483:

[12172] There was no reason for alerting or waking up the Chief of Staff, we will say, or certainly Secretary Hull, on the night of December 6th that I could see.

Senator FERGUSON. So, then, is it your—

Colonel BRATTON. May I interrupt you there just a moment, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. I think he meant Secretary Stimson instead of Secretary Hull.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; because Hull would be the Navy obligation, wouldn't it?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Senator FERGUSON. So, then, it is your opinion now that you told Bratton it would be all right to wait and deliver the remaining sections on the morning?

General MILES. I think that is probably what happened, sir. When the total message was in he was to see that it was promptly delivered, but I am not sure.

Is your recollection different from General Miles' on that subject?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

[12173] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I think Congressman Gearhart is next.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Had you finished?

Mr. GEARHART. I think I have finished.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Ferguson will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the year, Colonel Bratton, that you went into the Far Eastern Section?

Colonel BRATTON. In September of 1936.

Senator FERGUSON. You speak and write and read the Japanese language?

Colonel BRATTON. I used to be able to, sir, but through lack of practice I have forgotten a great deal of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at the time you were in that service did you read the language?

Colonel BRATTON. I was reasonably proficient in it; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were the top of that section?

Colonel BRATTON. Not when I first joined it, sir. I was the assistant to Colonel Homer Slaughter, now retired, who at that time was the chief of the section. He left G-2 in February or March of 1937 and I took over the section upon his departure.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, this Far Eastern Section had the [12174] duty of evaluating the intelligence in relation to the Far East, which included Japan?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the head of your department was Miles?

Colonel BRATTON. He was the chief of the Military Intelligence Division, sir. The Military Intelligence Division—

Senator FERGUSON. You need not explain it. He was, in effect, chief of the whole division?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was chief of the Far Eastern?

Colonel BRATTON. I was chief of the Far Eastern Section, sir. Now, the chief of the Intelligence Branch when I joined G-2 was Colonel Fay Brabson.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand, then, that you, as chief of the Far Eastern Division, that one of your duties was to deliver these messages to these respective parties?

Colonel BRATTON. Deliver what, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. These decoded messages. You, as chief, were delivering the messages?

Colonel BRATTON. That was one of my primary duties; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, who else delivered? Who else was authorized to deliver these messages?

[12174-A] Colonel BRATTON. Nobody else until the fall of 1941, when the volume of this material increased so that I had to have help and at that time I secured from General Miles permission to utilize one or more of my assistant commissioned officers in this work.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did you authorize to deliver? Who beside you?

Colonel BRATTON. General Miles authorized me to use assistants.

Senator FERGUSON. What assistants did you use to deliver these messages?

Colonel BRATTON. Colonel Dusenbury for one, Major Moore, a Reserve officer who had had long experience in Japan and was on duty in my section, and a Lieutenant Schindel, another Reserve officer.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, by the end of November and during November I assume that the duty of the Far Eastern Section was to try to correlate all intelligence in relation to that section to ascertain three facts: First—probably connected with the first one was whether or not there was going to be a war between the United States and Japan; second, as to where that war might start; third, the capabilities of the enemy.

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

[12175] Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that that was the purpose of your section?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, let me put it in another way, sir; for further clarification. My section was charged with the collection, compilation, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence concerning Japan, the Japanese Empire, among other countries bordering on the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Other countries in the Far East.

Now, did you ever send Pettingill out—was it Pettingill?

Colonel BRATTON. In the Army it was Pettigrew.

Senator FERGUSON. Pettigrew? He was in the Army?

Colonel BRATTON. He was one of my assistants, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever send him to the Far East on a mission?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain that, as to when it was?

Colonel BRATTON. In the spring of 1941. It was perfectly apparent to us in the Far Eastern Section that Japan's war potential was increasing by leaps and bounds. It was becoming increasingly evident that war between Japan and the United States ranked high on the list of probabilities unless either or both countries changed their policies.

[12176] It became evident that we needed an inspection, a tightening up, a revision and general betterment of our intelligence system.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not satisfied then with the set-up of the intelligence system, as far as the Army was concerned, as it related to the Far East?

Colonel BRATTON. No. It lacked coordination, cooperation, and collaboration among the various agencies in the field.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Those agencies themselves, it was apparent, were not themselves functioning in some respects, as they should. So, with General Miles' concurrence, I had Colonel Pettigrew sent to all of our agencies in the Pacific area. He traveled mostly by air. He went to Hawaii, the Philippines, Tokyo, Hongkong, Shanghai, the Netherlands East Indies, and one or two other places that I may have omitted, for the purpose of inspecting our G-2 set-up, making such corrections on the spot as were possible, getting these people in line, so that their trend of thought followed ours in Washington, improving our communications, our systems of report, mail and otherwise, informing them as to our trend of thought in Washington, and in general tightening the net up.

[12177] He was gone a month or two, returned, reported what progress he had made in writing to the A. C. of S., G-2, and submitted a number of recommendations as to changes here and there in set-ups, personnel, reassignments, improvements in communications, lateral exchange of intelligence, so on and so forth, that he himself had not been able to effect.

I scanned his report—or rather I studied his report very carefully, found it was an excellent one and forwarded it to my chief, General Miles, for such action as might be found possible in complying with Colonel Pettigrew's recommendations which I thought were perfectly sound.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what month did you submit that to your chief, General Marshall?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. What month was it in 1941?

Colonel BRATTON. It think it was in May. I am not sure sir, I would have to look at the record.

Senator FERGUSON. In May. Now when did you next hear from those recommendations?

Colonel BRATTON. From the recommendations, you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You made certain recommendations.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

[12178] Senator FERGUSON. That certain things be done to improve the services between Washington and Hawaii and the Philippines, and the various places, in the correlation of intelligence.

When did you next hear of that?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not think I ever got the paper back.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you ever get any of those things done?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. I followed the thing up to the best of my ability, as did Colonel Pettigrew. We encountered a number of administrative obstacles that at the time seemed insurmountable.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you name those?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Will you name those?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes. At that time we were suffering under a number of limitations as to personnel available for duty in Wash-

ington. We were then under the Manchu laws which prohibited the detail of officers in certain positions for longer than a fixed period of time.

There was a great dearth of trained Japanese specialists in the Army. They were all, or many of them were, serving [12179] with troops, as was required by law at that time, and were not available for detail service or for special assignments.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean statutory law required them to be with troops and not here in Washington?

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, yes, sir. Those regulations all stem from laws passed by the Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. What law required the United States Army to put a man with troops and not put him here in Washington, if he can do the job here in Washington?

Colonel BRATTON. That is what we call the Manchu law. I vaguely remember now that it requires an officer to serve with troops 2 years running out of every 6.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask Congress to change that law, that you knew a war was coming on, and that you needed some more intelligence officers, or did you just let it ride?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not myself, sir, but I did go to a committee of Congress on another matter at about that time, trying to get a law passed which would give us some control over these dual citizens of Japanese ancestry.

General Miles and I, and my assistants in the Far Eastern Section argued this thing with a committee of Congress for about 2 months, and did not get anywhere, so we just stopped.

[12180] We had other things to do.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

That was in 1941?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to get the rule changed so you could get more men in this intelligence branch here to do the job that you saw coming, and coming very fast?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir, we did the best we could under the circumstances.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you be able to get the memorandum which you gave to General Miles?

Colonel BRATTON. It should be somewhere in the files of G-2 in the War Department, sir. I am not connected with that office in any way at all, but I am sure the liaison officer can secure the document.

Senator FERGUSON. Will the liaison officer obtain that document?

Lieutenant BOSKEY. We will try to, sir.¹

[12181] Senator FERGUSON. When did war between the United States and Japan, in your opinion, become imminent?

Colonel BRATTON. I myself thought that war between Japan and the United States ranked high on the list of probabilities in 1940. In 1941, in the spring of 1941, I was convinced that war was inevitable. It was simply a question of timing. In the latter part of 1941 it was apparent to all of us that the time was running out, that a crisis was approaching. My personal feeling was that Japan's major effort would be a drive to the Southwest Pacific to secure the tin, rubber, and oil that she so badly needed, that she would run over any installa-

¹ The memorandum was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 156.

tion of ours that stood in her path. That seemed to be the logical procedure.

It did not appear logical to me for Japan to go out of her way deliberately to attack an American installation. As a matter of fact, I think the attack on Pearl Harbor was the stupidest thing the Japanese ever did. If they had gone about their way down through the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, Indochina, and leave us stewing in our own juices, the war might still be on, or we might still be arguing here as to what to do about it. We might never have declared war on Japan.

But by this deliberate attack upon an American fortress [12182] in the mid-Pacific she inflamed the American people to such an extent that we had nothing left to do, we had to go to war.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand you feel if Japan had not attacked an American possession we would not have gone to war, and that you did not anticipate she would attack an American possession?

Colonel BRATTON. If she had bypassed the Philippines and had not attacked any American installation, had simply invaded Malaya or the Netherlands Indies and Indochina, we might have been dragged into the war eventually; yes. We had certain tentative commitments with the British and the Dutch and the Chinese. Those commitments were tentative, but pressure might have been brought to bear upon us so great that we would have been dragged into that conflict. But it would not have happened the way it did as the result of the attack upon Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you have mentioned our tentative commitments with the British. What were those tentative commitments with the British?

Colonel BRATTON. I am not the best witness on that, sir. My knowledge of the ABCD agreement is only general.

Senator FERGUSON. If you are not the best witness on that, will you be the witness that you are?

[12183] Colonel BRATTON. My understanding was and is that we had a tentative agreement that had been initiated by a meeting of Army and Navy representatives of those powers in the South Pacific. Their recommendations had been forwarded to Washington and were considered by the joint chiefs of staff, who in turn prepared memoranda for the President, recommending that certain action be taken or that certain recommendations of ours be tentatively approved.

I believe that this paper was later withdrawn and held in a suspense file when they learned that the President would not approve it, and it remained in that status for some time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, where did you get your knowledge on that?

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, I saw the documents as they came into Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they in the suspense file on the day of the attack?

Colonel BRATTON. To the best of my knowledge they were, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was that suspense file?

Colonel BRATTON. I think it was in the files of the joint chiefs of staff.

Senator FERGUSON. In your affidavit you use this sentence:

[12184] I did not mention to the chief of staff the subject of Colonel Sadtler's report, nor do I know that anyone else in G-2 did. General Miles and I, by reason of our knowledge, among other things, of the existence of the ABCD Bloc, were aware of the implications which would be inherent in any implementing message in the wind code indicating Japanese aggression against Great Britain.

Now, if the ABCD agreement was in the suspense file on the day of the outbreak, what obligation did America have under it, and then why did you make this affidavit?

You say:

We were aware of the implication which would be inherent in any implementing message to the wind code indicating Japanese aggression against Great Britain.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, the obligation was only a tentative one. It had not been signed or approved by the President; it had not been approved by the Congress. We just do not barge off to war whenever the spirit moves us; we have to go through certain formalities.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew the war was on in the Atlantic and you did not go through the formalities.

Colonel BRATTON. An unofficial war; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now what did you mean by this:

We were aware of the implications which would be inherent in any implementing message to the wind code indicating [12185] Japanese aggression against Great Britain—

What were the implications?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I meant those that were tentatively agreed upon in this ABCD conference down in the southwest Pacific. That is the one that was initiated there, that the United States would take certain action if the Japanese crossed a certain line or invaded a certain body of water.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see a message that came from Australia about the 6th of December?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't think I saw it until after the attack, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with exhibit A to Army Pearl Harbor Board top secret transcript, Summary of Far Eastern Documents?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Page 36 under FE-366—what is that. Far Eastern Document—366?

Colonel BRATTON. You refer to FE-366?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; I see it.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Melbourne radioed that on 6 December the Netherlands Far East command had ordered the execution of mobilization [12186] Plan A-2 upon learning of Japanese naval movements out of Palau.

What was that?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember sir, but the document which this refers to is in the files of G-2 and can be produced for the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will show you this document.

Colonel BRATTON. I think you will find that that document was held up, that message was held up by the Australian authorities for some reason best known to them, and did not reach us until after the attack on the 7th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how many hours it was held up by the Australian Government?

Colonel BRATTON. Not at this time; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether it was held up 17 hours by the Australian Government?

Colonel BRATTON. I was going to say—

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't allow our military attaché to send it out?

Colonel BRATTON. I was going to say that I think it was held up for a day.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever learn why the Australian Government held up a message from our own authorities to Washington advising them in relation to this war that was [12187] breaking out?

Colonel BRATTON. I was told that the Australian authorities wished to take the matter up with their own parliament before they released the information to us.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, didn't they release it first and then demand that we hold it up and not give it to our Government until they could have a Cabinet meeting?

Colonel BRATTON. I think that was it, sir. That is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. I show you this exhibit and ask you whether Merle Smith—well I will put it in the record. Read it into the record.

Colonel BRATTON. It states here in the message:

This message held 17 hours by Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Blank government isn't it?

Colonel BRATTON. Blank government; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the Australian Government?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Read the whole message into the record.

Colonel BRATTON (reading):

December 7, 1941.

7:58 P. M.

From Melbourne, Australia, via Honolulu.

[12188] To War Department and Commanding General Hawaiian Department.
Secret.

Number 24. December 6th.

Based on Dutch intelligence report (unconfirmed here) of naval movements from Pelau objective Menado and/or Ambon, Dutch ordered execution plan A-2 and suggested RAAF reciprocal movement be directed Laha Ambon and Koepang. So ordered pm yesterday including flight Catalina to Rabaul task reconnaissance Buka and northwest passage Australian Army reinforcements Ambon Koepang subject to request Dutch East Indies. This message held 17 hours by . . . Government eight am. Dutch reported advancing planes to be on Koepang not now considered necessary. Eleven a m Chief of Air Corps desired proceed with all aircraft forward movements Manila informed.

MERLE SMITH.

Senator FERGUSON. What investigation was Carter Clarke carrying on? General Carter Clarke?

Colonel BRATTON. At present?

Senator FERGUSON. No. Is he carrying on one now in relation to Pearl Harbor?

Colonel BRATTON. Not that I know of, sir. You say what investigation was he carrying on?

[12189] Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Was he carrying on an investigation about Pearl Harbor?

Colonel BRATTON. Upon my return to this country in the fall of 1944, I found that Colonel, now General, Carter Clarke was carrying on an investigation directed by the office of the Chief of Staff, as to the details of the handling of magic when I was the chief of Far Eastern Section.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was the Carter Clarke investigation going along at the same time as the Clausen investigation?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir. This was a year before Clausen—a year before the Army board started operating.

Senator FERGUSON. It was going on before the Army board even started to operate?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it continue while the Army board was in operation?

Colonel BRATTON. The Army board was in operation but not in Washington when I appeared before the Clarke board the first time.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the Army board in operation and functioning while the Carter Clarke investigation was going on?

[12190] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for these two investigations going along at the same time in relation to Pearl Harbor?

Colonel BRATTON. The Clarke Board's primary objective, as I remember it had no relation specifically to the Pearl Harbor disaster. It was an investigation of the handling, processing and delivery of Japanese intercepts which we now know as magic at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Senator FERGUSON. But that was, wasn't it, one of the very things that the Pearl Harbor board was looking into?

Colonel BRATTON. The Pearl Harbor board was investigating that at that time, but, as you have heard from Colonel Clausen today, did not have complete access to magic information.

Senator FERGUSON. But the only person that kept them from having access was the chief of staff; isn't that correct? And at the same time, he was carrying on his own investigation into it by General Clarke; isn't that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. In general, that is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And Carter Clarke's investigation of magic was not turned over to the Army board?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't know whether a report of Colonel Clarke's investigation was turned over to the Army [12191] board or not, but I, after being examined by the Clarke board as to my part in the handling of magic, and after some discussion between General Clarke and General Bissell, and I believe either General Marshall or General McNarney, I was given a free hand in testifying before the Grunert board as to what I knew about magic, with the understanding that every time I touched upon that subject in that testimony before the Grunert board I would call the attention of the

President of the board to the fact that I was now about to state that which was classified as top secret.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what I want to get at on this Carter Clarke investigation, on the 6th of October 1944 at 9 a. m.—do you know whether the board, the Army board was functioning at that time?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I know that they were functioning on the 30th of September, because I testified before them on that day.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, a man by the name of Lieutenant O'Dell appeared before the Carter Clarke investigation on the 6th of October 1944 at 9 a. m., and he was asked these questions by Colonel Clarke:

All right, now tell me your story. We got the story that you wrote to Kemper and said you knew who did Pearl Harbor, or something to that effect, so you can start [12192] telling us what you know.

Lieutenant O'Dell said:

Well, sir, here's the part of the information that I thought might not have come out through other sources.

There was a cable that was sent on the fifth of December to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaii and Philippine Departments concerning the movement of a Japanese task force in the South China Sea. The information had come to the Military Attaché through the Australian Government, Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Burnett, who called Colonel Merle Smith and myself to his office.

General Clarke said:

You were then Merle Smith's assistant?

Lieutenant O'Dell said:

That's right. There were the two of us and he is now dead. That's the reason I struck my nose in this. We were called over on Thursday afternoon about 5 o'clock.

That would be the 5th.

Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Burnett, myself and Colonel Merle Smith and Commander Saom, who is the Naval Liaison Officer from the Dutch East Indies. The information was primarily in regard to the Netherlands, through the Indies, and principally concerned itself with the movement of a Japanese task force in the South China Sea.

[12193] However, within an hour after we had gotten there some additional information came in, the exact nature of which I wasn't told at the time, but when we went out, Colonel Merle Smith had me prepare a cable which he revised to send out and the principal part of that other than the movement of this convoy was that the Dutch has ordered the execution of the Rainbow Plan A-2.

I remember it's been almost three years now, and I can distinctly remember that particular part of the cable where it said A-2, repeat A-2, which was a part of the joint Abducan Plan only to be taken in the event of war. It provided for specific occurrences they would counteract by certain other action.

In other words A-1 would have been some other direction expected attack, A-2 was from a particular direction, and they ordered the execution of this A-2. That was significant because the plan called for joint operations for the Australians and the Dutch, and to the best of my knowledge, our Navy if nothing else.

In other words, our Navy was to take part in it.

That was to go into effect only in case of war and here the Dutch had ordered it. That was the definite information that it had gone into effect. There was a bit of flurried excitement with that, and Sir Charles Burnett asked [12194] us not to send that cable and Colonel Merle Smith, although impatient to send it, said that he would wait 12 hours at Sir Charles Burnett's specific request.

In other words, they didn't say they wouldn't let that cable go out, but I dare say they probably would have stopped it had we tried to launch it.

Now, we get the cable and we find that the Australian Government held it up 17 hours and we didn't get it until after the war started; is that correct? Is that what you found out?

Colonel BRATTON. To the best of my recollection, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Doesn't that indicate just what you said in your affidavit:

—by reason of our knowledge among other things of the existence of the ABCD Bloc, were aware of the implications which would be inherent in any implementing message to the "winds code," indicating Japanese aggression against Great Britain.

Now, the ABCD involved the Dutch too, did it not, down there?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And didn't it provide that in case of war with any of these countries we had certain obligations [12195] and isn't that just exactly what the Australians held up?

Colonel BRATTON. That was the hope of the people who drew up this tentative agreement. As far as I know it was never officially agreed by our Joint Chiefs of Staff that we would take this action, nor was the proposed action ever approved by the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, I want to ask you this, Colonel:

To you, at the time and up until the time of the attack, it didn't make a particle of difference, as far as the United States was concerned, that there was a war being started against the Dutch, that didn't mean anything to you?

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, in what way, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That we would get into it at that time.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir, but we wouldn't get into it within the next 24 hours, until certain formalities were gone through and certain Government action taken.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't that the point, that everybody in your Department had the understanding that you would have 24-hour notice after they had struck against the Dutch or the English?

Colonel BRATTON. That we would have 24 hours notice?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, that you would have something [12196] you would have some time, some notice.

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir. You are out of my depth now. I am afraid I don't follow you.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know on the 6th that the Japanese were going to attack the Kra Peninsula?

Colonel BRATTON. On the 6th?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. All the evidence pointed to that event, sir.

[12197] Senator FERGUSON. Did you see the Winant message?

Colonel BRATTON. Which message? No, sir; not until after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Not until after the attack, and it came in at 10:40 on the morning of the 6th, saying that there would be an attack in 14 hours on the Kra Peninsula.

Colonel BRATTON. I don't doubt that, sir, but it didn't filter down to me until long after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. If it had filtered down to the Intelligence Department—as I understood it the Intelligence Department was to filter things up, it ought to come to the Intelligence Department first?

Colonel BRATTON. Quite so; but this was a State Department dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand that if the State Department got a message that involved the question of intelligence, that they were on a higher level and therefore it took quite a long time to filter down to you?

Colonel BRATTON. It took what I thought was an unreasonably long time for us to get any type of intelligence out of the State Department during this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how did you account for that? Was it a higher level there?

Colonel BRATTON. Due in a large measure to the way the [12198] State Department handles its dispatches. Certain dispatches were of such a highly secret nature that they would not give them to other departments of Government. Those of the lower level had to be processed, reproduced in quantity, distributed, and so on. All that took time. That is under the set-up they had at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Could anything have been more secret than the codes that you were intercepting from the Japanese?

Colonel BRATTON. Our own codes and ciphers were equally secret.

Senator FERGUSON. Equally. Then why didn't you get them so that you could evaluate them with the Japanese information? In other words, Colonel—

Colonel BRATTON. I understand, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. If you had the Winant message from the Royal Navy that there was going to be an attack and you had the pilot message which showed we were going to get an answer to our note of the 26th, that it was going to be delivered at a specific time, later to be announced, and that that note was to be typed, not by a typist or anyone else, but was to be put in good shape, would that have helped you to evaluate the first 13 parts that it meant war with America?

[12199] Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I don't like to object, but I don't see how this witness can answer that question intelligently unless he had the Winant message in front of him and studied it and had all the other things.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I don't know of a better witness to get on the question of intelligence in the Far East. This was the man in charge.

Colonel BRATTON. I think I understand your question. It is to the effect that if I had this message from Melbourne before me—

Senator FERGUSON. Not from Melbourne.

Colonel BRATTON. From Winant.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Together with the pilot message and several other communications—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Colonel BRATTON. Would it not have led me to arrive at the conclusion that war between Japan and America was imminent.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Colonel BRATTON. I didn't need those extra messages to know that war between Japan and the United States was highly probable at that time, sir, but if I had had these other messages it would have confirmed my already arrived at [12200] estimate of the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, when you got the announcement that bombs had been dropped on an American possession at Hawaii, were you or were you not surprised?

Colonel BRATTON. I was not surprised that war had broken out. I was not surprised that the Japanese had attacked. I was surprised at the point that they attacked.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, you anticipated an attack at 1 o'clock our time?

Colonel BRATTON. Afternoon.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; 1 o'clock afternoon, our time on Sunday.

Colonel BRATTON. Immediately.

Senator FERGUSON. But you didn't anticipate it at Pearl Harbor?

Colonel BRATTON. Immediately upon receipt of this 1:00 o'clock delivery message I became convinced the Japanese were going to attack some American installation in the Pacific area.

Senator FERGUSON. At 1 o'clock?

Colonel BRATTON. At or shortly after 1 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. All right. So at 9 o'clock on Sunday morning you came to the conclusion that an American possession in the Pacific would be attacked by [12201] the Japanese at 1 o'clock or shortly thereafter on that same day?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And at that time you conveyed that information to what superior?

Colonel BRATTON. I tried to convey that impression to the Chief of Staff at once.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. And by trying you say that you called his home in Virginia at about 9 o'clock?

Colonel BRATTON. Between 9 and 9:15; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I said about 9 o'clock.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you talked to his orderly?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you told him that you had a very vital and important message, did you?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you asked him if he knew how to locate the General and he said he did?

Colonel BRATTON. He said he thought he knew where the General was riding and thought he could find him.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you waited until 10 o'clock before the General called you and you held this information for 1 hour or practically an hour?

[12202] Colonel BRATTON. No, I didn't hold it exclusively in my possession. I got the information to the Secretary of State. I called General Miles and either he or I called General Gerow. I told General Miles, in a guarded way, what this thing was and recommended, or requested, that he come to the office at once. I told him that I was trying to get in touch with General Marshall and I felt sure that General Marshall would come to the office and would want to see him, General Miles, and General Gerow, as soon as they could get together.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what time did you reach Gerow on the telephone after you came to this conclusion about the attack on American possessions?

Colonel BRATTON. As I stated before, sir, I don't remember whether it was General Miles that called General Gerow or myself. If it was myself it was immediately after calling General Miles.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. That would be around 9:15?

Colonel BRATTON. Around about 9:30, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. About 9:30. So General Gerow was reached at 9:30?

Colonel BRATTON. Approximately.

Senator FERGUSON. Approximately?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12203] Senator FERGUSON. And then you don't get to see him for two hours, which is 11:25, and you have in your possession this message that brought you to the conclusion that there was going to be an attack upon an American possession at 1 o'clock?

Colonel BRATTON. The Secretary of State and myself had it in our possession at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and it took two hours before you reached General Gerow; is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. No, that isn't correct, sir. General Gerow, I didn't see General Gerow until 11:00, sometime after 11:00 in General Marshall's office.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am talking about. So it was 2 hours from the time he was notified about this very important message before you saw him.

[12204] Colonel BRATTON. Well, it was 2 hours, Senator, approximately between the time I tried to get all these people together and the time they all did get together, if that is what you mean.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I want to take them separately. The War Plans was General Gerow and it took 2 hours in order that you might show him this pilot message, is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. Two hours elapsed before he saw it; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, that is what I am talking about. Now, General Marshall called you at 10 o'clock?

Colonel BRATTON. No, I think I testified that he called me at about half past 10, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then it took his orderly from between 9 and a quarter after 9 and 10:30 to get General Marshall to call you back on the phone?

Colonel BRATTON. Presumably so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then it took you another hour before you could show this pilot message to General Marshall because he did not come down and he told you not to come out?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. And this is the message that made you feel there was going to be the attack that you [12205] have explained?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you went to General Marshall's office was General Marshall in his office? When you got into his outer office, we will call it the waiting room, was he in his office?

Colonel BRATTON. He was in his office sitting at his desk.

Senator FERGUSON. Sitting at his desk. And when you walked in there you saw a brown folder with the 13-part message in it?

Colonel BRATTON. All 14 parts in it, all 14 parts were in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Fourteen parts were in it?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you make inquiry—well, I will first ask you, do you know how long General Marshall had been in his office?

Colonel BRATTON. He has just gotten into his office, sir. He went into his office from the door that opens into the hall and General Miles and I, oh, in not more than a minute or 2 minutes after that walked in through the other door.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then you arrived practically at the same time?

[12206] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, had he started to read the 13 part message before you got into his office?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was reading the 14 parts of the message when you entered his office?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you attempted to stop him to show him what you had?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I had this message in my hand and made a statement to the effect, "General, I have a very important message here which I think you should see at once," and he did not look at it until after he had finished reading the 14 parts.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, how do you account for General Marshall having in a folder before him and reading it when you went into his office at 11:25 if you did not give them to someone Saturday night?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, if I did not give it to someone Saturday night or Colonel Dusenbury, my assistant, did not give it to someone Saturday night, Colonel Dusenbury must have delivered it to Colonel Deane, who was the secretary on duty Sunday morning, to place on General Marshall's desk.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you said that that is the man [12207] that you questioned and he doesn't remember anything of those two dates.

Colonel BRATTON. His memory is not very clear as to the happenings on those two dates, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have talked to him and his memory is not very clear?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you asked him about the delivery of that message to anyone Sunday morning?

Colonel BRATTON. I have, sir, repeatedly and he cannot remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you deliver it Sunday morning?

Colonel BRATTON. I am certain that I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you mentioned in your testimony three secretaries and you did not name Deane. He had a number of secretaries in there. They were Major Max Taylor, Colonel Bedell Smith, Colonel Sexton, and one or two others, but at that time Colonel Smith was the senior secretary.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Deane was in that office at that time?

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, I saw Deane standing around in his office and in the hall Sunday morning when I was waiting for [12208] General Marshall to arrive.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you delivered the pilot message at what time, or had it delivered?

Colonel BRATTON. About 3 o'clock Saturday afternoon the 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Army translate that pilot message?

Colonel BRATTON. I think so, yes, sir. I can tell by looking at this.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Army translation.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know when that was delivered to the Navy?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir, and there is no way that I would know that because I did not do the delivering to the Navy. That was done by the SIS.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how would you suggest we find out what time it was delivered to the Navy? You got it at three o'clock and delivered it at three?

Colonel BRATTON. I got it at about 2 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. About 2 o'clock.

Colonel BRATTON. And delivered it among other messages that Saturday afternoon at about three o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know of any other reason [12209] that it would not go to the Navy at two o'clock, at the time you got it?

Colonel BRATTON. I think it probably did but it was buried in a mass of other intercepts in an envelope that had to be sorted and sifted out and evaluated.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was translated?

Colonel BRATTON. They were all translated when they went out of the translating section, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. They were all translated; they were all in English when they reached my desk.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right, at two o'clock, and the ordinary procedure was that the message, together with whatever other messages were translated, would be taken to the Navy?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there is no reason to doubt in your mind that at two o'clock or shortly thereafter on Saturday the 6th the Navy had the translated pilot message?

Colonel BRATTON. No, I can't say that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what can you say along that line?

[12210] Colonel BRATTON. I don't know when the SIS delivered its batch of translated intercepts to the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it its duty to deliver it at the same time they delivered it to you?

Colonel BRATTON. That was standard operating procedure, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am getting at, the standard operational procedure was that your department and the Navy would get them at the same time.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Colonel BRATTON. Let me modify that a moment. If the same man delivered the two envelopes he obviously could not deliver them in two opposite directions at the same time.

Senator FERGUSON. I would say that would be correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield to Mr. Murphy?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment, until he gets through,

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through with your answer?

Colonel BRATTON. With what, sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through making answer to that question?

[12211] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. I was just wondering if the SIS was working on Saturday afternoon and the Army translators were not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. They left at 1 o'clock that day; it was Saturday.

Colonel BRATTON. They were there.

Mr. MURPHY. They were working?

Colonel BRATTON. The SIS was on a 24-hour shift during the latter part of November and I know that there were translators and decoders and decipherers in the Army SIS on Saturday afternoon, Saturday night, Sunday.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain Kramer said he had to call them and ask them to come back and I think he said they started to work around 6 o'clock that evening.

Colonel BRATTON. I think Kramer's memory is at fault in that respect. Captain or now Colonel Schukraft, who was one of the officers on duty in the SIS at this time, is here in Washington and has been waiting to testify before this committee. He can give you much better evidence than I can on that subject, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He has not been waiting as long as you have.

[12212] Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. He has not waited here as long as you have to testify?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at page 245 of Exhibit 1, No. 902? Have you got that message?

Colonel BRATTON. What number?

Senator FERGUSON. 902; Army 25,844.

Colonel BRATTON. The fourteenth part?

Senator FERGUSON. No, 902—no, it is 904, pardon me.

Colonel BRATTON. That is Army 25,844?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that is the one not to use typists. When did you get that message?

Colonel BRATTON. I cannot state definitely, sir; I do not remember definitely, but the presumption is that I received it at the same time that I got the pilot message.

Senator FERGUSON. And then it would be delivered with the batch that the pilot message was in?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first—

Colonel BRATTON. May I make another statement in that connection, sir?

[12213] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. You will notice that the SIS number on the pilot message is No. 25,838.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. The SIS number on this No. 902 is 25,844; that is 6 numbers apart, so the presumption is that they both came over to me at the same time.

Senator FERGUSON. And then the 1 o'clock message does not get a number till—that is 25,850; that is 6 later. And then the one on destruction of the codes is 25,854, 4 later; that is on page 250.

Colonel BRATTON. These numbers were stamped on in the SIS as they passed over the desk of the person who was assembling them and sending them to me and to the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, when did you first learn that the embassy here was destroying their codes, their code books?

Colonel BRATTON. On the 3d of December.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I have a message here and I would like for you to identify James F. Perry, First Lieutenant, Military Intelligence Evaluation Sub-section. Do you know Perry?

Colonel BRATTON. He was not in my section.

Senator FERGUSON. This was a message December the 6th. [12214] Saturday.

Memorandum for Colonel Holbrook.

Do you know Colonel Holbrook?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. He was an officer in the counter-intelligence division.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Word has just been received from ONI by telephone to the effect that the Japanese embassy in Washington, D. C. was reliably reported to have burned its code books and ciphers last night.

When did you get that message?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember seeing that message until recently, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that would be an important message, would it not?

Colonel BRATTON. Not to me, no, sir, because when I read the order to Admiral Nomura to start burning his codes and ciphers I sent one of my young officers up to the Japanese embassy to find out if they were burning any papers in their back yard and he came back and reported to me that they were.

Senator FERGUSON. They were?

Colonel BRATTON. They were.

Senator FERGUSON. And what date did you send a man up [12215] to the embassy and find out they were burning papers in the back alley?

Colonel BRATTON. On the 3d of December, when I received the message.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 3d of December?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did you transmit that message to, that information that you had sent a man up and found them burning their codes and ciphers?

Colonel BRATTON. I delivered the Japanese intercept directing the Japanese ambassador to start burning his codes and ciphers to the usual recipients on that day, on December the 3rd. I went in person to General Miles and to General Gerow to invite their attention to this particular message.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that mean war between the United States and Japan when you received that message, did that mean war to you?

Colonel BRATTON. It meant that time was running out and the approach of the crisis. It meant, if they destroyed their codes and ciphers a breach, at the least a breach in diplomatic relations and probably a war.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. Did you know at that time that they were asking to send to [12216] South America their chief intelligence officer in this hemisphere?

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, I think that is among the intercepts, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir, I remember seeing that message.

Senator FERGUSON. And that the man named was the chief intelligence officer?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that mean anything?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, yes, that was another straw in the wind. It meant that the time was running out, that the crisis was approaching.

Mr. MURPHY. At page 280 of the Grunert hearings he testifies unequivocally that it meant war, at page 280.

Senator FERGUSON. The Congressman calls my attention that you said that it did mean war. Now you say that if they were burning all their codes and ciphers you figured it would mean war, but you knew that they had not burnt them all, didn't you?

Colonel BRATTON. I knew that they had not burnt them all, that they still had one or two in reserve. Admiral Nomura requested permission from his government to keep one until [12217] the last moment.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you intercept a message like that?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. It is in the book here.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I think there is, now that you bring it to my attention.

Colonel BRATTON. Don't you remember?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I do. They asked to keep one code; that is correct, isn't it?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Colonel BRATTON. I believe they had two purple machines and requested permission to retain one until the last moment.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you were instrumental, were you not, in getting a message to Panama on the 5th?

Colonel BRATTON. On the 5th that was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you remember that message to Panama?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Signed by Miles?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you sent this message on the 5th, after a war warning had gone to Panama, isn't that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; but I must remind you that I did not see the messages that went out to Panama or to Hawaii [12218] until after the attack. I knew in general what their text was; I knew that they were war warnings. I did not know to what extent they touched upon the diplomatic situation as between America and Japan. My purpose in sending that message to Panama was to inform the G-2 there that whereas our diplomatic relations were still strained, war at that moment did not appear imminent and by "imminent" I mean immediate, a matter of hours.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, we have General Marshall—

Colonel BRATTON. I must remind you, sir, that at that time we had not even received the pilot message.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that, but on the 27th General Marshall had sent a message to General Short.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with that message now?

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had not seen it, had you, up until after the attack?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not see that message until after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. This went to Hawaii:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibility [12219] that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future acts unpredictable—and so forth.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that kind of a message went to Panama. You caused on the 5th—this is the 27th.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had the burning of the codes messages after that.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had sent up to the Embassy and heard they were burning codes; that is correct?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you caused to be sent to Panama a message like this:

In the event severance of diplomatic relations is near this office will notify you. Japanese-U. S. relations are now very difficult.

(Signed)

MILES.

The actual message reads this way. That was a paraphrase—

Colonel BRATTON. I think what you have read is a paraphrase, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I am going to read you the message:

U. S.-Japanese relations. Stop—

which is period—

[12220] • Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So on the 5th you changed, in effect, General Marshall's message to Panama and told them that Japanese-U. S. relations were strained and that you would inform them if and when severance of diplomatic relations were imminent.

Now I want to know when, in your opinion, severance of diplomatic relations became imminent?

Colonel BRATTON. Upon delivery of the 14-part message to the Secretary of State.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you then wire to Panama that it was imminent or did you ever get a message to Panama?

Colonel BRATTON. No. The bombs started falling on Pearl Harbor while the Japanese Ambassador was delivering this message.

Senator FERGUSON. But you say that you believed at 1 o'clock—or at 9 o'clock that there was going to be an attack on an American possession in the Pacific and you have outstanding, as far as Panama was concerned, a message that you would, if and when severance of diplomatic relations was imminent, notify Panama.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I didn't do it, sir.

[12221] Senator FERGUSON. You didn't do it. Now, you were talking today about General Short's reply not being an answer to General Marshall's message.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why, it even answered it by number; did it not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; he referred to General Marshall's message by number.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And isn't it true that the messages that went out from Adams on sabotage was answered specifically by General Short, so that no one could make his short answer to General Marshall's message by number, because he specifically answered the sabotage messages, so that there were answers to all of the messages. Isn't that a fact?

Colonel BRATTON. I believe that to be, sir; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, how could anyone be mistaken that he did answer the Marshall message by saying that he was alerted to sabotage?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not believe I understand your question, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. How could anyone be mistaken that his answer which gave General Marshall's number to his message, having answered the other sabotage messages specifically and by number, that this message was intended to answer General [12222] Marshall's message?

Colonel BRATTON. How could anybody have thought it was intended to answer it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, because Adams had seen this reply was to Marshall and gave the Marshall number.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I don't know how anybody could have made the mistake. The message was not shown to me. General Miles has testified that he did not see the message. The message was handled by the War Plans Division, and by the Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this true, that the Chief of Staff and all persons in the General Staff were satisfied with his answer that he was alerted to sabotage, because that is all they expected at Hawaii?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; I do not agree with that.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that your conclusion at that time?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not see this message, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. No. Was that your conclusion, that you thought that the only danger at Hawaii was sabotage? You told me you were surprised not that there was an attack on an American possession but you were surprised that they attacked Hawaii.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes. This thing has been called an attack on Pearl Harbor ever since the event. It really was [12223] not an attack on Pearl Harbor. It was an attack on the fleet unit they found in Pearl Harbor. I was not surprised that they attacked our fleet if they could catch it by surprise. I would have been surprised at an attack on the installations of Pearl Harbor, the land installations.

[12224] Senator FERGUSON. Now do I understand then that you did not know where the fleet was but you anticipated an attack on the fleet? Is that what you want to tell me?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not know that any major unit of the fleet was in Pearl Harbor. My opposite number in ONI did not know it, because I went and asked him. I asked that specific question in the Navy several days before the attack, in a conference that I had with my opposite number, Captain McCollum. I said to him, "Are you sure these people are properly alerted? Are they on the job? Have they been properly warned?"

He said, "Oh, yes, the fleet has gone," or, "is going to sea."

Senator FERGUSON. Now we get something that has not been developed here yet. You went to McCollum?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. I saw McCollum every day at least once, and sometimes two or three times a day. We were in very close contact.

Senator FERGUSON. But you saw McCollum 2 days before the attack?

Colonel BRATTON. I would not say 2 days before the attack. It was in that first week of December.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. And you at that time asked him where the fleet was and whether it had been [12225] properly warned, and he told you that it was out?

Colonel BRATTON. In effect that is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Captain McCollum himself has testified before this committee that he did not know any major unit of the fleet was in Pearl Harbor. Admiral Turner has made the same statement.

Senator FERGUSON. But did not OpNav's board show this fleet in Pearl Harbor?

Colonel BRATTON. I have no knowledge of that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, the Japanese Intelligence Section getting information that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor knew more than our own Intelligence Section.

Colonel BRATTON. That appears to be correct, sir..

Senator FERGUSON. What?

Colonel BRATTON. That appears to be correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So we boil it down to that, that as far as our Army and Navy Intelligence system was concerned, the Jap Intelligence knew more about where our fleet was.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now are you surprised that there was an attack at Pearl Harbor?

[12226] Colonel BRATTON. You have got me in a corner now, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to be fair.

Colonel BRATTON. It was a perfectly logical action for the Japanese to take, if they knew that any large unit of our fleet was in Pearl Harbor, to attack that unit wherever it was, Pearl Harbor or elsewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. Now let us look at Exhibit 2. We will find that their intelligence did know more than your intelligence did.

Senator LUCAS. I don't think anybody disputed that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He admits it.

Senator FERGUSON. Look at page 29. There the Japs were learning that there were in Pearl Harbor

nine battleships, three light cruisers, three submarine tenders, seventeen destroyers, and in addition there were four light cruisers, two destroyers lying at docks, the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers having all left.

Colonel BRATTON. That is right, sir; but it did not reach us until the 8th of December. It was not translated until then.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

Colonel BRATTON. I see the message, sir.

[12227] Senator FERGUSON. All right. This message comes from Honolulu to Tokyo on the 6th. We got it but did not decode it. That is right, isn't it? The Japanese had that knowledge on the 6th?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12228] Senator FERGUSON. And we were depending upon their information to get where our fleet was?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, we were not getting the information, because I did not read this until on or after the 8th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on page 27, Honolulu notified Tokyo:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

Now, did your intelligence system know that?

Colonel BRATTON. What message is that you are reading?

Senator FERGUSON. That is on page 27. It is the last sentence.

Colonel BRATTON. That message was not translated until the 8th either.

Senator FERGUSON. I know, but Honolulu sent it to Tokyo on the 6th.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In this language:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places—

meaning Pearl Harbor.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; and if we had gotten that message on the 6th, I assure you the whole picture would [12229] have been different.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Bratton, you had the same information—or did not you have—that a surprise attack could be made on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel BRATTON. How do you mean, I had the same information?

Senator FERGUSON. Did not you know that a surprise attack could be made on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel BRATTON. It is written into every Hawaii war plan that I have any knowledge of, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you did not have to wait for that information from the Japs. But if you had known that the Japs were sending it, then it would have meant something? That is what you mean, is it?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know that on page 22 of Exhibit 2—that is the one where they were going to put lights out. Are you familiar with that message?

Colonel BRATTON. This tabulation, this code message—

A number of carriers, preparing to sortie, signal No. 2—
is that it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that that was translated [12230] in the rough in the Navy by 2 o'clock on Saturday the 6th?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not know it until I heard the statement made before the committee here the other day, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, let us look at the one on the 24th, on page 12.

Did you have what was known as a gist system, that you would put the gist of the message on? It was a flag, wasn't it?

Colonel BRATTON. No; but I had a similar system of my own.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your system?

Colonel BRATTON. You appreciate the fact that we were not evaluating this material for the chief of staff or anyone else who wanted to see it in the raw.

Senator FERGUSON. I will get to that a little later.

Colonel BRATTON. Notwithstanding that fact, I took it upon myself to pin a little buck slip to the inside cover of the book that I delivered to General Miles, General Gerow, and General Marshall, listing all the SIS numbers of messages that would be found in that book, and I put a red check mark against those that I considered of special importance, meaning that those were the ones I wanted those officers to pay particular attention to.

[12231] Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now when did you stop doing that?

Colonel BRATTON. I never stopped doing it until I turned over this work to my successor.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why there has not been delivered to this committee any of those tabs?

Colonel BRATTON. They were destroyed by me as soon as I got the books back.

Senator FERGUSON. You would get the book back and destroy the tabs?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, there was no point in keeping them after that. I knew by the return of the book containing the message that it had been seen by the officer to whom it was delivered.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now did the book that you saw on General Marshall's desk on Sunday morning, with the 14-part message in it that he read, have one of these tabs on checked by you?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not know, sir, because I did not examine that book.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it one of your regular books?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you don't know whether that had the tab on it or not?

[12232] Colonel BRATTON. I do not, sir, because the events happened so rapidly after I left General Marshall's office that looking at those books—I just did not do it. I had something else to do.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now I want to take up this proposition about the delivery of these messages in the raw.

You said that you—your Department had taken away from it the evaluation of messages, is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not say it in that way, sir. When I first started handling this material it was brought to me in the form of a memorandum by the then chief of the Plans and Training Division of G-2, who received it from SIS. It was a rough memorandum saying that a certain message had been intercepted from Tokyo to Washington. It said, in brief, such and such a thing, and so on. That went on for awhile after I took over the Far Eastern Section, and I changed that system. I had set up an arrangement whereby the SIS delivered to me in person the actual translated intercepts, because there was too much bypassing, there was too much waste effort and waste time in the system in effect when I took over the section.

I then instituted a system whereby periodically I assembled, evaluated and briefed one or more of these inter- [12233] cepts in the form of a secret memorandum for the chief of staff, giving the gist of the information and placing my evaluation upon it.

I would say, for example, "It has been learned from a secret source hitherto reliable that the following has taken place", or "is about to take place. We evaluate this" a certain way. That went on for some time.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us about when that started?

Colonel BRATTON. May I refer to some notes I made on this, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. If there is no objection, sir, I would like to read these notes that I prepared a month or so ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it along that line?

Colonel BRATTON. It is only a page and a quarter.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Colonel BRATTON. As to the handling of magic intercepts by myself.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Colonel BRATTON. When I joined the Far Eastern Section G-2 in September 1936, and for some time thereafter, this intercept material was delivered from time to time in memorandum form from the SIS through the chief of the Operations and [12234] Training Branch G-2. When the intelligence was of sufficient importance it was then made the subject of a special confidential memorandum for the chief of staff, the chief of the War Plans Division, or both, sometimes the State Department was so served.

Shortly after I became chief of the Far Eastern Section G-2 in February of 1937, I made arrangements to have exact copies of decoded or deciphered and translated messages delivered to me direct from the SIS. This type of intelligence was the result of combined efforts on the part of the section of naval Communications and SIS of the Army Signal Corps.

As time went by and additional codes and ciphers were broken the material increased in volume and importance and the A. C. of S. G-2 made me responsible for the selection and screening of this material and for its security in G-2, and for its dissemination as intelligence to the proper officials of the Government.

By direction of G-2 the number of persons so served and the number of persons so handling and who had access to this material was, for security reasons, kept down to the absolute minimum. I worked in close cooperation with my opposite number in the Navy, chief of the Far Eastern Section ONI in seeing that the proper officials of the Government had access to the intelligence derived from this [12235] source.

In early spring 1941, however, it became apparent that some more formal understanding between ONI and G-2 was desirable in order to insure proper dissemination and evenly distribute the work involved, provide adequate security and prevent duplication of effort.

Such an understanding was arrived at in the form of a chart dated January 23, 1941, and signed by General Miles and Captain James. This chart has already been introduced as evidence.

In compliance with the provisions of this chart I have served the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, A. C. of S. G-2, and chief of the War Plans Division by means of special confidential memoranda or intelligence reports such as IB No. 1 so and so. They were all given serial numbers up to 1-173-173 of them during the months of January, March, May, and July of 1941.

On about 5 August 1941, by direction of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, I stopped writing this type of memorandum and started serving the designated officials with the raw material instead, that is, exact copies of the decoded or deciphered and translated Japanese messages.

Does that answer your question, sir?

[12236] Colonel BRATTON. That was on or about the 5th of August 1941.

[12237] Senator FERGUSON. Now, sometime in 1943, you prepared a secret summary of the Far Eastern documents, did you not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was prepared on whose orders?

Colonel BRATTON. I have a copy here, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have a copy. Whose order was it on?

Colonel BRATTON. It was prepared as a result of a letter from the President of the United States to the chief of staff, a copy of which I have here, which I secured from the G-2 files.

Senator FERGUSON. Is the letter in the exhibit?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't think it is. Not the one that you have, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is yours a photostatic copy?

Colonel BRATTON. It is not, sir. It is a typewritten copy.

Senator FERGUSON. I want you to see the photostatic copy. When you prepared the copy to whom did you submit it? Who did you prepare it for?

Colonel BRATTON. The President.

Senator FERGUSON. Who had to approve it before it [12238] went to the White House?

Colonel BRATTON. The Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he approve it?

Colonel BRATTON. Not in the form in which it was originally gotten up.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that is what I want to show you, the original. On page 3, at the bottom of the page, FE39, has the photostat of a paper clip.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is crossed out there.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It reads:

"The seriousness of the far eastern situation was summarized in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, dated 4 November. The memorandum reads in part, as follows:

"There is a possibility, fantastic as it may seem that Japan contemplates military action against Great Britain in the Orient at a time when she is involved in Europe, with the idea of seizing Hongkong and Singapore, and ultimately acquiring the Dutch oil fields and control of trade routes to the Orient.

"—it is not improbable that this country will be compelled to apply the Neutrality Act and ultimately become [12239] involved.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator give the date of that? It is in 1937, is it not?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Is that correct, Colonel Bratton?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now who struck that out of the report?

Colonel BRATTON. To the best of my knowledge and belief it was stricken out by General Marshall in person.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, will you tell us whether or not that was a false report that you had inserted in there or was it true?

Colonel BRATTON. The report was true to the best of our knowledge and belief and was based on intelligence that we had secured from various sources.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is there anything else that is stricken out? Let's look at 1940. There is a paper clip there, and three-quarters of a page stricken out. It says:

As the year began the seriousness of the Far Eastern situation was summarized on 8 January—

page 15.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[12240] Mr. MURPHY. Isn't there a letter in the front, to which you did not refer, showing why they are stricken out, a letter from Colonel Sexton?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a letter as to why they were stricken out?

Colonel BRATTON. There is a—I started to give the history of this document, sir, but you stopped me.

Senator FERGUSON. You started to read a letter that you said was written by the President.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; to the Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

And you were trying to prepare this in 1943, in compliance with that letter?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you prepared it and the Chief of Staff struck certain things out of it?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I am trying to find out what he struck out, and if you know, as to whether or not it was true when you put it in.

Colonel BRATTON. All of the items that were stricken out of this book, to the best of our knowledge and belief, were supported by documents now on file in G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did the Chief of Staff get [12241] his information that would cause him to strike these items out that I am going to show you here?

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. I want to be patient, as we all do, but I am wondering if this investigation has gotten down to where we have to figure out how some documents came to be written in a particular way in 1937.

Senator FERGUSON. No; this is 1943.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What good is it? In 1943.

Senator LUCAS. 1937 is the first page stricken out.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, the only point I make, and I do it with the greatest deference to the Senator, if we are going to conclude here, it just seems to me that we ought to hold to the main track a little more than we are doing.

Now, whatever was done in making up this thing, it got down to some final form and that is the form in which it exists. If we have to go back into how it was revised and how it got into the present form, I don't see how we will ever conclude.

Senator FERGUSON. The President, as I understand, and [12242] the witness will correct me if I am wrong, the President requested this to be made up in relation to Pearl Harbor.

He wanted the whole far eastern situation outlined and he asked for it in 1943. Is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. He asked for a coverage from 1937 down to and including Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. If you will look at the letter from the President, you we find that he asked for a report from the military attaché. On the second or third page of that document is a letter signed by Sexton from the Chief of Staff's office saying that it didn't comply with the request and asked that the things that didn't comply be stricken out. That letter is in that document there.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, going back now, you wanted to produce a letter from the President; is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. I have here a copy of a letter from the President.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Will you produce that and read it into the record?

Senator LUCAS. What is it about?

Senator FERGUSON. It is about this far eastern situation, is it not? [12243]

Colonel BRATTON. Partially. It is about the Axis war potential, and what we knew about it from various sources.

Mr. MURPHY. May we have the letter read?

Colonel BRATTON. Shall I read the letter?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Read the letter.

Senator LUCAS. What is the date of the letter?

Colonel BRATTON. White House, Washington, July 14, 1943.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask, does this relate to Pearl Harbor or something else?

Colonel BRATTON. It relates to the probability or improbability of an outbreak of war between us and any and all of the Axis powers.

Mr. CLARK. 1943?

Colonel BRATTON. Covering the period—that is, our knowledge of the probability or improbability of the outbreak of war between us and the Axis powers; that we acquired from certain sources during the years 1937 down to and including a certain date, which in one or two instances went beyond Pearl Harbor.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think the President's letter will give an indication as to what was required.

[12244] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Colonel, and read it. That seems to be the best way to get at it.

Senator LUCAS. If we are ever going to get through, I agree we can't go back to 1937.

Colonel BRATTON. I may say this is a document that has been referred to a number of times by my Chief, General Miles. He attempted to get this committee to take cognizance of this document on a number of occasions while he was testifying but nobody seemed to take an interest.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, Congressman Murphy asked you about this document today.

Colonel BRATTON. He started to.

Senator FERGUSON. And then quit. I want to talk about—

Mr. MURPHY. I asked for it yesterday, Senator, and stated on the record that you had had a copy from October and that Mr. Gearhart had had a copy from November. I got it last night, after a pretty hard day. I read a little of it at my hotel room, was busy here today, and didn't read the rest of it.

But I read the part in the beginning. I don't like to question a witness about a thing with which I am not familiar. But, as I understand it, the President wanted a report in this respect, and there is a letter from Sexton [12245] showing the parts which were stricken out.

MR. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I brought the matter up.

Colonel BRATTON. This volume is only part of it. There was one volume on the European Axis. This volume is on the far eastern Axis. Each of these volumes is supported by 10 to 15 volumes of photostats of documents, original documents that are on file in G-2.

Senator LUCAS. Can we get those for the instruction of the committee, those 10 or 15 volumes that you have down there?

Colonel BRATTON. I saw them in the safe of Gen. Carter Clarke a month ago.

Senator LUCAS. I think it is very important that we have them.

Colonel BRATTON. I don't think the actual documents themselves will give you any more information than you can get out of this summary. They simply support the summary.

Senator LUCAS. I will withdraw the request then.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, how far does the committee intend to go with this character of proof?

Here is a review made by a person 2 years after Pearl Harbor. It is of no more importance than a review [12246] made by the Washington Post or the Chicago Tribune. It is an historical review made by the colonel. If you are going into this situation, you will have to accept anything that is offered by anyone, any book that has been printed by anybody since Pearl Harbor as to what happened at Pearl Harbor.

Now, not a single thing is fact. Everything is conclusion of this witness, historically, as to what happened.

I don't care how many times it has been referred to here, but I am wondering as counsel how far the committee is going to go into the hindsight of some historian as to what the situation was at Pearl Harbor when we have all this trouble here trying to get foresight.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, we are getting near the adjourning time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let's finish with Colonel Bratton tonight.

Colonel BRATTON. Shall I read this letter or not, sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, Senator Senator Ferguson has requested that it be read; is that correct?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the colonel reading the letter?

[12247] The Chair hears none.

Proceed to read it.

Colonel BRATTON (reading) :

The WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, July 14, 1943.

DEAR GEORGE: I would like to have copies of the dispatches of our military attachés which estimate or express any opinion regarding the probability or improbability of an outbreak of war, or which refer in any way to the estimate of potential military strength of any of the countries involved.

I am concerned with those dispatches dating from January 1, 1937 until such time as our military attachés left the following countries:

Germany, Japan, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria, Occupied France, Belgium.

I should also like the similar dispatches from England dating from January 1, 1937, to the outbreak of the war in September, 1939. I should like our dispatches bearing on this subject from Russia from January 1, 1937 until the present time.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

[12248] Senator LUCAS. What is the date of that?

Colonel BRATTON. July 14, 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. All I wanted to speak about was Japan. As I understand they are in this Far Eastern document?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell us—it is difficult for me to tell what was stricken out by General Marshall because of the nature of the photostating. Was there anything stricken out of FE149, FE-147, rather, on page 16?

Mr. MURPHY. If you will let the witness read Sexton's letter, I think you will understand what was stricken out, Senator. It is in the beginning of the volume about the third page, by Sexton.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If that will be helpful, go ahead and read that letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anything that will tell us what was stricken out?

Colonel BRATTON. All you have to do is look at the book itself.

[12249] Senator FERGUSON. That is what I was trying to do but he says there is some memorandum in it.

Mr. MURPHY. There is a memorandum by Sexton of the Chief of Staff's office telling why it should be stricken out, because it didn't comply with the President's request.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you find the Sexton letter?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, August 26, 1943.

Memorandum for General Strong:—

who was then G-2.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it.

Colonel BRATTON (reading):

The attached tab does not comply with the directive in that it contains much material other than MA reports. The Chief of Staff desires that it be revised to contain only MA reports.

By direction of the Chief of Staff.

(Signed) W. T. SEXTON,
*Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.*

[12250] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand everything was stricken out except MA's? What is an MA? That is a military attaché?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was everything stricken out except that?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. The book was torn all to pieces by the Chief of Staff and everything deleted therefrom except the raw MA and MO reports, MO meaning military observer.

Senator FERGUSON. How can we tell what items come under that category? Take the first item which I talked about which was stricken out.

Colonel BRATTON. All right. Take that first item. If you will turn to the index at the back of the book and find out what FE-39 was, you will see.

Senator FERGUSON. FE-149.

Colonel BRATTON. FE-39.

Senator FERGUSON. 149, isn't it?

Colonel BRATTON. You will find it on page 4, roman numerals, of the index in the back of the book. It says FE-39—

[12251] Mr. RICHARDSON. 149.

Colonel BRATTON (reading):

Washington, Memorandum to Chief of Staff—
dated the 4th of November 1937—

Subject, Far Eastern Situation.

In other words, this was a memorandum prepared in my office for the Chief of Staff based upon intelligence that I had secured from a number of sources, including, probably, MA's and MO's and probably including other sources.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, take FE-149.

Colonel BRATTON. What page?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 16.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, this is the substance of a confidential lecture delivered to the faculty and students of the Army War College but it gives the opinion of the far eastern section as to the approaching crisis in the Far East. You will see FE-142 on the next page—it is page 16.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's look at FE-159.

Colonel BRATTON. What page?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 18:

On 19 June G-2 forwarded to the Chief of Staff details of a Japanese ultimatum to Great Britain which required that the Hongkong and Burma borders be closed and that British troops be withdrawn from Shanghai if a Japanese [12252] declaration of war was to be averted.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. That was stricken out.

[12253] Senator FERGUSON. Was that a military attaché, or what was that?

Colonel BRATTON. That was a memorandum for the Chief of Staff drafted in my section based upon intelligence that we had acquired from various sources. It wasn't the raw military attaché or military observer's report. It was considered an evaluated paper containing intelligence secured from a number of sources.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's take something that isn't stricken out. The top of page 18:

This G-2 report of 31 May to the Chief of Staff outlined the Pacific situation—

Or is that stricken out? I can't tell from this.

Colonel BRATTON. What item is that?

Senator FERGUSON. It is the second paragraph at the top of the page, page 18.

Colonel BRATTON. That is all stricken out, down to FE-156 on page 18, the middle of page 18. Starting on page 17, you will see FE-155, the last paragraph on the page. That was all stricken out as was all the first half of page 18 down to and not including FE-156.

Now, FE-156 was a Tokyo MA report. It states:

Tokyo reported concentrations of Japanese troops—

That was not stricken out.

[12254] Senator FERGUSON. Take the top of page 27 for a moment, 1941. There are some lines drawn in after the word "Canton" and before June 25. What is that?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, that means that the Chief of Staff wanted part of that taken out and part of it left in.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was that because that was not in the report, that he wanted it taken out?

Colonel BRATTON. He wanted the sentence, he wanted the first four lines stricken out.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it all MA or not? How did you get MA mixed up with your others?

Colonel BRATTON. I will have to look at the index to identify these things that are referred to on the margin to find out what they were.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you do it on that one to see whether that was an MA or not?

Colonel BRATTON. All right.

FE-248, the basis of the first four lines was a report from G-2, the headquarters of the Philippine Department No. 176, dated 24 June 1941.

Since it was not a military attaché report or a military observer report, the Chief of Staff directed it be stricken out.

[12255] FE-254 was another report from the headquarters of the Philippine Department, a cablegram No. 1236, dated 26 June 1941, reporting Japanese troop movements and parachute training.

Since it was not an MA or MO report it was stricken out.

Senator FERGUSON. Take 249.

Colonel BRATTON. 249 was a radiogram from the military observer in Hong Kong, dated 25 June 1941.

Since it was a military observer's report, it was left in.

Senator FERGUSON. What did the letter say here?

An MA isn't a military observer.

Colonel BRATTON. The report of the military attachés and military observers were to be left in.

Senator FERGUSON. What were the initials for the military observers?

Colonel BRATTON. MO.

Senator FERGUSON. It doesn't say that the Chief of Staff desires that it be revised to contain only MA reports.

Colonel BRATTON. That is true, but General Strong on or about the 26th of August, at about 2:45 p. m., on the 26th of August 1943, General Strong directed me to [12256] include military observers' reports with military attaché reports in tab A.

The reason that MO reports were included in here was because I was ordered to do so by General Strong. That is in the revision of the copy.

[12257] Senator FERGUSON. You told us that had some importance to this investigation. Do you think so now?

Colonel BRATTON. I think the document would be of interest and important to this committee; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And important in solving the problem before it as to the intelligence that was given to the various departments out of your department?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, if the committee is interested in what G-2 did, as well as what it did not do, this volume is very important.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Mr. Chairman, I move that we include this as an exhibit.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to state in that connection that this very witness in a previous hearing said that it is far from complete.

Senator FERGUSON. It will speak for itself on that.

Mr. MURPHY. But the witness himself said so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to Senator Ferguson's request?

Mr. KAUFMAN. I am told that that volume is already a part of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report.

Senator FERGUSON. If it is, why, we don't want it duplicated.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And it is all being printed as an exhibit [12258] in that matter.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, then it is an exhibit in that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you withdraw your request, then?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask one question at this point, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you present, Colonel, when General Marshall read those 37 pages and studied this index?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. How do you know he drew these lines through there?

Colonel BRATTON. To the best of my knowledge and belief, that is his handwriting.

Mr. MURPHY. How do you know, sir? Those are just lines. How do you know that those are his lines up and down? Can you recognize his handwriting by lines up and down and waves across the page, is that what you mean? There are just pencil lines up and down and waves and can you recognize his handwriting as making those waves?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, Mr. Murphy, I cannot state, of course, that the up and down lines and zig-zig lines were made [12259] by General Marshall.

Mr. MURPHY. The other lines are vertical lines, just one after the other, and you can tell that is General Marshall's handwriting?

Colonel BRATTON. I examined the original document, however, on its return to General Strong by the Chief of Staff. It contained in addition two deletions by pencil of certain paragraphs and has marginal notes.

Mr. MURPHY. Then that is not a true copy?

Colonel BRATTON. In his handwriting.

Mr. MURPHY. This is not a true copy then, is that it?

Colonel BRATTON. This is a photograph of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Is there anything in there in General Marshall's handwriting? Everything I see are lines up and down, or waves, and

I am wondering how any handwriting expert in the world could identify who made them, even Osborne?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, on page 32, for example, in the margin is written, "Singapore M. O." I believe that to be in General Marshall's handwriting. There are numerous comments on the margin all through the book which I believe, and General Strong also believed, to have been made by General Marshall in person.

Mr. MURPHY. When did you talk to General Strong about it?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

[12260] Mr. MURPHY. When did General Strong tell you that?

Colonel BRATTON. Upon the return of the volume, the original volume, to G-2 on or about the 26th of August 1943.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Anything else, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I am not through. I just was waiting on the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield while I ask a question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I will yield.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel Bratton, where are you stationed at the present time?

Colonel BRATTON. I am on temporary duty with the headquarters of the Army Service Forces awaiting the pleasure of this committee, sir. My permanent station, to which I shall proceed when released, is Headquarters, Western Pacific, now at Manila.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you will go to Manila as soon as the committee has finished with your testimony?

Colonel BRATTON. I believe so; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You have been waiting for that trip for some time?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you were talking about the higher [12261] levels on this intelligence. Do you remember that expression? There was a higher level on this intelligence, somebody else was handling it higher than you?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, there was a joint intelligence committee that was a part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff installation set up some time in the summer of 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it ever function?

Colonel BRATTON. To the best of my knowledge and belief it never functioned prior to Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you greatly concerned and had some meetings with other members in the lower echelons about what information was getting out to our fronts?

Colonel BRATTON. Will you repeat that question, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I say, were you greatly concerned and holding meetings or holding conferences with other members in your section and in the Navy in relation to what messages were getting out to the front or what information was getting out to our outposts?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell us what meetings or what conferences—I don't suppose you call them meetings—what conferences you had with Army officers about getting intelligence out to the front? You know what I mean by "front." To Hawaii and the Philippines and to vari- [12262] ous other places.

Colonel BRATTON. What kind of intelligence, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, any kind that you had any conferences about.

Colonel BRATTON. We had a system by means of which we provided our overseas garrisons with encyclopedic intelligence on Japan, China, and various other Pacific countries, a system whereby they were provided with periodic combat estimates. The combat estimates were kept revised and brought up to date from time to time as the picture changed.

On special occasions, where time was important, we would send cables or telegrams to our overseas garrisons reporting the information that we thought they should receive. However, the restriction placed upon us by the Chief of Staff prevented me from transmitting any magic to overseas commanders or overseas G-2's.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to know when the restriction was placed on you by the Chief of Staff not to send any magic to the overseas theaters?

Colonel BRATTON. I received orders from the Chief of Staff through General Miles sometime in August as to exactly who was to be given magic.

Senator FERGUSON. And that has included what you gave us here and they were all in Washington?

[12263] Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I say that included what you have already stated here and everyone was in Washington?

Colonel BRATTON. Everyone was in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, were there any civilians outside of the State Department that ever received any magic from you?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes. The Secretary of War.

Senator FERGUSON. Who else besides the Secretary of War?

Colonel BRATTON. I believe that from time to time the Secretary showed some of this stuff to one or more of his civilian assistants, such as Mr. Bundy or one or more of his other assistants.

Senator FERGUSON. Anyone outside of the Secretary of War's office?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you testified to this; I want to read it to you and ask you about it:

I managed to get General Miles to O. K. this message to G-2 in Hawaii because he and I both thought that we could get that message out without violating any of the policies that were in effect about getting concurrence from OPD.

What were you talking about?

[12264] Colonel BRATTON. The message that went to Fielder directing him to get in touch with Rochefort.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but what is this part, "Without violating any of the policies that were then in effect about getting concurrence from OPD"?

Colonel BRATTON. At this time, and for some time previous thereto, we were operating under a limitation laid down upon us by OPD and approved by Chief of Staff, to the effect that we would not send any intelligence to overseas garrisons which might have tactical repercussions without the approval of the Operations Division.

Senator FERGUSON. Give me an example of that.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, we could not send an intelligence message to Hawaii, for example, that would have the effect of implementing their war plans without the approval of the Operations Division.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, in other words, you could do nothing that would alert?

Colonel BRATTON. Not without the approval of the Operations Division.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean. If it would in any way alert you could not send it out?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were a little fearful—

[12265] Colonel BRATTON. If I had had authority to act upon this 1 p. m. delivery message I would have done so immediately upon its receipt. I wouldn't have waited for General Marshall, General Gerow, or anybody else.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, there were two restrictions placed on you, were there not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. One that you could not send any magic. The other one—

Colonel BRATTON. The other one was that we could send no intelligence out based upon magic and upon an Army code or cipher system because the Navy did not trust our systems and they objected to our sending this material out over the Army net for security reasons.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have authority to alert or to send anything that might alert?

Colonel BRATTON. Not from the time that relations between the United States and Japan became serious or critical.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you were quite concerned about this one item, as to whether or not this Rochefort message would not violate this one rule, and you took a chance, you and who else? Who was the other man, Miles—and sent it out, is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. General Miles has testified that he had [12266] no such notion in his mind, of trying to get around or circumvent the Operations Division.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I wanted to get the message out, and in drafting it the way I did I felt that we were not violating the limitations imposed upon us, and I got General Miles to O. K. it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you not testify that he felt as you did?

I still felt uneasy about this thing and went over in the Navy where I had a conference with Commander McCollum, the head of the Far Eastern Section. McCollum felt as I did, that further warning should be sent out and said that he was going to write one up and try to get the Chief of Naval Operations to dispatch it.

Colonel BRATTON. And you heard Captain McCollum testify to that effect before you the other day.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And you got this out because you got the approval of Miles.

Colonel BRATTON. In that rather innocuous form, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were trying to convey that you had to put it in this innocuous form, as you describe it?

Colonel BRATTON. I was trying to get Colonel, now General Fielder, in close personal touch with Captain Rochefort, who was the ONI No. 1 man in Hawaii, who knew everything that we did in Washington at that time, and I felt if I could get Fielder to go and talk to this Naval officer under any pretext whatsoever, that I would be accomplishing my purpose, which was to bring them closer together for an exchange of intelligence.

[12268] Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean that part of your answer where you said he knew everything that you did?

Colonel BRATTON. I was told that in almost those exact words by Captain McCollum, that Rochefort knew the situation between Japan and America practically as well as we did at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did not have any knowledge except what McCollum told you on that question?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I had to accept his say-so as to Rochefort's knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you have any reason to believe that there was not close relation between Rochefort and Fielder?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir, but I wanted to make them as close as possible. I wanted them to get to sit in each other's laps, if necessary.

Senator FERGUSON. Because you really felt war was coming and you wanted them to be alerted?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you have knowledge as to where all the purple machines were?

Colonel BRATTON. It was my understanding that there was one in the Philippines. There was not one in Hawaii. We had one in the SIS, and the Navy had one, I believe. The [12269] only other one in existence at that time had been, on orders of the Secretary of War, delivered to the British.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all that you knew about?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now do you know of anything else that you can add here that would enlighten in any way this committee on this problem as to how this could happen at Hawaii and we not be alerted to it? Have you got any memorandum or papers or information?

Colonel BRATTON. Will you read that, please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Colonel BRATTON. You mean as to how the attack could be delivered against Pearl Harbor and we not know about it beforehand?

Senator FERGUSON. That they were not alerted to it.

Colonel BRATTON. That they were not alerted to it?

Senator FERGUSON. Or you were not alerted to it, either one or both.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, Admiral Kimmel and General Short have both testified before this committee that if they had had all the information that Washington had they felt that they would have been better prepared for the attack when it came.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Colonel, I do not think he is asking [12270] for your opinion, he is asking whether you have any more facts or any more papers.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to cover this broad field, now that you do not even say "Well they did not ask me about that."

Colonel BRATTON. I have no documentary evidence to submit to you, sir, that you haven't cognizance of already.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any facts that you know about, whether it is in documents or not?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; I cannot think of any at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now there is one question in relation to your testimony. Which do you want the committee to take as the fact, what you said at the Grunert Board as to the delivery of the 13 parts to the Chief of Staff's office on the 6th, or what you have testified here, that you did not make such a delivery?

Colonel BRATTON. I think what I testified before the committee today is more nearly correct than the statement that I made to the Grunert Board, sir. It is my best recollection at the moment. I realize it is not a good recollection, but it is the best I can do.

Senator FERGUSON. But your recollection, when you were before the Grunert Board, was as you stated it there?

[12271] Colonel BRATTON. At that time that was my recollection. Right now I have the feeling that my testimony before the Grunert Board as to the delivery of those messages on Saturday night was erroneous.

Senator FERGUSON. So, therefore, you want this committee to believe the statements that you are making now? Is that as I understand it?

Colonel BRATTON. That I have made before the committee during the course of the day represents my best recollection on the matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you point to any specific fact that caused you to change your testimony?

Colonel BRATTON. It was a combination of facts, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, give them to us so we will know what they are.

Colonel BRATTON. My subsequent recollection that Colonel Dusenbury was at work with me in the office that evening, I had not remembered that when I made my statements before the Grunert Board, and the affidavits of various officers stating that I did not make deliveries to them on Saturday evening, and my recollection of the telephone conversation with General Miles at about half-past eleven Saturday night, my subsequent conversations with Colonel Dusenbury, with whom I have talked here in Washington, my [12272] conversations with General Gerow, with whom I talked here in Washington, my conversations with General Miles before he appeared before the committee, all these have combined to lead me to the belief that the evidence that I have given before the committee today is my best recollection of the facts.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to say for the record Congressman Keefe, as I understood him today, indicated that he could not be here this evening, but he had some questions that he wanted to ask Colonel Bratton.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I will state that Senator Brewster stated to me awhile ago that he thought Mr. Keefe might have some questions. I went over and asked Mr. Gearhart, who, as you all know, sits next to Mr. Keefe, and asked him if he knew of any reason why Colonel Bratton should be held over to the morning. He said he did not. I

asked him if he thought Mr. Keefe was interested in asking him any questions, and he said he did not think so.

I asked him then if he thought it would be all right to get through with Colonel Bratton tonight, and he said yes.

Now that is the situation.

Mr. GEARHART. Congressman Keefe told me he could not be here tonight. He did not say anything about desiring [12273] to examine this witness further tomorrow. That is all I can say.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I would have thought he might have said something to me, if he was interested, or certainly something to Mr. Gearhart. So that is the situation.

Colonel BRATTON. I cannot get away, I cannot go anywhere tomorrow morning, Mr. Chairman. If you want me to be here, I will be glad to report to you any time you say.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let us do this, then: When we get through with you, Colonel, we will excuse you in the usual way, and I will proceed to swear the next witness that counsel calls. If Mr. Keefe wants to make the request that you be returned for questions, you will be available here in the morning?

Colonel BRATTON. You want me to be here in the morning?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Would it be convenient for you to be here in the morning?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. With that understanding, we will swear Colonel Sadtler.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I have one question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel, I understand you to say that you knew about the 1 p. m. message at 9 o'clock on [12274] December 7. If you knew about the 1 o'clock message on December 7 at 9 o'clock, how do you explain the fact that you had no memorandum, no suggested message, nothing at all for General Marshall until such time as he read the message at 11:25, or 2½ hours later? Neither you nor General Miles had any memorandum and no suggested warning messages.

Colonel BRATTON. It was not the function of G-2 to prepare messages of that nature. Those were Operations messages.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean you never drew suggestions before?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Mr. MURPHY. You mean neither you nor General Miles drew suggestions before?

Colonel BRATTON. Did we ever draw these suggestions before?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; messages; information messages before.

Colonel BRATTON. Neither of us considered it necessary at the time, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You did not consider it necessary?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And yet you say here tonight that you expected an attack at 1 o'clock, and you did not consider any message necessary; is that it?

[12275] Colonel BRATTON. No; I did not say that. If I did I wish to correct the statement, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I understood you to say that at 9 o'clock you expected an attack at 1 o'clock.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you mean that?

Colonel BRATTON. I expected an attack on some American installation at or shortly after 1 o'clock; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You and General Miles both said before the Grunert Board you expected an attack on Thailand, did you not?

Colonel BRATTON. As the Japanese major effort we had been expecting for some days; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you say at any time at all in your previous testimony before this very night that you expected an attack on an American possession at 1 o'clock?

Colonel BRATTON. I told that to General Marshall when I saw him, sir, and I told that to General Miles.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever tell any board before in any of your testimony? You heard me read what you said.

Colonel BRATTON. I do not remember now, sir. When I saw this 1 o'clock message, as I have indicated, it told me that there was going to be an attack on an American installation at or shortly after 1 o'clock.

[12276] Mr. MURPHY. It is your opinion, I take it, now, that you got in before 9 o'clock and you were not at the State Department at 10 o'clock that morning?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Mr. MURPHY. It is still your opinion that you got in before 9 o'clock and you were not at the State Department at 10 o'clock that morning?

Colonel BRATTON. No, I was not at the State Department at 10 o'clock that morning.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does counsel have anything further?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Colonel, we want to thank you for your appearance, the information you have given the committee, and your apparent desire to be helpful to this inquiry, and with the statement made a while ago, you will be present in the morning if convenient.

You will now be excused until the morning.

Colonel, would it be more convenient for you to be at the War Department subject to call here?

Colonel BRATTON. I shall be here at any time you tell me, sir.¹

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Colonel Sadtler, will you come forward, please, sir? Please be sworn.

[12277] **TESTIMONY OF COL. OTIS K. SADTLER, SIGNAL CORPS,
UNITED STATES ARMY**

(Having been first duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You will please be here tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

There being nothing further, we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 10:40 p. m., February 14, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m. of the following day, Friday, February 15, 1946.)

Part 10—February 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946—follows.

¹ Col. Bratton's testimony is resumed in Hearings, Part 10, p. 4607.

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)


A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 10

FEBRUARY 15, 16, 18, 19, AND 20, 1946

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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK

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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

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KEYED TO PAGES OF THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPTS, REPRESENTED IN THESE VOLUMES BY NUMERALS IN ITALICS IN BRACKETS, EXCEPT WITNESSES BEFORE JOINT COMMITTEE

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[12278]¹

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[12279] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time before the examination of the witnesses?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Nothing, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions that I want to ask from Colonel Bratton.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, last night the Senator from Michigan, in questioning the witness on the stand, read from paragraphs of his testimony on page 1 of the Clarke Report, under the heading of "Lieutenant O'Dell," about a certain dispatch from Australia.

On page 2 there is testimony to the effect that that telegram or dispatch had been sent to Hawaii, and that there was no mention of Pearl Harbor whatsoever in the telegram, that they expected an attack on the Philippines and the Indies.

I think, in view of part of the statement of the witness having gone into the record, that the rest of the statement of the witness should be incorporated at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. I have no objection.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The testimony referred to follows:)

[12280] COLONEL CARL W. CLARKE, COLONEL E. W. GIBSON, AND LT. O'DELL—
6 OCTOBER 1944, 9 A. M.

CWC. All right, now tell me your story. We got the story that you wrote to Kemper and said you knew who did Pearl Harbor, or something to that effect; so you can start telling us what you know.

O'D. Well, sir, here's the part of the information that I thought might not have come out through other sources. There was a cable that was sent on the fifth of December to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian and Philippine Departments concerning the movement of a Japanese Task Force in the South China Sea. The information had come to the Military Attaché through the

¹ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

Australian Government, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, who called Colonel Merle Smith and myself to his office.

CWC. You were then Merle Smith's assistant?

O'D. That's right. There were the two of us, and he is now dead. That's the reason I stuck my nose in this. We were called over on Thursday afternoon about 5 o'clock. Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, myself, and Colonel Merle Smith and Commander Saom, who is the Naval Liaison Officer from the Dutch East Indies. The information was primarily in regard to the Netherlands, to the Indies, and, as I say, principally concerned itself with the movement of a Jap Task Force [12281] in the South China Sea. However, within an hour after we had gotten there some additional information came in, the exact nature of which I wasn't told at the time, but when we went out, Colonel Merle Smith had me prepare a cable which he revised to send out and the principal part of that other, than the movement of this convoy, was that the Dutch had ordered the execution of the Rainbow Plan, A-2. I remember, it's been almost three years now, and I can distinctly remember that particular part of the cable where it said A-2, repeat A-2, which was a part of the joint Abducan plan only to be taken in the event of war. It provided for specific occurrences they would counteract by certain other action. In other words, A-1 would have been some other direction expected attack, A-2 was from a particular direction, and they ordered the execution of this A-2. That was significant because the plan called for joint operations for the Australians, and the Dutch and to the best of my knowledge our Navy if nothing else. That was to go into effect only in case of war and here the Dutch had ordered it. That was the definite information that it had gone into effect. There was a bit of flurried excitement with that, and Sir Charles Burnett asked us not to send that cable and Colonel Merle Smith, although impatient to send it, said that he [12282] would wait twelve hours at Sir Charles Burnett's specific request. In other words, they didn't say they wouldn't let that cable go out, but I dare say they probably would have stopped it had we tried to launch it.

CWC. Let me ask you—now that was on December 5?

O'D. Sir, that was Thursday, the 4th, and we held it.

CWC. In other words that's the 3rd our time.

O'D. That's right, sir.

CWC. And you didn't send it actually until the 5th?

O'D. Well, the reason for the delay was that there was a War Cabinet Meeting at which Sir Charles Burnett was to report this information to the Australian War Cabinet which was meeting in Melbourne that evening, and he went from his office to the War Cabinet meeting. We, on our part, held the cable twelve hours, and I coded it and had it ready for dispatch and held on to it. In the cable (it was extremely urgent) this convoy, they had it doped out, could get to somewhere, either the Philippines or the Indies within, I believe it was, 60 hours, and that is the way that we had figured it. So we sent the cable one copy to General MacArthur in his code that we had then and another copy in a different code to Hawaii with a repeat to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the request to repeat it to Washington. In other words, we sent none direct to [12283] MILID as we would have done if time hadn't been such a factor. But, we were extremely laborious in writing—

CWC. In other words, you fellows instead of having a drop copy for Hawaii, you have it to Hawaii and told them—

O'D. And told them to repeat it here, sir, and then send another copy to the Philippines. There was no hint of Pearl Harbor in this whatsoever. It wholly concerned itself with the Philippines and the Indies, and it looked like the Indies at that precise moment would be the first to get it! Now, we sent that cable, that would be the morning of the 5th their time, and I see in the papers where Dixon denied that his country had any information of an attack on Pearl Harbor, and it was reported to the press in that way, which is so. But they did have a warning of action in the Philippines or in the South Pacific Area. I would say it is inescapable that they did. I don't know—we never had any acknowledgment of the cable from either Hawaii or the Philippines, and we never heard anything from MILID to let us know whether or not it had reached them. Of course, the subsequent events were such that it might have been overlooked. The file copy was destroyed—ah, this looks like it. That's it, sir, Netherlands Far East Command on Execution of Plan A-2. Naval moves in Mindanao—(interrupted)

[12283] CWC. General Osmun, this is Lieutenant O'Dell.

RAO. O'Dell.

O'D. How do you do, sir.

RAO. Mighty glad to know you.

O'D. Pleased to meet you, sir.

CWC. He's giving us some information here in connection with this Pearl Harbor business.

RAO. I've heard about it.

CWC. You've heard about Pearl Harbor?

RAO. Ha! Ha! I'll tell you sometime about a year from now at Christmas we'll all get together and celebrate that. I'm glad to have met you.

O'D. Thank you, sir.

O'D. What made us particularly angry about this was that the next morning the newspaper came out in the early edition with a certain part of this information about the Indies. And, after we had held the cable up at their request, Colonel Merle-Smith naturally raised a great deal of trouble over why we had had to hold our cable and the press had gotten an inkling of it; they hadn't gotten the words, sir, but they had an inkling. That is the message in particular, sir. That is the one

CWC. Notice the footnote down there.

O'D. (Reading from message:) "And relayed to War Department message center."

[12284] (Interrupted by telephone. CWC talked for some time with General Strong.)

O'D. We expected action to take place on Sunday, our time, and we all went down to the office on Sunday and waited with bated breath, and nothing happened Sunday. That led us to believe that, well, this was another of those scares. As you can probably guess, sir, we had had several previous warnings of impending action in time to reflect that in the reports and cables that we had sent. One other positive action was that Kopang—2 days before this happened—received 50 (the Japanese Consul received) cases which he wished to have in under Diplomatic privilege and it was refused by the Dutch and opened by the Dutch before he could get them back on this Japanese ship. I think that was the trouble, there wasn't a Japanese ship that he could put it on. And, when they opened it, they found a complete, well not radar because radar wasn't in the state that we now know it, but it was a sending and receiving radio set, and we had had information about that. Also, of course, all the Japanese shipping had been pulled back into Japanese waters for at least sixty days before. And, then on the afternoon that this was sent, we sent that in the morning, the Japanese consul in Melbourne, who was under surveillance, was [12285] seen to burn all of his codes in the back yard. Nobody, of course, was able to make a move to stop him, but they saw that.

CWC. You're sure this was sent out from Singapore, or where was it sent from?

O'D. From Melbourne, sir.

CWC. Melbourne on the fifth.

O'D. The fifth, in the morning, sir.

EWG. According to this copy, Colonel, this was received by Signals Hawaii, don't know when, but it was relayed to the War Department, arriving here at the night of Pearl Harbor day, December 7, with a memo on it that this was addressed to CG, Hawaii and relayed here with request for decipherment and repeat back to them.

CWC. Well, we got that in there with old man Smith's note.

EWG. Yes, we have that. The only thing is, it is curious why Signals Hawaii held that so long. They couldn't decipher it; maybe they thought they could, I don't know.

O'D. It was sent positively in a code which Hawaii had.

CWC. What did you use?

O'D. The information that was on the code and cipher. We used the secret book with the cipher table.

VWC. Did you use the black book or the red book? Do you remember?

O'D. If I saw it, of course, I could identify it. As I [12286] remember it, it was gray. I don't remember. There was a thick confidential and a thin secret and then there were the cipher tables that were changed every thirty days, and we were very careful to pick one. That's why we had to code it twice, once in a code that we knew Hawaii had and once in one the Philippines had because the Philippines had different codes entirely from Hawaii, and we had to—well, you can imagine, that is a rather laborious job, a message like that.

CWC. The message we got in said it was held for 17 hours.

O'D. That was 17 hours, sir, from one afternoon until the next morning. I see they have a question mark under what government. It was the Australian Government. We put that in the message.

EWG. Did you ever in Australia hear of any information indicating that there was a task force sailing toward Pearl Harbor?

O'D. Not toward Pearl Harbor, sir. We never had any information or anything in that direction. We knew of a task force in the South China Sea, and whether it was headed for the Philippines or whether it was headed for any part of the Indies, the reconnaissance information that was available to us did not specify.

CWC. Did you know about the build up of a task force in the Marshalls?

[12287] O'D. Yes, sir.

CWC. You did know about that.

O'D. Yes, sir, through the Australian Government again. Mostly the RAAF. They were the ones rather than the Army or the Navy, it was the RAAF that was feeding us what information of value—

CWC. How far in advance of Pearl Harbor did you know that, do you recall?

O'D. I should say it was in that same week. Probably early in that week. That was toward the latter part of the week. I should say in the early part of that week, sir. We had been following the Japanese disposition of troops and had sent a report, a regular M/A report on the disposition of all Japanese divisions about a month before all this came up, which was used merely to confirm what other reports were here. It was just how the Australians had the disposition of the Japanese Army and which we sent in confirming the other information here. Shipping, as I say, we knew that all the Japanese shipping had been moved back into its own territorial waters. Most of our information led us to the definite and inescapable conclusion that war was going to break here, nothing about Pearl Harbor, sir.

CWC. Well, of course, that is a typical Jap stunt. Now, who [12288] is this Sir Charles Burnett again?

O'D. He was Chief of Staff of the RAAF. He has been sent back to England now. He is an RAF officer who was on loan, and it was through him and Air Commodore Hewett, he was an intelligence officer, that we had disposal of whatever information they had, and they did, of course, cooperate a great deal with us. But the message that you have there, sir, which is the same one exactly as we sent it out, and a pretty good decipherment as well, Col. Merle Smith was exceedingly careful, and he was the opposite of an alarmist. He would not put anything in a cable that he didn't have absolutely down under his thumb perfectly.

CWC. Yes; I knew Merle Smith. I knew him very well.

[12289] O'D. And you can see from that cable, sir, that he put nothing that would tend to alarm that wasn't definite fact that he could attribute to something precise.

EWG. Do you know whether or not Hawaii knew what this plan A-2 was?

O'D. We believed that they did. That point came up because of the naval, because of Pearl Harbor being the naval headquarters and the Plan A-2 being for United States participation mostly in a naval manner. We certainly assumed that if anybody knew A-2, Pearl Harbor did know it. Now, whether the Army would show that to the Navy and that sort of thing, we naturally left up to them. But this naval plan, you see there was a naval attache in Melbourne, Captain Coursey, and we informed him of that and curiously enough Captain Coursey did not send any message like that. I do not believe he did. I'm not qualified to say for certain, but he was not in the same state that we were about it. What I am trying to say is that what we sent back might not have seemed such a positive indication, but that everything where we were definitely led to the assumption that war was going to break out. This was about the third or fourth time it had happened, but this time it really seemed in a state where in 60 hours that task force was going to be somewhere and with all this code [12290] burning and various other indications from all sorts that I knew about and no doubt they knew more than I did, it looked like this time it was going to be the end, and, as I say, we expected it on our Sunday and that Sunday came and went and nothing happened, and we had a let down, and then of course it was Monday, our time, that it happened. He put nothing in that cable that wouldn't be—

EWG. Well, this cable says the Netherlands command at 8 a. m. on 7 December reported planes to have reached Kopang. Could you have sent it before?

O'D. That was added, sir, on the morning as was the fact that it was delayed. In other words we had to rewrite it because the situation was changing momentarily.

EWG. Then you don't think that it was—

O'D. No, sir; that went out on Friday.

EWG. Do you think that might have been a mistake in deciphering?

O'D. Yes, sir. You see the meat of the thing: the suggestion that the RAAF likewise take reciprocal action. In other words "we're going to live up to our obligation—".

EWG. This date bothered me. That's all.

O'D. Well, it bothers me a bit, sir. That is the only copy that I know of in existence. The file copy was destroyed by the present military attache with all old papers, about two [12291] years ago.

CWC. Do you think that the Australians notified their people here? Do you have any way of knowing that, or any opinion?

O'D. I know that our own Minister was not informed of the situation. You see, of course, the capitol, sir is in Canberra, and we were stationed in Melbourne because that was the scene of activity. The War Cabinet met the previous night. That's when Sir Charles Burnett had told them this information. Whether the War Cabinet, who would be the body then who would have instructed them to let Washington know—. Sir Owen Dixon wasn't here then. He was a shipping man in Australia, and Mr. Casey was here.

CWC. Casey was the guy that was here then.

O'D. That's right, sir. Mr. Casey.

CWC. I know there was a roar about it when they pulled him out of here.

O'D. Yes, sir; that's right, sir, jealousy I think. Whether or not they sent a cable to—I rather doubt that they did, sir, because, as I say, the Australian Government wasn't too happy about our sending this out even after the delay. I mean they realized that it was inescapable, and we had to keep our Government informed, but—

CWC. Well, there is one thing I'd like to get straight in my [12292] own mind. Now, when Burnett gave Merle Smith this information, he gave it to you with the understanding that you not transmit it.

O'D. No, sir; when he told it to us we were getting ready to send it out. It was only after we had the cable—you see, we were there over an hour, over 2 hours, that afternoon, and the information was dribbling in in spurts, and we had that and it was only when we were getting ready to go, which was around 7 o'clock, that the War Cabinet meeting was called. I shouldn't say before 6:30, at the time we came out there, it wasn't scheduled. They called this emergency meeting and at that time when we had prepared the cable and were getting ready to go code it, Sir Charles Burnett requested very specifically that it not be sent, that we hold it up until he had informed the War Cabinet. I rather think that that is why he didn't want the information to leave Melbourne. In other words, he hadn't told his own Government yet.

CWC. In other words, he wanted to spring it on his people first.

O'D. Before there was any chance of our sending anything out, sir.

CWC. That's logical.

O'D. I might say, sir, that because there were only two of [12293] us and because everything was happening day and night then, that was one of the last messages that we sent out in our own code. From then on we used the Australian cipher section back and forth.

CWC. Why?

O'D. Well, sir, we weren't too sure of our codes to the Philippines. We knew they had the cipher device, but we weren't sure of the security afforded by the cipher device.

CWC. You mean the cylindrical?

O'D. That's right. After the outbreak of war, you see, sir.

CWC. But it was secure before the outbreak of war?

O'D. Once the show broke and we were going back and forth between General MacArthur's headquarters and Australia, we were given the use of the Australian code and it was mostly of a liaison nature, anyway, as to whether General MacArthur could send a plane here on reconnaissance or a plane there or what could be expected in one way or another. There were so many messages coming and going. General MacArthur would send us messages. Sir Charles Burnett would ask us for certain information from the Philippines. You see Washington was pretty far removed from us at that time. We didn't know what delays

would be encountered in the cables going through Hawaii to Washington, which was the only means of sending any message here, and there were matters which would [12294] come up which we would want answered in 5 or 6 hours, which we knew we'd never get to Washington and back in that time, and it concerned what General MacArthur would be able to tell us and what Washington would only have to ask someone else for. So, we had quite a bit of correspondence back and forth by cable and wireless from the Philippines to Australia as soon as the war broke out. We simply didn't have the means, I mean it would take at least 3 hours to do a job like that message there. By that time the information was not even wanted. So, we had this coming and going. We moved our office right into the RAAF headquarters.

CWC. They had the machines then, too, didn't they?

O'D. No, sir, they did not. They had—I can assure you that Col. Merle Smith went into it to the last detail, no violations of any security.

CWC. Oh, no; I wasn't think about that. Mine was just a question of the time factor. There is one question I want to ask you. This has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. Were you aware of that convoy which was at sea when Pearl Harbor hit?

O'D. Yes, sir.

CWC. Were you aware of the correspondence when they sent it all over the whole damned South Pacific?

O'D. Then, sir, we started getting messages from General [12295] Marshall in a code that was, at first one message came and we didn't have the code. They repeated the message in a different code, and we had that code, and curiously went through that and got that, it was a double transposition which, of course, didn't use the book. We got that, and, of course, that was a long one there again. We were having our troubles. We got that deciphered, and it was from General Marshall, and we called that the *Pensacola*, sir, that was under escort by one cruiser, which was the *Pensacola*. We would do about 10 of those in 1 message, sir. One little error in the first, and you go back and do the whole thing over again, and you can't tell until after you've finished that you've made an error, when you start to get your word groups. But we had heard, we got several cables about the arrival of the *Pensacola* convoy, including what was on it. As I remember, there were A-24's and P-40's. There were, I think, 26 P-40's and 18 A-24's. Immediately Sir Charles Burnett wanted to know what was the A-24. Well, sir, frankly the means at our disposal there, the Air Force manuals on what the A-24's were, we didn't get far, and that was a little annoying.

CWC. That was that Mitchell dive bomber?

O'D. That's right, sir; single engine, and, of course, the [12296] A-20 was a twin engine, and the question in Sir Charles Burnett's mind was, is it a single engine or is it a twin engine. They wanted those planes, and they had to make arrangements for staging areas for them and discharge and so forth, and it was rather difficult to do without that information. Still, by the time we wired to Washington to ask them (we didn't of course, because, with everything happening all over) they were going to land. They were due on the 23d of December, sir. They arrived in Brisbane, and we went up to Brisbane to meet the convoy.

CWC. Some of my old gang in the Second Air Force were on that. That interceptor outfit that came out with them.

O'D. Yes, sir; they were destined, of course, for the Philippines and South Hawaii. General Brereton had sent a mission down. General MacArthur had sent General Brereton with a mission of about eight men, eight officers, from the Philippines in the latter part of November, and General Brereton had arrived at Darwin and Col. Merle Smith went up to Darwin and flew over to Rabaul with them, and I met them in Brisbane and they went on this mission. They were primarily concerned with the fueling facilities for B-17's being flown out from Hawaii via Rabaul, Darwin, and then up through the Indies to the Philippines. They were trying [12297] to arrange for petrol from the Shell Oil Co. and airports, airports principally. That was where we got about a 60-day start, not quite that, about a 45-day start on building airports around Darwin which were later used when they evacuated the B-17's, these strips through the jungle. General Brereton, of course, had come down in plain clothes. He wouldn't have been allowed in the country in uniform at that time. He had flown down here, and we took them all around looking for airports where we could land them. Then, of course, this *Pensacola* convoy came in.

CWC. Yes; I remember all those things. Well, I don't think there is anything else unless you have something you want to add to what you have said.

O'D. No, sir; I just wanted you to have——

CWC. All right. Well, I'm awfully glad you came in, and I appreciate your taking the trouble. It's nice to have seen you.

O'D. Thank you very much, sir.

[12298] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee finished with Colonel Bratton last evening.

Mr. Keefe, Senator Ferguson said he thought you might want to ask him some questions. I went over and asked Mr. Gearhart, and he said he did not know of any questions you wanted to ask him, and we excused Colonel Bratton.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I think it should appear that I stated to you before that time——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you allow me to finish my statement, I am covering that, Senator. If you look at last night's record you will see where I said Senator Brewster had suggested to me that Mr. Keefe might want to ask some questions.

Senator BREWSTER. I said he did want to ask some questions. There is no "might" about it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I went over to ask Mr. Gearhart.

Senator Ferguson, Mr. Gearhart and I, all three of us made statements that appear in last night's record. There isn't any difficulty about the matter. I excused Colonel Bratton with the understanding that he would come back this morning if Mr. Keefe did want to ask some questions.

Will you please step aside, Colonel Sadtler, and let Colonel Bratton come forward, if he is here?

[12299] **TESTIMONY OF COL. RUFUS S. BRATTON, UNITED STATES ARMY—(Resumed)¹**

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, Colonel, Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire.

Mr. KEEFE. I regret, Mr. Chairman, that it was impossible for me to be here last evening, but I think my attendance in previous hearings justifies my being away for a couple of hours last night.

Colonel Bratton, when you testified before the Army board you were under oath, were you not, to tell the truth?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You understood that oath?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you undertook to tell the truth to that board?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You knew at that time, did you, that the testimony which you were giving before that board might affect the lives and welfare of many men?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you knew that that board might use your testimony that you gave as the basis of assessing responsibility for the tragedy at Pearl Harbor?

[12300] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And with that full knowledge you went before that board and testified in answer to specific questions that were propounded to you, did you not?

¹Col. Bratton's testimony begins in Hearings, Part 9, p. 4508.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12301] Mr. KEEFE. I understand your explanation to be, and if I am in error, you correct me, that you endeavored to give the impression to this board that when you testified before the Army board, you had not had an opportunity to refresh your recollection by examination of documents and consultation with other people, and that you were flown over here from Europe, that you were tired and dirty and dusty and that you went before the Army board somewhat cold without sufficient preparation; is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, granted that all of those things were true, in the face of the realization that what you testified to was supposed to be the truth, I want to call your attention to the examination appearing on page 237 and subsequent pages of the Army board transcript, and to questions that were asked you by Colonel Toulmin.

You understand that as a witness, Colonel Bratton, if you do not recall a fact, that you are interrogated about, it is always the privilege of the witness to say, "I do not remember"?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or "I have no recollection on the subject"?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But when a direct question is asked, and [12302] you testify without equivocation and without qualification, under oath, the people who hear that testimony should have a right to rely upon the fact that you have told the truth. Isn't that true?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then [reading]:

Colonel TOULMIN. —

Colonel BRATTON. May I ask, sir, what page you are reading from?

Mr. KEEFE. I am starting at the bottom of page 236. I will ask you if these questions were put to you and did you make these answers:

Colonel TOULMIN. I am aware of that, but you don't answer my question. Why weren't the first thirteen parts, which were considered important enough by the Navy to be delivered to the President and to everyone of the important Admirals in the Navy Department delivered by the War Department officers to the Chief of Staff, and his attention called to it, so he could have taken some action upon it? That's what puzzles me.

Colonel BRATTON. You are referring, now, to the Japanese reply?

Colonel TOULMIN. To the 13 parts.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes—not to the short message?

[12303] Colonel TOULMIN. Not to the short message. I am talking about the evening of December 6, and they were in English by 9 or 10 o'clock. The President of the United States and the leading Admirals of the Navy Department all had that message before midnight, most of them by ten or eleven o'clock. You had it in the early evening also.

What I am trying to find out is why it was that the Chief of Staff was not called and advised, as were others, that this important document had been received. In view of the tenor of its contents, it hardly needed the 14th paragraph to be conclusive as to its intent and contents; and why did not the Chief of Staff get that message?

Colonel BRATTON. I am trying to remember, sir, what I did with the copies that went to General Miles and General Marshall and General Gerow. I can't verify it or prove it at this time, but my recollection is that those three officers got their copies the evening of the 6th.

Colonel TOULMIN. By "the three officers" you mean whom?

Colonel BRATTON. General Marshall, General Miles, and General Gerow. Now it was my practice to deliver them their copies before I went to the State Department.

Colonel TOULMIN. That was your practice?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12304] Colonel TOULMIN. Did you deliver this copy, for instance, to General Marshall personally on the evening of the 6th?

Colonel BRATTON. No; I very seldom delivered it to him in person. I gave it to his secretary, in a locked bag.

Colonel TOULMIN. And you gave it to General Miles in that way, on the evening of the 6th?

Colonel BRATTON. I generally took them into his office and handed them to him, and if he wasn't there, I left it with the executive secretary, Major, now Colonel, Smith.

Colonel TOULMIN. We are now talking about the evening before, Saturday evening, December 6.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN. Is it your recollection that you handed this important, long, 13-part message to General Miles on that evening?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. Is it your recollection you handed that long 13-part message on that evening to the secretary of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And it is your recollection that you handed it on that evening of December 6 to General Gerow, [12305] or some representative of General Gerow?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did you hand it to General Gerow directly, or to his secretary.

I am reading on page 238.

Colonel BRATTON. To his executive secretary.

Colonel TOULMIN. Who was he?

Colonel BRATTON. The executive?

Colonel TOULMIN. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Colonel Gailey.

Colonel TOULMIN. And what is the name of the secretary of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON. Colonel Smith, Bedell Smith, now lieutenant general.

Colonel TOULMIN. And after this, you then went over and delivered it to the Secretary of State in the locked pouch for and on his behalf, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; to the watch officer in the State Department.

Colonel TOULMIN. To the watch officer, about 10 or 10:30 on that Saturday evening, December 6?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct.

Colonel TOULMIN. Now, having made these deliveries, Colonel, to these four recipients, the Chief of Staff, the [12306] Chief of G-2, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Secretary of State, did you get any reaction to that message until the following day?

Colonel BRATTON. What do you mean by "reaction," Colonel?

Colonel TOULMIN. Did they answer it? Did they act upon it, did they mention it, did they discuss it, did they call you, did they look at it, to your knowledge? Or, put it in the negative—did they do nothing about it, so far as you know?

Colonel BRATTON. I had some discussions of the message, as I remember now, with General Miles, indicating to him that the final part was yet to come. It did not come in until the following morning. The reaction from General Marshall was a reading and a discussion of the entire communication.

General FRANK. That night?

Colonel BRATTON. No.

General FRANK. Or the following morning?

Colonel BRATTON. The following morning.

Colonel TOULMIN. Let us confine ourselves to the night of December 6, now.

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Colonel TOULMIN. Let us confine ourselves to the night [12307] of December 6, for the moment, at least.

Now, did you talk to General Miles?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not talk to General Marshall the night of the 6th.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did you talk to General Miles on the night of the 6th?

Colonel BRATTON. My recollection is that I did, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. You talked to him on the phone, or in his office?

Colonel BRATTON. No; I believe I talked to him in his office.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you talk to him in his office?

Colonel BRATTON. My memory on that is not clear even today, sir, but I do know that I talked to him over the telephone because I have conferred with General Miles on that subject; we have both refreshed our memories on the point, and I now know that I did talk to him on the telephone that night at about 11:30. I don't believe I talked to him in his office on the night of the 6th. I did talk to him in his office on the afternoon of the 6th in connection with another message, the so-called pilot message.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I am intrigued somewhat by the fact that Captain Kramer testified that he had no recollection that General Miles was at the home of Admiral Wilkinson [12308] until he was told later. His first testimony was that only Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner were there. Then he was refreshed by someone later to the effect that General Miles was there.

Now, you testified before the Army board that General Miles was at his office, and you talked with him.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, this was Saturday afternoon.

Mr. KEEFE. Was it true?

Colonel BRATTON. Saturday afternoon, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I am talking about Saturday evening when you delivered this message.

Colonel BRATTON. I think I have already answered that question. My recollection is now that I did not talk to him in his office on Saturday night, but I did talk to him over the telephone.

Mr. KEEFE. When do you expect the members of the committee are going to know when the truth is being told in this proceeding?

Colonel BRATTON. I was telling the truth on all occasions in which I testified before any board in connection with this Pearl Harbor affair to the best of my ability, and I am still doing so.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, is truth dependent upon a man's ability to say a thing?

[12309] Colonel BRATTON. No; it is dependent upon his ability to recollect details of events.

Mr. KEEFE. Let me read these questions to you, and ask you if you made these answers. Page 241:

Colonel TOULMIN. And how about General Smith? Did you get any reaction from him, or any reaction, rather?

Colonel BRATTON. No. General Smith did not have access to these pouches. You mean General Bedell Smith?

Colonel TOULMIN. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. He didn't have a key to the bag.

General RUSSELL. What was his relation?

Colonel BRATTON. General Marshall's secretary.

General RUSSELL. Well, he is the man to whom you gave General Marshall's copy, was he not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; but it was in a locked pouch, to which General Marshall had the key.

You didn't qualify your answer and say:

I don't recollect whether I gave it to him or not, but my present recollection is that I did.

Colonel BRATTON. I beg your pardon, I did.

Mr. KEEFE. In this answer?

Colonel BRATTON. On page 307 in the same document you are looking at, the third line:

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir; to the best of [12310] my knowledge and belief. My recollection is that I found Colonel Smith in his office. It may have been one of the other secretaries, but my recollection is that it was Colonel Smith—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, your recollection is that it was Colonel Smith and your recollection is that it might have been somebody else, but your recollection is positive that you delivered that message to the office of the Chief of Staff that night; that is what you testified before this Army board wasn't it?

Colonel BRATTON. In one sense, yes, sir; but I qualified—

Mr. KEEFE. You gave no reservations.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Let the witness finish.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, this witness is entitled to respect.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let him answer. Complete your answer, Colonel.

Colonel BRATTON. I qualified that statement, and a number of other statements throughout the testimony of mine before the Army board by saying that that was the best of my belief, I thought so; it was the way I recollected it at the time, or that I was not sure, or some other such [12311] qualification, some other such qualifying phrase.

Mr. KEEFE. What changed your belief?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Mr. KEEFE. What changed your belief?

Colonel BRATTON. A number of facts that were presented to me subsequent to this.

Mr. KEEFE. When were they presented to you?

Colonel BRATTON. That I had not recollected at the time.

Mr. KEEFE. When—

Senator LUCAS. Let him answer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Colonel.

Colonel BRATTON. As I stated to the committee last night, there were a number of facts that were brought to my attention subsequent to this date which materially modified my recollection of the details of events on the night of the 6th, and the morning of the 7th of December, 1941.

In the first place, when I testified before the Army board I did not at that time remember that Colonel Dusenbury was working with me in the office that night. When I worked over this stuff, this magic, alone, there was one standard operating procedure that was followed with respect to its processing and delivery. When I had help in the person of [12312] Colonel Dusenbury, of one of my other assistants, we used another method, particularly with respect to the delivery of the pouches.

When I had two assistants, there was still another standard operating procedure.

Now, that is one fact that was brought to my attention.

When Colonel Clausen interviewed me in Europe he invited my attention to a number of affidavits signed by General Gerow, General Bedell Smith, General Ralph Smith, General Gailey, and a number of other officers, to the effect that they did not receive these pouches from G-2 on the night of the 6th.

As I stated to the committee last night, I know all of these officers; they are men of honor, and integrity, and if they say that they didn't receive the pouches from me, or Colonel Dusenbury, or one of my assistants, then my recollection must have been at fault and I so admit.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I want to read these questions to you and ask you whether they were submitted to you, and did you make these answers.

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Mr. KEEFE. I want to ask you if these questions were put to you and did you make these answers.

General RUSSELL—

[12313] Colonel BRATTON. What page, may I ask, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. Page 242.

General RUSSELL. Well he is the man to whom you gave General Marshall's copy, was he not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; but it was in a locked pouch, to which General Marshall had the key.

General RUSSELL. Did you know what Bedell Smith did with it?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did you tell him that it was an important document in the locked pouch?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And that the Chief of Staff should know about it.

Colonel BRATTON. Should see it right away.

Colonel TOULMIN. What was General Smith's response—that he would get in touch with the Chief of Staff, or would not?

Colonel BRATTON. It must have been because if it had been otherwise, it would have registered on my memory.

Colonel TOULMIN. And about what time in the evening was it when General Smith was told there was an important document in that locked pouch for General Marshall, and that his attention should be called to it?

[12314] Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember that, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And that was on the evening of December 6?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN. 1941?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Were those questions asked you, and did you make those answers?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12315] Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, then, the next time that you had any discussion about this matter was when you were interviewed by Colonel Clausen, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When was the next time?

Colonel BRATTON. If you will turn over, sir, to page 279—

Mr. KEEFE. No; I mean the next time after that Army Board report. Do you want to refer to some other evidence in the Army Board?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. If you will turn over to page 279 you will see further reference to this incident in the middle of the page. [Reading:]

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. When I last appeared before the Board I was somewhat puzzled by what I considered at that time an over-emphasis placed by the Board on two messages. One was the implementation of the winds-weather code. The other was this fourteen part ultimatum. I was considerably puzzled at the time by the insistence of the Board that these were vitally important documents, and I had the feeling that there was something missing, that they had no longer the significance after the 3rd of December, in my mind, that the Board attributed to them. I find, I think I know now [12316] why I had this feeling.

A search of the files in G-2 as of the day before yesterday and yesterday brought to light a carbon copy of a chronologically arranged series of extracts from intercepted Japanese communications which I prepared sometime after Pearl Harbor for the Chief of Staff. In glancing through this document I find that there was a message which I had forgotten when I appeared before you last; dispatch from Tokyo on the 2nd of December, to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. It was interpreted, or rather it was translated on the 3rd and presumably placed in my hands on that date.

General FRANK. During what month?

General RUSSELL. December 3, 1941, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. December 1941, sir. And it is listed here on my paper as S. I. S. 25640, and the extract that I have on this paper reads as follows:—

Then the message is quoted.

After the receipt of this translation any further intercepts that were brought to me would simply contribute toward the climax that I saw coming. That was it.

Then we branched off into a long discussion of this winds code business and I never did get back to an explanation of the 13 parts of the 14-part ultimatum. It [12317] slipped my mind and that of the board apparently.

Mr. KEEFE. Are you telling us this to imply that if you had gotten back to the 13th part you would have changed the testimony that you had given before the board?

Colonel BRATTON. Exactly that.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that what you want to tell us?

Colonel BRATTON. Exactly that, and as I testified before the committee yesterday, if I had had an opportunity to review or edit this testimony before leaving Washington in the fall of 1944 I would have corrected many of the conflicting and contradictory statements that now appear therein. I did not have that opportunity.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, is it your understanding that witnesses testifying in important matters before boards or commissions or courts have the right to examine their testimony that they have given under oath and correct it from time to time and day to day?

Colonel BRATTON. Certainly. I was told that I had that privilege by the president of the board.

Mr. KEEFE. When was that?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember the exact date. It was on the occasion of one of my appearances before the Army board. I asked that specific question, if I would be given an opportunity to review my testimony and make such corrections [12318] as were necessary.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you knew at the time you had concluded your testimony before the Army board that your testimony was in error as to the delivery of the first 13 parts of this Japanese reply, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. No; I did not know that and I did not say that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I understood you to say that had you had the opportunity to correct your testimony you would have corrected it in that particular. Did I misunderstand you?

Colonel BRATTON. I think I would have corrected many of the contradictions and conflicting statements that appear in this record, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the most conflicting statement that appears in this record in conflict with your affidavit given to Colonel Clausen is with respect to the delivery of this 13-part message.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I want to ask you the direct question: Do you mean to tell this committee that you were not given the right to correct your testimony before the Army board and that had you had that opportunity and not gone off on a tangent discussing the winds code and gotten lost in a mirage of discussion relating to the winds code that you would have [12319] corrected your testimony in respect to the delivery or failure of delivery or lack of delivery of the 13-part message? That is what I would like to get clear.

Colonel BRATTON. I did not say that I did not have the opportunity to review this testimony. As I testified before the committee yesterday, I was accorded that right. I also testified before the committee that my commanding general in Europe had instructed me to return as soon as I could be released from temporary duty in Washington. The testimony was not available for my review on the two occasions that I returned to the Grunert board for the purpose of checking over typographical and other errors therein and as time was passing by I left Washington without reviewing this testimony. I was anxious to get back to my command post.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, you did not answer my question at all, Colonel. You are just rambling. I want to ask this question of you now:

You have stated to this board this morning and specifically referred to the testimony which you read at some length into the record, that you got into a discussion before the board relating to the winds message and that you did not get a chance to talk about the 13-part message. Did I misunderstand you?

Colonel BRATTON. You misunderstood me, sir. I did not [12320] say that I did not get a chance. I said that my initial reference to the second message, which was the Japanese reply, slipped my memory later on in the course of the questioning. I did not get back to it because we had gotten way off the track and I forgot about it. Apparently no member of the board remembered that that was one of the messages that I wanted to discuss.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, how many times did you appear before the Army board?

Colonel BRATTON. Three times.

Mr. KEEFE. You had three opportunities to tell your story or make any corrections you wanted to, didn't you?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, and I think if you will examine this testimony you will see that I made a number of corrections and changes each time I appeared.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, I have read it and studied it very carefully and I am very familiar with it, I assure you.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you went back to Europe?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were there confronted by or met Major Clausen?

Colonel BRATTON. About a year later.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. And you finally got to Paris where you [12321] discussed this matter with him?

Colonel BRATTON. I gave my affidavit in Paris; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, didn't you discuss anything with him before you gave that affidavit?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, sir, just to clear up any misapprehension that may be in your mind, sir, I would like to explain why I gave my affidavit in Paris.

Mr. KEEFE. No, I would like to have you answer my question, please, if you will. Before you made this affidavit or signed it did you discuss the facts with Major Clausen?

Colonel BRATTON. On numerous occasions, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now go ahead, Colonel. If you want to make an explanation, you are entitled to make it.

Colonel BRATTON. When I first encountered Colonel Clausen I was on the autobahn encircling Berlin on my way to the British sector headquarters. A British car overtook me and pulled over to the right of the road and flagged me down.

Colonel Clausen stepped out and he presented me with his credentials, identified himself, said what his mission was, said that he was looking for me and that he had authority to interrogate me. I took him and his baggage into my car and after I had completed my business up in the British sector took him to my billet, which was the billet of the Chief of Staff and the officers on the General Staff of the United States [12322] District Headquarters. We put him up there; he became a part of our mess.

It developed that the papers that he had had been left in Paris locked up in a safe at G-2 of the same base sector. He sent a radiogram to G-2 in Paris requesting that these papers be flown up by officer courier to Berlin so that they could be utilized in his questioning of myself. G-2 of the same base sector refused to do this on the ground that they were top secret material and for security reasons could not be flown over enemy territory for fear the plane would crash and the documents would fall into the wrong hands. It then became necessary for Colonel Clausen and myself to go to where the papers were so that I could see what it was he wanted to question me about, look at the affidavits that he had and make such correction of my previous testimony as might be necessary or make such comment as seemed called for upon the affidavits which were in Paris. That is why the affidavit was given in Paris.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your evidence on this?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that all you want to say?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

[12323] Mr. KEEFE. All right. When you got to Paris, then, you had all these affidavits before you?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you in a hotel room?

Colonel BRATTON. I was in one of the officers' billets of the same base sector. That headquarters had taken over a number of hotels in Paris for that purpose. They were run as billets for officers.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Colonel BRATTON. This happened to be the Hotel Prince of Wales.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I will refer to it as a hotel. You can refer to it as a billet.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. It was a hotel, wasn't it?

Colonel BRATTON. It was a hotel.

Mr. KEEFE. And you and Clausen sat down in a room in that hotel, did you not?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And discussed the testimony that you had given before the Army Board?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, do you remember that discussion?

Colonel BRATTON. Not in any detail; no, sir.

[12324] Mr. KEEFE. Do you remember what Colonel Clausen said to you?

Colonel BRATTON. He showed me the statements and affidavits made by various officers that he had reached and run down all over the world, bearing upon the delivery of the 13 parts of this 14-part message, among other things.

He had some notes in his possession, transcribed notes from my testimony before the Grunert Board. He said:

Now, after you have read these affidavits and considered the matter and tried to refresh your memory on the thing, do you wish to make any comment on this point that you covered in your testimony before the Grunert Board?

Mr. KEEFE. And then he gave you these affidavits, the affidavits of Clyde Dusenbury, Moses Pettigrew, Ralph Smith, Charles Gailey, Tom Betts, Walter B. Smith, Leonard T. Gerow, Robert Schukraft, John F. Stone, and George Renchard, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. I read them all, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You read those affidavits?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And when you got through reading the affidavits, what happened then?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I made some statement to Colonel [12325] Clausen to the effect that in the light of the evidence before me now it seems advisable for me to modify some of the statements that I gave before the Grunert Board.

Mr. KEEFE. Anything else?

Colonel BRATTON (reading):

All right. Suppose we draft up what it is you would like to say now?

Mr. KEEFE. That is Colonel Clausen speaking?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

All right, suppose we draft up what you want to say now.

Colonel BRATTON. Then he got a pencil and paper and, as I remember it, I dictated what I thought I should say in modification of my original statement and I made corrections as we went along and he made suggestions as to arrangement of the material. Finally we got it all in shape in pencil. Then he put a piece of paper into the typewriter and typed it. I read the thing over and as I recall now I made a number of suggestions and corrections in the typewritten copy. I don't remember now whether it was retyped or not.

After I was satisfied that the document before me represented my best recollection at that time, I signed it.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you sworn?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you signed it?

[12326] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is the affidavit that is before us?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, but I want to make it perfectly clear that no pressure was put on me.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, yes.

Colonel BRATTON. I was not coerced in any way whatsoever.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, yes.

Colonel BRATTON. The statement or affidavit that I gave was given freely, of my own accord.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, I understand that, you said that. It appears quite clear.

Well, now, in your affidavit which has been offered in evidence you say this:

The intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, started coming in from the Navy the evening of 6 December 1941, when I was on duty with Colonel Dusenbury in the office.

Is that correct, that it was coming in in the evening?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes. By "evening" I mean somewhere from 5 o'clock on.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I find that in some portions of the country they refer to "evening" as any time after 12 o'clock noon. Now, just what did you have in mind when you said it started coming in in the evening?

[12327] Mr. RICHARDSON. He just told you, Congressman. Five o'clock.

Mr. KEEFE. Did I understand you to say some time after 5 o'clock?

Colonel BRATTON. Or thereabouts, sir. I don't remember the exact hour when any one of the parts first reached my desk.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

We assembled and studied the thirteen parts, which I believe had come in by ten o'clock P. M.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you made that statement in your affidavit had you read the affidavit of Dusenbury?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. I had read all the affidavits that Colonel Clausen had with him.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, Dusenbury's affidavit in that respect says:

I recall the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, which started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 P. M. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being [12328] the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did that statement of Dusenbury's refresh your recollection any when you were talking with Colonel Clausen?

Colonel BRATTON. Not at all. Colonel Dusenbury is at present on duty in Washington in G-2, War Department General Staff. He is available as a witness before this committee. If you call him I think he will contradict every statement that he made in that affidavit be-

cause his recollection now as to what happened on the evening of Saturday the 6th is even worse than mine.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, but, Colonel—

Colonel BRATTON. There are obvious errors in that affidavit. It has been proved—

Mr. KEEFE. Did you recognize them as errors when you read his affidavit over there in the hotel in Paris?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Mr. KEEFE. Read him the question, please.

(Question read.)

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; I recognized at that time that several of the statements he made in there could not be correct.

[12329] Mr. KEEFE. So his affidavit did not refresh you any as to the events, did it?

Colonel BRATTON. Only to the extent of reminding me that he was with me in the office that evening. Up until that moment I had forgotten that Colonel Dusenbury and I were working together that evening.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in your affidavit you say further:

After receipt of the thirteenth part I called the officer on duty at the SIS, who I believe was either Colonel Schukraft or Colonel Doud, and asked if there was any likelihood of the fourteenth part coming in that night. I was told there was not, as there had been a delay in transmission. Colonel Dusenbury and I then assembled the thirteen parts in preparation for delivery to the authorized recipients.

That was your normal practice, wasn't it?

Colonel BRATTON. When the two of us worked together that was our operating procedure; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And when a message of this kind came in it was operating procedure to deliver it to those who were entitled to receive that message?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And so your affidavit is as given to Colonel Clausen that you did assemble this information for the purpose of making delivery to the authorized recipients. [12330]

Colonel BRATTON. That is the statement that I made in my affidavit, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you say in your affidavit:

I directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set for the Chief of Staff to his home in Fort Myer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to his home in Arlington. This was about ten o'clock P. M.

Colonel BRATTON. That was our—

Mr. KEEFE. Did you deliver it to Colonel Dusenbury?

Colonel BRATTON. That was our normal practice and procedure, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you deliver this pouch to Colonel Dusenbury and instruct him to deliver it to General Marshall's home at Fort Myer?

Colonel BRATTON. That was my recollection when I made that statement. I know now that I did not and I just—

Mr. KEEFE. So again we go from one step to the other. So the affidavit that you gave to Colonel Clausen was in error then?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When did you find that out?

Colonel BRATTON. Upon my return to Washington this time, sir.

[12331] Mr. KEEFE. Who told you?

Colonel BRATTON. No one told me. I deduced that from conversations that I had had with General Miles, Colonel Dusenbury, Colonel Pettigrew, General Gerow and from an examination of documents in the files of the War Department which up to that time I had not had access to.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, that is a very general statement, Colonel. I am referring now to a situation that involved yourself and Colonel Dusenbury.

You state that you two assembled this material and that you gave that material to Colonel Dusenbury with instructions that he deliver it to the Chief of Staff at his home at Fort Meyer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to his home in Arlington. Now, either you did or you did not, give that information to him and those directions. What is the fact now? Did you or did you not give those directions?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then your affidavit in that respect was false, was it not?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute.

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute. Just for the sake of the committee I think that we should have some understanding with reference to the use—Mr. Keefe did it before with a witness— [12332] as to whether he is charging the witness with committing perjury or whether he is charging that the witness made an incorrect statement.

Now, I don't care how it is but I really think it would be for the advantage of our proceedings if when a charge of falsity based upon perjury is made the witness is given to understand that is the point of it, as distinguished from calling the witness' attention to an incorrect statement in the testimony.

Now, we had that word the other day with Kramer I think, which had to be corrected later and I simply bring it up now, not as criticism of the Congressman at all, but simply if that is his purpose in asking the question that the witness be given that definite information.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the distinguished counsel, I think, is very familiar with the fact that there is a great distinction between perjury and false swearing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There is no—

Mr. KEEFE. There couldn't by any possible stretch of the imagination be any charge of perjury when there is false swearing in the making of an affidavit.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I do not know, sir, that there is any difference between—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, there is a difference under any rule of [12333] law.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute. I don't understand there is any difference in this proceeding between a charge of false swearing and a charge of perjury.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand there is in the law of the land and I will demonstrate it to you conclusively. I will go further and say that this man when he made the statement before Colonel Clausen and took an oath in an affidavit that he could not be guilty of perjury. Perjury must be willful and knowing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So must false swearing.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Both perjury and false swearing are indictable offenses, and it does not make much difference what the technical difference in definition may be.

Mr. KEEFE. One is a felony and the other is a misdemeanor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It depends upon the particular State.

The CHAIRMAN. It depends on the State. Proceed, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, we may get the law——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Either one is a misdemeanor in any State.

Mr. KEEFE. We may get the law defined in a short time [12334] from what I read in the paper this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know what that has to do with this hearing, whether it has any relation to this testimony or this investigation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. KEEFE. Let us not split hairs about it, Colonel.

Colonel BRATTON. My answer to your question was "No, sir."

Mr. KEEFE. Well, is it your testimony today that when you read these affidavits that Colonel Clausen had submitted to you that your memory was refreshed and that is what prompted you to change the testimony you had given before the Army Board?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I am limiting it to Colonel Dusenbury's affidavit.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You say that there isn't anything that is true in that affidavit?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; I did not say that.

Mr. KEEFE. What did you say?

Colonel BRATTON. I said that there are several statements therein that are obviously incorrect and can be so proved.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you make a distinction between truth [12335] and incorrect statements, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. Very definitely.

Mr. KEEFE. I see; all right. We are getting into very fine distinctions now.

Senator LUCAS. The Congressman makes the fine distinctions.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I want to turn to the affidavit of Bedell Smith. Did that influence you to any extent in changing your testimony?

Colonel BRATTON. Why, yes, sir. If Colonel Smith stated that he was not on duty in the office of the Chief of Staff Saturday night I accept that statement as being the truth and I could not have delivered this pouch to him that night. I know Colonel Smith. Obviously, my memory had been at fault when I made the original statement.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you referred to the fact that—I have some difficulty in finding Bedell Smith's affidavit, but in view of the fact that you referred also to the affidavit of Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith as one of the affidavits that refreshed your recollection I want to refer to that affidavit. What was there in his affidavit that refreshed your recollection?

Colonel BRATTON. I could not possibly have given a pouch to Gen. Ralph Smith on the night of Saturday, December the [12336] 6th because at that time Gen. Ralph Smith was on a train headed for Fort Benning, Ga. I was to have been a member of that same group.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you testify that you had delivered it to Gen. Ralph Smith?

Colonel BRATTON. I did in the proceedings before the Grunert Board; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So when Gen. Ralph Smith said he was not there, he was on a train going to Fort Benning, Ga.—

Colonel BRATTON. I know that he was.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he says that in his affidavit.

Colonel BRATTON. I would have been with him.

Mr. KEEFE. He says that in his affidavit.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When did you find that out?

Colonel BRATTON. Find what out?

Mr. KEEFE. That he was on a train going to Fort Benning that night? You indicated that you were supposed to be on that same train.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I remembered it when I read his affidavit. I said, "Why, of course this is correct, I remember now."

Mr. KEEFE. And that is the refreshing that you got from his affidavit?

[12337] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Those facts did not come to you when you were testifying before the Army board?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not remember them at that time, no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. What was there in the affidavit of Charles Gailey that refreshed your recollection?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember now what General Gailey said.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he says this:

Specifically with respect to the evening of 6 December 1941 I do not recall having received any pouch or intercepts from Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury or from any other person.

He is testifying from his recollection he did not recall it. You did recall it before the Army board.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I may be able to clear this up a little bit by saying that what I told this Army board was my best recollection at the time. I was repeating to them a procedure that I had followed over and over and over again. I was remembering the delivery of some other message. I had done it that way countless number of times.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Bedell Smith's affidavit with respect to this incident, Colonel Bratton, reads as follows:

[12338] To the best of my recollection I left the office at about the usual time the evening of 6 December 1941, that is about seven P. M., turning over to the night duty officer. I am quite certain I was not at the office after ten P. M.

I repeat that:

I am quite certain that I was not at the office after ten P. M. If the intercepted radio messages referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or the night duty officer it would have been delivered in the locked envelope which I have previously described and unless the officer who received it were so informed by Colonel Bratton he would have had no definite knowledge of its contents, as neither I nor any other officer in the secretariat was classified as "Ultra." If he had been informed of the contents or of the urgent nature it would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either by the officer on duty or someone other than myself.

Now, just how did that refresh your recollection?

Colonel BRATTON. I accept that as his best recollection when he made that statement.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he says that to the best of his recollection he was not there after seven and then he says that he [12339] is certain that he was not there after 10 p. m. He may have been there up to 10, however, up to 10 p. m.

Colonel BRATTON. All right, he may have been there then, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you may have delivered it to him there then up to 10 p. m., isn't that true?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't think now that I did.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, at least according to his affidavit he has no clear recollection when he left the office and that the only thing he is certain about in his affidavit is that he was not there after 10 p. m.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So it is possible he may have been there when you, as you testified, delivered it to him about 10 p. m.

Colonel BRATTON. That is what I testified to before the Grunert Board; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you want to say that that affidavit refreshed your recollection so that you now are of the opinion that you did not make any such delivery to him?

Colonel BRATTON. That was one of the contributing factors; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now I refer to the affidavit of General Gerow and this is what he says:

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is [12340] stated to have been testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general effect:

(3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept number 25843. My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows:

And then he referred to 3:

I did not receive or see any parts of the message mentioned until the morning of 7 December 1941, when a conference was held with the Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of 6 December 1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was always open to me.

Now, he says:

I did not receive or see any parts of the message. I did not receive or see the 13 parts of the message or the fourteenth part until the morning of December 7—and if he had seen it on the evening of the 6th he would have immediately warned the overseas commanders.

Now, is it because General Gerow makes that statement that your recollection was refreshed so that you can now state with certainty that neither Colonel Dusenbury or you delivered the first 13 parts to him on the evening of the 6th of December 1941?

[12341] Colonel BRATTON. Mr. Keefe, the preponderance of evidence indicates that my memory was at fault when I made these statements before the Grunert Board. To say that any one statement made by any one man got me to change my mind is not correct. If General Gerow said that he did not receive the 13 parts or the fourteenth part until the morning of the 7th of December 1941, then I probably did not deliver that message to him or to his executive officer on Saturday

night. I know General Gerow, I have known him for a long time. He would make no such statement as that unless it represented his best belief at the time.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, when Colonel Clausen showed you these affidavits you became convinced that the preponderance of evidence was that you were in error?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And then you tried to set down meticulously to Colonel Clausen what the facts were, that is correct, isn't it, as you then remembered them?

Colonel BRATTON. I tried to modify my statement to make it what was my best recollection when I signed that affidavit.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is when you made the statement that you directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the pouch to General Marshall at Fort Meyer on his way home to Arlington?

[12342] Colonel BRATTON. That is so, sir. We had done that on numerous previous occasions and I was simply remembering something that had happened before.

Mr. KEEFE. You did deliver them to the State Department, you remember that?

Colonel BRATTON. Definitely.

Mr. KEEFE. That night?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, what was there in the affidavits that were shown you by Clausen that got you to make this statement in your affidavit that you had directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the 13-part message to General Marshall?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, the fact that it was recalled to my memory that Colonel Dusenbury was with me that evening. When the two of us worked together and it was necessary to make delivery at an unusual hour, because I lived in one direction from my office and he lived in another direction, we divided the work. On several previous occasions I had made deliveries to the State Department late at night and he had made delivery to General Marshall in his quarters at Fort Meyer. I was remembering one of those previous occasions when I made that statement.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you were attempting to just reconstruct in your mind something that may have happened, is that right, [12343] when you made that statement?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, and as I have stated to this committee anything beyond what I said to the Grunert Board must necessarily be an attempt on my part to reconstruct the details of events based upon my knowledge of what was my operating procedure at the time under various sets of circumstances.

Mr. KEEFE. And then after you got back to Washington and got to digging into the matter you found that the statement which you made to Colonel Clausen was not in accord with the facts?

Colonel BRATTON. That is true, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Are you certain that the statements you are making to this committee are in accord with the facts now or might they be refreshed at some later time and be changed?

Colonel BRATTON. They are true to the best of my knowledge and belief at this time.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a question. Do I understand that the Chair recognizes me?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yesterday or last evening you indicated that the winds message as a message did not come into your department. You heard the testimony under which the Navy had set it up on cards so that it would be telephoned rather than delivered in the usual manner? [12344]

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you have a similar system of cards or any memorandums or papers?

Colonel BRATTON. Not exactly, but—

Senator FERGUSON. What did you have?

Colonel BRATTON. At General Miles' request I wrote out for the office on paper either the Japanese phrase or the English translation or both, indicating below the meaning, so that if I had to call him up at any unusual hour in his quarters I could repeat one of these phrases to him in a guarded way and he would know what I was talking about. I also carried one of those slips of paper around in my pocket; I believe Colonel Dusenbury did, too. I don't know whether I gave one to Colonel Sadtler or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give one to the Secretary of State?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Gerow?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir. I knew that if the implementation of the winds code ever came in and came to the attention of Colonel Dusenbury, myself, or General Miles, we would know what to do about it with respect to those other officers. [12345]

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not set up a system then the same as the Navy?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you handed it on to two or three officers, you had a system whereby you gave them memoranda that they could refer to if you telephoned them?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to ask one question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. There was a good deal of flurry yesterday about this fellow Lieutenant O'Dell. Who was he, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. As I understand it, sir, he was an assistant to Col. Merle Smith, who was our military observer out in Australia.

Senator LUCAS. Well, what authority did Merle Smith have with respect to sending cables to Australia or communicating with any foreign government with respect to tense situations between this country and Japan or any other nation?

Colonel BRATTON. His position was analogous to that of a military attaché, sir, and before we sent him down there he was [12346]

accredited to the Australian Government as a military observer and he was furnished with certain codes and ciphers for use in communicating with G-2 or the War Department in Washington.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator LUCAS. I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. In the record this morning I placed the rest of the O'Dell testimony to the effect that the dispatch from Australia was sent to the Philippines and Hawaii, that they anticipated an attack on the Indies, somewhere down in there, and never anticipated any on Pearl Harbor. That is in the record offered this morning.

Senator LUCAS. What I was trying to get clear in my own mind is with respect to this testimony that O'Dell gave before someone in connection with one of these investigations.

Colonel BRATTON. Before the Clarke inquiry, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. What I want to find out is this. Now, O'Dell testified as follows:

However, within an hour and a half after we had gotten there some additional things came in, the exact nature of which I was not told at the time, but when we went out Colonel Merle Smith said that he had prepared a cable which he had to send out and the principal part of [12347] it was that the movement of this convoy was there and that the Dutch had ordered the execution of Rainbow Plan A-2—

and so forth.

What I want to find out is, what authority, if any, did Colonel Smith have as a colonel to send out a cable of this importance? Wasn't that up to somebody else? Wouldn't that have to go through somebody higher than Colonel Smith to send a cable of this kind?

Colonel BRATTON. He was the highest ranking American officer in Australia, sir, and was a representative of G-2.

Senator LUCAS. Well, do I understand that Smith at the time was serving in Australia, Colonel Smith was serving in Australia?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And was O'Dell serving with him out there?

Colonel BRATTON. That is my belief; yes, sir; as his assistant.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. That is what I wanted to get straightened out in my mind. Now, just wait, Colonel, one thing more.

[12348] Senator LUCAS. That is all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Colonel, I want to get myself oriented in connection with Congressman Keefe's examination.

If either the 13 part message or the 14th part message was to be delivered to General Marshall on the evening of the 6th of December it would have to be delivered by either you or Dusenbury?

Colonel BRATTON. Through us, yes, sir; out of my office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And either you or Dusenbury would know how the delivery of that message to Marshall was to be made?

Colonel BRATTON. We ought to; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You did not make any delivery to Marshall that evening of either the 13 parts or the 14th part message?

Colonel BRATTON. Not in person; no, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you now have been convinced, by your contact with Dusenbury, that he did not?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then am I to understand that it is your present recollection and belief that no copy of either the 13 parts or the 14th part message went to General Marshall on the evening of December 6th?

Colonel BRATTON. That is my present belief; yes, sir.

[12349] Mr. RICHARDSON. And that the first time General Marshall saw either the 13 parts message or the 14th part message was when he got to his office sometime between 11 and 12 o'clock on Sunday morning, December 7?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not think General Marshall saw either the 13 or the 14th part of the 14-part message until sometime in the morning of the 7th of December.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that occasion was when he came, after his horseback ride, to his office, and found the message there then?

Colonel BRATTON. Presumably so; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As far as you know?

Colonel BRATTON. As far as I know.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, one question on that point, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not deliver the message to General Marshall on the morning of the 7th, the 13 parts or the 14th part, did you?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know whether Colonel Dusenbury did?

Colonel BRATTON. He has no definite recollection of it, either.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, could it have been delivered to General Marshall by anybody else other than you and Dusenbury? [12350]

Colonel BRATTON. It could have, but I do not see how at this time.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, how did General Marshall get that message then? How did it get on his desk when he came there?

Colonel BRATTON. I think it must have been given by Colonel Dusenbury to Colonel Deane, who was the secretary on duty there on the morning of December 7; and I think Colonel Deane must have taken it in and placed it on General Marshall's desk so it would be there when he arrived.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know this to be a fact?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not know it; no, sir. Colonel Deane has no recollection of it and Colonel Dusenbury has none, and I know I did not put it there.

Mr. KEEFE. He could not have gotten it from General Gerow because there had not been any delivery to General Gerow, as you say.

Colonel BRATTON. By that time in the morning the pouch had been delivered to the War Plans Division; yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And had been delivered to General Miles also?

Colonel BRATTON. And General Miles had seen it and read it in his office.

Mr. KEEFE. But you are unable to throw any light, other than what you have said now, on the point as to where [12351] this magic, which was so highly secret, came from that was found on General Marshall's desk when he came into his office that morning?

Colonel BRATTON. I am unable at this time to throw any additional light on that subject, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us the hour that the War Plans received the 13 parts?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not know when the War Plans Division got their 13 parts or the 14th part. As I testified before, the moment I received the 1 p. m. delivery message at about 9 o'clock Sunday morning I left all other deliveries in the hands of my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, and took off with this 1 p. m. message and tried to follow it through from that time on.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did you give the 1 p. m. message to the War Plans?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not give it to them. General Gerow saw it when he came in with us to General Marshall's office.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you talked to him on the telephone so that you told him the contents of it?

[12352] Colonel BRATTON. As I testified, sir, I do not remember whether I talked to him on the telephone or whether General Miles did. One of us did.

Senator FERGUSON. At what hour?

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, sometime about 9:30, after I had made my initial call trying to trace General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. So the War Plans had notice of the 1 p. m. message at 9:30 either through you or Miles?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; I did not say that.

Senator FERGUSON. When did that happen?

Colonel BRATTON. I said I don't think General Gerow knew anything about the 1 p. m. delivery message until he came into the office where General Miles and I were with General Marshall at 11:25.

Senator FERGUSON. 11:25. Now have you any knowledge as to when Gerow or the War Plans got the 13 parts?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about the fourteenth part.

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You say "no"?

Colonel BRATTON. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any knowledge as to when they got the fourteenth part?

[12353] Colonel BRATTON. Only what I heard him say in testimony before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Of your own knowledge, you haven't any?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When counsel asked you the question as to when General Marshall first saw the thirteenth or the fourteenth part, you have no personal knowledge except that you saw them on his desk that morning when he was reading them?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you haven't any other knowledge that he may have seen them before somewhere else?

Colonel BRATTON. I have not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Colonel, for your cooperation in trying to elicit the facts in this case. You are now excused.

Is there any further statement that you wish to make, or any further information that has not been elicited by the questions?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir. I have no other testimony to give.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you very much.

The committee will go into executive session and our [12354] guests will depart as rapidly as possible.

(The witness was excused.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The hearing will be resumed at 1:30.

Colonel Sadtler will please be here at 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a. m., the committee recessed to meet in executive session, and to reconvene at 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[12355]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed with the examination of Colonel Sadtler.

TESTIMONY OF COL. OTIS K. SADTLER, UNITED STATES ARMY

(Resumed)¹

Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel, what is your full name?

Colonel SADTLER. Sadtler, Otis K., colonel, Signal Corps.

Mr. KAUFMAN. How long have you been in the Army, Colonel?

Colonel SADTLER. Thirty-seven years the 1st day of March.

Mr. KEEFE. You will have to speak a little louder, Colonel, so we can hear you.

Colonel SADTLER. Thirty-seven years the 1st day of March.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What was your assignment during the months of November and December 1941?

Colonel SADTLER. I was on duty in the office of the Chief Signal Officer, in charge of the military branch of [12356] the Signal Corps, which duties comprised the supervisory operation of the communication services, the signal intelligence service, the Army pictorial work, military training, and the signal schools.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That included the division that received messages for signal intelligence?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Are you familiar with the set-up of the so-called winds codes?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That are referred to in Exhibit 1, Japanese Circulars 2353 and 2354?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When were they first called to your attention?

Colonel SADTLER. About November 28, 1941.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And what did you do after that set-up was called to your attention?

Colonel SADTLER. I sent my liaison officer, Colonel Guest, to the Federal Communications Commission, and asked them to make a special watch on that broadcast frequency, and that they make arrangements so that Colonel Bratton, our liaison officer with G-2, could be reached by telephone at any hour of the day or night.

¹At the time of Colonel Sadtler's previous appearance before the committee, the oath was administered to him, but he gave no actual testimony. See Hearings, Part 9, p. 4599.

[12357] Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you get any communication from the Federal Communications Commission of an implement to either one of those two circulars?

Colonel SADTLER. Not to my knowledge; no, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you ever receive a call from anybody in the Navy?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you tell us when it was that you received a call from the Navy?

Colonel SADTLER. About 9 or shortly thereafter on Friday, December 5, Admiral Noyes telephoned me to the effect that the message was in.

Mr. KAUFMAN. How do you fix the date of December 5.

Colonel SADTLER. On December 4 I attended, as an alternate to the Chief Signal Officer who was then absent in Panama, the weekly meeting of the Defense Communication Board, which met every Thursday at 10 a. m., and that was December 4.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you know it was after that meeting that you received that call from Admiral Noyes?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you tell the committee as fully as you can the conversation that you had with Admiral Noyes?

[12358] Colonel SADTLER. Admiral Noyes telephoned to say that the word was in. I asked him which one, and he told me that it was the word that implied a break in relations between Japan and Great Britain.

I then went to General Miles' office—

Mr. KAUFMAN. Before you went to General Miles' office, was that the entire conversation you had with Admiral Noyes?

Colonel SADTLER. Practically, yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then what did you do?

Colonel SADTLER. I went to General Miles' office and informed him that the word was in. He then sent for Colonel Bratton, and when Bratton came in, I told him that the word had been received from Admiral Noyes to the effect that diplomatic relations between Japan and Great Britain were in danger.

He pulled out a little slip of paper from his pocket and asked me which one of those words it was. I told him I did not know any Japanese, but it was the one that indicated Japan and Great Britain.

We discussed that to the extent of some few words, as to whether or not it was a false alarm, and he asked me to verify the receipt of that message.

I went back to my office, which was several doors down [12359] the hall, where the secret telephone between Admiral Noyes' office and the Chief Signal Officer was located.

I then called Admiral Noyes again and asked him to verify the Japanese word. He replied that he did not know any Japanese, but it was the one that meant Japan and Great Britain.

I asked him if he could verify that for me at that moment, and he said "no," that he had an engagement to go immediately either to the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Naval Operations' office for a conference, and he would do it at a later time.

I then returned immediately to General Miles' office and told him that Admiral Noyes could not verify the word at that moment; that he would do it later, but it was the one definitely meaning Japan and Great Britain.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you try to get in touch with Admiral Noyes after that?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you have any further connection with this winds code execute after that?

Colonel SADTLER. Well, in view of the "Haruna" message which had just come in, the winds message at that time made a great impression on me. In fact, I think it is the most important message I ever received. So I went back to my [12360] office and decided to go to see General Gerow, who was the head of War Plans, and tell him that the word was in.

I saw General Gerow and told him that the winds implement was in, and we discussed it something to the effect of notifying various people, and he told me, as I recall it, that the various departments had been adequately warned.

I then went over and talked to Colonel Bedell Smith, who was the Secretary of the General Staff, and told him that the winds implement was in. He asked me what I had done, and I told him I had seen General Miles and General Gerow, and he did not wish to discuss it further. That ended the conversation.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You talked a moment ago about the winds implement, or what you thought was the winds implement, coming on top of the "Haruna" messages.

Will you tell us what they were?

Colonel SADTLER. About December 2nd—you will find it on page 215 of this exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is Exhibit 1, Colonel, of this hearing?

Colonel SADTLER. Of Exhibit 1, message No. 867.

Mr. KEEFE. 8-6-7?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel SADTLER. Page 215, message No. 867:

Among the [12361] telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped, burn all but those now used with the machine—

and so forth. They were to be burned and destroyed, and when that was done, they were to reply by the one word "Haruna," to Tokyo.

That message indicates at the bottom it was translated on the 3rd, corrected on the 4th, and is Army 25640.

Mr. KAUFMAN. How many messages, to your knowledge, were intercepted from various parts of the world to Tokyo, using the word "Haruna"?

Colonel SADTLER. I recall seeing several from New Orleans, San Francisco, Seattle, and I have since seen the record produced showing that there were 16 of these words "Haruna" received up until the 6th of December.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel, do you know what facilities were available in Hawaii to the Army for the breaking down of Jap codes, or ciphers?

Colonel SADTLER. The Army had no means of breaking down any of the more difficult codes.

[12362] Mr. KAUFMAN. Did they have the means to break down any of the codes in Hawaii?

Colonel SADTLER. I do not think so, except some very simple ones they may have had, but I do not recall any real crypt analyses that were in Hawaii at that time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I do not believe I have any questions at the moment.

Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Did you ever see the message, Colonel, that Admiral Noyes reported to you?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You never examined it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Was it ever in your immediate office, so far as you know?

Colonel SADTLER. As far as I can ascertain, it did not come over.

Senator GEORGE. It did not come over?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. No further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark is not here at the moment?

Senator LUCAS. He is not here at the moment.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one additional [12363] question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Kaufman.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The fact that a copy of this so-called winds execute failed to come over to the Army was an unusual thing, was it not?

Colonel SADTLER. Most unusual, yes, sir, because it was a routine matter that any message would come over in the normal interchange of business between the two services.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You mean any message that came to ONI would go to the Signal Intelligence Service, and correspondingly, any message that SIS received would go to ONI?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel, who was your counterpart in the Navy?

Colonel SADTLER. Admiral Noyes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I notice on page 248 of the Army Pearl Harbor hearing the question by General Russell:

Did you give attention to the substance of those messages at any time, or were you primarily or solely interested in a proper deciphering, interpretation, and delivery?

[12364] Colonel SADTLER. In general my position was one of operations only. In other words, we were concerned primarily with the collection of data that came to our attention through various intercept means, and we were not concerned with the evaluation or the analysis of the content of those messages.

Does that describe your duties?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now on page 249 you testified that you expected a declaration of war, at the bottom of page 249. Do you have a copy of your testimony, Colonel?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I do not know that there is an extra copy available.

Mr. KAUFMAN. There is not.

Mr. MURPHY. I will read it slowly, Colonel. You say on the bottom of the page:

General Mauborgne, the retired Chief Signal Officer at that time.

I will go back a little bit:

General RUSSELL. What was the history as it relates to the number of messages reaching you, or those associated with you, for processing, late in November and early in December, 1941, relating to the Japanese-American [12365] negotiations? Did they become more numerous or fewer?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; the messages regarding the relations between Japan and the United States did increase materially.

General FRANK. On what date? Leading up to what date, about?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know. It seems to me that when I first came to the office, I was warned that the messages beginning to come, on the relations between Japan and the United States, were getting more tense, the condition.

General FRANK. Who warned you of that?

Colonel SADTLER. General Mauborgne, the retired Chief Signal Officer at that time. The information began to assume rather serious proportions regarding the tense and strained relations between the two countries, and the number of messages about warnings of conditions that might obtain in case of hostilities really reached a climax around the middle of November, to such an extent that we were of the opinion that there might be a declaration of war between Japan and the United States on Sunday, November 30. This, as you all know, proved to be a "dud", and on Monday, December 1, if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning began coming in from Tokyo telling the Consuls to destroy their codes and to reply to Tokyo with one code [12366] word when they had so complied with their directive. If I recall correctly, that word was "haruna". It is the same name as that battleship that Colin Kelly was alleged to have sunk.

You made that answer and that is a true statement, as I understand it, of the situation at that time?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there anything in particular which made you feel there might be war on November 30? Was it the dead line message?

Colonel SADTLER. It was the message of November 22 which stated after the 29th things were going to automatically happen.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you also stated:

About December 3, Tokyo notified the Embassy pertaining to the destruction of their codes, at once.

General FRANK. The Embassy in Washington?

Colonel SADTLER. The Japanese Embassy in Washington, regarding the destruction of their codes. Now, those messages were important as showing the trend of conditions.

You made that statement at that time?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now you testified at page 253:

Some time about—I don't know whether it was the [12367] 5th or 6th of December, or at that period, Tokyo notified the Japanese Embassy at Washington to destroy their remaining codes, which was done on Saturday afternoon, and duly reported in the Sunday Star on December 7.

Was it in the Sunday Star?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir, it was in the Monday Star.

Mr. MURPHY. The Monday Star?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You said Sunday Star.

Colonel SADTLER. I am sorry to say I looked it up.

Mr. MURPHY. It was Monday?

Colonel SADTLER. It was Monday; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In the Monday Star there was word about the Japs destroying their codes?

Colonel SADTLER. There was a picture in the paper of their burning their codes on the Embassy grounds up on Massachusetts Avenue.

Mr. MURPHY. That was on Monday, December 8, 1941, the Washington Star?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. A good paper, by the way.

Now, then, as to the night of the 6th and the morning of the 7th, you have no familiarity with those messages, because you did not work on the night of the 6th or the [12368] morning of the 7th? Isn't that right? The 6th of December?

Colonel SADTLER. The 6th we worked. The 7th I did not go to work, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I refer you to your testimony on page 255. This was by General Russell:

It has come to the attention of the Board that sometime on the evening of December 6, probably around 9:00 or 10:00 o'clock, there were received by some Government agency the first 13 of 14 parts of the reply of the Japanese Government to Mr. Hull's note of November 26, 1941. Did that clear through your agency?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know, sir.

General RUSSELL. It is also in the record that sometime in the morning, December 7, the last, the 14th part of this reply, reached War Department agencies, and the time for delivery of the entire reply was received in a message, as well as some further instructions about the destruction of codes or code machines. Do you have any recollection of those December 7 messages which I have described?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I did not go to work on the morning of December 7.

General GRUNERT. How about the night of the 6th? Were you there?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I was not. I heard about [12369] these things after that, on about the 8th or 9th, General. I did not know anything about them at the time.

Was that a true reflection of your testimony?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct. I left the office usually on Saturday afternoon, I imagine around 6 o'clock. That is when I generally left. I did not stay there until 9 or 10 o'clock.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster would be next. He is not present at the moment.

Mr. Gearhart would be next, but he is not present at the moment.

Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, may I just ask one question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. At page 252 you describe those present in the office when you discussed the message with Noyes as General Miles, Colonel Bratton, Colonel Sadtler, and General Roderick, who is now dead.

Colonel SADTLER. I have been told that it was General Roderick, Mr. Murphy. I did not know the man at the time; I did not know who he was.

Mr. MURPHY. But in the record you said you thought it was "General Roderick, who is now dead".

[12370] Colonel SADTLER. I think my memory was refreshed at the time that I made that statement.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 252 you said that; did you not?

Colonel SADTLER. I do not recall it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me read the exact words:

[12371] I went immediately to General Miles' office and told him that the word was in. He said, "Wait a minute. I will call Colonel Bratton," and in

a very short while Colonel Bratton came into the office, and we sat down at General Miles' desk. There were General Miles, Colonel Bratton; some officer, I don't know who it was. I think he has since been identified as General Roderrick, who is now dead; and myself.

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Sadtler, what hours did you work on the 6th? From what time?

Colonel SADTLER. From about 8 a. m. to about 6 p. m.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you left your work?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you went back to work Sunday morning?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I did not go back to work Sunday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not work Sunday?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you had nothing to do with the receipt of the 13 parts?

[12372] Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I had nothing to do with it.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing to do with that.

Did you know whether or not there had been a special line run to Colonel Bratton's home so that he might get the winds message if it came in?

Colonel SADTLER. I did not know of a special line. I knew that the FCC had been given his telephone numbers so he could be reached at any time, day or night, by telephone, if that message came in.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not know of any special line?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any special set-up about the winds code as far as you were concerned?

Colonel SADTLER. Except the arrangement that we made with the FCC to monitor that frequency, and the special arrangements that were made by both the Army and Navy to attempt to catch that message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you talked to Admiral Noyes, did he call you or did you call him?

Colonel SADTLER. He called me the first time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say why he was calling you?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes; he said "The message is in."

[12373] Senator FERGUSON. At that first conversation, did he say whether it was with the British or the Dutch, or Russia?

Colonel SADTLER. He said it was between Japan and Great Britain.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did you ask him whether it was between America and Japan at all?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just Japan and Great Britain?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what did that mean to you? That there was going to be war between Great Britain and Japan? How was America concerned with that message?

Colonel SADTLER. Senator, these intercepts are a very difficult thing to obtain. You either get it or you don't get it. It is very easy to

get part of a message, and I assumed that, having gotten the British part, that they had somehow missed the American part, and thought no more about it.

I knew that those "Haruna" messages were being sent back to Tokyo, indicating destruction of codes at various consulates in the United States and Great Britain, Singapore, Hongkong, and therefore that the indication was that there was going to be a break between Japan and Great Britain and there must necessarily be one between Japan and the [12374] United States.

Senator FERGUSON. So you felt the British part meant a break also with the United States, and that is why you became so concerned?

Colonel SADTLER. In view of everything that had gone before; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were concerned, as I understand it, because you went to General Gerow?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And told him about it?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And told him about it. You went to Miles—or Bratton, which was it?

Colonel SADTLER. Both.

Senator FERGUSON. Both. To Miles and Bratton. How did you get in to see Col. Bedell Smith, the secretary to General Marshall?

Colonel SADTLER. Just walked in his door.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you want to see him on this code message?

Colonel SADTLER. Colonel Smith was secretary of the General Staff and he had direct access to General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. And you felt that this was a message that should reach General Marshall?

[12375] Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you tell Bedell Smith that, Colonel Smith?

Colonel SADTLER. Everybody in the War Department knew about that winds message as far as I know. Everybody was talking about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let him finish.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you finished?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Pardon me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you explain to them that in your opinion, that because the way the messages were received, getting the British part and what other things you knew, that that by necessity meant war with America?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you say to Colonel Bedell Smith, "The part is in about the British"?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. I said, "The winds message is in," as I recall the wording.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't explain to him what part of the winds message was in?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't recall doing that, no sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you told him the winds message [12376] was in. And did you ask him to get it to General Marshall, that word, that it was in?

Colonel SADTLER. As I remember it, he asked me what I had done and I told him I had talked to General Miles and General Gerow.

Senator FERGUSON. And told them?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say?

Colonel SADTLER. He said he didn't care to discuss it further.

Senator FERGUSON. What did that really mean, that he didn't care to discuss it further?

Colonel SADTLER. That I was through.

Senator FERGUSON. That you had completed your job?

Colonel SADTLER. Had done as much as I could possibly do.

Senator FERGUSON. You had done all you could do?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say as to whether or not he would convey this to General Marshall?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, I assume, you thought your mission had been performed, when you told them that the winds message was in?

[12377] Colonel SADTLER. I think I had gone a little too far in talking to either General Gerow or Col. Bedell Smith.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least you had gone as far as you could go?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then, I take it from what you say in your previous testimony, that having done that, you never tried to ascertain in detail whether this was a fake message or not?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You considered it was genuine message?

Colonel SADTLER. I did, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that continued until after the attack?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So far as you were concerned, the winds message was in and it meant war?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, war within what length of time?

Colonel SADTLER. When the winds message was first brought to my attention by Colonel Bratton, he emphasized the destruction of codes, that it could mean one thing, and that was war. Here we had practically all codes in the United [12378] States destroyed except the one left in the Embassy in Washington, Japanese Embassy in Washington. That meant that we were going to have war in a very short time.

Senator FERGUSON. And at one time I think you used the expression "within 48 hours"?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; that is not my expression.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now:

Just before that meeting, Mr. Gaston asked me what I thought about war being declared, and I said that I thought they would have war within 48 hours. He turned to Captain Redman who represented Admiral Noyes at that meeting and asked him what he thought and he said he agreed with Colonel Sadtler.

You are testifying.

Colonel SADTLER. That is true, yes, sir; but I have since verified it with Captain Redman, and Mr. Gaston, member of the committee, and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, said it to Captain Redman, and Captain Redman replied, "I think we will have 48 hours," and I have just been reversed.

Senator FERGUSON. You agreed with Captain Redman?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What date was that?

Colonel SADTLER. That was December 4.

[12379] Senator FERGUSON. December 4. Then you did feel that there would be war within 48 hours of December 4?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you were not surprised when the war came at 1 o'clock; 1 o'clock Washington time?

Colonel SADTLER. Not a bit; no, sir. I was only surprised that the attack was in Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. I see.

You were not surprised that there was an attack?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How, why were you surprised that there was an attack in Hawaii?

Colonel SADTLER. During the entire——

Senator FERGUSON. That is where the fleet was, wasn't it?

Colonel SADTLER. Where the fleet was was no concern of mine. I didn't know where it was.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Colonel SADTLER. All the discussion that I heard in the War and Navy Departments, I never heard the word Pearl Harbor or Hawaii discussed in connection with an attack by Japan on the United States in the event of war.

There was a great deal of conversation about the Philippines, Indochina, and Panama Canal.

[12380] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you know as late as the 5th, General Miles had sent a message to Panama after the war warning message, after the message of the 27th telling them that when the break of diplomatic relations became imminent they would notify them?

Colonel SADTLER. I did not know of that message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it is to this effect:

U. S.-Japanese relations strained. Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent.

Signed "Miles."

Do you know how such a message could be sent on the 5th after you had told him that the wind message was in, and you had discussion about the destruction of codes?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I don't recall that message to Panama at all, nor should it have been my business to have even seen it, except as officer in charge of Army communications.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The 48-hour incident occurred 24 hours before he saw the winds message, so-called winds message. That was at the meeting

on Thursday. I mean the conversation was at the security meeting 24 hours before the call from Noyes, as I understand it.

[12381] Colonel SADTLER. That is correct, Mr. Murphy; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You told us about Colonel Bratton discussing it with you, that the discussion of these codes, the wind code message, and so forth, meant war?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that there were any files destroyed or lost?

Colonel SADTLER. I heard some gossip to that effect; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, I want to ask you, down in the Army, how you determined between gossip and non-gossip, the real thing. You say you heard it by gossip.

Colonel SADTLER. In 1923, I think—

Senator FERGUSON. No, no.

Colonel SADTLER. I mean 1943, I think it was at Fort Bragg, N. C., in a casual conversation with Gen. Isaac Spalding, he told me that nothing could be found about Pearl Harbor because the records had been destroyed.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Spalding?

Colonel SADTLER. Gen. Isaac Spalding.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you anything more?

Colonel SADTLER. And he told me that Colonel Bissell, Jack Bissell, J. T. Bissell, had told him that he had destroyed certain evidence, certain documents.

[12382] Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you what documents were supposed to have been destroyed?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't recall that he did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, why did you tell me that was gossip? He was attempting to tell you a fact, was he not?

Colonel SADTLER. Well, it was a casual conversation between two men who have known each other for a great many years.

Senator FERGUSON. And you hadn't any reason to discount that this gentleman was speaking to you and telling you what he considered to be a fact that he had heard?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And was it gossip?

Colonel SADTLER. It turned out to be; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you tell me it turned out to be gossip; what investigation was made, to your knowledge?

Colonel SADTLER. By General Carter Clarke.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you come back here and tell anyone about what you had been told?

Colonel SADTLER. I may have; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know how the investigation of Carter Clarke got started?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. I was just told to appear before it. I appeared before it twice, to be exact.

[12383] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why the Army Board didn't investigate that gossip?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell the Army Board that?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't think so. I don't know, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. It wasn't mentioned in that hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't think you told the Army Board?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only knowledge that you have concerning the missing of any files or papers in the War Department?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. I am interested in knowing whether or not this thing that you refer to as gossip is that which my boys always referred to in the service as being "scuttlebutt"?

Colonel SADTLER. That is another name for it.

Mr. KEEFE. Isn't that the same thing?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Saying "according to scuttlebutt", so and so, that is what you refer in the service as meaning gossip?

[12384] Colonel SADTLER. Well, it is referred to by a lot of names, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. That is quite a familiar word, isn't it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir, not "scuttlebutt," in the Army; it is a Navy term.

Mr. KEEFE. That is a Navy term.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. One of my boys was a marine and he was always referring to "scuttlebutt."

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want you to explain part of your testimony about this message of the 7th. It isn't clear to me.

The circumstances attending that message are about as follows—

You are testifying—

I sent the inquiry, with the approval of the General Staff, inquiring as to the operation of radar on December 7. Upon receipt of that message Colonel Colton, Acting Chief Signal Officer, personally took a copy of it into General Marshall's office. I gave a copy to General Gerow. Colonel Colton, upon his return from General Marshall's office, said that he wanted all copies of that message collected and held intact as, inasmuch as radar and the damage done at Pearl Harbor were secret at that time, the information was [12385] not to be disclosed. General Gerow kept his message and I think that Colonel Handy had it and he held it.

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you talking about?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator give the page of the record and where from?

Senator FERGUSON. That is volume 2 of the Clarke Report.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you talking about? That isn't clear to me.

Colonel SADTLER. We were trying to find out whether our radar sets were working in Hawaii at the time of the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you make an investigation on that question as to whether or not the radar was working just prior to the attack?

Colonel SADTLER. I talked to Colonel Powell in Hawaii on the night of December 7 and asked him the question as to the operation of his radar, and he did not answer as it was secret, and he said he would let us know later, and the next day Mr. Bundy gave me permission to send that message—I think it was Bundy because he accused me of being in charge of it—to find out whether the radar was working in Hawaii on the morning of December 7. We sent a telegram [12386] to make an inquiry. The reply to the effect that it was working came in and was delivered to me and I gave it to Colonel Colton, who took it in to General Marshall personally.

When he came out he said :

I want all copies collected and held intact so that this information cannot get out.

That was merely a precautionary move to preserve secrecy as to the effect of what happened in Pearl Harbor and also the secrecy of radar at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, that radar was working that morning was to be held a secret? That was to be held a secret?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir. Any information regarding radar was to be held a secret.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you had in mind by that testimony?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was to be held a secret, that radar had been working?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I don't think we should draw inferences.

Senator FERGUSON. You tell us what you meant again.

Colonel SADTLER. We were trying to find out whether radar was working on December 7 and when the information came in we wanted to keep it as secret as possible, any [12387] information regarding radar.

Senator FERGUSON. Not necessarily that it had been working but the fact that radar was there was to be kept a secret?

Colonel SADTLER. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know what was done with those messages, did you file them, or keep them?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. Those messages are on file today.

Senator FERGUSON. They are on file?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever keep a diary or a log sheet in your office?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. I have kept some notes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have those notes?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where they are?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any in a safe? Did you at one time state that you may have had them in a safe? In your Clausen affidavit I notice that you say—have you got the Clausen affidavit? I will get it.

Have you identified as much as you can who Spalding was and who Bissell was?

[12388] Colonel SADTLER. Bissell was on duty in G-2. Spalding was on duty in G-1.

Senator FERGUSON. One was in G-1, intelligence, and the other in G-2?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

Mr. MURPHY. For a correction. I think you will find Spalding wasn't in Washington but he was under a tree down in North Carolina.

Colonel SADTLER. May I explain that at the time of December 7 Colonel Spalding was in Washington in G-1. Bissell was in G-2. In 1943 the conversation was, I think, at Jackson or Fort Bragg, N. C. Colonel Bissell was overseas at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time of Pearl Harbor they were both in Washington?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. One in Intelligence and the other in G-1?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what is Bissell's first name?

Colonel SADTLER. He has three initials. J. T. Jack Bissell, we call him.

[12389] Senator FERGUSON. Jack Bissell?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, who is presently the head of G-2? Isn't there a Bissell there now?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. General Vandenburg is head of G-2. Bissell was. That is an entirely different Bissell.

Senator FERGUSON. An entirely different Bissell.

Now, you said here in this affidavit:

"I have not collected any such material in a safe deposit box although I thought I had done so."

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. How would a man think that he had done so if he hadn't?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you say this?

Colonel SADTLER. Because I thought I had.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought you had.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you account for that kind of thinking, that you had collected it and put it in a safe deposit box?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you put any papers in a safe deposit box, collected in any way, about Pearl Harbor, [12390] memorandums or notes?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; because there are none in there now, and I looked to find them, so I couldn't have put them there.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. What you mean is you thought you had put them in the safe deposit box but when you went there to look for them you didn't find them and then you considered that you were mistaken?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you tried to think since where you would have put them?

Colonel SADTLER. I had a little tin box I used to keep in my desk and I think I kept them there.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, they were there on the 7th, then?

Colonel SADTLER. Evidently not; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, when do you consider that they were removed?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make any memorandums in relation to the winds message?

Colonel SADTLER. I made some notes on the whole subject; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You made some notes on the whole subject. Now, when did you make those notes?

[12391] Colonel SADTLER. After talking with General Drum in New York.

Senator FERGUSON. And what year was that?

Colonel SADTLER. 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. In 1942 after the happening of this event you made a memorandum putting down on paper these various things that happened so that you would be able to remember them?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What conversation had you with Drum?

Colonel SADTLER. I told him the story.

Senator FERGUSON. You told him the story?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was that, an investigation?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And who was General Drum?

Colonel SADTLER. Commanding General of the Eastern Defense Command of the First Army.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how that conversation came about that you related the story to him?

Colonel SADTLER. He just asked me one day what happened.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield? Get General Drum's assignment at this time. Where is he now?

Colonel SADTLER. He is retired now.

[12392] Mr. MURPHY. Is he retired or is he in a military position? Isn't he Military Aide to Governor Dewey?

Colonel SADTLER. That I don't know, Mr. Murphy. At that time he was Commanding General of the Eastern Defense Command.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Better be careful. That is a serious charge. You better be careful about it, Mr. Witness.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, may I have the last answer read?

(The last question and answer were read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct, is that all you want to say on that?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir, that is about all.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, when you told him, did you at that time make this memorandum?

Colonel SADTLER. It was the time that I was being relieved from duty at Governors Island to go to the Second Army at Memphis, Tenn., and that was around about the latter part of 1943, about November.

Senator FERGUSON. Then how did this get into your tin box here in Washington?

Colonel SADTLER. I had this little box with me, to carry with me. I am not sure that it was ever in the tin box, Senator.

[12393] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, was what you put on the memorandum the same as you are testifying to here, do you know?

Colonel SADTLER. Essentially; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any other memorandum?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the only one and you haven't any idea now where that could be or what happened to it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever make any investigation of one of the cable companies in relation to any messages?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't think I understand the question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever make any investigation in relation to any files of a cable company?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't recall any; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever go to any of the various intercepting monitoring stations or did you know of anyone going to inspect their files as to whether or not any wind message did come in?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You know nothing about that?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the so-called [12394] pilot message?

Colonel SADTLER. Only in a general way.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what was the general way?

Colonel SADTLER. That there was a long message coming in on Saturday.

Senator FERGUSON. And when did that first come to your attention, that the long message was coming in and there would be a time of delivery?

Colonel SADTLER. There was never any notice came to me of any hour of delivery.

Senator FERGUSON. No, not the specific hour, but that there would be a time of delivery. Did you ever see the pilot message?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear about it?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you hear about the pilot message?

Colonel SADTLER. That there was a long message coming in.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that about all?

Colonel SADTLER. Except that we would keep people on at night to see that the thing was received.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, sometime prior to the long message coming in you had information that it was coming [12395] in and you kept your staff on at night to intercept it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I hadn't kept anybody on to intercept it. It was to be covered at night until the message was intercepted. And I think we can thank one civilian, Mr. Rowlett, who stayed down and did that work of his own accord with Colonel Schukraft. I think they are better witnesses than I am on that question.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't make any plans in the Department to have someone stay on?

Colonel SADTLER. I knew there would be someone on.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you concerned at one time about getting messages out to the theaters?

Colonel SADTLER. On what subject, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. On the question of alerting them.

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; except as the Army Communications Service would handle those messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Not that you were personally talking with any other officers about the various services to be notified?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no such conversations?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

[12396] Mr. KEEFE. May I have the book of affidavits again, the Clausen report. Colonel Sadtler, you gave an affidavit to Colonel Clausen, did you not?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Here at Washington on the 13th day of August 1945?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, if I understand your testimony here today, it is that Admiral Noyes called you on the morning of the 5th of December 1941 and in substance told you that the message was in, referring to the wind execute message?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you explained to us how you definitely recalled the date because of the meeting which you had had the day before?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. If I understand your testimony here, it is that you immediately informed General Miles?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And he sent for Colonel Bratton?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And Colonel Bratton pulled out a slip of paper from his pocket and asked what words were used on [12397] this message?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you did not know and you were instructed by General Miles to go back to Admiral Noyes and find out the exact words, and Admiral Noyes said he was going to attend a meeting and you didn't get the exact words?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You then discussed the matter with General Gerow?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And advised General Gerow of the receipt of this winds message?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And discussed it some with him?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you then went to the secretary of the general staff, General Bedell Smith?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And advised him that this winds execute message was in?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And advised him that you had talked to General Gerow and General Miles and that upon his learning that you discussed the matter with them he said he didn't [12398] care to discuss it further with you?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you left?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the story that you tell us here today?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in this affidavit which you gave to Colonel Clausen you say this:

I made the recommendations to General Gerow and General Smith on 5 December 1941, as stated on pages 253 and 254 of the transcript mentioned, without getting additional information from Admiral Noyes, on my own initiative and without informing any representatives of G-2.

That is correct, isn't it?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. (reading):

I was alarmed by the series of Japanese diplomatic and consular intercepts which I had been reading over a considerable period of time—

And you have referred to these intercepts with reference to the destruction of codes?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. (reading):

—and the mounting tension, and the information which [12399] Admiral Noyes had just given me. Accordingly, after I had conferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton, as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I went to my office, which was also in the Munitions Building and personally typed a proposed warning which I intended to recommend be sent to the overseas commanders, and which warning read substantially as follows and quoted herewith from memory:

"C. G.—P. I., Hawaii—Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future Stop Take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur Stop Notify the Navy. Marshall."

Now, is that statement correct?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you want us to understand that to be your testimony here before this committee?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That you did prepare such a warning message?

Colonel SADTLER. I did, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you did it because of the mounting tension and flow of information which you had together with the winds execute message which you believed was the true winds execute message at that time?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct, yes, sir.

[12400] Mr. KEEFE. You were very apprehensive that war was going to strike immediately?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And I understood your apprehension that war would come to the United States was based in part at least upon the fact that the Japanese code word that was being sent out from the consular offices here in the United States indicated the destruction of all codes and ciphers and secret papers except the one code here in the Embassy at Washington; is that correct?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Your affidavit further says:

I have since checked with my office staff at the time and they have no recollection of the drafting of this proposed warning message. I did not show it to anyone. I do not know where the message is now, and I made no copy at the time. After I had typed this message, I conferred with General Gerow and General Smith as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I did not show them the warning message I had typed.

What became of your message?

Colonel SADTLER. That is what I don't know, sir. .

Mr. KEEFE. Your mind doesn't reach back that far?

Colonel SADTLER. I know that I had it, and I thought [12401] I had put it away to keep, and when I went to look for it, it was gone.

Mr. KEEFE. You knew you had put it away?

Colonel SADTLER. I put it away for safekeeping.

Mr. KEEFE. Why wasn't the message sent?

Colonel SADTLER. General Gerow informed me that he thought they had been adequately warned, and General Smith refused to discuss it any further.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you suggest to General Gerow that a message of that character should go?

Colonel SADTLER. No. I talked to him to the effect that the winds message was in and didn't he think there should be some warning sent out.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you discuss this particular message that you had drafted?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then I understand your testimony to be that you asked him whether he did not think that an additional warning should be sent.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And he advised you that in his opinion they had sufficient warning?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And when you told that to General Smith— [12402] I guess it was Colonel Smith at that time?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; Colonel Smith.

Mr. KEEFE. He refused to discuss the matter further with you?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you thought you put this message, this proposed message, away some place for safekeeping?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you put it away with these memoranda that you have told us about?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; because the memorandum was not made until later, and that was made at the time?

Mr. KEEFE. Where did you last see this proposed message?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know where it was, sir. I have no idea where it is.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the last time you saw it you had it in your hand?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That was sometime on the morning of the 5th of December, 1941?

Colonel SADTLER. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have it in your hand when you talked to Bedell Smith?

Colonel SADTLER. I think I did.

[12403] Mr. KEEFE. Did you have it in your hand when you talked to General Gerow?

Colonel SADTLER. I think so; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You perhaps went back to your office and from that point on you do not recall what became of that proposed message?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. It never became an official message because it never was sent?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. With the approval of the proper authorities?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in this affidavit that you gave to Colonel Clausen, you say this:

I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941.

Now, I want you to listen to this next:

I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits mentioned are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows concerning this subject:

[12404] "General GEROW. I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer, and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of magic. I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection I did not receive prior to 7 December, 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese winds code. If I had received such a message or notice thereof I believe I would not recall the facts, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the facts, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened."

If I understand your affidavit, you state:

I believe the comments by General Smith contained in his affidavit are correct statements of fact.

[12405] In his affidavit he says he has no recollection that you ever talked to him at all, and believes you are entirely mistaken.

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. How can you make a statement that you did talk to him, before this committee, and make an affidavit before Colonel Clausen that you believed that Colonel Smith or rather General Gerow,

is correct, when he says he doesn't believe that you talked to him at all, and that you must be mistaken? You seem to be taking two different positions in the same affidavit.

Colonel SADTLER. I realized when I got through talking to Miles that I had made no impression to the effect that the winds message was in in view of the "Haruna" messages going back to Tokyo and the reason I went to Gerow was to arouse somebody that I thought should be aware of what was happening.

I made no impression on Gerow at the time I was there and for that reason I went to Colonel Smith, and he shut it off to the effect "I don't care to discuss it further."

I don't believe I made any impression on any one of those three men.

[12406] Mr. KEEFE. Well, I can well believe that and I think that is the absolute truth that you are telling us now, Colonel Sadtler, but the difficulty that confronts me is the affidavit which you gave to Colonel Clausen.

Colonel SADTLER. Isn't that essentially what I said just now?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, General Gerow says, "I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken", and you say in your affidavit that you believed the comments of General Gerow contained in his affidavit are correct statements of fact.

Colonel SADTLER. Insofar as he goes I think they are essentially absolute statements of fact.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Colonel SADTLER. I am absolutely positive that General Gerow said that to me.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, we get down to this, Colonel Sadtler. that your interpretation of this affidavit and the one that you would like to have this committee understand is that when you said you believed that General Smith and General Gerow in their affidavits stated correct statements of fact that you are of the impression that they could not recall or recollect that you talked to them at all and that, perhaps, that was a correct statement of fact, is that it?

[12407] Colonel SADTLER. Practically that; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But you mean to tell this committee positively and without any question at all of faulty recollection is that you did talk to both of them as you have indicated here?

Colonel SADTLER. Absolutely, I talked to both of them.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you remember the circumstances under which this affidavit was given to Colonel Clausen?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you state them?

Colonel SADTLER. It was in a room in the Pentagon Building. He sent for me and asked me to come up and talk to him, as I recall it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, tell me just what took place.

Colonel SADTLER. He showed me the affidavits of Gerow and Smith and asked me to comment on them, which I have done. Anything further that I cared to add to the testimony or anything that I wanted to say that could help clear up anything.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I note that you added to this affidavit this language, in your own handwriting, I assume it is.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading) :

Other than the persons mentioned, namely, General Miles, Colonel Bratton, General Gerow, Colonel Smith and whoever may have been in General Miles' office at [12408] the time, to the best of my recollection up to December 7, 1941 I did not give any other person the information I received from Admiral Noyes.

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is your testimony today, Colonel?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in this statement you say—a statement given to Clausen :

I deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given to General Clarke to the effect that I could not get the execute message from Admiral Noyes and reiterate that other than making the telephone call, as testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I made no further efforts to obtain the execute message mentioned by Admiral Noyes.

Now, did you have a discussion with Colonel Clausen as to the testimony of everybody that had testified that seemed to contradict your statement?

Colonel SADTLER. I do not recall all the conversation with Colonel Clausen, but if that is what it says that is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, as a matter of fact, then, in reading your affidavit meticulously it impresses me that it is not exactly correct because you have testified to us that you [12409] did go back to Admiral Noyes after you had talked with General Miles and Colonel Bratton, at the direction of General Miles, I assume, to get verification of the message.

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is in addition to the telephone call?

Colonel SADTLER. That is the telephone call.

Mr. KEEFE. What is that?

Colonel SADTLER. That is the telephone call.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, you did not go; you just called up?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, I see. Well, then, that clears it up, Colonel. You did not actually go to Noyes' office then?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You simply called him on the phone and asked for verification?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And did not get it?

Colonel SADTLER. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. And you did not want to give the impression that Noyes had refused to give you that message?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He said he was going to a meeting and was busy and you did not press the matter thereafter?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

[12410] Mr. KEEFE. Well, personally I want to thank you. We have at least got one witness that has some clear recollection without refreshing. That seemed to be the case in each case. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a few questions in connection with the questions asked you by Senator Ferguson.

Now, this conference that you spoke of in response to Senator Ferguson's question with Redmond, Gaston, and whoever else it was, that was on December 4, 1941?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was the time that the question of 48 hours was discussed?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was the day before the so-called winds execute message was supposed to have reached Admiral Noyes?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So that this conference in which the 48-hour question was mentioned had nothing to do with the winds execute message at all?

Colonel SADTLER. Nothing at all; no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And whatever discussion occurred [12411] there in which the 48-hour question was mentioned was solely with relation to the information you had about the burning of Japanese codes?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; and the other information that had gone before, Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But it had nothing to do with any winds message?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; not a thing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, your reason for thinking that war with Britain would also probably mean war with the United States was because the Japanese were destroying their codes in both the United States and in Britain?

Colonel SADTLER. And in British possessions; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes. And that had nothing to do with any winds message at all?

Colonel SADTLER. Not a thing; no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, this message written by you on December 5 which is mentioned in your affidavit to Colonel Clausen, I believe you state was never shown to General Gerow or General Miles or Colonel Bedell Smith or Colonel Bratton.

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not show it to anybody else?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

[12412] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You simply wrote it out and kept it yourself?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And did not show it to any of these other officers.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you never did see the so-called winds execute message and all you know about it is what Admiral Noyes told you?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You never did at any time see it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And as far as you know of your own knowledge there never was any winds execute message received?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, thank you.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel, as I understand it then, because you had a phone call from Admiral Noyes about which there was some doubt and concerning which you could not get confirmation you, who had charge of the collection of data and not the evaluation or analysis of data, took it upon yourself to go to the Chief of War Plans and the Secretary of the Chief of [12413] Staff in order to have a message sent out to Hawaii and the other possessions, is that right?

Colonel SADTLER. That is essentially correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know at that time of the war warning message of November 27?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; I knew about that.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you read—you had read the Navy's message?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. I knew the one that General Short had sent into the War Department.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you know about the Navy's message, "This is a war warning" on the 27th?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I knew nothing of that message.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know about the message of the 24th of November that hostilities might commence at any moment?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know about the message of the 27th of November to General Short from General Marshall?

Colonel SADTLER. To which General Short replied that he was on a sabotage alert?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not talking about his reply. I am talking about the message of Marshall to Short, did you know about that?

[12414] Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I don't identify it; no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So that you, not knowing that there had been a warning message on the 24th of November and the Army message of the 27th of November and the Navy message of the 27th of November, were feeling disturbed that no warning message had gone out, is that right?

Colonel SADTLER. I thought that additional warning should go out, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you know what had gone out?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So that you took it upon yourself, not knowing what the Chief of Staff and the other officers in charge of such functions had done and not knowing what the Navy officers in charge of such functions had done, decided that you would write the kind of a message that should go out, is that it?

Colonel SADTLER. I intended that to be some sort of a model that if they wanted to send a message they could use that to start out with.

Mr. MURPHY. And you expected General Gerow, after you came into his office as head of Signal Corps, to discuss with you the kind of a message that should go out, is that it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you expected that he would take your [12415] suggestion that a message should go out?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And then when you didn't get any satisfaction from General Gerow you then went to the Chief of Staff's office, is that right?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, did you tell the Chief of Staff at that time that you had already conferred with General Miles and you had already conferred with General Gerow? Did you ever tell that to Colonel Smith?

Colonel SADTLER. I think you mean Colonel Smith, the Secretary of the General Staff.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You told him that you had discussed the matter with General Miles, Chief of Army Intelligence, G-2, and that you had already discussed the matter with General Gerow and that you did not get any satisfaction from them, and didn't he then tell you, "Well, don't bother me about it," or something to that effect?

Colonel SADTLER. Essentially, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Now, then, we come to your conversation with General Drum. I would like to get some more details on that. This material that you got was of a highly confi- [12416] dential nature, wasn't it?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And what did you tell General Drum about it? Did he have any right to know about this magic?

Colonel SADTLER. He had been my commanding general.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't care what he was. You knew that he did not have any right to know about magic, didn't you?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir, I knew that.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. And did he as your commanding general presume as your general to ask you to reveal such information to him?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. It was the time of my relief from duty under General Drum to go to duty with the Second Army.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Colonel SADTLER. And he said—he asked me, "Weren't you on duty in the Chief's office at the time this trouble occurred?"

Mr. MURPHY. What else?

Colonel SADTLER. And asked me to tell him the circumstances.

Mr. MURPHY. And did you discuss magic with him and the messages?

Colonel SADTLER. I told him about the winds message.

[12417] Mr. MURPHY. What else?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know, sir, I have forgotten exactly, but I essentially told him what was done at that time about that, what had happened.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he tell you why he wanted to know?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And then after you talked with him you went out and made a memorandum?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. I left for Tennessee almost immediately.

Mr. MURPHY. But you have already told us that after you talked to General Drum you made some notes. That is what you said in this record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. A few months later he said.

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know whether it was the same day or a week later or a month later.

Mr. MURPHY. After you talked to General Drum you made some notes. Why did you make the notes? Did General Drum suggest it or not?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. He suggested that you make some notes?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he say why?

Colonel SADTLER. He said, "You had better remember this."

[12418] Mr. MURPHY. What is that?

Colonel SADTLER. He said, "You had better remember this."

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. What else?

Colonel SADTLER. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. And was it he who suggested you make notes?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you tell General Drum about magic?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I don't think so.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean you just confined it to that one incident?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't recall telling him anything else; no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you have already testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and you have testified before this Board that you felt on the 4th of December 1941, 24 hours before any talk of a conversation with Admiral Noyes, that you felt war was coming in 48 hours.

What was there about the winds intercept that you singled out, since you felt it was coming the day before, that you would talk about only that one instance to General Drum? How do you explain that?

Colonel SADTLER. I can't explain it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, have you any idea?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

[12419] Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman from Wisconsin said your memory was clear. Now I would like to have your memory on it. Why would you discuss that one little incident when you said you felt the "Haruna" message meant war, when you knew the consuls were being told to destroy their codes, when you knew the ambassador was being told to destroy his codes, when you felt that war was coming, why would you single out this one incident to talk to General Drum about?

Colonel SADTLER. I cannot answer that question, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Who brought up the subject?

Colonel SADTLER. When I went in to say good-by to General Drum he asked me the circumstances surrounding the events at Pearl Harbor at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. You said you only told him about one little incident after he asked you about the conditions surrounding Pearl Harbor. Is that so, now? He asked you what were the conditions surrounding Pearl Harbor and out of all this important mass of detail you just singled out one little item. Is that so?

Colonel SADTLER. The winds message, Mr. Murphy, as I said before, was the most important message that I think I ever handled in my life.

Mr. MURPHY. Why? Will you tell the committee?

Colonel SADTLER. The whole thing. We knew on the 29th, [12420] we knew of the disappearance of the Japanese fleet, we knew of Mr. Hull's ultimatum, we knew on December 1st these code machines were being destroyed, we knew the "Haruna" messages, and then this final winds message came in to cap the whole climax.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, what did the winds message mean to you? You said before in your testimony that it meant a break in diplomatic relations.

Colonel SADTLER. It meant destruction of codes, papers, and so forth.

Mr. MURPHY. Weren't they already destroyed?

Colonel SADTLER. That was the final word to me that everything had happened, because that winds message was also predicated upon the fact, upon the interruption of international communications that they would certainly have.

Mr. MURPHY. But, sir, didn't you already testify that there were sixteen "Haruna" messages?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir, I did not. I said after that date there have been found sixteen. I saw two or three at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. But at any rate you did say—let me get it exactly. Let me get your exact words.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and answer it if you can.

Mr. MURPHY. Page 250.

[12421] The CHAIRMAN. It seemed to be in the form of a question that required an answer.

Mr. MURPHY. You did expect a declaration of war on the 30th of November, didn't you?

Colonel SADTLER. Well, we expected something to happen.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, didn't you say before the Army board that we were of the opinion there might be a declaration of war between Japan and the United States on Sunday, November the 30th?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

This, as you all know, proved to be a "dud" and on Monday, December 1, if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning began coming in from Tokyo telling the consuls to destroy their codes and to reply to Tokyo with one code word when they had so complied with their directive. If I recall correctly, that word was "Haruna." It is the same name as that battleship that Colin Kelly was alleged to have sunk.

About December 3, Tokyo notified the embassy pertaining to the destruction of their codes at once.

Now, if you had all those messages that the consuls were to destroy their codes and if you had on the 5th the message about the Embassy burning their codes, what did the winds [12422] intercept do?

Colonel SADTLER. It capped the climax.

Mr. MURPHY. In what way?

Colonel SADTLER. That everything is here. Now we have the whole thing.

Mr. MURPHY. What was here that you did not have before?

Colonel SADTLER. Nothing, not a thing. Now, there was nothing but the winds message, which was a message that we had been straining every nerve to get; we had everybody listening for that message.

Mr. MURPHY. You did intercept certain messages after the 5th, did you not?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Were the codes destroyed when you were intercepting those messages?

Colonel SADTLER. Practically all the codes were destroyed except the one in the Japanese Embassy.

Mr. MURPHY. Weren't you kept busy all day on the 5th and on the night of the 5th and all day on the 6th and on the evening of the 6th and on Sunday intercepting messages?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. New messages?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, they were not destroyed then on the 5th, were they? [12423]

Colonel SADTLER. What was not destroyed on the 5th?

Mr. MURPHY. You said that it capped the climax. The message to destroy the codes came on the 5th. You still received intercepted messages the afternoon of the 5th and the night of the 5th and the 6th and the 7th?

Colonel SADTLER. That is true, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if that capped the climax they did not destroy the codes, did they? Do you understand me?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; I understand you perfectly, but they had destroyed practically all of their codes by that time except the one in the Japanese Embassy.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you knew that there were messages to different parts of the world that we intercepted, too, did you not?

Colonel SADTLER. Not at that time, I did not, no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you give me Exhibit 1? Will you show that to the witness?

Mr. RICHARDSON. If he doesn't know, why show him anything?

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know about the message of December 7th coming in?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. About relations with England?

[12424] Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You don't know about that?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You don't know that we did intercept a message on the 7th of December about relations between Japan and England not being in accordance with expectations?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir, I do not; that is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, in view of all of that you still say that you only told General Drum about that one little message?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir, I will not. I think that is about all we discussed, though, as to what happened in Washington at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, what happened to your notes?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you certainly don't want to create any inference that anybody in Washington is responsible for your notes being destroyed, do you?

Colonel SADTLER. I do not, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. How many times did you talk to Captain Safford before you were a witness?

Colonel SADTLER. I have never talked to Captain Safford but once or twice in my life and that was before December 7, 1941.

[12425] Mr. MURPHY. Did you talk to anybody about this except General Drum?

Colonel SADTLER. You mean discuss what has happened?

Mr. MURPHY. About the winds intercept, yes; or your notes?

Colonel SADTLER. I remember telling General Carter Clarke the story.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, about Carter Clarke: That has come into the record three times and the Clarke exhibit is not in the record as yet.

As I understand it, you were talking to General Spalding, and General Spalding gave you some gossip about certain papers being destroyed, did he not?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you learn that General Spalding learned it from Bissell?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And did you learn that Bissell learned it from Friedman?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you learn where Bissell got it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you familiar with the Clarke report that investigated that whole incident and dismissed it?

Colonel SADTLER. I am familiar with the part of my testimony and I listened to General Spalding when he gave his testimony. [12426]

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you had heard from General Spalding certain things; and then the gossip you got from General Spalding, who did you give it to?

Colonel SADTLER. It is going to get down to Mr. Friedman; isn't it?

Mr. MURPHY. It is going to get to wherever you put it.

Colonel SADTLER. I did, in conversation with Mr. Friedman, tell him that; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. It was you, then, who told Friedman?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And then Friedman told other people?

Colonel SADTLER. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So that you are the one responsible for Friedman having this so-called information; is that right?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. May I see the Clarke report, please? I refer to your testimony. You testified before General Clarke on the 14th of July 1945; is that right?

Colonel SADTLER. I think that is about right; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You were questioned by Gibson [reading]:

Colonel Sadtler, you realize that you are under oath [12427] and you are fully aware of what your rights are?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes.

Colonel GIBSON. I want to ask you first if you ever saw a so-called winds execute message?

Colonel SADTLER. I did not.

Colonel GIBSON. To your knowledge, was such a message ever in the War Department?

Colonel SADTLER. It was not.

Colonel GIBSON. And all that you know about that message and all contact that you had with it is in your former testimony?

Colonel SADTLER. That is right. I might further add that the information came from Admiral Noyes.

Colonel GIBSON. Mr. William F. Friedman has testified before Admiral Hewitt of the Department of the Navy recently as follows: "Then if I remember correctly, I asked Colonel Sadtler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer was, if I remember correctly, that he hadn't himself seen a copy but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall."

You were the one, then, that told—

Colonel SADTLER. I did not. Those words were Mr. Friedman's words.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, he said you did.

Colonel SADTLER. Mr. Friedman tells it in his words.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had been told by somebody that the copies of the winds execute message had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall?

Colonel SADTLER. I will make an absolute flat denial of that statement made by Mr. Friedman because, as far as I know, that message was never in the War Department and I never made any statement that General Marshall ordered it destroyed or that anyone told me that General Marshall ordered it destroyed.

Colonel GIBSON. When did you return to duty in Washington this last time?

Colonel SADTLER. About March 28, 1944.

Colonel GIBSON. After your return during the following summer and fall on occasion did you visit with Mr. Friedman?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes.

Colonel GIBSON. And did you visit about Pearl Harbor, amongst other things?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes. We had discussed what had [12429] happened at that time.

So that you did talk to more than Drum, didn't you? You did say Friedman, did you not, before?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, I talked to a lot of people who I assumed would get this message.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Colonel GIBSON. Did some of those discussions take place in Mr. Friedman's office?

Colonel SADTLER. Well, I assume they did because I have been in his office several times. I had talked to him on occasions about what had happened, not only in his office but at his house.

Colonel GIBSON. At some time did somebody tell you that messages pertaining to the Pearl Harbor affair were being destroyed?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes. Sometime during 1943 General Isaac Spalding at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, told me something to the effect that J. T. B. Bissell had told him that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had been destroyed.

That is what General Spalding told you, was it?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Colonel GIBSON. Is it possible that you told that [12430] to Mr. Friedman in one of your conversations?

Colonel SADTLER. It is possible.

Colonel GIBSON. You have been an old friend of Mr. Friedman for many years?

Colonel SADTLER. I have known him for over 25 years.

Colonel GIBSON. This Colonel, now Brigadier J. T. B. Bissell, that you speak of, do you know him personally?

Colonel SADTLER. I do not.

Colonel GIBSON. To your knowledge have you ever met him?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes. I have met him casually but I doubt if I would recognize him today if I saw him.

I will try to cut this down.

Now, you typed this so-called message that you spoke to the gentleman from Wisconsin about, you typed it yourself, didn't you?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You did not have your stenographer type it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, on December 1st you tried to dissuade General Olmstead from going to Panama because you thought that there would be war there then, did you not?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That is December 1st?

[12431] Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You said:

On December 1, when General Olmstead was making preparations to go to Panama, I attempted to dissuade him from his trip because I felt positive that war would be declared before he returned and I thought that it was his duty to be in Washington.

You did say that before General Clarke?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Colonel Sadtler, you were asked this question:

Colonel Sadtler, Mr. Friedman has also testified that you told him that you had heard that in addition to the Winds execute message being ordered destroyed by General Marshall, there was a second message that was ordered destroyed by General Marshall. This second message was a message which was the result of a message sent by the War Department a day or two after Pearl Harbor to the Signal Officer, Colonel Powell, asking him whether the radar installation in the Islands was in operative order at the time of the attack, and the answer came back in the affirmative. Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had heard that the message of inquiry relative to the working of the radar installation in the Islands or the answer [12432] thereto had been destroyed?

Your answer was, "I did not."

So that you were not responsible for that part of the gossip?

Colonel SADTLER. Absolutely not; no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And the fact is that radar message is down in the files of the War Department now, is it not?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir. That was collected for secrecy at first, as I have explained before.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. That is all, Colonel.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, counsel for General Short requests that I ask a question of the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Counsel for General Short would like to have me inquire from the witness as to whether he had seen the reply of General Short to the November 27th message?

Colonel SADTLER. That would be the sabotage?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Where did you see it for the first time?

Colonel SADTLER. In the War Department.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Around the date that it was received?

Colonel SADTLER. I imagine so; yes, sir. I have forgotten exactly when, but I do recall seeing it before Pearl Harbor.

[12433] Mr. KAUFMAN. That is all.

Mr. KEEFE. One question on that, Mr. Chairman. I was going to ask that same question because I thought that you had attempted to say something with respect to the message from General Short to General Marshall of the War Department with respect to his being alerted only against sabotage. It impressed me that you were cut-off by Mr. Murphy and did not get to say it.

Now, as a matter of fact do I understand that at the time you became so apprehensive and felt that a message should go out to Short, was that because you had seen this message which set forth that he was only alerted against sabotage?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I had no reason to single General Short at Hawaii out to get a warning. I thought that they all should be warned because I personally thought that if the Japs attacked it would be the Panama Canal.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then the fact that he had sent in a wire and you knew about it, that he was only alerted against sabotage did not make any particular impression on you?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Colonel SADTLER. Except that I knew he had not—

Mr. KEEFE. I just want to get that clear.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I want to get that clear.

[12434] General Short sent more than one sabotage message. Did you see both of them?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't recall but one.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if he stated—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, if he only saw one why go into the second?

Mr. MURPHY. I want to know which one he saw.

Colonel SADTLER. The one I saw was about—I imagine—it was about a hundred words.

Mr. MURPHY. A hundred words?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Colonel SADTLER. It was not a long message.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel, for your cooperation. The committee appreciates your attendance here.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the next witness?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Commander Schulz.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander Schulz, come around, please.

[12435] **TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER LESTER ROBERT
SCHULZ, UNITED STATES NAVY**

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you state your full name, please?

Commander SCHULZ. Lester Robert Schulz.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy, Commander?

Commander SCHULZ. Since June 1930, beginning as a midshipman.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you in Washington during November and December 1941?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was your assignment for duty in Washington during the first week of December?

Commander SCHULZ. I was under instruction in the Office of Naval Communications for communication intelligence. That was my permanent assignment. However, I was on temporary duty under verbal orders at the White House as a communications assistant to the Naval Aide, then Captain Beardall. Also, I had gone to Warm Springs in the same capacity the previous week end. Thus, my return to Washington, I believe, was Tuesday of that week.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were under Admiral Beardall?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who others of the Navy were occupying the same duty, a similar duty there under Beardall?

[12436] Commander SCHULZ. On the 6th of December, I believe the morning of the 6th there was an Ensign Carson who was sent up to assist me. Actually he performed no duties that day and was simply being instructed and informed as to what his duties would be.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is your present assignment now?

Commander SCHULZ. I am under orders at present to be executive officer of the *Indiana*, a battleship.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you on duty at the White House in Admiral Beardall's office there on the night of December 6, 1941?

Commander SCHULZ. I was on duty in the White House. Admiral Beardall had no fixed office in the White House at that time. He conducted his business for the most part in the Navy Department in the Navy Building and I was given a small office in a corner of the mail room, a closed office, but it was not a place used by Admiral Beardall.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was at the White House?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall Captain Kramer coming to the White House on the evening of December 6 to deliver any papers?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. About what time did he come?

[12437] Commander SCHULZ. Between 9 and 10; I should say about 9:30.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In the evening?

Commander SCHULZ. In the evening; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was there besides you?

Commander SCHULZ. No one else of the Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To whom, if anyone, did Captain Kramer hand his papers?

Commander SCHULZ. He handed them to me. They were in a locked pouch.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was that the customary way in which dispatches that were being delivered there were delivered?

Commander SCHULZ. Material of that category was so delivered.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you do with the locked pouch when it was handed to you?

Commander SCHULZ. I took it from the mail room, which is in the office building, over to the White House proper and obtained permission to go up on the second floor and took it to the President's study.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you go alone?

Commander SCHULZ. I was accompanied by someone from the usher's office and announced to the President. However, then I was alone.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But Captain Kramer did not go with you?

[12438] Commander SCHULZ. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long from the time the papers were placed in your hands by Captain Kramer was it before you went to the President's study?

Commander SCHULZ. About 5 minutes, I would say.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Whom did you find in the study when you arrived there?

Commander SCHULZ. The President was there seated at his desk, and Mr. Hopkins was there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is Mr. Harry Hopkins?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew him?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir. I had met him the previous day.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you knew the President?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was the pouch still locked?

Commander SCHULZ. I had a key to the pouch. I do not recall just when I unlocked it. In all likelihood it was after I was in the study, however.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you do after you entered the study?

Commander SCHULZ. I was announced and I informed the President that I had the material which Captain Kramer had brought and I took it out of the pouch. [12439]

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you make any further statement at the time with reference to the material, as to your having been told that it was important or not?

Commander SCHULZ. That I do not recall, sir, but I believe that the President was expecting it. As I recall, he was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why? What makes you believe that? Was there anything said, I mean, that would indicate that?

Commander SCHULZ. When Admiral Beardall instructed me to stay and meet Captain Kramer and receive the material, he told me of its important nature.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, wait just a moment there.

Commander SCHULZ. And my recollection was also that it was of such importance that the President expected to receive it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Before Captain Kramer came did you have a talk with Admiral Beardall with reference to the possibility of papers being delivered in the immediate future?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; I did. That is why I stayed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did Admiral Beardall say to you?

Commander SCHULZ. He told me that during the evening Captain Kramer would bring up some magic material and that I was to take it and give it immediately to the President and [12440] he gave me the key to the pouch so that I could take it out and deliver it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the substance of your conversation with Admiral Beardall?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, when you presented the material to the President, was it in the pouch?

Commander SCHULZ. To the best of my recollection I took it out of the pouch and handed it to him. The papers were clipped together. There were perhaps 15 typewritten pages and they were fastened together in a sheaf and I took them out of the pouch and handed them to the President personally.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You know now what we mean when we talk about the first 13 parts of the 14-part message; you know what I am talking about?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you able to state now whether among the papers which were delivered to the President there were this 13 parts of what was eventually the 14-part message?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; I cannot. I did not read the message. I have only learned of its substance through information that has been divulged during this inquiry, from [12441] newspapers and so on.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, what happened when you delivered these papers to the President? You remained there?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; I remained in the room.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What happened?

Commander SCHULZ. The President read the papers, which took perhaps 10 minutes. Then he handed them to Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How far away from the President was Mr. Hopkins sitting?

Commander SCHULZ. He was standing up, pacing back and forth slowly, not more than 10 feet away.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did the President read out loud when he was reading the papers?

Commander SCHULZ. I do not recall that he did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now go ahead and give us in detail just what occurred there, if you please, Commander.

Commander SCHULZ. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance—I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance—“This means war.” Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps 5 minutes, the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their deployment and—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you recall what either of them said?

[12442] Commander SCHULZ. In substance I can. There are only a few words that I can definitely say I am sure of, but the substance of it was that—I believe Mr. Hopkins mentioned it first—that since war was imminent, that the Japanese intended to strike when they were ready, at a moment when all was most opportune for them—

The CHAIRMAN. When all was what?

Commander SCHULZ. When all was most opportune for them. That is, when their forces were most properly deployed for their advantage. Indochina in particular was mentioned, because the Japanese forces

had already landed there and there were implications of where they should move next.

The President mentioned a message that he had sent to the Japanese Emperor concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in effect requesting their withdrawal.

Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going to come at the convenience of the Japanese, it was too bad that we could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded and then said, in effect, "No, we can't do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people." Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said, "But we have a good record."

The impression that I got was that we would have to stand [12443] on that record, we could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came.

During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbor. The only geographic name I recall was Indochina. The time at which war might begin was not discussed, but from the manner of the discussion there was no indication that tomorrow was necessarily the day. I carried that impression away because it contributed to my personal surprise when the news did come.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said, Commander, with reference to the subject of notice or notification as a result of the papers that were being read?

Commander SCHULZ. There was no mention made of sending any further warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the war going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was then determined—I do not recall exactly, but I believe the White House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached at the National Theater.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, was it from what was said there that you draw the conclusion that that was what the White House operator reported?

[12444] Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir. I did not hear what the operator said, but the National Theater was mentioned in my presence, and the President went on to state, in substance, that he would reach the admiral later, that he did not want to cause public alarm by having the admiral paged or otherwise when in the theater, where, I believe, the fact that he had a box reserved was mentioned and that if he had left suddenly he would surely have been seen because of the position which he held and undue alarm might be caused, and the President did not wish that to happen because he could get him within perhaps another half an hour in any case.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said about telephoning anybody else except Stark?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; there was not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How did he refer to Admiral Stark?

Commander SCHULZ. When he first mentioned calling him, he referred to him as "Betty."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any further discussion there before you left?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir. To the best of my knowledge that is all that was discussed. The President returned the papers to me, and I left the study.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all you know about it?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is all.

[12445] Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. What time would you say you went to the President's study that night?

Commander SCHULZ. It was approximately 9:30.

The CHAIRMAN. How long were you there altogether?

Commander SCHULZ. I would say about one-half hour, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. One-half hour?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So you left there about ten?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then where did you go?

Commander SCHULZ. Then I went back to the office which I mentioned before.

The CHAIRMAN. Back to what you call the situation room?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir. The situation room was a later development, after the war began.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see. You went back to the place from which you departed to deliver the message?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark?

[12446] Mr. CLARK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lucas? Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Commander, you just flew in from California, did you?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. You got off the plane within the last hour or so?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir. I arrived at the National Airport at about 9 o'clock this morning.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever commit any of this material to writing at any time?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. MURPHY. You have no notes whatsoever?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I would like to have you just relax yourself just a little bit; you are tense. No other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. I will pass at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. GEARHART. Were there any other high ranking Army or Navy officers that called at the White House that night, that you know of?

Commander SCHULZ. Not to my knowledge, sir. However, I was not in that part of the White House, except during this [12447] half hour, where I would have seen them.

Mr. GEARHART. Your office was in the annex near the executive end of the building?

Commander SCHULZ. I believe that is what it is called, sir. It is the annex over toward the State Department.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right. And where is that office to which you have referred? In the basement?

Commander SCHULZ. It is on the basement level; yes, sir. I haven't been in it now for over 4 years but I believe it is on the street level, however, on the side on which you come in on.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Your particular room was off of the mail receiving room?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. How long did you remain on duty that night?

Commander SCHULZ. Until about 10:30.

Mr. GEARHART. And when did you return to duty the next day?

Commander SCHULZ. The next day, after the news of the attack, I called Admiral Beardall after I had heard the news, and then came back to the White House.

Mr. GEARHART. Arriving at the White House at what time?

Commander SCHULZ. About 4 o'clock, I would say, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

[12448] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want to take the situation after you left the President's study. You then returned, as I understand it, to the mail room?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And the mail room had these long tables in it?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was Captain Kramer sitting at those tables when you went back, at one of the tables?

Commander SCHULZ. It is my collection that he was.

Senator FERGUSON. And then did you return to Captain Kramer this pouch? Is that your recollection.

Commander SCHULZ. That is my recollection. The happenings during that particular period are somewhat hazy but I know that I did not have the papers the next day. Further, I hadn't too suitable a place to put them during the night because of their high secrecy classification.

Senator FERGUSON. You had worked in the Naval ONI so that you knew how secret these papers were and how valuable they were?

Commander SCHULZ. I was in the Communications Division rather than ONI.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, Communications.

[12449] Commander SCHULZ. However, I knew of their nature and their general source because of their importance.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, you wouldn't have cared to keep them at home or where you stayed, and you did not leave them anywhere in the White House?

Commander SCHULZ. I would not have kept them under any circumstances, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that is your reason for saying that you gave them to Commander Kramer, or he was Captain at that time, was he?

Commander SCHULZ. I am not sure of his rank but it is the same Captain Kramer.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your grade at that time?

Commander SCHULZ. I was a Lieutenant at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. And you would say that you were in all about 1 hour or ½ hour, I think you said, in the President's study?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you have any other conversation that night later with Commander Beardall?

Commander SCHULZ. I recall having talked on the telephone to then Captain Beardall after I had shown the papers to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us that conversation?

[12450] Commander SCHULZ. I do not remember the exact words. However, the purpose of the call was to inform him that I had received the papers, the President had seen them and I had carried out my instructions; then I would be free to go home.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did get home about what hour that night?

Commander SCHULZ. I left the White House at about 10:30.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Admiral Beardall ask you for the details of the conversation of what the President may have said?

Commander SCHULZ. I don't recall that he did; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not recall telling Admiral Beardall at any time this conversation that you have related here?

Commander SCHULZ. I never told any one during the course of the war of any conversation being held that night in the President's presence.

Senator FERGUSON. And to whom have you repeated this conversation?

Commander SCHULZ. I have repeated it since to you and to Lieutenant Commander Baecher and the gentleman who was with you at the time; I did not know his name.

Mr. MURPHY. By "you" you mean who?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson?

[12451] Commander SCHULZ. I mean—

Mr. MURPHY. You mean you told Senator Ferguson about this before today?

Senator FERGUSON. This is Mr. Morgan.

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; not before today. Immediately preceding my coming to the chair, within 10 minutes before I came to the chair here.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Morgan was present and Commander Baecher was present?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, had you talked it over with anyone else prior to that?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, can you tell us whether or not that was the first week of your assignment there, so that you had not been with the President prior to his Warm Springs trip and this particular week in the White House?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct. My first association with the White House in any capacity was on the Friday of the week before, when I made the trip to Warm Springs. I did not go to the White House at that time. The first time I was ever in the White House was on the 5th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on the 5th of December did any messages come in, to your knowledge?

[12452] Commander SCHULZ. There was one message. I had that in my custody. As I recall, it was given to me by Captain Beardall and had already been shown to the President. At least it was given to me only for custody, and it concerned the reported burning of Japanese consular codes. It came to me on a normal Navy Department secret message form. Its original source, I recall, was from Australia, but I do not know and do not recall who actually originated the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it say anything about the Japanese destroying a code machine in Batavia or sending it back to Tokyo, do you recall?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; no machine was mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. No machine was mentioned in that particular message?

Commander SCHULZ. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, outside of that message, have you any information as to any messages delivered to the President?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; there were no others.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is this the only conversation or the only words that you heard from the President, that you have given us, in relation to the Pacific or the Japanese question?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct, the only words.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing at Warm Springs, any messages [12453] there or any conversations about the Far East?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; I had no such material or information there.

Senator FERGUSON. And you heard no conversations by the President there?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there is one thing I am not entirely clear on and that is when the President said that he did not want Admiral Stark or "Betty," as he referred to him first, called from the National Theater because it would, in your language, arouse people, or what was the word?

Commander SCHULZ. It might have caused public alarm.

Senator FERGUSON. Public alarm?

Commander SCHULZ. Or at least speculation.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and there was one thing said about that he didn't want that to happen for another hour?

Commander SCHULZ. He made no statement as to when it would be all right that public knowledge might be all right. His statement, his words were, in effect, that he would reach the admiral later. The matter of it being another hour is my own observation based on the fact that the theater eventually was going to close that evening.

Senator FERGUSON. So the President did not use the words "another hour"?

[12454] Commander SCHULZ. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you took that to mean that he would get him after the show?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you have any knowledge as to whether the President did reach Admiral Stark that night or not?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. And as I understand it then, you did not work or go to the White House on the morning of the 7th.

Commander SCHULZ. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And will you tell us who was the President's naval aide on Sunday morning, if you have any knowledge of it?

Commander SCHULZ. Captain Beardall was the naval aide at that time, on that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. To your knowledge, this other gentleman—the other lieutenant—and I did not catch his name.

Commander SCHULZ. The officer who was my assistant was Ensign Carson.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that C-a-r-s-o-n?

Commander SCHULZ. C-a-r-s-o-n—Carson was not there that morning either. He had only reported for work the preceding day and was not yet fully instructed. [12455]

Senator FERGUSON. And to your knowledge then he was really not authorized to handle this locked pouch, is that correct?

Commander SCHULZ. He had never been left there alone for such an assignment before.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there is only about one other thing, and that is when did Admiral Beardall first tell you to remain there that night to receive this special message for the President?

Commander SCHULZ. It was about 4 o'clock. The time is not exact—

Senator FERGUSON. Near the time.

Commander SCHULZ. It was late in the afternoon, before the admiral left, himself.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did Admiral Beardall leave?

Commander SCHULZ. I do not recall exactly, but about 5:30, I should say.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were the only one that remained on duty or did Carson stay with you?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir, Carson left, also, and I remained.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, when did you first learn that you were going to be a witness here?

Commander SCHULZ. I learned definitely only on the 12th [12456] of this month; that is about 3 days ago. I had previous indication about the 1st of December, when I was informed by Lieutenant Commander Baecher that because of my having been on duty at the White House at that time that I might be called. I did not receive definite word.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you then here in Washington?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir. I was in Bremerton, Washington, the Puget Sound Navy Yard at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Baecher there or did he telephone you?

Commander SCHULZ. He telephoned to me.

Senator FERGUSON. And did he ask you to hold yourself in readiness for a call?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; in effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me?

Commander SCHULZ. In effect, to expect to come.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And did you tell him at that time what you knew?

Commander SCHULZ. Not in as great detail as I have today, but I mentioned the fact that I had received the material from Captain Kramer and that I had personally delivered it to the President and stayed there while he read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And have you been called by any other board or anyone else to get your story, to get your [12457] version of what happened?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. This is the first time that you have testified?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did anyone else call you and tell you that you might be a witness?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; no one has.

Senator FERGUSON. You were on the *Indiana* when you got word to come into San Francisco to get off?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; I was. The ship was at sea and we received orders from the Bureau of Personnel that I proceed here for this purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. And your ship pulled into San Francisco?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; the ship came into San Francisco yesterday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. You took a plane and landed here at 9 o'clock this morning?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When are you going back?

Commander SCHULZ. Sunday or Monday, I would think, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I have two questions.

You say you talked to Mr. Morgan and Senator Fergu- [12458] son. Where was that?

Commander SCHULZ. That was in the hall, just beyond the large door over there.

Mr. MURPHY. With only those two persons present before you came into the presence of the committee?

Commander SCHULZ. And Lieutenant Commander Baecher.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, one other question. Did you know anything about the President dispatching a message to the Emperor on the night of December 6th, the Emperor of Japan?

Commander SCHULZ. I knew that a message had been sent since during the discussion with Mr. Hopkins the President mentioned that he had sent a message to the Emperor and he made a point of the fact that he had sent it to the Emperor as Chief of State and not to Tojo as Premier. He had sent the message to the Emperor and such mention of it as was made in my presence concerned only Indochina.

Mr. MURPHY. But that had been sent, apparently, before the conversation that you heard down there?

Commander SCHULZ. Whether it had actually been sent I do not know, but I know the President had drafted it.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Mr. KEEFE. Just one question.

Commander, you made a statement that you believed that the President was expecting this message. Did I so under- [12459] stand you?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir, that is what I said.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Commander SCHULZ. And such was my impression.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I would like to pursue that just a little bit further.

Commander SCHULZ. My reason for telling that was that Admiral Beardall, knowing its importance and knowing that it was coming out, told the President to expect it during the evening.

Mr. KEEFE. How did Admiral Beardall know that it was coming?

Commander SCHULZ. It had been—it is my understanding that it had been received in the Navy Department and was being worked on. It, of course, takes time, some time to obtain the English text in such a message.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you aware of the fact that there was a so-called pilot message?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; I was not.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to see if we can get that cleared up. You have no knowledge yourself as to the fact that there was a pilot message which came in some time around about noon on the 6th, which indicated that a long message was going to be sent to the Japanese Ambassador?

[12460] There is evidence before the committee that that pilot message was delivered to certain people around about 3 o'clock. Do you know whether it was delivered to the White House by the Navy that afternoon?

Commander SCHULZ. I have no knowledge of that, sir. I did not receive it or see it personally.

Mr. KEEFE. At least Admiral Beardall before he left indicated to you that they were expecting a message in reply from the Japs?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; a message at least. He did not indicate the substance, but a message which was a decode.

Mr. KEEFE. An important message?

Commander SCHULZ. And an important message.

Mr. KEEFE. And did he indicate to you that he had advised the President that there might be such a message?

Commander SCHULZ. I don't recall that he did; no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, when the President got through reading it, as I understood your testimony, he showed it to Hopkins and said, "This means war," and Hopkins concurred.

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir. The words may not be exact but that is the substance.

Mr. KEEFE. Then the discussion went on between Mr. Hopkins and the President as to possibly where the Japs might strike and you remember discussions of Indochina?

[12461] Commander SCHULZ. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But there was no mention of Pearl Harbor or Hawaii?

Commander SCHULZ. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or any other places that you recall?

Commander SCHULZ. No other places that I recall; none that I recall.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall with any degree of certainty, Commander, just what the conversation was with respect to the transmission of this message direct to the Emperor of Japan and how that came into the conversation?

Commander SCHULZ. It came into the conversation when the disposition of forces in Indochina was mentioned, and the way it came

in was that in this message to the Emperor it is my understanding that the presence of Japanese forces in Indochina was mentioned and that the—I have never read the message, if I may say, Congressman, I would like to have you understand that—but, however, I recall mention being made, the President quoting from this message that he drafted to the effect that he had told Hirohito that he could not see how it could be held that there was any danger to peace in the Far East as far as the United States was concerned if there were no Japanese forces in Indochina.

[12462] In other words, we were not going to attack Indochina, nor was anyone else. Therefore, the presence of Japanese forces in Indochina was for an aggressive purpose or for ulterior purposes on the part of the Japanese. We ourselves held no threat for Indochina.

That also is in substance, but I do remember that point being brought out.

[12463] Mr. KEEFE. Did you get the impression from that conversation that the message to the Emperor had been sent, or was going to be sent?

Commander SCHULZ. I cannot recall that definitely, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now when the President said he wanted to get in touch with "Betty", did he seem to know where "Betty" Stark was that night?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; not initially, at least, because I recall that he started to place a telephone call for Admiral Stark.

Mr. KEEFE. Then did word come back that Admiral Stark was at the National Theater? Is that what I understood you to say?

Commander SCHULZ. Word came back that that was where he might be reached. Personally, I have no knowledge that he was there, but the President was informed that that was where the admiral had either left word or else someone who could get in touch with him expected to find him there.

Mr. KEEFE. And then the President indicated that he would not bother calling him to the phone, that he would get him later after the theater was over?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the impression you got?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir.

[12464] Mr. KEEFE. That is because he felt Admiral Stark's leaving his box in the theater might cause some speculation and arouse some public discussion, or alarm.

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that was my impression.

Mr. KEEFE. Now when you got to the President's study the only people who were there were the President and Harry Hopkins?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. You are a graduate of Annapolis?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. What year?

Commander SCHULZ. 1934, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you again, Commander.

Commander SCHULZ. You are welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. You are excused.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call Admiral Rochefort.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Rochefort, come forward, please.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is Captain Rochefort.

[12465]

**TESTIMONY OF CAPT. JOSEPH JOHN
ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY**

(Having been first duly sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is your rank?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I was about to thank you, Senator, for promoting me. I am actually a captain.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. You are not averse to a real promotion it comes your way, I suppose.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would appreciate it, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, will you state your name?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Joseph John Rochefort.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How old are you, Captain?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Forty-six years, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Since 1918, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When were you first assigned to Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. You mean my first trip there, sir?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The first trip was in 1920—1921.

[12466] Mr. RICHARDSON. How long were you there then?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Approximately 2 months.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you next go to Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In 1924.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And how long did you stay that time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Approximately the same length of time, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then when did you return there on regular assignment?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In April 1939, when the Hawaiian Detachment was formed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in what capacity?

Captain ROCHEFORT. At that time on the staff of Commander Scouting Force, who was also Commander, Hawaiian Detachment.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What changes occurred in your assignment thereafter?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In May of 1941 I received dispatch orders to report to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, for duty.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would be Admiral Bloch?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That would be Admiral Bloch, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Right.

Captain ROCHEFORT. In personal correspondence [12467] was informed that my duty there would consist of Officer in Charge of the Communications Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you assume those duties?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In June 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long did you remain in that capacity?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Until October 1942.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was there in your unit when you took charge?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Approximately 10 officers and 20 men at Pearl Harbor, and an additional 10 officers and approximately 50 to 60 men in the outlying stations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the name of your unit as it was known at Pearl Harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. After I arrived there we changed the name slightly and called it the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What were your duties during November and December 1941?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Very briefly, sir, to find out about all of the Japanese naval cryptographic systems.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What experience had you had in connection with cryptographic work?

Captain ROCHEFORT. During the period 1925 to 1927 I [12468] was in charge of all cryptographic work for the Navy Department in Washington. I had had, subsequently, 3 years in Japan as a language officer, and on various staffs during various war problems had carried out cryptographic research.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you speak Japanese?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Proceed, and give us a little detail as to the scope of your duties with your assignment in Hawaii.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The primary duty consisted of intercepting all Japanese naval traffic, and of attacking all the Japanese naval systems contained in that traffic with the exception of one system, which was being worked on in Washington, and in Cavite.

Along with that we had organized a radio intelligence unit whose duties were to obtain all information available from the Japanese naval traffic by means other than cryptanalysis.

We also had in the unit a mid-Pacific direction-finding unit with stations in Dutch Harbor, Samoa, Pearl Harbor, and Midway.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What Japanese codes and ciphers were in use by Japan during November and December that it was [12469] your duty to intercept?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Of the regular systems; that is, the systems used for any considerable period of time, approximately 8 to 10, in addition to which there would be several what we called minor systems, or systems used for specific purposes, such as a fleet problem.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And what field was covered by those codes and ciphers that you were intercepting?

Captain ROCHEFORT. All Japanese naval traffic of all descriptions, including personnel matters, engineering matters, operational intelligence, direction finding; in short, all types of naval communication, including ship movements.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Ship locations?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Ship locations would be incidental. That is, they would be contained in the traffic.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, were there any Japanese naval codes that you could intercept, but could not translate at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In terms of volume of traffic, perhaps 90 per cent.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me see if I get it accurately. [12470] Out of all the interceptions that you had with reference to Japanese naval operations, you were only able to decode and therefore understand at Hawaii approximately 10 percent of that traffic?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were not able there to handle by deciphering what is known as the purple code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. That was a diplomatic system.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Give me the designations of the other codes there that you could not handle.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Diplomatic or naval, sir?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, both.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I will put it this way: We were not handling any of the diplomatic systems. We were directed to attempt to process all naval systems with the exception of one, which I previously mentioned.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was the fact as to what section you were expected to handle and decode the result of a working arrangement between you and Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it true that messages might be intercepted by you that you were unable to decode?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Naval; yes, sir.

[12471] Mr. RICHARDSON. And when you intercepted a dispatch or information that you were unable to decode, what was your duty then with respect to that information?

Captain ROCHEFORT. If it were other than Navy, we would send it to Washington. But I might point out, sir, that the circuits that we were covering were all naval circuits in which no diplomatic traffic would be passed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. By way of illustration, Captain, let me show you two dispatches here that appear to have been intercepted by the Army at Hawaii—not by the Navy but by the Army, and ask you what codes they came in on? What is the page, please, so it may be identified for the record?

Captain ROCHEFORT. On page 21 of Exhibit 2, I see two dispatches, the first one No. 123, which was translated on 30 December 1941, and it is in the J-19 system.

[12472] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now if the Army had presented that dispatch to you, could you have decoded it in Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not without special equipment.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, did you have the equipment in Hawaii that would permit you to decode that message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. On December 2, 1941?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now let me show you the message number 128 on page 26 of Exhibit 2, dated 5 December. Will you tell me what code that came in on? That is also an Army message.

Captain ROCHEFORT. That came in the PA-K2 system.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you had been requested by the Army to decode that dispatch would you have been able to do it at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In about how long a time from the time it was presented to you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Probably 6 hours to 6 days. Three days may be a good average.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was in charge of G-2 in Hawaii for the Army?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Colonel Fielder, sir.

[12473] Mr. RICHARDSON. And who was under Fielder as his Chief Assistant?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Colonel Bicknell was at that time, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew both of those gentlemen?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were your relations with them cordial?

Captain ROCHEFORT. My relations, I should say particularly with Colonel Fielder, were most cordial.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How frequently would you see them?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Perhaps twice a week, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any discussion between you as to the intelligence that you were handling and the intelligence they were handling?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; but it would be in very general terms, because our jobs were different.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there ever any request by the Army for assistance from you and your outfit?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In my particular work, sir?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. To the best of my recollection not until after the 7th. After the 7th there was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To whom was the information that you picked up in Hawaii transmitted by you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. To the Commander-in-Chief verbally, [12474] and by means of written summaries to the Navy Department and commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, by dispatch or by air mail.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you would turn over what you had to Layton, and Layton had the duty of transmitting it to the commander in chief?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. In addition to that we would send over with the summary a qualified officer to discuss the matter in detail with Layton, if he so wished.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you familiar, Captain, with a dispatch that appears in the record here, sent through the Army, requesting G-2 in Hawaii to contact you for information with reference to weather broadcasts?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I have heard of such a message, sir, but I did not hear of it up until a short time ago.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There never at any time was presented any communication to you to contact you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not for that express purpose.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Based upon such a dispatch, as far as you knew Captain ROCHEFORT. Not for that express purpose, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know how the messages went out from Hawaii, from the Japanese consuls to Tokyo?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I have no first-hand information on that, sir. [1247]

Mr. RICHARDSON. I did not understand.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I have no first-hand information on that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. With reference to the dispatches from Honolulu to Tokyo during the first week in December, such as is illustrated by the number 247 here, indicating the message went out under PA-K would such a message as that go by cable or would it go by some other form of transmission?

Captain ROCHEFORT. It would go either by cable or by radio.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were there any arrangements that you had which would have enabled you to know what was being sent out by cable?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. If we had been asked to do it, or directed to do it, we could have possibly obtained the information.

[12476] Mr. RICHARDSON. What is the basis for that statement, Captain?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The basis for the statement is, sir, I have had considerable experience in attempting to obtain so-called commercial traffic over a period of years, and there are one or two Federal statutes in the matter which made the thing rather delicate to try.

Furthermore, I knew that the authorities in Washington were not obtaining the information in sufficient detail, and if they required any assistance, they would ask me to get some information from Honolulu.

In other words, not receiving any requests, or direction from the Navy Department, I assumed they were getting all the information they needed from the diplomatic traffic.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, such a dispatch as this shown on page 29 of Exhibit 2, might have gone to Tokyo either by cable or by radio broadcast?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if you had made the effort, would it have been possible for you to have intercepted and decoded that message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. If it had gone by radio, we could, of course have intercepted it. If it had gone by cable, special arrangements would have to have been made in order to obtain copies of the cable traffic.

[12477] Mr. RICHARDSON. Why were not such arrangements made with reference to knowledge of cable transmissions?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Speaking of Honolulu, sir?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Because attempts had been made in previous years to obtain the same information, without success, and I had been led to believe, without making any specific inquiries, that the Navy Department, or the War Department, or both were receiving that information from sources known only to them.

Senator LUCAS. What was your last statement based on? You said you were led to believe.

Captain ROCHEFORT. In personal conversation, sir, with officers from Washington on their way to or from the Far East.

Senator BREWSTER. Will you name any of them?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. Of course, I was in communication with Captain Safford. He was in charge of the entire organization. The others I cannot recall their names at this time. They were officers going and coming from the Asiatic Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. During the week prior to December 7, were you actively translating for the information of the commander in chief in Hawaii all of the messages coming [12478] in to Honolulu and going out of Honolulu, which it was possible for you to decode?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Could you, by any arrangement with the cable company, have increased the number of messages that you could have translated and reported to the commander in chief?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, Mr. Counsel, that had been done on either the 3d or the 4th of December, on which certain messages were made available to me by the District Intelligence Officer. They were being handled in Washington, but I undertook to attempt to handle them myself in Honolulu, as well as send back copies to Washington immediately, and thus we did read some before the 7th, but the important ones after the 7th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And those that you read were transmitted by you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. To the commander in chief.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To the commander in chief, in due course?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes. Actually, I think what happened, sir, was I told Layton that we had some messages, but they were absolutely of no value then. They involved such things as wages, visas, and that sort of thing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, it is very definite, is it not, [12479] that there never was any time prior to Pearl Harbor when your station in Hawaii could handle any of the purple or other high Japanese code transmissions?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we could not handle them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that, of course, would include the code J-19 that you spoke of a moment ago?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But it would not include the PA-K2?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We could handle the PA-K2 and lower classifications.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, did you make up, while you were there, a communications intelligence summary covering specific periods?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. For transmission from your department to the commander in chief?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The communications intelligence summary was a daily report to the commander in chief, Pacific, of all information obtained, estimates made, and deductions drawn from the previous day's traffic.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How often? Daily?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, daily.

[12480] Mr. RICHARDSON. And covering the period of a week or 10 days prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, you furnished, as part

of your duty to the commander in chief, a daily intelligence summary, to acquaint him with everything that had passed through your unit during the preceeding 24 hours?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I show you our Exhibit 115, and ask you whether those are samples of that intelligence summary.

(The document was handed to Captain Rochefort.)

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes; they are.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the fact is, Captain, that your activities there, as is indicated by these intelligence summaries, were quite definitely confined to Japanese ship movements, and other matters connected with naval operations which came in codes which you were able to handle and translate?

Captain ROCHEFORT. About 10 percent of which we were able to handle and translate, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, all that did come to you that you were able to handle and translate came from ship movements?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And other similar activities of the Japanese naval forces?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12481] Mr. RICHARDSON. And did not include the diplomatic intercepts, which, it was your understanding, as I understood your testimony, were being handled by Washington, and at Cavite?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any arrangement, so far as you know, between your station in Hawaii and Cavite with respect to the interchange of communications?

Captain ROCHEFORT. There had been an arrangement, which had existed for some years, in which one of the three stations, that is, Cavite, Pearl Harbor, or Washington, if they had information of value to one or more of the other stations, it was immediately passed to that station by radio, or by airmail.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When was that stopped?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not think it was ever stopped; not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any cessation of it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. There might have been a possible lowering in the number of messages which were sent to us for information, but that would be because they felt they were more technical in nature and did not interest us.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, if there had been suitable empowering directions from Washington, could there have [12482] been closer and better cooperation between your unit and G-2 in Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. When I say "yes, sir" that may sound as if there were not full cooperation. We did cooperate to the fullest extent possible, bearing in mind the different jobs we had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know anything of your own knowledge about the G-2 set-up there?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; from conversations with Colonel Fielder.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know what they were able to intercept and decode?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not discuss that matter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were unable, in many instances, to discuss with G-2 the character of the intelligence that you were receiving, were you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; by reason of the fact that, insofar as I knew, Colonel Fielder, as G-2, was not authorized to receive "ultra."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then there was a large field of intelligence that would pass through your unit that you could not communicate to G-2, or any officer in G-2?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. I could not communicate [12483] it to G-2 as ultra, but I could communicate the sense of it, which I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you be able to say that that duty was carried out to the extent that you feel G-2 got all of the information from you that would have been useful to them?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your assignment now?

Captain ROCHEFORT. On duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Here in Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Here in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you had that assignment?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Since approximately the middle of December 1945, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And prior to that, where have you been?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I have been ordered to sea duty, sir, at my own request, in October.

The CHAIRMAN. How long after the attack on Pearl Harbor before you were assigned to some other place?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In October 1942, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nearly a year?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12484] The CHAIRMAN. You were not in Washington at any time immediately prior to the attack and immediately after?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark isn't here.

Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to pass for the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Is it commander or captain?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Captain, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain Rochefort, as I understand it, each day at Pearl Harbor you prepared an intelligence summary, which in turn was turned over by you to Layton. That would be Captain Layton?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Captain Layton now, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then Captain Layton himself would make his own estimate of the situation, and present it to Admiral Kimmel, or would he present your intelligence summary?

Captain ROCHEFORT. He would present our intelligence summary, sir, in addition to which he would prepare for [12485] Admiral Kimmel, at infrequent intervals perhaps an over-all general estimate.

Mr. MURPHY. But, at any rate, each of your summaries would, in the ordinary course of events, be presented to Admiral Kimmel daily?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, on November 1, the Japanese changed the code signals, did they not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Call sign, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Call sign.

Then sometime towards the end of November you predicted that the Japs were about to change their call sign signals again?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In Navy parlance, that would be pretty extraordinary; wouldn't it, a change within less than 30 days of call sign signals?

Captain ROCHEFORT. It would have been the first time it had happened, to my knowledge, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you conveyed that information to Layton, and he in turn to Kimmel, did he not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then, about the first of December there was an actual change of the call signs again, was there not?

[12486] Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That too was quite unusual, wasn't it, the fact that they actually changed it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Ordinarily it would be 6 months to a year before they would make such a change; isn't that right?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. The periods in which they were being kept in effect were comparatively smaller.

Mr. MURPHY. It is also a fact, is it not, sir, that in your daily intelligence summaries, you stated definitely and positively that the Japanese appeared to be preparing for a major offense in the Pacific?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. About when was it that you stated that in your summary?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We prepared a special dispatch along that line on the 26th of November, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And on that day you felt the Japanese were preparing for a move on a large scale?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You also predicted in your daily summaries the fact that the Japanese were moving in the direction of Hawaii with their submarines, did you not?

[12487] Captain ROCHEFORT. We did not say they were moving in the direction of Hawaii.

Mr. MURPHY. You said they were moving eastward?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And moving eastward was in the direction of Hawaii so far as our possessions were concerned, Midway, and the United States?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. They were moving, at any rate, from the Asiatic coast and from the Japanese coast in the direction generally due east, weren't they?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And due east would be Midway, Johnston, Hawaii, and the west coast of the United States, wouldn't it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you showed that in your summaries, that that progressive move was occurring, did you not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Perhaps not in those words, sir, but that was the sense of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, to a naval man, it would mean you predicted the gradual move east of submarine activity of the Japanese, would it not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. As I recall, sir, we [12488] said they were going to the Marshalls.

Mr. MURPHY. They were going to the Marshalls?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. As far as the Marshalls were concerned, there was some controversy over how many carriers were in the Marshalls, wasn't there?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt there were only two carriers there did you not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You were right, weren't you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We said one cardiv, or carrier division—at the most, two carriers.

Mr. MURPHY. At the most two carriers?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You were right and the others were wrong?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would hesitate to say.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you were right. There were only two down there.

Captain ROCHEFORT. There would be a maximum of two down there.

Mr. MURPHY. And that was your report on your daily intelligence summary?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That was a special summary.

[12489] Mr. MURPHY. That was a special summary.

On the 26th of November you said there were only two carriers at the Marshalls, and you later learned there were only two carriers at the Marshalls?

Captain ROCHEFORT. There were two carriers actually at Palau, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. There were two carriers at Palau?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Then, in addition to that, you had located en masse practically the entire Japanese Fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor, had you not? I mean in your daily intelligence summary.

Captain ROCHEFORT. We located them in a negative sense, sir. We had lost them. We did not know where they were.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you made reference in one of your summaries, did you not, to the actual group or block, almost without exception, of the actual ships that had come to Pearl Harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not recall that, sir. We may have. I do not recall that.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the fact is you did, on your daily intelligence summary, show that the carriers were not accounted for, did you not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12490] Mr. MURPHY. You got to the point where you could not account for them, you just left them out of your report, to indicate that nothing was known about them?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

As I recall, we said, "Nothing is known about carriers."

Mr. MURPHY. And the reason for doing that, as a Navy man, as a communications expert, was you did not want to venture an opinion on an unknown quantity; isn't that correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes. The idea there was, by means short of cryptanalysis, in other words, radio intelligence, we could obtain a considerable amount of information. That is, without actually reading the messages.

From that information, we found we did not know anything about the carriers.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact you did not know anything about them, and the fact that you did not put in your intelligence summary anything as to their being in home waters meant to indicate, did it not, to those who read it, that there was a danger signal?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would not say that, sir, because that condition had obtained before.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the fact is, you said you knew nothing about them.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

[12491] Mr. MURPHY. And, therefore, when there is an uncertainty you usually look for the worst, don't you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Of course, they could have gone out on a fleet problem, or they could have gone into radio silence, or a variety of other things. That happened before, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it the usual plan, when you have a war warning and you cannot account for carriers, that you prepare for the worst?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the fact is that you did say on your summaries that they could not be accounted for, and then you gave that to Captain Layton, and Captain Layton went to Admiral Kimmel, and presented it to him and Admiral Kimmel said to Captain Layton, "You mean to say they might even be coming around Diamond Head?" Do you remember that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I had heard that later, sir.

[12492] Mr. MURPHY. Captain, did you, as the communications expert at Pearl Harbor, know anything about the war warning of November 27?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; I did see it on or about November 27.

Mr. MURPHY. So that you had knowledge of that and you took that into consideration when you were preparing your intelligence summaries about the location of the carriers; isn't that right?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you alarmed approaching December 2d about those carriers?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You expected trouble was coming, did you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We all knew it was coming, sir. It was a question of where.

Mr. MURPHY. Now then, what facilities did you have for interchanging what you had with your counterpart of the Army?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Personal conversation, sir, with Colonel Fielder in Shafter and Colonel Fielder in Pearl Harbor; meeting Colonel Fielder in Captain Layton's office and perhaps seeing him down town with Captain Mayfield.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, it has come to the committee's attention [12493] that the FBI sent a message to Washington to the effect that the Japanese were destroying most of their important papers as a result of an intercept of a conversation of a cook in the Japanese consulate with Japan; did you know about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I did not know about the conversation at the time, sir. I had been informed by the district intelligence officer of the fact that the Japanese consulate was destroying certain papers and codes.

Mr. MURPHY. The only difference is that the information that Admiral Kimmel and General Short appeared to have gotten was that the Japanese were reported destroying papers but the FBI reported to Washington that they were destroying most of their important papers. Did you know that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. The information was given to me that they were destroying their codes.

Mr. MURPHY. Codes?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, there was a message from Honolulu to Washington on the 6th day of December that the Japanese were destroying their codes. Did you know about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I originated that message, sir, from Honolulu to Washington.

[12494] Mr. MURPHY. General Short said that he never heard about that. Do you know whether he did or not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, do you know whether your counterpart in the Army knew the Japanese were destroying their codes on December 6 at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; because I received that information from the district intelligence officer. I was fairly sure without asking that he had received it either from the FBI or the Army and in either event the Army would have known about it either from the FBI or themselves.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, General Short said he never heard it. Would you be surprised at that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; it could very well be that it was a matter which was known perhaps to somebody in General Short's staff and was not considered important. I don't know.

Mr. MURPHY. As a communications expert, Captain, when you heard of the destruction of the codes at the very place where you were located, what did it mean to you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Well, I am trying to keep hindsight out of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; I don't want present-day quarterbacks. What did it mean to you on the 6th with the carriers not [12495] located, with the war warning message before, with the feeling that war was coming, and then the sign that right where you are they are destroying their codes, the expected enemy?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I think that my reaction at that time would have been that Admiral Hart is going to have himself quite a job very shortly.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt that at least some of the forces of the United States were going to be in for action?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That Admiral Hart was going to have himself quite a bit of work to do.

Mr. MURPHY. I have just one other question.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, in order to straighten out my own mind I would like to ask you one or two questions.

You originated that message that was sent to Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Wherein you advised the Navy that the Japanese consul was destroying codes?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, was that information disseminated after you sent the code or where did the information come from in the first instance?

[12496] Captain ROCHEFORT. The reason for sending the message was twofold. First, we received a message either from Washington or from Admiral Hart, Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet, to the effect that the Japanese were destroying communications equipment in various places throughout the world, and my message to Washington was in amplification of that message in part.

Senator LUCAS. What I am trying to find out, Captain, is what means you had or what liaison did you have with the Army so that everyone of importance in the Army, and in the Navy, would know about the burning of the codes in the consulate at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I don't think I follow you there, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you knew the codes were being burned?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You sent a message to Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Who else knew?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Layton.

Senator LUCAS. That codes were being burned?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Layton, I was informed.

Senator LUCAS. What was your arrangement between the Army and Navy to get that information to the Army?

[12497] Captain ROCHEFORT. As I said, sir, the information came to me from the District Intelligence Officer.

Senator LUCAS. Who was he?

Captain ROCHEFORT. It was Captain Mayfield, sir. He was a naval officer. Captain Mayfield. He gave me the information. In other words, the District Intelligence Officer then was familiar with the situation. He informed me and I undertook to inform Washington

and the Commander in Chief of the Fleet and, as I said before, I was fairly sure that Captain Mayfield had obtained the information in the first instance either from the FBI or from the Army. In any event, I would not consider it my job to have informed either the FBI or the Army.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. I am trying to ascertain as to whose responsibility it was to disseminate that information between the Army and the Navy, assuming that the Navy got it first?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The District Intelligence Officer, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That was Captain Mayfield?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And it was his duty to inform the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet as well as the Army?

[12498] Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. Captain Mayfield actually informed me and I undertook to see that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was informed.

Senator LUCAS. So it was your duty then to see that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was informed?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Whose duty was it in the Navy—I assume they got the message first—whose duty was it in the Navy in Hawaii to advise General Short and his staff of this important message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would say the District Intelligence Officer, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That would be Captain Mayfield?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. They must have had an arrangement for the exchange of information, intelligence.

Captain ROCHEFORT. From what I observed they worked in close contact.

Senator LUCAS. Wouldn't you know about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would not know first-hand.

Senator LUCAS. We would have to rely upon Captain Mayfield for that information as to whether or not he exchanged information with the Army on such vital information as the burning of codes at that particular time?

[12499] Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. I would have no first-hand information of that.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, is there any doubt in your mind that Admiral Kimmel knew of this message that you sent to Washington on the 6th? I believe you said that was sent by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to Washington.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. That would be the office clearing the message that I had prepared.

Mr. MURPHY. What I mean is, do you know whether or not that message, that information about the destruction of codes on the 6th in Hawaii, got to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I naturally couldn't say positively, sir, but I am quite sure it would have; quite sure.

Mr. MURPHY. How would it get there, who would be the one, Layton?

Captain ROCHEFORT. From Layton; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, one other question. In Exhibit 2 there are a number of messages concerning ship locations in Hawaii. Do you recall whether or not you were translating any of the PA-K2 dispatches?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not until the 3d or 4th of December, sir.

[12500] Mr. MURPHY. And some of these, though, that you did decode had something to do with the number of ships that were actually in Pearl Harbor, did they not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. As I recall, one or two of them did, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I wonder if you would be able to tell which ones—you did refer to them in your previous testimony, not before this committee but before another committee. It may be that you didn't. Somebody at Hawaii did, Captain.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The only message that I would recall, sir, of any importance in the group that we worked on at Pearl subsequent to the night of 3 December was the rather long message pertaining to lights in homes and that sort of thing.

Mr. MURPHY. Had you succeeded in getting enough out of that to know pretty much what they were doing?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; unfortunately, that was not translated until the evening of the 10th.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you didn't know what was in it on the 7th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Had you translated any messages before the 7th which indicated an interest on the part of Tokyo in what was going on at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

[12501] Mr. MURPHY. None at all?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know that Tokyo was making inquiry of Honolulu for any purpose up to the 7th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I recall of no messages that indicated that, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, my final question: You said you expected there would be a lot of trouble in store for Admiral Hart. How soon after you heard that about the codes being destroyed at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not more than 3 or 4 days, sir, at the outside.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, sir. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster is next.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave now.

Captain, are you going to be in the city for awhile?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I don't know that I shall want to further interrogate you, but if you will be here tomorrow I will appreciate it.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, how many kinds of codes are there?

[12502] The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Senator Brewster is next.

Senator BREWSTER. I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. GEARHART. I have heard of the Army, the Navy, and the diplomatic. Are there any other classifications of codes and ciphers?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Most any government agency would have its own system or systems as well as the various commercial systems.

Mr. GEARHART. Of course, when you are monitoring for, picking up these codes, you don't know what they are while you are getting them, it is only after you get them and study them that you can classify them; is that correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. Over a period of years we had developed a pretty fair knowledge of the Japanese naval communication system which involved, among other things, a rather detailed knowledge of the radio circuits that were plied, such as between Tokyo and ships at sea, that sort of thing. In Pearl Harbor we merely covered or monitored, if you will, the circuits that we felt the most information was available on.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, do we have respected channels when using radio?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Even if there weren't, sir, [12503] we would still find it, because we maintain special watches for searching the whole spectrum.

Mr. GEARHART. You broke some of the Naval codes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Sir?

Mr. GEARHART. You were able to crack some of the naval codes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Some of the diplomatic codes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Were you able to crack any of the Army, Japanese Army codes?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We didn't try anything with the Army systems at all, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The Army systems would come over the air once in awhile?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, they would, but we were not covering any of those circuits. Our primary concern was with the Navy. When I say that I do not wish to be misunderstood. We were only able to cover a part of the naval communications system through a lack of personnel.

Mr. GEARHART. Because you were way out in the middle of the Pacific, I suppose there weren't many Army messages coming, were there?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We could have probably picked up [12504] quite a few had we had the personnel to do it with.

Mr. GEARHART. Once in awhile the Navy could be caught?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We could have, sir; but I conceived my first job was to put my own house in order, which was the Japanese Navy. Then when we were able to do that, we could look around and offer whatever help we could.

Mr. GEARHART. I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. I pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain, there was a message sent from OPNAV, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, for Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet, No. 061743.

Mr. Masten, will you show him that message.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that reads:

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands, you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

That is the way that reads.

[12505] Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that was received by CINCPAC, which is Pearl Harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you note whether or not it is marked "Urgent" or "Priority"?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I can't see from this copy, sir, what the classification was. This copy that I have is not marked at all as far as the classification.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether in the Navy if it wasn't marked "Priority" or "Urgent" that it would not go "Priority" or "Urgent"?

What hour was it sent out of Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. 1743, which would be 12:43 Washington time. In other words, 43 minutes after noon.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 6th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. 6 December, Saturday.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you receive that prior to the attack?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I did not see this message prior to the attack, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when it did come to your attention?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I recall having seen it, sir, and [12506] it must have been some time after the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were you at the time of the attack on Sunday morning at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. At Pearl Harbor, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you on duty?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. I got out there about 20 minutes after the attack started.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you surprised at an attack?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; at Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you anticipated an attack Sunday morning?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Anywhere?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where?

Mr. MURPHY. May we get the answer as to whether he was surprised at an attack.

(The answer was read by the reporter, as follows:)

Yes, sir, at Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you anticipate an attack Sunday morning?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I anticipated an attack might occur any morning or any afternoon certainly definitely along the China coast, possibly in the Philippines.

[12507] Senator FERGUSON. Was that because of your Intelligence? What would you draw that conclusion from? I mean, when I say your "Intelligence," I mean the information that you had.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Probably it was due on my part at least to a feeling that the Japanese had more or less committed themselves in southeast Asia, possibly the Philippines, which would not leave very much for an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't understand.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Which would not leave them very much in the way of ships and planes for an attack on any other spot.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't the only deterrent to the Japanese movement to the south in Pearl Harbor in the form of ships?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And airplanes?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was the deterrent?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Considering the fact that we had a 5-5-3 ratio in the two fleets, Pearl Harbor, some 5,000 miles aloof from Tokyo, and one of the reasons for the 5-5-3 ratio was to give the Japanese a parity in their own waters, it follows that if they were going to the south that the existence or nonexistence of a fleet 5,000 miles [12508] to the eastward was certainly not a major deterrent.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it a deterrent?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In my opinion not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any deterrent at all to them moving?

Captain ROCHEFORT. There would be a deterrent if the entire Japanese Fleet moved to the south thereby risked a hit and run attack on a certain part of their territory, yes, to that extent.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, didn't you know that the entire fleet was not moving south; didn't you know from the British how many ships were moving into the Kra Peninsula?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We could count, both from our own sources and other sources, a group of ships going to the south, which comprised, I would say, probably a majority of the Japanese forces available.

Senator FERGUSON. The majority. Would you say over half?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, where did you think the other half was going to strike?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Some, of course, would be in overhaul. Some we just plain lost.

Senator FERGUSON. What about those you lost? Didn't you think there may be danger that they would strike?

[12509] Captain ROCHEFORT. They could; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why weren't you prepared at Pearl Harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. You will pardon me, sir, but I had a rather relatively junior position in Pearl Harbor in connection with preparations.

Senator FERGUSON. You were the head of the Intelligence section?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I was the head of the Combat Intelligence Section, radio intelligence section.

Senator FERGUSON. You were the head of the Radio Combat Intelligence Section?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't it be your duty to appraise as to where Japan was going to attack, when Japan was going to attack and where she was going to attack, and with what force?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Based on radio intelligence only, sir, we would.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand then that we had our Intelligence so divided that you only operated on radio intelligence?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then what did you mean by your last [12510] answer?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We gave all the information that we had available or that we had deduced or estimated that had been obtained by means of radio intelligence to the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Senator FERGUSON. That was—

Captain ROCHEFORT. Captain Layton.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you didn't pay any attention after you had given it to him and had drawn the appraisal of it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We gave him our best estimate, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you estimate to him that there was going to be an attack somewhere on Sunday?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; not on Sunday. We did not specify any date, as I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, when did you give him the last estimate?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Saturday, sir, December 6.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you tell him it would happen?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We did not tell them, to the best of my knowledge, on Saturday, 6 December, when it would happen.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell them it was going to happen?

[12511] Captain ROCHEFORT. We indicated very strongly there was an offensive movement.

Senator FERGUSON. An offensive movement where?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I think perhaps the best statement on that, sir, would be the November 26 message.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say to him on the 26th? I am trying to find out now—you are the Radio Intelligence man there—why they didn't know about this attack coming, I am trying to find out why the Intelligence System didn't work out there.

Captain ROCHEFORT. As to that I have no answer, Mr. Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no answer as to why it didn't work?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. I cannot explain to you why we did not specify a certain date or a day in the week.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you had known under your radio system that there was a message being delivered in Washington Sunday morning and it was to be delivered to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock and that it was even more than an ultimatum, would that have given you the hour?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I believe it would have, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get such a message?

[12512] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. No; not now.

Mr. MURPHY. I am wondering the basis for the Senator's statement about it being more than an ultimatum.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what I am talking about, the 14th-part message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. I did not see that message until 1944-1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you had this, as you call it, the radio intelligence, did you get other intelligence so that you could appraise the entire situation?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12513] Senator FERGUSON. Well then, did you give to Captain Layton an entire appraisal, as far as the Navy was concerned of the situation as to whether or not to expect war and where to expect it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you give it to him?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Daily.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you ever call it to his attention that there was going to be war as far as the United States was concerned?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, I would not say in writing that we made the flat statement that there was or was not going to be war. We gave them indications as we saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. Were those indications that we were going to have war with Japan, America was?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never gave him such an appraisal?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, not in writing. We may have discussed the matter and undoubtedly did at great length.

Senator FERGUSON. If you had the foundation for such appraisal, why didn't you put it in writing?

The CHAIRMAN. It is 5 o'clock. Obviously we can't finish with the witness. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Mr. MURPHY. May we have available in the morning that 26 summary?

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., February 15, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Saturday, February 16, 1946.)

[12514]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan; and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

[12515] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Senator Ferguson will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. JOSEPH JOHN ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. You have the message now?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I asked you about the message of November 24. Do you have it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. November 26.

Senator FERGUSON. November 26.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Do you wish me to read it, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. At the direction of the Commander in Chief, the unit under my command during the month of November had been making various summaries and as a result of Admiral Kimmel's order, as transmitted by Captain Layton, we prepared a summary on the 26th of November which gave our general views as regards the situation which had been developing. I shall read the message.¹ It went to OPNAV for information of Commander in Chief Asiatic and COM16 and Commander in Chief Pacific:

For the past month Commander Second Fleet has been [12516] organizing a task force which comprises following units: Second Fleet, Third Fleet including First and Second Base Forces and First Defense Division, Combined Air Force, Desron Three, Airron Seven, Subron Five and possibly units of Batdiv Three from First Fleet.

In messages concerning these units South China Fleet and French Indo China force have appeared as well as the naval station at Sama, Bako and Takao.

¹ The message referred to is printed in full in Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2814-2815.

Third base force at Palao and RNO Palao have also been engaged in extensive communications with Second Fleet commander.

Combined air force has assembled in Takao with indications that some components have moved on to Hainan.

Third Fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako.

Second base force appears transporting equipment of air forces to Taiwan.

Takao radio today accepted traffic for unidentified Second Fleet unit and submarine division or squadron.

Crudiv seven and Desron three appear as an advance unit and may be en route South China.

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise Alrron twenty-four at least one carrier division unit plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet.

[12517] Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

That, I think, Mr. Senator, gives our views as of the end of November.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, boiling that down, where did that mean an attack, if one?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That meant—we did not refer to it in terms of attack or war. We referred to it constantly as a strong offensive movement with major operations of the Japanese primarily toward Southeastern Asia, while certain parts may operate from Palao and the Marshalls.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, where would they go from Palao? What should we be on guard for? Did you see that Australian message that was held up the 17 hours?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I do not recall having seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you seen it recently?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I have seen it in the papers, sir, is all, or some reference to it in the papers.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if the Dutch knew there was going to be an attack on the Dutch possessions from Palao at the time or prior to that message, how do you account for your Intelligence Branch not knowing? Didn't you have [12518] close liaison with the Dutch?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And with the English?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what the arrangement was under the ABCD Bloc?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you plan if you didn't know the arrangement? If there was an attack on British possessions, what did that mean to you as far as America was concerned?

Captain ROCHEFORT. You mean whether or not we would be involved, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would not hazard an opinion on that, sir; that decision would be made in Washington.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I didn't understand, Captain.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I said I would not hazard an opinion on that; the decision would be made in Washington.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you will permit the suggestion, I am afraid you keep a little too close to the microphone. It has a tendency of blurring your words. Keep 4 or 5 inches from it.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew there was some arrangement [12519] but the actual arrangement was not known by you and all action, as far as that would be concerned, would come from Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Would come from Washington to the Commander in Chief, sir.

[12520] Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But if there was going to be an attack on the Dutch, for instance, as shown by the Melbourne message that was held up by the Australians, where they were going to put Rainbow-2 into effect, which meant the joint plan, as I take it from reading that with the evidence, now did that mean anything to you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That merely—if I had seen the message from the Australians prior to the 7th that would merely have confirmed an opinion that we already had, namely, a movement to NEI, Indochina, and neighboring areas.

Senator FERGUSON. But the fact that they were going to attack there on Sunday—

Captain ROCHEFORT. I did not see the message, sir, prior to the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. No; but if you had known that they were going to attack these possessions on Sunday, would that have meant anything to you under what you knew about the A-B-C-D?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not necessarily, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were more or less of a collector of this material, is that true, and handed it up to Layton?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Of the radio intelligence material?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[12521] Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were confined, really to the radio intelligence?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not feel that your responsibility was to determine when war was coming or where it was coming, except as you would get it from radio intelligence?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And as to the policy, you did not have charge of that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did not understand it and did not know it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. That was at a higher level.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, when you got radio intelligence—for instance, you intercepted some of these messages that are in Exhibit 2, which you were shown yesterday, that you saw here. Did you send them to Washington? Do you know what I mean by Exhibit 2? The ship movements.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Oh, yes, sir; they would have been sent to Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. How were they sent to Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. If they were important enough they would have been sent by radio. Otherwise, if they were very [12522] old, they would have gone by air mail.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, look at page 22. First look at page 12. Do you see the message on page 12?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. September 24, 1941.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. That is a diplomatic message, Mr. Senator. I think we are perhaps being confused by diplomatic and naval.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, no.

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is a diplomatic message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the one on page 12 is considered a diplomatic message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. That did not go in any naval system.

Senator FERGUSON. Look on page 22.

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is also a diplomatic message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, do I understand then that all these exhibits in Exhibit 2 were the J-19?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; in the various diplomatic systems, sir, J-19 and so on.

Senator FERGUSON. They were all in the diplomatic systems?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12523] Senator FERGUSON. And therefore you were not decoding them in—

Captain ROCHEFORT. Honolulu.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). Honolulu or Pearl Harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you know how to do PA-K2?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But some of these messages are in that code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would you tell me whether 12, 22, 25, 26, 27, and 29, in what codes are those?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The one on page 12, sir, is in the J-19 system.

Senator FERGUSON. So then you did not translate it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not have facilities for translating that one.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever seen that one before, up to the 7th, up to and including the 7th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, what is 22?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The one on page 22 is PA-K2, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not attempt to translate [12524] that and send it on to Washington. Do you know whether you intercepted it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not. We did not intercept it; we did not read it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now go to the one on page 25. These are all in exhibit 2.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The one on page 25, sir, is also PA-K2.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you intercept it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, you did not have any knowledge of it prior to the 7th.

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, on page 26 there are two of them, the first one and the second one.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The first one, No. 252, was also in PA-K2.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you intercept that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The second one on that page?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is also PA-K2.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you intercept that one?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We did not intercept it or read it.

Senator FERGUSON. The one on page 27 and then the one [12525] on 29.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The one on page 27, No. 253, likewise was not intercepted or read.

Senator FERGUSON. What code is it in?

Captain ROCHEFORT. PA-K2, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And on 29?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The one on page 29 is also PA-K2. The same condition applies; we did not intercept it or read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you in effect did not know that those existed?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you were before Admiral Hewitt, were you not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Hewitt said this:

The book of Battle Reports states, "The United States shortly before 7 December 1941 had two task forces at sea and the Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo." What do you know about that?

You answered:

To the best of my knowledge Tokyo was not informed on the presence at sea of the two task forces.

What did you mean by that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. What I was referring to there was, sir, [12526] that at the time I did not know whether or not they had been and I had seen no traffic subsequent to that that indicated that they had; in other words, reading this sort of material here.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, weren't you concerned with the exhibits in number 2 where Japan is trying to ascertain, as they did originally on the 24th of September, laying out a plan of the harbor, not only of the ships that were going out but where they were anchored, so that if they came in for an air attack they would know exactly what ship was at what dock or what buoy?

Captain ROCHEFORT. If I may have your indulgence for just a moment, sir, perhaps I can clear up that point.

My unit in Pearl Harbor was charged by the authorities in Washington with specific duties, which were to intercept and to exploit all Japanese naval communications systems and transmit all the information we could obtain from those interceptions to the fleet and to the Navy Department and other interested parties. We were specifically told to keep away or not to exploit the so-called five-number system, which was a naval system. That was being done elsewhere.

We were not to do any work on the diplomatic systems. That was being handled in Washington and perhaps in Cavite. In other words, the reason that we did not have these diplo- [12527] matic messages, the reason we did not intercept them, the reason we did not

work on them or read them was because it was not our assignment but was being handled by Washington.

On the other hand, Washington was not doing anything on our general naval systems. That was our responsibility.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain ROCHEFORT. In other words, there was a division of work, a division of labor.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, your job then was to use the radio finders and locate fleets?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was your specific assignment, on radio?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was your assignment?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Japanese naval messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And not these so-called diplomatic, or from the consuls in Hawaii.

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not your assignment.

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, it was not.

Senator FERGUSON. That does clear up some of this testimony. [12528]

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. There apparently has been some confusion on that, Mr. Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I correctly understand then that you did not personally inform Fielder, Bicknell, or any other Army officers of the fact that the Japs were destroying most of their codes in the United States in early December 1941?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would hesitate to make a categorical statement to that effect, sir. I may have. If I did, it was probably in the course of conversation. I do not recall informing them at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, when you were considering that point did you have in mind that it meant war with America?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not have any recollection of it now?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. I may have, but I do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know what conference you had with Bicknell or with—yes, with Bicknell—or Fielder between the 27th of November and the 7th of December?

Captain ROCHEFORT. As to dates or hours or places, no, sir. I saw them fairly frequently, perhaps twice a week, something in that nature, and maybe oftener.

[12529] Senator FERGUSON. Would you generally sit down with your various memorandums and messages and compare them? Is that what you call liaison, or is it just to meet each other and be friendly?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. You see, as of that time, Senator, Colonel Fielder was not what we would say in on the "ultra" picture. In other words, he was not a recipient of that type of information. However, if it affected him or it affected his organization, I would give it to him in a somewhat sanitized form.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you mean by the last answer? In what form?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would give him the sense of the information without disclosing its source.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you are going back. You tell me now, this morning, that you were connected only with the Navy, the naval codes and location of the fleets, and so forth, and I think at one time there was a dispute between your branch and the one in the Sixteenth; was there not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; there was no dispute, because Admiral Hart said what he was going to do and that was sufficient.

Senator FERGUSON. No, no; as to where the fleets were.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. There was no dispute there.

[12530] Senator FERGUSON. It was decided here in Washington that in the future they would look for and rely more on Admiral Hart's information than they would upon yours.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did that mean to you? Did that remove from you that branch?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Oh, no, sir; not at all.

Senator FERGUSON. And you considered then that the Army was not directly connected with the information on what you were covering, the fleet movements of the Japanese, and that is the reason that you cannot recall giving anything to Bicknell or to Fielder?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would not put it that way, sir. I would say that if anything developed insofar as the Japanese were concerned that indicated a vital interest or a general interest or which affected the Army, I would have given it to either General Fielder or Colonel Bicknell, whoever was concerned, in a sanitized form.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the Army was alerted to sabotage from the 27th on?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where you got your information?

[12531] Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. Probably in conversations with Army officers.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you ever tell Colonel Bicknell about any magic messages or about the winds message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And if you did, did you place a condition on it that he keep it secret even from Fielder and from General Short?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I would never have done anything like that. On the contrary, it is much more reasonable to assume that I would have given the information to General Fielder rather than to Colonel Bicknell by reason of the fact that General Fielder was Colonel Bicknell's superior.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you do not then recall either Fielder or Bicknell conferring with you about the winds message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you know what I mean, the original set-up on the winds message.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Not even on those?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you ever confer with them [12532] that you were looking for a weather report?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Trying to exclude what those officers have testified, I still cannot recall having discussed the matter with them.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you monitoring for a wind execute message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And how did you come to do that? You had not intercepted the original two set-up codes?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We had received from Admiral Hart's organization the basic message. We received further orders from Washington to listen in on the known broadcast frequencies, which we proceeded to do and which we continued to do until after the attack on the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know what I mean by the two set-up messages for the wind code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. The directions you mean.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That east wind meant—

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; I am perfectly familiar with that.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12533] Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get that information—by intercepting and decoding?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. That information came to us initially from Admiral Hart and it was followed shortly by a directive from Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Telling us what to do.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. So you had a directive to look out for and monitor for an execution of the wind code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And up until the time of the attack were you continuing that monitoring for the wind code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; with four of my very best language officers on a 24-hour watch. That is, a constant watch on the frequencies that were given to us by Washington as well as at frequencies which we knew existed and which we had uncovered.

Senator FERGUSON. You were following Washington's instructions and even doing more in trying to intercept a wind code message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you at any time get such an intercept?

[12534] Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not get it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, after the attack did you talk to Colonel Bicknell about either the set-up messages or the execute message, or either of them?

Captain ROCHEFORT. To the best of my knowledge, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether you talked to Fielder after the attack about either the set-up messages for the winds code or the execute message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I do not believe I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anything that you can add here to give us information that would help us in this problem that we have before us?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I do not. If the duties of my organization are understood now, that is—

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you want to say anything on your duties, so that we do understand your duties?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, aside from the fact that we were not working on diplomatic systems, that was not one of our assignments, and we were directed to work on naval systems only, which we were doing. The reason I mention that is there has been some confusion, apparently, about diplomatic systems.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

[12535] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. No questions.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain Rochefort, you were considered, and still are considered, one of the most capable and competent communications men in the Navy. I do not want to ask you to put yourself in the position of criticizing your superiors, but in regard to this winds message set-up, here you are with the four best men that you had on a 24-hour watch, and here is the Army and the FCC working on it, and here is the Navy and everybody apparently frantic about the winds message, and all that we get is apparently that the Japanese international communications must be broken up, and then when it comes, all we get is that diplomatic relations are not according to expectations.

I am wondering why the Navy and the Army got so excited about a message of that kind, when the fact is we were still continuing to get all of these interceptions right along, even up to the 7th of December, when international communications were not broken up, and when we already knew the diplomatic relations were not according to expectations; when we even knew that war was coming. Can you understand why all this excitement, and why this 24-hour watch [12536] to get a message that would only confirm what these fellows on the 24-hour watch were going to supplement by getting other valuable information?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I submit the witness, from his position, cannot possibly answer any part of that question.

The CHAIRMAN. That would seem to be an expression of an opinion, and the drawing of a conclusion by the witness and argumentative.

Mr. MURPHY. He is referred to in this record, Mr. Chairman, as the outstanding expert of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. He could not tell why he was ordered from Washington to put a 24-hour watch on the monitoring system. It was his duty to carry it out. I doubt very much whether this witness could give the reasons for that. If he can, the committee would be glad to have it.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me ask you some specific questions, in view of the objection of counsel.

Do you know of any information that the winds intercept would have given and that you did not have?

Captain ROCHEFORT. It would have given perhaps a little advance information as to whether it was the Japanese intention to terminate or to break off the negotiations then in progress.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is, is it not, that we had the [12537] dead-line message of the 29th, and we had the messages saying "Just carry out this pretense for a little while," and we had a message saying "You will be sent the code word as to what to do," and we had a message from someone in Tokyo saying the instructions will come very soon.

That is one link in the chain that would add up to what we already had; is that it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. It would, perhaps, have given a little additional or earlier information of Japanese intentions with regard to negotiations only.

Mr. MURPHY. One of the witnesses yesterday was permitted, in the record, to say it was the most important message ever received.

Would you so consider it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. You are referring to the winds message, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. What he thought was a winds intercept.

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; that would not, in my opinion, be an extremely important message.

Mr. MURPHY. The next thing I would like to have is for you to put in the record your communication summary of the 26th of November.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The 26th of November, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. That was the one where you pointed, [12538] is it not, that the Japs were ready for action? You read that this morning, did you not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I read the dispatch, sir, which was based on perhaps a month's summaries.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you refer to the dispatch, if you can, that shows the submarines at Saipan moving eastward?

At any rate, Captain, as I understand it, all of your daily communications summaries are in evidence. I understand between November 26 and December 7 in your communications summaries, you did point out that the Japanese submarines were then at Saipan and moving gradually in an easterly direction.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; toward Jaluit.

Mr. MURPHY. And Jaluit is in the same general location, considering a movement from the Asiatic Coast, as Pearl Harbor, is that right?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

We said that, I might say, on the 30th of November, sir. That might answer your question.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. On the 30th of November. The known progress of the submarine force from the Empire to Chichi Jima and to Saipan makes his destination obviously the Marshalls.

Mr. MURPHY. One other question. You said that General [12539] Fielder was not entitled to magic in this ultra form, so when you say if there was something that you felt was vital, that affected the Army, you gave it to him in a sanitized form.

Now, who would be over you in authority to give an order so that you would give the information you had to your counterpart in the Army? Who had the authority to give you the order to do that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Captain Layton, as a personal representative of Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Kimmel had the authority to order you, did he not, to give this ultra material to General Fielder?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And, of course, if you got the order you would promptly obey it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would carry out any order I received.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, allow me to inquire a little for information.

I am not quite clear on one or two points mentioned by you.

[12540] General, then Colonel, I believe, Fielder, was the head of G-2 in Hawaii for the Army, wasn't he?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And Colonel Bicknell was G-2 for the Army Air Forces in Hawaii, wasn't he?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That was not my understanding sir. I considered Colonel Bicknell as a subordinate of Colonel Fielder.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was an assistant to Colonel Fielder?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; that was my understanding.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that applied to the G-2 of the Army in Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12541] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is it your understanding that the head of G-2 and the assistant G-2 in Hawaii were not entitled to receive this secret information?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; he was not on the list of personnel that I had, which indicated those that were entitled to receive ultra.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, who made that list?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That list was maintained in our office and was made up initially by the officer in charge and was passed on to succeeding officers in charge.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was the responsible official for determining that question?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The officer in charge, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As to who would receive this secret information.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The officer in charge, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was the officer in charge?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I was from June 1941 on, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then while you held this position it was solely within your province to determine who in the Army should or should not receive this secret information?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; unless I received contrary orders from either Washington or from Admiral Kimmel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How is that?

[12542] Captain ROCHEFORT. Unless I had received orders to the contrary from either Washington or Admiral Kimmel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who fixed that responsibility or that discretion in you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not think I understand that, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You said it was within your province to determine who in the Army should receive this secret information.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, who fixed your province as to what you should do in that respect?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Nobody, sir. I would determine that by ascertaining whether or not Colonel Fielder had been receiving ultra from his own people, from the Army, and whether or not he was qualified—I say qualified—to receive ultra either from Washington or from Admiral Kimmel's staff.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you determined the question?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As to what and how the secret information should be transmitted from the Navy to the Army?

Captain ROCHEFORT. A slight correction, sir. I would determine whether or not certain people in the Army received ultra from the Navy. Not secret information, but ultra.

[12543] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Ultra?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you could receive certain ultra information and did?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you determined how much or what part of that was transmitted to the Army?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now if the Army had requested or desired this information, could they have secured it from you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But they would have had to come to you and ask for it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And there was not that free interchange of information of that type and character between you and the Army unless they requested it of you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I think I have given the wrong impression there, sir. If we received any information at the ultra level, that is, information obtained from ultra sources, which the Army should have had, or it would have been desirable for the Army to have had, I would have certainly given it to the Army, but not in the form of ultra. I would have paraphrased it, or changed it around, [12544] or, as we say, sanitized it and then given it to them in such a way as not to disclose the source. But I would have seen that they had the information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But in the final analysis you determined what they should get?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And if you decided that something was not necessary in your opinion to give to the Army, why, they did not get it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That applies to myself; yes, sir. Of course they could obtain it from Admiral Kimmel, or possibly from Wash-

ington, or any other source. But insofar as I was concerned, that was it; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now were you monitoring for the Morse code, or Morse code information in Honolulu?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Not at any time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. You are referring to the winds message now, sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I will refer to that, but right now I am talking about the general situation.

Captain ROCHEFORT. All Japanese naval communications—I say all, but perhaps 98 percent of them were in Morse code or Imperial Japanese Kani, which is a variation of Morse— [12545] about 98 percent of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About 98 percent of it was in Morse?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes; of naval communications.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Naval communications?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am trying to find out about the Morse code. You certainly know what that is?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Were you monitoring for that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Were you monitoring for the winds message in the Morse code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Never did at any time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So then if any winds message had come in the Morse code you would not have received it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you were monitoring the Morse code messages why did not you also monitor for the winds message in the Morse code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The broadcasts that were furnished us [12546] by Washington, the broadcast schedules giving the various frequencies, were all on voice frequencies; none of them were Morse. The term "broadcast" to me, in referring to weather message and news broadcasts, and all that, means simply voice. As I said before, all of the frequencies that had been assigned us by Washington, giving in their opinion a complete list of all known Japanese broadcast frequencies, were all voice broadcasts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, Captain, you stated to Senator Ferguson that you tried to receive information in all of the systems that were designated to you by Washington, and some in addition to that.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. You just stated a few moments ago that you were monitoring for Morse code messages.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then if you were monitoring for Morse code messages generally, why did not you monitor for the winds message in Morse code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The monitoring of Morse code messages was for Japanese naval communications system messages which went by well-known circuits, what we would call circuits; that is, established channels of communication. Within the Japanese Navy, perhaps 98 percent of that traffic would [12547] have been in the Japanese version of the Morse code. The listening in for the winds message, for the winds execute message, was a separate and totally distinct assignment for the normal assignment which had been given us.

In other words, it was a little additional duty. All the frequencies that were known in Washington on which that winds execute message could have been sent, and which were furnished us, were all voice frequencies. We listened for those. We also searched for other voice frequencies. We uncovered several of them. We continued monitoring all of the known voice broadcasts from the Japanese Empire.

Does that clear up the thing, sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No; I am sorry. I just want to ask the simple question if you were monitoring for Morse code messages why you did not monitor for the winds execute message in Morse code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Because the very setting up of the winds execute, the term itself implies, in my mind, voice. I have never seen it used otherwise.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then with the Japanese message setting up the so-called winds code, it was clear to you that there would not be any message in that code, about the winds execute message, in Morse code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12548] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is clear?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You then knew there was no need for monitoring for the winds execute message in a Morse code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, as I recall Captain Safford's testimony here, I think he stated that the winds execute message, which he says he saw, came in the Morse code.

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is entirely possible, sir, but in order to have that condition exist you must remember that the list of frequencies given us by Washington were all voice. If the message was sent in Morse code, that is, the exact message was sent in Morse code, that would have meant then that every Japanese Embassy in every Japanese location throughout the world for whom the message was intended by the Japanese Government would have had to maintain Morse code operators, people capable of receiving Morse code. I do not think so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You do not think so?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you do not attach much importance to the winds execute message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Personally, I would not, sir. I would say that it merely would have given a little additional [12549] information, perhaps earlier information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is it your best judgment, Captain, that there was never any genuine winds code execute message received?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would prefer to answer that, sir, by saying that, insofar as my unit was concerned, no winds execute was ever

heard. I would rather not pass on what may or may not have been heard in other parts of the world.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. The Morse code is a technical, mechanical, instrumental method of transmitting information?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. It is normally referred to as dot and dash.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in no case voice?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Weather broadcasts, such as that indicated in the winds message, that predicted that under certain circumstances the weather report would be broadcast, that is always in voice, isn't it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you had two entirely different systems?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. One of them mechanical and the other [12550] vocal?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were listening over the vocal system?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. For the winds execute message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It never came through?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not hear it.

The CHAIRMAN. According to the two messages predicting that under certain circumstances the broadcast of weather would contain certain words, that in itself indicated it would be a vocal transmission?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator BREWSTER. What is the difference, Captain, between a cipher and a code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Between a cipher and a code, sir?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. In the original understanding, sir, a code has a group of letters and numbers—sometimes the letters are pronounceable and sometimes not—which designate a letter or number, a phrase, perhaps, a whole sentence or a complete thought. That would be termed a code.

[12551] Senator BREWSTER. And you would need a code book of some character in order to interpret it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; you would require the book. That is, the original people would.

Senator BREWSTER. Whoever would get it decoded would have to have a book indicating the significance of these letters and symbols?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. What about a cipher?

Captain ROCHEFORT. A pure cipher would interchange or change each letter of the original text so that rather than having a group of letters meaning a whole thought or sentence or phrase, each letter would be changed, or each numeral.

Senator BREWSTER. You mean the letter "A" might mean "X", for instance?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; and then the following letter "B" might mean "L." Where you interchange your letter by another letter, or a numeral by another numeral, that would be a pure cipher.

Senator BREWSTER. That was the advantage of this so-called cipher machine that you referred to?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The Japanese system, you mean?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. That would mean on this machine [12552] you punch certain letters and certain other letters come out?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. If you know what that combination is, you are able to read it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Is that peculiar to the Japanese, or do other countries use somewhat similar systems, as far as you know?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Ciphers go back to before the days of Julius Caesar.

Senator FERGUSON. They are not exactly novel?

Captain ROCHEFORT. There is nothing that is novel in them, sir.

[12553] Senator BREWSTER. It is just a question of the possible ways in which they follow the techniques, and so on?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Senator FERGUSON. There is one question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. When you said you were getting radio information, did that include RCA? That was cable, was it, or was that considered radio?

Captain ROCHEFORT. You mean the messages we got about the 3d of December?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not know where the District Intelligence Officer got his information, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you do with those messages that you received?

Captain ROCHEFORT. On the night of the 3d or the morning of the 4th, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. We read what we could as quickly as we could. We put our best people on it. Those that we read prior to the 7th were of absolutely no value whatever.

We continued working on them, and on the night of the 10th, we managed to read the remainder.

[12554] Senator FERGUSON. Give it to me up until the time the bombs fell.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Nothing of any value, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you put your best men on those messages as soon as you got them from the so-called cable office; is that right?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Wherever they came from I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean they were on other than your regular channel.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Those were diplomatic messages, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on this winds code, you were attempting to evaluate that execution message when you did not have all of the other diplomatic messages.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. I think it could have been reasonable to assume the meaning of the thing.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know we had sent a message on the 26th to Japan?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, not prior to the 7th. I did not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know that prior to the 7th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

[12555] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a deadline set on the 25th to close the negotiations?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Other than what I read in the newspapers, I did not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know it prior to the 7th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I did not know it prior to the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that was extended to the 29th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; my information came from newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you had that kind of knowledge, would the winds code execute have been more significant if you had those diplomatic messages?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I do not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think so?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a question, Captain.

The CHAIRMAN. The counsel has a question.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If there was to be a winds execute message sent in Morse, it would have had to be initially started in Morse in Tokyo?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12556] Mr. RICHARDSON. And wherever that message would go, it would go in Morse?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then if it was to be in a weather news communication, it would mean that London and the United States and other places that Morse could go to would be advised in Morse what the news and weather was in Japan?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you had had any idea that a winds execute might come in Morse, you could have directed your attention to Morse intercepts for the purpose of getting such an intercept, could you not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, we could have.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But it was your understanding, from the information you received from Washington, and the nature of the recitals in the original winds code message, that any intercept was to come by radio broadcast?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all you monitored for?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, it is true, is it not, that early in 1941 arrangements were made for the transmission from Washington

to Cavite the information with respect to purple messages received at Washington from Tokyo?

[12557] Captain ROCHEFORT. I imagine there were a series of messages technical in nature.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when Washington would transmit the information which they got from the purple intercepts to Cavite, would that be transmitted in the Japanese code to Cavite or would it be transmitted in our code, or would it be transmitted in English between Washington and Cavite?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That would have been transmitted in one of the U. S. Naval cryptographic systems.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, would you be able in Hawaii to intercept and read the communications from the United States to Cavite, the information that Washington had received in purple?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, whenever information was given by Washington to Cavite, based upon information which came to Washington under the purple code, did you pick it up in Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You could have?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We could have, with considerable difficulty, I would say. In other words, it would have involved picking one message out of perhaps 50,000, which would have required going to the Fleet communications officer.

[12558] Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you paid no attention, in your station at Hawaii, to communications between Washington and Cavite of that nature?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee thanks you, Captain, for your appearance here. You are excused.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Thank you, sir.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Call the next witness.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would like to call Admiral Noyes, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. LEIGH NOYES, UNITED STATES NAVY ¹

(Having been first duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral Noyes, will you please state your full name, your rank, and present assignment for the committee.

Admiral NOYES. Leigh Noyes. Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy. President of the Board of Inspection and Survey.

Mr. MASTEN. And what were your rank and duties on the 7th of December, 1941?

Admiral NOYES. I was Rear Admiral, Director of Naval Communications in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. MASTEN. When did you become Director of Naval Communications, Admiral? [12559]

Admiral NOYES. About the 1st of August 1939.

Mr. MASTEN. And how long did you then continue as such?

Admiral NOYES. Until the 24th, I think, of February 1942.

¹ See suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Admiral Noyes, Hearings, Part II, pp. 5306 et seq.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, would you state briefly to the committee, your experience in the Navy?

Admiral NOYES. I was appointed to the Naval Academy from Vermont; graduated in February 1906; went to the Asiatic station for 3 years; came back in the cruise around the world; was in the *Missouri*, *Mississippi*; aide to Rear Admiral Ward; the *Wyoming*; in 1914 I went to the Office of the then Aide for Operations in the Navy Department, and became the first communications officer of the Navy Department.

I went to sea in 1916 as Fleet Communications Officer, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. I commanded the *Biddle*, a destroyer; came ashore to the Office of Director of Naval Communications, Atlantic Coast Communications Superintendent; went to the Naval War College; battleship *Colorado*; the Naval Mission to Brazil; Director of Training for Navigation on shore; commanded the light cruiser *Richmond* for 2 years; went to Pensacola to qualify as a naval aviator; commanded the *Lexington*; Chief of Staff to commander [12560] aircraft battle force.

In 1939, Director of Naval Communications, which I left in February 1942 to go to sea in the Pacific Fleet.

Commander Task Force 18, 61; came ashore in November of 1942 to the Board of Inspection and Survey, West Coast, and in March 1945 to Washington as President of the Board of Inspection and Survey, which position I now hold.

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral, how many appearances have you made before boards investigating the Pearl Harbor matter?

Admiral NOYES. One. Before the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Mr. MASTEN. That was in July 1944, about?

Admiral NOYES. December.

Mr. MASTEN. December 1944?

Admiral NOYES. Yes; in San Francisco.

Mr. MASTEN. In San Francisco?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. Where had you been immediately prior to your appearance before that board?

Admiral NOYES. I was then a senior member of the Board of Inspection and Survey, West Coast—Pacific Coast.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, the office of Naval Communications—

Admiral NOYES. May I add something, sir?

Mr. MASTEN. Excuse me.

Admiral NOYES. I was approached by the Hewitt Board [12561] or, rather, I was given an opportunity to appear before them if I wished to make any changes in any testimony I had given to the Naval Court of Inquiry, but at that time I had nothing to say.

Mr. MASTEN. It is my recollection that all, or part of your testimony in the Navy proceeding was incorporated in the record of the Hewitt proceeding.

Admiral NOYES. I would have made three minor changes if I had known then what I do now.

Mr. MASTEN. What would those have been, Admiral, do you recall?

Admiral NOYES. In regard to the cards for the winds code; in regard to the telephone message from one of the watch officers about a false winds message; and about my knowledge about the first 13 parts.

Mr. MASTEN. We will come to that a little bit later. At the time we mention it, will you state what changes you would have made in any part of what you have previously testified?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, in November and December 1941, the Office of Naval Communications was one of the principal divisions of the Office of Naval Operations, was it not?

[12562] Admiral NOYES. It was one of the coordinate divisions. All divisions are supposed to be coordinate.

Mr. MASTEN. On a par with the War Plans Division and the Division of Intelligence?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. And you were Admiral Stark's principal adviser on matters relating to naval communications, were you not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. Did your work as head of that office bring you into contact more closely with certain of the division heads than others; that is, Admiral Wilkinson or Admiral Turner?

Admiral NOYES. You are speaking of the pre-Pearl Harbor period?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. Yes; more closely with Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner than the other divisions.

Mr. MASTEN. At that time, the principal function of your office was the maintenance of the Navy's communication system, was it not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. In a sense, you were the Navy's Western Union at that time?

[12563] Admiral NOYES. Western Union and A. T. & T.

Mr. MASTEN. In addition to those duties, your office included the unit that was under Captain Safford, known as the Communications Security Unit, or some such name?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. And a part of that unit was the translation section headed by Captain Kramer?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. At whose initiative was Captain Kramer appointed to that work?

Admiral NOYES. I found him there when I reported.

Mr. MASTEN. At the time you became Director of Naval Communications?

Admiral NOYES. That is my recollection.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, who was your Assistant Director of Naval Communications during the period just prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral NOYES. Then Capt. J. R. Redman.

[12654] Mr. MASTEN. Did he come into the office after you came in, or was he there before?

Admiral NOYES. After.

Mr. MASTEN. What was what might be called the chain of command as regards the Communications Intelligence Unit? Did you issue orders directly to Captain Safford in matters pertaining to his unit, or did you issue orders to Captain Redman and then he passed them on to Captain Safford?

Admiral NOYES. I was the Chief of the Division and Captain Redman was my assistant, second in command, the Executive Officer, Chief of Staff, whatever you might call it. I dealt directly with the heads of sections, who acted in my place. I could give instructions to him, or in handling a certain amount of detail, he could carry it out without referring to me.

Mr. MASTEN. When you were absent, Captain Redman would be in charge of the Office of Naval Communications?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. To what extent were you familiar with the day-to-day operations of Captain Safford's unit?

Admiral NOYES. I tried to be familiar with all that was going on, that was my responsibility. I did not exactly follow you on the question, as to how much detail I could keep track of.

[12565] Mr. MASTEN. Would it be only matters that he would bring to you that you would be informed regarding, or on occasion would you find it necessary to raise questions with him as to the daily operation of his unit?

Admiral NOYES. It was desired to have a considerable amount of decentralization. There was a great deal of detail to Captain Safford's section. In addition to the part in which you are interested, magic, we had a tremendous job in our own codes and ciphers, for which he was responsible.

Mr. MASTEN. Captain Safford was also responsible for that work?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, or his office.

Mr. MASTEN. Turning to the interception and decryption of the Japanese messages, we know from the testimony before the committee that the Navy was maintaining a system of monitoring stations for the interception of those messages. You were familiar, were you not, with that system?

Admiral NOYES. I was, except—

Mr. MASTEN. Except what?

Admiral NOYES. Except the intercept stations were part of the Navy system. They had not been established for this specific purpose.

Mr. MASTEN. And did they take their orders directly from Washington through Captain Safford?

[12566] Admiral NOYES. We had what is called in the Navy operational control of all the systems, somewhat similar to the telephone tie-up. You have to have a net. There must be some over-all control of the entire system. Each station—as Commander Rochefort mentioned, he reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief, Commander Fourteenth Naval District, but he got over-all directions from Washington.

Mr. MASTEN. Now in addition to the intercepting system of monitoring stations, did the Navy Department also maintain facilities in Washington and at Corregidor and Pearl Harbor for decrypting Japanese messages? Captain Rochefort has been testifying as to how it was done at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. You were familiar with the assignments and facilities available at Pearl Harbor and at Corregidor, were you not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. What was your understanding, prior to December 7, as to what could be decrypted in Pearl Harbor, of the diplomatic traffic?

Admiral NOYES. What Captain Rochefort said.

Mr. MASTEN. That is to say, you understood that there were no facilities at Pearl Harbor for decryption of Japanese messages in the purple code?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

[12567] Mr. MASTEN. And in the code known as J-19, that was your understanding prior to December 7?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral Kimmel has contended before the committee that the Japanese diplomatic intercepts which were decrypted in Washington—some of them—should have been sent to Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Turner has stated before the committee that it was his understanding there were facilities at Pearl Harbor which permitted the people at Pearl Harbor to read the Japanese diplomatic messages. Did Admiral Turner or Admiral Stark ever discuss that matter with you?

The CHAIRMAN. We will suspend just a moment.

(Short interruption.)

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral, you were about to say whether or not Admiral Turner or Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Stark had ever had any conversations with you as to the facilities available for the decryption of diplomatic messages in Pearl Harbor.

Admiral NOYES. I know the question. I think it has already been stated by Admiral Turner that he discovered he was mistaken. I think if you look at his testimony, on page 419 of the Navy narrative, you will see that he is speaking of what we call radio intelligence, which is the activity that Captain Rochefort has been discussing. It [12568] does not involve knowing the contents of the messages. It involves direction finding, to find the location of ships, the analysis of the transmissions they monitored, and call signs on messages in code, which, although you cannot read, you can form a good estimate of what the ships are doing from the call signs and the direction alone. That is called a traffic analysis. The ultimate was the question of the carriers, when the traffic became zero.

Mr. MASTEN. Now did you ever make any statements to Admiral Turner that Admiral Kimmel was able to read the translated or decrypted messages in purple code at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral NOYES. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief, because I had been the one who had proposed, when we had one machine available—I had to get approval from Admiral Stark to send it to Cavite, and I knew perfectly well that they could decipher the diplomatic traffic and send it to Honolulu.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you now recall that at any time prior to December 7 Admiral Turner made any statements to you which would have indicated at the time that he understood that Admiral Kimmel had the means of decrypting purple traffic?

Admiral NOYES. I do not.

Mr. MASTEN. You account for his apparent misunderstanding [12569] ing as confusion in his mind between the decrypting and handling of the traffic that you spoke of and the diplomatic, the Jap-

anese diplomatic code? In other words, do you think that he had those two types of information confused in his mind?

Admiral NOYES. That is merely my opinion.

Mr. MASTEN. That is merely your opinion?

Admiral NOYES. Yes. I think it is the only way in which I could see that a misunderstanding could have occurred, plus the fact that his original testimony referred to traffic analyses, which had nothing to do with the reading of the text, of enemy messages.

Mr. MASTEN. Now turning to the exchange of purple information between Manila and Washington and Pearl Harbor, to what extent was the station in Manila expected to forward in to Washington the information which it derived from the interception and decryption of Japanese purple messages at Manila? Will you state in a general way the arrangement between Manila and Washington for any such exchange of information?

[12570] Admiral NOYES. Originally there were no facilities at Cavite for decrypting diplomatic traffic, it all had to be forwarded to Washington. I might say that starting in 1939, when I first came, what little we were doing was not of immediate importance and mail was used almost entirely for forwarding the intercepts.

As Pearl Harbor approached, as December approached and the crisis, that was speeded up more and more.

Mr. MASTEN. May I interrupt you there, Admiral. Are you speaking of forwarding the messages still in the Japanese code or after decryption in English?

Admiral NOYES. Originally they could only be forwarded in the Japanese code.

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. I think it was early—may I look at this dispatch that you have there.

I should say that about March 1941 one machine became available and it was decided to send it to Cavite.

Mr. MASTEN. And after that anything that came into Washington from Cavite was decrypted and in English?

Admiral NOYES. If they could handle it. All this enemy interception is not an open and shut proposition. Many messages we never could translate. We were very fortunate to get what we did.

[12571] Mr. MASTEN. Was it the practice for Manila to send on to Washington, in the encoded Japanese, what they could not handle in Manila in order that Washington could have an opportunity to decode it?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. And did they also send to Washington in English the messages which they did decode in Manila?

Admiral NOYES. The object of putting the machine at Cavite, which was the best listening post we had, was to cut out the transmission between Cavite and Washington, let them decrypt the messages there, throw out the unimportant ones and forward in Navy cipher the important ones, or by ML the important ones, to Washington, depending on the importance.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, to what extent was the reverse true, to what extent did Washington send to Cavite decrypted messages that had been decrypted here in Washington?

Admiral NOYES. I think testimony has been given as to the division of responsibility between Navy Intelligence and Communications in regard to the enemy intercepted messages. The function of Naval Communications was to obtain understandable messages from the original material. That was turned over to Naval Intelligence for distribution. It was their function to evaluate or distribute it to the [12572] proper people, everything in its final form. We only exchanged messages to assist the other station. For example, if Cavite had found that they had gotten started on a message and found a reference which they didn't have, to another message, and they were stuck on continuing their translation, breaking down this message, they would ask Washington for this reference which they had found and that would be sent out to assist them.

Mr. MASTEN. That would be sent out translated in English, would it not?

Admiral NOYES. Probably.

Mr. MASTEN. When it was sent would it be sent for the information of Admiral Kimmel as well as for action to Admiral Hart, or however you would describe it at that time?

Admiral NOYES. It would be sent for the use of the people who were decrypting some message which they had. It wouldn't be sent for information to anybody.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, I will ask you to look at Exhibit 37, pages 6 through 10. Exhibit 37 contains various basic dispatches from the Navy Department in Washington to Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart, and these dispatches on pages 6 through 10 contain specifically, do they not, material derived from intercepted Japanese diplomatic [12573] messages in the purple code?

The first one is dated 7 July, the one on page 6; the next is also on 7 July; the next is 15 July; the next is 17 July; and the last one, on page 10, is dated 19 July, and they all appear to have been sent from the Navy Department in Washington for action of Admiral Hart and for information of Admiral Kimmel, and they all specifically refer to particular intercepts, do they not?

Admiral NOYES. They do, although they are not exact translations, but apparently just briefs of what appeared.

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. I would say those are not actual messages that you were referring to.

Mr. MASTEN. These are not messages that were sent to aid Admiral Hart in translating?

Admiral NOYES. This is straight intelligence.

Mr. MASTEN. According to the photostats from which this Exhibit was prepared, the message on page 6 was released by Captain Kramer by direction of Captain Safford; the message on page 7 was released by Captain Kramer also by direction of Captain Safford; the message on page 8 was released by you; the message on page 9 was released by Captain Kramer by your direction, as also in the case of the message on page 10.

[12574] Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, for the information of the committee will you explain what is meant by the use of the phrase "released by" on these Navy forms? Does that mean that you decided to send the message

or does that mean that it was final clearance for sending it, that final clearance was given by the people that I have just referred to?

Admiral NOYES. Each office of the Navy Department had officers authorized to release messages and we only insisted that a message be authenticated by the authorized officer. We had one very strict rule. The basis of all our handling of these enemy intercepted messages was the extreme importance of allowing no inkling to reach the Japanese that we could read their messages. That would have ruined everything.

We had a strict rule and endeavored to carry it out that nothing should ever appear in any kind of ordinary Navy traffic which referred to the fact that we could read any Japanese messages. We had a special cipher, a special security cipher, which any reference to magic was supposed to be in, in which it was supposed to be decrypted, and I or some of my subordinates were the only ones that released messages in that system. I would have released in that system, if anyone wished to, I would have been directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or requested by [12575] the Director of Naval Intelligence, or by War Plans, to transmit the messages in this form, and any one of those forms, I would have immediately sent them in cipher, provided they wished to refer, as they did, to the fact of their origin.

If they could express it as intelligence without referring in any way where the information was to be obtained, for example, the expression of "reliable source," that doesn't give away the secret, that could have been sent in ordinary naval dispatch.

Mr. MASTEN. This special cipher that you had—when one of these messages was sent which either paraphrased or quoted directly from a Japanese purple message, was there any danger in your opinion that that special Navy code would be broken by someone else?

In other words, did you have any feeling of danger in revealing the secret of magic when you forwarded messages from Washington to Admiral Hart in that special cipher?

Admiral NOYES. We didn't like it particularly. We would have preferred never to cross up any reference to Japanese messages in our own codes, because, particularly in any long message, it is the greatest opening to a crypt analyst to break a cipher or code, the fact that he knows something has been sent; but actually by keeping [12576] the traffic down as we did in this particular cipher, it could not be. The cipher was not used even by my own communication watch officer. We had a special watch who were the only ones that could read the cipher. When messages came in in this cipher, the regular communications watch officers had to send it down to the special watch to be translated. They never saw it.

Mr. MASTEN. If you look at pages 11 and 15 of the same Exhibit 37, those are two messages also in July, the first one on the 19th of July, the second on the 20th, from COM-16, which was the naval district in the Philippines, was it not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. To Washington. And those also refer specifically to intercepts, Japanese intercepts in the purple code, do they not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. So that these are representative of messages that were exchanged during July between Washington and Manila containing information derived from the purple code?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. I had nothing to do with the preparation of this document. I am accepting them as they stand.

[12577] Mr. MASTEN. We understand.

Admiral NOYES. I can't remember now whether those are all the messages. There are no originals there. There is nothing I have to go by.

Mr. MASTEN. Were there any messages comparable to these on pages 6 through 10 which were sent after July and prior to December 1, 1941, and which referred specifically to, or quoted from, Japanese diplomatic intercepts? There are none in this Exhibit 37 but I am asking whether you recall any others?

Admiral NOYES. Let me see.

Mr. MASTEN. It won't be necessary to look through. You will have to accept my assurance that there are none that refer specifically to purple messages in this particular Exhibit.

But do you now recall any, so if we don't have them here we can get them?

Admiral NOYES. No, I do not. I couldn't recall any.

Mr. MASTEN. If you look at pages 40 and 41 of Exhibit 37, the first one on page 40 is the message from Washington for action of CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM14 and COM16. This starts off "Highly reliable information has been——"

Admiral NOYES. Which one is that?

Mr. MASTEN. One page 40, Exhibit 37.

[12578] Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. Starting off:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

That also was based upon information from purple sources, was it not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

[12579] Mr. MASTEN. Similarly in the case of the message on the next page, page 41, that specifically refers to the number designation of the circular from Tokyo, does it not?

Admiral NOYES. It does.

Mr. MASTEN. So that we have a situation where, during July messages were sent in this special code to which you have referred between Washington and Manila for the information of Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii, which specifically referred to magic and quoted from magic, and no other messages after July were sent until December; is that not correct? Which referred to magic?

Admiral NOYES. You are asking me to accept something that I had nothing to do with.

Mr. MASTEN. I am asking whether you recall any during the period from July to December 1.

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection now of individual messages.

Mr. MASTEN. But it is also true that during that same period, as shown by, for example, the warning message of November 27, messages went out which contained information from magic and did not specifically refer to the magic source?

Admiral NOYES. That is true. I would have very much preferred that that be done. We always preferred that [12580] the message be sent out, like the message you referred to, giving the information, but not stating its source, rather than in these direct quotations.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, were there any rules established in your division or was there any rule set up in the Navy Department, which expressly prevented or instructed against the sending of messages after July referring to magic and the source from which the information came?

Admiral NOYES. I know of no specific rule. I would say that—I think there has been testimony before this committee that we had several worries about the fact—the Japanese finding out the fact that we were reading their code, or at least one, and we had others where we were afraid that they were finding out that we were reading their codes, which, of course, caused us to be more careful in what we were doing.

Mr. MASTEN. You say there were no specific rules. Was there any policy established in the Navy Department against that?

Admiral NOYES. The basic policy was that, as I mentioned before, direct reference to the fact of our being able to read Japanese messages should never be referred to in ordinary Navy traffic.

Mr. MASTEN. Was that a rule or a policy that you [12581] established in your division, or was that established elsewhere in the Navy Department.

Admiral NOYES. It is one I inherited when I came to the place.

Mr. MASTEN. So that if messages that were being sent out for the information of those two posts, Manila and Hawaii, included information based upon purple intercepts, you would have sent it if you had been instructed by Admiral Wilkinson or Admiral Turner or Admiral Stark, or Admiral Ingersoll; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. If a message came to me, or if it came to the communications watch officer, released by proper authority, it might very well have gone. All of the messages in the Navy Department didn't pass through me. I couldn't visa all messages before they went out. It was generally understood that the people involved in this sort of thing knew what the rules were.

Mr. MASTEN. Well, did all messages that went by radio from Washington to Hawaii or the Philippines go through your office or did the Navy Department use other radio means?

Admiral NOYES. Every message that went out from the Navy Department, every official dispatch, passed through the [12582] Navy Department's communications office, which was one of my activities, but it was a 24-hour-a-day function; they were handling at that time—I got the data the other day. I think it was 4,100 messages a day.

Mr. MASTEN. By naval communications means?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. From Washington?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, you say there were other means by which this information could be sent. Are you referring to mail dispatches, or courier dispatches, or what else did you have in mind?

Admiral NOYES. Yes; we had a special arrangement with Pan American by which the pilot carried in a locked box, to which he did not have the key, messages for Honolulu.

Mr. MASTEN. How frequently did messages go by that system?

Admiral NOYES. I couldn't say.

Mr. MASTEN. Weekly?

Admiral NOYES. That was not necessarily for the purpose of sending these messages. It was a general means of communication. We would not have used ordinary air mail for any of this sort of thing on account of the danger.

Mr. MASTEN. Was this courier system regarded as safer [12583] than the special radio codes to which you referred a few minutes ago, in connection with these other messages that went from Washington?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. Did you consider there was less likelihood of the knowledge leaking out that we were breaking the Japanese code?

Admiral NOYES. Of course, we would have put anything we sent by the courier into a Navy cipher before we sent it so that we wouldn't have been much worse off if we had lost them than if it had been intercepted on the air.

Mr. MASTEN. And if anything went by this naval courier, which involved magic, you would have presumably used this special cipher which you referred to a few minutes ago?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. One of the greatest dangers of the communications business is the security side of it; we were responsible for both things. We had to protect our own codes and ciphers, and we were endeavoring to break the enemy codes and ciphers, and we had certain rules that we went by. We knew what we could do, and we avoided giving them the same opening. A large amount of traffic is one of the worst things that can be done, one of the worst offenses that can be committed against the security of any means of communication.

[12584] Mr. MASTEN. At page 11157 of our transcript appears this message, which I will ask you to look at. It is dated December 1, and it is an additional message conveying purple information from Washington to the Philippines for the information of Admiral Kimmel.

Down at the bottom of the message there is a certification that that is a true copy of an encrypted message in the files of the Navy Department. I would like to ask you this:

Was it customary when a message was sent from Washington to Manila which contained purple information, or information derived from Japanese purple messages, was it customary to leave in the files of the Navy Department the outgoing message only in the Navy code, or were copies of the message left in other files of your division?

In other words, I am interested in finding this: Would we be able to find other messages which went from Washington to the Philippines by making a further search through the encrypted messages in the files of the Navy Department, or was it also the practice to leave the translated versions in some of the files of your division?

Admiral NOYES. I couldn't say what the details of the filing were; I couldn't say at this date what the details of the filing system were

then. I notice this is not the [12585] original of the message, but has been translated by someone from the coded copy, so I don't know who originated it.

Mr. MASTEN. You know of no practice whereby when a message containing purple was sent from Washington, the only file copy of that was kept in the Navy code as a matter of precaution?

Admiral NOYES. Anything that referred to the purple code should not have appeared in the ordinary Navy filing system. It should have gone in a special channel which was kept entirely separate from this sort of stuff.

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by "this sort of stuff"?

Admiral NOYES. It is an ordinary naval dispatch which went in, it is a secret dispatch that went in a Navy cipher.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, I have here, Admiral, a message, No. 281500 dated March 25, 1941, from Opnav to Com 16 for the information of Cincaf, and Chief of Staff, United States Army, which reads as follows:

Following plan of coordination between Asiatic communication intelligence units of Army and Navy proposed X Army intercept unit furnish Navy decrypting unit copies of all intercepts in orange diplomatic systems forwarding same [12586] by land wire or other rapid and secure means X Com 16 furnish Commanding General Philippine Department translations of above messages—

There are some words stricken out here. Do you know what they are?

These two words?

Admiral NOYES. The original draft said "of interest to the Army," and it is corrected to say, "the translations of above messages be delivered."

Mr. MASTEN. Will you continue and read the balance of the message?

Admiral NOYES (reading):

Details to be worked out locally X Foregoing is additional to forwarding of intercepts to Washington by both services X Deliver Commanding General exact translation this message.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, would you also read into the record, Admiral, this second message of the same date?

Admiral NOYES. It is addressed from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the Philippine Department and Commandant Sixteenth Naval District.

Chief of Naval Operations and Army Chief of Staff authorize Commanding General Philippine Department and [12587] Commandant 16 Naval District to confer on subject matter of Opnav 281500.

Mr. MASTEN. Will you explain the purpose of the arrangement that is set up there, which applies only, as I understand it, to the Philippines and to the Com. 16 situation?

Admiral NOYES. Originally, the Army and Navy had worked independently in regard to magic. The Army had their intercept stations and the Navy had theirs, and we each had a unit which was only for the purpose of training cryptographers, cryptanalysts.

Early in 1941, General Mauborgne, Chief Signal Officer of the Army, who was my opposite number in the War Department, and I, had a conference in regard to avoiding duplication and pooling our interests in this matter.

At about this time we had been able to send a machine to Cavite and this arrangement was set up in order to cut down the amount of transmission to Washington and speed up the entire operation.

Mr. MASTEN. So this was, in effect, an arrangement to keep the Army and the Navy in the Philippines informed as to what each was doing in regard to the interception and decryption of Japanese diplomatic messages; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. As far as the diplomatic traffic was [12588] concerned, the object was to improve the system of getting the diplomatic information to Washington, rather than for the local value. They were given the benefit of it by giving them the authority to exchange locally. They were able to cut out the transmission back and forth, or at least back from Washington, of matters that were of interest to them.

[12589] Mr. MASTEN. Now, did this proposal and this method originate in your division, or was this a suggestion which originated elsewhere in the Navy Department and which you simply passed on as the man who was charged with communicating messages to the Philippines?

Admiral NOYES. Well, on our level there were four of us involved: The G-2 in the Army, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, Director of Naval Intelligence, and I. We four agreed on this plan as an improvement over the independent work we had been doing.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, was any similar plan to this set-up with respect to Hawaii that you recall?

Admiral NOYES. This plan could not have worked for Hawaii, because there was no machine available for Hawaii and, as I learned from listening to Comander Rochefort's testimony, they could not read another code, which was necessary.

Mr. MASTEN. But if there were advantages in making the information available in the Philippines with regard to the purple traffic, might there not have been similar advantages in Hawaii in arranging for exchange of information in connection with the messages that were being intercepted and handled and decrypted by the Army and the Navy in Hawaii?

Admiral NOYES. In the first place, we did not have another machine.

[12590] Mr. MASTEN. I realize that.

Admiral NOYES. And in the second place, as Commander Rochefort explained in his testimony, our plan was to have Hawaii concentrate on the naval codes, which was a large part of the business and what we were most behind on.

Mr. MASTEN. I was thinking of this: There is testimony before the committee that the Army station, which I believe was No. 5, intercepted certain messages which Captain Rochefort could have handled had they been made available to him by the Army. Now, do you recall whether or not any attempt was made, or any instructions sent from Washington, which would have permitted that interchange of information or intercepts, or which specifically directed it?

Admiral NOYES. No; I cannot recall. I should think that—in listening to Commander Rochefort's testimony I was surprised that there would have been anything intercepted in Hawaii that the Navy could translate that was not immediately passed to the Navy. I do not understand why that should not have been done.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You mean immediately passed to the Army?

Admiral NOYES. No. These are messages intercepted by the Army, as I understand it, which were forwarded to Washington, although there was one message that I don't think [12591] Commander Rochefort said they could have translated. They might have.

Mr. MASTEN. That was in this code J-19 about which he testified this morning.

Admiral NOYES. I would like to add to one thing Commander Rochefort said, which I am sure he would approve. You did not allow him to finish when he was describing the ciphers. He described a pure cipher to you, and then something came up and he did not go on.

I am sure he intended to add that we also speak of a cipher where there is a code book there. A key is applied to the code words or groups of figures in that book, and the key must be found out before you can get down to looking things up in a book. I am sure he would have said that if he had not been interrupted, and one of the big troubles was to recover the keys day by day, and that would require a certain amount of traffic before that could be done. It is very seldom that an individual message in anything can be translated. It requires, generally, a large number.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, turning to the handling of magic in the Navy Department. We have been discussing the exchange of information, and the method, back and forth between Washington and the Philippines and Hawaii. Turning now to the question of how the magic was handled in the Navy Department, the tes- [12592] timony shows that in the customary procedure a decrypted purple message would be taken to Captain Kramer's unit for translation and preparation of smooth copies for dissemination among those in the Navy Department who were entitled to receive them.

When was it customary for you to see the magic messages? That is, did Captain Kramer bring them to you before his dissemination or did you just learn of them afterward, or what was the practice in that regard?

Admiral NOYES. Maybe this is repetition but to make it quite clear, Captain Kramer was primarily a subordinate of the Director of Naval Intelligence and his primary duty was to act for the Director of Naval Intelligence in the distribution of the messages when they had been finished, when they were in readable form. He had an additional duty, somewhat, in getting them into readable form, the idea being to have one officer who carried right through horizontally through our two divisions.

Originally—that is, when I say originally—when I first came to the division in 1939 as Director of Naval Communications, there was only one copy made of any distributed messages. They were about 3 weeks old before we got any of them and the Director of Naval Intelligence took the book and carried it himself to the few persons that saw them.

[12593] Mr. MASTEN. Well, now, would he show that book to you before starting out on his distribution, or at what point did you come into the picture, if I may interrupt you?

Admiral NOYES. I was going to put that in.

Mr. MASTEN. All right, sir.

Admiral NOYES. That was the original plan and, therefore, the book was brought to me to O. K. before it went to him. I saw the book before he got in.

Mr. MASTEN. And that practice continued after the one-book method was abandoned and the several folders were prepared?

Admiral NOYES. No; it did not. One of our first efforts after September 1939 was to concentrate on speeding up the recovery of these intercepted messages, and between 1939 and December 1941 we got them down to where we were getting some messages in hours or a day or 2 days, and the volume had greatly increased. That is one of the points that I wish to change in my testimony. I said that after Pearl Harbor we changed to separate books. I am convinced from the testimony of Kramer, who delivered the books, and others that the change had already been made.

Mr. MASTEN. That is the testimony which you gave before the Navy court.

Admiral NOYES. The change had been made and I think it [12594] was made between October and November, when I was on temporary duty and absent, and that is the reason I did not remember the change.

Mr. MASTEN. Well, now, when Captain Kramer brought these messages to you and they were ready for distribution or dissemination, did you make any deletions from messages that he brought to you or did you pass on and give him to distribute all of the messages that he had translated? In other words, did you exercise any censorship over the messages that were distributed?

Admiral NOYES. I exercised no censorship. I scanned the messages for the purpose of seeing that they appeared to be in good—appeared to be authentic—in the first place. Second, for any indication that the Japanese had broken any of our codes. Several times I found indications that they referred to information, secret naval information, United States naval information. I always ran those cases down and every time it developed that they got the information somewhere else rather than by breaking one of our codes.

I also criticized my subordinates; required an explanation in regard to delays in messages. There was usually no criticism involved but I asked for an explanation as to why we had not gotten things sooner. Generally, it was because we could not read it.

[12595] Mr. MASTEN. So that your participation in the dissemination of the magic was simply the participation of one who was charged with the responsibility for getting it out to those others? In other words, you made no attempt to evaluate the messages or censor them in any way. Everything went out that your people decrypted and translated; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. There is only one other point that bears on it. There was an understanding between the Director of Naval Intelligence and myself that if at any time the other was involved when an important, when something important came up, that the other would act for him because we were closer than anyone else to it. We both understood each other's duties, and if, for example, some important message had come up and the Director of Naval Intelligence was involved, instead of going to his subordinate Kramer would have come direct to me and I would have taken it up immediately to the Chief of Naval Opera-

tions. However, that had no bearing on this particular period because at that time it had been decentralized among the several bureaus, and the Chief of Naval Communications went direct to him, and at the same time the Director of Naval Intelligence went to him direct.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, you mentioned a few minutes ago the question of delays in translations. What specific steps do you recall that were taken prior to December 7 which were directed [12596] toward speeding up the decrypts and translations, or increasing your staff to that end?

Admiral NOYES. The first thing we did was to—we conferred on this matter in September 1939. As I say, it was taking us about 3 weeks to get anything out—and made an analysis, an office analysis. Our bottleneck really was the translators, so we made every effort to acquire more translators, but they were very difficult to find because, in addition to being reasonable Japanese students, it was necessary to have them of unquestioned loyalty to the United States, and we could not afford to take a chance on anyone whose record was not entirely clear.

We found that with the competition of the Army and the State Department and some other Government departments the supply of Japanese translators in the United States was very small.

Mr. MASTEN. By December 7, do you recall how many translators you had in your Division?

Admiral NOYES. I heard Captain Kramer say the other day six. I do not know of my own knowledge that that is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Did that represent an increase during the immediately preceding period?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. In how many you had had on January 1, 1941?

[12597] Admiral NOYES. Well, I don't think we had found more than a couple. I should say we probably added two in the whole period.

Mr. MASTEN. Now I would like to turn to this question of the winds message, Admiral Noyes. I would like to have you look at page 154 of Exhibit 1, pages 154 and 155, which contain the messages establishing the winds codes. You were familiar with those, were you not, at the time they were intercepted and translated?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, following the receipt of those two messages, what steps were taken in your division to make sure that an implementing message, if it was sent, would be picked up?

Admiral NOYES. At my direction Captain Safford made certain assignments of frequencies to be covered by our intercepting stations—the same was done by the Army and through the Army by FCC—in order to intercept any message which might include this winds code.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you recall whether there were any written orders issued in that respect?

Admiral NOYES. I do not.

Mr. MASTEN. Probably it was done orally?

Admiral NOYES. I think so. Everything about the enemy intercepts was kept out of writing as much as possible. [12598] That is one reason it is difficult to find records.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you recall the question of these cards that Captain Kramer was instructed to prepare, on which were to be written the English translation of the code words and what they would mean?

Admiral NOYES. I do now.

Mr. MASTEN. You mentioned it a few minutes ago, earlier in your testimony.

Admiral NOYES. I testified previously I did not recall them, the reason I should think being that, as I understood the question, I was asked if we had cards in the office and I could not see any reason why we should have done that.

Captain Safford explained to me this summer that we had these cards so that we could telephone to people at home and just mention "weather." Of course, we never used the telephone for anything which had to do with intercepted messages and by having the cards with the English expression "East wind, rain," we could call up Admiral Stark and say that a message had come in—we had a weather report of "rain with an east wind" and he would have understood what it meant.

Mr. MASTEN. So that this card system was a special code in the Navy Department to enable you to discuss this matter over the telephone, was that the original purpose of it?

Admiral NOYES. It was a code to enable the watch officer [12599] in the Navy Department or me to talk over the telephone—to transmit that information at night or at odd hours to leading people at home.

Mr. MASTEN. If the information for which the Department was looking had come in during the daytime or at a time when you were at your office, there would have been no occasion to use these cards; it would simply have come direct to you?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Did you issue any instructions that any winds execute message, if received, should be brought directly to you?

Admiral NOYES. Reasonably direct. There was no reason that it should not pass through Captain Safford. It did not need to pass through anybody else, because the watch officers understood it and it was just a case of an expression appearing and it did not require any translation. I knew the words, I knew the Japanese words. The English meaning did not make any difference to us.

Mr. MASTEN. You say it was just a case of an expression appearing. Wasn't it also necessary to see the entire context of the message in which the words appeared?

Admiral NOYES. That is true. It had to appear in a certain way. It had to appear, this one to which you refer—

Mr. MASTEN. Page 154.

[12600] Admiral NOYES. It had to be repeated twice in the middle of a short-wave broadcast.

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather broadcast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers—

and so forth.

At the beginning it said:

The following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast—

which is the same thing that you will hear over WINX hourly in this city.

Mr. MASTEN. In the case of the code established by the message on page 154, which is circular 2353, did you expect that that would come in in voice or in Morse?

Admiral NOYES. In voice. In voice because that is what the message said:

The daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

As I say, a good example of that is given in WINX on an hourly broadcast by voice which people would listen to. The other message—do you know what page the other one is on?

Mr. MASTEN. The next following, on page 155.

Admiral NOYES. Oh, yes. In that, they only use the first words, the words that mean "East, North and West," which [12601] were at the end of the general intelligence broadcast, and I believe those could have come in the Morse broadcast, which is the dot-dash. You can hear it on the same receiver, but we knew in general what the schedule was.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, while it is perfectly true that under circular 2353 it was to be in a short-wave news broadcast, was there not a possibility that that short-wave news broadcast might be sent out from Tokyo in the Morse code?

Admiral NOYES. I don't see how. You can only have a broadcast when people know when it is coming, just the same as, to use the analogy here, you would have to listen all day long if you did not know when the news was being sent. Now, if you say that you are going to put something in a news broadcast on a certain schedule and then you send it at some other time, then you certainly cannot depend on anybody hearing it who is familiar with the schedule.

Mr. MASTEN. So that as far as your opinion at the time is concerned, you wish the committee to understand that you expected any implementing message under 2353 to be a voice broadcast?

Admiral NOYES. I did and, furthermore, I expected it to be a voice broadcast in accordance with this.

Mr. MASTEN. With the other conditions.

Admiral NOYES. "Daily Japanese language short wave news [12602] broadcast." If they changed their short wave news broadcast to a Morse transmission, that would have changed the code along with it, but at the time it was being sent by voice. The guiding point was what they said, that it would appear in the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast, and the Japanese are most meticulous in carrying out their own instructions.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, under this arrangement that you set up, would it have been necessary for a winds execute message, if received, to have passed through Captain Kramer's hands?

Admiral NOYES. No.

Mr. MASTEN. It would have been brought directly to you, or to Captain Safford and then to you?

Admiral NOYES. I should think so. There is no reason that Captain Kramer should not have been consulted, but if a correct message had ever come in nobody would have needed to be consulted. If

there had not been a question about it, I could have told just by being shown it.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, under the system which was set up who was to be the final judge of whether or not a message was a genuine winds execute message under either of these two circulars that we have mentioned?

Admiral NOYES. Well, I was the Director of Naval Communications. I was supposed to be the deciding factor over my [12603] subordinates if there was any question.

Mr. MASTEN. And in deciding whether or not an alleged winds execute message was genuine would you have taken into account these various points you have mentioned that appear in circular 2353, is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. That is what I did do.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, did anybody—

Admiral NOYES. If you do not mind, if you will refer to that FFC, it is on page —

Mr. MASTEN. It is item 3d right at the top, in the right-hand corner.

Admiral NOYES. That is what I expected to come as an executed winds message, assuming that it is repeated at the end.

Mr. MASTEN. You are referring now to item 3-D of Exhibit No. 142?

Admiral NOYES. Item No. 3-d, document No. 4.

Mr. MASTEN. Document No. 4, yes.

Admiral NOYES. Sent as in the right-hand column, which is in Japanese, expressed in "Kana".

Mr. MASTEN. With the phrase repeated twice?

Admiral NOYES. The English translation is, "This is in the middle of the news." He went out of his way to state that it was in the middle of the news, to comply with those [12604] instructions and that here it should be in the middle of the news, so that somebody would not say that it was too far and miss it—

but today, at this point specially I will give the weather forecast: West Wind, clear—West Wind, Clear.

The other station did the same thing in almost the same words, just changed the point of the wording, of the word "specially." Now, I would say that, assuming that that was repeated again at the end, that that was an authentic broadcast in this cipher, in this code.

Mr. MASTEN. This document that you are looking at is the one which is described as a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Federal Communication Commission monitors from Tokyo stations between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Col. C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. eastern standard time, December 7, 1941.

I am reading from the certification of Mr. Slowie, item 3 of this Exhibit.

Now, before we discuss anything further, I would like to ask you this. At any time prior to December 7, 1941, did anyone bring to you, or call your attention to, a message which they said was or appeared to be a genuine winds execute message and which, [12605] after consideration by you, was so regarded? In other words, did you see, prior to December 7, 1941, a genuine winds execute message under either of these two circulars, 2353 and 2354?

Admiral NOYES. You asked me about two things. You asked did I receive a false one and did I receive a correct one.

Mr. MASTEN. Let us confine it just to the latter part. Did you receive a genuine one?

Admiral NOYES. I did see messages that were brought to me because they were supposed to be, but I never saw one which checked out as being an authentic message.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 12:30. We will recess until 1:30. Admiral, be back at that time.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[12606]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order, please. Counsel may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. LEIGH NOYES, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral, just before the recess I asked you whether prior to December 7 any genuine winds execute message was brought to you, or to your attention, by anyone in the Navy Department.

Admiral NOYES. There was not.

Mr. MASTEN. Your answer to that question is, there was not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. If there had been, would that have been a matter of importance so that you would now remember it?

Admiral NOYES. Up to December 3 it would have been a matter of importance. On December 3 we received an intercepted message, which is in the exhibit—

Mr. MASTEN. Exhibit 1.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, which informed us that the Japanese were destroying their codes. Sent out on December 2, No. 867.

Mr. MASTEN. Will you identify the page, Admiral?

Admiral NOYES. Page 215. I think that is the one.

Mr. MASTEN. That is message No. 867?

[12607] Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. And what effect did that have on how you regarded the question of intercepting a winds execute message?

Admiral NOYES. We sent that message out to all people concerned, and thereafter there was no particular importance to an execute of the winds message except in a cumulative way.

Mr. MASTEN. So that you regard the sending from Tokyo of the instructions to burn the codes of the Japanese representatives as for all practical purposes nullifying the importance of the search for a winds execute message; is that what the committee is to understand?

Admiral NOYES. No, I don't think that that way, I am quite sure, from what I heard testified to, for instance, in Honolulu, I don't think the orders were immediately countermanded, I don't think they would have been, because this coverage was, at any time something else might have come up, and we had a system which covered pretty well Japanese transmissions.

Mr. MASTEN. But the receipt of this message instructing the Japanese representatives to burn their codes did lessen the importance in your mind, at any rate, of the interception of a winds execute message?

Admiral NOYES. Of this particular east wind rain message, [12608] yes.

Mr. KEEFE. What message are you referring to, east wind rain? Are you referring to that code set-up when you make that statement?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You are not referring to the message that is alleged to have been delivered by Captain Safford?

Admiral NOYES. That is what is alleged to have been delivered to me.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I want to know whether that answer relates to the message which Safford delivered. We haven't gotten to the point where it is shown one was delivered.

Mr. MASTEN. We haven't come to that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, counsel is doing a good job.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not critical of counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. He will do a better one if he is not interrupted.

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral, the question was whether or not after December 3 and the receipt of this message from Tokyo instructing the Japanese representatives to burn their codes, you regarded the interception of a winds execute message of as great importance as you had before you received the message regarding the code burning, and I take it your answer to that is, that it was not of as great importance [12609] after December 3?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, before the recess we referred to document 4, item 3 (d) of Exhibit 142, and you stated that you regarded that as a genuine winds execute message under circular 2353; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. Assuming it was repeated again at the end of the message.

Mr. MASTEN. Yes. This document does not show whether or not it was repeated at the end of the message.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. But did you check at the time, or was this communicated to you at the time so that you could check as to whether or not it had been repeated at the end of the message, do you remember?

Admiral NOYES. I do not remember the receipt of this specific message in detail. It occurred after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, then, prior to December 7, do you recall any instances when messages that were first thought to be winds execute messages were brought to you and were determined by you not to be genuine winds execute messages?

Admiral NOYES. I recall the fact that there were several but I do not recall the details.

[12610] Mr. MASTEN. How many occasions were there on which alleged winds execute messages were brought to you and it was left for you to determine whether or not they were genuine winds execute messages?

Admiral NOYES. I could not say. Few.

Mr. MASTEN. As many as half a dozen or a dozen?

Admiral NOYES. Not a dozen. Less than a half-dozen. Two or three, perhaps.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, Captain Safford has testified before this committee that a winds execute message was received on the morning of December 4. I am going to read you his testimony from his prepared statement in that regard. At page 9641 of our transcript Captain Safford testified as follows:

The winds message broadcast was about 200 words long, with the code words prescribed in Tokyo circular 2353 appearing in the middle of the message, whereas we had expected to find the code words of Tokyo circular 2354 in a Morse broadcast. All three "code words" were used, but the expression meaning "North Wind Cloudy" was in the negative form.

When I first saw the winds message, it had already been translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, in charge of the Translation Section of the Navy Department Communications [12611] Intelligence Unit. Kramer had underscored all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below the printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon in Kramer's handwriting, the following three translations:

War with England (including NEI, etc.)

War with the U. S.

Peace with Russia.

I am not sure of the order; but it was the same as in the broadcast and I think England appeared first. I think Kramer used "U. S." rather than "United States". It is possible that the words "no war", instead of "peace", were used to describe Japan's intentions with regard to Russia.

Then dropping down to the bottom of page 9642 he continued:

I immediately sent the original of the winds message up to the Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Noyes) by one of the officers serving under me and told him to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person, to track him down and not take "no" for an answer, and if he could not find him in a reasonable time to let me know. I did not explain the nature or significance of the winds message to this officer. In a few minutes I received a report to the effect that the message had been delivered.

[12612] Now, going back to the description which I have just read you, given by Captain Safford before this committee, do you have any recollection of ever seeing such a message as he describes?

Admiral NOYES. I don't believe that his description is good enough for me to answer that question. I will say, however, that the message which he describes is not an authentic execute of a winds message.

Mr. MASTEN. Why do you say it is not an authentic winds execute message?

Admiral NOYES. In the first place, for the reason, in my opinion, that it was not transmitted as the Japanese said it would be, which he passes over.

Mr. MASTEN. What do you mean by that?

Admiral NOYES. It was sent in Morse code and not by voice. Not on the schedule and not in the broadcast which they had said they would send it. Furthermore, his description of the meaning of the phrases, of course, is not correct. I think that has been discussed. About whether it meant war or not. But actually this one had nothing to do with "including the Netherlands East Indies," the circular that was set up—the one he says did—east wind rain.

Mr. MASTEN. 2353?

Admiral NOYES. Had no reference to Netherlands East Indies.

[12613] Mr. MASTEN. Now, what other reasons?

Admiral NOYES. That would have been the Morse one, which merely said north, east, and south. There is no such thing in Japanese, any more than there is in English, as negative nouns. We don't say, the Japanese don't say, "no north wind," they say what the wind is. It

wasn't provided in the code for any negative expression. The only thing in connection with that I have a recollection of, which is not very distinct, is that this question did come up of someone trying to make out of a translation that it meant "Peace with Russia," which is in common with what he said here.

Mr. MASTEN. Was that in connection with a message that you recall having been brought to you on December 4?

Admiral NOYES. I don't recall the date.

Mr. MASTEN. But you do remember some incident prior to December 7 having to do with whether "Peace with Russia" was a proper expression under the winds code?

Admiral NOYES. If I may take up another matter, it was, in another place, in a previous investigation, it was said that one of the watch officers telephoned to me at my home a possible winds execute message and I replied that that was a peculiar direction from which to have the wind blowing. I didn't remember that at the first investigation.

[12614] Captain Safford recalled to my recollection that that is what I had agreed I would say, that if I didn't agree over the telephone that the message was authentic. So if that is the message, that part fits together.

I believe that a message was presented to me which in some way mentioned Russia, which I was unwilling to accept.

Mr. MASTEN. Let's come back to the reasons why the particular message described by Captain Safford would not, in your opinion, have met the requirements of the winds code?

In the first place, you say you have no specific collection of this incident?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Then you say that if a message such as this had been brought to you, you would not have regarded it as an authentic winds execute for the reasons, first, that it was a Morse broadcast whereas you expected it to be a voice broadcast?

Admiral NOYES. Because it had been stated in the set-up that it would be, when these expressions were used it would be in a voice broadcast. In Circular 2354 there was not another set-up that could have been used in the Morse broadcast.

Mr. MASTEN. Your second reason was that the message [12615] as written, the interpretation as said to have been written by Captain Kramer at the bottom, "including N. E. I. etc." does not appear in Circular 2353; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, and also the fact——

Mr. MASTEN. Or in 2354, for that matter?

Admiral NOYES. This did not agree with 2353, which Captain Safford said it was intended to be. Captain Kramer also I believe stated that he would never have written "war" because he didn't consider, and so testified before the committee, that that was the correct Japanese translation of the set-up.

Mr. MASTEN. And your fourth reason is that the expression used in regard to Russia was in the negative form; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Which was not provided for under the circular establishing the code?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir; and there is nothing positive to show that it did appear in the middle of a broadcast so that it was repeated twice.

Mr. MASTEN. But the phrase "including N. E. I." might have been derived, might it not, from the dispatch you had received from Admiral Hart, [12616] which also appears in Exhibit 142, and in which he says he translates the intercept received from Singapore, the phrase "Nishi," as meaning England, including the occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya or N. E. I.

Admiral NOYES. That is right; that is 2354.

I will tell you, I think they did a poor job of a second-hand translation out there. I think they got it rather mixed up.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you recall whether by the morning of December 4, this message from Admiral Hart had been received? That is on page 1 (c) of Exhibit 142.

Admiral NOYES. Please repeat that.

Mr. MASTEN. I just wanted to get your recollection as to whether or not this message had been received in the Navy Department before the morning of December 4.

Admiral NOYES. It had. It should have been. It was transmitted on the 28th of November.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, Colonel Sadtler testified yesterday before the committee that on the morning of December 5 you telephoned him and said to him, "The message is in," or words to that effect, regarding a winds execute message.

Do you have any present recollection of having said that?

Admiral NOYES. No, I have not. We had a private tele- [12617] phone, secret telephone, from my desk to the desk of the Chief Signal Officer in the Army and we talked together a number of times a day. As to any particular conversation, I do not identify a conversation such as he testified to, although I wouldn't say it didn't occur.

Mr. KEEFE. What was the last part?

Admiral NOYES. I would not say that it didn't occur, because I talked to him several times a day.

Mr. MASTEN. At any rate you were in communication with him on matters such as this from time to time during the period prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct. I cannot see why I should have said "The" message, because, to my mind this was not "the" message. We had large numbers of messages to discuss. If anything the note which we were waiting for was more important on the date he says, the 5th, than this. Incidentally, his day is not the same as the date given by Captain Safford or Captain Kramer, which makes it difficult for me to identify a date in answering.

Mr. MASTEN. Well, now, would it have been your practice in deciding whether an alleged winds execute message was authentic or not, to have discussed the matter with Admiral Ingersoll, or Admiral Wilkinson, or Admiral Turner before making up your mind on the subject?

[12618] Admiral NOYES. Yes, particularly if I, if it met some requirement, and if it was approaching the borderline, I certainly would have discussed it with them.

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral Turner testified before this committee that on December 5 in the afternoon you telephoned him and told him

that a winds execute message translated "North wind clear," or perhaps "North wind cloudy" had been received in the Navy Department. Do you have any recollection of that incident?

Admiral NOYES. He says the afternoon of the 5th?

Mr. MASTEN. He said the afternoon of the 5th.

Admiral NOYES. Of course, Captain Safford says the morning of the 4th. I would say there was only one message that had a Russian slant. They are probably both talking about the same false message.

Mr. MASTEN. But you have no specific recollection of that particular incident?

Admiral NOYES. I have not, except that I have an indistinct recollection of a message—of going over this thing once before, that there is no such thing in Japanese as a negative noun.

Mr. MASTEN. Then would it be fair to summarize your testimony on this question of a winds execute message as follows, that prior to December 7 in your best recollection [12619] no authentic winds execute message was received in the Navy Department?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. That prior to December 7, a number, perhaps as many as a half dozen, alleged winds execute messages were brought to you and you decided, perhaps after consultation with Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Turner or Admiral Wilkinson, that the messages were not authentic winds messages?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, except I would say that some of the ones brought to me were brought with a subordinate saying himself that he was sure it couldn't be correct.

In other words, already questioned by one of the watch officers, or Captain Safford.

[12620] Mr. MASTEN. Were the watch officers supposed to bring them directly to you, or to take them to Captain Safford, if an alleged message came in?

Admiral NOYES. They took them to him if he was there.

Mr. MASTEN. If he was there.

Admiral NOYES. I imagine.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you recall having had anything to do after December the 7th with the preparation of a folder of intercepted Japanese messages to be submitted to the Roberts Commission?

Admiral NOYES. I received orders from the Secretary of the Navy, probably via the Chief of Naval Operations, to prepare such a folder for the Roberts Commission and I passed that order on to my subordinates and checked the folder after it was presented to me.

Mr. MASTEN. Did that folder include an execute message under either of the codes establishing the winds code?

Admiral NOYES. It did not. It was supposed to contain no magic or any reference to it.

Mr. KEEFE. What was that answer?

Admiral NOYES. The folder for the Roberts Commission was not supposed to contain magic.

Mr. KEEFE. And did not?

Admiral NOYES. It did not to the best of my recollection. [12621] If it did, it got by me.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, there is one other point at which this winds message comes up and that is in connection with the warning dispatch

which Captain McCollum prepared during the week prior to Pearl Harbor and which was never sent.

Captain Safford has testified before this committee in connection with that message (and he also testified before the Navy Court) that the message ended with a reference to the receipt in the Navy Department of a winds execute message. Do you recall having been shown this message proposed by Captain McCollum on or about December the 5th?

Admiral NOYES. I recall having been shown a message prepared by Captain McCollum. I am not sure of the date. Incidentally, Captain McCollum's own testimony was that it did not contain any reference to the winds message; that is my own recollection.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you recall whether or not the proposed message contained a reference to a winds execute?

Admiral NOYES. I will say it did not.

Mr. MASTEN. It is your present recollection that there was no reference in this message prepared by Captain McCollum to any winds execute message; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, referring again to these dispatches [12,622] in Exhibit 37, on pages 42 to 44, which were the messages regarding the destruction of codes by the United States representatives in our outlying islands, will you state again—I think you touched on it briefly earlier—will you state again why those messages were prepared at that particular time?

Admiral NOYES. To the best of my recollection, based on an intercepted Japanese message, we had on the 3d of December notified our outlying representatives of the fact that the Japanese had destroyed their codes and papers in general.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, those are the dispatches on pages 40 and 41, are they not?

Admiral NOYES. The dispatches on pages 40 and 41. On the morning of the 4th of December I asked Admirals Turner and Wilkinson to come to my office and proposed to them that we had better destroy our own codes and ciphers in our most outlying positions. They agreed and I gave instructions to Captain Safford over the inter-office phone to prepare these messages which you have in the Exhibit.

Mr. MASTEN. And the reason, the immediate cause of sending those out was the receipt and decryption in Washington of the Japanese messages instructing their representatives to destroy their codes; is that correct?

[12623] Admiral NOYES. It was a natural sequence to the fact that they had destroyed theirs at the places named, Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, Shanghai. Of course, when we did it we limited ourselves to any—we cut ourselves off from any further information. That is the reason it was desirable from our point of view and from the operational people's point of view that it had to be agreed to.

Mr. MASTEN. And the sending of those messages was not caused, are we to understand, by the receipt in Washington of a winds execute message prior to that time?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. You say that is correct?

Admiral NOYES. These messages were not caused by the receipt of any winds code execute.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, Admiral, turning to the events of December the 6th and 7th, will you state briefly where you were, and what you did, on the late afternoon and evening of December the 6th, if you can now recall?

Admiral NOYES. On the 6th, Saturday the 6th, around noontime we had another conference, to the best of my recollection, to discuss authorizing the commander in chief, Pacific, to destroy more codes, which was a rather serious matter because that still further out down our communications, incoming communications. The message was prepared and sent up to be [12624] considered by the Chief of Naval Operations and eventually released by him, or by Admiral Ingersoll, it was.

Mr. MASTEN. Could I interrupt you and ask you if that is the message on page 44 of Exhibit 37?

Admiral NOYES. No; that is about Guam. It is the message on page 45.

Mr. MASTEN. The message on page 45 is the one that was discussed at this conference to which you referred?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. And that was in the late afternoon of December, the 6th?

Admiral NOYES. You see, we had Com 16, who was the shore representative of the commander in chief, Asiatic, he had been covered by the dispatch on page 42 and this covered the rest of the islands.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, about what time did this conference take place?

Admiral NOYES. I would not remember except for the reference number on the dispatch, which is my best guide.

Mr. MASTEN. And what time does that indicate?

Admiral NOYES. That is around noontime.

Mr. MASTEN. Around noontime.

Admiral NOYES. The middle of the day.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, during the afternoon of December the 6th, [12625] did you know that the 13-part message, so-called—you are familiar with what I mean when I refer to that?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. Did you know that that had been received and was being decrypted in the Navy Department?

Admiral NOYES. I now believe that I did. I was either informed or saw the rough originals of the parts and knew they were coming in, and I particularly instructed Kramer to be sure that the Secretary of State got his copies promptly, although it was the Army responsibility for the delivery, because I felt it very important that he should be able to study the note before the Japanese representatives presented it to him.

Mr. MASTEN. And when did you first see the 13 parts as translated?

Admiral NOYES. As I say, I think I saw the rough. When these messages come in originally they are quite full of holes and they were—I think you will notice in that message, I believe, reference to 46 words that we never did get. I saw enough to get the sense of it before I left.

Mr. MASTEN. Can you be more specific as to what time it was?

Admiral NOYES. No.

Mr. MASTEN. It would have been along in the late afternoon, before 6 o'clock?

[12626] Admiral NOYES. I left between 7 and 8, nearer 8, from my office. It could have been any time. It wasn't after 8 o'clock.

Mr. MASTEN. And did you return home at that time?

Admiral NOYES. I did.

Mr. MASTEN. And you were at home all during the evening of December the 6th?

Admiral NOYES. I was. As I mentioned before, I might have come back then to the office but nobody seems to have seen me, so I guess I did not.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you have any recollection of having seen on the evening of December the 6th the so-called pilot message? That is the message on page 238 of Exhibit 1.

Admiral NOYES. No, I am rather definite that I did not.

Mr. MASTEN. You did not see that in the late afternoon or evening of the 6th?

Admiral NOYES. I don't think the Navy received it on the 6th.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, what time did you come to your office on Sunday morning?

Admiral NOYES. Around 9.

Mr. MASTEN. Around 9 o'clock?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. And what time on Sunday morning, or when, did [12627] you first learn of the receipt of the fourteenth part of the 14-part message?

Admiral NOYES. Actually I was reading my copy of the note when I got the intercept of the warning of the attack on Pearl Harbor—I mean of the notice of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Just when the book was brought to me I could not say.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you recall specifically what time it was on Sunday when you say you first heard of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral NOYES. Oh, the broadcast—we intercepted the broadcast from Pearl Harbor. I do not remember the exact number of minutes after 1, but as soon as it was intercepted by my people—I was sitting at my desk reading the booklet when on my interoffice phone they gave me the message, "Air raid on Pearl Harbor; this is not drill."

Mr. MASTEN. Now, by "booklet" you mean the volume of translated intercepts which contained the full 14 parts of the 14-part message; is that what you mean?

Admiral NOYES. I think the fourteenth part was in it.

Mr. MASTEN. Was the 1 p. m. message in the booklet at that time? Do you recall seeing it?

Admiral NOYES. I am sure it was not.

Mr. MASTEN. Prior to that time had you seen any of the other admirals in OPNAV during the morning of December the 7th?

[12628] Admiral NOYES. I had been busy from nine until one. We were quite involved with a Japanese convoy, which over our regular systems of communication had been reported by Admiral Hart.

Mr. MASTEN. Did you have any discussion with any of the other admirals that morning regarding the 14 part and 1 p. m. message? Are we to understand that you had not seen it up until just prior to

the time when the radio message was intercepted saying, "Air raid on Pearl Harbor; this is not drill"?

Admiral NOYES. That is my best recollection.

Mr. MASTEN. You had not read it prior to that time and had not discussed it with anyone or heard anyone else talking about it or its receipt?

ADMIRAL NOYES. I might explain by saying that Kramer in being caught between the White House and State Department and Secretary of the Navy did not get around to cover my copies of those messages, which was quite proper because I knew my job was to see that the things got delivered to the ultimate addressees and I would not expect him to hold up in getting the copies through. I gathered from his testimony that when he returned from one trip he found another and had to go right back. I think that is the reason I did not have my booklet sooner.

[12629] Mr. MASTEN. Now, you said that on the afternoon of December the 6th you had seen the 13-part message in the rough.

Admiral NOYES. I said I think so. I had either seen them or had been told about them by Kramer.

Mr. MASTEN. Did you receive any—or, rather, did you leave any instructions with Captain Safford about it, or with Captain Kramer about it, when you left the Navy Department on the evening of December 6th—regarding that message or any other intercepts?

Admiral NOYES. The only specific instructions that I remember were to be sure that the Secretary of State got the completed copy as soon as possible. At the time it was coming, and we did not know how long it was going to take for the note to be completed.

Mr. MASTEN. Did anyone get in touch with you during the late evening or night of December 6th regarding those messages?

Admiral NOYES. Not to the best of my recollection.

Mr. MASTEN. Is there anything else in connection with the events of those two days that you now recall that would be helpful to the committee? For example, as to whether or not during the morning of December the 7th you heard any discussion of Pearl Harbor.

[12630] Admiral NOYES. Well, I can be very definite that I heard no discussion of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MASTEN. You heard no discussion of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral NOYES. I heard no discussion of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MASTEN. Until the time of the attack?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct. There is only one thing. A British officer came to my office shortly after 9 o'clock in connection with this actual sighting that we had made of this Japanese convoy heading either for Thailand, Malay Peninsula or the Philippines. It was around abreast the Philippines at that time. He had some information and I gave him ours, which we were doing, and he wanted an appointment with the Secretary of State. I called up the Secretary of State's office and they told me that the Japanese, I believe, had conflicted; that the Japanese representatives had asked for an appointment at 1 o'clock. That is the best of my recollection.

Mr. MASTEN. Other than that incident you have no other information which you think would be helpful regarding the events on the morning of December the 7th?

Admiral NOYES. No.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, Admiral what steps were taken in the Navy Department, in your division of the Navy Department, immediately after December the 7th to make certain that there [12631] were no leaks of information from the Navy Department? I suppose there were such steps taken.

Admiral NOYES. Well, I read in the paper Captain Safford's testimony that I directed all personal memoranda to be destroyed, war having been declared. I have no recollection of that particular meeting.

We had a conference every Tuesday morning of division heads, but I certainly would be perfectly willing to stand by that order. I would not have allowed officers to keep personal memoranda on secret matters and it is now, it is at the present time a standing instruction in the Navy.

Mr. MASTEN. Did you attend a particular meeting, or call together a particular meeting of your subordinates to issue such instructions, during the week after the Pearl Harbor attack?

Admiral NOYES. I have no such recollection, but as I say, I may very well have done that. That would have been a logical thing to do.

Mr. MASTEN. Captain Safford also testified that at that meeting to which he referred there was reference to stopping the attack on, or the rumors about, Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Do you have any recollection of that?

Admiral NOYES. I have not, but the same thing applies. According to what he said, I said that the Roberts commission [12632] was going to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor and that I did not want any gossiping from any of my people. If they had anything to say they were to say it when they were witnesses on the stand, which is also standard Navy procedure, that witnesses are not to discuss matters aside from court.

Mr. MASTEN. Did any instructions of that character which you issued at that time call for the destruction of any official papers of any kind?

Admiral NOYES. Absolutely not.

Mr. MASTEN. I think we have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Junior counsel has covered the ground so thoroughly that the chairman has no questions to ask.

Mr. Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. I do not believe I have any at the present time. I may want to ask some later on.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark? Mr. Lucas? Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Noyes, there has been testimony before this committee that you made a call to the Army and you gave them to believe that there had been some kind of a winds intercept and that the Army, in their desire to find out what the truth was, called you on the phone and you said you were too busy, you had to go to a meeting. Is that true or not true?

[12633] Admiral NOYES. I have no such recollection, Mr. Murphy. I don't believe that I would have ever handled it in that way.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, this committee for the last 2 weeks have been working night and day on this matter, I think largely on what

your subordinate, Captain Safford said, that he took it to you and he said when he brought it to you that ended his responsibility and I think this committee is entitled to a definite, positive statement from you, to pick up from what your subordinate stated with reference to it.

Captain Safford said:

There was a winds message. It meant war—and we knew it meant war.

What do you have to say about that?

Admiral NOYES. I say that that is not a correct statement.

Mr. MURPHY. Also Captain Safford said:

I saw the Winds message typed in page form on yellow teletype paper, with the translation written below. I immediately forwarded this message to my commanding officer (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN), thus fully discharging my responsibility in the matter.

Is that so?

Admiral NOYES. I cannot say that Captain Safford did not send to me a message. I will say that he sent me no message which was a correct execute of the winds message or, rather, [12634] that I did not receive it.

I will again read you what Captain Safford said:

I immediately forwarded this message to my Commanding Officer (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN), thus fully discharging my responsibility in the matter.

He said that he forwarded this message to your personally. Do you know whether he did or did not? Is that question clear?

Admiral NOYES. I cannot say that Captain Safford did not on the 4th of December forward some form of message on yellow teletype paper to me. If it was such message as he describes, it was not a correct execute of the winds message.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, he says on page 2:

CINCAF 281430 together with Tokyo Circular 2353 and other collateral intercept information apparently made an impression upon the Director of Naval Intelligence, for he immediately sent word to me, through the Director of Naval Communications, that he wished the Communication Intelligence Organization to make every attempt to intercept any message sent in accordance with the Winds codes.

Was it usual for Admiral Wilkinson to send messages to Captain Safford through you or would he confer with you directly?

Admiral NOYES. He would confer with me directly and in [12635] my own opinion this is not correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, he says:

It would be a feather in our cap if the Navy got it and our sister service didn't.

Were your services trying to get feathers in their caps in competition with the other service that you know of?

Admiral NOYES. They were not, and I disapproved very much of his making any such statement. We were making every effort to cooperate with the Army. As I told you, we had the closest cooperation between General Maughborne and myself and he was later succeeded by General Olmstead and Colonel Sadtler was Acting at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would like to ask at this point, Mr. Chairman, that counsel prepare for the record Tokyo-to-Washington serial 843, dated November 27, 1941, prescribing the schedule of Tokyo news broadcasts, as well as OPNAV 282301 and the three other messages which Captain Safford referred to at the bottom of page 3 of his

statement, so that all five of them can be in the record. Are they in the record?

Mr. MASTEN. They are not all in the record, Mr. Murphy. Commander Baecher has furnished us with a number of the messages referred to in Captain Safford's statement and they are still looking for some others and we had intended to put them all in at the same time.

[12636] Mr. MURPHY. We will get them all in at the same time.

Mr. MASTEN. I think this 28143, that is one of the documents we have here. If you wish me to do so, I will read it into the record now.

Mr. MURPHY. No; I will wait. I want them all to go in at the same time in the record so that we can refer to them at one place.¹

Captain Safford said that his superiors were heckling him. You did not indulge in any heckling of Captain Safford, did you?

Admiral NOYES. I never did.

Mr. MURPHY. That is on page 8 of his statement.

Now, he says on page 10:

We used to "sample" these broadcasts periodically until the F. C. C.'s Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service came into existence and relieved the U. S. Navy of this duty.

And he is speaking there of general information broadcasts, as well as Domei News to its diplomatic and consular officials in foreign lands.

Is it true, Admiral, that FCC did take over that function from the Navy?

Admiral NOYES. The Navy never had that function, Mr. Murphy. Mr. Berle, who was Assistant Secretary of State— [12637] one of his representatives came to see me at one time and asked if we would not expand our copying of Japanese broadcasts. I told him that we did not want to go into that business; we had all we could handle with official traffic and I suggested that we much preferred that the FCC should do it. Eventually the FCC got some funds or found some funds and took that on. It was more a taking on than a taking over.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Captain Safford then in connection with that on page 10 said:

There is no basis for assuming that the Winds message had to be sent on a voice broadcast—

and then he leaves the inference, to me, at least, on page 10 that the Navy then started, after December 1, to listen in on these broadcasts which FCC was covering generally. Do you know whether or not that is true?

Admiral NOYES. I do not agree with him about its not being necessary to send the broadcast by voice. It had to be sent in accordance with the instructions that they had sent out, on certain broadcasts, which was at a definite time, and in voice. We only covered such broadcasts as were specifically covered by those two circulars.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it is true, is it not, that FCC was covering the general information broadcasts and the Domei News broadcasts to diplomatic and consular officials?

[12638] Admiral NOYES. I think so, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And do you of your own knowledge know whether or not Cheltenham then decided to go into that field as a result of this dispatch on page 155 in Exhibit 1?

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5500 et seq.

Admiral NOYES. Whether Cheltenham started to cover this Circular 2354 on page 155?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Admiral NOYES. The one we were talking about is page 154.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right, but Safford talks about page 155 instead of 154.

Admiral NOYES. No, sir; I think he has got them mixed up.

Mr. MURPHY. He says:

We expected that the Winds message would be sent in Morse code—and it was.

Admiral NOYES. Well, I think—

Mr. MURPHY. Were you expecting it to come in Morse code?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir. I think Commander Rochefort testified to the same effect on that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, Commander Rochefort was listening only for voice and he certainly would not get code if he was listening for voice.

Admiral NOYES. I think that the 24-hour-a-day [12639] coverage that he mentioned was—it is, and I may be repeating—just like WINX in their news broadcasts. They do not send it out 24 hours a day, all day, but during the 24 hours of the day they had certain schedules on which they broadcast that news and people listen for it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Captain Safford said on page 11:

The original documents giving details of the interception of the Winds message are not available.

What is your answer to that?

Admiral NOYES. He was in charge of the files at the time. I will say further I left Washington in February 1942, and I have no knowledge of what has occurred since then.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, he also stated that after he went to your office, that there was a smooth copy placed in the dispatch case and that that was delivered to each of the recipients in the Army and the Navy. Of course, he had only an impression on that.

Did you ever approve any winds intercept as being authentic so that it would get over to Captain Kramer and then be placed as a communication for each of the recipients of magic in the Navy and the Army?

Admiral NOYES. I did not, Mr. Murphy.

I would like to say about the files, I was talking to the commanding officer of the radio station at Cheltenham. [12640] This broadcast business, when you intercept it is not addressed to us. It is things like weather reports and press and things like that that build up to a terrible amount of paper in a short time and it is customary in any naval radio station to keep files of any message addressed to a station for which they are responsible or which comes for information, in other words, all Navy business, but intercept stuff is never kept more than 3 or 4 months.

Now, this question not having been raised, as I understand it, until almost a year later whatever station might have intercepted would have by that time destroyed intercepts that far back. The commanding officer at Cheltenham told me it was customary to keep it for 3 or 4 months.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you did receive then after that monthly reports from Cheltenham, Winter Harbor, and Bainbridge Island, did you not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And those reports for 1941 are still down in the Navy Department, aren't they?

Admiral NOYES. I left there. I have no information on that matter.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, I am going to ask the Navy liaison to make a statement in the record as to whether they are or not. I understand they are and have been since [12641] 1941, but I would like to have it definitely by the Navy Department.

Now, then, he says at page 12—is he in a position to indicate it now?

The CHAIRMAN. Not at the moment.

Mr. MURPHY. My question is whether or not the reports from Cheltenham, Bainbridge Island, and Winter Harbor are available at the Navy Department presently for the month of December 1941.

Commander BAECHER. They are, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And they have been since 1941, have they, the monthly reports?

Commander BAECHER. Yes; that is the way I understand it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Now, then, at page 12, Admiral Noyes, Captain Safford said:

The Winds broadcast message was about two hundred words long, with the code words prescribed in Tokyo circular 2353—

so that would be voice broadcast—

appearing in the middle of the message, whereas we had expected to find the code words of Tokyo circular 2354 in a Morse broadcast.

Now, then, if you will just go back to 154 and 155 a [12642] while, in 154 it was to appear in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave broadcast and at the end and the sentence was to be repeated twice. In the one on page 155 it was to be repeated five times and both at the beginning and at the end. On 154 it was to be in voice. On 155 it was to be in code. So that Captain Safford describes one that is part of 154 and one that is part of 155. Do the Japanese do things like that?

Admiral NOYES. They did not, sir. I think the Japanese are much more meticulous than any people I know of in carrying out exactly instructions that they send out. That is supposed to be one of their faults.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, as I understand it you have no recollection whatever of a call from Captain Sadtler to inquire as to what word was used, do you? Do you have any such recollection?

Admiral NOYES. As I understand it from listening to Colonel Sadtler's testimony, he talks about the 5th of December and Captain Safford's is the 4th of December.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, do you have any recollection of having, either on the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th or 7th of December, had a call from Colonel Sadtler asking you what word was used in the alleged winds intercept?

Admiral NOYES. I have no such recollection, sir. [12643] I could not say that he did not ask me such a question because we handled many messages together and the only thing that I am sur-

prised at is that he would make a point of someone, that, I would say, that he would say that I would speak of the message when we handled so many things together.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, when did you first have a talk with Captain Safford as to whether or not there were any missing papers or did you ever have a talk with him? He has been talking to a lot of people for a long time. Did he talk to you about it?

Admiral NOYES. The only time I have talked to Captain Safford—I had been away from Washington from February 1942 until March 1945 and it was some time after I got back. I had not heard any more about Pearl Harbor since I had appeared before the Naval Court of Inquiry.

[19644] Mr. MURPHY. Now at this point I would like it if counsel would produce the page in the record referring to the Rochefort message that Colonel Bratton said he forwarded to Hawaii, and I would like to offer that in the record at this point for the reason that the record shows it was mailed instead of dispatched, and I would like to ask the witness about it.

Do you have that? It is in the B, C, or D of the Army board.

Mr. MASTEN. We do not have it in our record.

Mr. MURPHY. While you are getting that, I will move on.

Admiral NOYES. I did not finish, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Excuse me. Go ahead, if you will. I am sorry.

Admiral NOYES. I do not know whether you want to go ahead with my talk with Captain Safford.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. I did not see Captain Safford from the time I left Washington or hear from him until I got back in March 1945.

Mr. MURPHY. So you did not talk to him in the meantime?

Admiral NOYES. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he try to communicate with you?

Admiral NOYES. Did he try to communicate with me?

[19645] Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. No, sir; he did not, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. MURPHY. When you came to Washington—you say it was what month of 1945?

Admiral NOYES. March, 1945.

Mr. MURPHY. Now then, Captain Safford did talk to you on your return to Washington?

Admiral NOYES. He came to see me on my initiative.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you tell us what that conversation was? First tell us when it was, and then what it was.

Admiral NOYES. I gathered from the questions that were asked me in the Naval Court of Inquiry that somebody had had a different recollection on certain matters from mine. So I called up Safford and asked him to have lunch with me. He said he was very busy and could not, but he would come down to the office. I told him I wanted to see him about things in connection with our past, with the Office of Naval Communications.

So when he came down I told him I gathered from the questions that were asked me that there was some difference of opinion, and asked him why he and Kramer and I could not get together and get hold of the files, now that we were here in Washington, and remove

any of these discrepancies [12646] and decide them one way or another.

Well, he said there were not many discrepancies, and he said he was sure there was a winds message and that everybody else agreed with me. I said, "Can't you find some evidence that you are right, that you can show me what this is based on?" He said no, that he had not been able to find anything. So he said he was going to write a statement and when he got it together he would show it to me and we would talk it over.

Well, I did not hear from him. In about, I think it was in August, there was something in the newspaper about Pear Harbor. So I called him up. There were some things that I had not ever heard of. I called him up and I asked him what he was doing about his statement in conference with me. He said that he was still working on it. Within a few days it was proposed that this congressional inquiry occur. So he called me up and said he thought it would be better if we did not have any conference, that we might be criticised for talking together, and I agreed with him, and so we dropped it.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know of any trouble that Captain Safford had, or any differences between him and anyone down there at the Navy?

Admiral NOYES. I do not.

[12647] Mr. MURPHY. Was there any difference between him and Captain Redman, or anyone else there that you know of?

Admiral NOYES. I left Washington in February 1942.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Mr. Chairman, I have just one other thing that I want to cover, that I will pass for the time being. When I find that one thing I want to show a reference in the Army board to the Rochefort message.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We will pass you temporarily.

Senator Brewster is absent.

Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral, did I understand you correctly to say that you testified first in the Navy Court of Inquiry investigation?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You have not testified in any other investigations other than that one, and this one?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. And the Navy Court of Inquiry investigation was carried on during the summer months of 1944?

Admiral NOYES. Well, they did not get out to San Francisco until December 1944, as I remember it.

Mr. GEARHART. It started in the summer and continued [12648] through the balance of the year?

Admiral NOYES. I believe they went out to Pearl Harbor and on the way back, they stopped at San Francisco, and I was called as a witness there.

Mr. GEARHART. That, you say, was in December?

Admiral NOYES. I thought it was December. I may be wrong about the month.

Mr. GEARHART. The Secretary of the Navy's statement is the next to the last notation that appears in the succession of events, and that was the 28th of August 1944.

Admiral NOYES. I must be wrong about the date, then. It ought to show the date that I appeared in the transcript. I did not appear in Washington. I appeared in San Francisco.

Mr. GEARHART. The thing that makes me inquire about that is the fact that the Secretary of the Navy himself prepared a statement in reference to the court of inquiry's decision, which is the fourth endorsement, and that is dated the 28th day of August, unless I am mistaken.

No, I see another one here now. That was the third endorsement, which preceded the one I have reference to. The date of the fourth one is December 1944. So it extended from the summer to the end of the year.

Admiral NOYES. That is my recollection.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; I think you are right. The dates [12649] are so confusing, but they are here, nevertheless.

Now, what did you have to do, if anything, with or in the investigations that preceded the Navy Court of Inquiry?

Were you consulted in reference to your knowledge about these matters or did you have anything to do with it at all?

Admiral NOYES. When the Roberts Commission was held, I was directed to prepare the dispatches to and from the Navy Department bearing on the incident, for the use of the committee, or the commission, whatever it was called.

Mr. GEARHART. Did that involve the making out of any memorandum, or any evaluations, or any statement as to your own participation in or with relation to the events?

Admiral NOYES. It involved nothing but a file of dispatches, with a list and index.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, did you prepare a memorandum between December 7, 1941, and December of 1944, as an aid to your memory?

Admiral NOYES. I did not, sir. I did not particularly, because I was at sea, in the Pacific, and I think in general the naval officers at that time did not know about magic.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, when you testified in December 1944, you testified from your memory at that moment, unaided [12650] by any memorandum that you may have made between December 7, 1941, and the time you testified?

Admiral NOYES. I was not only testifying from memory, but I did not know until I got into the room what I was going to be asked, or what the questions would be, or the subject.

Mr. GEARHART. Between Pearl Harbor and the giving of your testimony, many earth-shaking events had occurred, events of tremendous importance, hadn't there? That is correct, isn't it?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Matters of tremendous importance, which, in your mind, as in other persons' minds, overshadowed the earlier events; isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you have heard the testimony of Captain Kramer with reference to the so-called winds execute. He said that a watch officer came by and handed you a teletype paper on which there was an evaluation—or a translation, rather—of a message, what he constructed to be a winds execute message. He was so impressed

with it that he went to Captain Safford and said, "This is it." You have heard that testimony, haven't you?

Admiral NOYES. I thought that was Captain Safford's [12651] testimony.

Mr. GEARHART. No; Captain Kramer's testimony, and also Captain Safford's testimony. They—you heard the testimony of Admiral Ingersoll to the effect that they brought him the message and he read it, and tossed it aside, because he considered it unimportant; that there were many other events, many other messages which preceded it, which convinced him that war was very imminent.

You heard his testimony to that effect, didn't you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes; I heard Admiral Ingersoll's testimony.

Mr. GEARHART. There we have three naval officers who say it was a winds execute; all three of them said they saw it, and Admiral Ingersoll said it was unimportant.

Admiral NOYES. I did not gather that from Captain Kramer's testimony, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. What?

Admiral NOYES. I did not gather that from Captain Kramer's testimony.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I think you will find that that is a correct statement.

Admiral NOYES. I certainly did not gather that he agreed with Captain Safford at all.

Mr. GEARHART. He agreed definitely that he took it from [12652] the hands of the watch officer, hastily read it, and took it to Captain Safford and said "This is it." No question about that. He does not pretend to remember clearly what was in that message, but he has stated in his testimony over and over and over again, "When I handed it to Captain Safford, I said 'This is it'." He also testified definitely that he, Captain Kramer, considered it the winds execute message. So Captain Kramer absolutely corroborates Captain Safford, as far as he goes, and that was as far as he did go.

Then Admiral Ingersoll steps into the picture and tells us:

Yes; they brought it to me. I read it, but I did not consider it important. There were so many other things of greater importance that indicated to me that war was imminent and I tossed it aside.

But the substance of that testimony is that there was a winds execute. Now, I say those things preliminarily to asking you this question: In all fairness, isn't it possible that you read it too, but considered it so unimportant, for the same reason that Admiral Ingersoll considered it unimportant, and you not being interrogated on the subject from December 7, 1941, until December 1944, that it might have gone from your mind? Isn't that possible?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir; not in my opinion.

[12653] Mr. GEARHART. You knew about the message of November 29, after which things were automatically going to happen? You knew about that, didn't you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now that was a very, very important intercept, that was telling us of the hostile attitude of Japan, wasn't it, "things were going automatically to begin to happen"?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That was a very direct warning, wasn't it?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It was of overshadowing importance, wasn't it?

Admiral NOYES. Progressive importance, I would say, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And you knew all about the Japanese message directing their Ambassadors, their consuls, and all the other Japanese agents of different degrees, the Japanese nationals, directing them to destroy their codes, didn't you? The fact that consuls were included indicated more than anything else the suspension of diplomatic negotiations, didn't it?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Those messages collectively were of [12654] tremendous importance, were they not?

Admiral NOYES. As I say, each one carried matters a step further.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Then if you should get another message which would merely tell you that relations between the United States and Japan were becoming dangerous, you would regard that message as of overshadowing importance, would you not, after you had already received these other messages?

Admiral NOYES. I would not consider it as of overshadowing importance, but it would be of sufficient importance so it would be taken up, under my standard system, and handled as a message.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. There would have been at least 50 copies around Washington before we got through—not 50, but 30 I should say. If somebody had brought to me in November, 1943, a paper with my initials on it I would have had to admit that my recollection was wrong. If anybody could have brought me other documentary evidence I would have to admit my recollection had failed me. I am only testifying to the best of my recollection, except in this case I have studied other people's testimony and I can find no testimony that will hang together against my own recollection. [12655] There is nothing that in any way tends to make me feel that my recollection as to the fact that there was no execute message is not correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, supposing you had gotten the execute message conveying that thought to you, that relations with Japan were growing dangerous—that is a literal interpretation of the words, isn't it?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. What it was primarily is an instruction to destroy the codes.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right.

Admiral NOYES. We would have written it up as an instruction to destroy the codes.

Mr. GEARHART. The message on the destruction of codes was an important message?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. That was the tell-tale to us of what Japan was up to?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now if you got this other message, the winds execute message, after you had read all these other messages about the destruction of codes, would you be called upon to do anything about it?

Admiral NOYES. There was nothing to do about it, except it would be written up, distributed and handled as [12656] an enemy intercept, just like all these messages that are in the book.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you send every message that came over your desk to all these distributees, whether it was important or unimportant?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You decided whether or not it was important enough to be distributed, did you not? That was one of your jobs?

Admiral NOYES. But it was gaged not on whether action was to be taken, but the subject matter of the message. There were lots of messages about typewriters, personnel, promoting clerks, and that sort of thing, which we just threw out, which we did not finish translating. But anything of that character would have been carried through as a matter of record.

Mr. GEARHART. But in view of this importance of the message would you not have distributed it? You had already distributed the very, very ultra important ones, and here you had the most important one, in the light of events, and yet you might have tossed that aside as unimportant, just like Ingersoll said he did when he read it?

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Ingersoll was not in my position, sir. I was responsible for all this business, whereas [12657] Admiral Ingersoll had it as only one of his activities. To him it was very far down the list, and to me it was down the list, too, but it still had to be taken care of.

If it had been an authentic execute, we had all these people copying and intercepting messages, the War Department, the FCC, we would have had to distribute it as a message.

I cannot imagine, from Colonel Sadtler's testimony, how the War Department, if they thought it was authentic at all, could have thought of dropping it, why they would not have followed it through, unless it was a false message.

Mr. GEARHART. That was just the point I had in mind. Here you have several people saying they are very positive as to the existence of the winds execute, and you seem to be equally positive what they testified to is not the fact. So I was trying to harmonize the testimony they have given with the testimony that you have given on the ground that you simply don't remember, because you regarded it, as Admiral Ingersoll did, as being only in part important.

Admiral NOYES. May I ask you a question, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. Did you hear my testimony in answer to the counsel this morning?

Mr. GEARHART. I have listened, but if you wish to repeat what you have said, that I may have overlooked, I [12658] would be glad to hear it again.

Admiral NOYES. I testified that there were several false messages that came in. It is very difficult for me to answer when these different witnesses all differ in their description of the circumstances. The dates are different, the conditions are different.

I am perfectly willing to admit that Captain Safford may have sent me such a message and on the face of it, from a documentary point of view, I would never have accepted that message as an execute of the winds message, and I gave the reasons to the counsel for my believing as I do.

Mr. GEARHART. How can so many testify to the same thing and it not have a semblance of truth? These other things that these other

officers have said must be true, because you don't remember whether it was true or not true.

Then when you come up to the winds execute message you positively say there was none, in the face of these other men testifying there was a winds execute. How can you be so positive about that and at the same time you are willing to accept what Captain Safford says, or Colonel Sadtler?

Admiral NOYES. Colonel Sadtler?

Mr. GEARHART. You said many things he said may have been true because he said so. You have no memory on it.

Admiral NOYES. I am perfectly willing to admit that [12659-12669] every one of the witnesses that have testified to a so-called winds execute has some message in mind of which I had knowledge, but I do not think that any one of their stories, their recollection, their description will stand up as a description of a true winds execute, nor do they fit together.

Captain Kramer's and Captain Safford's descriptions were entirely different. It is very difficult for me to answer if you ask me if I got a message on the 4th or the 5th. Captain Safford goes into great detail about his reasons for thinking it was the 4th, although his original testimony was it was the 5th.

I do not want to question the fact that their recollection is the best they have, but that does not convince me that there is anything wrong with my recollection. That is all I can say about that, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, as I understand it now, in your Department you were the head and it was your duty, in effect, to determine what messages were to be distributed to certain persons, which included the President, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Naval Operations, the War Plans Division, the Intelligence Department—and what other departments of the Navy?

Admiral NOYES. I think that is all.

[12670] Senator FERGUSON. That is all?

Admiral NOYES. Yes. But I had nothing to do with them.

Senator FERGUSON. No, but you determined what messages were to be distributed.

Admiral NOYES. No, Senator Ferguson, I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now let us get down then to this: If a message came to your desk, or your department, about hiring a clerk in the Embassy and one came in relation to a reply to the message of the 26th, who determined what message would be delivered to the President? What department?

Admiral NOYES. The Director of Naval Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, who determined how that message would get to the Naval Intelligence?

Admiral NOYES. In the mechanics of deciphering, Captain Kramer, who was primarily the subordinate to the Director of Naval Intelligence, had the additional duty with me, so that one officer could carry through the whole process from the interception, from the receipt in Washington of an enemy message in cipher until it was actually delivered, as far as he was concerned. On account of the load we had, and the peak loads we had, we could not possibly decipher every message

of the ones we received. Therefore, having started the message, as soon as it turned out to be of no apparent value, it was laid aside and the next one was [12671] gone ahead with. We had to do that.

We found at first that the Army and ourselves, working independently, were wasting a lot of time by translating the same messages. We might work 3 days on a message and find we had the same thing. At a conference we decided the best solution was to take the Tokyo date of origin, and it was agreed that the Navy would take all messages originated in Tokyo on the odd day and the Army would take all messages originated in Tokyo on an even day.

In order to determine when it originated in Tokyo it was necessary to start to break the message. So each service took the message coming from its own intercept stations and the message was given a number, and as soon as they had reached the date of origin they kept it or sent it over at it might be.

Now from there on the other service went on until they discovered it seemed to be something that was not of diplomatic, or military, or political value and they laid it aside.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he have before him the cipher to break the date?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you had to know what key in the cipher or the machine was necessary by breaking the [12672] date?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you sent the key over to the other department, or would you let them work it out for themselves?

Admiral NOYES. Well, we had a constant interchange. If there was any recovery of keys, we had a direct telephone from our code room to theirs, a secret phone.

Senator FERGUSON. Then as soon as the date was ascertained you had the cipher and you knew what key it was in?

Admiral NOYES. We did not necessarily. We might get that far and still not be able to go all the way through, but we had a start then.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we come back to the question, and you say it was Kramer's duty to ascertain and determine what messages were distributed to the list that I gave you just in my former question.

Admiral NOYES. The question of what messages were finished was primarily determined below, by Kramer, who supervised—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). I am trying to get an answer to this particular question, because I think it is very important.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. I understand, Senator Ferguson, [12673] and I am trying to explain it to you, sir. Some messages were never finished. Other messages that were finished, I doubt if they were all sent to the White House. I did not censor them myself. The Director of Naval Intelligence was the one who did that function, in regard to the finished messages. He probably did not want to bother the President with a lot of messages, or the Secretary of State.

In other words, there were certain messages that he probably had culled out of certain books, but, as far as I know, there was nothing culled out of the finished stuff from the Navy books.

Senator FERGUSON. Who, in your department, or in anyone's department, determined what messages would be decoded? You say some

were decoded just part way and you determined they were not of any value. Now who had that determination?

Admiral NOYES. Well, I should say Kramer was the one who was directly responsible for that. If he had a question he could bring it to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, if he was in doubt he could bring it to you. Then it was your responsibility to determine what was decoded, is that right?

Admiral NOYES. I was responsible for it, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, then, who determined what messages were sent in to the Intelligence when they were [12674] intelligence?

Admiral NOYES. They were all sent to Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. They were all sent to Intelligence?

Admiral NOYES. Everything that was decoded was sent to Intelligence, whether it was important or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Whether it was hiring a clerk or doing something else?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was sent to Intelligence?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. Incidentally, some of those things that we did not bother with ourselves, all personnel matters, were sent to FBI, as a matter of fact. That was done by Naval Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you did not have to determine what messages went in to Intelligence because all that was translated, that Kramer determined should be determined, unless he needed your help, went immediately in to Intelligence?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now with that in mind, how can you reconcile this fact, that you were to get the winds code message?

Admiral NOYES. Because that was a special thing. It required no translation. They had set up those Japanese expressions which actually were plain Japanese. What they [12675] said in Japanese was "East Wind Rain," in the Japanese language, with no cipher, no code. They were not the ordinary run of diplomatic messages.

[12676] Senator FERGUSON. You just told me that after it was completely translated, it, by necessity, went to the Intelligence Branch, and this was in Japanese and, therefore, needed translation.

Admiral NOYES. It did not need translation, Senator Ferguson. They had given certain expressions a fixed meaning. Anyone of us could have told what the message was.

Those words did not mean destroy codes and ciphers; they just had an arbitrary meaning.

Senator FERGUSON. They mean what was in the message you had previously received?

Admiral NOYES. They appeared to be a weather report, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you draw up cards on that particular code message?

Admiral NOYES. Cards were drawn up to give the meaning of this in English, so that by telephone, in case we ever got an authentic execute of the winds code, Admiral Stark and the people concerned could be called over the telephone, and without any give-away we would say, "We received a weather report 'east wind rain'" and he would know what it meant.

Senator FERGUSON. Who ordered the cards drawn up?

Admiral NOYES. Well, I ordered it. It was my responsibility. [12677]

Senator FERGUSON. Did you send one to the White House?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir. I think the naval aide had one.

Senator FERGUSON. The naval aide had one?

Admiral NOYES. Yes. We did not deal directly with the President. I think the naval aide dealt with the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Then one went to the White House, to Admiral Beardall?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. I am not certain that he was one of them, but I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever set up a similar system of cards?

Admiral NOYES. Never, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. This was an outstandingly important message?

Admiral NOYES. At the time it was received, we thought it was the first—at the 28th of November—we thought it was very important and might give us our first tip as to what was to occur.

Senator FERGUSON. But a little later you say it had become a little doubtful.

Admiral NOYES. Become what, sir?

[12678] Senator FERGUSON. A little doubtful as to its value, because you got similar messages about destruction of codes.

Admiral NOYES. Having gotten the message from the Japanese in their own cipher, with detailed instructions about destroying the codes, it went very far down in importance.

Senator FERGUSON. But you still kept the cards?

Admiral NOYES. I do not remember whether the cards were destroyed at that time or not. The cards only said "East wind rain; U. S." We made them with the idea if anybody lost them, nothing would be given away.

Senator FERGUSON. That was in English?

Admiral NOYES. In English.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

If Colonel Sadtler is correct, that you called him and told him that was it—do you remember that testimony?

Admiral NOYES. I do not, sir. I remember the testimony, but I do not remember the incident.

Senator FERGUSON. He called you back and you told him you could not get the translation for him because you were going to a meeting. How could you reconcile your testimony with that, that you did not see any winds code message, any winds code execute message?

[12679] Admiral NOYES. Senator FERGUSON, that is not the way I interpreted his testimony.

As I interpreted it, what he said was he called back to ask for the exact words that were in the intercept.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

And you were too busy to give it to him.

Admiral NOYES. That I do not admit, but that is what he said.

[12680] Senator FERGUSON. You have no memory of it?

Admiral NOYES. I have no memory of it.

Senator FERGUSON. If there wasn't any winds code execute message how do you account for Admiral Ingersoll testifying here in this room that he saw one and never knew that there was any question

about it being a genuine or a phoney until sometime just recently when he landed back in this country?

Admiral NOYES. I do not account for it, sir. I think he is very busy and had many things to do at the time. I think he stated in his testimony that it very likely did turn out to be a false message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I want to ask you this: Could it have been that you called Sadtler when you received this message from the watch officer that Kramer and Safford talked about going to your office with your message? Could that be a true statement?

Admiral NOYES. Could I have called Sadtler?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. When I first got this message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now will you tell me——

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). I did not understand his [12681] answer.

Admiral NOYES. I said I could have called Sadtler when someone came to my office with a message. I had a private phone to his office.

Senator FERGUSON. So at that particular time you believed that this was a genuine message on this winds execute code, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. I would think it was a possible message.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Admiral NOYES. That is the impression he got, as I take it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now I will ask you whether or not you ever made an examination to determine that the message that the watch officer delivered to you, that Kramer and Safford were talking about, and that you telephoned to Sadtler about, whether you ever determined that that was a phoney and not a genuine message?

Admiral NOYES. I will give you a reconstruction that could be possible, if you would like to have me do it.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to know whether you ever made a determination that this message that you telephoned about, that the watch officer gave you, whether you ever made a determination that that particular message was a phoney and was not the genuine message in compliance with the code.

[12682] Admiral NOYES. The message has been testified to, that it was received on two different days.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not my question. My question is whether or not you ever made a determination at that time. I am not asking you what you determine now as you try to reconstruct, but I want to know whether or not you ever made a determination that that message that was sent to you was a phoney.

Admiral NOYES. If the message that Captain Safford describes in his statement was presented to me, and I think very likely it was, I would have determined it to be a phoney message.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you that: Did you determine that that message was a phoney?

Admiral NOYES. I have no direct recollection from his description, but from his own description I would not have accepted it. That is the best I can say, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not have accepted it. How could you then have called Sadtler about that message?

Admiral NOYES. Sadtler says it was a different day; it is not the same day.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about the reconstruction now, I mean as to what you heard testified here. Could you have kept it over a day and then called him? That [12683] even makes his testimony stronger, that it was a genuine message.

Admiral NOYES. I would not think of doing such a thing.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to do is to get the facts as to whether or not you ever made a determination that the message brought to you by the watch officer was not a genuine message.

Admiral NOYES. I am certain, sir, that I did not seem to make myself clear. I am perfectly willing to admit that several messages, which in the end turned out to be false, were brought to me by various watch officers. I also think one watch officer telephoned me at my home about one of the messages, which was afterwards delivered to me. I think every one was determined by me to be not correct, and, so far as I knew, everyone was in concurrence, no one raising a question, no one questioning my decision, to the best of my knowledge and belief at the time.

The first time any question was raised was much later on.

Senator FERGUSON. After the 7th?

Admiral NOYES. No; after I had left Washington. Nobody ever questioned me while I was here.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you this question: Did you ever notify Kramer that the message that he saw and said "Here it is," or whatever his expression was at the time, [12684] and showed it to Safford and they sent a watch officer to you, did you ever notify Kramer that that message was a phoney or a bad message?

Admiral NOYES. I was not supposed to be present, Senator Ferguson, when Kramer said "Here it is." That identifies nothing to me.

Senator FERGUSON. You admit here that Safford could have sent you a message. Did you ever send word back to Kramer, or to Safford, that the message was not a genuine message?

Admiral NOYES. I undoubtedly did, if this message as described by Safford, which I am not at all sure is correct—it is not what he told me this summer at all, and I am not sure that it is at all correct—but if it is correct, I would have determined it to be not a proper winds execute, and I would have informed him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you inform him?

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection of the message being received as described nor of having determined it as being wrong, and therefore not informing him.

Senator FERGUSON. My question is a short one. Did you so inform him, that it was not a genuine message?

Admiral NOYES. I cannot admit that this message, as now described by Captain Safford, was ever delivered to me, sir. [12685] It does not comply with the description that he gave me as long ago as 4 months ago.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not what I am talking about. He has testified that he had delivered to you a message that he believed was a genuine one. My question to you now is: Did you ever notify him that that message was not a genuine message?

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman—

Admiral NOYES. I do not agree with his testimony, Mr. Ferguson.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever notify Safford personally then that any message on the winds was not a genuine one?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On what occasion?

Admiral NOYES. I could not tell you.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield for a correction?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever notify Sadtler—keeping in mind his testimony—that you had two conversations with him, that it was not a genuine message?

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection of that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other people in [12686] the Department there that you notified that there had come in some messages that were not genuine as far as the winds execute code was concerned?

Admiral NOYES. I have no specific recollection of the details regarding any of the false messages at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you have done what you did not do if you had received a winds code execute on either the 4th or the 5th?

Admiral NOYES. I would have approved the message as a winds code execute, and it would have been written up and distributed to the regular recipients. It is very difficult for me to say now everything I would have done. I think I would have put a note on it saying:

This confirms the previous information from the Naval Attachés and Commander in Chief.

Senator FERGUSON. I understood that only the messages that Kramer was in doubt about went to you. Why were you wanting this particular message? What were you going to do with it?

Admiral NOYES. This was the only instance that occurred, this was the only message of that sort which came up during my experience, that is this and the others that go with it. There is a series of them, I mean the ones that are shown in this book.

[12687] Senator FERGUSON. When did you come to the conclusion that war between Japan and the United States was imminent?

Admiral NOYES. Imminent?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. I first held a conference in my Division in September 1939, shortly after I took the Division over. I told them at that time that I thought that the chances of our being involved in the war which had started in Europe were considerable, and that we in 20 years had gotten very much on a peacetime basis and I wanted everything done to get us on a war basis, and I had a report for everything that was necessary to put us on a war basis in Naval Communications. That brought in the question of this time lapse, the intercepted enemy messages, but I imagine you would not be interested in all of the details.

However, in May 1941, on my recommendations, the Communications were mobilized, which meant that we had gone on a war status, as far as Communications were concerned. From then on we were on a war basis. I was cognizant, through my position, of these var-

ious messages as we went along. I considered that things practically continuously got worse.

At the time that when I came into the Department, which I think was June——

[12688] The CHAIRMAN. 1940?

Admiral NOYES. Of 1940—there was one time when I thought we might likely go to war with Japan. In June 1941 was another time. Each time we got by, but it became worse.

I think that the last chance that I thought of a peaceful settlement was when we turned down the Japanese proposition and submitted our last note, to which the 13 parts was the reply.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, when we turned down the modus vivendi and sent the message of the 26th, you then considered that we would have war?

Admiral NOYES. That is nothing but my personal opinion, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How is that?

Admiral NOYES. This is my personal opinion, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean.

Admiral NOYES. In my own opinion, Japan would not accept those terms, and therefore she would go ahead with her invasion of Siam, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and the question was what the result would be of that; were we or were we not going to stand for it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now did you know about the message that the President gave on the 17th of August [12689] 1941?

Admiral NOYES. I do not identify it that way, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what we were going to do in case of an attack, or a further move into the Southwest Pacific?

Admiral NOYES. I knew that we had tried to impress the Japanese with the idea that we would take definite action if they proceeded with their invasion.

Senator FERGUSON. If they proceeded with an invasion of the British or the Dutch, or both on them, we had undertaken, as you say now——

Admiral NOYES (interposing). No, sir; I beg your pardon. I did not say we had undertaken.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read his answer?

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. Now we tried to impress the Japanese with what we would do if they proceeded? What would we do if they proceeded?

Admiral NOYES. One thing we did was cut off the oil and scrap-iron shipments.

Senator FERGUSON. What else did we do to impress them if they moved down there that we would take action? You understand your answer, don't you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

[12690] Senator FERGUSON. What else did we do to impress them that we would take action?

Admiral NOYES. Other than arguments and notes, we had done nothing.

Senator FERGUSON. What did we say in notes to impress them?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, will not those notes speak for themselves? They are in the record, they are a part of the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't any idea as to whether all of the notes are in evidence yet.

Admiral NOYES. I must say I am not familiar offhand with the contents of those notes individually, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. But you just told me that we tried to impress them that if they made further moves we would take action. That is the substance of what you said.

Admiral NOYES. That is what I gathered from what I had been reading in the papers, and what I also knew of officially. I had no direct knowledge of what was going on through the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you evaluate the evidence if you had not any knowledge of our policy?

Admiral NOYES. I said I had no direct knowledge of what [12691] was going on through the State Department, sir. I think you will find most of it appeared in the press. I had some access to other information through this book.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that book is Exhibit 1. Those are the messages that we had been given.

Admiral NOYES. I had a general familiarity with the messages that are in this book. That is where I got my picture partly.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would like to object. They are not the messages that we were given that were sent out. They are the Jap version of certain dispatches.

Senator FERGUSON. The record is clear as to what Exhibit 1 is.

Were we intercepting messages to Rome?

Admiral NOYES. To whom in Rome?

Senator FERGUSON. The Japanese. To anyone in Rome.

Admiral NOYES. From time to time we got messages that were from the Japanese Ambassadors abroad.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not quite the question. The question is, were we intercepting Japanese messages to Rome?

Admiral NOYES. From time to time; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. From Tokyo to Rome?

[12692] Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir, or Rome to Tokyo. I do not remember seeing any from Tokyo to Rome. It is more difficult for us to intercept from Tokyo to Rome. Rome to Tokyo was a different proposition.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think I have been able to find any messages in Exhibit 1 that we intercepted from Rome to Tokyo or Tokyo to Rome.

Admiral NOYES. I think there is one in there that I saw.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would point them out.

Mr. MURPHY. The one of December 3d.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, there is one on page 228, the 3d of December. Are you familiar with that message?

Admiral NOYES. What page, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. On page 228.

Admiral NOYES. I would like to say I had never seen this book until 2 weeks ago when it was given me by the counsel of the committee.

I have read the message now, sir. I do not recall it specifically. It was not translated until the 6th of December, according to the note.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when it was delivered to the people who were supposed to receive these messages?

Admiral NOYES. I have no idea, sir.

[12693] Senator FERGUSON. Now one paragraph there on page 229:

Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on the United States and Great Britain I asked would it be due almost immediately and Mussolini replied of course she is obligated to do so under the terms of the tripartite pact. Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point.

That would indicate that the message that they are talking about was that they were trying to get a commitment from Italy as to whether or not, if the war started, they would join in it. Would you not say that is a fair construction of that paragraph?

Admiral NOYES. I should think so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that indicate to you that they were going into a war with America?

Admiral NOYES. I do not imagine I saw this message before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know as you saw it?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir, I have no definite recollection of it, and I would not be surprised at that sort of conversation. I think it was a natural thing for the Ambassador to discuss matters like that. In my own opinion, some of the Japanese were afraid that we were going to war with them if they went ahead with their invasion. It was not [12694] that they wanted to go to war with us, it was that they wanted to occupy southwest Asia. If we let them do it they would not go to war with us.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you think the reason for the attack, as you give in this last answer, would be that they expected that we would interfere with their occupation of other countries?

Admiral NOYES. That would be my personal opinion, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your personal opinion. And you were of that opinion back in December of 1941?

Admiral NOYES. As I stated, that if we had been willing to accept their point and allow them to occupy Siam, French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, they would probably not have gone to war with us, if they could avoid it.

[12695] Senator FERGUSON. Were you surprised on December 7 that there had been an attack by the Japanese on an American possession?

Admiral NOYES. I was surprised that the attack got in. I was surprised that an air raid was made on Pearl Harbor at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wait. You said first that you were surprised that the attack got in. You mean that it was successful?

Admiral NOYES. I will put it in the reverse. I was surprised that an air attack was made on Pearl Harbor at that time, and if it was made, I was surprised it got in.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you expect an attack on the 7th?

Admiral NOYES. I did not expect an attack on the 7th, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Anywhere?

Admiral NOYES. Beg pardon?

Senator FERGUSON. Any where?

Admiral NOYES. When, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I mean anywhere on the 7th, any country by the Japanese.

Admiral NOYES. I do not understand. At what time did I expect an attack on the 7th? I didn't expect an attack on [12696] the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not expect the Japanese to attack any country on the 7th?

Admiral NOYES. I did not expect it; no, sir.

I knew that 30 warships, a large convoy was heading south, and they were going to attack somewhere within a short time. The convoy would not probably have landed on the 7th. They could go to the Philippines, but they were pretty far away to get in on the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. They were over in the north of Siam?

Admiral NOYES. That is right.

I had considerable to do with traffic on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I will ask you about that traffic. Were you not in contact with Admiral Hart, about that move?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew the movement was to the Kra Peninsula, did you not?

Admiral NOYES. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not America know from the message that our Ambassador Winant sent here at 10:40 on the morning of the 6th, which was Saturday, that the movement was on the Kra Peninsula, and that we could expect an attack within 14 hours?

[12697] Admiral NOYES. I never saw that message, sir. That was not a Navy message. It was a State Department message.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you understand the movement was going?

Admiral NOYES. Probably somewhere in that vicinity. Whether they were going first into Indochina, or Thailand, or direct to the Kra Peninsula, I could not say, but there was always a possibility that they could turn toward the Philippines. It was in that order of possibilities.

Senator FERGUSON. They would have had to reverse their course and sail almost 1,000 miles, would they not, to the Philippines from where they were?

Admiral NOYES. I do not think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How far?

Admiral NOYES. I do not remember exactly the position, but Camranh Bay is a little less distant to Manila Bay than it is to the Kra Peninsula.

Senator FERGUSON. Had not the ships gone further than that on Saturday?

Admiral NOYES. I do not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Had not the ships gone further than Camranh Bay on Saturday?

Admiral NOYES. I do not think so, sir. I have no definite recollection of the exact position, but as I remember, [12698] it was somewhere near Camranh Bay.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would not have been surprised at an attack on the Philippines on Sunday?

Admiral NOYES. I am getting a little out of my depth, Senator Ferguson. I was not concerned with the war plans or with this from a strategic point of view. That was not my business at the time. I was merely handling the traffic.

I got involved in an expression of my personal views. I had no responsibility in this respect in the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what I mean when I say the pilot message?

Admiral NOYES. The what message, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. The pilot message.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what that is? It is in Exhibit 1.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at it and just tell me when you first knew that there was such a message, if you knew at all, prior to the attack?

Admiral NOYES. My recollection is not clear as to exactly when I saw that message. I think it was in the afternoon. I do not think I saw the message prior to the at- [12699] tack.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say your best judgment then was that you saw it after the attack?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you when you first saw the message that tells them not to use typists or any other person, which is on page 245.

Admiral NOYES. I should imagine during the afternoon of the 7th, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. After the attack?

Admiral NOYES. I have no direct recollection of the time when I first saw that particular message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what were you working on in relation to Admiral Hart's position in the Southwest Pacific?

Admiral NOYES. We had received a considerable amount of traffic, which I do not remember exactly now, the overnight traffic from both the Atlantic and Pacific. I do not remember any of the traffic specifically, except a report from Admiral Hart in regard to the convoy. That is the thing that sticks in my mind in regard to that warning.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that report came in from Admiral Hart about convoys?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir; I do not recollect at the moment.

[12700] Senator FERGUSON. Well, was it the 6th?

Admiral NOYES. I thought you were speaking of the morning of the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. That is when you saw it. Do you know when it came in?

Admiral NOYES. A message came in during the night of the 6th, that is during our night of the 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you whether it was this message from Admiral Hart.

To OPNAV.

Learn from Singapore we have assured British armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

Admiral NOYES. No, sir; that is not the message to which I was referring.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that there was such a message?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir; I think I knew at the time. I have heard it discussed here.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of it before the attack?

Admiral NOYES. I should say I did. I think that I knew of it before the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what interpretation did you give that?

[12701] Admiral NOYES. That it was some misinformation in regard to the ABC agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. You say it was some misinformation?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you say that?

Admiral NOYES. Because the ABC agreement was purely a military conversation, starting with an assumption that the United States would be associated with certain other countries in a war with Japan, and from there on the plans would be put into effect if that assumption should come through.

Senator FERGUSON. What does this mean:

Learn from Singapore we have assured British armed support under three or four eventualities.

Admiral NOYES. I think it was somebody misinterpreting the ABC agreement. That is my personal opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you understand in case of war we were to give them armed support?

Admiral NOYES. What war, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. With Japan.

Admiral NOYES. I do not understand.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you interpret this to mean?

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities.

[12702] Admiral NOYES. I was familiar with the ABC agreement because I had certain duties under it, and I knew whoever said that misinterpreted what the whole agreement was.

I suppose it is a case of some young liaison officer getting off the track.

[12703] Senator FERGUSON. If this was Admiral Phillips of the Royal British Navy, you wouldn't expect that he would be very far off the track, would you?

Admiral NOYES. I don't believe it was Admiral Phillips of the British Navy. I think it was some young man in our Navy talking to some man in the British Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you ever get that idea? Where did you ever hear that?

Admiral NOYES. You asked me what I thought of the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. I suppose I should have said I don't know anything about it.

Senator FERGUSON. You said you do know, now.

Admiral NOYES. I said I supposed that that was discussed. You asked me what I thought at the time. The truth was I thought somebody misinterpreted the agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Admiral Phillips told Admiral Hart this at Manila on December 6, and that is why Admiral Hart cabled to Washington to find out why he didn't have the information that the British had, and there was about to be an attack upon the British?

Admiral NOYES. I did not know that information, sir, and I knew I had read and was involved in the duties in the [12704] ABCD agreement, and it is purely a military agreement, starting out with an assumption.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Did you know that Phillips was in command of the British in Singapore?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. I don't, I don't know; I wouldn't be positive about that now. I thought he was a captain on one of the British ships, but my recollection may be wrong.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you really think at the time that Admiral Hart would wire Washington if some young officer told him this, that the British were assured armed support under three or four eventualities?

Admiral NOYES. You are asking me what I think now, and what I thought then, sir. I do not remember having any particular thoughts on it. The best answer I can give is that that is what seems to me would have been my reaction then, seeing that message.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it true that you were working on this? I didn't bring it up. You brought it up, about working, you were busily engaged on this Hart proposition in the South Pacific.

Admiral NOYES. You asked me what I was doing.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Now, I show you this message.

[12705] Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you whether or not you saw that message that morning and were working on that proposition?

Admiral NOYES. May I ask the date of the message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It came in Saturday night.

(A paper was handed to Admiral Noyes.)

Admiral NOYES. I did not have this message in mind at all. I had thought that this message came in before the 7th.

Mr. FERGUSON. Yes, it did. It came in Saturday night.

ADMIRAL NOYES. I hadn't thought it was a message that was in it.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you working on? What message were you replying to? Didn't Admiral Hart then send a much longer message and a wire also, cable, from the British, about this proposition, that very day? Is that what you were working on?

Admiral NOYES. The recollection I have is the strategic and tactical implications of a convoy. I do not remember any other messages specifically.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain just what it was [12706] you were working on and what you had worked out, whether you had sent a message?

Admiral NOYES. We had been following the—trying to follow the course of this convoy, because we—you are again asking me something I had nothing to do with except from seeing messages.

Senator FERGUSON. You stated, as I understood you, that you were working on this proposition of Admiral Hart in the South Pacific. Now, this was one of the propositions that he had and he sent a long message which was replied to before the attack, but not actually sent until after the attack, and that is in the record—on this very point. Did you know about that?

Admiral NOYES. I don't recollect such a message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, what were you working on about the convoy? What were you doing that morning?

Admiral NOYES. This message had come in in regard to the scouting, reports on the convoy entirely aside from this other enemy intercept. This was a straight naval message from Admiral Hart.

A British officer came to see me with some information that he had on the same, in regard to what information the British received about the movements of the big convoy. I gave him the information we had. He went up to see the [12707] Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy, I believe, and later on he asked me if I would arrange for him, ask for an appointment for him with the Secretary of State.

I called up the Secretary of State's office, and asked for an appointment. That is the one message that sticks in my mind on Sunday morning other than the note business.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that you did this all Sunday morning?

Admiral NOYES. I can't—no, sir. I had all the Atlantic traffic—

Senator FERGUSON. Do. Did you call the Secretary of State? Did you see the British officer on Sunday morning?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

[12708] Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand that the British had an officer talking with you about this convoy going to the Kra Peninsula, or going somewhere, and you and he were working it out as to where it was going?

Admiral NOYES. We weren't working out where it was going. He came to me with his information.

Senator FERGUSON. What for, what information did he have?

Admiral NOYES. I don't remember the specific information now.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you recall what you gave him?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What information did you have on that convoy?

Admiral NOYES. I think I have seen it in some of these dispatches, but I don't remember the text of it now.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to point out is why he would come to the communications officer, the head of the Communications, this British officer, and not come to our Intelligence Branch, if he wanted to get this information. You were not an evaluator of this information, were you?

Admiral NOYES. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was this British officer that came to you Sunday morning and what time did he come?

Admiral NOYES. I could not give you the exact hour, sir.

[12709] Senator FERGUSON. About what time?

Admiral NOYES. I would say about 9:30 or 10.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say that they expected an attack that morning?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say that they did not expect an attack that day?

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection in regard to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, wouldn't that be a thing that a man would be likely to remember?

Admiral NOYES. I am sure I would remember if they had expected an attack. I might not remember if they didn't. There would be many days when you would not expect an attack but only one day when you did expect one.

Senator FERGUSON. Can't you help the committee here on what this conversation between you and the British officer was about this transport on Sunday morning?

Admiral NOYES. I have—you asked me what I was doing, sir. I had a 24-hour day job. The only thing I remember specifically about that morning was this British officer coming in. In addition I had enough business to do going over my traffic with the Atlantic where we were in a very serious situation to take me the morning without doing anything [12710] else. I have no recollection of the British officer except the part that I have explained to you, sir. I had no conversation about Singapore. I had no conversation about political matters. It was purely in regard to the strategic and tactical implications of this convoy movement. Why he came to me, probably was because it was Sunday morning and there probably weren't so many people down there.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your office alerted this morning to war?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir, it was, 24 hours a day, since May 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. What was said, why did you send him to the Secretary of State and not to the Intelligence Department of the Navy?

Admiral NOYES. That I said to the Secretary of State?

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't I understand that you called the Secretary of State for an appointment?

Admiral NOYES. I called his office.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. Some subordinate.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make an appointment with the Secretary of State?

Admiral NOYES. I did, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the point that he wanted [12711] you to get him in touch with the Secretary of State to discuss?

Admiral NOYES. He didn't tell me, sir. He merely said everybody was busy and would I ring up the State Department and ask if they could see him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say who he wanted to see in the State Department?

Admiral NOYES. I am not sure whom he wanted to see. I thought it was the Secretary of State. It might have been the Under Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the rank of this officer?

Admiral NOYES. I think he was a rear admiral.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that at 10 o'clock that morning there was a meeting between the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and Secretary of Navy?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know why that had been called?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us why?

Admiral NOYES. It was called on the Japanese note.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you received word that the Secretary of State had told the Secretary of the Navy that it was up to the Army and Navy as early as the 27th of November?

[12712] Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never knew that?

Admiral NOYES. I know it now.

Senator FERGUSON. Before the 7th you didn't know it?

Admiral NOYES. I think not. I don't remember having it brought to my attention.

[12713] Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get the information about the meeting between the three secretaries?

Admiral NOYES. I don't remember. I imagine Kramer told me. Kramer, or one of his people.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Admiral NOYES. Kramer, or one of his assistants.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any meeting in Admiral Stark's office that morning?

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Stark's office was more or less full of meetings in those days, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't understand.

Admiral NOYES. There were meetings going on all the time in Admiral Stark's office. I remember nothing specific about it that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall anything about that morning?

Admiral NOYES. I did not see Admiral Stark that morning. I saw Admiral Ingersoll, but not Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was Admiral Ingersoll when you saw him?

Admiral NOYES. I think in his office.

Senator FERGUSON. On what occasion was it that you saw him Sunday morning?

Admiral NOYES. I don't remember, sir.

[12714] Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall that at all.

Admiral NOYES. No. I saw him very often. He was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and I dealt a great deal with him?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any discussion about the 14 parts message or the pilot message or any of these other messages?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir; I remember nothing. I believe, as I remember it, that I felt they were having this meeting and they had the note and would decide what they were going to do about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would say that was a normal morning in your office and in Admiral Ingersoll's office?

Admiral NOYES. Normal for the last week. There had been gradually increasing tension.

Senator FERGUSON. Normal for the last week. Will you explain that a little more? Things were getting rather tense were they not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes. I think from the 28th of November on, some important dispatch had been sent out almost every day in regard to the situation. There was hardly a day that there wasn't some approach to the crisis.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was gradually getting worse.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

[12715] Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever see the message, the answer to General Marshall's note sent by General Short?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not.

Admiral NOYES. I say I didn't. I didn't see it before Pearl Harbor. I have seen it since.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't know then what was going on between General Marshall and General Short, or Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark?

Admiral NOYES. Oh, yes; I handled the war-warning message that was sent by the Navy. I didn't see the Army's incoming message. The message from General Short to the War Department. We exchanged this intercepted enemy traffic with the War Department. Our ordinary business was not exchanged through me. We didn't send a copy to the War Department of every message we sent to the field.

The important messages were in general discussed between Admiral Stark and General Marshall. And at one time I was sent over to see General Marshall about a message and clear it with him. Whenever it involved the Army, we endeavored to clear with the Army.

But it didn't happen that General Short's message to the War Department ever came to my attention until after Pearl [12716] Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Now Captain Safford has testified that he drafted a message to CINCPAC for information of Wake:

In view of the imminence of war destroy all registered publications on Wake except this system and current editions of aircraft code and direction finding code.

This message was not sent.

Admiral Noyes asked:

What do you mean by using such language as that?

Captain SAFFORD. Admiral, the war is just a matter of days if not hours.

Admiral NOYES. You may think there is going to be war, but I think they are bluffing.

Captain SAFFORD. Well, Admiral, if all these publications on Wake are captured, we will never be able to explain.

Now, do you remember such a conversation?

Admiral NOYES. What date was this, may I ask? Was this message under discussion?

Senator FERGUSON. I may refresh your memory further on it:

Admiral Noyes rewrote 061743.

That is the number of the message which was sent deferred on December 6, and received after the attack. It was [12717] that message about the destruction of codes on Wake.

Admiral NOYES. I recollect no such conversation as you have read me, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Admiral NOYES. I recollect no such conversation with Captain Safford. As a matter of fact, I took the initiative in the sending of these previous—the only argument that I recollect having with Captain Safford in regard to the destruction of codes, which we both agreed as being responsible for the security of our own codes, we were both in agreement that we would like to get all of the dangerous ones out of the way, but we recognize the fact that it had a very direct influence on the operations people, intelligence and war plans, and I think he

recognized, as well as I did that we had to get their concurrence, and that is the reason we had to consider quite a bit before it was sent.

The one argument we had about it was that he wanted to specify to the commander in chief what codes, exactly what codes should be kept, and I, since you bring it up, sir, it comes back to me, that argument that I had with him that he shouldn't tell Admiral Kimmel which codes to keep with the outlying islands; let him decide that for himself.

That is the only difference of opinion that I remember, except I think he stuck in some rather brusque language to [12718] the commander in chief, which was contrary to the policy of the Chief of Naval Operations, and I scratched it out.

Senator FERGUSON. What kind of language?

Admiral NOYES. Brusque.

Senator FERGUSON. There could have been such a conversation then: "What do you mean by using such language as that?"

Admiral NOYES. Well, that might have been—I will modify what I said to that extent, if that is what he refers to. You didn't say what the language was.

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Admiral NOYES. I think he made the direct order to Admiral Kimmel that he should destroy certain codes in the outlying islands, something to that effect. Nobody was willing to go along with that because they felt Admiral Kimmel should have more discretion in the matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't you believe that you and Captain Safford would know more about what codes to destroy than Admiral Kimmel would because you were the men who knew your codes, knew how you would have to communicate? Wouldn't you say you had more experience along that line and should have told him what to destroy?

Admiral NOYES. We can't run the Navy that way, sir. We have to let the man in the field use his judgment in [12719] regard to things within his province. That is what the discussion was between Captain Safford and me. He wanted to specify.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell the Admiral what to do?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you thought that that was not the way the Navy did business?

Admiral NOYES. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that right?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, did you at that time think Japan was bluffing as far as the United States was concerned?

Admiral NOYES. On what date?

Senator FERGUSON. On the 6th.

Admiral NOYES. No; I don't think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that did you think they were bluffing?

Admiral NOYES. Sometimes I would see a message, these intercepted messages, which would have a little bit of a favorable tendency in that direction, but on the whole not.

I never had any feeling that way that lasted over one message.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you came to the conclusion [12720] that this was really business and that Japan was not bluffing in these messages?

Admiral NOYES. I have made a list of messages that you could read that would lead you to believe that they weren't going to war.

Senator FERGUSON. They were not going to war?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They would indicate that they were bluffing. Will you give us those?

Admiral NOYES. 1180, page 181; 842, page 186; 1204, page 192; 844, page 199; 857, page 199; 1393, page 200; 985, page 204; 865, page 208; 1226, page 212; 1243, page 227; 1256, page 227.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you the occasion for making up that list.

Admiral NOYES. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. What was the occasion of making up that list?

The CHAIRMAN. Did you finish your answer to the former question? Did you complete your answer to the former question after you read that list? The Chair thought you started to say something else.

Admiral NOYES. No, sir. I think Senator Ferguson asked me if I ever thought there wasn't going to be war. As [12721] I say, I didn't get this book until 2 weeks ago. I just did it as a matter of interest, to pick out certain messages from these messages. In most of these messages Nomura and Kurusu and even the Prime Minister, the Japanese Prime Minister, give the impression that they are sincere. And the other thing that I said, that the Japanese would be glad to—in other words, if we would leave them alone, they would occupy southeast Asia and not necessarily attack us.

But, of course, I didn't think that would ever be.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back, I had been asking you whether or not you thought that they were bluffing, and you said at times you did, and at times you did not.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, you made up this list to demonstrate that they didn't mean to go to war.

Admiral NOYES. No, sir. That is not my thesis, sir. I said among those messages, you will find times when the Prime Minister seemed to be optimistic, says we are trying one more thing. There are several messages in there where the Japanese seem to be endeavoring to patch things up.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, look on page 204, the message to Berlin. The last part of that message:

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon [12722] nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

Admiral NOYES. If you go back, I think you will find that the preceding one to that shows that the Japanese told Hitler that they were afraid if they went ahead with Thailand that we would intervene.

Also at this time Hitler was trying to get Japan to go to war with Russia. My general conclusion was—I merely meant to say, Senator Ferguson, that in going over all of them there are times when you see some evidence of Japan trying to do something to smooth things over, but the net result was certainly all to the bad.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, look at the one on page 195. They are referring there to the message of the 26th:

Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. That is one of the worst ones.

Senator FERGUSON. That didn't leave much doubt, did it?

Admiral NOYES. Well, look at the one, if you will, sir, on page 197, that follows that.

[12723] Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, what are we after with this examination?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair doesn't know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I don't think the witness knows anything about these dispatches, and I don't think his opinion amounts to anything, therefore.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair can't pass on that question, but the Chair has been unable to see just where this meticulous inquiry about these particular messages leads.

It may be that the Senator from Michigan can explain it.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not going to comment upon the evidence, but the witness gave me a list of messages and I was inquiring about some other messages that seem to contradict the ones he had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I know, but my suggestion is that the list of messages is just as far out of relevance in this proceeding. I want to get through with it and get through with this witness.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to cooperate, and I am sure the member at the far end of the table to the left would also be glad if we could do that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no witness to follow this witness this afternoon, so perhaps I shouldn't have interrupted.

[12724] Senator FERGUSON. The witness has been on the stand all day, and I have only had him for a short time.

The CHAIRMAN. It has perhaps only been a short time, but it probably just seems long.

Mr. RICHARDSON. No; I don't even make that criticism; I just wondered whether we couldn't get along.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, I am not accustomed to ask the other members of the committee what questions I should ask; neither do I ask counsel.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I think if the committee is able to endure it, counsel ought to be able to do so, and I think that the propriety of counsel raising these issues is somewhat open to question.

Members of the committee have repeatedly raised that question but I hadn't supposed that we secured counsel in order for him to tell us how to cross-examine witnesses.

I regret that the issue has been raised in just this way.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to say that counsel were secured, not only present counsel, but all counsel, to assist and guide the committee in the interrogation of witnesses and the elucidation of facts, and the Chair sees no impropriety in counsel suggesting that the witness' testimony might be terminated. The whole thing started by counsel [12725] asking the Chair a question that he couldn't answer. From there on, it went.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I just want to say that I agree with Senator Brewster. I have been waiting for some kick in the shins when I made one of these objections, but this is the first time I have received it.

I won't do it any more.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair hopes that counsel will feel free to kick any shins that need to be kicked. Maybe we ought to have done more of that.

Will you proceed so that we can finish with the Admiral today if possible?

Senator FERGUSON. I might say that I haven't questioned the Chairman's questions to the witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. You haven't had much chance, because the Chair has asked very few questions of any witness.

Go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. I could say many things right now but for the purpose of getting through with the witness I will not say them.

I just want to find out why you prepared this list of messages that you just read.

Admiral NOYES. Senator, I have been waiting to testify, present in this committee room, since last Monday. For 2 [12726] weeks before last Monday I have been standing by, away from the committee room.

I made it purely for my own information; while studying it over I made notes, as I read through this Exhibit 1, which was given to me by counsel for the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make any list that would indicate that they were going to war?

Admiral NOYES. That is a combination of both, sir. It is a list of both. It has to do with the probability of war. Negative or positive.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, then, the list is on both sides?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir, and I am very sorry that I brought this up. I tried to tell you this is my personal opinion and I recognize the fact that I didn't have any business to express my personal opinion on this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked if you stated to Captain Safford that you thought the Japanese were bluffing and in answer to that question, I think you went into this.

Admiral NOYES. That is where I got into it, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You were led into it. You didn't just go into it.

Senator FERGUSON. Is the Chair through?

The CHAIRMAN. For the moment.

[12727] Senator FERGUSON. Of course, other people have tried to take me off the track, but I will ask more questions anyway.

Admiral, it is your understanding that the Navy sent direct communications, that is, the direct intercepts to Admiral Kimmel prior to July 1941, or up until sometime in July 1941?

Admiral NOYES. I tried to explain that in my answer this morning by saying we had a strict rule not to send exact translations or direct reference to enemy intercepted messages mixed up with any other Navy business. There was no objection to sending from time to time an exact translation of any message under my cognizance for the purpose of helping people who had had it as a reference in other messages.

In other words, for the mechanics of decrypting.

Senator FERGUSON. If you look back on the question, we will get through quicker. If you will try to keep to the question.

Admiral NOYES. I know of no reason why there were less after July than before July unless it was on account of the international situation.

Senator FERGUSON. On May 26, 1941, did you know that Admiral Kimmel had written a letter to Admiral Stark asking [12728] him specifically for this kind of information?

Admiral NOYES. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a circular sent out through the various departments along that line?

Admiral NOYES. A circular, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, to the various departments.

Admiral NOYES. In regard to magic?

Senator FERGUSON. No, about sending information direct to Kimmel.

Admiral NOYES. I had nothing to do with that, sir. That was the Director of Naval Intelligence, who sent out information.

The messages I sent were at the request of someone else.

Senator FERGUSON. You say there may have been a change from July until November because of the international situation. Will you explain what you mean by that answer?

Admiral NOYES. I understood your question, Senator Ferguson, to be on the assumption that the number of messages sent out decreased after July.

Senator FERGUSON. There isn't any doubt about that. That is what I was asking about, and that is a fact, as I take it from this record.

Admiral NOYES. I had nothing to do with the preparation [12729] of the record, and I supposed the record was supposed to bear on subsequent events.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get an order from Admiral Stark on that?

Admiral NOYES. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Ingersoll?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Anyone, to your knowledge?

Admiral NOYES. All of the orders in regard to the handling of magic came from the Chief of Naval Operations. I could make no change in the orders or the general policy without his approval.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as far as you were concerned, there was no change in policy, as far as you personally were concerned, you knew of no change in the policy of sending messages to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral Turner has indicated on this record—I want you to be specific on this—that he obtained some information from you that Admiral Kimmel was getting all of the magic, and Admiral Stark to the same effect.

What have you got to say about that?

Did you believe that Admiral Kimmel was getting all [12730] of the magic?

Admiral NOYES. I knew that he was not, sir. It would not have been a possibility to do it. There was no way to get the messages to him.

Senator FERGUSON. And there was no way for him to decode it?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew specifically that Admiral Kimmel or his source there did not have any machinery or equipment to decipher or decode magic, that is purple?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. Magic includes all.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I changed it to purple.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your answer?

Admiral NOYES. Purple.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that?

Admiral NOYES. I knew that, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of anyone ever asking you that question as to whether or not they were able to get purple or not?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir, except when it was discussed when the machine was sent to Cavite, when the purple machine was sent to Cavite the decision had to be made between Cavite and Honolulu. It was sent by the approval of [12731] Naval Operations because it was the best listening post for us. It wasn't sent for the benefit of Admiral Hart. That was a secondary consideration.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us when it was sent to Cavite?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir, I cannot.

Senator FERGUSON. What year?

Admiral NOYES. 1941, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what part of 1941?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. With whom did you discuss the question?

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral Ingersoll certainly, and I think with Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time did the British have theirs, their machine?

Admiral NOYES. I think so, sir.

[12732] Senator FERGUSON. We had already sent one to the British, is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. The Navy did not do that, so I am not sure of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who did furnish the British with the deciphering machine?

Admiral NOYES. I am not familiar with the—I cannot give you a specific answer to the question. I imagine it was the Army, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you don't know who did it?

Admiral NOYES. I don't recollect. I didn't have anything to do with it. I did not do it personally.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did have a discussion with Admiral Stark that you only had the one machine and it could be sent to Cavite and not sent to Hawaii?

Admiral NOYES. I recommended that it be sent to Cavite because that was the best place to intercept Japanese traffic and receive information during that time and that was—I will say that that was about the time of the message that the counsel put in the record this morning, when we sent a joint message to the Philippines, the commanding general in the Philippines and the commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, to make a full exchange at their end of the line.

Admiral NOYES. I think that was March 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. You say this is in March 1941?

Admiral NOYES. I think the message was sent in March 1941 and it would have had to be—the machine would have had to be there before the message was sent.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether you discussed that matter with Admiral Turner?

Admiral NOYES. I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And would your answers be the same on Admiral Turner about a conversation of purple being translated at Hawaii, as it was with Admiral Stark, that you do not recall any such statement to Admiral Turner or Admiral Stark on that question, that Kimmel was getting the purple?

Admiral NOYES. In regard to Admiral Turner, his testimony indicates that he was referring to traffic analyses and I think that he got confused between the business that Commander Rochefort was describing this morning in his testimony, the analysis of traffic, radio direction finder bearings, and that kind of strictly naval work, as contrasted with diplomatic dispatches, which was what was the primary use of the purple code.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you at the time breaking the Japanese navy code?

[12734] Admiral NOYES. We were working on them. Actually we—it is a relative matter with all codes. There is no code ever read—there is no one code ever read 100 percent. We speak of it in percentage. Some codes can be read 10 percent, some 90 percent, and I never heard of any one that could be read for any length of time 100 percent.

Senator FERGUSON. How much of the Navy code were you in 1941 able to read?

Admiral NOYES. I would have to refer you to Commander Rochefort's testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know?

Admiral NOYES. Not of my own knowledge. I heard him this morning but I do not recollect his exact statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether we were able to read all of it, whether there was a top and a lower code?

Admiral NOYES. Whether we could read all Japanese naval codes?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. The naval codes had given us much more trouble than the other codes in general, that is the reason that we had—since it was directly naval traffic, before I took over the job—we had that set-up, with the people in Hawaii concentrated on the naval systems and they were the hardest [12735] and they had not got as far as we had with the diplomatic through more or less luck.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there is one message that is mentioned in Safford's testimony; that is No. 843, on November 27, 1941, prescribing a schedule of Tokyo news broadcasts. That is just a short time after—it is not in a book. That is just a short time after the setting up of the wind code. I will send it to you so that you can see it. It is from Tokyo to Washington, 27th of November 1941, purple 843 is the number [handing document to witness].

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see that before?

Admiral NOYES. I could not say, sir. I probably did. I am familiar with what it means. It was used in connection with the—

Captain Safford though it had a connection with the winds execute. It is a list of Japanese stations and their frequencies.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. When did Captain Safford discuss that with you, or was that what you took from his testimony?

Admiral NOYES. Oh, we discussed, as soon as the—

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, when it came in?

Admiral NOYES. When the winds set-up came in. This came in actually prior to the—well, it came in the—they were translated the same day, apparently. This was the day before [12736] this schedule message came in a day before the set-up for the winds code was sent out from Tokyo or, rather, it was sent out a day before, as I remember it.

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Admiral NOYES. No, I am wrong on that.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 19th.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was sent out on the 19th.

Admiral NOYES. It was not translated until the 28th.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Admiral NOYES. We got them both translated on the same day.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall a discussion with Safford that the message that he has now referred to in his testimony, that is not in the book, Number 843, which I have shown you, had something to do with setting up a program for this winds code?

Admiral NOYES. Well, for the reason, I should say, that does not check, because the winds code had been sent out on the 19th and this schedule was not set up until the 27th, so it could not—

Senator FERGUSON. I just want to know whether you had a discussion with him?

Admiral NOYES. I do not recollect, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, didn't you tell us that you did [12737] have a discussion with him at some time?

Admiral NOYES. I did have a discussion—

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Admiral NOYES (continuing).—In regard to the implementing winds code.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Admiral NOYES. At about the time that it came in.

Senator FERGUSON. And was it on that schedule that I have shown you, 843?

Admiral NOYES. I have no specific recollection of any discussion of this particular schedule. I am perfectly willing to accept his statement that he thought that this schedule was received—that this schedule was likely to be one on which the winds execute might be received. He may have said that; I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. In view of the fact, Admiral, that there was a little discrepancy as to the time you testified before the Navy Court I have checked that record and find that it was in September 1944 and not December.

Admiral NOYES. Thank you, sir. My recollection was at fault.

Mr. KEEFE. The Navy Court had concluded its hearings on [12738] the 19th of October 1944.

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. The Hewitt examination followed and took place in December.

Now, I am very much mystified by certain portions of your testimony and some time or other in the course of trying to work out some sort of a report to come to some determination on this testimony we will have to judge the witnesses that testified and we have got to believe some.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir, I realize that.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is going to be a pretty difficult task in view of the testimony that has been given here, as I see it.

Admiral NOYES. I have been here this past week, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I would like to refer you to the testimony which you gave before the Navy Court of Inquiry and I want to ask you whether or not this question was asked you, or these questions were asked you, and did you make these answers? This is question 82:

Q. What special circumstances or procedures were set up in your office for the handling of the execution signal of the winds code system if and when the execution signal was received?

A. We had a special twenty-four hour watch for all [12739] Communication Intelligence matters.

Q. Were there any special cards prepared giving the Japanese words that were expected and these cards, sets of them, delivered to persons in the Navy Department who would be particularly interested upon the receipt of the execution of that signal?

A. I could not say.

Now, I want to stop right there.

Admiral NOYES. Did you say question 82, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, that is the way it appears in our record, questions 82 and 83. I read you the questions and read you the answers.

Now the question is, were those questions asked you and did you make those answers before the Naval Board of Inquiry?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Now you come before us in this matter and you say that after hearing the testimony of Captain Kramer you think that you did direct the preparation of some cards. Now, did you or didn't you?

Admiral NOYES. I stated that I had a discussion with Captain Safford after my return to Washington this summer which—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, the question is—pardon me. I don't want to interrupt you but I would like to have this as [12740] short and as succinct and as clear as possible without a lot of roaming around the bush. Did you or did you not direct the preparation of these cards?

Admiral NOYES. I authorized the preparation of them, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, is there a distinction to be made between authorization and direction?

Admiral NOYES. I think that the suggestion probably came from Captain Safford or Captain Kramer and I approved of its being done. They were in my division.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, can't you answer that specific question? Did you yourself direct the preparation of those cards?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Can you answer that yes or no?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, than the answer is "Yes, sir." We have got that much settled then. Now, the next question is were those cards prepared?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And who prepared them?

Admiral NOYES. I do not recollect, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Were they delivered to you?

Admiral NOYES. I do not recollect, sir. They were delivered to me or to the ones who were to use them but I do not know that I made the delivery or Kramer. I should think that [12741] Kramer would have been probably the one to deliver it.

Mr. KEEFE. I don't care for argumentation that is not an answer. I am asking you simple questions and they can have simple and direct answers. That has been the trouble with this whole hearing, every answer is an argument; instead of being an answer to the question we go off around the bush and saying all around about what this one said and that one said and everything else instead of getting a direct answer to the question.

Now, I am going to have difficulty, in passing on the character of the witnesses that testified here, to determine who is telling the truth. They cannot all be telling the truth, as I have listened to this testimony and I want to see if we cannot pin some of these things down. We have now reached the point where you have testified here that you did direct the preparation of these cards.

Admiral NOYES. And that the cards were distributed.

Mr. KEEFE. Distributed to whom?

Admiral NOYES. I should say, to the best of my recollection—

Mr. RICHARDSON. He is asking for your personal knowledge now.

Mr. KEEFE. I am asking you to testify not about what somebody else told you or somebody told him or what you heard [12742] here in this room. I am asking you to test your recollection and your knowledge of the things that you are testifying about, trying to apply what are ordinary rules of evidence and the construction of evidence.

To whom were those cards distributed?

Admiral NOYES. If you ask me to whom I personally delivered the cards, I do not recollect.

Mr. KEEFE. To whom were they delivered by your direction?

Admiral NOYES. I believe that they were delivered to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Wilkinson, the Naval Aide, probably Admiral Turner.

Mr. KEEFE. The Naval Aide to whom?

Admiral NOYES. The Naval Aide to the President.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, it is perfectly sensible, is it not, Admiral Noyes, that that procedure would have been indulged in due to the importance that had been previously attached to this winds code that had been set up?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the evidence is before this committee that as to no other message other than this proposed winds execute was any such arrangement made. That is true, isn't it?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

[12743] Mr. KEEFE. Yes. It is also true, is it not, that due to the fact of secrecy of magic these cards would not have been delivered to any persons other than those entitled to receive ultra-magic, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is true, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the very purpose of delivering these cards was so that when and if this winds code execute message came in it would be possible to immediately contact the recipients of those cards and advise them of the receipt of that message, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. At night, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, at night, yes. They could have those cards at home with them. isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. That was the idea of the cards.

Mr. KEEFE. So you had a plan set up by which a telephone message could be sent to the Chief of Naval Operations or to the President or to this one or that one of the six that you have named and they could be given language that would indicate to them what the winds execute message was and by turning to the card they could interpret it and understand it, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you devised that plan yourself, didn't you?

[12744] Admiral NOYES. I am not sure whether I devised it or whether it was suggested to me. It may have been a joint affair. It came—Kramer and Safford and myself—

Mr. KEEFE. I am trying to give you the credit.

Admiral NOYES. Sir?

Mr. KEEFE. I am trying to give you the credit in this case.

Admiral NOYES. Well, Safford, I see, took credit for it already.

Mr. KEEFE. Safford does not take credit for that. The testimony of both Captain Kramer and Captain Safford is that this whole card system was your production.

Admiral NOYES. Well, it was undoubtedly my direction.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Admiral NOYES. I thought you asked me if I initiated the idea, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, we have got this far, that the cards were made out, they were distributed and in the hands of those entitled to receive ultra-magic. You are sure about that, aren't you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Before this committee now, that much you are sure of?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. There can be no mistake about that?

[12745] Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that subsequent refreshment won't change your opinion later, is that right?

Admiral NOYES. My opinion has only been changed once, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I am not so certain about that if I go through your testimony, as I will before we get through.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean today?

Admiral NOYES. I mean this particular incident.

Mr. KEEFE. What is that?

Admiral NOYES. I did not mean that there was only one discrepancy. I mean that I changed my opinion on this after talking to Captain Safford upon my return to Washington.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, what I want to be sure—is what you are testifying to now a fact?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I am asking for facts.

Admiral NOYES. To the best of my recollection it is a fact.

Mr. KEEFE. Not rumors, suspicions, and not conjectures, and not composite ideas resulting from conversations where you worked out something to say, but I am asking for simple facts. You realize that, do you not?

Admiral NOYES. I understand that, Mr. Keefe.

[12746] Mr. KEEFE. And the reason I am asking it is because this question was asked you. Question 84:

As a possible refreshing of your memory, there has been testimony given before this court that prior to the receipt of the execution signal you had prepared a series of six cards and each had been delivered to officials in the Navy Department who would be particularly anxious to know of this execute signal at the earliest moment it was received. Do you now recall if any such system was established?

No, I could not say.

That is what you told the Court of Inquiry?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But since that time, after talking with other individuals you now are prepared to come here under oath and tell this committee as a fact what you have stated to us this afternoon in respect to those cards, is that right?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. One other individual, not individuals.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, was this question asked you before the Naval Court of Inquiry at that time:

Q. Then at no time did you learn from anyone the execution of the winds message in any form and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form of [12747] the winds message, is that the way you want to leave your testimony on this subject?

A. That is right; yes.

Now, you want that changed before this committee, do you not?

Admiral NOYES. I do not, sir. I have stated before this committee that there was no authentic execute on the winds message.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Admiral, I don't want to split hairs.

Admiral NOYES. I am not trying to split hairs, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I think you are.

Admiral NOYES. I am sorry.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, listen to this question that was asked you:

Then at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the winds message in any form.

Admiral NOYES. I did not take that question to be an execute, a false execute at the time. That is the reason I answered as I did.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Question 136. Was this question asked you and did you make this answer:

Q. Referring to this winds message and the execute of the winds message, have you any recollection whether Lieu- [12748] tenant Commander Kramer came in with an execute of the winds message and said, "Here it is"?

A. As I remember it we received some outside information which afterwards turned out not to be correct.

What information was taken to mean that an execute of this winds message had been received which turned out not to be correct? Did you make that answer?

Admiral NOYES. That it turned out not to be correct?

Mr. KEEFE. No, I am not asking you that. I am asking you the simple question——

Admiral NOYES. Well, I haven't been able to find it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I assumed that you made it because I am reading it from the record.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Admiral Noyes, Captain Kramer has testified that the watch officer on duty, as he says, on the 5th of December came to his door and handed him a message that had just been taken off the teletype. Captain Kramer looked at it and told this committee that he believed at that time that it was an authentic winds execute message; that he walked down with the watch officer to Captain Safford's office and said to Captain Safford, "Here it is."

Kramer says that Safford then carried the ball from there on and indicated that he had gone to your office. Captain [12749] Safford said that he sent one of his subordinates to your office with that message.

Now, my question is, Did a message, true or false, good or bad, of the character described by Captain Safford and Captain Kramer reach your office either on the 4th or 5th of December?

Admiral NOYES. I could not give you a specific answer to that question, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Why not?

Admiral NOYES. Because to say that a false message written on yellow teletype paper—I cannot say that a message written on yellow teletype paper was not delivered to me in my office on the 4th or the 5th.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, was it ever delivered to you?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then we are to understand that your memory fails on that subject, is that right? You have no recollection of receiving this message, regardless of whether you considered it to be a true winds execute or a false winds execute, you cannot tell this committee whether you received such a message?

Admiral NOYES. With the exception that I have a partial recollection of receiving a message with a Russian slant, which caused a dispute and that would fit in with a winds [12750] message, except for some parts of Captain Safford's testimony. I testified to that this morning, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, the difficulty that I have with this testimony of yours is that Colonel Sadtler, who has apparently told the same story all through all these hearings, comes before this committee and says that he received a telephone message from you on the 5th, in which you told him that the winds execute message was in.

Now, he testified meticulously that he talked to Colonel Bratton; that Colonel Bratton took a piece of paper out of his pocket with some words on it, looked at them and said to Colonel Sadtler, "What were the words on this?" And Sadtler did not get them. They then talked to General Miles and General Miles told him to call you on

the telephone and ascertain the exact words on the message and Colonel Sadtler says he did call you on the telephone and that you told him that you were busy, that you were just going to a meeting and did not have time to talk to him.

Now, your testimony is, if I understand it, that your mind is a blank as to all of that; you have no recollection of anything of that kind taking place. Is that right?

Admiral NOYES. I testified that I had talked to Colonel Sadtler numerous times during that week. I have no recollection of a conversation such as he describes. I believe from [12751] listening to his testimony yesterday that he said it was a message, regarding only severance of relations with the British that he referred to.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, my dear sir, Colonel Sadtler never saw the message. The only thing that Colonel Sadtler knows about it is what you told him and he told us that you told him that over the telephone.

Admiral NOYES. He said in his testimony yesterday I told him there was a message in that looked like severance of relations with the British.

Mr. KEEFE. Exactly; that is what Colonel Sadtler said that you told him over the phone.

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And when he reported that to Colonel Bratton, Colonel Bratton wanted him to tell him what was the Japanese word upon it and Sadtler could not tell Bratton that and General Miles directed him to call you back and get the exact words that were in the message and you said you were busy and going to attend a meeting.

Now, you wouldn't think Colonel Sadtler could possibly be mistaken and make up a story that was not absolutely true in that respect, do you?

Admiral NOYES. I should be very sorry to think that any of these witnesses were intentionally mistaken, sir.

[12752] Mr. KEEFE. Well, do you think that took place exactly as Colonel Sadtler stated?

Admiral NOYES. I do not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then do you deny that it did take place?

Admiral NOYES. I do not, sir. I deny that it took place exactly as he said.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then you tell us what did take place?

Admiral NOYES. I do not know, sir. I would not have said that the message is in just the way I have been quoted. I might very well have called him and told him that we had a questionable message that we were considering and that is the most that I would have done, or that could have resulted in the train of circumstances that occurred.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, that is an argument. That is not a statement of facts, Admiral.

Admiral NOYES. I do not recollect that I made any such remarks over the telephone as Colonel Sadtler states that I made.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you do not want to testify under oath that you did not, do you?

Admiral NOYES. I do not, sir. I stated that I hadn't a recollection.

Mr. KEEFE. Then the nature of your story is you do not remember what was said?

[12753] Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or you don't remember that there was even a telephone conversation?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, why then build up something and argue and say that if I had a telephone conversation I may have said so and so when your recollection is a perfect blank and you don't know whether you telephoned him at all or not, and you certainly don't remember what you did say if you did telephone. Now, that is a fair assumption, isn't it?

Admiral NOYES. You are right, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Then let us get down to some facts. Now, did you talk to anyone else about this winds code execute that you do remember about?

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection of specific conversations with anyone else in regard to false executes on the wind message.

Mr. KEEFE. I did not ask you for your recollection as to specific conversations. I asked you the simple question did you talk to anyone else? We will go to the question as to what the conversation was in a minute.

Admiral NOYES. I do not recollect, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you talk to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark?

[12754] Admiral NOYES. In regard to the execute you mean?

Mr. KEEFE. In regard to this message that had been brought to your office.

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection of discussing it with him personally. You mean in regard to the set-up, I assume, and not the execution?

Mr. KEEFE. I am talking about the execute message.

Admiral NOYES. The execution I did not ever discuss with the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I want to ask you if these questions were put to you and did you make these answers before the naval court of inquiry? Question No. 141.

In my previous examination I asked you—

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask whether there is a chance to finish with the admiral today?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; in just a few minutes I can get through.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us go ahead then.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

In my previous examination I asked you, at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution on the winds message in any form and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form? I ask you if that is the way you wish to leave your testimony on that subject? I now invite your attention to the fact that you have just testified [12755] that you did receive some information. From where did this information come?

A. I beg your pardon. I said to the best of my recollection there was a false alarm about it.

Q. But that was information about the winds message, was it not? The mere fact that it turned out to be false afterwards did not take it away from that subject, did it?

A. I would be very glad to give you a better answer if I could.

Q. Then you did hear from some source about the execution of the winds message, is that right?

A. I can only say that to the best of my remembrance no execution of the so-called winds message was finally received.

Q. Did you ever discuss this winds message—and they are referring to the winds execute message, the one you have just been talking about—did you ever discuss this winds message or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it more important than a later study of it indicated. The message only said that relations were strained.

[12756] Q. I asked you whether you discussed it?

A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally?

Q. Yes.

A. No.

Q. Did you give him any information?

A. He got a copy of it.

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers? You can answer that “yes” or “no” if you remember.

Admiral NOYES. I don’t think the record is correct, but I have no objection to accepting those. It does not sound—it sounds as if something is misplaced in the record to me. I never had a chance to go over my testimony, but I see nothing that is contrary to what might have been said, with the exception of—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I haven’t time—

Senator BREWSTER. What exception?

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness finish.

Mr. KEEFE. I thought he had finished.

The CHAIRMAN. He started to say, “With the exception of” something.

Admiral NOYES. I noticed in reading this over that it looks as if the question did not belong with the—the answer did not belong with the question, but I don’t know that it makes any particular difference so far as the facts go.

[12757] Mr. KEEFE. I will read it to you again.

Admiral NOYES. I am perfectly willing to accept the facts as stated, having in mind what you just read.

Mr. KEEFE. Question 145:

I asked you whether you discussed it?

A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally?

Q. Yes.

A. No.

Q. Did you give him any information?

A. He got a copy of it.

That is perfectly clear and logical, isn’t it, and follows in sequence, doesn’t it?

Admiral NOYES. All right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you made those answers, didn’t you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, was that answer true that the Chief of Naval Operations did get a copy of this message?

Admiral NOYES. He got a copy of the message setting up the winds code; that is what I said. I don’t think it is correctly written up from the notes. He did not get a copy of the execute. They said they wanted to know if he had any information on the set-up or the execute, as I followed you in your reading, and he did get a copy—

Mr. KEEFE. Evidently you did not follow me in the reading [12758] because I will read it to you again and demonstrate to

you that your interpretation could not possibly be a fact. This is what I said:

Did you ever discuss this winds message or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations?

Without going back, the previous questions were referring to the winds execute message, and then the question is:

Did you ever discuss this winds message or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. When the message came in, as I remember at that time we considered it more important than a later study of it indicated.

Now, get this:

The message only said that relations were strained.

There wasn't anything in the original code that talked about the relations being strained, was there? That was what was alleged to have been in the winds execute message.

Admiral NOYES. Oh, I beg your pardon, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Admiral NOYES. The winds execute message contained nothing but a weather report, an apparent weather report. The description as to what it meant finally you will find on page 154.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; I am very familiar with it. I have got [12759] it right in front of me.

Admiral NOYES. That is the only place where any words in regard to severing diplomatic relations occurs. When the execute came it was merely to have the words in Japanese, "East wind, rain; north wind, cloudy; or west wind, clear." That was all the Japanese would mean.

Mr. KEEFE. Then I understand your present statement to be that you did not discuss this winds code execute message with the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral NOYES. I did not discuss an execute message with the Chief of Naval Operations; that is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you discuss it with anyone else, the message which was delivered to you either by Captain Safford or one of his assistants?

Admiral NOYES. I think I very probably did.

Mr. KEEFE. With whom did you discuss it?

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll would have been the most probable ones, outside of my own division.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not dealing in probabilities. I cannot arrive at a decision in this matter based upon probability. Did you talk to Admiral Wilkinson or didn't you?

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection of a conversation in regard to any specific false execute message with any [12760] individuals.

Mr. KEEFE. Where are the cards now that were made out by Captain Kramer?

Admiral NOYES. I have no idea, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have one of them in your office?

Admiral NOYES. I had one in my possession; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Where is it now?

Admiral NOYES. I do not know, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you made any search among any of those other people who had those cards to determine what has become of them?

Admiral NOYE. I have not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you had one of these cards in your possession?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall what was stated on the card?

Admiral NOYES. "East wind, rain—U. S.; north wind, cloudy—USSR; west wind, clear—British."

Expressions to that effect. I wouldn't be sure of the exact way of expressing it but to that sense.

Mr. KEEFE. Were the Japanese words on there?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir. The Japanese words would have been of no value because nobody could—the code was intended purely for telephoning to people at their home and [12761] the idea was that over the telephone there would merely be said that a weather report had been received "East wind, rain" which to the recipient of this card would remind him which country was involved.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I want to get this one thing straight, Admiral. You had this pick-up station or intercept station over here at Cheltenham?

Admiral NOYES. Cheltenham was the receiving station for the Navy Department. It was not a pick-up station. It was the main traffic station of the Navy.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the testimony here up to date is quite undisputed, it seems to me, that a message was taken off the teletype. We haven't heard yet from the lieutenant who took it off, Lieutenant Murray. Some of them were identified by Lieutenant Murray. Now, if a message came over the teletype, that message would have to be written down at the station that received it; isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. It had to be typed at the station.

Mr. KEEFE. It had to be typed at the station that received it; isn't that right?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And typing it at the station sends it over the teletype here to the Navy Department where it is teletyped on the teletype machine?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the way it is received?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

[12762] Mr. KEEFE. Now the only way you could identify the winds execute message was by finding the words that were set up in the original code set-up, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So when the testimony is, as testified by Captain Safford before the Naval Court of Inquiry, that the watch officer saw the identification words on this teletype and tore off this page, the Japanese word must have been there to identify it, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Without that nobody would have even thought of it being a winds execute, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the Japanese word that was there would indicate with whom relations were strained or broken off?

Admiral NOYES. It may, after the other requirements of the code were met.

Mr. KEEFE. Of course, I understand that. Now you found a message taken off the teletype which Kramer—with all the other inconsistencies in his testimony, but I think he was clear finally before this committee that he then believed that that was an original, authentic winds code execute message, and Safford believed it to be such, two of the high men handling that sort of traffic in this division, and [12763] that message found its way into your office and from there on the matter becomes blank. Now with all this refreshing of your mind you are still unable to tell us what became of the message that was actually delivered to you from Captain Safford? I do not care whether it was on the 4th or the 5th. That is immaterial. Dates do not make any difference.

Admiral NOYES. It is quite material to me, sir. When you ask me to identify a specific piece of paper and to line it up with the testimony of three different people, it puts me in a very difficult position.

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral Noyes, I am not asking you to do any such thing. Here is a message that the testimony is clear and convincing on that both the Army and Navy had gone to great lengths to receive it, and the evidence is clear on that score, and you have gone to the extent of setting up an absolutely clear system that would apply only to this one message when it came in, so that this message could be identified out of all the other messages, it was the only one that was to be handled and brought directly to your office and the only one for which these cards were made out.

Now that takes it completely out of the ordinary traffic, doesn't it?

Admiral NOYES. It was out of the ordinary traffic; there is no question of that, sir.

[12764] Mr. KEEFE. Still you do not remember this message, or anything about it?

Admiral NOYES. You ask me to bring together a 200-word message, which is a message that long [indicating], at least, on the 4th, which Safford testified to, a small strip of paper on the 5th, which Kramer testified to, and a different message on the 5th, about an entirely different set-up, where the British and Russia were both brought in, and they are not the same thing.

I am not able to identify the disposition of any one of those three supposed messages.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I would think, Admiral, there might be some justification for this last statement of yours were it not for the testimony of Colonel Sadtler that you actually telephoned him. He did not telephone you; you telephoned him and told him the message was in, clearly demonstrating the extreme interest that was applied to this one particular message, and you do not deny that you telephoned that to Colonel Sadtler. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I want to ask you a question or two.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood in regard to this telephone message that your testimony here before us is to the effect [12765] you may have telephoned him but you do not recall.

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. If you did telephone him.

Admiral NOYES. That is correct. I telephoned many times a day. We had a secret telephone between my office and the office of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army for the purpose of discussing these matters.

The CHAIRMAN. You were all down there in offices that were closely associated, weren't you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In and out all during the day?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not, any of you, quarantined against the other so you were afraid to go back and forth, and you did go back and forth and held many conversations about things that were then of interest to your Department and to the Navy and the Government with respect to this Japanese situation, is that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Now about these cards that we have been talking about here. As I understand it, whether you initiated that or whether Kramer or Safford initiated it, it was a matter of convenience, so you could distribute those cards—which were identical, as I understand it.

[12766] Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir; they were identical.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). To four or five people.

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So if they happened to be at home at night and what you were looking for, that is the execute message came in, you could call these people and say, "The weather report is here." Nobody could understand that except the two people at each end of the telephone, is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. The general public would not understand it?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They would not know what you were talking about. They would not know you were talking about a Japanese secret code message, would they?

Admiral NOYES. That was the purpose of the cards.

The CHAIRMAN. You would call up and say, "The weather report is in", and the other man would say, "Well, what is it?" You would say, "It is East Wind Rain", and he knew what that meant. You did not have to go into details, or to give a blueprint. That card was for that purpose, is that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So it does not make a lot of difference [12767] who initiated it, or who actually wrote that out, if there was such a card system and it was distributed to these four or five top-notchers who were entitled to this secret information.

Admiral NOYES. I might say the original question which I was asked before the Navy court of inquiry indicated they were cards for use in the office, and having been away for a year in the Pacific, away from Washington, I did not recall them in that sense.

The CHAIRMAN. The first impression I got in reference to these cards was that they were cards that were distributed among the high officers in the offices and kept there. I evidently was mistaken. They were supposed to take them home with them?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They could keep them in the office if anybody called them there, and they would understand the meaning?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This teletype business, you had both white and yellow teletype paper, didn't you, or pink and yellow?

Admiral NOYES. I could not say, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have more than one color?

[12768] Admiral NOYES. I do not know, sir. I thought the general run of teletype rolls was yellow.

The CHAIRMAN. A lot of it is white. I have seen white teletype paper, although I do not know what the Navy uses.

Admiral NOYES. I think we would use white, if we did not have yellow. In other words, I do not know of any color code distinction in a teletype message.

The CHAIRMAN. If you were using both yellow and pink, or white and pink, or any other color, would you be able now to identify which color any particular message was in that was handed to you?

Admiral NOYES. The only way I could identify a message now, unless it recalls something to my memory, would be my initials on the message.

The CHAIRMAN. Now about the execute message which has been referred to here. When you referred to the message shown to you on either the 4th or 5th you were talking about the message that you call the false execute message?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now in the code set-up, the weather set-up, the Japanese from Tokyo sent a message to their Ambassador here that in the event of a breaking off of relations or interfering with communications, if they heard a weather report containing these words this is what [12769] it meant: "East Wind Rain: Trouble with the United States," or a break in relations?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. "North Wind Cloudy: With Russian; West Wind Clear: With England."

Admiral NOYES. It would indicate on account of the probable severance of relations with the country indicated, upon receipt of the message codes and papers were to be destroyed.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if other means of communication became impossible and they heard a weather broadcast of that sort and heard these words they would know what they meant?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir. I believe the reason the Japanese sent the British message on the 7th was that some one of their stations had not checked in with the word "Haruna," indicating that the papers had been destroyed, and they may have found out, or have suspected that they never had gotten the message, and they sent that out to try to get that set destroyed.

The CHAIRMAN. Now prior to the 7th the conditions under which this weather report were to be broadcast had not taken place, that is, there had been no break in diplomatic relations nor communications. had there?

[12770] Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now the message that was received here on the 7th, is that a message that you regarded and interpreted as a true execute message, according to the weather set-up?

Admiral NOYES. The one in the FCC?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the one that you referred to earlier as having gotten here on the 7th. I think it is on the last page of the exhibit.

Admiral NOYES. Page 3 (d) of Exhibit 142?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. It says in English, and this is in the middle of the news:

but today especially at this point I will give the weather broadcast West Wind Clear, West Wind Clear—

twice.

The CHAIRMAN. That meant there was no trouble with Russia?

Admiral NOYES. That meant diplomatic relations severed with England.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course neither of those signals or symbols were to be interpreted as meaning war, necessarily.

Admiral NOYES. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It meant there might be severance of diplomatic relations between the respective countries. Well, [12771] now, if that was to be regarded as an execute message based upon the weather signals that had been previously given to the Japanese diplomatic representatives, would there have been any need or any occasion for sending an execute message either on the 4th or 5th, and if they sent one on the 4th or 5th would they necessarily have repeated it on the 7th?

Admiral NOYES. I should think it is very unlikely, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So if the message that was received here was really an execute message and was so intended to be regarded by the Japanese to their representatives, would there have been any need to send another one on the 7th?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir, except I think this one on the 7th was just intended to clean up some things in some British point.

The CHAIRMAN. That related to the British?

Admiral NOYES. They had not got an answer back from some British station and they were afraid they were going to lose their codes at that place, or for some reason the British had held them up.

The CHAIRMAN. Now with reference to Admiral Phillips, he was an acquaintance of yours?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir, I did not know him personally. I knew who he was.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether he came there [12772] specifically to see you that Sunday morning, or just came to see somebody?

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Phillips was at an Asiatic station, I think sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the man who came in to see you on Sunday morning, the 7th.

Admiral NOYES. I think that was Admiral Little, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He was referred to here as Phillips.

Admiral NOYES. I beg your pardon, sir. He was talking about Manila.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the man who came into your office on Sunday morning and wanted you to make an appointment with Secretary Hull.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that?

Admiral NOYES. I think it was Admiral Little. I do not know whether Admiral Phillips was in Washington at that time or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there anything unusual about that?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say he gave you some information that he had from British sources and then you gave him some idea about this fleet going down through the South China Sea.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

[12773] The CHAIRMAN. Then you called up to see if you could make an appointment with Secretary Hull, and you talked to one of his subordinates.

Admiral NOYES. Normally a foreigner is supposed to go through the Office of Naval Intelligence, and he wanted to cut a corner and asked me if I would be willing to call the Secretary of State's office. I knew one of the Secretary of State's people and I just called him up.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this man an acquaintance of yours?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He was?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So he knew you and you knew him?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It being Sunday and most of the officers probably not being there, he chose you as a sort of agent through whom he could seek an appointment with the Secretary of State?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You performed that function and he left?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

[12774] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you stated that you had a conversation with Captain Safford, I believe, about 4 months ago.

Admiral NOYES. During the summer. I could not give you the exact month, sir.

[12775] The VICE CHAIRMAN. During this last summer?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was the description that Captain Safford gave you about the winds message at that time?

Admiral NOYES. To the best of my recollection, Captain Safford said—he said that he still thought there had been an execute of the winds message. I said, well, I don't think so. Why can't you show me something, if it is true; some record that we can get together on. I said, when did it come in. He said that it came in at Winter Harbor, I think, and they have destroyed their records. I didn't want to put any pressure on Captain Safford to change his opinion.

I just told him that I had no recollection of it, and that he would have to show me something to indicate that there was an authentic execute.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you to state that the description that Captain Safford gave here in his prepared statement of a winds

execute message was different from the description that he gave you last summer; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. It is correct in that he didn't give me any description like that.

[12776] He said, in the first place, that it came in at Winter Harbor, he thought, and he didn't tell me anything about this business about the Russian slant, the negative Russian business. That wasn't mentioned.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When he talked to you that summer, he said the message came in at Winter Harbor, Maine?

Admiral NOYES. Yes. I don't think he was positive.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When he testified here, I think he said it came in over the Cheltenham station, didn't he?

Admiral NOYES. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is, two different places?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now then, whatever description he gave you last summer about a winds execute message, your impression of that is that it was different from the description he gave here. Is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. Specifically to the extent of the station and in the fact he did not mention any—he mentioned very little—of what was contained in his present statement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And he told you that he was going to prepare a statement, and would show it to you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And he never did do that?

[12777] Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral NOYES. But he stated that he didn't think it was proper after this inquiry was ordered by Congress; that was his reason, and I agreed with him on that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I would like to ask you this question: You were present during the appearance of Admiral Ingersoll here?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Before this committee?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You heard his testimony about the so-called winds execute message?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In which he said, in substance, that he thought it had been magnified beyond all reasonable proportion of importance?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you agree in that statement?

Admiral NOYES. I do, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is your opinion then that if such a message had been received as Captain Safford contends, it would have been of very little importance in the light of [12778] other information you had?

Admiral NOYES. I should have recommended no action whatever in regard to such a message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Even if a correct winds execute message, just as Captain Safford contends, had been received on either the 4th or

the 5th of December and brought to you, you would not have recommended that any action be taken on it?

Admiral NOYES. I would not have recommended that any action be taken, Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Because you didn't consider it of any importance then?

Admiral NOYES. We had already informed our people in the field everything that the message would have told.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I overlooked one question.

In regard to these cards, in your former testimony, I believe, before the naval inquiry, you either said that you did not know about the cards, or didn't remember them?

Admiral NOYES. I said I didn't remember.

The CHAIRMAN. After you came back here, you testified, I believe, on the Pacific coast, after having been in the Pacific since 1942, you testified from memory and after you [12779] got back to Washington, you talked it over with Captain Safford, and you concluded that he was correct, and that you were mistaken in the first instance, and that there was a system of cards, is that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, on the 6-7 of December, were you in civilian clothes?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Admiral Hart in civilian clothes?

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Hart?

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark.

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Stark?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. I said right away, "yes." I may be wrong. I didn't think we put on uniforms until after the attack at Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. You were all in civilian clothes?

Admiral NOYES. All the same way.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll. Now, Admiral Little, was he in civilian clothes or in British uniform?

[12780] Admiral NOYES. Well, I think if we were, he was. I think the attaché people in foreign stations wear the same rig we do.

The CHAIRMAN. Inasmuch as Britain was at war, he might well have been in uniform, and our naval officers in civilian clothes?

Admiral NOYES. That is true. Yes, you are probably correct, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions, thank you very much for your presence here. You are excused.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:35 p. m., February 16, 1946, the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., on Monday morning, February 18, 1946.)

[12781]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[12782] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel desire to call his next witness? Who does counsel desire to call as his next witness?

Mr. RICHARDSON. The first thing I wish to call the committee's attention to, Mr. Chairman, is a letter I have just received from Mr. Farrington, the Representative from Hawaii, in which he states:

I have received from Fred Ohrt, manager and chief engineer of the Board of Water Supply of Honolulu the accompanying map and memorandum showing the bombs which dropped in the city of Honolulu on December 7, 1941.

I am calling this to your attention to ascertain whether or not you care to incorporate this information in the record of the Pearl Harbor proceedings I will, of course, be happy to have you do so if it is your wish, but in the event you feel it is not pertinent to this inquiry I trust you will return it to me for my records.

He accompanies it with a statement with reference to the bomb damage done in Oahu at the time of the attack, together with a map of the area, showing on that map the points of bomb damage and content. I present it in respect to the Delegate for the committee to determine whether it thinks that matter would be of any importance in our record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I at the moment, not having [12783] heard of it before, I rather doubt whether that would have any particular place here. I would assume from what you say that it might be a question of damages sustained there that they might want some future consideration on, but that would not have anything to do with this inquiry.

Senator BREWSTER. I think perhaps, Mr. Chairman, that it would have a bearing, of course, on the nature of the attack which we have, of course, gone into in some detail as to the attack on the ships and

the fields. I have never realized, as that indicated, that so many bombs hit on the city. I don't think anyone we have had before us has indicated it and I think it would be very valuable for historical purposes to have it in the record if it is not too extended.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The statement which is attached to it, Mr. Chairman, is not controversial in any way.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I did not assume there was any controversy about it, Mr. Richardson. It was just a question whether the committee feels that that type of material ought to be included in this inquiry, in this record.

Senator BREWSTER. The bearing that it has is on the hazards which the Navy and other installations present. I had not realized that the bombs were scattered around that way.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of course, I know Mr. Farrington very pleasantly and any requests that he might present would certainly be worthy of the utmost consideration. I did not [12784] get the impression from what he said that he was insistent on it one way or the other.

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, no. I am presenting it only because Mr. Farrington asked me to present it to the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did he specially emphasize that he thought it ought to be in the record here?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No. He said:

I am calling this to your attention to ascertain whether or not you care to incorporate this information in the record of the Pearl Harbor proceedings.

Senator FERGUSON. I think, Mr. Chairman, that it ought to be made part of the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator BREWSTER. I think it would be a good idea.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, without objection then it will be included in the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, may it be given an exhibit number?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, it will be given the proper exhibit number and received as an exhibit.

(The document above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 152.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Anything further from counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now I would like to ask you to call Admiral, Mr., Senator Hart, whichever is correct.

[12785] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, Senator, Mr. Hart, please come forward.

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR THOMAS CHARLES HART, FORMERLY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ASIATIC FLEET, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel may proceed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, will you state your full name for the reporter?

Senator HART. Thomas Charles Hart.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are now one of the Senators from the State of Connecticut?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long did you serve in the Navy?

Senator HART. Nearly 52 years.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And what was your rank and assignment at the time you were retired?

Senator HART. I was a full admiral on the active list, was switched over to the retired list on the 1st of July 1942, but continued on active duty until the day before I came to the Senate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. During what period were you the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet?

Senator HART. From the latter part of July 1939 until the date of my transfer to the retired list; that was 3 years afterward.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are the same Admiral Hart who conducted an examination of witnesses under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, commencing in February 1944?

Senator HART. Yes, I am that man but I do not know that the word "examination" is quite correct. I was really recording testimony for the purposes of preservation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in your work in that connection witnesses did appear before you?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were sworn and their sworn testimony taken down and recorded?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And among those witnesses, Admiral, was Captain Safford?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, in Captain Safford's testimony which appears at page 10428, under examination by Senator Brewster, the following record was made which I will read to you:

Senator BREWSTER. Captain, I want to speak about this Hart incident, which has come to my attention, and in that connection will read the testimony which you gave before the Army Board at pages 172, 173, and 174:

"Captain SAFFORD. There is a possibility that [12787] the original distribution copy of that message is in existence in the Navy Department in the hands or in the safe of some high official, probably the Vice Chief of Naval Operations if it is in existence, possibly the Secretary of the Navy. Admiral Hart made a statement to me which implied that he had sighted it and that I was not justified in the statement that all copies of the 'winds' message had been destroyed.

"Major CLAUSEN. In connection with the answer that you just gave to General Russell you stated that Admiral Hart informed you he had cited a distribution list. Do you recall that?

"Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. That he had sighted the actual "winds" message.

"Major CLAUSEN. That he had cited the message in a written report that he rendered?

"Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. He said to me, 'I have just come from the front office, and I have seen your "winds" message. Now, don't make statements that you can't verify.' This is of the time I came in to verify my testimony, so I withdrew from my testimony any statement to the effect relative then to other copies having been destroyed, because I didn't know where I stood then."

[12788] That is the end of the quotation of the testimony.

Now, do you recall the statement of Admiral Hart to you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That is substantially correct, as you testified?

Captain SAFFORD. It is substantially correct.

Senator BREWSTER. And that was at the time you were going to verify your testimony before Admiral Hart when he cautioned you to be careful about any

statement that the winds message had been destroyed because you understood him to say he had seen a copy just before that?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, immediately before that.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

Now, Admiral, do you recall having a conversation with Captain Safford that has any relation to the incident detailed in that testimony?

Senator HART. Yes.

[12789] Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you tell the committee all you know about the incident?

Senator HART. In every case witnesses were allowed to verify testimony as a check on the correctness of the recording. Due to the lapse of time between the events that they were testifying to, and the dates that they were testifying, I was in the habit of allowing considerable latitude in that verification, and instructed them that I would before they began.

It is a very severe tax on memory at best, and my object was to get the most accurate testimony I could obtain.

Therefore all witness were told that after thinking over what they had given, if they noted errors of commission or omission that were of moment, and talked to me about it when they returned their testimony, I would make my decision as to what alterations could be made.

Captain Safford came in as a part of the process. I found that he had made very extensive alterations, not so much in the way of changes in what he did state, but in additions to it.

Now, as I recall, I pointed out quite a number of places where he was not stating simply what he knew, but what he had been told, and in certain places where he was, as of that date, making deductions and drawing conclusions.

[12790] May I have the testimony?

Mr. RICHARDSON. You mean your own record, or the testimony I just read?

Senator HART. No; my record.

(The document was handed to Senator Hart.)

Senator HART. Captain Safford had very extensively expanded his answer to my question No. 18 that contained certain deductions and certain analyses on his part, which my conversation with him brought out were not made at the time, but were made subsequently.

I think in the end I permitted him to leave his amended answer about as he had brought it in in this case, although I did think that he was taking considerably more latitude than the situation justified.

Now, as I recall, in response to my invitation, or instruction, which was usual under Navy customs, to add additional facts which he might remember subsequent to his testimony and which would seem to be particularly pertinent, Captain Safford wrote a long reply, and I told him that so much of that reply was not a matter of stating facts, but was deductions on his part, and somewhat hearsay, that I did not think it was a correct answer and that it would be necessary for him to revise it in the other direction.

Now, it was in connection with that that Captain Safford's [12791] testimony before the Army Court which you have just read, must have been given.

To the best of my recollection he stated as a fact that one or all of the dispatches referring to the winds message had been removed from the files.

I pointed out that that was a very serious thing to say and that he ought not to say it unless he knew it to be a fact.

[12792] I think I told him that in my entire naval career I had never known of any one instance where files had been falsified, and that he needed to be very sure before he made such a statement as that.

I think I prefaced what I said about having seen something myself with the statement to him that when I first began this job of taking testimony, while I was planning the work, I spent some time in looking through the Navy's files to see how the pertinent material was stored—and incidentally, decided that I would simplify my own task by not doing other than referring to pertinent documents.

So I told Captain Safford that I thought that I myself had sighted something in the files about the winds message, and the conversation on that point stopped right there.

Now to complete the story, that same thing turned up during the Navy's Court of Inquiry on the subject and what had always seemed to me to be a matter of very little importance, as I still regard the entire winds code affair, was a point of issue in some respects, so I returned to that office to reconstruct what it was that I had seen, and found that I had not seen the file at all, because that particular file was not at that time even stored in the Navy Department Building. What I had seen was a compilation, rather a history, gotten out by some entirely nontechnical officer, [12793] to somewhat indicate to a layman's point of view what the work of that unit had been. I ran over that rather hastily, and there was some reference to the winds code in it, and that was what I had seen.¹

Now I did not, and I could not have made the definite statement to Captain Safford that I had seen in the official files any of those messages, because I had not examined the files at the time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Does that complete your statement, Admiral?

Senator HART. Well, that is all I have now.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions of the Admiral. I called him on this one point of Senator Brewster's testimony.

Senator BREWSTER. Just a minute.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I mean Senator Brewster's investigation.

Senator BREWSTER. You mean inquiry.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Inquiry. I do not believe I have any questions at this time of the Admiral.

Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. No, I have no questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark is next. He not being here, Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Hart, or Senator Hart, as I [12794] understood you to say in your statement to the committee, in the beginning this was more or less of a procedure for the purpose of preservation of testimony. Am I correct in that, or was it an actual investigation, or do you make a distinction between the two?

Senator HART. As you state, Senator, it was a matter of recording testimony. My precept read:

Certain members of the Naval forces who have knowledge pertinent to the foregoing matters are now or soon may be on dangerous assignments at great distances from the United States, and it is now deemed necessary, in order to prevent evidence being lost by death or unavoidable absence of those certain

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5477, for a letter from the Navy Department in this connection.

members of the Naval forces, that their testimony pertinent to the aforesaid Japanese attack be recorded and preserved.

[12795] That was the gist of my instruction.

Senator LUCAS. Is that all of the original directive that you had?

Senator HART. No.

Senator LUCAS. I think perhaps at this point it probably all should go into the record.

Senator HART. That is not all. The rest of it contains various preliminary "whereas's" and instructions about what would be available to me.

Senator LUCAS. All right. I will withdraw that last request.

Now, Senator Hart, with whom did you have a conversation before you started to gather this testimony in connection with the disaster at Pearl Harbor?

Senator HART. Will you repeat the first part of that question?

Senator LUCAS. With whom did you confer before you started the gathering of this testimony in relation to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Senator HART. No one, except the Navy Judge Advocate General. That had all to do with ways and means. No instructions about how I should do it from him.

Senator LUCAS. Now, as I understood your direct statement to the committee, after you interrogated a witness [12796] you would permit that witness to review his testimony before it was actually recorded, in order to give him an opportunity to correct any statements that he might have made, or also you might give him the opportunity to add to anything that he had said previous to that time.

Senator HART. Yes, within the limitations which I stated in my answer to the counsel.

Senator LUCAS. I understand, and this examination of witnesses took place at what time? What year?

Senator HART. The date of the precept was February 12, 1944, and the date of my submitting it to the Secretary as completed was approximately June 30. The date of the last testimony taken was June 15, 1944.

Senator LUCAS. And all the witnesses whom you examined at that time were members of the Navy, or members of the armed forces of this country?

Senator HART. They were all Navy.

Senator LUCAS. They were all engaged at that time in the prosecution of the war?

Senator HART. There may be an exception or two, but in general that is correct.

Senator LUCAS. You stated to the committee that it was a rather severe memory test of these men whom you examined in 1944, as to what actually happened at Pearl Harbor [12797] in early December 1941.

Senator HART. I considered it so at the time, and I still do.

Senator LUCAS. What was true of the witnesses whom you examined would be true of all the witnesses who were examined in 1944, whether it was this inquiry or any other inquiry, I take it.

As far as their memory is concerned, as far as the memory test is concerned, it would be difficult for any witness—if you found that to be true in the course of your inquiry, it would also be true in the

naval court of inquiry and it would be very difficult for any witness to remember exactly what transpired in those hectic days around December 1941, isn't that true?

Senator HART. I do not wish to agree or disagree with you, Senator. You know that as well as I do.

[12798] Senator LUCAS. Now, you stated to the committee that Captain Safford made extensive alterations in his testimony.

Will you explain to the committee just a little more in detail what you mean by that?

Senator HART. I don't think I am able to go into great detail. My statement was that his changes were largely additions rather than corrections.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in the first statement that he made to you, do you recall whether he went extensively into the winds message?

Senator HART. I don't recall, but I have an impression that there was nothing about it in his original testimony. I certainly didn't ask him anything about it.

Senator LUCAS. It is your recollection now, that in the original testimony submitted to you, he said nothing to you about the winds message at all?

Senator HART. That is my recollection, but I am most uncertain on the point. He might have.

Senator LUCAS. I think it is rather important to ascertain whether Captain Safford did say anything to you in his original testimony about this winds message.

Counsel has suggested that this is the only compilation of testimony and that maybe you do not have any memorandum of what he first originally submitted to you.

[12799] Mr. RICHARDSON. Senator Hart, would you be able to tell from your official record there what was or what was not in the original reporter's statement of the testimony prior to his amendment or addition to it?

Admiral HART. No. That original, I am quite sure, was destroyed.

Senator LUCAS. As I understand you, Senator, it is your best recollection now that in the first memorandum submitted to you by Captain Safford, there was nothing in it about the winds message?

Senator HART. By "memorandum" do you mean his first testimony?

Senator LUCAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator HART. That is what I said.

Senator LUCAS. Later on, when he made additional statements, when Captain Safford gave you additional testimony, then is when the winds message was discussed between you and Captain Safford?

Senator HART. That isn't what I said, Senator.

I didn't say that he was giving additional testimony. I said that in the process of the verification of his testimony, he was allowed to correct errors of omission and commission.

Senator LUCAS. I stand corrected on that, sir.

[12800] Now, as I understand it, you took some exceptions to Captain Safford's lengthy statement, because it included a lot of hearsay testimony, and he drew his own conclusions and deductions about a number of things.

Senator HART. I think I said "a certain amount." I didn't say "a lot."

Senator LUCAS. I said a number of things, or a certain amount. Whatever you said. Anyhow, he did have certain deductions and conclusions to which you took some exception?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, in the conversation that you had with him about the winds message, as I recall, you stated that you told him that you thought you had probably seen some sort of a winds message when you made an examination of the files?

Senator HART. Well, I suggest that you have the recorder read what I said.

Senator LUCAS. I don't want to misquote you. I am just trying to get exact information on that question.

Senator HART. I tried to give you a correct statement of the situation.

Senator LUCAS. I think you did.

Senator HART. I would rather rest on that rather than have you interpret what I did say.

[12801] Senator LUCAS. I am not trying to interpret what you said, Senator. I am trying to get additional light on this winds message because of its tremendous importance.

The newspapers of the country have told the people that you saw a message and that because of the conversation that you had with Captain Safford as brought out here in the examination by Senator Brewster the other day.

Senator HART. You say it is of tremendous importance. I think I said in my testimony that I considered it of very little importance.

Senator LUCAS. I agree, Senator, but certain people have made much ado about this so-called execute message.

In the opinion of the Senator from Illinois, and I think you agree, there isn't very much to it, but certain people on this committee, and certain newspapers of the country have made much to-do about this winds message.

Senator HART. All right, Senator, I will try to go along with it.

Senator LUCAS. That is the reason the Senator from Illinois is interrogating you further on it.

In the final analysis, when you went back to the Navy Department, and you examined the files again to refresh your memory to see whether or not there was a so-called execute winds message, you found none?

[12802] Senator HART. I didn't look at the files. I simply returned, as I stated in my testimony, in order to see what it was that I had seen which caused me to carry on that conversation with Captain Safford.

I did not say that I had gone back and examined the files.

Senator LUCAS. You went back to examine the original file where you thought, at least you had discovered a so-called winds message of some kind?

Senator HART. Well, it wasn't a file, I didn't say it was a file.

Senator LUCAS. Whatever it was. You went back to see whether or not your memory was correct?

Senator HART. Right.

[12803] Senator LUCAS. And when you got there you found that it was not what you thought it was?

Senator HART. I found that I had not seen the official file.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I am talking about a winds message. As I understand it, at least Captain Safford indicated in his testimony you had said, Senator, or he thought you said, at least, that you saw a winds message of some kind; later on you went back to look at the place where you thought you had seen the so-called winds message, or whatever it was, and you discovered that it was, as I recall your testimony, a history that had been compiled by a nontechnical officer of some kind?

Senator HART. That is what I said.

Senator LUCAS. And it didn't have any relation at all to the winds execute message or the original so-called pilot winds message?

Senator HART. That is what I said.

Senator LUCAS. Did it have?

Senator HART. Did it have what?

Senator LUCAS. Did what you saw when you returned, what was in this nontechnical officer's file, did it have any relation to the so-called winds message and the winds execute message?

[12804] Senator HART. I didn't differentiate between the two parts at all. I simply saw that there was something about the winds code subject and I think that at the time, I am fairly sure that at the time, I didn't go any further than simply to note that there was something about it in there.

Senator LUCAS. You say there was something about it in there?

Senator HART. That is what I said.

Senator LUCAS. What was there about it?

Senator HART. I don't remember. I don't remember any more than I have already told you.

Senator LUCAS. All right. I think that is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy would be next. Senator Brewster would be next. Mr. Gearhart, of California.

Mr. GEARHART. No questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Hart, as I understand it, the purpose of your inquiry was to perpetuate the testimony. Had you been given the names of witnesses that you were to interview?

Senator HART. The purpose was to record and not to inquire. I was not given any names or any instructions whatever as to whom to include or exclude. It was all left [12805] to my discretion.

Senator FERGUSON. And I suppose the subject of the inquiry had been fully discussed with the Secretary of the Navy; is that correct?

Senator HART. No. I discussed it with no one, as I stated before, except the Judge Advocate General.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that Admiral Gatch?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to get at is this: Did it include Washington as well as what took place in Hawaii? What took place in both places?

Senator HART. That was a subject, of course, of my own judgment and interpretation. And I carried out the instructions. I think, I am sure, that my first idea was to get on paper the evidence of those

people whom we might lose, and after a few days of taking testimony of men in Washington I went out into the field, out into the Pacific, to get that testimony, and the general sequence was that I first examined those who were outside of Washington when the war began rather than those who were here.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make any inquiry in the Secretary of State's office to obtain facts?

Senator HART. Certainly not. I was not authorized to.

Senator FERGUSON. And I assume the same answer applies [12806] to the Executive Office, the White House?

Senator HART. Yes; and also to the War Department.

Senator FERGUSON. The War Department. Did you interview Admiral Stark?

Senator HART. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Ingersoll?

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time that you were in command of the Asiatic Fleet, commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, on about the 6th you sent a message to Washington. It is Exhibit 40. It says:

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

This is from CINCAF to OPNAV, which would be from you to Admiral Stark.

Do you recall the sending of that message or having it sent?

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, Senator Ferguson now throws back 2 years further, over 4 years, and during this intervening time I have had no time for any thoughts on the events of those days at all. I wish to be helpful to the committee but in order to give what I myself would consider the best testimony I need some time to throw everything out [12807] of my mind and think over those days. My memory is cold. By putting my thoughts back to those days, as would be assisted by what documents there are, I could warm my memory up. But if the committee wishes to go into my own participation in those days I would like a certain amount of time to prepare.

Now, possibly I can answer this question of Senator Ferguson's forthwith.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have quite a number along the same line. If you do want to use the documents to refresh your memory I would ask the committee to give you some time and to have you return as a later witness.

The CHAIRMAN. We might see how many of them he can answer now and determine that later. The committee would want the admiral to be given every opportunity to refresh his recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. It would take considerable time. I think we would get along faster if the admiral had some time to refresh his memory on it, not only this but a longer message that was sent and the reply that was sent back.

Senator HART. I can give a fair answer to this specific question, Mr. Chairman, but if it does go much further I think I would like to have some time, and I would [12808] also like to have with me one or two members of my staff during those days, whom I think are available and who could help me in remembering, and I might be more specific with their aid.

Now, as regards this one, the copy seems rather incomplete, but I gather from the reference number that it was on the 7th of December. On that supposition I can answer.

At about that time, the early days of December, I did receive a dispatch from Capt. John Creighton, who was stationed in Singapore subject directly to the direct orders of the Navy Department, but over whom I had a certain amount of authority, and the substance of the message was as follows: That he, Creighton, had learned from Air Marshal Brooke Popham that the latter had been advised from London that in certain eventualities, which I cannot recall, they, the British, had been assured of our armed support. I think this dispatch of mine was entirely founded upon that one from Captain Creighton. At about that same time I was in conference with the new British commander in chief, Admiral Tom Phillips, who had just arrived on the station, but I do not recall that he said anything to me whatever on that subject, but he may have.

Senator FERGUSON. The 7th would be your 6th, which was the 7th in the Philippines?

[12809] Senator HART. No. The 7th would be our 8th.

Senator FERGUSON. Eighth.

Senator HART. Yes. But, of course, this is——

Senator FERGUSON. This was sent on your 7th, which was our 6th?

Senator HART. Your 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator HART. But this is Greenwich time and the date on the face of this, I don't think it is too reliable. In stating the date and hour I would rather see the original.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it was prior to the attack at Hawaii?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, can you recall what the eventualities were, that we were to give armed support?

Senator HART. I said I did not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have officers here that are familiar with that conversation so that you could refresh your memory on that?

Senator HART. I didn't say it was a conversation. I said it was a dispatch from Captain Creighton at Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know where we might locate that dispatch? Would it come later to the office here in the Navy?

[12810] Senator HART. You mean the dispatch from Captain Creighton?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Senator HART. No. My files were lost and the only source that you would have would be Captain Creighton himself.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you surprised at an attack on Hawaii on Sunday?

Senator HART. You have two parts to your question, Senator. I was in no way surprised at the date. I was surprised at the attack, a part of the attack fell on Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. You had been alerted in the Philippines, had you not?

Senator HART. Well, I had alerted myself for a good many months and weeks.

[12811] Senator FERGUSON. You had access to magic in the Philippines?

Senator HART. I had a unit there which spent a certain amount of its time on the Japanese diplomatic code, if that is what you mean by "magic."

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I have in mind. And you were familiar, I assume, with the 13 parts of the message—did you receive that?

Senator HART. No; I don't recall receiving it. I may have, but I don't recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the Japanese were sending reconnaissance planes over the Philippines prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor?

Senator HART. I don't recall having heard that that was the case.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your fleet attacked at the same time as the airports, Clark Field, in the Philippines?

Senator HART. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the attack before or after the airfields had been attacked?

Senator HART. The first attack in the Philippines occurred at daybreak on Monday morning. That would be about 2 hours after the exact hour of the beginning of the attack on Pearl Harbor. That attack was made on a small [12812] air reconnaissance unit which was stationed in the Gulf of Davao in the southeast portion of the Philippines. The attack was by air, but there was an attempted attack on the part of four Japanese destroyers which was evaded.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was your fleet located at the time of the attack at Pearl Harbor?

Senator HART. Well, it was located in its deployment positions.

Senator FERGUSON. What was that position?

Senator HART. There wasn't any one position.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have instructions or any information as to what the United States would do, as far as your fleet was concerned, or any other fleet in case of an attack upon the British and/or the Dutch, and not upon American possessions?

Senator HART. Throwing back to this dispatch which you brought in, Senator, I said, "Have received no corresponding instructions from you."

Senator FERGUSON. You sent a longer dispatch, did you not, signed by you and by Phillips—page 5125 of our record?

I will ask for the original, if it can be produced, to refresh the Senator's memory. Page 5125 of our record, up to page 5127.

I would like to have you see the record.

[12813] (The record was handed to Senator Hart.)

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, I haven't seen or thought of this message since the day it was sent, and I have a very scant recollection of what is in it. I can read it, and perhaps go on, but possibly not.

The CHAIRMAN. You might read it now, and see what you think of it. If you don't feel you are qualified to answer specifically without further research, the committee will be glad to give you that time.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, this pertains to a subject in which my chief of staff, Rear Admiral Parnell, was always the negotiator on my part, except on this one particular occasion. He was present

through this entire interview with Admiral Phillips, and I think that his testimony on this, and all the rest of that series of the so-called A. D. B. agreements, if the committee wishes to go into it, would be much better than mine.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that message?

Senator FERGUSON. It is prior to the attack. It is on the 7th. Our reply was drawn up prior to the attack, but not sent out until after.

Senator HART. This dispatch which Senator Ferguson has brought up was drafted on Saturday afternoon, the attack on the Philippines beginning on Monday morning, Philippine [12814] time Monday morning, and it was the culmination of about a day and a half of conference, the British and our Navy with General MacArthur's representation part of the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, I noticed, in the second paragraph you say this:

In the early stages of a war with Japan occurring at the present time, the initiative must inevitably rest with the Japanese.

Now, the bombs did not start to drop until Monday morning, and this language was used Saturday. Was that because you knew of the fleet going to the Kra Peninsula, and you knew it meant war?

Senator HART. No; we did not know that when that was drawn up that the Japanese expedition had left Camranh Bay.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn of that, that it had left Camranh Bay for the Kra Peninsula?

Senator HART. About 5 or 6 hours after this dispatch was sent.

[12815] Senator FERGUSON. How is it that you used this language then, "War with Japan occurring at the present time"?

Senator HART. I don't know; that may be paraphrased. It doesn't look like very good language, but that whole paragraph simply says what everybody knew, that we were not going to start the war and if it was started that the Japanese would start it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have such instructions about overt acts from Washington?

Senator HART. I don't know whether the word "overt" ever appeared in any of my instructions, but I certainly didn't need any instructions to keep me from starting a war.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see the war-warning message personally?

Senator HART. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were alerted to war prior to that time, that was the 27th, I think you said, for months you were alerted?

Senator HART. Well, Senator, there is always a degree of alert. Yes. We were close to the enemy. The Japanese forces were in Formosa, Hainan, over in Indochina, a few hundred miles away. So naturally we were alerted in various degrees for some time before that. But the actual, there was no actual time when we said, "Well, today we don't have [12816] to worry," and "Now we do." It was a shading all the way along there and I don't think that I could give you a date as to when we were alerted. I suppose it might be made out that when the war began I was not fully alerted because I had a fuel ship or two in Manila Bay.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, would this be a fair statement, that you, because of the tenseness of the situation, you were in effect waiting for the attack which you anticipated from Japan?

Senator HART. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And when you learned that the fleet left Camranh Bay about 6 hours after you sent this message you knew then there was going to be an attack or you anticipated an attack upon the Kra Peninsula?

Senator HART. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you anticipate that attack?

Senator HART. That force might have gone up into Thailand.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So you didn't know exactly where that one was going?

Senator HART. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Admiral Phillips in Manila when that was drawn up? I notice his name is purported to be signed to it.

[12817] Senator HART. That was drawn up in conference between Admiral Phillips and me.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact that a British admiral—your conference was in Manila, was it not?

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And how do you account for the fact, can you explain the fact, that the British admiral also sent this message to us here in Washington?

Senator HART. That was a joint message that went to the Navy Department and to the Admiralty in London.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice there is used in the fourth paragraph this language:

We are agreed that it is of great importance to prevent any Japanese movement through the Malay Barrier.

What did you have in mind there; will you explain that on the record?

Senator HART. I take it that you wish me to define the Malay Barrier?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Why it was important to America to prevent any Japanese movement through there. I would like to have the record show what you had in mind on that.

Senator HART. The Malay Barrier is a name that was given to a land from Singapore through the southernmost islands [12818] of the N. E. I. to the northwest coast of Australia, say Darwin. It has passages through, the most of which are rather narrow, and from the naval strategic standpoint it is a defense land, and the best defense land that there was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it include the Malay Peninsula?

Senator HART. No. I said it came from Singapore, which is the island south of the Malay Peninsula.

Senator FERGUSON. So it didn't include a part where the fleet could have gone, the fleet that left Camranh Bay?

Senator HART. The fleet couldn't go across the Malay Peninsula.

Senator FERGUSON. That is sure. That is certain. But it didn't include that territory, did it? I am trying to analyze this message, because the fleet was not moving in this direction toward the Malay Barrier as you defined it.

Now, did you have another movement in mind?

Senator HART. I don't agree that it wasn't moving toward the Malay Barrier. Any movement that it made to the southward was toward the Malay Barrier. Any movement that it made to the southward was toward that barrier.

Senator FERGUSON. Did our airplanes make reconnaissance so that you knew from the time the fleet left about 6 hours after you had sent this message—so we kept track of where that fleet was going?

Senator HART. No; my planes didn't see them leave Camranh Bay and did not follow them at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get information from the British as to the movement of that fleet?

Senator HART. That was where the information came from, which was the first we knew that they left Camranh Bay, was the dispatch originated by a British plane. It was the northeast monsoon season. That whole area is filled with rain squalls. And on the occasion of the last reconnaissance made by my own planes, everything seemed to have been shut in so they saw nothing and I do not know to this day whether the Japanese expedition was still there on that occasion or whether it had departed.

Senator FERGUSON. The information that you received from the British, did you send that on to Washington?

Senator HART. The best evidence for that would lie in the files. I feel that I must have, but I don't recall having written the dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall a message dated the 2d of December 1941, page 39 of Exhibit 37:

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt of this dispatch. Charter three small vessels to form a "defensive information patrol".

Then you were to equip three small vessels to make them men-of-war. I wish you would look at that message. [12820]

Senator HART. Yes; I recall the dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it carried out?

Senator HART. No. Time did not serve. One ship was—the *Isabel* was dispatched in consequence of this instruction and was nearing her station when the Japanese attack occurred. The second one to be made ready was on the point of sailing and the third was not yet ready.

Senator FERGUSON. So the *Isabel* had been equipped, or was equipped at the time, and you sent her on the mission, the other one was just about ready to sail, and the third not?

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us where the *Isabel* was to be stationed?

Senator HART. She was the one that was to be off Camranh Bay.

Senator FERGUSON. She had not taken her station or had not obtained information that she could send about this fleet movement, is that correct, until after the attack?

Senator HART. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us the purpose, if you know, that was to be served by these three small men-of-war? That was more for patrol of what was going on in the Gulf of Siam, was it not, than what would be going on in the [12821] Philippines?

Senator HART. I know nothing, Senator, that is not contained in the dispatch. I wouldn't say that your analysis was quite correct.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would correct me.

Senator HART. The Gulf of Siam is quite a distance around the corner; it is south and west, and the coast of the Philippines is 600 miles east.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you give instructions to the *Isabel* as to what they were to do, what they were to patrol?

Senator HART. Yes; based on this dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what that was?

Senator HART. I don't remember the wording of the dispatch and I can't give you anything better than that, that whatever instructions she had were in conformity with this dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, going back to a question that I had asked you previously on Exhibit 40, I am trying to get information on the question of if you had received any instructions as to what would or should be done in case of an attack upon the British and not upon any of our possessions. This message says:

Learn from Singapore we have assured British armed [12822] support under three or four eventualities.

Now, you have told us that you didn't remember those eventualities, but your message, signed by you and Admiral Phillips, as I read it, indicates that we were to do certain things, and I find nowhere in it that they were based upon the fact that first an attack had to be made upon the American possessions.

I am trying to find out if you had any information either from the British or from America as to what we were supposed to do if there was an attack upon the British and not upon the American possessions.

Senator HART. You mean did I have? You said "We." Did you mean "me"?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator HART. No. Again the same answer that I gave the Department. "I have received no instructions."

[12823] Senator FERGUSON. So you were at that time seeking information as to what we intended to do because you had the information from the British; is that correct?

Senator HART. No, no; I don't think so. Will you repeat the question?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. When I use the word "we" I mean the country here, the Government here in Washington. The British had told you, as I understand it, that there were eventualities that we were to give them armed support.

Senator HART. Well, you don't understand it correctly. I had not been told that by the British.

Senator FERGUSON. You learned from Singapore. Was that an American that gave you that information?

Senator HART. I have told you two or three times, Senator, it came from Capt. J. Creighton, United States Navy—

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you where he—

Senator HART. Who said that Brooke-Popham had told him.

Senator FERGUSON. So the information from Brooke-Popham was the British, was it not?

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Or the Dutch?

Senator HART. British.

Senator FERGUSON. British. So the information did come [12824] from the British, isn't that correct, even though it was hearsay?

Senator HART. The information to whom?

Senator FERGUSON. To the captain that gave you the message.

Senator HART. Yes, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did this armed support include an attack upon the British or the Dutch, that one of the eventualities was an attack upon the British or the Dutch?

Senator HART. I have told you that I do not remember what those eventualities were.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that by some study with other officers you can get those eventualities?

Senator HART. I think the best man to remember it would be what I said before, Captain Creighton himself. He did not have as many things on his mind as the rest of us had and he perhaps would remember it quite accurately.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Creighton place in his message to you what the eventualities were or did he use the same kind of an expression, the conclusion being three or four eventualities, or did he describe them so that when we call him we can find out what the eventualities were?

Senator HART. I don't remember well enough to say.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't remember that?

[12825] Senator HART. No. I think Captain Creighton would be your best source of information.

Senator FERGUSON. He would be the best source of information on that.

Now, on December 4th—it shows from the Army Top Secret, from Captain Safford, that on the 4th of December, from OPNAV to commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, under serial No. 042018:

Communications room should now be stripped of all secret and confidential books and papers which in the hands of an enemy would be a disadvantage to the United States, retaining for essential purposes the minimum number of cryptographic channels at your discretion. Report those retained.

General Frank asked the question:

Did this go to the Asiatic?

Captain SAFFORD. Those went.

General FRANK. Did information copies of that go to the Pacific Fleet?

Captain SAFFORD. No, that also did not go to the Pacific Fleet.

I read that, indicating that it went to you, as far as Safford was concerned, and I would like to show you that and ask you if you remember that message?

[12826] Senator HART. No; I don't remember that dispatch, and from its nature I think it is most unlikely that I would have been shown it. It was a matter of rather a small detail to come to me about.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would the officer be that would receive that kind of a message to the Communications?

Senator HART. My intelligence officer would have had the most direct cognizance of it. He is Capt. Redfield Mason. Also the

officer who was in charge of that unit on Corregidor, and his name is Leitwiler; L-e-i-t-w-i-l-e-r, I think it is.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that kind of a message, Admiral, would indicate that at Washington they thought war was near as far as your fleet was concerned, would it not?

Senator HART. No; I think that is a message which deals with activities on a rather minor scale, on lower levels in the Navy Department and in my own command, and that no particular inference was to be drawn from it. It was rather a follow-up of the higher level instructions that had already been sent out, a matter of carrying out of certain detail.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any discussion with the High Commissioner in the Philippines in relation to the coming attack or coming war?

Senator HART. Oh, yes; we used to talk about it all [12827] through the last 3 or 4 months preceding the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he indicate that he had received a message from the President and that he was to take a matter up with you in relation to the attack or the war?

Senator HART. There was a dispatch which was transmitted over Navy radio from the President to the High Commissioner, and it was approximately current with the war warning. Is that the one you mean, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Your name was not mentioned in it. General MacArthur—as I recall the message—was mentioned in it, but I wondered whether or not he had taken it up with you also.

Senator HART. Oh, I no doubt saw it before the High Commissioner did himself, because it came over my radio, my system. I think I sent it over to him with my own aide.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that mean in your opinion that war was imminent?

Senator HART. Nothing additional to what we already had.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to show you another exhibit and ask you about it—or it is in the transcript—a penciled memo which had nothing to do with that.

Senator HART. Yes, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with that message?

Senator HART. Well, I hadn't thought of it for four and [12828] a half years. I had forgotten all about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, does it refresh your memory?

Senator HART. Somewhat.

Senator FERGUSON. You were asked to do some scouting with airplanes; and you, as I recall the instructions, were to avoid the appearance of attacking. Will you explain how that could be done and what you did in relation to that order?

Senator HART. Well, we began doing it rather before we got the order, Senator, and Admiral Hart stuck his neck out considerably in doing it, too. We felt that we had to—that the time had arrived when we had to take a certain number of chances, which in air scouting would be a minimum, because we were concerned in order to find out what was going on along the Indochina coast and as far as Hainan, to say nothing about Formosa.

I started it myself personally and personally instructed the pilots who were going in on the coast that they were not to get into combat;

and even if they returned having seen nothing, that would be a whole lot better than if they brought on a collision in the air. Being aviators, I know how they would interpret most anything that I told them and that I was taking chances. However, it would not have been an overt act. The air is free, and we had just as much right to be using it along the Indochina coast as the Japanese had. Still, [12829] they were to be as careful about it as possible.

It happened that conditions were such that the very first morning they went out they did see the Japanese expedition in Camranh Bay, and I think we had been flying for about 2 days before I had any instruction from the Navy Department, and in the meantime one of our planes and a Jap plane or two had been looking each other over at short range in the air, so I was decidedly relieved when I got—

Senator FERGUSON. The message from Washington?

Senator HART (continuing). The message from Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Washington notify you that the Japs were complaining that one of your planes had gone over Formosa?

Senator HART. I don't recall any incident of that sort. It most likely would have been an Army B-17.

Senator FERGUSON. Rather than one of your own?

Senator HART. Rather than Navy, because the Army B-17's had finally volunteered to take one rather narrow sector which covered Formosa.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, we have some evidence here of a message—or not a message—indicating that in the morning previous, 3 mornings or 4 mornings previous to the attack, there had been a scouting plane or a Japanese [12830] plane flying over the Philippines or Clark Field. Did you have that information?

Senator HART. I don't recall it now, and I don't think I was told that.

Senator FERGUSON. There isn't any doubt that you were fully alerted to war, and that was true even prior to the warning message?

Senator HART. I tried to express a little while ago, Senator, that it would not be possible, even in the future I don't think, and it is not possible now, to say that at this time we became fully alerted and before that we were not. Our degree of alertness had been growing for several weeks before the war warning dispatch was received.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, there wasn't any doubt as far as the Philippines were concerned that you anticipated for a considerable time that there would be war between the United States and Japan and it was only a question as to when it would start?

Senator HART. Well, if I had been getting up a bet on the subject, Senator, I would have given tremendous odds, but I would have felt that I would have liked to have a chance on earning a dollar or two in risking my one thousand. We were never absolutely certain, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. But did you think it was a thousand [12831] to two?

Senator HART. I never got up a bet.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not. Well, it was very certain, was it not, in your mind?

Senator HART. Well, again, Senator, in the effort to warm up a cold memory and go back 4 years, I think the simplest way to state my estimate of the situation as of those days would be this:

The Japanese, of course, sought to attain their ends without getting into any more extended war, and no doubt we were the last nation that they wished to take on in case they did extend. They had to go to the NEI to get oil. That was a "must" in their situation. The question then resolved to this: Did they dare go into the NEI in force, running into British opposition perhaps as well as Dutch, certainly Dutch, and leave the Philippines on their flank while they stuck their necks out fifteen hundred miles farther south? My own estimate was that they would not leave us on their flank and make the venture. Consequently, that they would attack.

Senator FERGUSON. That answers my question. Now, did you know Admiral Helfrich?

Senator HART. I became acquainted with him after the war began.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you communicate with him at any [12832] time after the war began or have someone communicate with him in relation to your fleet getting in?

Senator HART. There, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that you bring in Admiral Purnell, who, as I stated before, was the conferee in all of that and who can give you much better testimony. I had no communications with Admiral Helfrich, no direct communication, and the only business that went on between the two commands were either of a minor nature or, if on a higher plane, were a subject of conference with Admiral Purnell.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Senator, we have had considerable testimony on the meaning of "deploy" as far as the fleet was concerned. I wish that you would give us your opinion of what it meant by deploying your fleet, which you have indicated that you did this morning. You have stated that you had your fleet deployed at the time.

Senator HART. Senator, are you bringing in the language of the war warning dispatch?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator HART. Then I think you should say a "defensive deployment."

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Senator HART. Is that what you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; if you will tell us about that. [12833] I wanted first the word "deployed," but the words used were "defensive deployment."

Senator HART. I think the easiest way is to indicate what the Asiatic Fleet did in carrying out that directive.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I would like to know, what you understood it to mean and what you did in compliance with it.

Senator HART. The Asiatic Fleet had to await attack. It could not attack. So, manifestly, the measure was to so dispose ourselves that when the attack came it would inflict as little damage as was possible; and under the circumstances that obtained out there, the only way to do that was following the principle of dispersal and concealment. That is what we did.

The submarines, in which lay the main power of the Asiatic Fleet—their concealment is inherent in the type. The surface ships were dispersed and disposed in a southerly direction, where they were farthest away from what would have to be the points from which the Japanese would jump off, and that was about all there was to it.

Well, I could go on and say that following that we sent all the cruisers, including the *Boise*, which arrived on the 4th of December and which I did not permit to return, and three-fourths of the destroyers well south, and a part [12834] of them even in down to the Borneo oil ports.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, did that defensive deployment—was it done in any way to protect the base—your base?

Senator HART. You mean Manila Bay?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; or the base where your fleet had been stationed?

Senator HART. Certainly not, as regards the surface ships.

Senator FERGUSON. And you would not so construe the words “defensive deployment”—that they were to be used for the purpose of defending the base?

Senator HART. I do not think—I think your question is theoretical rather than practical, if you can permit me that observation, Senator. From the theoretical standpoint, I think you are quite correct—that bases are for the purpose of fleets, and it is always a wrong conception to tie a fleet to a base in order to protect it; but, at the same time, since no one ever knows enough, if there is anything hat the Navy can do while not violating theoretical conceptions to assist the other force, particularly the Army, in defending bases, why, that is the thing to do; and insofar as the Philippines were concerned, that was what we did. We so disposed the submarines as to be in good defensive positions, and the main power of defense that lay in the Asiatic [12835] Fleet was confined to the submarines.

Senator FERGUSON. Those submarines were a defense from surface ships, were they not, of the enemy?

Senator HART. You mean warships?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; as far as protection of the bases is concerned.

Senator HART. That, or invading expeditions with transports and supply ships.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you at any time anticipate that the Japanese Fleet or ships that were in Camranh Bay were intended for an attack upon the Philippines?

Senator HART. Repeat that question.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Senator HART. I am not sure what you mean by “anticipate,” Senator. I think I can only answer you to the effect that I saw the possibility that they would.

Senator FERGUSON. It had never reached the stage, though, of probability?

Senator HART. I don't think that I can warm up to the point of differentiating between probability and possibility back in those days.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, your Asiatic Fleet, as you have explained, was certainly not intended as an offensive fleet, and had you had trouble getting ships for your fleet or [12836] equipment for your fleet that you did have?

Senator HART. You mean had I been having trouble in getting reinforcements?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator HART. Or ships and equipment for the fleet I had? Details and equipment for the fleet I had?

Senator FERGUSON. Both reinforcements and details of equipment.

Senator HART. Oh, yes, yes; plenty of trouble.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you very anxious to obtain more vessels, more ships, I will say?

Senator HART. Yes; I think I had the common failing of all commanders in chief. You always want more.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was that just because you felt, and sincerely felt, that you needed them for the purpose of defending even those that you did have, helping with the defense?

Senator HART. Well, as you express it, Senator, it would not be my conception of the way to do, get some ships to defend some others, but perhaps I can answer you this way; I think I know what you mean.

I don't think that at any time during the months leading up to the war I felt like persistently urging upon the Navy Department that I be reinforced with surface ships. The reason was that unless that reinforcement was great I would not be in a markedly stronger position. Shall I go on?

[12837] Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Senator HART. The only urging of that sort that I did was to give me more modern ships, because the cruisers and destroyers that I had were the weakest and the slowest that we had in the Navy.

A small, fast force of very high quality could have been used under those conditions, whereas my cruisers and destroyers, which were both weaker and slower than the Japanese, did not give us much to work with.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell us just how many hours after the attack at Pearl Harbor the first attack on our Navy was made, as far as your fleet was concerned.

Senator HART. I have already testified to that in the instance of Davao Bay, Davao Gulf.

Senator FERGUSON. It was then 2 hours—I will let you tell that.

Senator HART. I said it was at daybreak that morning. It was about, in point of time, an hour or two after the attack began on Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know, in time, how long that attack was, either before or after in relation to the attack upon the airfield in the Philippines? I am trying to get this time down. We have had some difficulty with this time.

Senator HART. Well, the attack at Balalak on my [12838] unit in the Gulf of Davao was a little before 6 a. m.

The first Japanese air attack on Luzon was on Bagio, as I recall, about 10:30, and the heavy, very damaging, attack upon the Army's airfields, as I recall, was at about 12:30.

Now, those hours are as I pull them out of memory, and there is much better evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I assume—and do I assume correctly—that as soon as the attack came upon your part of the fleet, which was the first attack, that there was notice given both to the Navy headquarters at Manila and also notice given to the Army, so that everyone was warned there had been an attack upon the Philippines?

Senator HART. That would be a natural assumption, Senator, but I fear that was not right, because the only unit that took that attack,

that could transmit the news of it, was the destroyer, and she was so exceedingly busy the next 2 hours in evading the four Japanese destroyers that, as I recall, she did not get the message in, and we did not hear about that until, oh, I would guess 9 o'clock.

After that, no doubt, it was immediately sent to the Army.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were in Manila at that time?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

[12839] Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Admiral, do you want to go and answer that roll call? We do not pay very much attention to roll calls here in the committee.

Senator HART. I would like to do anything to get me out of this seat, but I will continue.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I shall be very brief.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral, the entire Hart report is in evidence before this committee.

Senator HART. What report?

Mr. KEEFE. The evidence taken by you.

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Under the direction or precept of February 12, 1944.

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in accordance with the directions which were given to you by the Secretary of the Navy, Knox, you did, in fact, examine the witnesses, did you not?

Senator HART. Well, as it appears on the record, subject to the modifications in the testimony concerning which I have already testified, all questions and answers [12840] appear in the testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. Exactly. But I gained the impression from your testimony today that this was an effort on the part of the Navy to preserve the testimony, and that it was in the nature of taking statements rather than the examination of witnesses.

Senator HART. Well, the witnesses were under oath.

Mr. KEEFE. They were, in fact, questioned, were they not?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Questions were submitted to them to answer?

Senator HART. Questions were asked them.

Mr. KEEFE. Questions were asked them, we will put it that way.

I note also in this directive, it specifically set forth:

In view of the fact that Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, was on 7 December 1941, serving on active duty as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of Admiral, U. S. Navy, and therefore has an interest in the matter into which this examination is being made, you will notify him of the times and places of the meetings to be had and that he has the right to be present, to have counsel, to introduce, examine, and cross [12841] examine witnesses, to introduce matter pertinent to the examination and to testify or declare in his own behalf at his own request.

That right was extended to Admiral Kimmel, was it not, during the course of your examination?

Senator HART. Of course, I carried out the directive of the precept.

Mr. KEEFE. Was Admiral Kimmel represented at any of these hearings?

Senator HART. None of them.

Mr. KEEFE. He did not appear at any of these hearings?

Senator HART. No.

Mr. KEEFE. Was he notified of the hearings?

Senator HART. You will find attached to the record, which you say is before the committee, certain letters on the subject which I think fully explain it, although he did not appear, we continued to send him notices of the meetings for, oh, I would guess, the first seven or eight sessions, and after that I believe my assistant told me that he had heard indirectly from Admiral Kimmel that we need not inform him any longer.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I note according to this record, that you did examine Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Turner, Director of [12842] War Plans. That is right; is it not?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral Schuirmann, Director of Central Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And Admiral Ingersoll, as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And Captain McRea, aide to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Captain Wellborn, assistant aide to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. But you did not examine Admiral Stark. That is the thing that impressed me, and I wondered if there was any reason for it.

Senator HART. Well, for one reason he was very busy in London carrying on the war. I decided not to make a trip to London.

After I had examined Admiral Ingersoll, I felt perhaps I should have gone to London and examined Admiral Stark, but I decided not to.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, as a member of this committee, it [12843] rather impressed me when all of the high ranking officers in connection with the Office of Chief of Naval Operations had their testimony preserved through your interrogation, that the Chief of Naval Operations, who was the responsible head of that department, was not examined, and the only reason for it was because, as you state, he was then in London, and busy, as commander in chief of the European Fleet, and you did not see fit to go there to preserve his testimony for that reason.

Senator HART. Yes, Mr. Keefe. I think you may well be quite right in criticizing me for not having done it. I felt that I had met the requirements of my precept, with the exception of the two witnesses whom I mentioned in the end.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, of course, Senator, I am not asking you questions with any desire to be critical.

Senator HART. That is all right.

Mr. KEEFE. I want this record to be clear.

Senator HART. That is all right.

Mr. KEEFE. It impressed me that the most important testimony that should be preserved, that there was any reason for preserving, should be the testimony of the Chief of Naval Operations, and his testimony was not preserved as the result of the precept which was issued to you by the [12844] Secretary of the Navy, and I would like to have that explained, as to why it was not.

Now, the Court of Inquiry set up by the Navy Department followed your examination; did it not?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. So as to get the chronological record, so that we will have it in this record at this point, my record indicates that your investigation began on February 12, 1944, and ended on June 14, 1944.

Are those dates correct?

Senator HART. Whatever is shown in the report which I submitted.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I would like to have the dates established in our record here now, if it is not too difficult to ascertain it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He has already testified to it specifically.

Senator HART. I think I have given that a couple of times. The first testimony was under date of February 22 and the last date is June 15. It states the examination is then finished.

Mr. KEEFE. My record indicates that the first hearing of the Naval Court of Inquiry was on July 31, 1944, which is about a month after you had concluded your investigation, [12845] and that the first witness called, a month after you had concluded your investigation, the first witness called by the Naval Court of Inquiry was Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.

Did you know that?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

I might also add that I was not authorized to call Admiral Stark to testify, but, of course, the Court of Inquiry was. That was a much higher level instrument than I was.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when Admiral Stark first appeared before the Naval Court of Inquiry, did you appear before that court as his counsel?

Senator HART. No.

Mr. KEEFE. Or one of his counsel?

Senator HART. No. Admiral Stark was called back, and was made an interested party, and at the same time it was entirely apparent that he could not be present throughout the proceedings and would have to return to London to carry on the war.

He called me by long distance phone in Chicago, and set forth the dilemma, that he, of course, would like to stand on his rights and insist on being present throughout the proceedings of the court of inquiry, but the exigencies [12846] of the war and his duties in connection therewith were such that he could not conscientiously do that, and he thought if I would consent that some arrangement might be made under which I could act as his counsel, and do my best toward representing him.

I tried to get him to do much better than that, to get a lawyer, but he could not get one whom he wished to turn it over to.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you attend the naval court of inquiry proceedings?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. You appeared before the naval court of inquiry as his counsel?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have an assistant counsel in the person of Admiral Ingersoll?

Senator HART. I think Admiral Ingersoll was in there as counsel before the court before I got back to town, just filling in, and was there for one or two sessions of the court, when he returned to his duties as commander of all the forces in the Atlantic.

Mr. KEEFE. Then at least after you got back to Washington you assumed the responsibility of representing Admiral Stark as his counsel before the naval court of inquiry?

[12847] Senator HART. That is putting it rather extremely, but I will go along with that; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, if there is anything extreme about it—all I want is the facts, Senator, that is all.

Senator HART. I do not know what you are leading up to, so possibly I will come back to that.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not leading up to anything.

Senator HART. I set forth the situation under which I was before the court.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. I am very frank to state to you the reason for my asking these questions is because my attention was challenged by the fact that you, in your investigation, had failed to examine Admiral Stark. A month after you had completed your examination, the naval court of inquiry is set up, Admiral Stark is brought here from London and is the first witness, and that in the proceedings before the naval court of inquiry you then appeared as counsel for Admiral Stark.

Senator HART. And what is the inference?

Mr. KEEFE. I just wondered whether there is any question that ought to be explained in reference to that situation.

Senator HART. I think you have an inference there, do you not? You may as well state it.

[12848] Mr. KEEFE. I am not the witness on the stand.

I am asking you if there isn't any or if there is. I would be glad to have you state it.

Senator HART. No; I have stated my position, and expressed my reluctance to assume the position of representing Admiral Stark.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

Senator HART. There happened to be a war on at the time, otherwise I certainly would not have done it.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

[12849] The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I would like to ask you one or two questions. I was absent when you began your testimony.

I would like to ask you with reference to this dispatch you received from Captain Creighton from Singapore, in which he told you that he had been informed by this British naval officer—whether he named him or not is not material—that he had received information from London that in certain eventualities, maybe three or four, assistance would be given. Do you know whether that had any relationship to

the conference that took place, I think in Singapore, previous to that between American, British, and Dutch military and naval officers in which a plan was worked out and agreed to there to do certain things under certain eventualities, but which was never approved by the President?

You are familiar with that, aren't you?

Senator HART. Dimly so, Senator. I think not. I think the last conference at Singapore had terminated some weeks before. I do not think there was any connection.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the evidence here is that these representatives of these different Governments did meet there and they worked out there a tentative plan based upon certain assumptions, that that plan was never agreed to, never was approved by the President and never went into effect. I wondered if it could have any relationship to [12850] this information that Captain Creighton had received from the British officer who said he had gotten it from London.

You do not think it had any relationship?

Senator HART. I would not think so, Senator, because all that planning was staff planning, with the idea, "Well if we do become allies in a war this is what we will do," but with no commitments whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know from what sources the British officer in Singapore received that information, or how reliable it was, I presume, or what it was based on?

Senator HART. No.

The CHAIRMAN. When you received it you sent a dispatch here in which you said you had gotten this information, but that you had received no—what did you call it?—no corresponding instructions from the Navy Department or from Washington, and you never did after that receive any in reply to that message.

Senator HART. I do not think I ever had any reply. No; I am sure I never had any reply to that message.

The CHAIRMAN. So you had no instructions or no information from Washington with reference to any naval assistance?

Senator HART. No.

The CHAIRMAN. That anybody had promised?

[12851] Senator HART. I had nothing at the time, as I stated in my dispatch, and I got no reply.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, you got the dispatch from the Navy that was sent out on the 24th of November in which they said that the Japanese attack from any direction, or in any direction, might be expected.

Senator HART. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You got the one on the 27th also which started out by saying this was a war warning?

Senator HART. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You got that?

Senator HART. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You also got a dispatch from the Navy that the Japanese were burning their codes, which was sent out, I believe, December 3 or 4. You got that?

Senator HART. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask you this question, and if you do not feel you can properly answer it, why, I will leave that up to you.

You described awhile ago your method of deployment. It is a sort of scatterment of your ships, if I can use such a word, so they would not be subject to a concentrated attack; in the first place, to conceal them, or to get them as far away from the jumping-off place of an attack as possible. [12852] In the case of submarines it is easier to conceal them because concealment is inherent in their construction largely.

Now, assuming that the same information you got went to Pearl Harbor with respect to the attack from any direction, with respect to the war warning, with respect to the burning of the codes, and with instructions to execute an appropriate defensive deployment of the ships preparatory for such possible attack, do you think that the concentration of a fleet, any fleet, such as the one that was concentrated in Pearl Harbor, would be interpreted or regarded as an appropriate defensive deployment of those ships?

Senator HART. Senator, you, I think, should have included in your question also what was expected of the Pacific Fleet in case a war broke out, in a way of offensive movements and readiness to carry them out.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably so.

Senator HART. Now, even so, I doubt, despite all the information that I have read and heard concerning the Pearl Harbor incident, that I can properly put myself in the position of the commander in chief who was there and give a useful opinion on what was the best thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. I will not press you on that. I will ask you this: Whether, from the information that you have about what was done there with the ships that were in Pearl Harbor, and from the testimony that has been adduced in all of these hearings as to where they were located, was it the sort of deployment that you executed in the control of your fleet?

Senator HART. No; it was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Now I will ask you this: You spoke awhile ago about no naval commander ever having all that he wanted. At that time we were engaged in a two-ocean war and we did not at that time have a two-ocean fleet or Navy, did we?

Senator HART. No.

The CHAIRMAN. So that those who were in control on the war strategy had to decide the relative importance of shifting ships from one ocean to another, and not having enough ships for the two oceans simultaneously to match the Japanese Navy and German submarine menace and Italian, and others, that were being carried on in the Atlantic. You, I suppose, recognized that the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the countries at war had to determine how much of the Navy in the Pacific might be needed in the Atlantic, or how much of the Navy in the Atlantic could be shifted into the Pacific without weakening either one out of proportion to its importance; that is true, isn't it?

Senator HART. I do not know whether you are correct [12854] in mentioning the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am not sure that it was set up at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us limit it to our own Naval Department.

Senator HART. They naturally were the ones who were carrying the responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. What I understood you to say awhile ago was that while no naval commander ever had all he wanted, you do not mean by that to convey the impression to the committee that those who were charged with the primary responsibility of deciding where the Navy should be, or what proportion should be at any one place, were acting without due judgment in deciding that matter as they did?

Senator HART. That is correct. The question of the correctness of the judgment is another matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Of course, that is always a question that enters into every human act and all human conduct, is the question of judgment, and when we get into that realm we get into a difficult field. I do not think I want to ask any other questions.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to ask one question.

Senator HART. I might say, Senator, while I never particularly pressed the Department for additional forces, I think I did make known, in an unofficial way, my total [12855] disagreement in not keeping almost all of our force in the Pacific waters during those times, but at the same time I know I did not have very good knowledge of what the requirements and responsibilities were in the Atlantic.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator LUCAS.

Senator LUCAS. Senator Hart, do you recall from whom you first learned about the attack on Clark Field at 12:30 on the afternoon of December 7, or whenever it was?

Senator HART. Someone of my staff officers came in and told me.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever have a talk with General MacArthur about the destruction of those planes on Clark Field thereafter?

Senator HART. Only on that afternoon, when he told me what had happened.

Senator LUCAS. Will you give to the committee the substance of that conversation, please?

Senator HART. The substance was that the Japanese had made a highly efficient attack, displayed excellent ability in the air, and told me about what he had lost and about what he had left. The respective figures I no longer remember.

Senator LUCAS. Did he give you at that time any [12856] information as to why the planes were on the ground?

Senator HART. No.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall how many he said he lost at that time?

Senator HART. No. I said I did not remember.

Senator LUCAS. There are no records that I can find here in the War Department as to the number of planes that were lost at Clark Field, and that is one of the reasons I am asking you about it.

Senator HART. I would not know.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. You have indicated to one of the chairman's questions—

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have some questions that I would like to ask him, so you might adjourn to the afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 12:30. We might as well go over.

Admiral, you will be back at 1:30, please.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, I repeat what I told you a little while ago, that I have been doing my best to be helpful here to the committee, but if there is going to be much more questioning I suggest that I be given some [12857] time to get better prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. I imagine there will not be but a few more questions, Senator. I hate to bring you back, but we do have to recess. The time has arrived.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[12858]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Senator, will you please come forward and take the stand? Senator Ferguson will inquire.

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR THOMAS CHARLES HART (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Hart, I show you the memorandum which you wrote at the time that you learned that there had been an attack upon America and ask you to read it into the record. I think that should be read into the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You might give the circumstances at the time when you wrote it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; if you will just relate under what circumstances you wrote it.

Senator HART. This is a photostat copy of a scrap of paper in my hand which was written at 4 a. m. sitting on my bed in Manila just after we had received the dispatch which was sent out from Pearl Harbor to the effect that there was an air raid on Pearl Harbor and that it was no drill.

I made sure from the staff officer who brought it over to me from my command post about 200 yards away that it was authentic and did emanate from someone who was on the official key in Pearl Harbor and then wrote this dispatch to send to all my forces:

Priority dispatch: Japan started hostilities. [12859] Govern yourselves accordingly.

That was all they had to go on until they got official word from Washington that the war was on.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I show you another exhibit, which is the one, as I understand it, you received from Washington. Is that correct?

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And will you read that into the record and, if you can, tell us when as commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet you received that one.

Senator HART. This also is photostat copy of the working copy of the dispatch. I might say that these two scraps of paper were picked up by one of my men when we were abandoning that command post and were carried by him throughout his 3½ years of captivity and finally got to me. I returned them to him to keep for his own purposes. The dispatch says:

Execute WPL-46 against Japan.

That was the war plan which was in effect. It was issued by the Secretary of the Navy and went to the entire Navy. The hour at which it was sent seems to be 1930 Greenwich time on December 7. It was received in my communication office 15 minutes afterward.

Senator FERGUSON. That is 5 hours earlier in Washington? [12860]

Senator HART. In Washington time this would mean 2:30 p. m., on the 7th of December when it was sent.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And 15 minutes later it was received?

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you a few questions about the fact that you have now stated that your fleet was not deployed as the one at Pearl Harbor. I notice in this dispatch of the 27th it is this way:

Execute a preparatory defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

Now, your task and the commander in chief at Pearl Harbor's task under WPL-46 were different, were they not?

Senator HART. In detail; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He had certain tasks to carry out against the Marshalls, did he not, under WPL-46? I have a copy if you want to look at it. I have turned up the page on one of your tasks if you will just look at that.

Senator HART. That is correct, Senator. His first task, either given to him in the Navy Department's war plan or following that written into his own contributory plan was a raid on the Japanese mandate islands.

Senator FERGUSON. Could that account for the fact that [12861] one man, if he had one plan to carry out, would deploy his ships in one way, whereas if he had another plan to carry out he might deploy them in another way?

Senator HART. Well, the war plan was not in effect until the dispatch was sent which I have just read into the record. Up to that time it was simply a plan, but it did require something to put it into effect.

Now, the dispatch that you mentioned of November 27 said, "preparatory to carrying out the plan."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator HART. In the meantime, as I read that dispatch, from anybody's standpoint, deployment should be defensive.

Senator FERGUSON. Defensive alone or preparatory to carrying out this task?

Senator HART. It is pretty difficult to figure just where you are going to draw the line and that is the difficulty that any commander in chief is always under such circumstances.

Senator FERGUSON. In reading the language that is sent to him.

Senator HART. In knowing how to act.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, in knowing how to act and understanding it.

Senator HART. There is no fault with the language at [12862] all but on the conditions that face you.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand then from this language you are not attempting to say how Admiral Kimmel should have deployed his fleet preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

Senator HART. No. I told Senator Barkley in the preceding session that as to what it might mean that it was difficult to give an opinion on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. And the fact that you carried this out in a way different than Admiral Kimmel carried his task out is not to be considered a criticism of his method of doing it under this message?

Senator HART. Not at all. There was a vast difference of geography between the two commands. Japan was over 3,000 miles away from Pearl Harbor and very much less than that from where the Asiatic Fleet was.

Senator FERGUSON. There is one thing, and this is only for the purpose of trying to locate the instrument that you were speaking of, will you describe a little more on the record the so-called historical paper or historical instrument that you looked at in relation to the winds message, that we may be able to locate that if possible?

Senator HART. I think that Admiral Redman probably knows what that is better than I and will know what it means [12863] if he reads my testimony. It obviously was produced primarily with a view to at some later date being able to show the rest of the Navy what that unit had been engaged in, what it had been trained for, and what it had accomplished.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume, then, it had been made out after the attack, that paper?

Senator HART. Oh, yes. I do not recall, but I rather think it was probably produced about January or February 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would you just tell us what office it was in when you saw it, which may help us locate it?

Senator HART. Office of Naval Communications, and it was given me by Admiral Redman.¹

Senator FERGUSON. And, Admiral, you made no report and was not supposed to make a report on your work that you did in getting this testimony in the, as we call it in this hearing, the Hart report or the Hart hearing?

Senator HART. No; no findings of fact or opinion were required of me, and it would have been going way out of my field to have volunteered any. It was simply what the precept says it is. It was recording testimony that was being forgotten, and worse yet, was being lost on account of men dying.

I might further say that I did not turn it in as by any means a complete job. A complete job, of course, would have required me to put Admiral Kimmel on the stand as well as [12864] Admiral Stark, who was mentioned this morning by Mr. Keefe, and various other subordinates who were important.

At the end of the report I advised the Secretary only as regards two witnesses, the names were McCollum and Kramer, whom I had not examined but pointed out that I thought they did have very pertinent testimony and I probably might well have gone back to the Pacific, chased them to Australia and then to the Solomons, in order to get the testimony, but I decided to close it down at that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, you started this in 1944. Did the Secretary of the Navy state to you why he was doing this that many years after the happening of the event, as to what his purpose in getting his testimony was?

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5477 et seq. for a letter from the Navy Department.

Senator HART. No; I don't think Secretary Knox ever said anything whatever to me about that. All of my dealings were with Admiral Gatch; quite a little of it is persuading me that I ought to be willing to take on the task, and while that was going on I think Admiral Gatch said that Admiral Kimmel himself had pointed out that situation, that testimony was being forgotten and lost and that something ought to be done.

Senator FERGUSON. So as I understand it, then, the Navy did not close the matter just because the President had appointed a commission and that commission had made a report; [12865] that Admiral Gatch desired that the Navy itself perpetuate this testimony?

Senator HART. You refer to the Roberts Commission, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator HART. I doubt if there was any relationship there. If there was, I did not know of it and it is my impression that I was put on this job because there was a feeling on the part of—a considerable feeling that better records ought to be made and that Admiral Kimmel was one of the leaders in setting that forth.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes; I have a question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will inquire.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, might I ask you to turn your attention to the dispatch of November 24? Would you care to offer any statement, Admiral, as to what meaning the words, "aggressive movement in any direction," meant to you? In other words, is the language as broad as it seems or did the words "aggressive movement in any direction" confine itself to any particular theater in your mind?

Senator HART. Well, there are six addressees to this dispatch.

[12866] Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Senator HART. The two commanders in chief afloat and the commanders of four different naval districts, including the one in the Canal Zone, and in specific answer to your question I would read it now as I read it then: They may strike in any direction and particularly watch out in the Philippines and at Guam.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But there can be no place where you have indicated the dispatch went that would not have to bear the burden of interpreting that language as it applied to them?

Senator HART. Oh, I think that is always the case when a dispatch is written to multiple addressees scattered over as large a portion of the world as this one was scattered.

[12867] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, if you will turn to the dispatch of the 27th, would you care to indicate, Admiral, what meaning you gave to the phrase, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning"?

Did that differentiate this dispatch from other dispatches, or was there anything in your mind that was significant in the use of those terms?

Senator HART. Well, absolutely. Insofar as I was concerned, the dispatch might have ended right there, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you regard the subsequent matters in that dispatch in any extent qualifying or minimizing the language in the first nine words?

Senator HART. Well, it certainly did not from where I sat.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, at the end of the dispatch, what significance would the phrase "Spenavo inform British" have? What would that mean to you?

Senator HART. I am not sure that I knew at the time who Spenavo was. I think he was a liaison man, a naval officer in London. It meant nothing to me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The inference you got was that the nature of this dispatch and the purport would come to the knowledge of the British in that way?

[12868] Senator HART. Yes, but not through me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. I realize that.

"Spenavo" would identify someone in London who would advise the British?

Senator HART. Yes. It is addressed to him for information.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Now, Admiral, did you observe, following the attack at Pearl Harbor, that there was any change in the amount of ships, and military supplies that were brought into the Pacific area?

Senator HART. Did you say after the attack?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will repeat that.

You testified this morning that you asked for and desired additional ships and additional military supplies. You spoke of the fact that commanders are always doing that.

I am asking you whether there was any change in the getting of supplies and equipment and ships into the Pacific after Pearl Harbor.

Senator HART. Certainly not in my area, because it could not be done, and I do not know anything about the rest of the area.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, one question further.

You spoke about the Japanese having to take into consideration the presence of your fleet on their flank, if they proceeded to go down to the Malay barrier. [12869]

Would you, as a skilled naval commander have regarded the Pacific Fleet which was based on Pearl Harbor as also presenting any flank threat to a Japanese aggressive move?

Senator HART. Eventually, when they were able to get there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

Senator HART. From Pearl Harbor, the radius over which they could deliver their power did not reach to the Philippines.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will ask you one other thing further.

Would the duty, imposed by a desire for readiness to move under a proper order, under War Plan 46, have required a commander to make the preparation and conditioning of his fleet his first objective, to get it ready to execute such an order when it should come at the sacrifice of defensive deployment in the meantime?

Senator HART. Well, it is a matter of being between the devil and the deep blue sea. It is an occasion where you have to use your judgment and make the right guess, and it does take a certain amount of guessing. A commander could easily make the mistake of taking himself so far afield that the offensive which the Government has a right to expect of its forces, would be too slow in being brought to play. [12870]

On the other hand, if he does not guard himself against an attack sufficiently, he is making another mistake.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recognize, as a skilled naval expert, any difference in the priority status between a future aggressive movement of the fleet and the protection or the safety of the fleet before that movement?

Is one prior to the other in importance?

Senator HART. Any general statement either way, would be no good. Some men err, some commanders err on the side of caution and others err on the other side.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster will inquire.

Senator BREWSTER. I apologize for not having been here this morning, and what I have in mind may have been covered, so I shall not try to duplicate.

As I think I have said to you privately, I did hear from Admiral Helfrich of a message which, as I understood it, you sent to him prior to Pearl Harbor dealing with the possibility of moving some parts of your fleet down there.

I am not clear as to what the state of the record is regarding that.

Senator HART. No, I was not asked that.

[12871] I communicated with Admiral Helfrich only informally.

Under peacetime regulations naval ships cannot be sent into foreign ports without a process of getting permission and authority via the State Department.

Well, of course, I was not going to do that, so I sent the ships down to these oil ports ostensibly to get fuel—and, incidentally, they did get some—and had word conveyed over to Admiral Helfrich informally what I was doing, and I apprehended that those ships would have a great deal of difficulty in getting any fuel and might be there some days, and please not to raise any row about it.

[12872] Senator BREWSTER. That was some time prior to December 7?

Senator HART. About 10 days.

Senator BREWSTER. That indicated some concern you felt at that time regarding the security of your ships?

Senator HART. Well, that was the primary reason for sending them down there.

Senator BREWSTER. Those ships did remain down there?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. It was thought it would not have been helpful to bring them back to the Philippines to join you?

Senator HART. You mean after the war broke?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Senator HART. Well, their first task was guarding the escape of about 200,000 tons of allied merchant craft which fled into Manila Harbor and which we got out and to safety. As I stated this morning, Senator, those destroyers and cruisers were both weaker and slower than the Jap opposite numbers, and that, coupled with the superiority in the air which the Japanese obtained within 2 or 3 days,

meant that they did not have much chance to accomplish anything if they had returned, so I never did bring them back.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, the last answer has [12873] brought up a question that was not fully covered, as I recall.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Hart, you made the statement this morning, as I recall it, in relation to the transfer of the ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic, in relation to your private opinion, or at least your opinion possibly not through direct navy channels that you had an opinion on the matter.

Would you explain what you did, or what your opinion was?

Senator HART. I answered to this effect in reply to a question by Senator Barkley, that I, sitting out where I was, rather naturally perhaps, could not see any good reason for having much of our naval power in the Atlantic because of our situation in the Pacific, but that I acknowledged freely that I was not faced with the over-all responsibility and did not know the situation which confronted our highest levels of command as well as they knew it themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you of the opinion that the Pacific Fleet was sufficient, as it was constituted on the 7th of December, to carry out the war plan against Japan?

Senator HART. Yes; I thought that they had power [12874] enough to make a raid into the Japanese Mandated Islands.

Senator FERGUSON. They were not sufficient to go further than the Mandated Islands, as constituted?

Senator HART. No. The logistic considerations would have prevented their reaching much further than the eastern edge of the Mandated Islands.

Senator FERGUSON. That, of course, would not have been true if we had had our entire fleet in the Pacific?

Senator HART. Well, the entire fleet, including all of the logistic power that we had, would have been another thing. But just the combat ships——

Senator FERGUSON. No; I mean all of the trains, and all.

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That we would have been able to secure.

Senator HART. I do not know how far we would be able to go.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator, the raid you spoke of into the mandated islands, is that what was provided under the war plans?

Senator HART. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your appearance [12875] and the information you have given the committee, and your apparent desire to be helpful to us in every way. You are now excused.

Senator HART. Thank you, sir.

(Senator Hart was excused.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will counsel please call the next witness?

Senator FERGUSON. May I ask counsel if they can locate the report and history that has been talked about so the committee might see it?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We will call Captain Layton.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is Captain Layton the next witness, Counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will Captain Layton please come forward.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. EDWIN THOMAS LAYTON, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you please state your full name to the committee?

Captain LAYTON. Edwin Thomas Layton.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You are a captain in the United States [12876] Navy?

Captain LAYTON. Captain, United States Navy; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy?

Captain LAYTON. I entered the Naval Academy in 1920. I graduated therefrom in 1924. I have served continuously ever since.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is your present assignment?

Captain LAYTON. Fleet intelligence officer and combat intelligence officer, United States Pacific Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was your assignment at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. Fleet intelligence officer, United States Pacific Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you give to the committee in some detail as to what your duties were at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, what duties you were performing in Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. I will read from the staff instructions to the staff of the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, issued July 14, 1941, and in effect the day of the attack. The instructions I will read are those laid out for the duty of the fleet intelligence officer and his assistants [reading]:

Paragraph 214. Intelligence Officer.

[12877] A. Directs assembly of enemy information and evaluate the same; disseminating to the various members of staff, indicating where action is required.

B. Provides operation officer and war plans officer information essential for current estimates; monograph material.

C. Maintain section 2 sub-paragraph A, B, C, D, E, F and G of the estimate of situation, enemy forces; maintains location plot of Fleets of possibly enemy or Allies.

D. Directs counter-espionage and counter-information.

E. Maintains intelligence records. (See the Naval Intelligence Manual.)

F. Prepares Fleet intelligence bulletins.

G. Evaluates intelligence information received of procedures or processes of other navies, and prepares definite recommendation as to any action to be taken within our own Fleet.

H. In charge of censorship.

I. Internal security of ships.

J. Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

215. Assistant Intelligence Officer,

who was my subordinate and for whom I am responsible.

In addition to assisting 25—

that was my number—

In all duties of the Intelligence Section, performs the [12878] following additional assignments:

- A. Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analyses.
- B. Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to the Fleet.
- C. Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of enemy information.
- D. Maintenance of current estimates of situation enemy forces and location of plots of fleets of possible enemies or Allies.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was your assistant?

Captain LAYTON. Commander Robert E. Hudson, U. S. Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. From whom or through whom did you get your basic intelligence on which you made your reports?

Captain LAYTON. In accordance with the set-up, the Chief of Naval Operations subdivision of Naval Intelligence was charged with the furnishing of information of all kinds from all sources to the fleet intelligence officer via official channels.

I also received what we then called combat intelligence, which is now called communications intelligence, and derived via the Fourteenth Naval District Combat Intelligence Unit. This was the unit commanded by the then commander, now Capt. J. J. Rochefort.

[12879] In addition, from time to time and infrequently, we would receive telegraphic information from other communication intelligence organizations, for instance, Cavite and OPNAV.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you secured this intelligence did you put it in shape for delivery?

Captain LAYTON. In some cases the actual material was in shape. For instance, reports from OPNAV, various observations. In most cases the communication intelligence as delivered or as received by me was not always in shape desirable for presentation to the commander in chief, and therefore I would work on that, make an evaluation of it and submit it to the commander in chief.

When I speak of it not being in shape, I refer to some of the station logs received from the intercept station at Guam, and the station at Cavite, which was recorded and indexed in accordance with their procedure, but was not in suitable shape for intelligence material requiring a considerable digesting, collating, and the putting together of basic elements of intelligence information for the commander in chief.

[12880] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did most of your basic material come through Captain Rochefort?

Captain LAYTON. Most of the basic material received concerning the Japanese ship locations came from Captain Rochefort, although I must say the unit at Cavite was of great assistance, both as a check and because they were nearer and could provide probably more accurate information on certain details.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How would information from Cavite come to you?

Captain LAYTON. Both by mail and by dispatch. In the latter part of October and November most of their information came by dispatch.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To whom did you directly convey your intelligence?

Captain LAYTON. Directly to Admiral Kimmel, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In person.

Captain LAYTON. In person.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in what form?

Captain LAYTON. At 8:15 each morning I would appear at the admiral's office with my intelligence material. It invariably consisted of the communications intelligence summary for that day, plus notations of dispatches received in the recent 24 hours that I thought pertinent materials, that [12881] might bear upon the subject.

This would then be discussed, sometimes briefly, and other times at length, depending upon the state of the material or the nature of the information contained therein.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, were those intelligence reports made directly to Admiral Kimmel during the week prior to the attack on December 7?

Captain LAYTON. They were made daily to Admiral Kimmel during the week prior to the attack on December 7, and for several months theretofore.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in each of those intelligence reports that you made, did you endeavor to collate all of the intelligence that was available to you for that day?

Captain LAYTON. The written communications intelligence report contained all information noted from observation of enemy naval circuits. Additionally, through conversational explanation, additional enemy reports received during the past 24 hours were discussed, and an attempt made to make them fit, or to key them into materials contained in the radio intelligence report.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you the agency through whom dispatches to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, would pass?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. The dispatches to the commander [12882] in chief, Pacific Fleet, were of generally two categories; regular Navy dispatches, that is, secret, confidential, plain language, which would come through the communications office, and there were the magic dispatches, or dispatches carried in the special channel which has been referred to before, a special radio cryptographic system coming over the same radio channels.

When this went to the communications office, they could not identify the cipher except to know it was a special cipher and held by the fleet security officer, the then Lieutenant Coleman, now deceased, who would bring out the special machinery wheels and would then decrypt this dispatch, would deliver it to me in person, after having shown it to Admiral Kimmel, or the chief of staff, then Captain Smith, the war plans officer, then Captain McMorris, and the fleet communications officer, Commander Curts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would they get that information before it came to you or afterward?

Captain LAYTON. There were occasions when I saw it first because I would be in the office when it was being deciphered, and would read it, but the admiral and chief of staff had priority on the receipt of this material, naturally.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then in the transmission of intelligence to the chief of staff, part of it would be in your communication [12883]

intelligence summary, and part of it would be oral, and part of it would consist of dispatches?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That had been sent in, where it was your duty to convey that to the commander in chief?

Captain LAYTON. Plus other normal dispatches, such as sightings, or reports from naval attachés, or naval observers from State Department sources, and others that came in ordinary dispatch form, and was delivered to the admiral as well as the chief of staff and other officers.

Mr. RICHARDSON. After this information had gone to the commander in chief, would it reach other members of his staff?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, it would. May I explain why and how this was done?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. The radio intelligence organization at that time was a secret. Regulations had been issued as to how it would be handled, who would have access to it, and by whose authority.

When I first assumed this job on December 7, 1940, 1 year before the big day, I made a liaison contact with the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is Admiral Bloch?

[12884] Captain LAYTON. Directly under Admiral Bloch, for administration.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Captain LAYTON. I showed them my credentials, and they showed me these regulations, and had me read one page, and this page is more or less in substance as follows:

This is very secret. No one shall know about it except the following named officers and offices:

The Commandant of Operations, in which office is placed the Commander in Chief, his Chief of Staff, his Intelligence Officer, and such other officers as designated by him or by the Chief of Naval Operations.

This page was signed by the then Chief of Naval Operations.

I was then administered an oath to maintain secrecy and carry out these regulations.

Now, in order that other members of the staff who were not by the admiral's direction on this list who would receive this secret intelligence, or supersecret intelligence might be aware of these facts, I would make up a special intelligence folder in which I would not say where it came from but would give it a rating of A-1 in case it was communication intelligence, and would lay out the facts as I saw them, as contained in these dispatches. This was shown to the [12885] members of the staff, and their initials appear in blocks at the bottom of the page.

I would like to say parenthetically, by Admiral Kimmel's direction, the war plans officer was added to this list and I received a written directive to that effect.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, I think you told us that it was your custom to include in your communication intelligence summary which you made daily the information which had come to you with reference to fleet and enemy vessel locations.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, I call your attention to your intelligence summary as of November 30, 1941.

Captain LAYTON. I have the original before me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That appears in our record, Captain as Exhibit 115.

Now, will you explain to the committee what the significance would be of your report of November 30, as you explained it to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. It was my practice to take the communications intelligence summary to Admiral Kimmel at 8:15. He would accept it from my hand and sit and read it. Thereafter he would ask me questions regarding specific points and then a brief discussion would take place regarding its contents.

Thereafter, he would initial it, and in this case it has initials also of the War Plans Officer, then Captain McMorris. I cannot now recall specific words or discussions regarding this specific summary.

[12886] I would like to say, however, that since the middle of November the tenor of these discussions had been about the apparent change in the Japanese naval tactical organization as reflected by radio intercepts of their own circuits.

It was apparent that the normal volumes of traffic were increasing, that the commanders of certain fleets had decreasing importance. One, for example, the c. in c., Combined Fleet, the big boss, and the c. in c. of the Second Fleet, who correspond roughly to our commander, Scouting Forces, who commanded normally cruisers and destroyers, had taken a position high and above what he had been in the previous 6 to 8 or 10 months.

Also a fairly newly organized force, the Third Fleet that they sent out, and that we assumed to be an amphibious force, also was far more important in the traffic than he would have been under normal circumstances.

From receiving these from day to day there was no doubt in our minds that a task force was being formed.

This same phenomenon had been noted, only not so strongly, first in February 1941, when the Japanese decided to mediate the French Indochina-Thailand dispute over a border, and with a show of force went down and mediated.

The task force organization at that time was fairly well reflected in the traffic. The task force organization [12887] at that time was well proven in traffic. When the mediation was over the security measures were reduced and they returned to Tokyo.

This same sort of phenomenon had been noted in about July, 1941, when the Japanese, by ultimatum to Vichy and French Indochina authorities, decided to move in and take over certain Japanese naval bases and air bases in French Indochina.

Then we also received information from magic, from Washington, by the special channel, and were able to fill the picture very nicely.

To return to November 1941, I have spoken of the prominence of two fleet commanders. We had also the commander of the combined air forces, a shore-based air organization, which also contained air tenders with seaplanes aboard, and so forth.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Speaking now of the Japanese forces?

Captain LAYTON. Yes. The Japanese combined air force. They were also quite prominent.

Another point of interest at this time that had been noted and talked about was the fact that fleet units belonging to certain fleets apparently no longer had the same mother. For instance, some first fleet destroyers definitely were working for the second fleet.

[12888] Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, let me caution you right there, in relating this information as you saw it about the middle of November and from then on, I should like to have you confine yourself to information which was communicated to Admiral Kimmel and to his staff generally.

Captain LAYTON. This information was communicated to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead.

Captain LAYTON. And was written up in the summary, which I will produce later, if you wish.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead. You said something about the ships not having the same mother.

Captain LAYTON. Various units no longer had their normal mothers. In other words, each fleet commander, that we call mother, had certain chickens, and some of these chickens no longer belonged to the mother, but belonged to other mothers of other fleets. This was an unusual procedure, because normally all naval traffic followed an administrative routing, and to have new commanders traced directly as subordinates of another commander was an unusual procedure and indicated he had a tactical interest as opposed to an administrative interest.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I see.

Captain LAYTON. The associations of these commanders [12889] were entirely with southern addresses, Formosa, Hainan, and French Indochina. Their direction of movement clearly indicated they were bypassing Formosa, and they were going in that general direction.

It was noted also that certain Cardivs, carrier divisions, were apparently interested or concerned with this movement.

To be specific, the one we called Carrier Division 3, the one we called Carrier Division 4, apparently were concerned somewhat with this movement.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many carriers in a division?

Captain LAYTON. Two, sir. As a result of this radio phenomenon, Admiral Kimmel became more interested day by day, and on the 24th told me to contact Rochefort and to see if he was receiving from other units any such phenomena. Rochefort's answer was to the effect that no one had reported this on the circuits. Admiral Kimmel then directed me to order a dispatch, to send a dispatch in a special system to the unit at Cavite and OpNav, making his observations and drawing the conclusions that had been drawn in the summaries which Admiral Kimmel had been reading.

The dispatch that Commander Rochefort originated and was sent to COM14 was the one read here in the testimony the other day. This was replied to by the fleet commander of the Sixteenth Naval Operation at Cavite, in which he agreed [12890] in part and elaborated in part and disagreed to a minor degree.

I have always believed, and I do to this day, that it was the result of these two dispatches to some degree that the war warning came on the 27th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why?

Captain LAYTON. Speaking now from December 6, 1941, we had this information and no more, we saw this movement growing; we had reports from shore observers in China, assistant naval attachés, merchant skippers, consular authorities, that they had seen these ships loading and going out, that they had been sighted going south, the merchant marine ships stating that they were going south in a convoy, and the entire movement was noted as going south.

That was the radio picture. The visual picture, of course, was not as complete as to detail, or as to destination.

[12891] When the 27th of November war warning message came, as more than one officer on the staff has explained, that fits the picture, as we see it, and that was what I thought myself.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Coming up to the 30th of November, let me ask you, in the designation of that Intelligence summary under the styling of the Third Fleet you make the recital:

No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is under way.

Will you explain that statement?

Captain LAYTON. I did not write this summary and I cannot explain that statement other than to say that the operators and the supervisors who sat on these circuits week in, month in, and year in, had the impression, from the type of traffic they were seeing, that he was under way.

I can explain it a little further by this, by going back there in these summaries you will see where the commander in chief, Third Fleet, is a very busy originator of traffic. He is talking to the commander of the Second Fleet, he is talking to the commander of the Air Force, he is talking to the resident naval officer of Hainan, he is talking to the resident naval officer in Taihoku, to the present naval officer in Indochina, to the officer in charge at Palao in [12892] the Caroline Islands, he is entirely associated with them and with other high commands, C in C, Second Fleet, indicating he is getting ready to go in those directions. He then shows no longer in the traffic. He is still being addressed in the traffic. He is the addressee of other messages. But no messages originate from him that day. The operator gets the impression he is under way. I think that is what is meant in here.

Like all things, radio intelligence, however, has its limitations. I won't go into the technical details but when you identify one whom you don't know you do it by association, by his activities in the radio circuits, and by his known friends.

In this one, however, is an example of the misleading character of the radio intelligence information. In the general paragraph it states:

The only tactical circuit heard today was one with *Akagi* and several *Marus*.

A tactical circuit is one in which one unit calls another unit on strong enough power for us to hear at Pearl Harbor or Cavite. Normally, units do not communicate that way. Administrative traffic and command traffic is usually handled up a chain of command to its nearest shore station who broadcasts it, and it is then rebroadcast so that [12893] all addresses receive it on an umbrella.

The fact that *Akagi* was that day exercising with several marus was brought to my attention and the admiral noted it also. He asked me what I thought, as I recall it, and I said the *Akagi* was probably talking to some tanker marus, marus being merchant ships and probably going to get oil.

As a matter of fact we now know the *Akagi* was at sea under radio silence and was not talking to the marus because this same *Akagi* identified here was identified by Cavite on this day as moving southward from the Empire.

This, of course, is not to find fault with the time of information. It just has its limitations. It certainly is an inexact science and while the averages are good you cannot follow it on to the last detail and depend upon it without looking it over.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, referring to this language in the fourth paragraph:

Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.

What is there in the presence of destroyers which gives an indication of the presence of carriers?

Captain LAYTON. There again is the technique of reading [12894] the enemy's radio signals without reading his messages and taking who does things as a rule and how he does it as a rule and using that as a thumb rule to find out what he is doing now.

The Japanese naval organization was so set up that originally the carriers or carrier divisions had been assigned to both First and Second Fleets. Sometime in the middle of 1941 this organization was apparently dissolved. It took us some time to find it out for sure. The carriers were lumped under one organization. But one of the Japanese tendencies had been to keep plane guard destroyers with the same carrier division and when they moved over from the First and Second Fleet into the Carrier Fleet they took their plane guard destroyers with them.

The presence of a plane guard destroyer in the Mandates would be the first and probably the only tip-off under normal circumstances if they were under radio silence that a carrier might be there, too. It wouldn't prove that the carrier was there, but under normal circumstances it would be logical to assume it. This, unfortunately, was not the case. This plane guard destroyer division, it later turned out, had been detached from the carriers and had gone to the Mandates to reinforce the Mandate Fleet. The deduction was right at the time but incorrect in fact.

[12895] Mr. RICHARDSON. Turning to the Intelligence summary of December 1 I note the statement:

The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale.

Will you explain that statement?

Captain LAYTON. Japanese radio call signs normally lasted about 6 months. It was anticipated on November 1 from the type of traffic before that that the call signs would change about November 1. They did so do. To find the radio call signs changing in only 1 month, and when I speak of radio call signs I am speaking of fleet and command call signs, not shore stations, this change was significant and was

considered an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations because, first, we saw tactical task forces being formed. We heard of them being formed from eye witnesses who had sighted them on the China coast.

Call signs changing then on December 1 along with the formation of task forces was a logical thought and that they were preparing for operation was also a logical sequence.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, turning to the second page of the Communication Intelligence Summary of December 2, I note there in reference to carriers the statement:

[12896] Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today.

Now, when did this carrier silence, approximately, begin?

Captain LAYTON. There had been very little information on the carrier divisions and commander carriers who was their technical commander with the exception of Carrier Division 3 and sometimes Carrier Division 4 since early in November. There was no definite information throughout November as to their exact location or activity although from time to time a carrier call or carrier activity would be associated with shore stations, air bases.

On November 14 a statement was made:

The carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port.

The subject of carrier information thereafter was generally fragmentary but it was noted that BatDivThree, the carrier divisions, and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic and addressed letters to the Chief of Naval General Staff, which generally indicated impending operations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, for how many days prior to December 7 had there been general carrier silence?

Captain LAYTON. I would have to check the record to be exact. Carrier silence was not commented on as such at any [12897] time. The lack of information on the carriers was commented on after November 27. The November 27 summary indicated the carriers were still located in home waters.

It is to be remarked here, and I believe it to be of extreme importance in judging all these facts, that in this build-up that I mentioned, since the middle of November the association of forces, the tying together of your task forces, the commander of carriers, or carrier division commander, with the exception of Carrier Division 3, were not addressed, were not associated, and apparently were entirely aloof from the whole proceedings.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, I called your attention a moment ago to your Intelligence summary of December 1 and to the language therein quoted:

The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale.

Now, it is a fact, is it not, that that opinion was directly presented to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that is the opinion which in your testimony before the Hewitt investigation you referred to as being, that sentence, being underlined in red pencil by Admiral Kimmel at the time?

[12898] Captain LAYTON. I have the original copy here and it is not underlined in red pencil. It was underlined in lead pencil. L-e-a-d.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the reference "in red pencil", was a mistake?

Captain LAYTON. That was a typographical error on the part of the recorder, I believe.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the underlining, however, was done by Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. At that time; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, is the—

Captain LAYTON. Mr. Counsel—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is the absence of information over a considerable period of time of the carriers any evidence of whether those carriers are at sea or in port?

Captain LAYTON. Not necessarily, sir. There have been many times during the course of 1941 and previously when not only carriers but battleships, cruisers and other types were not located by Radio Intelligence traffic. This is because when carriers or other types of vessels go into home waters, home ports, home exercise areas, they use low power radio direct with shore stations. This is then handled normally on telegraphic land lines to prevent our direction finder stations and intercept stations from hearing [12899] their traffic. During such periods as that we have always carried those units as "home waters."

Also when one of these vessels go into a navy yard for overhaul he suspends communications and it is handled by the nearest naval station for him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, in reporting the fact that these carriers were lost, did you have in your mind at that time any apprehension as to what that might mean with respect to what the carriers were doing, speaking of your own apprehensions now?

Captain LAYTON. My apprehensions as of that time were briefly these: We have all of these units, all these commands, very well lined up for an operational, an offensive operation. We haven't seen the carriers except Cardiv 3 and sometimes Cardiv 4. Since it was my duty to keep track of the Japanese naval forces, I felt apprehensive as to where they were and therefore conferred with my opposite number daily regarding any evidence that might be able to be pieced out.

[12900] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you called Admiral Kimmel's attention to the fact that you didn't know where Carrier Divisions 1 or 2 were?

Captain LAYTON. That was at the time following the December 1, 1941, Communication Intelligence Summary which I have been referring to.

Admiral Kimmel told me to make out for him a location sheet on the Japanese Navy. I proceeded to do so from my current files, derived principally from Radio Intelligence.

I did it at December 1, 1941, that is, it was so typed, but I am positive in my mind that it was actually delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 2, 1941.

This location sheet showed the location, to the best of our knowledge, of the major portion of the Japanese Fleet and which, with the

exception of the Pearl Harbor Task Force was very active. In this location sheet I did not list Carrier Division 1 or Carrier Division 2 because neither one of those commands had appeared in traffic for fully 15 and possibly 25 days. That is, identifiable traffic as an addressee, or as an originator.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, Admiral Kimmel at that time called your attention to the fact that you didn't know where those carriers were?

Captain LAYTON. He did, sir.

[12901] Mr. RICHARDSON. And that was the occasion of his remark to you, to which you testified, Admiral Kimmel speaking:

Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it? My reply was I hoped they would be sighted before now.

Captain LAYTON. Words said to that effect. I believe that Admiral Kimmel said, "What, you do not know where the carriers are?" And my reply was as you read it, or words to that effect.

I must say that his saying "You mean they could be rounding Diamond Head," was to emphasize the fact that I didn't know where they were. I don't believe the admiral meant to say they were off Diamond Head, and I didn't know it, and I answered saying I hoped they would be sighted.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there any significance attached to lack of information concerning the whereabouts of the carriers that could be construed by you from your experience as indicating a possibility that they were at sea on a mission?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that everyone who has worked with enemy radio intelligence has always been aware that any force given sealed orders can get under way, go to sea, and as long as they don't use their radio, as long as they are not sighted, can move almost anywhere in the world, provided they are not sighted before they arrive where they [12902] are going.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then radio silence would, in itself, be one of the evidences from which it might be possible to deduce that certain warships were under sealed orders proceeding at sea and not using their radio?

Captain LAYTON. That would be a very difficult deduction to make, but one could make such a deduction, and I might say, in hindsight now, not foresight, that there was no evidence in this of considerations of radio silence.

I would like to point out that had these carriers or carrier-division commanders or the carrier commander in chief been addressed in any messages of the thousands and thousands that came out from the naval General Staff, regardless of the silence of carriers, then the thought of radio silence would have been paramount, but the fact that they were never addressed, not even once, led to the belief that they were in the same situation as the carrier divisions were in July 1941, when the Japanese had a task force go down with their ultimatum into French Indochina.

At that time the carriers remained in home waters, and not known as to where they were in a covering position, doubtlessly, in case we took counteraction, but where they continued training, returning to the Empire after the conclusion of the French Indochina matter.

[12903] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral Kimmel in his testimony asserted that there had been quite a number of occasions prior

to this period during early 1941 and 1940 when there was a similar absence of call signs from groups of ships and carriers, quite the same in intimation and extent of this absence of signs to which you have just testified.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there any difference in your mind between the earlier lack of information and the present lack of information you are referring to here?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. I believe it to be identical.

In the previous cases they were not addressed, nor did they address messages. In this case they followed the same pattern. I submitted a memorandum to the Roberts commission to that effect prepared by the Intelligence Unit under Commander Rochefort to give a general analysis of periods in which various types of ships were unlocated. Some types of ships were never located by radio intelligence because they didn't appear.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If it were felt that war was imminent and a war warning had been received, the fact that the carrier divisions 1 and 2 were lost, would have some significance in the evaluation of that warning, would it not, from an intelligence standpoint?

[12904] Captain LAYTON. The valuation of the enemy information was my job. I evaluated it to the best of my ability.

The formulation of the estimate of the enemy situation and its possible courses of action was not a function of Intelligence, and was laid down in the staff instructions as under Operations and War Plans.

I furnished those sections with my material. I furnished it to Admiral Kimmel. I did not at any time suggest that the Japanese carriers were under radio silence approaching Oahu. I wish I had. I did not so consider at that time.

My own personal opinion, and that is what we work on, when making estimates to ourselves, was that the carriers were remaining in home waters preparing for operations so that they would be in a covering position in case we moved against Japan after she attacked, if she did, in southeast Asia.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This information that you were giving, the method that you were following in assembling this information, continued every day up to the attack, did it?

Captain LAYTON. It continued every day up until I left Pearl Harbor on November 29, 1945.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in conveying that information, you did your very best to acquaint Admiral Kimmel with all of the information at your disposal?

[12905] Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel had all of the information at my disposal.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you are not now conscious of having omitted any method of conveying information to him that you did not use?

Captain LAYTON. I feel confident of that. I also feel confident that Admiral Kimmel feels confident of that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I don't believe I have any questions now.
Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Just one or two questions, Mr. Chairman.

Captain, you say that you transmitted everything that you received to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. That is, in general, true. Certain things came in to the staff that I received that he received also in the course of routine routing of mail, dispatches, et cetera, which I did not have the responsibility for delivering.

Senator GEORGE. So far as you know, did the information which you gave Admiral Kimmel pass on to General Short?

Captain LAYTON. I was rarely present when Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred. However, from time to time in late 1941, whenever naval task-force commanders came in to [12606] port, there was a conference in Admiral Kimmel's cabin wherein I outlined the recent strategic and tactical disposition of the Japanese Navy, their rearmament in the Marshall Islands, in the Carolines, and in general went over the entire picture as against Japan. On at least one and possibly more of these occasions, General Short was present and was so briefed by me.

However, when General Short and Admiral Kimmel had conferences between themselves, I was not a party to the conference.

Senator GEORGE. Do you recall any conference in which General Short participated late in November or in the first 6 days of December 1941?

Captain LAYTON. I have no definite recollection of what days they were, but I saw General Short in the admiral's outer office, I saw General Short's aide in the admiral's outer office waiting for General Short, who was inside with the admiral, and I believe it was the middle of November 1941, or around the 20th, perhaps, when I last saw General Short in at a general task-force briefing where I went over the Japanese situation as to the mandated islands, and the general disposition and tactical deployment of the Japanese Fleet.

Senator GEORGE. You say that was about the middle of November? [12907]

Captain LAYTON. About that time, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, did you continue to tell Admiral Kimmel, or submit your reports to Admiral Kimmel, indicating the loss of the carriers, or the lack of contact with the carriers, through the means available to you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. May I read those to you?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

Captain LAYTON. December 1, 1941—

Senator GEORGE. Is that the original paper?

Captain LAYTON. This is the original paper made out at that time, and bears Admiral Kimmel's initials.

Carriers, no change.

December 2, 1941:

Carriers, almost a complete blank of information on the carriers, today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information.

I would like to say that the call-sign change had taken place the day before and with some twelve or fifteen thousand call signs being changed the lack of identification would naturally show little information on carriers.

However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change to the first of December, and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

[12908] About 200 calls is about 6 percent of the total.

Senator GEORGE. That was the 2d of December?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. That was the 2d of December. December 3:

No information on submarines or carriers.

The 4th of December:

Carriers were not mentioned.

Fifth of December:

Carriers were not mentioned.

I beg your pardon. Correction.

No traffic from the commander carriers or submarine force has been seen.

Sixth of December, the summary was not delivered until after the attack.

Senator GEORGE. Do you have anything on the 6th of December relating to carriers? It wasn't delivered?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. It was not delivered until after the attack, and contained no information on the carriers.

Senator GEORGE. Captain, did the message of December 3 relating to the destruction reach you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That came through you?

[12909] Captain LAYTON. No, sir. That came through a special security officer who signed it, delivered to the admiral, Chief of Staff, head of war plans, Chief of Operations, and to myself, and the communications officer.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral Kimmel had that message, did he?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did he also have as information the message of December 4, 5, or 6—4 or 5—I believe, relating to the code destruction?

Captain LAYTON. Senator, I am not clear on which message you refer to. The message I was referring to was a message stating that purple machines were being destroyed at certain places. Admiral Kimmel sent for me and asked me what a purple machine was.

Senator GEORGE. That was the December 3 message?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That was the information that was sent direct to him, was it?

Captain LAYTON. That was information sent—information to him; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Sent as information to him?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; and he sent for me, wanted to know what the purple machine was, and I told him I did not [12910] know but would find out.

I went to the fleet security officer, late Lieutenant Coleman, and asked him, and he said it was an electric diplomatic coding machine of the Japs, and I so reported it to Admiral Kimmel.

[12911] Senator GEORGE. Now, subsequent to that there were two other messages that referred to codes. I don't know whether you have them there or not. Did they go to Admiral Kimmel also as information?

Captain LAYTON. One on December 3 saying:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong Singapore Batavia Manila Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

That is the one you refer to?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; that was received.

Senator GEORGE. That was received also?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. That was believed to be another version of the one I previously mentioned, Circular 2444, from Tokyo, speaking of purple machines.

Senator GEORGE. I believe I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart, of California, will inquire.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, the answers to these questions of mine may be obvious. They are put for the purpose of the [12912] record.

Is there any absolutely sure method of preventing a surprise attack?

Captain LAYTON. Mr. Gearhart, I am glad you asked me that question. I was a little curious myself at the end of the war to see what the results had been during the war. If I may have your indulgence for a minute, I will try and find my paper.

To avoid having any personal interest I asked CincPac Analytical Section. They analyzed all reports from all sources and put them together in what they thought was the best narrative of what happened. I told them that I wanted to have a study made of all our carrier task force raids throughout the course of the war, and that I would like to know what degree of surprise they were able to have against the Japs who were supposed to be looking for them.

I told them to go on the cautious side, if anything. And this is what was handed to me by the chief of that section:

There were 72 major raids by carrier-based planes in the Pacific during World War II in which it might have been expected that the element of surprise would be present. Of these, 21, or 29% percent achieved complete surprise; 32 or 44% percent achieved partial surprise; 15 or 20% percent achieved no element of surprise; and 4 or [12913] 5.5 percent achieved an unknown element of surprise.

In this tabulation raids on the same area within a week's time or on areas under amphibious attack or under bombardment were not included.

Mr. GEARHART. That is very interesting. I don't think I got the third one. Will you repeat it?

Captain LAYTON. There were 21, which is 29% percent; 32, which is 44% percent; 15, which is 20% percent; and 4 or 5% percent.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, that was surprise to the Japs?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When they were at war with us, when they were on the lookout for us, using all of their methods to prevent surprise?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then anything that is done to prevent surprise is merely to reduce the probability of surprise; is that not correct?

Captain LAYTON. In general I think that is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, if you were to say anything else you would say there would be a method of preventing surprise absolutely.

Captain LAYTON. There is, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. There is?

[12914] Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. If you have all the information from the enemy's intercepts and you are reading enough of his systems you can prevent a surprise, and we did it at Midway.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, what you are saying is that if you achieve perfection then you approach the absolute.

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. But that isn't to be expected in human affairs on very, very many occasions, is it?

Captain LAYTON. Perfection is a very rare thing, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, one of the best methods that could have been pursued to have prevented the surprise at Pearl Harbor would have been to have placed in operation adequate and efficient long-distance patrol; is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is one of the ways, sir. I think the Japanese in the early part of the war had an efficient method. The raid that Halsey conducted to take General Doolittle and his brave fliers into Tokyo in April 1942 was prevented not by aerial reconnaissance but by picket boats or fishing boats, thousands of them, spread out there 800 miles to the east of Japan, wherein no task force could penetrate without being seen.

They sank the picket boats but they got their radio message off.

[12915] Mr. GEARHART. Then if they had sufficient equipment to have carried on an adequate long-distance aerial reconnaissance for 360° around Hawaii the opportunity of a surprise would have been greatly reduced?

Captain LAYTON. Greatly reduced subject to weather conditions which would allow the search to be effective. Weather conditions prevented a plane from seeing forces, at that time, before the installation of radar.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you any idea how many airplanes of the long-distance reconnaissance type would have been required to keep up a long-distance reconnaissance around that island that was adequate?

Captain LAYTON. That is a little out of my field. I would rather let the operations people and the aviation people answer those technical questions.

Mr. GEARHART. I think the figures you have given here are very helpful. Thank you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire, Captain.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Layton, apparently from your answer about this purple machine you were not familiar with the fact that Washington was intercepting the diplomatic messages that the Japanese were using the machine to decipher?

Captain LAYTON. I was not personally familiar with the [12916] machine. I knew that Washington had been, in July 1941, intercepting and decrypting Japanese high diplomatic traffic because they told us what the Japanese were going to demand of Vichy and what they were going to do if Vichy didn't give in, and they also laid out the

bases they were going to take and which they did take. So I was aware that our unit in Washington was working and having success as of July with the Japanese, as you call it now, high-level diplomatic system.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know the name "purple"?

Captain LAYTON. The name "purple" was new to me. I had never heard it.

Senator FERGUSON. So when the word "purple" came in on the message you were not familiar with what they were talking about?

Captain LAYTON. I didn't know what "purple machine" meant. I thought it probably was one of our code names to cover some device or means of decrypting messages, perhaps.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now,, you mentioned these messages came to you in July and you knew we were intercepting them here in Washington.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get any specific notice that they were not going to give you any more of that kind [12917] of information?

Captain LAYTON. I had noticed, sir. I had written to my opposite number in Washington, Captain McCollum, and had urged him to send us diplomatic traffic of the very nature of which you speak. He replied in a personal letter and said it was determined that we should not have this sent to us because in fact Washington was the place best qualified both by personnel in number and in experience to evaluate it and to disseminate this information to the fleet and assured me that we would get what we needed at the time we needed it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you have that personal letter?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have it with you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you produce it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. Shall I read it, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain LAYTON (reading):

APRIL 22, 1941.

DEAR EDDIE: Sorry to be so late in replying to your letter of 11 March but I have just gotten out of the hospital after having them trim me down a trifle. I have taken up the [12918] matter of getting you the Fortnightly Summary by air mail and hope that this matter will be adjusted in the very near future but I cannot be certain as another division handles the mailing and distribution of this report.

I would like to add parenthetically that we got it.

I thoroughly appreciate that you would probably be much helped in your daily estimates if you had at your disposal the DIP.

That is what I asked for, "DIP", standing for diplomatic traffic.

This, however, brings up matters of security, et cetera, which would be very difficult to solve. While I appreciate your position fully in the matter, still I cannot agree that this material should be forwarded to you in the way you suggest. It seems reasonable to suppose that the Department should be the origin for evaluated political situations as its availability of information is greater than that of any command afloat, however large, its staff is larger and it should be in a position to evaluate the political consequences. Therefore it would seem that the forces afloat must rely on the Department for evaluated views of political situations.

I should think that the forces afloat should, in general, confine themselves to the estimates of the strategic [12919] and tactical situations with which they will be confronted when the time of action arrives. The material you mentioned can necessarily have but passing and transient interest as action in the political sphere is determined by the Government as a whole and not by the forces afloat.

It does not seem to me to be very practical to build up an organization afloat which will merely duplicate the efforts of the Intelligence Division in the Department. I appreciate that all this leaves you in rather a spot as naturally people are interested in current developments. I believe, however, that a sharp line should be drawn and a distinction continuously emphasized between information that is of interest and information that is desirable to have on which to base action.

In other words, while you and the Fleet may be highly interested in politics, there is nothing that you can do about it. Therefore, information of political significance, except as it affects immediate action by the Fleet, is merely a matter of interest to you and not a matter of utility.

Senator FERGUSON. Signed?

Captain LAYTON. I have another paragraph.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain LAYTON (reading):

I think your remarks concerning the slate are very [12920] apt and pertinent.

The word "slate" means the slate for language officers in case of war.

I would, however, ask you to look at this other aspect of the situation. If the officers concerned are to continue to be of use to the Navy in their specialty they must be given a reasonable opportunity for promotion. Certain of the promotion laws are matters of law and are not within the province of the Bureau of Navigation or of any Selection Board to modify.

I don't believe reading this letter any further will have any influence on the Pearl Harbor investigation, Senator. It is a long talk about why the officers have to go to sea and cannot remain at their posts.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is of interest to the committee.

Captain LAYTON [reading]:

A case in point—I am advised by the Bureau of Navigation that Birtley—

Commander Birtley was then the officer in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit and who was relieved as officer in charge by Commander Rochefort later on. I was trying to get him kept on in view of his experience. [Reading further:]

A case in point—I am advised by the Bureau of [12921] Navigation that Birtley is barely over the line in sea duty in rank for the promotion to the grade of Commander, and they were not quite sure of their computation. In other words, it is desirable from the Bureau's viewpoint and from the point of view of law for Birtley to get to sea for about a year so that there will be no question as to his qualifications for promotion.

Fullinwider, of course, has no sea duty in rank and as he must have two years sea duty in rank before his next grade he cannot afford to stay ashore much more than about another year and we are leaving him there for just that.

I had asked for Fullinwider. He had been there for 2 years. Birtley had been there for 2 years. I wanted Commander Rochefort to come there as the most experienced and talented officer in the line. I felt that the Pacific Fleet needed the best talent on the spot.

Senator FERGUSON. You conveyed that to McCollum?

Captain LAYTON. In a personal letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. He is telling you why you can't have these valuable men?

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

This whole subject is tied up with matters of the progress of the work as a whole. I appreciate that the local view frequently looms very big but in assigning personnel [12922] to stations and providing for shifts in personnel I must consider future requirements as well as present needs.

In this connection, we ran on a present need basis for several years with the result that our talent all of a sudden disappeared from certain important billets and I have had a great deal of difficulty in getting all of our stations on a functioning basis again. All of them are just now functioning with some degree of satisfaction and continuity and in order to provide for this desirable continuity, I might even say essential continuity, a definite plan for shifting personnel is essential.

I appreciate that the two boys in Honolulu are doing exceptionally good work and for that reason I would like to see them stay there, but for their own good and more important for the good of the specialized service as a whole, some shift is going to have to be made and Honolulu is the place that a general study of the situation indicates to be the logical place to make the change.

I hope to have the new silhouettes in the mail within the next two weeks. I am ashamed that they have not been sent out before now but I have been forced to accept a reduction in priority of this work as the powers that be have considered other work more urgent. The instruction models I will have to check up on for you although I had [12923] understood that they were already being sent out.

I hope that you will keep in touch with me from time to time as I value your comments very highly.

With best regards,

MAC.

Over the signature of A. H. McCollum.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, have you any other letters or memoranda?

Captain LAYTON. No other pertaining to Pearl Harbor, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that would indicate, that letter, that you were told at that time that you would not be getting diplomatic matter except that which the Department here wanted you to know for action?

Captain LAYTON. That affected action on the part of the fleet; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you believe up until the time of the attack that you were getting all diplomatic intercepted messages that would in any way relate to the action of the fleet?

Captain LAYTON. I thought that the Department had sent us everything they had and when I learned a couple of years later that we had been short-changed I was outraged and astonished.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we have in evidence three intercepts of so-called diplomatic messages, the one of the [12924] intrigue in Thailand and the two in relation to the codes. Do you know of any others? One is on the 1st of December and the other two are on the 3d of December. Do you know of any other for action? Those show on their face that they were the so-called magic or purple, or at least intercepts. You didn't know them by the name of magic. Are those the only three messages that showed on their face that they were intercepted Japanese messages?

Captain LAYTON. Those are the only ones I recall at present. I am sure there weren't many others, if there was even one.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't understand.

Captain LAYTON. Those are the only ones I recall at present, although the setting up on the winds code may be included in that same category.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now how can we find out how many other messages there are that on their face indicate that they were intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages?

Captain LAYTON. I have my file here. If the Senator will give me a little time I will go through it.

Senator FERGUSON. I will be glad to give you time. I think that is important.

Captain LAYTON. I have one dated December 1, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your file?

[12925] Captain LAYTON. That is the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, intelligence file, sir. I have kept it since December 1940, when I first reported for duty.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that message?

Captain LAYTON. It is a duplication of the one you just handed me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That I gave you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain LAYTON. It started out "Ambassador in Bangkok."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. I have one here dated November 28, 1941, from Cincaf to Opnav, Cincpac, Com14, and Com16, which I am sure you have in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the winds?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; that is the five times winds and the two times winds.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson has to go to the floor, and in the meantime Mr. Richardson has a question or two.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, are you the author of this map of Pearl Harbor that has been set up on this side of the room?

Captain LAYTON. I am not the artist; no, sir. The [12926] map of Pearl Harbor made from existing records in the office of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, was constructed by the direction of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to show this committee if they wished where the ships were at the time of the attack; also where a couple of them moved during the time of the attack, and to show what has been referred to as Japanese submarine track around Ford Island.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Suppose you take the pointer, Captain, and give us a demonstration on that map of the information it is intended to convey.

Captain LAYTON. This map, with its color for sounding, does not lend itself to being seen, but I will show with this pointer the course laid down on a captured map from the Japanese midget submarine the course he intended to follow. His course has been projected on the map which is a United States naval confidence chart of Pearl Harbor corrected and brought up to date as of December 7, 1941. It is to be remarked when you see me put this submarine on the ground that I am following his track as he laid it down in his chart, which was not a correct chart.

He comes up the channel here to this point; then he starts almost due north.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Does this arrow indicate due north?

[12927] Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Here he arrives in the vicinity of Hickam Field; this is Hickam Field here; this area here is a naval section base at Bishop Point; this point is Bishop Point.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you indicate where the entrance net is?

Captain LAYTON. The entrance net was here, sir.

And the course of this midget submarine as he projected it in his chart places him almost aground on the corner of Bishop Point; he then was going to proceed on this course to this position and then around Ford Island to this position and then to cut across; and notice that he cuts across these ships that were anchored there at the time, across these ships to this position and down here and down here; and he goes then under a position which the *Nevada* has moved to after she was underway during the attack and ground herself; and then he proceeds on out.

Actually I can prove, and any naval officer will believe me, that he was never inside of Pearl Harbor. That was his intended course.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it is your opinion that the chart which has sometimes been interpreted as indicating that he actually entered the harbor and made a circuit of the harbor was not correct, and it was simply a projection of the course?

[12928] Captain LAYTON. It was a projected course and not an accomplished course. And, furthermore, the prisoner in interrogation never said that he went inside of Pearl Harbor.

As a matter of fact, he still had his torpedoes aboard when picked up.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where was he picked up?

Captain LAYTON. At Bellows Field, over at Kaneohe Bay.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Show where the different vessels were. What is this channel to the left?

Captain LAYTON. This is West Loch. It is not used, as a rule, by naval vessels, except ammunition vessels, to unload at the ammunition depot over here.

At the time of the attack the vessel shown here is U. S. S. *California*.

At the time of the attack the vessel shown here is the oiler *Neosho*. She got under way and moved about the harbor. She was full of high-test gasoline and was not touched.

Alongside this mooring is the *Maryland* and *Oklahoma*. I beg pardon. *Oklahoma*.

Alongside of this mooring is the *Tennessee* and *West Virginia*.

Alongside of this mooring was the *Arizona* and the repair [12929] ship *Vista*. The *Vista* got under way and moved over here.

The *Nevada* had been in this position, got under way at the time of the attack and moved down here.

These were destroyers.

This was a hospital ship, *Solace*.

This was a destroyer.

This was the cruiser *Phoenix*.

Later two destroyers.

Tender and destroyers.

Four destroyers.

There were four destroyers.

Here was a cruiser, *Detroit*.

Light cruiser *Raleigh*.

The old training ship *Utah*.

And there was the *Tangier*.

Seaplane tender *Curtiss* was here.

Medusa, a repair ship, was here.

Mine sweeping destroyers were here.

The ships that moved, the principal ships that moved were the vessels from alongside the *Arizona*, which grounded itself.

The *Nevada* moved down here.

The cruiser *Detroit*, these four destroyers, part of these destroyers, the *Phoenix*, these two destroyers, one [12930] destroyer. The *Solace* moved over here. And the *Nevada*, which I mentioned before.

I think that covers the high lights.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where are the oil supplies?

Captain LAYTON. These are the oil supply tanks of Pearl Harbor, and here. There.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where are the beaches where the patrol planes were maintained?

Captain LAYTON. The patrol planes, sir?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Patrol planes.

Captain LAYTON. The patrol planes were operating from this section of Ford Island here.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where is the airport where the carrier planes were?

Captain LAYTON. They were in this field here.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is Ford Island?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Nothing further.

Mr. KEEFE. Captain, I understand your testimony to be that you communicated the available intelligence to Admiral Kimmel and his staff each morning?

Captain LAYTON. To Admiral Kimmel each morning; to other members of his staff on every two or three mornings, sometimes every other day, depending on their availability and the amount of material available for them to see. The [12931] Communication Intelligence summaries that I have referred to were mostly always shown to the Chief of Staff and frequently to the Chief of Plans, War Plans, and the operations officer. These officers all saw the evaluated intelligence summaries that I also wrote up for the entire staff.

[12932] Mr. KEEFE. In your answers to questions before the Hart investigation you stated in substance facts which I assume is what you mean to tell us today:

Q. How often did you communicate the intelligence available, concerning the Japanese naval forces, to Admiral Kimmel?

A. Daily, at about eight-fifteen in the morning. If subsequent thereto an important dispatch was received, generally from Cavite, or if important developments took place and reported from local communications intelligence unit, I would take it to Admiral Kimmel at the first opportunity he was free.

Q. Did those daily visits to Commander-in-Chief usually bring forth discussions concerning the intelligence?

A. Yes, sir. A discussion concerning the intelligence submitted and as to the Japanese dispositions, intentions, and future operations of the forces concerned, and a general discussion of the situation in general.

That is correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading) :

Q. Was it usual for any other members of the [12933] Staff or any of the Commanders of the Fleet's task forces to be present during those discussions?

A. The Chief of Staff was most always present. On important occasions, the senior War Plans Officer and the senior Operations Officer was called in and a discussion then held. Often during these discussions I was no longer required and was permitted to retire. When Task Force Commanders, who were then operating out two weeks and in one week, approximately, would return to port, the Admiral would send for me and have me review for the benefit of the Task Force Commanders, then in port the situation and developments that had taken place during their absence and a general discussion of Japanese potentialities, capabilities, strength would ensue.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is generally the manner that you operated?

Captain LAYTON. That is a better general picture than I have told orally here because I had a chance to put question marks, punctuation, and periods in that testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. And during these discussions you were in the habit of expressing your own opinion and estimate as to the situation that confronted the commander in chief?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel encouraged officers to [12934] express themselves and I took advantage of that opportunity to express my own opinions on several occasions.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when messages came in which were considered important, there was a general staff discussion as to the meaning and intent of that particular message, was there not?

Captain LAYTON. There were staff discussions almost every day. My participation in the staff discussions was generally of an intelligence nature, such as briefing the staff on the situation as developed and giving them the picture so they would not have to read a lot of material. Then I would be allowed to retire while they discussed specific phases, particularly regarding the war plans.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, did you have a liaison with the Army through the person of Col. Edwin Raley?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He was appointed by the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

Captain LAYTON. I understood that at the time, Mr. Keefe. He came to me in the middle of 1941 and said he wanted to establish a liaison with the fleet.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. I told him that I was delighted and thereafter I saw Colonel Raley from time to time. Shortly [12935] thereafter the B-17's were to be flown to Australia and the Philippines and I furnished him all the information I had available of weather or bases, including some secret information from the Dutch that we had received regarding the air bases in Dutch territory that could be used.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in any event there was complete, direct, friendly and intimate and almost daily liaison with the Army through the officers that had been appointed by the G-2 in the presence of Colonel Raley?

Captain LAYTON. Colonel Raley and I saw one another on an average of maybe twice a week in late October and I am sure at least

three times a week or more often in late November of 1941. Our liaison was so good—I mean by good, I could get together with his liaison officer. His assistant reported to me, to my desk the morning of the attack and remained there for some 18 hours so that liaison would be intimate and correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I want to get this one fact clear, that so far as the relations in matters of intelligence between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor you had an intimate and a direct and a constant relationship.

Captain LAYTON. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you transferred, as I understand it, to the Army through their liaison officer Colonel Raley the im- [12936] portant information that you thought the Army should have?

Captain LAYTON. I had to dress it down from some of its very secret action. I could not tell him the sources and because I was under oath I went a little further than my oath allowed.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

Captain LAYTON. But Admiral Kimmel knew I was doing it. I had his permission to make and give Colonel Raley a little more than you could under the oath that I was under obligation to. I would not tell him how it came about we knew these things, but I would inform him of the general details. He knew of this December 1 message—he did not know it was a message—regarding the plot by the Japanese to force the British to invade Thailand so that the Thais could call the British the aggressor and then call on the Japanese to come and help them out. He knew that.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not have this message which has been introduced in evidence here, or discuss that one, the so-called plotting message, by which the Japs sought to plot Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. Unfortunately, Mr. Keefe, it was not transmitted to the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Mr. KEEFE. And some other things were not communicated [12937] to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.

Captain LAYTON. I think Exhibit 1—

Mr. KEEFE. Which were considered important.

Captain LAYTON. I think Exhibit 1 covers most of those, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you made a statement a few moments ago in response to Senator Ferguson's question, that about 2 years after Pearl Harbor, when you learned that you had been short-changed, you were very much upset and disturbed.

Captain LAYTON. I was outraged, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You said you were outraged?

Captain LAYTON. I still am, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, will you explain that just a little more, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. Perhaps my outrage, being 2 years after Pearl Harbor, is hindsight, but throughout this war I have been the fleet intelligence officer and the combat intelligence officer and directly charged with informing our forces at sea with all pertinent information of the Japanese dispositions or intentions or anything else that had to do with our forces and for their own safety, had I been negligent for 1 minute and not informed our forces of things which should be known, I would have been court-martialed and possibly shot and deserved it. That, of course, was during the war.

[12938] Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, I have before me an affidavit of Col. Edward W. Raley, who at the time of making this affidavit was at Langley Field, Va., and who was allegedly sworn by Henry C. Clausen, and in this affidavit Colonel Raley says this:

On 7 December 1941 and for about one year preceding I was G-2, Hawaiian Air Force. Shortly after assuming these duties, I established for purposes of the Hawaiian Air Force, some form of contact with the Navy, through then Commander Layton, U. S. N.

I close the quote there and I want to inquire: From this affidavit it would appear that Colonel Raley is drawing a distinction between G-2 of the Army and G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force.

Captain LAYTON. There is a distinction, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you understand that that was his capacity when he contacted you?

Captain LAYTON. I knew that he was the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force. When he came to establish his liaison I understood that he was coming as Army liaison, without distinguishing in my mind G-2, Hawaiian Department, or G-2, Hawaiian Air Force. He did, however, say, and I agreed with him, to the effect that this liaison was an ideal one insofar as the Navy and the Air Force were offensive weapons while the Hawaiian Department [12939] was a defense garrison, and, therefore, our liaison should be good and intimate, and we thereafter carried on that liaison.

Mr. KEEFE. I am quoting again from his affidavit:

I told Commander Layton that my contact was for the Hawaiian Air Force. During this period of about one year I had not more than six conversations with Commander Layton concerning the subject of my contact. These conversations were spread out during this period. As nearly as I can recall the last conversation I had with Commander Layton before 7 December 1941 was about October 1941.

The information given me by Commander Layton was my only Navy source. He stated that if there was any Navy movement by Japan coming to his knowledge, and which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would inform me. The only specific information he gave me in this regard were studies he made of a possible Japanese Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet installations in the Mandates. I believe this was at least two months before 7 December 1941.

Any information I received from Commander Layton I promptly gave to my Commanding General, General Martin.

On 1 October 1941 I conferred with Commander Lay- [12940] ton and Colonel Bicknell, who was the Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, concerning a conclusion I had reached that hostilities with Japan was possible within a short time or any moment. They apparently shared my view. I reported this to General Martin. Attached are portions of a letter, written by me to my daughter on 2 October 1941, concerning this conference.

Now I want to get this straightened out because the colonel's affidavit is here in the record for what it is worth; I have had no chance, or no one on the committee has had any chance to examine Col. Edward Raley, but I would like to get the exact liaison that existed between you and the Army out there at Hawaii and if I am to read his affidavit correctly, he states that he was merely representing the Hawaiian Air Force and that he reported to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Air Force, General Martin.

Now, to a layman this is difficult to understand. It perhaps explains some of the reasons why Pearl Harbor occurred.

Now, I understand your story to be that there was complete friendly relations and almost daily liaison with the Army officer.

He says he did not have over six conversations in a year and the last one was in October 1941, before Pearl Harbor. Now, that raises a question of fact. If I am to consider Colonel Raley's affidavit at all, I have got to [12941] appraise it in connection with the testimony that you have given to the committee. Do you understand the purpose of my questions?

Captain LAYTON. Mr. Keefe, my testimony that I gave you here is the facts and I am sure in my heart that if Col. Edward Raley—I think I called him Edwin before—were to testify here he would say exactly what I have said or words to that effect. Now, I would like to point out one thing. His affidavit was made—

Mr. KEEFE. I will give you the date. It was made the 11th of March 1945.

Captain LAYTON. Perhaps his memory has slipped him on that but he referred to a Japanese attack on Malay, didn't he?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. And may I point out that Ambassador Subokimo's dispatch received by CINCPAC on December 1 was the thing that I testified to as having told him and which he in turn refers to as having been told him here.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. That would indicate that I saw him some time after November 30, wouldn't it?

Mr. KEEFE. It would indicate that you saw him after October at least, Captain.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[12942] Mr. KEEFE. Well, I want to say to you and I am glad to say so for the purposes of the record—

Captain LAYTON. I would like to continue if I may, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, yes. Pardon me.

Captain LAYTON. I am sure that Colonel Raley in making this affidavit had a bad memory or his recollection was not too good. He has always been a personal friend of mine and I know that if he were to stand here I could recollect things to him.

For example, as I recall the Army-Navy game was played on Saturday, the 29th of November 1941. He invited myself and my assistant, Commander Hudson, to join him at the Officers' Club at Hickam Field the evening before that game. We had a little conversation and I took him outside the club, out onto the veranda away from ears, to tell him what was the latest developments at that time in my office and again impressed him with what I considered the seriousness of the situation. I am sure that Colonel Raley will remember that and I believe that his attitude at that time was one of not considering the importance of this matter as you have brought it up, or of the recollection of the matters that I have brought up.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I do not want to be prejudging anyone, but the testimony that you have given here so far as I am [12943] concerned has a ring of complete sincerity and truth in it and it has impressed me just exactly that way. But, of course, this committee has got to try to understand this testimony and reconcile the differences that exist as best we can. That is what I am trying to do.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It is going to be a difficult job as we go along and see these differences that crop out in this testimony.

Now, in your testimony before Admiral Hart you stated:

I want to say this: I had all the information of intelligence sources, and I had spent all of my time trying to evaluate these jig-saw puzzle pieces to make the true picture of events to come, and I think I was as surprised as anyone when the Japanese attacked the following morning.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir. However, I was not given a lot of pieces of this jig-saw puzzle. All the pieces I had made a pretty good picture and when you work as I have in Intelligence I can say it is nothing more than piecing up pieces that do not belong to a jigsaw and pieces that do belong to jigsaw until you form a framework. Then you try to complete the framework of a puzzle until you get [12944] enough to show you what your complete picture is. Unfortunately, there were other sets of jigsaw puzzles that went with this one that were not given us, so all I could do was use what I had and I was surprised.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, Captain, am I correct in saying this, that to me your testimony means that you had a pretty good mosaic or a jigsaw worked out and put together from what information was available to you and that information indicated that there was going to be war but that it would take place in its initial phases, at least, way off to the southwest, is that right?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir, backed additionally by the past experience of the previous Japanese task force movement to French Indochina, which took place and which was backed up by diplomatic intercept dispatches to us to inform us as to the nature of these ultimatums as to what the Japanese were going to do, which they did.

Here again we have the same build-up, we have a possibility, we get everything that Washington gives us with that and so our jigsaw puzzle as we make it looked pretty good at that time. As a matter of fact, it looked good in Washington.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, you had in that jigsaw puzzle this war warning message of the 27th—

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

[12945] Mr. KEEFE (continuing). Did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Let me ask you this: Not having ever been an intelligence officer and not too intelligent in any respect connected with this whole business, I would like to have you tell me this because you are one witness that we have had here who talks plainly and frankly and you know what you are talking about, you know your business:

Is it possible in interpreting the actions of men in the armed services charged with responsibility to judge their conduct by any one particular message such as this war warning message of the 27th of November, or must you judge that message in connection with all the other intelligence and all the other information that is available to the commander in the field?

Captain LAYTON. It has been my experience, limited as it may be, that certain commanders write certain messages in certain ways. I believe that certain commanders under them know what their commander means by the way he writes his message. I do not think—other than that, I do not believe I can comment.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I might say to you that a very high-ranking officer in the intelligence field and who has not yet been a witness here

but whose affidavit appears in this [12946] so-called Clausen file, I have had a chance to talk with at some length and the conclusion that I have gotten from that man was that you cannot pick out of intelligence any one single message and say that is the message which determines the responsibility of a commander in the field.

Take a man situated exactly as Kimmel was or as Short was: Kimmel gets this so-called war warning message and the implications have been that that ought to be sufficient to warn anybody to go out and do certain things, execute a suitable defensive deployment of his ships when he also has an order before him, war plan 46, which required him to attack, spearhead an attack into the Marshalls.

Now, the point is, can I, as one attempting to evaluate this picture look at that one war warning message of the twenty-seventh and disregard all the other information and all of the other wires and all the other orders that might affect his decision as to what to do? That is what I am struggling with in my mind, trying to get it straightened out.

Captain LAYTON. Any commander who took only one message and based his course of action on one message would most likely be relieved of his command because his guess most likely would be wrong.

I have a file here and here of probably 50 messages from Chinese sources and diplomatic sources. I mean consuls [12947] and assistant naval attachés, Chiang Kai-shek's representative, and so forth, saying that the Japanese are positively going to invade Russia next week. I did not take any of this to be factual until something else backs it up. You have to have all these things and intelligence must be backed up by something else. That is what makes the jig-saw puzzle.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Having all these messages and finally here is a message comes through which I believe in your statement before the Hart committee, before Admiral Hart, you said was the first message of its kind you had ever seen?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. A war warning message?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It would be striking, it would be called to the attention of anybody, wouldn't it?

Captain LAYTON. It would, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, that message must have been discussed out there, and I believe the evidence here shows that it was discussed in the staff meetings of Admiral Kimmel.

Captain LAYTON. There was a staff meeting that afternoon and evening, yes. I was drafting a paraphrase for delivery to General Short. As a matter of fact, I had a draft—I had to draft three paraphrases before I found one that carried the picture right without destroying it.

[12948] When I took it to Admiral Kimmel's cabin there were discussions going on at the time. There were about half a dozen of our higher echelon staff in there. At that time the chief of staff of the Fourteenth Naval District brought General Short's message from the War Department over there and gave it to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, you found difficulty, as far as the staff was concerned, in determining what to do, all discussing the message that

came from Marshall to Short and here is a message from their Chief of Naval Operations to Kimmel.

Now, we are sitting here on this committee judging by hindsight what men should have done. They were faced out there with the situation as it was on the 7th of December and I am trying to put myself in that position.

Now, there were a lot of distinguished men on that staff, were there not?

Captain LAYTON. I thought so, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Very able men?

Captain LAYTON. I am sure of that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you participate in any of those discussions with respect to this war warning message?

Captain LAYTON. No, I did not, sir. I was busy making this paraphrase and thereafter I was told to get it to General Short. I was not in on the discussions of the war warning [12949] message.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in any event, Captain Layton, so far as you were concerned, with available to you all of the information that had come out there to Admiral Kimmel—you knew of all of it, didn't you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were the one that supplied him with the information?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were utterly and completely surprised at this attack the moment that it came?

Captain LAYTON. I was, sir, very.

Mr. KEEFE. But I understand your testimony to be that had you had the information that Washington had, which they did not send out there, then a situation might well have arisen in your mind?

Captain LAYTON. That is hindsight, sir, but I feel confident that had we had all that material, particularly those main intercepts from the consul and from Foreign Minister Togo to the consul telling him to make reports even when there wasn't anything to report, I think there would have been an entirely different situation there, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you people out there knew that the Japs were destroying their codes and orders went out from [12950] Washington here to go to our outlying possessions for them to destroy their codes; you knew that, didn't you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That simply confirmed the fact that war was going to start; isn't that true?

Captain LAYTON. It did to me, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But so far as the information which you had of the places where the war was going to start it led you all to believe that it was going to start out in the Far East; is that right?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is why everybody was surprised when it started with an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you made the statement that you did a little while ago, if I understand you correctly, you felt outraged and still feel outraged because of the fact that you were not supplied with the information which you now feel had you had it at that time would

have given you people out there an entirely different picture of the situation?

Captain LAYTON. I feel very confident of that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the funny part of it is, Captain, from all the witnesses that have been here before this committee in the higher echelons in Washington, everyone of them [12951] were surprised, from the Commander in Chief on down apparently, that there was any attack on Pearl Harbor. Nobody expected an attack on Pearl Harbor apparently, those in Washington here who had all this information. You have read the testimony, I assume, or heard it?

Captain LAYTON. I have heard a good part of it, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. You got that impression, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. There are only two witnesses who differ in that respect and I think I am right in that, I have been trying to follow this thing carefully. One is Admiral Turner and the other is Captain Zacharias; they were the only two witnesses, and Zacharias' testimony was in the form of a sort of prophecy. Admiral Turner seemed to be the only one that had any idea that there might be any possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Now, was there anybody out there that you knew out at Pearl Harbor that had any idea that there was a likelihood of an attack at that point?

Captain LAYTON. I feel very positive that there was no one there that was not as surprised as I was. I feel confident also that had anyone predicted this attack coming that something would have been done.

[12952] Mr. KEEFE. Well, Captain, you say that in view of the fact that this book that has been referred to here several times by some Jap, that some Jap wrote predicting the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor—you were all familiar with that, were you not?

Captain LAYTON. I translated it, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You translated it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That had all been presented to Kimmel and his staff and evaluated, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. That was a book dealing with the movements or possible actions of the Japanese Fleet after the outbreak of war. It did not predict a surprise attack before war and it was one of many of their courses of action.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

Captain LAYTON. I do not mean to say for a minute that the Japanese did not have the Pearl Harbor raid as a potentiality, but it was not by itself, in my own mental estimate, made as a capability, capability being differentiated in the military sense as something that they can and will do under the proper circumstances. The Japanese proved that it was a capability.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in your testimony before Admiral Hart you made this comment, Captain:

[12953] I have one matter which I think should be properly included in the record. Admiral Kimmel, as I mentioned before, always consulted with his Task Force Commanders, District Commandant, on the war warning for instance, and had with them, many times in my hearing, a complete, free, and frank dis-

cussion of the situation, and asked and received their opinions regarding it. I frequently took messages of secret, ultra-secret, and confidential nature to these Commanders on their Flagships on specific occasions as there was on Saturday morning, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from CinC Asiatic Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliaries units in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh bay by CinCAF forces. I took that to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the *California*, and there again a complete and free discussion took place as to what all this meant, not only this message but others they had seen and discussed. That was the only place that I recall as having said positively that the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I considered, very significant and that the only problem remaining was whether or not they would leave us on their flank as a menace or take us out on the way down.

That meant the Philippines and Guam, did it not?

[12954] Captain LAYTON. That is right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message to the files, Admiral Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated their conversations in abbreviated form. On other occasions, other Admirals expressed apprehension as to the status of the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious regarding the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that Japan could by-pass our Philippine flank.

Now, is that a fair statement of the situation, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. That is a very fair statement of the situation as I saw it then and as I see it now.

Mr. KEEFE. You further said:

It was my personal opinion that the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that time was very far from most people's minds.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you made that statement before Admiral Hart in the face of the fact that you were the fleet intelligence officer?

Captain LAYTON. That is right, sir.

[12955] Mr. KEEFE. And had all of the available information that came to Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And were the individual who discussed it with the commander in chief, Admiral Kimmel, and with the commanders of his task forces?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Who were Admiral Halsey and Admiral Newton, I believe.

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Brown and Admiral Halsey and Admiral Pye were the three task force commanders.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, yes.

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Newton was a subordinate of Admiral Brown, I believe.

Mr. KEEFE. I think perhaps that is right. My recollection is that Admiral Newton was in command of this task force in which the carrier—

Captain LAYTON. That is correct. On the movement just before December 7 Admiral Newton was put in command of that task unit or group because part of the force went to Johnston Island for landing-force exercises, so the reference to that as a task force as I have there would be a misnomer.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you further made this statement. I would like to have this in the record and have you confirm it [12956] to this committee and in this record. This question was asked you:

Q. Do you recall your own reaction to the phrase concerning war warning in the Department's dispatch of 27 November?

A. As it was the first dispatch that I had ever seen saying "This is a war warning", I took particular note of it. I thought it over considerably. Meanwhile, its subconscious impression was that it certainly fitted the picture up to date, and that we would be at war shortly if Japan would decide to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward, hoping, meanwhile, to mollify us through a compromise deal with Kurusu-Nomura negotiations. It made me feel that the picture we had was a good picture, and perhaps complete, and that the times were very critical and perhaps the Department hoped for a last minute compromise in view of their statement that nothing should be done to aggravate an already serious situation. I saw the Army that evening take their condition of readiness, trucks moving, troops moving, and I thought I saw weapons moving in the street and I presumed that they were going into full condition of readiness, including the emplacement of anti-aircraft and other mobile weapons around Pearl Harbor and other im- [12957] portant points on Oahu.

Is that a fair statement?

Captain LAYTON. That is a correct statement except one typographical error or else you may have misread it there where it was leaving the Philippines on the flank. I think it would be more properly not leaving the Philippines on the flank. In other words, as it was stated there, as I understood it, if it was leaving them on their flank they wouldn't bother us and go in there but I was apprehensive that if there was they would not leave us on our flank and proceed southward from the Philippines in their southward movement, and that they would attack the Philippines along with the Malay barrier.

Mr. KEEFE. You think that the word "not" should be in there?

Captain LAYTON. I think so. It would make better sense.

Mr. KEEFE. I had better read it again as it does make sense to me:

Meanwhile, its subconscious impression was that it certainly fitted the picture up to date, and that we would be at war shortly if Japan would decide to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward, hoping meanwhile to mollify us through a compromise deal via Kurusu-Nomura negotiations.

You think it should read, "If Japan would decide not [12958] to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward"?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. "Hoping meanwhile to mollify us through a compromise deal via Kurusu-Nomura negotiations."

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; that would read better.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the way that that ought to be corrected?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is quite important.

Captain, where are you stationed now?

Captain LAYTON. I am still attached to the staff of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. Upon the conclusion of this testimony and return to the west coast I hope to be detached for new duty.

Mr. KEEFE. Detached what?

Captain LAYTON. For a reassignment, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

Captain LAYTON. I have been on one job too long, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, that is another thing, Captain, that bothers me. I don't know whether other members of the committee have

been bothered or not but I want to ask you because I value your opinion.

There seems to be an attitude that a man who is attached to Intelligence, which is to me a highly specialized field of [12959] activity, does not have very much to look forward to in the line of promotion; that in order to meet the attitudes of the examining boards he must leave the field of intelligence and go to sea and get sea duty and all that sort of thing and thus we have the situation where you are writing to McCollum here at Washington asking him to leave out at Honolulu two men who are experts in their field and whom you wanted there for the purpose of building up and maintaining the highest state of efficiency in intelligence and the answer comes back that, "Well, sorry, but they have got other plans. They have got to go to sea in order to meet the tests of sea duty," and all that sort of thing.

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, is that a situation that persists in the Navy?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the law.

Mr. KEEFE. What?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the law.

Captain LAYTON. The law is that you must go to sea and you must perform your duties in an outstanding and highly able manner because, you see, there is selection to promotion.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. If you do not have a record that shows what you have been doing and have commanded ships at sea and [12960] have been a sailor you cannot be promoted to higher grade. That is the law. McCollum was only trying to protect his officers because if he had left Birtley, for example, over at Pearl Harbor he wouldn't show the sea service on his record. When he came up for selection he would be passed over and he would not get his promotion.

Mr. KEEFE. All right, Captain, I will betray my ignorance some but I want to know about it. You say it is the law, that is a congressional act. Do you understand it to be a law of Congress?

Captain LAYTON. Maybe I overstepped—

Mr. KEEFE. Or a rule or regulation of the Navy?

Captain LAYTON. I think that is, you might say, a law by doctrine. I can say only that I am not prepared to give testimony of that sort.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, this committee is bound to make some recommendations to the Congress and if that is the law I would like to know about it. If it is a law passed by the Congress governing the Army and Navy, that is one thing, but if it is a rule and regulation and practice and tradition of the service, that is another thing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you yield there?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

[12961] The VICE CHAIRMAN. My recollection is Admiral Stark testified here that it is a law passed by Congress.

Captain LAYTON. He is in a much better position to know than I, sir. I have been doing nothing but intelligence work for a long time and I haven't paid any attention to the regulations other than that pertain to intelligence and I must confess my ignorance on that subject.

Mr. KEEFE. On the other side of the picture we are confronted with a situation where you take a man off a ship who is an outstanding line officer and drag him into Washington to head up the Naval Intelligence Service 1 month before Pearl Harbor.

Captain LAYTON. It is true that—

Mr. KEEFE. A man that never had any previous experience in the field of intelligence. That is the other side of the picture.

Captain LAYTON. I believe it is true, sir, that intelligence as a line of endeavor with the Navy has not been in the past thoroughly appreciated. I believe as a result of this war, however, there is a very high appreciation among many of the high-ranking officers and certainly those who were at sea in commanding task forces would value that intelligence during this war, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

[12962] Mr. KEEFE. Well, the reason for my asking those questions is in line with some that have been asked heretofore, that it is quite difficult for me to understand, when we spent the money that has been spent by the United States Government in training people as Japanese language experts—you have been trained as a Japanese language expert; is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. I trained as Japanese-language expert and was also assistant naval attaché.

Mr. KEEFE. So you would be competent in the field of intelligence, isn't that true, in the Pacific area?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, the evidence here is that they had such limited numbers of people in the Navy to do this sort of work, and yet it is the most outstanding type of work and most necessary work, perhaps, that has to be done, and I came to the impression that the men would sort of shy away from it because when their name comes up for selection they know when they are in intelligence they get passed up.

I don't know whether this committee will do anything about it or not, but it may desire to make some recommendation to the Congress, or to the Navy with reference to that.

That is why I asked these questions, because I have been impressed with the fact that there is a lot of work that could [12963] have been better coordinated in this field of intelligence prior to Pearl Harbor.

That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, let me ask you a question or two, if I may, please, sir.

You were the fleet intelligence officer at Pearl Harbor on the 1st of December 1941?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And had been or a year or more?

Captain LAYTON. I reported on December 7, 1940, 1 year to a day before the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And as I understood you to say, you were not present at the staff meetings that were held about the war-warning message.

Captain LAYTON. I was not an active member. I walked into the admiral's cabin during the process of these meetings to show him the paraphrase of the war-warning message that I had drawn up to deliver to General Short and to receive his approval of this paraphrase.

I was in there while the chief of staff of the Fourteenth Naval District brought in General Short's warning message that he received from the War Department, and I remained there while there was a discussion among other staff members of this.

[12964] I was not directly asked to and I did not venture an opinion.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not give any opinion?

Captain LAYTON. At that time, I did not feel it was proper, sir.

I do not think I could have added anything to the opinions already being given, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you did not attend and participate?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir, I did not attend and participate. I was an intruder.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not participate in the staff meeting with respect to the war-warning message?

Captain LAYTON. That is right, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what messages were in Washington that you did not have at Pearl Harbor that would have caused you to anticipate the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I did not want to give the impression that by afterthought and hindsight I could look at a book of these messages and pick out some and show them to you, and state what they would have meant to me. Offhand, I think the bomb plot would have been important. I am sure the messages that were passed in the latter part of November from Kita, the consul in Honolulu, to Tokyo, plus the [12965] request from Togo to Kita for information on our fleet moving in and out, plus a message I have seen about, I believe, balloon barrages were not being used, I think were all important.

I have not gone over Exhibit 1, sir. I have not read it in detail. I merely have heard these things here in this room and have been impressed. I did read some of the messages that are now in Exhibit 1, 2 years after Pearl Harbor, when I first learned that they had them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the list of messages listed in Admiral Kimmel's statement to this committee?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; I read that statement, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You read his statement?

Captain LAYTON. I have read his statement; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Before he presented it here?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; I read the statement about, oh, about a month ago, I think, sir, and again 3 or 4 days ago.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Now, of those messages listed by him as being important, that he should have had in Hawaii, do you agree with him in his conclusion in that respect?

Captain LAYTON. I agree with the statements that he made there regarding these messages, yes, sir. I think it [12966] would have assisted considerably. I think probably, as I recall it, the one from Berlin outlining the conversations that had been held with Ribbentrop and Hitler, and the one from Rome in which the Japanese Ambassador outlined his conversation with Mussolini, they clearly indicated that the Axis were talking to one another regarding a war with the Anglo-Saxons, which was then very imminent.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Would any of those messages listed by Admiral Kimmel indicate an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I do not believe any of them would have indicated definitely an attack on Pearl Harbor, unless you take them all

together, and discover that Pearl Harbor is the only geographical location in all the magic intercepts wherein there was increasing interest along toward the latter part of November, keeping in mind the information we had from intercepts of their traffic, which indicated also a naval interest.

It is another one of these things. I cannot say now that I would have been able to say, "Admiral they are going to take Pearl Harbor." I did not mean to give that impression.

I mean to say it was a sort of jigsaw puzzle, that, when fitted together, fell into a common pattern.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is a fact, Captain, that none of [12967] the messages mentioned by Admiral Kimmel in his statement, except the so-called bomb-plot message refers to Pearl Harbor. Is that true?

Captain LAYTON. I would have to review the statement very carefully to make a definite answer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You do not recall now?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall now, but I thought there were a couple that referred to the movement of ships in and out, or the anchorage of ships, that referred to area C, and area A, Malama Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is my recollection of all the list of messages mentioned by Admiral Kimmel in his statement, none of them referred to Pearl Harbor, except the so-called bomb-plot message.

Mr. GEARHART. Will the gentleman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. There were five or six messages that had to do with the ships' movements to which the witness just referred. There was one message dividing Pearl Harbor into five areas.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the so-called bomb-plot message.

Mr. GEARHART. And other messages calling for reports on ship movements, and calling upon Honolulu for reports [12968] even when there were no ship-movement messages.

Captain LAYTON. Those are the ones I referred to, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The so-called bomb-plot message is the one dividing Pearl Harbor into five areas. You are familiar with that?

Captain LAYTON. I recall having seen that here; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. My recollection is that is the only one that directly refers to Pearl Harbor, and I believe you substantially agree with me in that respect.

Captain LAYTON. Except those that refer to the movements in and out of Pearl Harbor; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Captain you say you kept the Army officials in Pearl Harbor completely advised as to all the intelligence you had?

Captain LAYTON. I do not believe I said that, Senator. I said that I kept Colonel Raley of the Hawaiian Air Force, who established Army liaison with me rather fully informed as to the general situation and as to some of the details of the Japanese task force, its movements, and its implications. I did not for a minute intend to say that I had contacts with General Fielder, then Colonel Fielder. I stated in my affidavit to Colonel Clausen that inasmuch as [12969] Colonel Raley was an Army liaison, I saw no reason to establish a liaison with

Fielder, and if Fielder for 1 minute was not satisfied with what he was getting from Washington—and I did not know that he was getting anything, or nothing—then, he could certainly establish liaison with me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was your opposite number in the Army in Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. May I take a minute to explain what the intelligence functions were? I think I can rather straighten out a little doubt in the minds of the committee.

When I joined there, we were afloat. It had been the habitual practice and doctrine in the Navy that when the fleet desires liaison with shore-based authorities, whether they be public or private services, or the Army or the FBI, we made this liaison through the naval district intelligence officer in the place where we were.

My liaison through the Army official was, therefore, through Captain Mayfield, the district intelligence officer at Honolulu who was attached to Admiral Bloch's organization.

There were meetings between the Army and FBI and himself every week or more. I attended one of them shortly after I reported, just to let them know I was there, and to say [12970] that I was willing to cooperate in all matters. But for anyone to imply that I had to search out and find an opposite number, or that the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department should be dependent upon me for sources of information, is rather unusual, for the simple reason the Army and Navy in Washington have close agreement, and have worked in close liaison for years in intelligence, that the Navy passed it down and disclosed it to the Army and the Army disclosed it to the Navy, and in case there was an occasion in which we wanted to consult one another in the field, we consulted then with each other in the field.

Now, it is doctrine in the Army that if you do not know, and the same applies to the Navy, that if you do not know what you have, or that you want more than you already have, then you go and ask somebody else for it.

Had Colonel Fielder come to me and said, "I want some information," I could give him the same amount in a paraphrased form without revealing the source, had I had Admiral Kimmel's permission. He did not do so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you did not give it to him?

Captain LAYTON. Well, he not being there I could not very well give it to him, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Was Colonel Fielder your opposite number in the Army?

[12971] Captain LAYTON. I would not say he was my opposite number in the Army, because the fleet might move from Pearl Harbor, say to San Francisco, for example, and then my opposite over there would be another person.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; I just want to try to get to the point and not take up too much time.

You were the intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was the intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Department of the Army?

Captain LAYTON. Colonel Field, then Colonel Fielder.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was he your opposite number?

Captain LAYTON. He was the opposite number of the commandant Fourteenth Naval District intelligence organization.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you have an opposite number in the Army?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Captain LAYTON. I did not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There was not anybody in the Army that you were supposed to cooperate with, so far as intelligence is concerned?

Captain LAYTON. I would not want to use the word "cooperate," sir. I would cooperate with him any minute. It [12972] is a question of delineation of the line of command and authority.

Suppose the Army had set up on Oahu an amphibious force to go to sea and land on some island in accordance with the war plan, then the G-2 of that organization would be my opposite number, and not the G-2 of a local defense garrison.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you did not have any opposite number in the Army?

Captain LAYTON. I did not have any opposite number in the Army in the strict sense of the word, no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you were in the same position as Captain Rochefort when he testified here, that he did not give the information he had to the Army officials, but he sometimes gave it to them in paraphrased form, or changed, sanitized form, I believe he said.

Is that the practice you used?

Captain LAYTON. I gave it to Colonel Raley in the so-called sanitized form. He never knew the source of information, and he was requested not to ask and promised never to ask.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You gave it sanitized form, as did Captain Rochefort?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[12973] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Captain, you of course saw the message of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; and Admiral Kimmel ordered me to take that to General Short in person, which I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You, of course, were entirely familiar with that message?

Captain LAYTON. I was, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did not that give you sufficient knowledge about strained relations between the United States and Japan?

Captain LAYTON. It did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you also saw the war warning message of November 27?

Captain LAYTON. I did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have testified that that was different in form from any message that you had ever seen.

Captain LAYTON. The words "This is a war warning" were a shock to me, to see it written down. I never saw anything like it before, and I was impressed by it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were impressed by it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You considered it to be just what it said, a war warning?

[12974] Captain LAYTON. It was just exactly that, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you did not consider that an unusual expression, "This is a war warning"?

Captain LAYTON. I thought that was very unusual. I never saw anything like it before.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It impressed you as such?

Captain LAYTON. Very much so, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There was not anything following in that message that nullified that impression in your mind, was there?

Captain LAYTON. I would not say there was anything in that message that nullified that impression. It certainly gave me the idea that the Department in Washington had the same concept of the situation that we had, insofar as they said Japan was going to make an amphibious invasion in the future on the same places that we thought, the Philippines.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Guam?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; Guam was not mentioned in the war warning message, sir. The Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, possibly N. E. I. or possibly Borneo, I believe it was remarked at the time that Guam was left out of the second one, while it was mentioned in the first one. One person facetiously remarked, "I guess they thought Guam was going to fall, anyway, so it would not be worth while to put it in."

[12975] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Philippines were in the message of the 24th?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you hear Admiral Hart's testimony here today?

Captain LAYTON. I did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He thought that meant all the addressees should be watching and on guard, and that the Philippines and Guam should take special note.

Captain LAYTON. I heard the distinguished Admiral's testimony; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Did you agree with the interpretation that he placed on it?

Captain LAYTON. Well, I was not able to agree wholly; judging today from hindsight, I would say "Yes."

At that time I was concerned, as I said, with the picture before me, with what they said, and it was so definitely related to the Far East and it was so easy to put in there, if they had any suspicion of Hawaii, "Hawaii," that the thought of Hawaii did not then occur to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Well, you don't know of anybody in Washington or in Hawaii that actually expected the attack on Pearl Harbor [12976] that Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, did you?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; and if I did, I would certainly shake his hand, because he would be a good guesser.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You do not know anybody either in Washington or Hawaii that expected that attack?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Will the gentleman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Even the man who wrote it never expected war to come in Hawaii, so he could not convey to you a different impression than he had himself. Would you expect him to?

Captain LAYTON. It is standard naval procedure that when you tell a man something, you tell him what you are thinking and try to project that thought into his mind.

Mr. GEARHART. Then the correct interpretation of such a message is interpreting what he had intended to convey?

Captain LAYTON. Reading the words he put there and trying, without any great mental gymnastics, to put your mind in the same frame his mind was in when he wrote it; had he wanted to put Hawaii in he would have put Hawaii in, I am sure, if he was thinking of it.

Mr. GEARHART. That is correct. And since that time we have had the man on the stand who wrote the message, and [12977] he said that he was surprised that war came to Hawaii, and therefore he could not attempt to convey to you the impression that he was not taken greatly by surprise.

Does not that sound logical?

Captain LAYTON. That sounds logical to me, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire, Captain.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, one or two questions with respect to the so-called bomb-plot message. You said hindsight leads you to believe that the Japs were talking about Pearl Harbor when they sent that message from the standpoint of an attack.

Can you read into that message any other thing that they were talking about, leaving hindsight out?

Captain LAYTON. Leaving hindsight out, you can always look into a message and find something that is different from your first impression.

It is typical of the Japanese that they desire to keep meticulous records on everybody, whether he is a friend or an enemy.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, leaving hindsight out of the picture, an individual who was working in the intelligence department, either in Washington or Hawaii, in view of the many messages that they had had of a similar nature, [12978] that you just discussed, could very well have easily reached the conclusion that you just have stated?

Captain LAYTON. Anyone reading that message at the time they did, which I believe was sometime around September, was it not, sir?

Senator LUCAS. I think September 24.

Captain LAYTON (continuing). Around September, at that time, could have made the very logical mistake of seeing it only as a Japanese flair for listing information, and particularly on the United States Pacific Fleet, since we were based there, since April 1940, they wanted to know how many ships were there, when they went in and when they went out.

I think the word "bomb-plot" message has been applied here.

[12979] Senator LUCAS. That is correct, it has.

Captain LAYTON. I do not intend to insinuate for one minute that had I had it I would have known what their intention was. I only say had we had that, and some other information, there would at least have grown in our minds a suspicion that something was stirring, that was growing right under our feet.

Senator LUCAS. You are correct in saying the term "bomb-plot" has been applied in this hearing. I think General Mitchell is the one who first used the term.

The situation you have described was especially true, and it became more true as time went on. In other words, from September 23 to December 7 is some two months and a half. Every day that passed after that bomb-plot message the so-called bomb-plot message, without any action on the part of the Japanese might indicate more definitely that they were asking for ship movements and other things that they were used to asking for without thinking about an attack. I mean the longer they put it off the more the chances for Intelligence, as you have suggested. Am I correct in that?

Captain LAYTON. I believe what you said to be correct; yes, sir. I do not think I am capable of commenting on it.

Senator LUCAS. Now, Captain, with respect to magic, you [12980] could translate out there, as I understand it, PA-K2.

Captain LAYTON. That is out of my field, sir. I had nothing to do with Commander Rochefort's unit, in its mechanics.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. Captain Rochefort testified before the committee that they could translate that code.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; I heard his testimony, sir.

Senator LUCAS. They could translate messages that were sent in the code known as PA-K2. Now, in Exhibit 2, on page 22, is a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated December 3, 1941, which, as I understand, went out in that code, and which I understand Commander Rochefort could have decoded and translated if he had made an arrangement with the cable office, but did not do that. Can you tell the committee why no arrangement was made with the cable office there in Hawaii so that they would have been able to intercept this message?

Captain LAYTON. I believe Captain Rochefort testified, and from my point of view, as far as I know the side lights of it, it is correct, that his directive from the Chief of Naval Operations, under which he directly worked, was the interception of Japanese naval radio traffic; that he was told to work on certain Japanese naval codes and ciphers; [12981] that he was directed to pass other material to Washington. Now, if Washington were not receiving these intercepts, then it would be up to Washington to tell Rochefort to make these arrangements, or it would be up to Washington to make them themselves.

As I understand it, these were cabled. Now you can sit in here and you can intercept a Japanese radio transmission and not violate the laws of the United States.

Maybe I am wrong, but that is the way I understand it, but you sit down and tap that cable and you get a \$10,000 fine and 10 years in jail.

Senator LUCAS. Is it not a fact that the Navy were tapping the communication lines or the telephone lines of the Japs for 22 straight months there?

Captain LAYTON. I did not know the district Intelligence officer was tapping the lines. I did not know until I read it here in the committee. I did not want to know, incidentally.

Senator LUCAS. How is that?

Captain LAYTON. I did not want to know. Had I known it it would have been my responsibility to have reported it to Admiral Kimmel, and then he would have had the responsibility of directing that either this be approved by the authorities in Washington or be discontinued. It was against [12982] the law, and that is a Federal statute.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. It is a very strange thing to me that the district Intelligence officer could tap the Japanese telephone lines for 22 straight months and then on December 2, because of some information he received about the FBI doing the same thing, right at that particular time, the Navy, at the height of the crisis, stopped the work of tapping these confidential communications.

Captain LAYTON. I cannot account for Captain Mayfield's action, but had it been I, I might have pulled the tap for fear the FBI would pull it out for me, and give me a \$10,000 fine, or 10 years in jail.

They were not caught until the 2d or 3d of December, and then they pulled the tap.

Senator LUCAS. It is very strange to me that the FBI could violate the law.

Captain LAYTON. They may have had clearance from some high authority. I do not know, sir. I cannot comment on that matter.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, do you know Captain Bicknell?

Captain LAYTON. Colonel Bicknell, you mean?

Senator LUCAS. Colonel Bicknell.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; I met him in Pearl Harbor. I think I met him down in Captain Mayfield's office at one [12983] of their weekly meetings.

Senator LUCAS. Are you familiar with the Mori message, so-called?

Captain LAYTON. My only connection with the Mori message—and I only learned of it here about a year ago—is on the evening of December 6, Captain Mayfield called me in and asked me if I was going to the office the next day.

I told him I expected to. He asked me if I would stop down in his office on the way down. I lived to the east of Honolulu. I asked him if there was anything I could do, and he said:

No, there is nothing you can do here because I haven't got the material, and I won't have it until tomorrow morning, but I would like to have you stop in here because I have something that I want your opinion on.

That is the last I ever heard of the so-called Mori message.

Senator LUCAS. What night was that?

Captain LAYTON. The night of December 6, 1941. As you know, the next morning the attack came. Then I next heard about it, as I recall, at the naval court of inquiry, when they asked me about it. I did not know what it was until they quizzed me about it, and then I thought that must be the circumstance.

Senator LUCAS. What happened that you did not see him [12984] on the night of the 6th?

Captain LAYTON. He told me he did not have the material and would not have it until the next morning, and did not therefore desire that I come down there until the next morning.

Senator LUCAS. Why would he call you if he did not have the material?

Captain LAYTON. He merely wanted to ascertain that I would be coming down the next day. He was informed apparently of the existence of this.

Senator LUCAS. Bicknell, in affidavit before Colonel Clausen, said he called General Fielder on the telephone and he said he had a very important message, and he had to deliver it to him.

Captain LAYTON. That illustrates my point awhile ago regarding the opposite numbers in liaison.

Mine was through Captain Mayfield. He called me in the evening about 6 o'clock and said, as I said before, he wanted to know if I was going to the office the following day, and I said I was, and he asked would I stop by, and I said I would.

I asked could I come down now, was there anything I could do. He said "no," that he did not have the material at that time, and would not have it until the next morning, but would I please stop by tomorrow morning because he had [12985] something he wanted my opinion on.

Senator LUCAS. And you learned after that that this was the Mori message?

Captain LAYTON. I did not learn until the next year that it was actually the Mori message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What message was it that he was talking about?

Captain LAYTON. He did not say. He just said he had something that he wanted to talk to me about.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you found out later, what was the message?

Captain LAYTON. I believe the judge advocate before the naval court of inquiry asked me, when I was called, if I knew something about the Mori message, and I said, "No, I never heard of it."

Mr. RICHARDSON. What message?

Captain LAYTON. M-o-r-i, the Mori message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What message was Mayfield calling you about?

Captain LAYTON. That was the same thing. It was only when I talked to the judge advocate and denied knowing anything about it, and he said, "Mayfield called you the night before?"

I said, "Yes," and he said, "Well, that was the Mori [12986] message that you heard on the radiotelephone," or something to that effect.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, one of the things that has puzzled me throughout the hearing is the fact that the Navy did not know that General Short was alerted only to sabotage.

Will you throw, or can you throw, any light on it.

Captain LAYTON. I did not know that either, sir.

I saw these troops move, I saw the trucks moving, I thought I saw weapons, and my first instinct was that they were in an alert the same as we were.

I did not ask my friend, Colonel Raley, either, what kind of an alert they were in.

I knew an alert had gone out, and I presumed it was the highest state of alert.

Senator LUCAS. Why did you make that assumption?

Captain LAYTON. The words, "This is a war warning" were pretty well impressed on my mind. When I got home that evening I was still thinking about it, and it impressed me very much.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, when you saw the troops moving—

Captain LAYTON. That was on my way home, sir.

Senator LUCAS (continuing). You did not realize it was a sabotage alert. You thought they were alerted because [12987] of the war warning message that came in on the 27th?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir. I delivered the messages that evening, and I was a little late with the message to General Short. When I went home I saw the trucks and troops, and I saw the weapons moving, and I came to the conclusion, a natural one, too, that they were on the alert.

Senator LUCAS. Can you give this committee any basic reason as to why the Navy and the Army should not have closer liaison upon such an important problem as that?

Captain LAYTON. I do not believe I am qualified to state as to why.

Senator LUCAS. Probably you are not. For instance, Admiral Smith, who was the chief of staff on Admiral Kimmel's force, testified that he did not know that Short's army was on the alert for sabotage. He thought, as you have testified, that they were on a full alert, because he saw them on that same day moving troops here and there.

Now, there is something that seems to be radically wrong.

After all these war warning messages came in, one after another, it seems to me radically wrong that the Navy would not know what the Army was doing, in view of the fact it was the Army's duty to defend the fleet in Pearl Harbor. [12988] I am not censuring you at all, sir, but nobody in the Navy has testified here, not even Kimmel himself, that he absolutely knew that the Army was not on a full alert.

Captain LAYTON. I can only offer this, Senator, and this is another Army and Navy custom of long standing.

If you pry into what another man is doing, he naturally resents it. He thinks he is capable of doing his own job.

Senator LUCAS. I can appreciate that.

Captain LAYTON. I think that is the only reason that someone did not go to the Army and ask what kind of alert they were on, and it is just the reason that the Army did not come to the Navy and ask what kind of alert we had on the ships in Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. I can appreciate that. This fleet was the most precious possession that we had in the Pacific, and under that joint agreement it was the duty of the Army to defend that fleet when it was in Pearl Harbor from a landing attack or an air raid. To me, it is inexcusable, unbelievable, that Short and Kimmel would not have a definite understanding with respect to what the other one was doing.

I have never been able to understand why Kimmel and all his chiefs of staff and other subordinates would not have known that Short was on a sabotage alert, alert No. 1, [12989] in view of the crisis pending.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 5 o'clock, so we will suspend until 8 o'clock this evening.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 8 p. m. of the same day.)

[12990]

EVENING SESSION—8 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have something at this point?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I have two certifications both from the War Department.

The first one is a memorandum furnishing to me at my request the number of patrol planes delivered by the United States between February 1 and December 7, 1941, under lend-lease. Also a memorandum under date of February 14 furnishing to me at my request the lend-lease figures on antiaircraft guns delivered under lend-lease from February 1 to December 7.

I would like to have these memoranda extended on the record in the usual and regular way.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Senator GEORGE. Delivered to whom, Mr. Richardson?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, about this—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Senator GEORGE. Delievered to whom?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the exhibit names and identifies the various countries who got the planes and who got the guns.

Senator GEORGE. Oh, it is a general statement then?

Mr. RICHARD. It is a general statement indicating that, for instance—

Senator FERGUSON. What was the total?

[12991] Mr. RICHARDSON. Between February 1 and December 1 in round figures there were 1,900 planes that went abroad, of which about 1,750 went to the British. Then of guns, interestingly enough, there were about 1,900 antiaircraft guns under lend-lease, of which some 1,500 went to the British.

Mr. MURPHY. That is from the 1st of the year 1941 to what date?

Mr. RICHARDSON. From the 1st of February to the 1st of December 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received as requested by counsel. (The documents referred to follow:)

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

4 D757

THE PENTAGON, 12 February 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Reference is made to your memorandum of 31 January 1946 asking for the number of patrol planes and antiaircraft guns delivered by the United States between 1 February and 7 December 1941 to countries subsequently allied with the United States.

Inclosed herewith is a table, based on information supplied by the Army Air Forces Office of Statistical Control, showing the number of bombers usable as patrol planes which were delivered at the factory to foreign countries (a) between 1 February and 30 November 1941 and (b) in December 1941. Information concerning such deliveries for the period 1 to 7 December 1941 is not

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presently available in the War Department and search of field records will be necessary if that information is desired.

A search of War Department records relating to deliveries of antiaircraft guns to foreign countries is still in process; when that search is completed, any pertinent information obtained will be promptly forwarded.

(Signed) **HARMON DUNCOMBE,**
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

U. S. Factory Deliveries of Bombers to Foreign Countries, 1 February to 30 November and 1-31 December 1941

[12993] Type	Description	Recipient	Number	
			1 Feb-30 Nov 41	1-31 Dec. 41
B-17.....	AAF Heavy Bomber 4-eng...	British Empire.....	20	
B-24.....	AAF Heavy Bomber 4-eng...	British Empire.....	93	3
B-25.....	AAF Medium Bomber 2-eng...	Latin America.....	3	3
B-25.....		British Empire.....		14
B-25.....		U. S. S. R.....	5	
PBY.....	Navy Patrol Bomber 2-eng...	British Empire.....	129	25
PBY.....		Netherlands.....	36	
A-20.....	AAF Light Bomber 2-eng...	British Empire.....	455	
A-20.....		Netherlands.....	29	
A-20.....		U. S. S. R.....	79	2
A-28/29.....	AAF Light Bomber 2-eng...	British Empire.....	800	49
A-28/29.....		China.....		17
A-30.....	AAF Light Bomber 2-eng...	British Empire.....	78	58
167.....	AAF Light Bomber 2-eng...	British Empire.....	90	
A-27.....	AAF Light Bomber 1-eng...	Latin America.....	10	
V-12.....	AAF Light Bomber 1-eng...	China.....	1	
8A.....	Navy Light Bomber 1-eng...	Norway.....	2	
SB2U.....	Navy Light Bomber 1-eng...	British Empire.....	50	
N3PB.....	Navy Light Bomber 1-eng...	Norway.....	24	
	Total.....		1,904	171

[12994]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 14 February 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Your memorandum of 31 January 1946 asked for the number of patrol planes and anti-aircraft guns delivered by the United States between 1 February and 7 December 1941 to countries subsequently allied with the United States. On 12 February this office forwarded information from the War Department files showing factory deliveries to foreign countries between 1 February and 31 December 1941 of bombers usable as patrol planes.

In further response to your request, there is transmitted herewith a memorandum signed by the Director of the International Division, Army Service Forces, on transfers of antiaircraft weapons prior to 7 December 1941. This office has been advised by the International Division that the transfers listed in the memorandum were made after 11 March 1941, the effective date of the Lend-Lease act, and were all a part of lend-lease except for the transfer to the Netherlands East Indies, which was pursuant to a commercial contract.

(Signed) **HARMON DUNCOMBE,**
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

[12995]

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
Washington, 25, D. C., Feb. 11 1946.

SPLIX 400.318

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, W. D. G. S.

Attention: Major John C. Catlin

Subject: Anti-aircraft Weapons Transferred to Lend-Lease Countries Prior to December 1941.

1. Reference is made to telephone request of Major John C. Catlin of your office for information regarding anti-aircraft weapons transferred to Lend-Lease countries prior to 7 December 1941.

2. The records of this office indicate that the following anti-aircraft weapons were transferred to the countries noted.

United Kingdom:

	Quantity
Machine Gun, 50 Cal. w/c A. A.-----	1520
Gun, 3", AA, Mobile-----	18
Russia:	
Gun, 90 mm, AA, Mobile-----	4
China:	
Machine Gun, 50 Cal. w/c A. A.-----	285
[12996] Netherlands East Indies:	
Gun, 3", A. A. Mobile-----	80

(Procured by Netherlands East Indies on their own contract.)

For the Commanding General:

D. G. SHINGLER,
Brigadier General, G. S. C.,
Director, International Division.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. If we are going into part of lend-lease questions in this record and in view of references made by counsel, I ask that a copy of the Lend-Lease Act be inserted in the record and the date of its passage and a statement as to the organization which was set up by this Government for the purpose of determining what distribution should be made under lend-lease and what officials were responsible for such distribution.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The text of the Lend-Lease Act follows:)¹

[12996-A]

[PUBLIC LAW 11—77TH CONGRESS]

[CHAPTER 11—1ST SESSION]

[H. R. 1776]

AN ACT Further to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States".

SEC. 2. As used in this Act—

(a) The term "defense article" means—

(1) Any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, or boat;

(2) Any machinery, facility, tool, material, or supply necessary for the manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, or operation of any article described in this subsection;

(3) Any component material or part of or equipment for any article described in this subsection;

(4) Any agricultural, industrial or other commodity or article for defense.

Such term "defense article" includes any article described in this subsection: Manufactured or procured pursuant to section 3, or to which the United States or any foreign government has or hereafter acquires title, possession, or control.

(b) The term "defense information" means any plan, specification, design, prototype, or information pertaining to any defense article.

SEC. 3. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—

(1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

(2) To sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5305 et seq. for a letter on the operations of lend-lease.

of, to any such government any defense article, but no defense article not manufactured or procured under paragraph (1) shall in any way be disposed of under this paragraph, except after consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, or both. The value of defense articles disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph, and procured from funds heretofore appropriated, shall not exceed \$1,300,000,000. The value of such defense articles [12996] shall be determined by the head of the department or agency concerned or such other department, agency or officer as shall be designated in the manner provided in the rules and regulations issued hereunder. Defense articles procured from funds hereafter appropriated to any department or agency of the Government, other than from funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act, shall not be disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph except to the extent hereafter authorized by the Congress in the Acts appropriating such funds or otherwise.

(3) To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise to place in good working order, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for any such government, or to procure any or all such services by private contract.

(4) To communicate to any such government any defense information, pertaining to any defense article furnished to such government under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(5) To release for export any defense article disposed of in any way under this subsection to any such government.

(b) The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.

(c) After June 30, 1943, or after the passage of concurrent resolution by the two Houses before June 30, 1943, which declares that the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) are no longer necessary to promote the defense of the United States, neither the President nor the head of any department or agency shall exercise any of the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a); except that until July 1, 1946, any of such powers may be exercised to the extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement with such a foreign government made before July 1, 1943, or before the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever is the earlier.

(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of convoying vessels by naval vessels of the United States.

(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of the entry of any American vessel into a combat area in violation of section 3 of the Neutrality Act of 1939.

SEC. 4. All contracts or agreements made for the disposition of any defense article or defense information pursuant to section 2 shall contain a clause by which the foreign government undertakes that it will not, without the consent of the President, transfer title to or possession of such defense article or defense information by gift, sale, or otherwise, or permit its use by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of such foreign government.

SEC. 5. (a) The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government involved shall, when any such defense article or defense information is exported, immediately inform the department or agency designated [12996-C] by the President to administer section 6 of the Act of July 2, 1940 (54 Stat. 714), of the quantities, character, value, terms of disposition, and destination of the article and information so exported.

(b) The President from time to time, but not less frequently than once every ninety days, shall transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this Act except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest to disclose. Reports provided for under this subsection shall be transmitted to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, if the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, is not in session.

SEC. 6. (a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this Act.

(b) All money and all property which is converted into money received under section 3 from any government shall, with the approval of the Director of the Budget, revert to the respective appropriation or appropriations out of which funds were expended with respect to the defense article or defense information for which such consideration is received, and shall be available for expenditure for the purpose for which such expended funds were appropriated by law, during the fiscal year in which such funds are received and the ensuing fiscal year; but in no event shall any funds so received be available for expenditure after June 30, 1946.

SEC. 7. The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the head of the department or agency shall in all contracts or agreements for the disposition of any defense article or defense information fully protect the rights of all citizens of the United States who have patent rights in and to any such article or information which is hereby authorized to be disposed of and the payments collected for royalties on such patents shall be paid to the owners and holders of such patents.

SEC. 8. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy are hereby authorized to purchase or otherwise acquire arms, ammunition, and implements of war produced within the jurisdiction of any country to which section 3 is applicable, whenever the President deems such purchase or acquisition to be necessary in the interests of the defense of the United States.

SEC. 9. The President may, from time to time, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act; and he may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act through such department, agency, or officer as he shall direct.

SEC. 10. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to change existing law relating to the use of the land and naval forces of the United States, except insofar as such use relates to the manufacture, procurement, and repair of defense articles, the communication of information and other noncombatant purposes enumerated in this Act.

SEC. 11. If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any circumstance shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and the applicability of such provision to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Approved, March 11, 1941.

[12997] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart, do you have something?

MR. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, the question that I wanted to ask was precisely the one that was propounded by the Senator from Michigan.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Does counsel have anything else?

MR. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, do you have any statement you desire to make before your examination is resumed?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we have on this record, Mr. Richardson, the amount of planes that went to Hawaii and the Philippines during this same period and the amount of antiaircraft guns? Could you get that?

MR. RICHARDSON. We will inquire and see if we have it and if we have not, I will endeavor to get the figures for you.

Senator FERGUSON. They should be in also.

MR. MURPHY. I am sorry, Senator, I did not hear what you said.

Senator FERGUSON. I wondered whether the record showed the amount of planes that had been furnished to Hawaii and the Philippines, respectively, and the number of antiaircraft guns during the same period.

[12998] MR. MURPHY. And are the dates also given in the breakdown, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that we may get those later.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

**TESTIMONY OF CAPT. EDWIN T. LAYTON, UNITED STATES
NAVY (Resumed)**

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Layton, you indicated that you had written to Captain McCollum a letter here in Washington. Was that sent through the mail or special pouch?

Captain LAYTON. As I recall it, I wrote the letter in pen myself with no copies and had it sealed, gave it to the flag secretary of the commander in chief, who in turn gave it to an officer courier passing through and going by air to the United States and to Washington, for hand-to-hand delivery to Captain McCollum.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you get your answer back which you have read into the record in the same way?

Captain LAYTON. It came back via the locked box on the Clipper, which has previously been described here as a secure means of delivery of highly important and highly secret material.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you lost the two important men in July—is that when you lost them?

[12999] Captain LAYTON. We only lost one, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What happened to the other one?

Captain LAYTON. He was the one who was allowed to remain all during the year.

Senator FERGUSON. And when did he leave the Intelligence Service?

Captain LAYTON. He did not leave the Intelligence Service. He was transferred after about 2 more years, possibly 3, to Washington where he continued his highly specialized duties and did not leave his duties entirely until after VJ-day.

Senator FERGUSON. How long have you been a captain?

Captain LAYTON. About 2 years, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not a captain, then, at the time that you were—

Captain LAYTON. I was a lieutenant commander on the outbreak of war on the senior part of the numbers.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to the question that I asked before, you were looking up in your book the amount of purple, or as we call it, of magic here and did you find anything in there?

Captain LAYTON. None other than the winds set-up message that I mentioned previously in testimony before this committee.

[13000] Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did the Philippines send you any of their magic that they translated?

Captain LAYTON. The one I referred to specifically was from Com. 16, which was in the Philippines, setting up the five winds and the two winds hidden word codes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that purple, do you know, or J-19?

Captain LAYTON. I will check to see what it says. It didn't say which system, sir. It merely said:

Following Tokyo to net. Intercept translation received from Singapore X.

Senator FERGUSON. I imagine it came to you in English, did it not?

Captain LAYTON. Oh, yes, sir. It came to us in or by this special intelligence high security channel for transmitting this so-called magic purple messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, after getting Captain McCollum's letter did you believe up until after the attack that you had received all diplomatic messages in some form or another that they figured that you should have in Hawaii for action?

Captain LAYTON. I thought so until some 2 years later when I found to the contrary. I also so stated on examination before the Roberts Commission that I did not believe that Washington was holding out on us.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know that there was a dead line set on the 25th of November?

[13001] Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And shifted then to the 29th?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a message delivered on the 26th of November to Japan and a reply to it on the 6th and morning of the 7th of December?

Captain LAYTON. I knew nothing concerning our notes to Japan nor Japan's answers. I may have seen in the paper that we had delivered a note but I do not recall distinctly recalling that it was in the papers or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know whether or not after the 26th any Hawaii papers carried evidence that we were still negotiating back and forth from Japan to Washington?

Captain LAYTON. Senator, I do not recall what the papers said at that time, although I might refresh my memory. I have made it a policy, however, not to use newspaper stories in evaluating intelligence unless they back up other known material or other material that was of some real value because a newspaper story can be slanted if they wish. For instance, what was coming out from Tokyo in those days under Domei I would not pay any attention to at all.

Senator FERGUSON. It appears that that wind code was J-19.

Captain LAYTON. Well, it did not say it in the message. [13002] It merely said, "Following Tokyo net intercept."

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all that you got from the Philippines?

Captain LAYTON. That is all that I recall at the present time; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would go to Exhibit 2. Some of your answers indicated that you were talking about some other messages in Exhibit 2 and I want to go over them with you, if we might.

Page 12 was the one that you have talked about. That is the 24th of September 1941 where they lay it out in areas. Do you have that exhibit before you?

Captain LAYTON. I have it before me; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you say that standing alone that would not be as clear, as I understood it, as with other evidence. Now, take the one from Tokyo, from Toyoda. Do you know who he was?

Captain LAYTON. Toyoda?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. Offhand, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he Foreign Minister?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; Togo was the Foreign Minister at that time, T-o-g-o.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[13003] Captain LAYTON. Toyoda would have been a department chief within the ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, on the next one, on the 29th of September 1941, from Honolulu to Washington, giving certain information in relation to Honolulu. Do you see that message?

Captain LAYTON. What page is that, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. That is on page 13. They say—

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir, I have it.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island. FV.

Alongside in Ford Island. FG.

Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier)—KT.

And then some other items, indicating that they were giving messages in relation to the ships in dock; was that not true?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[13004] Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next one from Tokyo (Tojo) to Honolulu, the 15th of November, says:

As relations between Japan and United States are most critical, make your ships in harbor report irregular but at the rate of twice a week, although you are already no doubt aware please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

Would that have been a significant message, that they wanted the ships in harbor report twice a week at Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we go to the next page, on November 18. If these were regular messages, why would they take the extra care?

They say: "Please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

Captain LAYTON. Senator, the Japanese love secrecy even among themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. And so that, in itself, would not have meant anything?

Captain LAYTON. That, plus the the fact that we had caught one of their agents snooping around and had him arrested. He being a Japanese naval officer, and at the insistence of the Secretary of State, he was released and deported.

The fact that he had been caught before would tend to make these people more suspicious and therefore they would [13005] want to take more secrecy.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you catch the Jap naval officer?

Captain LAYTON. The FBI caught him, sir, but he sent an agent of his out to Honolulu to obtain highly secret and confidential information on the United States Pacific Fleet, to come back to the west coast and report to him. Fortunately this agent that he approached had once been in the Navy and maintained loyalty, and having taken his story to the FBI and having been more or less told to await details, when he called on him again here he was told there was nothing much to do.

He then approached our Naval Intelligence agency in Los Angeles, and told his story.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Captain LAYTON. That was in mid-1941, as I recall, sir. It may have been late spring.

Senator FERGUSON. What finally happened to this Jap naval officer?

Captain LAYTON. Well, after we secured evidence, we waited for him and saw to it that he got it through our own agents. We saw to it that he got to the west coast, and saw to it the FBI could pick him up, and after that followed him to Washington where he had been in audience with the Japanese [13006] naval attaché here in Washington.

After this was over, we got permission of the Secretary of State to arrest him, and then in the interest of amity or other reasons, the prosecution was dropped, and he was deported as an undesirable alien. That was Lieutenant Tachibana.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, go to page 14.

Here is Honolulu again sending a message to Tokyo, and they are using the set-up that was provided for on page 12.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And they also give harbor locations.

Look under 3. There is care taken there to show how they come in and how long it takes them from the entrance of the harbor through area B to the buoys in area C—

to which they were moored, they changed course five times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered area A after passing the water reservoir on the eastern side.

Relayed to (bank).

Captain LAYTON. I read it, sir.

[13007] Senator FERGUSON. Is that a significant message?

Captain LAYTON. Senator, I would like to divorce hindsight from foresight on these. But were I reading these on December 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, I am sure they would have struck a responsive chord in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we have three on the next page, and they are all from Tokyo to Honolulu, seeking evidence.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor.

What bay is that? That is not Manila Bay?

Captain LAYTON. I think that is Manila Bay. That is near Honolulu Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing):

and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

That would be translated on the 5th, which would be on Friday the first week of December. The next one is from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu again.

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet (blank) bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

Now there has been some testimony here that where the blank line is there was something about air base, fleet air bases, which would make it even more significant, would [13008] it not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the next one from Tokyo to Honolulu, November 29, 1941:

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

We got that on a Friday.

Captain LAYTON. I think this caps them all by adding considerable significance to their individual messages taken collectively. A report when there are no movements is sometimes more significant than to have reports when there are movements.

Senator FERGUSON. Now there is some evidence in the entire record that the one on page 22 was translated in the rough by 2 o'clock, 1 or 2 o'clock, Saturday, here in the Navy. Would that one be significant?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now were any of these messages decoded and sent to you, or the substance of them sent to you?

Captain LAYTON. None of them were decoded and sent to me or the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, I should say, prior to December 7, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have specific evidence, or [13009] any evidence that there was going to be an attack in the vicinity of the Kra Peninsula on Sunday?

Captain LAYTON. I would like to answer that in two parts, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, I wish you would.

Captain LAYTON. There was a considerable amount of evidence from reports from various agents, I mean proper agents, consular officials, military observers, and so forth, who predicted an attack on the Kra Peninsula.

The Sunday angle of it can be taken only from an observation of the movement, of those Japanese movements that were actually sighted in the South China Sea, and the time and distance factors lend themselves toward Sunday being a rather critical day.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the radio traffic give it to you?

Captain LAYTON. Not specifically as to the Kra Peninsula, but the radio traffic certainly showed the movement was to the south, south of French Indochina, south of Formosa, south of Hainan, and plus the one purple message we received on the Japanese intrigue in Thailand, which certainly pointed toward either the Thailand border or Malaya.

It was also shown that the Thai airfield at Singora [13010] on the very southern tip of Thailand and only a few miles from the border, being a good beach area, presented an ideal point for amphibious landings. This point was shown to Admiral Kimmel in the morning conference I had with him on the morning of December 6, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you were asked as to whether or not the Navy in Hawaii knew that the Army, whose duty it was to protect the base, or the fleet while in the base, knew that the Army was only alerted to sabotage. Did you know that the Navy here in Washington did not know what the Army was alerted to in the Hawaiian Islands, even though General Short had sent back a message on the 28th of November that he was alerted to sabotage, and there was no other mention of any other alert?

Captain LAYTON. I did not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. The Navy did not know what ships were in the harbor, or what alert the Army was on; did you know that?

Captain LAYTON. I did not know that the naval officials here in Washington were unaware that the Army forces in Hawaii were on

a sabotage alert. I was not aware that the naval officials in Washington did not know what ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor, either.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was it the custom of Pearl Harbor [13011] to report their ships in the harbor?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The location of ships?

Captain LAYTON. It was not customary, as I recall it, for them to report the ships in the harbor, but reports of all movements of all groups or units was reported to Washington. The sailing, for instance, of Admiral Halsey's Task Force, of Admiral Brown's Task Force, of Admiral Newton's Task Unit, I felt confident were a matter of dispatch to Washington, and I think the records will bear me out.

Senator FERGUSON. Now take the two messages on pages 40 and 41 of exhibit 37. As I understand it, these messages were sent about 5 minutes apart. Those on the 3d of December, 31850 and 31855, which would be 5 minutes apart.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you gave some evidence this morning, as I recall, that you thought one related to the other, or they were the same message.

Captain LAYTON. When they were received and read it was my interpretation that these two messages originated by two different people in Washington were based on the same information, insofar as they carried basically the same data.

[13012] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, the first one names Washington. It says:

urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once.

That would indicate that they were to keep certain ciphers and certain codes, would it not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

and to burn all other important and confidential secret documents.

Now, the next one on the next page was sent 5 minutes later. It is:

Ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy machine. Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo. December 2nd Washington also directed destroy all but one copy of other systems and all secret documents. British Admiralty London today reports Embassy London has complied.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did those two messages mean war with the United States, as far as your evaluation was concerned?

Captain LAYTON. They added to my concern at the time I first read the message saying this was a war warning, but it did not necessarily mean war.

[13013] Let us examine this line of thought which I had at the time, and have previously testified to here. It was a matter of conjecture as to whether the Japanese would leave the Philippines on their flank and proceed further south.

If they were to try to go down into the south China Sea and to further their aggressive acts without treading on Uncle Sam's toes,

and if they thought they could get away with it, then it would not mean war, necessarily; but in case we were to take counteraction such as seizing their embassies, or their consulates, we would seize at that time their code machines, cryptographic material, and their secret documents.

So for the self-preservation, which everyone is born with, they decided to destroy certain or almost all of thees documents which meant considerable to them.

It can be read another way, by saying that they had made a determination that the war warning was emphasized by these but this neither proves nor disproves. They merely add more background and emphasis.

This matter of destroying codes and the purple machine, which I have mentioned previously was very briefly discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and, as I recall it, stress was laid on the fact that the word was "most," meaning most of their codes [19014] and ciphers.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Did you know that the Navy here in Washington had notified the military attaché in Tokyo to destroy his code machine and codes about the 5th?

Captain LAYTON. I believe it was around the 5th that I was aware that the Navy had directed the naval attaché in Tokyo, and also other naval establishments in China, such as at Tientsin to destroy their cryptographic material.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you get that message?

Captain LAYTON. I believe we were an information addressee in the messages sent them, and I know we received their plain language message, one of them which said "Boomerang," which was the code message saying all papers, codes, and ciphers, and so forth, to have destroyed.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what the policy of this Government was in case there was an attack only by Japan on the British?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; I was not on that level of high policy.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean that you did not know because you were not on that level? How could you evaluate the evidence, or the intelligence, if you did not know what the policy was?

[19015] Captain LAYTON. That same question I asked myself in December 1941, prior to the attack. I believe I heard it said no less than four or five times, five or six times, "I wish I knew what we were going to do," or words to that effect, by Admiral Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. In case of an attack just on the British?

Captain LAYTON. In case of eventualities in southeast Asia in which the United States was not immediately and directly involved.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did discuss that question with Admiral Kimmel, and it bothered you in evaluating the evidence?

Captain LAYTON. I would not say that Admiral Kimmel had discussed it with me. He had made these remarks in my hearing when the situation was brought to his attention regarding the movements of these ships, their position, their potentialities for attack, and the Japanese propensity for always trying to get something for nothing, if possible, as they had done in French Indochina, and if they were trying to do this again, for instance, in Thailand, hoping we would take no action, and knowing if they got in there and we would not

take any action, that would be another base for another move in the future.

[13016] At that time Admiral Kimmel said, "I wish I knew what we are going to do," or "This is the same thing that was true in relation to the Dutch East Indies." I do not recall if the Dutch East Indies was mentioned specifically by name. Actually it was a general discussion that dealt with the area of the South China Sea and Thailand, I believe was the only specific country mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. You made a statement that you believed, or you may have had a conversation with Colonel Raley concerning the geographic limit beyond which the British and Netherlands would not permit the Japanese to penetrate.

What was that?

Captain LAYTON. That is one of these rumors you hear, Senator. I had heard a rumor to the effect there was some geographic limit drawn, that only the high authorities knew it; that if the Japanese went beyond that limit, action would be taken by either the British or the Dutch or ourselves, perhaps.

There was no specific paper, or conversation by anyone in authority. It was one of those corridor gossip things that you pick up, but I passed it on to Colonel Raley for what it was worth.

[13017] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there were certain documents in Washington, for instance, Exhibit 17 which we have here, indicating that there was a line?

Captain LAYTON. I was not aware of the exact location of a geographic line, nor that there was a line, in fact.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That document was also in Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will ask, did you ever see this document?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. We will get it.

Captain LAYTON. I didn't see every document that came in. Many documents that had to do with war plans alone were handled, by the War Plans Division, which is a very understandable thing; you don't show everybody on the staff high plans and policies of future operations.

Senator FERGUSON. While they are looking for this document, do you know of anything else, Captain, that you can give us here that could help us in the solution of the problem that we have?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As to how this could happen and we not be alerted in Hawaii?

[13018] Captain LAYTON. Well, I formed a pretty good idea of how they did it. If you are interested in hearing how I think they did it and were able to come in undetected throughout I will be glad to give it to you in a couple of minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt but they came in and they were not detected.

Captain LAYTON. There is no doubt about that in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at that instrument?

Mr. GEARHART. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. I would like to hear that if he can tell it in a minute or so.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain LAYTON. I mentioned this radio intelligence as being an inexact science. I also said that if you go under sealed orders, don't use your radio, and take the precaution that you will receive no radios yourself addressed to you, then you can move freely on the high seas, so long as you are not detected by planes, submarines, picket boats or casual merchant vessels. I have formed a definite conclusion that the Japanese realized that a blow on Pearl Harbor was necessary toward their major plan of operation and that they had carefully studied their own radio traffic and had [13019] made an analysis of it and that therefore they made their plans, gave it to the carrier task force commander, and thereafter never addressed him and, of course, he went under radio silence, and therefore he had no implications, no associations, no mention in traffic, he was just as if, what they wanted me to believe he was, in home ports. That can always be done.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you look at that instrument. The bottom of the page.

Captain LAYTON. I see it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see that before?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is Exhibit 17.

Mr. MASTEN. Exhibit 106.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 106. It was originally in Exhibit 17.

Mr. MURPHY. The page, for the record.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the page on that?

Captain LAYTON. This says page 4 here, but this is a very thick volume.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the November 5. Admiral Stark and General Marshall for the President.

Captain LAYTON. I never saw it. I had heard corridor gossip that there was a delineation line.

[13020] Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you, as the chief of intelligence for the fleet at Hawaii, were obliged to be passing corridor gossip about the question that the Senator asked you but Admiral Kimmel did not show you that recommendation of the Army and the Navy given to the President?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel did not see fit to so inform me.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, it would have been of help to you, as an intelligence officer, if you had that, since you found it necessary to indulge in corridor gossip to meet the situation; isn't that correct?

Captain LAYTON. I tried to pass on to my liaison in the Hawaiian Air Force everything that I had that I thought would help him, and if I was passing gossip I told him that it was gossip and he could evaluate it accordingly, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you had to indulge in gossip because the admiral hadn't shown you this particular paper which discussed the idea of the Army and the Navy as to the Japanese at the time; isn't that right?

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you said that you could give us in a few minutes how the blow was brought about. You said that [13021] they could make plans and give those plans to a carrier task force, have the carriers proceed without traffic, and that that can always be done. You knew that before December 7, 1941, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you also knew that the Japanese had 10 carriers, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. You knew that you had only accounted for two, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Not in my sheet of December 2.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, how many had you accounted for? You had accounted for two going south and you thought there were two at the Marshalls; is that not right?

Captain LAYTON. There were a few more than that. I would like to read them.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Take it slowly so that I can follow your testimony before the Roberts Commission.

Captain LAYTON. Aye, sir.

On page 3 of my Location Sheet typed on December 1, corrected and submitted on December 2, I put: Cardiv-4, two carriers and four destroyers; Cardiv-3, two carriers and three destroyers; in the Bako-Takao area.

Mr. MURPHY. You also felt, did you not, that they were [13022] part of the second fleet under the commander in chief of the second fleet?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, go ahead.

Captain LAYTON. In the Marshall area I showed the *Koryu* plus plane guards, being one carrier and four destroyers in the Marshall area.

Mr. MURPHY. How many carriers?

Captain LAYTON. One.

Mr. MURPHY. One in the Marshalls?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. I showed the *Kasuga Maru*, a converted carrier, as being also in the Bako-Takao area.

Mr. MURPHY. How many did you have going south?

Captain LAYTON. I had a total of five going south.

Mr. MURPHY. Five?

Captain LAYTON. Five; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And one in the Marshalls?

Captain LAYTON. One of those five was a converted carrier.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me review your testimony before the Roberts Commission. Before I do that, Captain, you said that the Secretary of State sent this man back to Japan for amity or other reasons. What would be the other reasons?

Captain LAYTON. Well, I wouldn't be in a position to know.

[13023] Mr. MURPHY. I thought there might have been something sinister in your "other reasons."

Captain LAYTON. No. I meant rather than have this Naval Japanese officer up for a trial of espionage in our country and the ensuing

row in the Japanese papers, I believed it was deemed, and I am not speaking first-hand, I am guessing now, better to let him go as an undesirable alien.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, were you familiar with Japanese broadcasts intercepted at Pearl Harbor on December 8, were they called to your attention?

Captain LAYTON. You mean the Japanese broadcasts in plain language, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. The broadcasts in which they told about the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you were familiar with the weather broadcasts put in the middle of that message?

Captain LAYTON. I don't recall that there was a weather broadcast in the middle of that message; there may have been.

[13024] Mr. MURPHY (reading):

In the message here a weather forecast was made as far as I can recollect.

This is the Naval report.

A weather forecast was made, as far as I recollect. No such weather forecast had ever been made before.

His exact words were:

Allow me to especially make a weather forecast at this time. West wind clear. Since these broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy it may be some sort of a code.

Captain LAYTON. We heard that late the night of the 7th. It was reported to us that that west wind clear hidden code winds execute did come through late the night of the 7th, but we were not interested in it then.

Mr. MURPHY. West wind clear would refer to——

Captain LAYTON. England.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you had some discussion with Admiral Kimmel, did you not, between the 1st of December and the 7th of December, about the carriers you could not account for?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. That was on the 2nd of December.

Mr. MURPHY. And you also had discussion with him of the fact that you were unable to account for battleships?

[13025] Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

I believe that was in the middle of November, or possibly a little later.

Mr. MURPHY. You are sure it wasn't about the same time in December?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. Battleships were not brought up as a matter of conversation in the carrier conversation.

Mr. MURPHY. I refer you to your testimony on page 1090 before the Roberts board:

The CHAIRMAN. Commander, you were at conferences with the Commander in Chief, I presume, between November 27 and December 7, respecting the instant situation?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. I was in conferences daily.

In that connection, I would like to ask if there was at any time a conference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short and yourself and some intelligence officer of the Army between those dates?

Captain LAYTON. I previously testified that General Short had a conference with Admiral Kimmel and other naval force commanders—

Mr. MURPHY. Do you understand my question?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there at any time—

Captain LAYTON. An Army Intelligence officer present.

[13026] Mr. MURPHY. At any meeting you ever had with General Short?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir, never.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you also testified that you had liaison with the Air Corps, the Army Air Corps intelligence officer?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you have liaison with the Navy Air Corps intelligence officer?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Why would you have liaison with the Army Air Corps intelligence officer and not the Navy? What is the difference between the two?

Captain LAYTON. None, as I see it, except that Colonel Raley of the Hawaiian Air Force came to me in mid-1941 and said, or I understood him to say that he had been directed to establish liaison, which I was glad to do.

Mr. MURPHY. Isn't it rather singular that the Army Air Corps, who knew what was going on, or at least part of what was going on, and Captain Davis and Admiral Bellinger, neither knew anything about these messages?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Davis was on the staff, sir. He was a subsection officer under Operations.

Mr. MURPHY. He was in charge of Air?

Captain LAYTON. Under the officer who had all of the [13027] intelligence that I had, and all of my evaluated intelligence reports and who was aware of all of the situation.

Mr. MURPHY. Then, if Captain Davis didn't know about it that would be his superior's responsibility?

Captain LAYTON. That would be his superior. His superior had directed me to show the book to his assistant in Operations.

[13028] Mr. MURPHY. Did you show it to Captain Davis?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. He saw several of the books without initialing because he had not been ordered or told to read the books.

Mr. MURPHY. He has testified under oath that he didn't know about these war warning messages and I wondered if you knew whether he had or not.

Captain LAYTON. I couldn't state positively here under oath that I know positively that he did. It would be my assumption that he was present when the war warning message was being discussed in the admiral's cabin.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know whether he was or not?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know positively.

Mr. MURPHY. What do you know about Admiral Bellinger. He was also an air officer. He has testified that he knew nothing about them.

Captain LAYTON. I do not know, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you also testified this afternoon that you felt that the Army was on an all-out alert. Was that your testimony? Captain LAYTON. That was my conception at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. You presumed the Army was on the highest state of alert?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[13029] Mr. MURPHY. Why would you presume that when the fleet wasn't on the highest state of alert, they were only in the third condition.

Captain LAYTON. I didn't know there was a difference in the Army states of alert at that time. I thought they only had one.

Mr. MURPHY. Weren't the Navy ships themselves on the lowest state of alert, with only one-fourth of the antiaircraft guns manned?

Captain LAYTON. They went into the one customarily in while in port.

Mr. MURPHY. They didn't take any special precautions after the war warning than they had for months previous; isn't that true?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that is correct, although I don't know that first hand.

Mr. MURPHY. The Navy was in the normal ordinary routine alert and yet you thought that the Army was in the highest state of alert; the first hand.

Captain LAYTON. I thought the Army had only one state of alert. When I say "highest" I mean that they were on the alert.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you said you did not expect war in Hawaii.

[13030] Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that so?

Captain LAYTON. That is true.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you expect an attack on the fleet?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Kimmel has testified before us that he did expect a submarine attack. Why would you differ with him?

Captain LAYTON. My words were loose. I meant air attack, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you are restricting it to an air attack. If you were to have a submarine attack that would be war in Hawaii, would it not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. We had had submarine contacts off Hawaii many, many times, but you couldn't prove that they were submarines. We suspected that there were Japanese submarines lurking about trying to scout for information. We also had a report from the naval attaché in Tokyo that the crew of one submarine had returned and were bragging about having been in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. You knew that there was a considerable submarine movement moving east?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You know they were sighted at Saipan?

[13031] Captain LAYTON. They weren't sighted.

Mr. MURPHY. I mean the sound—they were detected.

Captain LAYTON. Definitely, passing down to the Marshalls.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain Rochefort did tell you in his daily intelligence summary that there was a submarine movement eastward?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; eastward toward the Marshalls.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the Marshalls are much closer to Hawaii than home waters, are they not?

Captain LAYTON. It would be a logical place to go for refueling and standing by for further exercises or operations.

Mr. MURPHY. How do you account for the fact that if the submarines were going to the Marshalls and you felt there were aircraft carriers at the Marshalls that the Army didn't know anything about it? General Short says that he never heard of it.

Captain LAYTON. I can only say that Washington had all the information that we had. Washington had close liaison with the Army. The Army in Washington knew who they were sending their information to. The Washington authorities had full right to send out their information. And it is my conception and belief, and it is sound, that if they didn't want to send it out to the authorities in [13032] Hawaii, that was a responsibility of the War Department.

Mr. MURPHY. Sir, did you have any responsibility? What were you doing out there?

Captain LAYTON. My responsibility was as laid down by the staff instructions which I read this afternoon. They clearly outline the full scope.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, as the fleet intelligence officer you were to advise the fleet generally as to conditions wherever the fleet was; isn't that right?

Captain LAYTON. I was to see about the fleet.

Mr. MURPHY. And while the fleet was in the harbor the fleet was your responsibility, wasn't it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. That is, my responsibility as far as intelligence went.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right. It was up to you to know everything there was in the way of intelligence to protect that fleet wherever it was?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the fact is, you did expect hostile Japanese action in the first week of December, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You had that information from various sources, Naval Intelligence, reports of naval attachés, naval observers, [13033] the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the intelligence unit at Manila, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. And Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. And the Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, about the middle of November you knew that the normal organization of the Japanese Fleet was disrupted?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You also knew that the commander in chief of the Second Fleet was placed in a position far more important than his normal administrative job?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You also knew and had been informed that that fleet was apparently getting together for an offensive action?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You also had a report as to what ships were seen going south, didn't you?

Captain LAYTON. Some reports; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You had detailed reports to some extent of warships, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[13034] Mr. MURPHY. And there were a number of carriers not accounted for in that report, were there not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, no carriers were reported by citation at any time.

Mr. MURPHY. You also knew that it appeared as if instead of protective operations by the fleet there was to be an operation by task forces or a task force, and the commander in chief of the Second Fleet was to be put in supreme command?

Captain LAYTON. We expected it, and he was.

Mr. MURPHY. You also knew by radio intelligence that you had no contact as to the commander in chief of the Second Fleet in connection with the southward movement?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe that is correct. Would you repeat that?

Mr. MURPHY. I say, did you also know that there was no radio intelligence placing the commander in chief of the Second Fleet in the southward movement?

Captain LAYTON. Oh, yes, there was.

Mr. MURPHY. There was?

Captain LAYTON. Considerable.

Mr. MURPHY. To make you believe he was in charge?

Captain LAYTON. He was commander in chief of the Second Fleet and was taking supreme command of the task forces moving [13035] south?

Mr. MURPHY. Was he in charge of the one coming to Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. The commander in chief of that force was called the commander in chief of the First Air Fleet.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt from radio intelligence that the movement would be south and that it would be amphibious in nature?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you felt that it would be to the Malay Barrier or against Singapore or to the Netherlands Indies or the Philippines, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you agreed entirely with what Washington had said to you in the dispatch they sent to you?

Captain LAYTON. Exactly. I considered their dispatches as dotting the i's and crossing the t's.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you also knew that there had been no positive indications of the location of the Japanese carriers with the exception of Carrier Division 3, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Well, I had positive location of Carrier Division 3. There was no positive location of Carrier [13036] Division 4 or these other units. I put one in the Marshalls and one in the south Formosa area. However, the extra carrier division had been in the past previously associated, even in a light way, with the com-

mander, Second Fleet, and commander, Third Fleet, and on the basis of that I placed that carrier division there.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask you whether or not before the Roberts Commission you gave this testimony:

Commander LAYTON. There had been no positive indications of the location of the Japanese carriers with the exception of Carrier Division 3, which was associated with the southern movement for some time.

The CHAIRMAN. What was Carrier Division 3? Two carriers?

Commander LAYTON. Two carriers, sir; the *Ryuio* and the *Hosho*.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did your command have knowledge of the number of Japanese carriers in their Navy?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How many were there?

Commander LAYTON. Ten, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So you have accounted for two?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the other eight I understand you to [13036A] say there were no definite indications as to their location.

Commander LAYTON. No positive indications of their location.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct. No positive. I have tried to indicate, sir, that when you make a location sheet you have to use some of the very small evidence rather than the preponderance of the evidence to locate your forces because if you wait for all positive evidence you would only put down two or three ships.

Mr. MURPHY. On the information you received from Commander Rochefort, the daily intelligence summaries, there was carried as to the carriers "no information."

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the first time you heard from the commander in chief of the carrier fleet was on December 8?

Captain LAYTON. December 7, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. December 7.

Captain LAYTON. He opened up after the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. You hadn't heard from him for some days and that morning you told Admiral Kimmel that you had heard from him for the first time in some time; isn't that right?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there was also a change in radio calls, was there not, in November?

[13037] Captain LAYTON. November 1; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And there was also a change the first of December?

Captain LAYTON. December 1; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That was extraordinary, wasn't it?

Captain LAYTON. Rather extraordinary. I would like to point out that the Japanese at that time were showing all the symptoms of taking increased radio security. I won't go into the technicalities but they were using multiple addresses and blanket coverage and what we call addressed to nobody from nobody, which everybody copied, and when they do that nobody is being talked to that you can identify, and therefore the forces are pretty hard to identify in traffic.

Mr. MURPHY. You did have a report from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and a report from the American observer in Singapore and the commander in chief of the British Far East Naval Forces that gave you some idea as to the initial distribution of the task force in the south, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. A part of it; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That left the carriers unaccounted for except two?

Captain LAYTON. Not precisely; no. That left a good [13038] part of that force unaccounted for by sighting, but they were definitely headed south. It left my distribution of carriers good in my mind. However, on that location sheet I did not list Cardivs 1 or 2 because they had not shown in traffic, had not been addressed, were in no way in the traffic headings, and had all the usual appearances of being in home ports or possibly standing by for a covering force in connection with the southern movement, remaining in home waters, I thought.

Mr. MURPHY. You say that the answer you made as to the inquiry as to the battleships not being accounted for was prior to November 27?

Captain LAYTON. It is my recollection. I have not read the Roberts report. I never saw a copy of it. It might have been after.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the Roberts Board, on page 1090, you were questioned about the conferences between November 27 and December 7, and it was then that you said in answer to this question:

The CHAIRMAN. Commander, you were at conferences with the Commander in Chief, I presume, between November 27 and December 7, respecting the instant situation?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. I was in conference daily.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you the slightest suspicion of a [13039] possible air attack upon Pearl Harbor?

Commander LAYTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not, when you had the warning and from what you knew about the situation that Japan would strike and probably strike hard and even before war was declared?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. That had all been considered.

The CHAIRMAN. That had all been considered?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, that had all been considered and discussed. The Admiral, in fact, said one day, "Where are the battleships". I said "I don't know. Their location had not been known for more than a week." He said, "Do you think they could be off here or out at sea without our knowing it?" I said, "Yes, if they have maintained radio silence." He said "Do you think they are?" and I said, "No." He said, "Where do you think they are?" and I said, "I estimate they are in port, having completed two weeks operations and they are having overhaul for new operations."

General McNABNEY. Was there some discussion held with reference to the carriers?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, only not so specific. The Admiral knew of the carriers down there, I am sure.

You told us here tonight that they could maintain radio silence. Did you take that into consideration?

[13040] Captain LAYTON. That is always taken into consideration to a degree; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you also take into consideration, since you expected a submarine attack, in the plans you had in effect at Hawaii, that if there was a submarine attack it would in all probability be accompanied by an air attack?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe I recall having grouped those two together in my mind. I know that was one of the feasibilities and capabilities of the enemy as laid down. I knew that was in our standard operating procedure letter. I won't say definitely I had those two coupled in my mind during that time.

As I recall it, and my memory may be bad, that conference regarding the battleships was previously, because on this location sheet dated December 1, 1941, I showed battle division 1 and battle division 2 in the Kure-Sasebo area. Now, they were fairly well indicated as being there and they hadn't been showing the radio silence but had shown it previously. They had no traffic on them and the admiral asked where they were. This was not the only location sheet that I submitted. I also carried BatDiv 3 in this location sheet as in the southern task force and of course only two were there. The other two came to Hawaii. But all the battleship divisions were accounted for, so I think that [13041] perhaps is the conversation prior to the period mentioned there as it being a general question referring to conferences regarding the surprise attack. The conference regarding surprise attack was some time before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you mean you indicated any such date before the Roberts board?

Captain LAYTON. I don't think I did.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the Roberts board did you make this answer: that Carrier Division 3 was enroute or in the China Sea, and one of the carrier divisions was reported to be in or near the Mandates, and others were getting their bases all set, but their location was not known.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, is it true that the strength of our two task forces that we had at Hawaii was superior in strength to the task force that attacked Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. Superior, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. I believe the task force that attacked Hawaii infinitely superior than a combination of our task forces, let alone any individual one.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you asked this question—of course, we may have more information since that time:

[13042] Admiral REEVES—

This is page 1093. You were discussing then before the Roberts board the strength of the Japanese Fleet:

Admiral REEVES. And that is the striking force.

Commander LAYTON. Yes. As I obtained that from the radio call sheet out of the plane.

Admiral REEVES. Then in strength, that is hardly equal to the strength of our task force, three of which we had out, except in carriers. That is, a carrier in each one, three heavy cruisers—

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And 12 destroyers?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And that was 12. They did have more carriers in this one group?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Now, was that to indicate our strength was greater than theirs?

Captain LAYTON. I don't follow the line of that questioning. I have never had a chance to proofread it. I know they struck a lot from the record. It is my firm belief that the Japanese carrier task force, with 6 carriers fully trained, armed, ready to go, with 2 battleships, 2 battle cruisers, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 [13043] light cruiser

and 12 destroyers, was a powerful offensive force. They had weaknesses. If they were caught at night or in poor visibility, then they had a weakness because somebody could make slashing attack upon them without them being able to use their air.

[13044] Mr. MURPHY. I won't press it because it is a matter of certainty in the record as to what each force consisted of. We have that in the record without indulging in speculation or recollection.

Were you aware of the message that was sent from Hawaii on the night of December 6 as to the destruction of the codes at Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. I was informed by then Commander Rochefort that he had very good pipe-line information to the effect that the Japanese consulate was destroying codes and official papers by burning.

Mr. MURPHY. Why didn't Admiral Kimmel know about that?

Captain LAYTON. I don't know that he didn't know about it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. My recollection is that he said he didn't. That was Com-14. Com-14 advised Washington on December 6:

Believe local consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not including your eighteen double five of third.

Did you know about that?

Captain LAYTON. I did not see that message, although Commander Rochefort informed me of the purport.

Mr. MURPHY. You feel you certainly notified your commander in chief?

[13045] Captain LAYTON. I wouldn't be too positive. I may have been notified when Admiral Kimmel was not in or at some time when I didn't get the message to him immediately, but I have no definite recollection.

Mr. MURPHY. If you heard they were destroying their system, you would report it?

Captain LAYTON. Then I would report it.

Mr. MURPHY. If they were destroying all but one system, you would feel that was important enough to get it to the commander in chief as quickly as possible?

Captain LAYTON. I would think so, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What is the significance to you of the destruction of codes? That is pretty important information, isn't it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Would you consider that a matter of vital importance?

Captain LAYTON. If we had not had previous information that the Japanese were destroying codes, I would say it would be very vital. The previous information was well known and this would merely be added evidence.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you also testified that you delivered the message of the 24th direct to General Short.

Captain LAYTON. In person.

[13046] Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral Kimmel criticized you about one message, didn't he?

Captain LAYTON. That was the 27th, sir.

I believe he withdrew that criticism when he discovered that General Short had in fact received it.

Mr. MURPHY. I know just what I read in the record, and I believe there was some qualification of it. I don't want to say that is true either. I mean his characterization. Far from it.

Now, you also said that you heard it said by Admiral Kimmel as to what we would do if there was an attack on the British.

You knew at Hawaii that we were a democracy, and that Congress had the right to declare war?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. I believe his statement was "I wish we knew what we were going to do."

Mr. MURPHY. You meant "What would we do when"?

Captain LAYTON. What would we do and when.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, as to knowledge of ships being in Pearl Harbor, did you know as the intelligence officer what reports were being made to Washington as to the ships? You did testify that they would not, in your judgment, be the task forces?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[13047] Mr. MURPHY. Is it not a fact that your reports to Washington were only as to the ships in the Harbor or that they were in the Hawaiian area?

Captain LAYTON. Very likely so. That was the province of Operations.

Mr. MURPHY. We had testimony before us and we have a map here showing some ship to the north of the island of Oahu on December 6. Did you know anything about that ship?

Captain LAYTON. My guess would be that it was a merchant ship that was torpedoed there on the morning of December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. But it wasn't there on the 7th. At least the map doesn't show it.

Captain LAYTON. It wasn't on my plot and I couldn't say.

Mr. MURPHY. The map shows it on the 6th and not on the 7th. In fact, it seems to trace it going into Pearl Harbor on the week end.

Captain LAYTON. It was customary for the ships to go in for the week end to give the crews needed rest and relaxation, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. This is my last question.

So far as liaison with the Army was concerned, you never received a single order from the commander in chief as to to any liaison whatever with any particular Army intelligence? [13048]

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir. Nor did I have any requests from Army sources for liaison.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to ask a few questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, shortly after the Pearl Harbor disaster, we had unity of command in Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Is that still in existence?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe I am competent to answer that question because I am not real sure. I left Pearl Harbor on the 29th of November to come before this committee, sir, and I am a little bit rusty on what is going on out there.

[13049] Senator LUCAS. When you left on the 29th of November was unity of command still in operation at that time?

Captain LAYTON. To a limited degree, sir. The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet still commanded the Pacific Ocean areas and the Army forces in that area came directly under General MacArthur. Under the unity of command principle that was in effect

prior to VJ-day or about that time the Army forces in the Pacific Ocean areas were under the direct military command of Admiral Nimitz through General Richardson, commanding general of the Central Pacific Forces.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, from what you know about the Pearl Harbor disaster and the events leading up to this disaster, did you feel that there was proper liaison between the Army and the Navy at that time?

Captain LAYTON. I believe the liaison at that time could be improved on in the light of war experience.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in light of what happened at Pearl Harbor and the war following you believe the liaison could be improved upon?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; but it must be done on a chain of command principle and not on parallel ladders, so to speak.

Senator LUCAS. I am not sure that I follow you on that last statement.

[13050] Captain LAYTON. For example, sir, under the principle of unity command in effect in the Pacific Ocean areas during the war, intelligence that funneled to the Pacific Ocean areas was a responsibility of the commander in chief of that area to get it to all forces in his area for their use. Before the setting up of that principle of that unity of command no single person was responsible for the intelligence for everybody else, so you had two parallel intelligence systems and as it turns out—and I did not know until afterward—the Army in Hawaii was receiving very little intelligence from Washington. The Navy was developing combat intelligence regarding the Japanese fleet but we received no Japanese troop movements or dispositions from the Army, and I don't believe the Army in Hawaii received them either.

If those funnels had been only funneled to one man whose responsibility it was, who in turn gives it to all the forces no matter what kind of a uniform they wear and is responsible for that, then you have a principle of single purpose, single responsibility, and a proper functioning organization. You cannot have two presidents of a corporation.

Senator LUCAS. I think that you have expressed it better than I would know how and it more or less coincides with what I believe should be done as a result of the testimony that has been adduced before this hearing.

[13051] In other words, do you agree with me that, either in peace or in war, if you are going to have a successful intelligence department either in Washington, Hawaii, the Philippines, or in any other outpost, you are going to have someone upon whom rests the sole responsibility for the proper evaluation and the dissemination of that information to every branch of the service, whether it is the Navy, the Army, or the Marine Corps?

Captain LAYTON. I quite agree with you whole-heartedly, Senator, and I believe the present new set-up that I have read about in the papers, wherein the State Department, Army, and Navy will form one central intelligence agency or whatever it is, will function to the benefit of this country in the future.

Senator LUCAS. You fellows in the Navy had some of the finest men that the Naval Academy ever turned out in the Pacific area during

that time, according to the testimony that has been given to this committee and Admiral Kimmel was in charge of the Pacific Fleet at that time as well as the Atlantic Fleet.

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. On December the 7th?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Wasn't he commander in chief of the entire fleet?

[13052] Captain LAYTON. No, sir. He was commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Senator LUCAS. Of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. And also the doctrines that he evolved, the techniques or matters of policy or standard operating procedure that he thought were good enough and having consulted with the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, were in fact issued by the commander in chief under the directive which he had to this United States Fleet.

Senator LUCAS. Well, at one time he was commander in chief of the United States Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. That was just a title, that was a hat he could wear, but it was not a tactical or administrative office.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the fact that this was a title or hat that he could wear, did that add anything to his importance out there as the commander of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. I don't think you can find anything higher than the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in the Pacific.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, it is a fact that General Short was out there and his was just a small part of the United States Army although he held a very responsible position.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

[13053] Senator LUCAS. I have obtained this sort of an idea and if I am wrong I want you to disabuse it from my mind. You fellows in the Navy are a pretty powerful group, and you had charge of the Pacific Fleet out there, and Short was more or less in charge of just an outpost, and, as far as the Army was concerned, was pretty small. I have gained sort of an impression that you fellows did not pay much attention to Short and his crowd; and I am wondering if I am wrong.

Captain LAYTON. If I answer that, you put me in an embarrassing position if I either agree with you and am not telling the truth.

Senator LUCAS. I won't press it if it is going to embarrass you, and I probably should have asked Admiral Kimmel that question when he was here.

Captain LAYTON. I say I think it is an embarrassing question, because I, for one, never thought of the Army as any small potato. In fact, I worked with the Army at our Army post all during this war, and they are a fine bunch of people, and if you really want to see how the services get together go out where they don't wear a collar and tie when they put them in the South Pacific. You can't tell the Army from the Navy.

Senator LUCAS. I am sure you always worked faithfully under any conditions, and that was the attitude in the Navy and Army, and I know that you worked faithfully since Pearl Harbor; [13054] there isn't any question about that; but the only thing I am talking about is previous to Pearl Harbor, when there was a sort of a non-chalant, lackadaisical attitude with the American people, and it seemed

to me that went right on into the Army and the Navy about that particular time. I may be wrong about that.

Captain LAYTON. I recall our attitude toward the impending crisis was anything but lackadaisical, Senator. As a matter of fact, there were some gray hairs sprouted out at that time.

Senator LUCAS. Some what?

Captain LAYTON. Gray hairs.

Senator LUCAS. There may have been some after Pearl Harbor, but do you think there were many before Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I can only speak for myself, sir.

Senator LUCAS. How far did you think that the carrier and the two destroyers and what number aircraft they might have had was from Pearl Harbor when you made an estimate to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. I think that was really December 2.

Senator LUCAS. December 2.

Captain LAYTON. I considered them in the Marshalls themselves, and I was delighted when the Army proposed a distance long-range, overwater reconnaissance of the Marshalls [13055] and the central Carolines to spot this task force down there.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; well, how far did you think that these carriers were from Pearl Harbor at the time you made the estimate?

Captain LAYTON. I thought they were in the Marshalls themselves, and most likely at anchor in one of the atolls—Jaluit, possibly Wotje, and possibly Maleolap.

Senator LUCAS. How far in miles would that be, the nearest one, I mean, that the carrier might be based in?

Captain LAYTON. I would like to give you the exact distance if I can, sir.

Senator LUCAS. All right, sir, I would like to have it.

Captain LAYTON. From Jaluit to Pearl Harbor is 2,096 nautical miles.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Is that the nearest port they might be located in?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that Wotje is a little closer. It is 1,970 miles. I believe that is about the nearest that has a good harbor and base facility.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, should that fact alone, Captain, have given the commander of the Pacific Fleet some concern and some warning, if there was an aircraft carrier that close on December the 3d?

Captain LAYTON. The attack that came did not come from [13056] the Marshalls.

Senator LUCAS. I understand that.

Captain LAYTON. There had been aircraft carriers in the Marshall Islands before. The situation, of course, was not as tense.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Captain LAYTON. Now, one of the basic axioms of intelligence is to always think if you were the enemy what would you do and being in intelligence you say, "Now, this fellow has got a carrier out here. I am a Jap. What did I put him down there for?" My answer to that one was he was there to ferry down some planes for other divisions. I mean they were expanding and enlarging the movement

in preparation for what you would think then would be our most logical point of attack, an attack on the Marshalls.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, it never occurred at that time, and I can understand it from the evidence, that this carrier might be there for the purpose of making a final attack upon Oahu?

Captain LAYTON. I did not think so, sir. The Senator will recall that there was a difference of opinion between the combat intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor and the one at Cavite as to the presence or absence of carriers in the Marshalls.

[13057] Senator LUCAS. That is right, I know there was a difference of opinion.

Captain LAYTON. And I had to evaluate this. One said none and the other one said two divisions, so I straddled the fence by putting one down there.

Now, there had been two and good evidence of two. They might be down there as a covering force and a scouting force to detect with their carrier planes the advance of our raiding force, which they could anticipate well by looking at the geography just along there where they stretched and thereby allow their land-based planes to make an attack in force without having to do scouting.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever learn thereafter whether your evaluation of that carrier was correct?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; I don't believe there has been anything found, any evidence found anywhere that one carrier was in the Marshalls. There was evidence of two carriers in the Palau area and they attacked the Philippines on the morning of December 8 Philippine time, December 7 our time.

Senator LUCAS. The fact is that the evidence before this committee shows that the Japs expected to lose one-third of their task force.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You are familiar with that?

[13058] Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know upon what basis they might have figured that in view of the complete surprise?

Captain LAYTON. That figuring was done before they had the complete surprise, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. They sat down and worked this out on a game board. They moved their forces and they had members of their general staff act as Americans, while the members of their task force who worked this out acted as their own selves, Japanese, and in working this out they did not, so I am told, anticipate getting off scot free and the umpires which you always have in a game of this nature assessed them one-third carrier damage. Based on that they anticipated one-third carrier loss.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in other words, regardless of how they finally reached the conclusion, they did not expect to be as successful in this surprise raid as they were.

Captain LAYTON. I believe their success surpassed their fondest dreams.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, they expected the Army and the Navy in Hawaii to be on the alert and give them some battle instead of finding them the way they were?

Captain LAYTON. That is true. They also gave the Army and [13059] Navy in Hawaii credit for far more planes than we had, in their war-college game board they worked out in advance.

Senator LUCAS. That is probably true. I am glad that we did not have more planes there the way it turned out. Of course, it may be that if we had had more planes they might not have struck, too; that is another angle. If we had had enough there to have had long-range reconnaissance around the perimeter, they probably may not have taken a chance.

Now, one other question. I think that is bordering along the line of a question I previously asked. I quote from Colonel Clausen's testimony. Senator Ferguson said this [reading]:

Did you find that that same thing took place in Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. In Washington, sir, I think there was far more cordial and freer exchange, but the same thing applies, Senator.

For the sake of the country it should be known that there was evidently some jealousy between the services, and this thing existed prior to Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. And it existed in Washington, Hawaii and the Philippines?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I understand. In other words, what a ludicrous situation is presented if you have [13060] a fleet intelligence officer, Captain Layton, saying he gave information to Colonel Raley but would not tell Colonel Raley where it came from. How would Colonel Raley know to evaluate it?

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I was going to get at for many days in this hearing here in Washington.

Colonel CLAUSEN. If I can make one simple contribution to this case, and if anything comes out of this hearing, it would be that you pursue the idea of having one agency and let that thing be coordinated on a business basis, so you do not have monopolistic agencies trying to hide the information for themselves.

And that is practically what you agreed to a little while ago in the question I propounded to you.

Captain LAYTON. That is basically what I said without the adjectives.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir. I think that is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there a separate Coast Guard set-up at Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; I believe the Coast Guard set-up was separate but I am not positive.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know whether they had a separate intelligence service? [13061]

Captain LAYTON. Their radio intelligence personnel worked with and side by side with the Navy.

Mr. MURPHY. But they had a separate intelligence man; did they?

Captain LAYTON. If they did, I never saw him; I never heard of him. I do not believe that they did, sir. The Coast Guard was concerned with the coastal waters alone there.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, they were firing on the morning of the 7th; weren't they?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. I was not saying anything to detract from the Coast Guard's fine record.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Captain LAYTON. I meant that their service was entirely limited and as such they came under the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, and as a fleet intelligence officer I would not have cognizance over matters pertaining to the Coast Guard.

Mr. MURPHY. I have been asked the question as to whether or not the Coast Guard were fully alerted on the morning of December 7 and ready to meet the attacks coming in there. Do you know anything about that?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

[13062] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, if I understood your testimony, you attributed great importance in the achieving of the success the Japanese carrier obtained to their ability to maintain radio silence over their ship movement.

Captain LAYTON. More than that, Mr. Gearhart. Radio silence alone would be a give-off if they had been in the traffic, but they were not in the traffic at all throughout the month. When the build-up came, they were not addressed. They had all the rest of these commanders addressed, but they were not. It was not unusual, but the fact they were not addressed and the fact that they were apparently unconcerned with this entire matter and operating no radio, whether as originators or as addressees, led us to the belief, erroneous as it was, that they were unconcerned and were remaining in home waters, probably preparing for future operations.

Mr. GEARHART. Wouldn't you have described that as a complete radio silence? They were just simply not involved in radio at all.

Captain LAYTON. It is more than radio silence, sir. Radio silence involves a ship or unit or series of units not using their radio but being addressed.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, if you are being addressed and there is no directional radio broadcasting, how can that help you?

[13063] Captain LAYTON. I mean if they are addressed in the traffic, their future activity may be forecast.

Mr. GEARHART. I would like to have you define something that I have been hearing over and over again. What do you mean by "traffic"?

Captain LAYTON. Well, sir, traffic is a broad term for all the radio messages that pass on the many, many circuits that a Navy has. I imagine the Japanese had somewhere around 200 different circuits as of December 7 or before, and they have a peculiarity, maybe I should explain, that is different from that in ordinary usage.

For instance, if a ship is at Kure in southwest Japan, and it is going to Ominata in the Hanshus, under normal circumstances he would send a movement report in which he would address the chief of the main reporting division in Tokyo, the commandant in Kure, where he was leaving, and to the naval station in Ominata, telling him he was coming. That would then be placed on the Kure broadcast. It would then go to the Tokyo broadcast, it would be picked up and broadcast on the Ominata broadcast, and by putting these together and watching their sequence you could forecast that this ship was going to go from Kure to Ominata. That is the way we forecast the task force that was going to the south.

Mr. GEARHART. I understand that all right, but I cannot [13064] understand what you mean when you say it is not the equivalent of radio silence when a ship is simply not mentioned on the radio at all,

no messages go from the ship and no messages are addressed to the ship. Now, isn't that absolute radio silence?

Captain LAYTON. It is more than radio silence, sir. If the ship itself merely remained silent and does not use its radio, that is generally called radio silence.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, it is a complete condition of no sending.

Captain LAYTON. It is a blank condition obtaining.

Mr. GEARHART. That is what it is, yes.

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you attributed great importance to the Japanese attack—in their attack on Pearl Harbor—to the fact that they were able to achieve their super two-way silence.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, what I would like to know is, is your attachment of importance to that condition which was produced, is that a hindsight matter or was that a principle that you had in mind before Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I think I stated, sir, that it was a hindsight observation that I would like to give in 2 minutes. The fact that ships could go under radio silence was well known but never in the history of the Japanese naval communication that I had observed over a period of years had such a phenomena ever occurred.

[13065] Mr. GEARHART. Well, an order for radio silence of some degree—I do not want to argue over terms, but an order for radio silence of some degree was imposed on American ships issued from the Pacific Fleet Command, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, an examination of logs of ships has disclosed, at least one of them, the *Boise*, that enemy ships were sighted in American waters adjacent to Guam on the last couple of days of November of 1941.

Captain LAYTON. I believe that is true.

Mr. GEARHART. You have learned that?

Captain LAYTON. I have read of that; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The fact that the *Boise* sighted enemy ships in American waters, adjacent to Guam, was never reported to you?

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is because of the order of radio silence; is that it?

Captain LAYTON. That, I believe, was the result of the interpretation of the captain on radio silence.

Radio silence as ordered is general in terms. You will maintain radio silence and will only break it in case of emergency.

This being a peacetime mission that the *Boise* [13066] was on, he maintained a radio silence. Whether he had an alternate in his directive or not, I do not know.

As a matter of fact had the *Boise* reported sighting the ship near Guam, it would have added nothing to our store of knowledge, as we had already suspected some of the ships in the southern Pacific force were going down to Palau.

Mr. GEARHART. It would have been important to know because it would have been a confirmation or proof of a fact which you merely suspected?

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Also, an examination of the log of the U. S. S. *Wright* in Hawaiian waters discloses that they sighted enemy ships on the 6th day of December 1941. Was that reported to you or to the fleet?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Would that have been important information for you to have received?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Under the orders for radio silence, do you think the commander of that ship or the captain of that ship was under an obligation not to report it, or did he exercise bad judgment?

Captain LAYTON. By no means, sir. I would say that was [19067] a case of bad judgment.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, can you tell me of any other instances where the order of radio silence prevented Admiral Kimmel's command from obtaining information they should have had until after the 7th day of December 1941?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall any at first-hand; no, sir. I do not recall any rumors either.

Mr. GEARHART. How is that?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall any; no sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, does anything occur to you along that line that you should report to us?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. I am being honest when I say I do not recall any such instance being brought to my attention at any time.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you have anything to do with the issuing of that order for radio silence shortly before Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. That would be the communications officer.

Mr. GEARHART. Was it not inspired or suggested by reason of your belief that the control of radio use was so important?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; none whatsoever.

Mr. GEARHART. I think that is all.

[19068] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. When Mr. Shivers was before the Roberts Board he spoke of a message of December 6, you spoke of one of December 5, and one of December 4, another of December 4, and one of December 3.

I do not know of any place in the record as to whether or not they were known in Hawaii before December 7.

De we, counsel?

Mr. MASTEN. They were messages from whom?

Mr. MURPHY. They were messages from Kita. I will ask it this way:

Captain, on December 6, 1941, from Togo, Foreign Minister, to the consul at Honolulu:

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of movements of warships after the 4th.

Signed, "Togo."

Did you know about that before the 7th?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. I believe Mr. Shivers got that after the 7th, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That series of messages?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. He did not make it clear to the Roberts [13069] Board.

Captain LAYTON. Those are the ones Captain Rochefort referred to, that they worked on some after the 3d and were not able to break down until I believe it was the 10th, he said, at which time I know they were given to the district intelligence officer to use, and Mr. Shivers was shown those.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to inquire if the Japanese ships were up in the "vacant sea," and without receiving radio messages, would the throwing of the beam to those ships, as I understand you can do, and being intercepted by your station, would that indicate that they were reaching ships in the "vacant sea"?

Captain LAYTON. The which sea?

Senator FERGUSON. It has been referred to as the "vacant sea," from Japan over north 2 or 3 hundred miles, north of Oahu.

Captain LAYTON. Well, if they were using a beamed antenna, shooting its beams only in a directional way, and they were not heard in Hawaii, and they were not heard in Cavite, there was still a chance that the radio direction finder unit as Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians would have heard [13070] them, and being a part of Captain Rochefort's mid-Pacific direction-finder net, they would so have reported it, and that would have been given considerable weight.

Senator FERGUSON. Then if the Japanese information indicates that on the 6th they sent out the message "Climb Mount Niitaka," if that was broadcast to the fleet to the Jap Fleet, that should have been picked up by the Dutch Harbor unit?

Captain LAYTON. I read that Japanese report with considerable interest.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you an opinion on it?

Captain LAYTON. I am of the opinion that "Climb Mount Niitaka" or any other such code phrase, was never transmitted.

Senator FERGUSON. You believe they went in there under radio silence both ways?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In and out?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; they broke radio silence right after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean until the attack took place?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The fact is that the minute the attack was commenced, the direction-finder bearings were placed immediately on, [13071] I think, the *Akagi* and *Kaga* and they were immediately identified.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean by our radio station?

Captain LAYTON. At Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did not we send some planes up there?

Captain LAYTON. Unfortunately, Senator, the direction-finder bearing is bilateral; it runs two ways. They did have one direction finder which could take a unilateral bearing, or a one-direction bearing.

The communications in that station were completely out all the forenoon, until late afternoon. They sent their information in by sidecar, or bicycle, or some such slow transportation.

Our direction finder at Haeia on the north part of Oahu was sending, and was giving what had come to that set what was called bilateral bearings.

As an example, the first information I received was 10:40 local time, Oahu, bearing bilateral 357° , or 178° true from Haeia.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand you went south to find these ships instead of going north?

Captain LAYTON. It was not a case of misleading at all, sir. The radio direction finder gives you two bearings; [13072] this way and that way [indicating]. It is the nature of the instrument and it cannot be helped.

Additionally, at that same time, they had reports, vague as they were, of carriers to the south, and that gave cause for thinking that the carriers were to the south, plus the report previously by Com 16 intelligence unit that there had been carrier divisions in the Marshalls, and that also influenced their thought that they might have come from the Marshalls.

Therefore, the preponderance of evidence indicated a southerly direction, while actually that was not true.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the radar man found these planes coming in from the north.

Captain LAYTON. So I have heard, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not anyone think of calling up the radar man to find out whether some radar did find them coming in?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know at first-hand, but I was informed that several efforts had been made to obtain that information from Fort Shafter that morning, without results.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you familiar with Captain Rochefort's testimony before the Roberts commission, about him charting [13073] the planes to the north?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Haven't you known that Captain Rochefort did have some charts that pointed to the north, and he got it by cross-bearings?

Captain LAYTON. Those bearings I believe you referred to are the ones of the following day, when we had the direction finder fixed to the northeast of Midway and northwest of Oahu, but at that time they were seven-hundred-and-sixty-odd miles from Oahu and we had no planes available to carry bombs out that far and have a chance of getting back.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you clear on the fact that Captain Rochefort was speaking of the next day?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know whether Captain Rochefort was speaking of the next day. I know that the only fix we had—and I would be the person who got the fixes—was the following day.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you through, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to ask one question:

The Japanese have supplied information to the effect that they sent out the message "Climb Mount Niitaka" and the Navy, 3 months

ago or 4 months ago presented us with evidence to that effect. Have you ever expressed [13074] your doubt to anyone in the Navy before this occasion as to the authenticity of that testimony?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; only to my assistants in Pearl Harbor when I first read that report from the strategic bombing survey.

Mr. MURPHY. If you have been able to break the Japanese naval code—I don't want to press the thing—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Which one? There are two.

Mr. MURPHY. I am talking about the fact we have been given evidence here, and I don't want to indulge in any arguments on it. I would like to have you, sir, since you made a flat assertion, state on this record why you disbelieve the testimony that is in the record.

Captain LAYTON. Had they transmitted that message, whether in code or plain language—and it is my understanding that in that code, or hidden-word message "Climb Mount Niitaka," they used plain language—

Mr. MURPHY (interposing). Have you read the testimony in this record?

Captain LAYTON. Not nearly all of it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What is that?

Captain LAYTON. Not nearly all of it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I am talking about this specific incident. Have you read the testimony on that in this record?

[13075] Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you read the reports from Japan?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You have read the report as to how they did it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, what do you differ about in that report?

Captain LAYTON. Had they broadcast that, I think we would have heard it, if it were broadcast "Climb Mount Niitaka".

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. Had they encoded it and addressed it to Commander, Carrier Division, who was the commander concerned, we would have the address that day, but we did not have it.

Mr. MURPHY. You feel then if there was one message some time during the night that you would be most certain to catch it?

Captain LAYTON. There was an intense watch kept from about the 25th to the 26th of November to try to find carrier frequencies. You see, every once in a while the Japanese would change frequencies, and then you would have to search to find them. It is a very difficult problem, but [13076] it can be solved.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, everybody was looking for carrier frequencies right up to December 7?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; and they came up on regular frequencies that morning.

Mr. MURPHY. The only way you could find them, if you could not find them by radio, was by reconnaissance, was that right?

Captain LAYTON. By reconnaissance, or by some merchant ship, or by picket boats, or submarines.

Mr. MURPHY. Even though you were working intently to find them by radio and could not find them, there was no substitute other than by way of ships or planes to do it, was there?

Captain LAYTON. None that I am aware of.

Mr. MURPHY. You base your statement on this message not being broadcast, or on your failure to hear it at Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one question.

Did you ever have any war games of an air attack upon Hawaii that came from any other direction than out of the north from the "vacant sea"?

[13077] Captain LAYTON. I do not recall any, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. Just one more.

Captain, do you care to express an opinion on whether or not our national defense and our security has been benefited or hurt as the result of this investigation?

Captain LAYTON. Do you want the truth, sir?

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir.

Captain LAYTON. I believe that the investigation has hurt our national security to an incalculable degree by so much publicity being given to the decryption activities.

While it may serve a very fine purpose for the future, that is my personal belief. I have the conviction that any potential enemy we ever have now or in the future will be watching his code books and cipher machines, and call signs, and our information, that we have obtained with some success against Japan in the past, will not be in that fine shape that it was, mediocre as it was, on December 7.

After all, if you recall, there was a book once written by a man named Yardley, called "The Black Chamber," and he exposed the reading of the Japanese diplomatic notes to the Washington conference at the time of the 5-5-3 ratio in 1922.

Senator, you would hardly believe it, but the Japanese [13078] naval ciphers in those days were pretty simple. Their call signs were even more simple. They were abbreviations of the full name, like "Kag" for Kagani. After they read that book they treated us language students with suspicion and rightly so, and they changed their codes and ciphers very fast, and the information we were able to have in the past, which was a prop to national security was knocked out from under us.

I believe the investigation here will have the same effect in the future, and I say it with no disrespect to any member present.

Senator LUCAS. Of course, it is unbelievable that a hearing of this kind could be held during the war.

Captain LAYTON. The war would still be going on if you had, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We thank you, Captain, for your appearance and the information you have given the committee, and your apparent desire to be helpful to us in this inquiry.

You may be excused, sir.

(The witness was excused.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will call the next witness.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Colonel Schukraft.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is Colonel Schukraft here?

Please be sworn, Colonel,

[13079] **TESTIMONY OF COL. ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT, UNITED
STATES ARMY**

(Having first been duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Please give your name, rank, and present assignment of duty to the reporter.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Robert E. Schukraft, colonel, Signal Corps. At present assigned to the Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Under Secretary of War.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Colonel, it is now 10 o'clock, so we suspend to 10 o'clock in the morning.

Please be here at 10 o'clock in the morning, sir.

(Whereupon, at 10 p. m., February 18, 1946, the committee adjourned until 10 a. m. of the following day, Tuesday, February 19, 1946.)

[13080]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[13081] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Is counsel ready to proceed?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have a communication from the Hawaiian Broadcasting System of Honolulu asserting that there has appeared somewhere in the record—I haven't myself seen it—and also in the public press reference to the fact that this broadcasting system continued its broadcast of Japanese programs and news in Hawaii up to the time of the attack. Reference has been made to that, they assert, by way of criticism at their failure to cooperate with proper defense measures in Hawaii.

You will remember that representing the FBI in Honolulu during this debatable period was Mr. Robert L. Shivers. Mr. Shivers is not now in the employ of the FBI, but is holding a position, I think, inspector of customs, or customs collector, or something of that sort, in the Hawaiian district.

Mr. Shivers is now no longer with the FBI, but he has given to Mr. J. Howard Worrall, the president of the Hawaiian Broadcasting System, a detailed letter in which he certifies that the continuance of these Japanese broadcasts by this broadcasting system was directly responsive to his request, in cooperation with the Office of Military Intelligence. Both he, representing the FBI at the time, [13082] and the Office of Military Intelligence, he asserts, believed strongly it would be necessary to use those facilities to propagandize the Japanese and to disseminate Japanese information, and, therefore, they insisted that these broadcasts continue despite the desire of the broadcasting company to discontinue.

Now the request of the broadcasting system is that this letter of Mr. Shivers, that is not sworn to, be included in the record of this proceed-

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ing to serve as a statement tending to show that they are not subject to criticism because they did, in response to these requests, continue their Japanese broadcasts.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any objection to the inclusion of this statement? If not, it will be spread on the record at this point.

(The letter referred to follows:)

HONOLULU, T. H., January 16, 1946.

Mr. J. HOWARD WORRELL,
President, Hawaiian Broadcasting System,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR MR. WORRELL: In view of the recent disclosures at the Pearl Harbor inquiry, which is being conducted by a Joint Committee of [13083] the Senate and House, concerning Japanese language broadcasts in Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941, I feel that in all fairness to your company and for the record, I should review some of the negotiations and conferences between you and me which caused the Hawaiian Broadcasting System to continue its Japanese language broadcasts right up to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

You made repeated visits to my office to discuss the advisability of discontinuing the Japanese language broadcasts beginning as early as June, 1941. At times, you were accompanied by some of the directors of your company. I informed you that from an intelligence standpoint, it was highly desirable that the Japanese language broadcasts be continued as it afforded a medium through which the Japanese population could be propagandized and that the intelligence agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence, did not want these broadcasts discontinued because it was felt that to do so before the actual outbreak of war would result in our losing the Japanese audience to the Tokyo radio station and that once having lost the audience, it would be very difficult to regain it for the purpose of giving orders and instructions to the Japanese population after the outbreak of war.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Military Intelligence believed very strongly it would be [13084] necessary to use the facilities of the local broadcasting stations to propagandize the Japanese and to disseminate information to them after the outbreak of war.

As it became increasingly apparent that war between the United States and Japan was inevitable, you became more insistent in your request to discontinue the Japanese language broadcasts and you were urged by me not to do so. You finally agreed to compromise and continue the Japanese language broadcasts if I would recommend to you some individual familiar with the Japanese language whom you could employ to read and edit the broadcasts before they went out over your station. I accepted this compromise and did recommend to you an American citizen of Japanese ancestry whom you employed for that purpose at your station in Hilo, Hawaii. I also recommended Mr. Akiyoshi Hayashido, whom you employed for the same purpose at KGMB in Honolulu. Mr. Hayashida and the employee at Hilo had been carefully investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and their loyalty to the United States was beyond question. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had utilized the services of both of these men and after the war broke out, Mr. Hayashida was employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a translator. He later worked in the same capacity for the Office of Military Intelligence and thereafter was employed by the Office of War Information as a translator [13085] and interpreter.

About the first of November, 1941, you came to my office and informed me you had definitely decided to discontinue the Japanese language broadcasts and that you would do so immediately. I urged you to defer this action until I had had an opportunity to consult with the officers of Military Intelligence, which you agreed to do. I conferred with the responsible officers in the Military Intelligence and advised them of your proposal to discontinue the Japanese language broadcasts immediately. They agreed with me that this action should not be taken and requested me to urge you again to continue the Japanese language broadcasts for the reasons I have previously outlined. I again communicated my desire and that of the officers of Military Intelligence to you and with considerable reluctance, you agreed to continue the broadcasts.

I have also observed statements which have been made before the Investigating Committee which were inferentially critical of the management of your station for having destroyed the records of the Japanese language broadcasts some time

after the Pearl Harbor attack. I want you to know that all of the Japanese language broadcasts over the Hawaiian Broadcasting System for several months prior to December 7, 1941, were carefully reviewed and investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Office of Military Intelligence and nothing was found by either agency which in any way remotely indicated that your broadcasting station had been used for the dissemination of information to the enemy. Furthermore, it was discovered that nothing of a subversive nature had gone out from your stations in the Japanese language. Sometime in the latter part of 1942 or the early part of 1943, I was asked by officers of Military Intelligence if there were any further need to retain the records of the Japanese language broadcasts over your stations. I informed these officers that these broadcasts had been carefully reviewed and investigated by all three of the intelligence agencies and that so far as the Federal Bureau of Investigation was concerned, it interposed no objection to their destruction.

I have gone into this matter very fully—probably more so than is necessary. But, since practically all of our discussions and negotiations were verbal, I feel that while the facts surrounding this issue are still fresh in my mind, I should record them for our mutual benefit.

Very truly yours,

/S/ Robert L. Shivers.
ROBERT L. SHIVERS.

[13087] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now I would like to bring up again at this time another matter, since open hearings are supposed to pause tomorrow, and that is the suggestion that I made concerning the memorandum which the Hawaiian Planters Association desire to have filed, tending to show their cooperation with the military forces in Hawaii during the period of the emergency.

As I stated before, that so-called memorandum is verified by the secretary of the association.

The suggestion was made, and I think with considerable point, that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the parties and therefore it might not be a proper part of the record. I have a feeling personally, after reading it, that the factual matter therein contained recites actual acts accomplished, and so forth, and it might be of some assistance to the committee as some source of material.

The committee held no hearings in Hawaii, and therefore there would be considerable difficulty in bringing the various people before the committee for the purpose of establishing these facts, and that is the reason why it appears in connection with this memorandum.

I suggested at the time that I would hold it in abeyance and bring it again to the attention of the committee, which I do now, and whatever action the committee desires to take [13088] with reference to it will be fine.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I suppose, for whatever weight may be given to it, it may be made part of the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You can give it whatever weight you want to.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be made a part of the record at this point.

Mr. KEEFE. Do I understand it will not be spread on the record, that it will just be an exhibit?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir; just an exhibit.

That is all we have.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 153.")

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you were just about to proceed to examine this witness.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF COL. ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT, UNITED STATES
ARMY (Resumed)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you state your full name, Colonel?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Robert E. Schukraft.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Army?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I have been an officer since 1932.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and some time prior thereto, what was your assignment?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I was assigned to the office of the [13089] Chief Signal Officer in Washington, in charge of radio intercept for the Chief Signal Officer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was your superior officer?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. My immediate superior was Colonel Minckler.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As a part of your duties prior to Pearl Harbor, was your attention ever called to what has been familiarly referred to as the winds code?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you see the original implementing intercepted dispatches which established that code?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir; I did. I saw both of them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have anything to do with a program of monitoring?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you state to the committee just what you did in that regard?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. About November 28 Colonel Minckler and I went to Colonel Sadtler's office and went over the two messages setting up the winds code, and Colonel Sadtler desired that some action be taken—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Colonel who?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Sadtler.

[13090] Mr. RICHARDSON. Statler?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. S-a-d-t-l-e-r, Sadtler.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Who was it you went with?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. With Colonel Minckler, sir; M-i-n-c-k-l-e-r, my boss.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Proceed.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Sadtler desired that some action be taken to monitor for the winds execute message. We knew at that time that the Navy was doing some monitoring for this and decided to coordinate our activity with the Navy. During the discussions it was decided that station 2 in San Francisco would probably have about the best chance of hearing this.

We had a double problem: One of them of getting the intercept into Washington, and the other problem of not telling the monitoring stations too much, not passing too much information to the monitoring stations. So that left the stations in the position that they had to monitor almost all of the broadcasts and forward the broadcasts intact to Washington, where they would be examined.

So to carry out this directive I had a teletype conference with the NCO in charge at the west coast, and told him to monitor certain

specific broadcasts, the general intelligence [13091] broadcasts, which they did.

At the same time it was decided to ask the FCC to monitor for the voice broadcasts. We were to monitor the code broadcasts and the FCC to monitor the voice broadcasts. This was because we had no Japanese linguists at the intercept stations.

Later in discussing the matter with Colonel Minckler, since considerable importance appeared to be attached to this, we decided we would also have station 7, which at that time was located in Fort Hunt, Va., monitor for the code broadcasts. I made a trip to Fort Hunt and discussed the matter with the officer in charge. I told him specifically what we were looking for, and they monitored from that point on, and I checked with them periodically.

That is all, Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it was contemplated that there might be responses to intercepts under this monitoring system, both of voice broadcasts and of code, Morse code intercepts?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir; both or either.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. What information, with reference to what key words or sentences you were looking for, did you give to these monitoring stations?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. We gave no information to station 2. We merely told them to monitor certain specified Japanese [13092] broadcast stations. To station 7 I did give the officer in charge the information that we were looking for a broadcast which would follow the pattern that the Japs had set up, that is, that certain code word or code words would be repeated.

[13093] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you give them the code words?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I did not, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just simply told them that there would be a repetition of words in the message that you were looking for.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would have required them to have translated every message that came in that had any such repetition?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It would require station 2—that is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, with reference to the voice broadcast, was there any information given to the monitoring stations as to the precise words you were interested in?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. The English translation of the words was given to the FCC. It was not given to the Army monitoring stations at all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever see any asserted winds execute message, either in a voice broadcast or teletype description, as the result of these monitorings?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I have seen two such, sir.

I have seen the FCC one recently.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the one that is asserted to have been intercepted about the 7th or 8th of December?

[13094] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. The 8th of December, I believe, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Now, what was the other one?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. The other one was a piece of teletype paper which contained what appeared to be a winds execute message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who called your attention to that piece of paper?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Minckler brought this piece of paper into my office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. About when?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was 2 or 3 days, as I recall, prior to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What time of day? Do you recall?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not recall exactly, except my impression is it was sometime in the morning, prior to noon.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there a conversation between you and Colonel Minckler concerning it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Minckler asked me what I thought of this piece of paper.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did he say where he got it?

[13095] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not recall whether he said exactly or not. The impression I had at the time was that he had received it from Colonel Sadtler.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What further conversation occurred between you?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. This message that he brought in was obviously not a true winds execute message. There were about three things wrong with it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Before you read it, was there any reference in the conversation to Kramer?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir; there was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. He had indicated—

Mr. RICHARDSON (interposing). Who had indicated?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Minckler—that the Navy had thought this was a true winds execute message, and that Captain Kramer had seen it and had thought that this was a true winds execute message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Very well. Was that the substance of the identifying information that was discussed between you and Minckler?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, was this piece of paper handed to you?

[13096] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I never actually had it in my hand, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Describe the piece of paper and the message on it, as nearly as you can.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. The pieces of paper was a piece of yellow teletype paper, 3 or 4 inches wide. Colonel Minckler, at the time I saw it, had this piece of paper folded in his hand.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many words, or lines were there on that sheet of paper?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. There were not more than one or two lines on that piece of paper.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was the language on the paper Japanese?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you examine the paper?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you conclude that it was or was not a true winds execute?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I concluded very positively that it was not a true winds execute message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It did not follow the pattern specified by the Japanese in setting up the winds execute message.

As I remember, there were about three things wrong [13097] with it.

First of all, it was transmitted by a Morse station, and the message was in the voice form, which was impossible.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean by that?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Well, when you set up a code of this type, it must carry some means of identifying this as a message, otherwise, you have no means of knowing whether the identification that was set up by the Japanese was actually carried. Whereas, if sent by voice there would appear in a specified place in the message in the broadcast and would be repeated in a certain specified manner, the words that they had set up in their code. Those were the keys to the fact that this was a message and not a weather report.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now diagnose this message you saw, and state what you think were its indications.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Well, my memory on it actually is rather hazy, but the one thing was that it was in a voice form.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean "in a voice form"?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Of the type of "East wind rain," of that type. Those were not the words on the message, as I remember.

[13098] So it was in the voice form transmitted by Morse station. It did not appear, the indications at the time were that it did not appear at the beginning of the message, but appeared in the middle of the broadcast, which, again is not correct for the Morse broadcast.

There was no indication that it was repeated at the end of the message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And your point is then that under the original code messages, there was a difference in the position of the key words where the message was to be sent in a voice news broadcast, and where the message was to be sent by Morse code?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. With respect to the position of the words?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the difference?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. In the voice code it was to be sent in the middle of the news broadcast, repeated twice, and also at the end of the broadcast and again repeated twice and those are the keys which indicated that this was a code message and not a weather report.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what was the requirement with respect to an intercept that would come in, in code?

[13099] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That it would be repeated five times at the beginning and end of the broadcast.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, your voice broadcast code message would be No. 2353 which had the words Higashi No Kaze Ame and the other Japanese phrases appearing in the middle of the broadcast?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Whereas the second message establishing a winds code was No. 2354 which had simply the single words Higashi and Kita and Nishi with the recital, "The above will be repeated five times and included at the beginning and end"?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What you are endeavoring to tell us, as I understand it, is that in order to qualify as a true winds execute, the executing message must comply with those requirements?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. For you as an officer interpreting that message to give it authenticity?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct. It must comply absolutely with the rules laid down by the Japanese, otherwise they, their own people, would have no means of knowing that this was an execute message.

[13100] Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any discussion to that effect between you and Colonel Minckler at the time you saw this message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Only that I pointed out to him what the discrepancies were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And did you conclude from that that it was or was not a true winds execute?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is very positively was not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You don't know where Minckler got the message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what was the color of the paper?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was yellow.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And was the message the original typed message or the carbon copy?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. My memory is very clear on that point, that it was a carbon copy and was not an original.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What became of the message after you saw it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Minckler left with the message, and that is the last I ever saw it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever see any other alleged winds message except the FCC one that you mentioned earlier in your testimony?

[13101] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there ever at any time any information given to you by anyone with whom you came in contact that a true winds execute message had been received, except the FCC one?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No sir; there has not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You never saw another?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And no one ever told you of another?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it would have been part of your duty, would it, to have seen and inspected and evaluated a message of that type?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Not necessarily, sir. Since I was in charge of the intercepts, it very probably would have been called to my attention, or I would have heard about it in one way or another, but I would not necessarily have seen it. I did not see nor hear of the FCC message, for example, the message of December 8.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The FCC message did not come in through either the Army or Navy channels?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you supposed to have contact with intercepts that came in through Army sources?

[13102] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I had contact with all intercepts that came in, sir, regardless of where they came from.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Army or Navy?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Army or Navy, that came into our office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Colonel, there has been some explanation with reference to this but I want to ask you a question about it.

There appears in connection with our exhibit which shows these intercepted messages, and their translation and deciphering a great deal of variation in point of time, point of elapsed time between the receipt of the original message and its ultimate decoding, translation.

What is the reason why one message will come in at 9 o'clock in the morning and be translated by 10 o'clock and another message will come in at 9 o'clock in the morning and not be translated for 2 or 3 days?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Actually there are very many reasons for that, sir.

First of all, in many cases, the key to a message had to be obtained before the message could be deciphered. This may take anywhere from 15 minutes to a week or even to a month, or we may never recover it.

It depends on many factors.

[13103] Then, after the message is deciphered, it would go to the translators, and in many cases the message would be scanned for information and the more important messages or the messages that appeared to the translator to be more important would be pulled out and translated first, and the messages which appeared of lesser importance would be translated during more or less free periods of the translators, when they did not have more important material to work on.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the fact that there is a difference in the time in which various messages have been translated cannot be laid to any negligence or slothfulness or delay or oversight in handling the messages?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir; I don't think so.

There is one thing on all of these messages coming in. There is no way of knowing what a message is about, or the importance of a message until it is actually deciphered and scanned by a translator. Externally there is nothing in the message except that you know that certain systems tend to be of more importance than others.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just one question.

You saw the message that came in, you say, on the 8th of December?

[13104] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I saw that recently, sir. I did not see it at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Then my question would be of no value. That is all.

Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. In whose hands did you say you saw this message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Minckler brought it in, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you say that you did not know where he got the message, from whom he got the message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not recall that he specified who he had obtained it from, sir.

Senator GEORGE. In your first examination on that point, did you say you had the impression that he got it from Colonel Sadtler?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I had the impression at the time that he had obtained it from Colonel Sadtler.

Senator GEORGE. That was just an impression?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was only an impression, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Do you remember the date of the message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. The only recollection I have of that is that it was 2 or 3 days prior to Pearl Harbor. [13105] That would be about December 4 or 5. I cannot place it any closer than that, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You are satisfied that the paper you saw was not the winds execute message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I am positive that it was not, sir.

Senator GEORGE. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask this question, if you will: After you saw the message that was intercepted on the eighth, did you interpret it as being a true execute message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir. I don't think there is any doubt that that was a true execute message, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had seen it on the day it had come in, you would have interpreted it as being a true execute message.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. There would have been no doubt whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. You say this was not a genuine winds execute message and you give some very clear reasons for that statement.

The question in my mind is as to why this matter of whether this was or was not a winds execute should be debated at such length as to get all around to the departments, and [13106] have a disagreement here before this committee on it.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That was the thing that puzzled me at the time, sir.

Mr. CLARK. It was a highly important question, was it not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. At that time, I don't think it was so important, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Why were you monitoring for it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. We had started monitoring for it about November 26.

Mr. CLARK. Why did you do that, if it wasn't important?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I think the importance of that message decreased as time went on.

You see, at the time that this came in, we knew that the Japanese were destroying codes.

Mr. CLARK. What I am trying to get at is why there was all this debate, if I might so term it, or discussion, of whether this was or

was not a true execute message, in the Navy Department, in the Army, and through all these hearings.

I am puzzled to know how that should occur if it was so plain that that was not a winds execute message.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Sir, this is a guess on my part: I honestly have not remembered this incident until [13107] recently.

Mr. CLARK. What was that?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I had not remembered this particular incident until recently. I think the reason that is hazy in everyone's mind is that they had thought it was a true winds execute, and then had found out that it was not which more or less wiped the thing from their memory.

Mr. CLARK. But if the message so clearly indicated that it was not a winds execute message, as you have stated here and for the reasons you have stated here, how could anybody be uncertain about it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Sir, I believe that is the same message that Captain Kramer had seen, I am positive that it is, although I do not know.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I think so too, for that matter.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Captain Kramer, if you will remember, testified that he did not check that the message appeared in the proper form or in the proper place in the broadcast. He checked only the translation.

Now, the thing that puzzled me at the time was how he could possibly have passed this as being a true winds message when it was obviously not, and I think his explanation of that explains what happened and why he did at the time think it was a true winds execute message.

[13108] Mr. CLARK. According to your testimony it showed on the face of it that it was not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was very obvious that it was not.

Mr. CLARK. Still there is all this debate through all these years, which surprises me a little, coming from the Army and the Navy Departments, about a matter of that kind. It looks like it is something that could have been settled.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I think it was settled and came up again much later after people had forgotten about it. I think that is what happened.

Mr. CLARK. It has certainly cut a big figure since that time.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas is not here. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Has Captain Safford talked to you?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I have not talked to Captain Safford in several years.

Mr. MURPHY. Has he ever talked to you about this particular piece of paper?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Not to my memory.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster is not here, Mr Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. No questions.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have one further question now, Mr. [13109] Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you ever talked with Colonel Minckler about this message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir; I have. Colonel Minckler has a very hazy recollection of having handled what was believed to have been a winds execute message. In other words, another false alarm.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you discuss with Colonel Minckler whether he got this paper that you saw?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I did, sir; and he does not remember.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. You are unable to tell us what words were used in the message you saw?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not remember what the words were, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were there more than one group of words?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. As I remember, there was one group of words and the message heading, and that about all that was on the paper.

Senator FERGUSON. How large a sheet of paper was it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was standard teletype width; about [13110] 3 or 4 inches in length.

Senator FERGUSON. Three or four inches in length.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't that indicate that that was not the entire broadcast?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir; it was not the entire broadcast.

Senator FERGUSON. Then how could you tell that this wasn't used at the end of the broadcast? You say it was not used at the end and was not a genuine message.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. There would have had to have been some explaining on the message. I do not remember why I knew this had to appear at the end. There must have been some comment on it placed on it by the operator. I do not remember actually.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see any handwriting on the message, interpretations or translation?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I actually do not remember such, sir. It is my impression that there was some writing on it, but I honestly do not remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did Minckler tell you in substance that this was not repeated at the end of the original message received?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir. There was something on [13111] the paper, as I remember, which indicated that it had not been repeated.

Senator FERGUSON. Why are you so sure about the fact that it wasn't at the end and that is the reason you discarded this message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was not repeated, sir. You see, this particular broadcast called for it being repeated five times, and it was not repeated five times. There was nothing to indicate it had been repeated five times.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't you tell the stations when they were monitoring not to send anything in that wasn't repeated?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. We told station 7 that, but did not tell station 2. We told station 2 to monitor those particular stations and transmit all, to send in all transmissions from these particular stations.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, where did it originate, the one that you saw, where did that message originate?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. At the time I had thought it was from the FCC. It could not possibly have been from the FCC, however, and it was not an Army intercept. If it had been an Army intercept I would have been the first to have received it.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you didn't have the entire [13112] message, I am at a loss to understand how you could tell, if it indicated it was torn off, how you could tell that this was not repeated at the end and repeated the proper number of times. Wasn't this true, that you had difficulty at times getting the entire message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is very true, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. By reason of static?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, you would have to have some direct information as to whether or not the static did interfere, whether they did get the entire message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct. The operators would normally indicate that on the intercepted copy. They would make some such mark as "Transmission faded before the end," or some remark of that nature.

Senator FERGUSON. But this was not an Army intercept, this was somebody else's?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. The Navy also did that. All of the intercept operators.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us if there was such a message on this or not such a message? I mean writing indicating that it did or did not fade?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not remember that there was, but still there must have been a comment by an operator or [13113] it would not have been obviously a false message.

Senator, if the message had contained only the heading and the message itself, "West Wind Clear", or whatever it may have been in Japanese, then there would be no way of knowing, except in this case there would be only one thing wrong with it, it would show the station call signs and frequency and one line of text, and then an operator's intercept time. That must occur on every copy. So if it contained the call sign of a code station and three words in the voice form, then it would not comply with the Japanese instructions to start with. However, that alone would not be conclusive.

The message must have had some comment that this appeared in the middle of it, weather broadcast, or some such words. I do not remember what did occur on the paper, however.

[13114] Senator FERGUSON. But you had forgotten all about this because in your present testimony you did not even mention it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And by sitting here in the room and hearing testimony from the Navy your memory was refreshed?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. Captain Kramer, when he was explaining what happened to this message that he thought it was original, explained what had puzzled me at the time and that brought the whole incident back to me.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had testified in a previous hearing that you had heard of an intercepted telephone conversation in which Kurusu used the expression—or Tokyo used it to him—"East wind,

rain", and that he had expressed the opinion that he was sorry to hear that, isn't that correct?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. When Colonel Clausen visited me in Italy he had a number of these intercepts with him. He did not have the complete file. He showed me, as I recall, one telephone conversation between Kurusu and Tokyo and I remembered very distinctly that there was a telephone conversation in which they had discussed a number of other things which Colonel Clausen did not have with him and my memory at that time, without having a complete file, [13115] was that a direction, wind direction had been in one of the conversations. My memory was faulty on that point. I had not thought of those conversations since December 1941, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Colonel, you swore to that in the affidavit, that you had remembered of a conversation between Tokyo and the embassy here in which the wind code was used, "East wind, rain" and that even the Ambassador, Kurusu, had expressed the opinion that he was sorry to hear that. Now, how could you be mistaken on a thing like that, which was so vital and so important at the time?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not think it was so vital or so important at the time, sir. Also, remember that this happened—this was nearly 4 years after the event.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. And I had not thought of the event since. There had been no reason to recall the event.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do you now testify that you did never hear of a conversation between Tokyo and the embassy here in which "East wind, rain" was used and the expression by the Ambassador or someone at this end of the line that he was sorry to hear that?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Senator, I must have been mistaken on the matter, and a bad memory on my part because there is no [13116] such conversation in the files. There are conversations, one conversation in which they are discussing a special movement.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, the fact that that is not in the file is what causes you to change your testimony?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir, it is not. Sir, in going through the file and seeing the complete things it has brought back many things that I had not thought of since then which fit into a pattern.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the reason for the change of the testimony?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, this message that you were picking up on the teletype, was it brought for you, brought to you, that you might evaluate it and determine specifically whether it was a genuine winds code execute message or not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not think so. I think actually that Colonel Minkler had intended to discuss it with another officer who was out at the time and that he showed it to me since I happened to be present.

Sir, incidentally, in respect to this message, we did call in one additional officer who verified that it was a false winds message.

Senator FERGUSON. This was not your duty, then, to determine whether or not this was a false winds message?

[13117] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. If we had received a winds message, it would have been passed on to other officers to evaluate in addi-

tion to myself. Sir, if we had received a winds message from station 7, for example, it would probably have come to me and I would have evaluated it and passed it on with whatever evaluation I placed on it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then even though this was a false winds message your duties would have caused you to pass it on to someone else to have their determination as to whether it was true or false?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you account for the one that you determined was false, as you now tell us, not being passed on by you to someone else to determine its truth or falsity?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Minkler was my chief at the time, sir, and we did call in an additional officer, who would have been one of the officers who would evaluate it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was that officer?

Senator FERGUSON. Now, who was that officer.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was Colonel Rowlett.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not get the name.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Rowlett.

Senator FERGUSON. Then would you say that he would be [13118] able to tell us about this consultation that you had over this winds code?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I have asked him, sir, and again he has no memory on the thing.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, why did this so-called wind execute message become of very little value around the 4th or 5th?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Largely because we knew at that time, this winds message, sir, indicated a tenseness in relationship and in addition to that carried instructions to destroy codes and confidential papers. We knew at that time that the Japanese were destroying codes and confidential papers because we had other messages directing that that be done.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, had you ever seen the Batavia message where they interpreted the original codes as meaning war?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I had not at the time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So as I understand it, then, in your department at least, that when you received the other indication, the other notice following or indicating the destruction of codes and the tenseness of the situation, that you disregarded the winds message idea?

[13119] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Not disregarded, sir, but the winds message would have had very little importance at that time. November 27 or 28, it probably would have been quite important, but after we had the code destruction instructions, but then it became of less and less importance.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, how do you account for the fact that you did not keep in your files all of these so-called wind execute messages whether they were true or false for some higher authority if they ever did want to look over them to determine your judgment?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Sir, I don't think there was any reason for keeping them. We used to get in reams of paper and there was no point in filing a piece of paper which is determined to be worthless and that is what this piece of paper was.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on this Batavia code it appears that on the 5th of December Batavia sent to Miles—he was your chief, was he not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. This you see decides the code meant war. You never saw that?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. So far as I know that message had—no, sir, I had not seen it until this hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. And you cannot give us any idea what [13120] the words were, whether they were in Japanese or in English or whether a translation was written on the margin or at the bottom?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Sir, I have an idea what the words would be. My memory of that, any memory I would have at this moment of them would be a reconstruction of what I think was on it. I do not actually remember.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want a guess.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel, for your appearance.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment, Mr. Chairman.

Were you working the 6th and the 7th?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir, I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any knowledge of the pilot message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did the pilot message come in and when was it translated as far as the War Department was concerned? You know what I mean by the pilot message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir, I do. Sir, Saturday morn- [13121] ing I was home sick and I was called to come to the office by Colonel Minkler some time Saturday afternoon. The basis for that call, to the best of my knowledge, was the pilot message.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you saw it when you came in in the afternoon?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I did see it after I came in, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was completed and translated?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what time would you say that was?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. As I remember, I got to the office about 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And do you know of any reason why it was not distributed, if it was not distributed, that afternoon?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I am quite sure that it was, sir, because a message of that type would not have been held up.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a very important message, was it not? It indicated a certain time of delivery of a 14-part message which was to be a reply to the message of the 26th of Secretary Hull to the Japanese Government?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir, and that was the basis of opening up the Army SIS Saturday afternoon after it had been closed.

[13122] Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, do you know when that pilot message would be delivered to the Navy? You say it was a very important message.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not know on that specific message, sir. Normally those messages were sent over at the same time or prior to their delivery by us to G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you would not want to deliver the messages in their regular course, which was the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, the War Plans and G-2 and the various other deliveries?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. We were responsible only for delivery to G-2, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. The distribution was made by G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. And when you delivered to G-2 you would deliver to the Navy?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. At the same time.

Senator FERGUSON. At the same time?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right, sir, or prior.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Or we would deliver to the Navy prior to delivery to G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That is, you would not deliver to G-2 so that they could make their deliveries before the Navy [13123] officially knew that you had one?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir; that would create an embarrassing situation. If the Secretary of State, for example, had a message and the President had not had it, it would not be too good.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. In other words, you were responsible for the Secretary of State and they were responsible for the President, so you felt that the delivery should be made simultaneously?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Insofar as possible, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Without unnecessarily delaying an important message.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. And this being an important message you feel that it was delivered to the Navy at the time?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I am quite positive that it was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Although I do not actually know.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean you do not remember the transaction of passing over the message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir, because that is one thing that we used to watch carefully, is that messages were delivered to the Navy.

[13124] Senator FERGUSON. And you being called in at this particular time because you had been ill and off that morning, you saw to it that these important messages went out, is that correct?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. We got rather mixed up on our days again Saturday night and Sunday and anyone that hap-

pened to be there more or less took charge of anything that was going on at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. But that was later at night?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That was later at night; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, isn't it true that you then knew there was a 14-part message coming in—in fact, it was coming in that afternoon, was it not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with that, are you not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did bring the staff back so that they could work and get that message out?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. To the best of my knowledge that was the reason that they were called back, because we were anticipating the 14-part message and we wanted to be sure that we got it to the people concerned as quickly as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, that is what the pilot message was and that is why you were going to go back, to get the fourteenth part? [13125]

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right. The pilot message was alerting the Japanese, so we were alerting ourselves.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. When did you get the 13 parts completed?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not remember the exact time, sir. It is in the record, I believe. It was some time Saturday evening. I do not remember the exact time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would it be 9 o'clock?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. My memory actually is it is about 9 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. About 9 o'clock.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, then, did you get the 13 parts—why did you want to send out 13 parts and not send out 10 or 12? Was there any reason why you did not use 13 or decided to send 13 parts out?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Well, actually, sir, all the deciphering of that message was done by the Navy since they had started it. The normal practice was if you had several parts of a message you tried to get the message as complete as possible and find the set if it did not unnecessarily delay things. As I remember, the 13 parts in themselves were [13126] not too important and they were hoping they would get the part which would say more or less what would happen.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, then, why did you deliver the 13 parts? The evidence indicates it was delivered to the President around 9 o'clock.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Because the fourteenth part was missing and we did not have it and could not find it.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you think that you had missed that entirely?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. We thought that we had missed it completely at the time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And is that the reason for delivering the 13 parts?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would your department call anyone to tell them that you were going to deliver a message later?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not know, sir. We delivered it to G-2 and then further discussion would be by them.

Senator FERGUSON. By them?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. And their set-up on that I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you work all night that night?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what time the fourteenth part came in?

[13127] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not know. So far as I know the only copy of that fourteenth part that was received was a copy from, I believe it was station S and the Navy received that copy and it was on a Navy cryptographic date so that they would have gone ahead and deciphered it.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you see the fourteenth part?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I saw it some time Sunday morning, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How early?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not actually remember the time. It was a considerable time before noon, I recall, because we had sufficient time to get the message to the Secretary of State prior to 1 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you say you worked at the Department all night?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The whole night?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not remember seeing it early in the morning, the fourteenth part?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you see the so-called 1 o'clock message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I saw that shortly after it came in, [13128] sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at what hour?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Let's see, I might be able to find that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Sir, my memory on that is rather hazy. The times are not actually shown as to when it came in. My memory actually is that I saw it shortly after I saw the fourteenth part, or about the same time. I think that was around 9 or 10 o'clock Sunday morning, but that is very, very dim.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, as I understand the hours that they were received it was around 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That was the time they were intercepted by the intercept station, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And you had the key to these messages, did you not, the fourteenth part, because it came in in the same key as the other parts?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir; it came in in a different key.

Senator FERGUSON. It did?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It came in under the date of the 7th, sir. You see, part of this fourteenth part message was keyed on the 6th and part was keyed on the 7th.

[13129] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know if there was difficulty in finding the key for the fourteenth part?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I am positive we did not have, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Positive?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you account for the fact that it took until 9 o'clock? You were working there all night; it came through your department. This message came in around 3 o'clock in the morning. Why would it be until 9 before it would be translated?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Sir, we did not—that was a Navy date. We did not have it. However, I think I can explain it, because we were looking very, very hard for the fourteenth part and we had thought that we had missed it. If you will notice, that fourteenth part was filed about 12 to 14 hours after the thirteenth part.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, it came in about 12 hours later.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was filed about 12 hours later, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was filed about 12 hours later?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right and there was no indication on the message that it was the fourteenth part until they started on it. What we were doing was looking and check- [13130] ing and rechecking every message that came in from Tokyo that was filed about the time of the other messages, of the other parts.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at the top of the translation, in forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appears the plain English phrase, "Very important".

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you had a flag right on here.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Not that it was the fourteenth part, and the fourteenth part was the most important thing we were looking for at the moment, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had a flag over here?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It does not necessarily mean anything.

Senator FERGUSON. It does not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir. The priorities are a little bit inconsistent at times. In this particular case it did, but you could not use that as a rule to go by.

Senator FERGUSON. And that "S. T. T." at the end, what does that mean?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Station S forwarded by teletype, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the Army?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir; it was not. That was a Navy station.

[13131] Senator FERGUSON. As a matter of fact, the Army did not get this message at all on teletype. They received it as translated.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. So far as I know the station S copy of that message is the only copy that we ever received.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you get the 1 o'clock message? That is your translation, isn't it? That is on page 248, "the time of delivery one o'clock on the 7th, your time"?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir, that was translated because the Navy had no translators that morning. It was decoded by the Navy and they sent the plain text over, the plain text version to the Army and one of our translators translated the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that come into your department to be translated?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Not the department that I had direct responsibility for, sir. It would have come into the section of which I was a member.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what time it was translated?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, look across on page 249, the top [13132] message. [Reading:]

After deciphering part 14 of my 902, and also 907, 908 and 909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

When did you first see that message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I also saw that one some time Sunday morning, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you give us the hour?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I cannot actually, sir. My memory actually for the 7th of December is rather hazy as far as events of the night and specific times. I had been there all night and I was getting pretty sleepy at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't suppose you received any more important message than the one that I just referred to, the 910, after they got these messages to destroy at once all the remaining cipher machines and all their codes; that ended it, didn't it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right. As I remember it, that message was given special handling, sir. That was given to G-2 as quickly as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. If it came in at 5 o'clock in the morning when should it have reached G-2 if it had had special handling?

[13133] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It would not have been by 5 o'clock in the morning. It was intercepted by station S at 5 o'clock in the morning.

Senator FERGUSON. How long should it take to be teletyped to your office?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It would have been teletyped to the Navy office, sir, and it would take probably a minimum of 20 minutes up to even 2 hours to be teletyped in.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see General Marshall at all Saturday or Sunday?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see General Gerow, General Miles?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir. Our contacts, Senator, would be with G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. 910 was filed by the Japanese at 6:44 p. m., Washington time, 4:44 a. m. 7th of December. Intercepted in Japanese code in naval station at Bainbridge Island, Washington, 5:09. Teletyped in Japanese code to the Navy—blank; decoded by the Navy—blank; sent by the Navy to the Army—blank; translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy code (A) 6th of December 1941; no hours given.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right, sir. We checked very carefully at our end to try to find times on these and there [13134] just are no times in existence unfortunately.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, will you tell us what you worked at? The 13 parts were out and delivered by 9:30. What did you work on the rest of the night if you didn't work on these messages when they came in the next morning?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. We were doing a number of things, sir. One of the things was trying to get the fourteenth part. That was our object, our major object in there at the time. We had stations send in notice of everything that they had in the hopes that one of them might have the fourteenth part. No one ever dreamed that the fourteenth part would have been following 14 hours later and I was looking for, as I recall it, a message that was filed about the time of the other 13 parts and when we did not get such a message, then we merely assumed or thought we had missed it.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Colonel, you had two other very important messages, 907 and 910, the 1 o'clock and the destruction of code messages.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Those were Navy dates, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Those were Navy dates. Those messages were messages the Navy processed.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, the fact that it was Navy day after midnight, is that what you have in mind?

[13135] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, you were not personally, your department was not personally responsible?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Our responsibility would be to get the cipher text to the Navy, sir, if it came in from an Army station. If it came in from a Navy station, then the Navy would keep the message and process it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand it, then, you had these divided so that even though this was a very vital and important time and you were waiting for the fourteenth part and other messages in relation to it, you had split the time up so it was definite and you sat there and waited?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir; we did not. We went over and checked and rechecked all messages coming in in the hopes that one of them might be the fourteenth part, but we would not have looked for a message that came in there 14 hours later with any idea that it might be the fourteenth part of the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if you were only over there and checking and you were there working the whole night, at 5:07 in the morning this No. 910 was in.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It came into the Navy, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But did you go to the Navy to check it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. We were working very closely with [13136] them that night; yes, sir. We did not check on this particular message because we did not know of the existence of that message until after it was decoded and translated.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot give us any time then on these two messages, the 1 o'clock and the destruction of codes?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not remember, no, sir; except that I do know it was sometime Sunday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all. Thank you very much, Colonel.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the next witness?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel Phillips.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Phillips, will you be sworn?

**TESTIMONY OF COL. WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
UNITED STATES ARMY**

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is your full name?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Walter C. Phillips.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And will you for the record state your Army experience?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have had almost 29 years' service. I came in on the examination, headed the examination in 1917, a graduate from the University of West Virginia, as a [13137] provisional second lieutenant. At the end of 2 years, which covered the World War period, I had served in command capacities most of the entire time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What do you mean by "command capacities"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I acted as a platoon commander; I commanded first a platoon and a company, for a time a battalion. I attained the rank of captain and for a short period was sent to the general staff of the Ninth Division as assistant G-2.

In 1919 I came to Washington attached to the general staff in G-2, or the Intelligence Department. I remained here until 1922 when I went to China in the capacity of G-2 for Maj. Gen. W. D. Connor. I remained in China until 1926 as G-2.

In 1926 I returned to Fort Benning, in which I completed the company officer's course. In 1927 I went to the Eighth Infantry in Georgia, later up at Charleston, S. C. In 1929 I returned to Fort Benning, took the advanced course and was retained as an instructor until 1934.

From 1934 to 1936 I was with the Sixth Infantry and in 1936, in the fall, I went to Fort Leavenworth, graduated in 1937.

I joined the First Division in 1937 and remained with the First Division, being the G-3 or operations and training officer of the division until January 1941; actually till Febru- [13138] ary 1941.

In December 1940, after a very successful series of maneuvers in the First Division, where I was operations officer, General Short requested that I come to Hawaii as chief of staff. I was going with the First Division, as I thought at that time; I was very well satisfied with my job and I requested some time to think this over.

In the meantime, having known General Marshall for many years—he was then Chief of Staff—I requested an appointment with him to talk over this jump to foreign service. I came to Washington and had my appointment with General Marshall, whom I had known since 1921.

He told me, speaking very freely, that General Short had spoken to him when he had conferred with him about having me come to Hawaii. General Mashall stated he thoroughly approved and directed that I attempt to bring the Hawaiian garrison as to training

up to the present training of the First Division, which he considered the best in the Army at that time.

I returned to my station in New York City and told my commanding general, Gen. Carl Truesdale, of this conference or the results of the conference. He had approved the conference prior to my going to Washington.

In February I sailed for Hawaii and joined the staff of [13139] the Hawaiian Department on March 1.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And when you joined the Hawaiian Department did you become its chief of staff at that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What was your first assignment when you arrived at the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My first assignment as a rather roving staff assignment was to go through the various staff sections and to thoroughly acquaint myself with their various and sundry problems. I had desired this opportunity and General Short approved. I moved through and worked in the various sections for a period of about 8 months.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And when did you become chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. On November the 5th, 1941.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that you had been in the Hawaiian Department since about the 1st of March?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Since the 1st of March.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And became the chief of staff of the Hawaiian Department on the 5th of November?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Of 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. 1941.

Mr. KAUFMAN. After the time of your appointment as chief of staff were you familiar with the coastal frontier defense [13140] plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Were you familiar with the message sent by the Navy to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, on November 24, 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe I recall it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Who called your attention to that message?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would like to refresh my memory on that. I am not sure; I cannot recall it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Have you got the message before you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, we will come back to that.

Do you recall the receipt of the message from General Marshall under date of November 27, 1941, which is on page 8 of Exhibit No. 32?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do.

Mr. KEEFE. What is the answer? I did not get it.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Coming back to the message of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, which is Exhibit 37, on pages 32 and 33, I ask you to tell us whether those two messages were called to your attention at that time.

Colonel PHILLIPS. This one and the next one?

[13141] Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have seen the first message, I recall that, but I do not recall the second.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You recall the message from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, under date of November 24, 1941, which is on page 32 of Exhibit No. 37; is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that was called to your attention on or about the date that the message bears, that is, namely, November 24, 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; that is to the best of my recollection.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Up to that time you were familiar with the tenseness of the situation in the Pacific?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was generally; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And did you become familiar with the correspondence between General Short and General Marshall which is in evidence here, Exhibit No. 53?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was acquainted with that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that was part of the studies that you made during the time you had this roving staff commission before you became chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

[13142] Mr. KAUFMAN. So that we have it that prior to the 24th of November you were familiar with the correspondence between General Marshall and General Short; that is correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And we have it that you were familiar with the growing tenseness of the situation in the Pacific?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And we have it that you were familiar with the coastal frontier defense plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the Martin-Bellinger report of 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had read that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And we have it also that you saw the message from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, on or before November 24?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not positive about that date, on or before, but to the best of my recollection that is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And in that message you saw that the Chief of Naval Operations advised the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet that the outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that a surprise attack might be expected in any direction at any time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Particularly to Guam and the Philippines, I believe—including Guam and the Philippines.

[13143] Mr. KAUFMAN. It says that a surprise movement in any direction, including attacks on the Philippines or Guam. Do you recall that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, a surprise move in any direction did not exclude Hawaii in your mind?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It did not include it at that time due to the inclusion of the Philippines and Guam.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did it exclude Hawaii in your mind?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not know that it did entirely. Such a thing was always a possibility.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then is it one of the things that you discussed with General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did, repeatedly.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then on November 27 you received the message from General Marshall?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is on page 8 of Exhibit No. 32.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct?

Mr. KAUFMAN. And on the receipt of that message you conferred with General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And according to his testimony the conference did not include any other officers except you and General [13144] Short. Is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think that is correct. I was under the impression at one time that G-2, Colonel Fielder, now General Fielder, was present, but he may not have been present.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General Short testified that you and he were the only persons that considered that message at the time of its receipt.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that within a half an hour after the receipt of that message General Short made his answer.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is generally correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And what conference did you and General Short have during the half-an-hour period between the receipt of this message of November 27 and the time he sent his telegram, his dispatch to the War Department stating the receipt of that message of November 27 and advising them that he has alerted against sabotage and made liaison with the Navy; what conference did you and General Short have?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have made some notes here in regard to the estimate of the situation that we made at that time.

The Army has always had a five-paragraph method for making a formal estimate of the situation. While we did not actually write this estimate out at the time, if it had been written it would have followed generally this form.

[13145] Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, are you answering my question, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I see.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am. This is part of the conference.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I see.

Colonel PHILLIPS. This was the entire conference, which consisted of the estimate of the situation, which was necessary to arrive at a decision on General Marshall's message.

The first paragraph in the estimate of the situation is the mission.

The Hawaiian Department had several missions. Our primary wartime job would be to defend the fleet and naval base at Pearl Har-

bor and to defend the airfields on Oahu. In peacetime our job was chiefly training and preparation for our wartime mission.

When I went to Hawaii, General Marshall told me specifically that he wanted the training brought up to the high standard set by the First Division. In late 1941 we had the very pressing duty of training air crews to ferry planes to Gen. Douglas MacArthur. We were part of MacArthur's support in this way.

No word from Washington in any way purported to relieve us of our training mission. We had only six B-17 Flying [13146] Fortresses in condition to use, which we needed for this Air Corps training.

Second paragraph. This is the estimate of the situation.

Second, the situation and the opposing lines of action. In this paragraph an Army commander and his staff consider the capabilities of the enemy and all the reasonable lines of action open to our side. Our facts were briefly these:

The Navy had task forces out and was conducting that kind of distant reconnaissance to the fullest extent they believed necessary and to the greatest degree possible consistent with their mission to prepare for raids on the Japanese mandated islands under WPL-46. The Navy was not worried, and we had only six planes which they could have borrowed to make their distant reconnaissance more effective. Six planes could cover an arc of only 8°. Six planes could only cover a small arc so far as degrees were concerned.

The Navy did not feel that such coverage would so substantially add to their security as to justify depriving us of the planes so vitally needed for training and for all possible support to General MacArthur in the Philippines.

Our enemy intelligence came from Washington and the Navy. We felt they had more than they gave us, but we assumed, and reasonably, that they could not be so foolish as [13147] to withhold vital intelligence from us.

Senator LUCAS. You mean the Navy in Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You said "Washington and the Navy."

Colonel PHILLIPS. I meant Washington, sir. They told us only that an attack might be expected in the Philippines, Kra, Guam, Borneo, or somewhere in the East.

They told us to expect hostile action. We believed they meant sabotage. After we were alerted to prevent sabotage and so reported to them, we received three more sabotage messages. This made us absolutely sure they meant sabotage and not some other unmentioned form of hostile action.

[13148] Since General MacArthur might expect to be attacked, according to the intelligence sent from Washington, it became even more important that we continue our training of ferry crews because our mission included this type of support to him.

We weighed those considerations. We had three alerts to choose from.

Under the third paragraph we analyze the opposing lines of action open to the enemy. On this planning had been very careful. We knew we could prevent sabotage, and we did. We knew we could not stop an air attack. We did not have the necessary planes. The only

way to do it is to locate the carriers more than 300 miles at sea and sink them by plane or naval bombardment before they can launch their planes and begin the attack.

The Army could not locate the enemy at such distance. Radar was considered effective only to 100 miles, and at that time provided no means of friend or foe identification.

The Navy had the job of long-distance scouting and patrolling, and they were doing their job with task forces. They were doing it to the greatest extent consistent with their potential offensive mission to raid the Marshall Islands.

The Navy believed there was no danger of an air raid. We were there to support the Navy—to defend their base and [13149] the fleet within it.

Paragraph 4 of the estimate is:

We compared our lines of action. Alert 2 or 3, if adopted, might help to disorganize an air raid, but an air raid was only a bare possibility. On the basis of intelligence from Washington, on the basis of what the Navy thought, and in reliance on the effectiveness of the most complete reconnaissance the Navy could furnish, we felt that preparation to defend against a bare possibility should be weighed against the urgent need to continue training. We could adopt alert 1 and fulfill all our missions, our defense mission to prevent sabotage which we and the War Department expected, and our training mission. Or we could adopt alert 2, or 3, and stop training, abandon our urgent training mission, to better prepare ourselves for the bare possibility of an attack which the War Department did not expect.

I knew from the dispatches which Admiral Kimmel and General Short received that the War and Navy Departments did not want the Rainbow plan implemented until Japan committed the first overt act.

I knew also that General Short had been ordered not to alarm the public, not to disclose intent, and not to inform any more than the minimum essential officers.

You can't put people out to shoot at enemy planes, unless [13150] you tell them to shoot. These were the lines of action as we compared them. We did not have the "magic" which Washington had, and we did not have the hindsight which is now open to everyone.

Paragraph 5 in our estimate is the decision. We made the decision to order an alert to prevent sabotage. We ordered it. We reported to the War Department, and as General Marshall testified, we were reasonable in our assumption that if Gerow or Marshall disagreed with what we had done, they would tell us what they wanted us to do.

In conclusion, I want to add that I fully approved of General Short's decision to order alert No. 1. I feel also that I share any responsibility that he bears for that decision. That decision turned out to be wrong, but it was as right as we could make it at the time on the information we had.

That is what we discussed during that 30-minute period.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You could not have discussed all of it, because a large part of what you have just read did not happen until long after the 27th of November.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Isn't that so?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

[13151] Mr. KAUFMAN. So what you have really given to us is your reasons, or your justification for having agreed with General Short in alert No. 1 against sabotage. Isn't that the fact?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have given you in that statement exactly what we covered. Generally speaking, we covered every subject, with the exception of the additions that I heard here.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Who prepared this memorandum for you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was that memorandum seen by anybody besides yourself?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not positive about that. Of course I did not type it. I have no means of typing it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did General Short's counsel see that memorandum?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I showed him a copy of it; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When did you show it to him?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say. Perhaps 10 days or 2 weeks ago, when I thought I was going to testify at that time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, did you inform the Navy that you were alerted against sabotage only?

[13152] Colonel PHILLIPS. We informed the Navy that we were alerted for sabotage. We had a naval liaison officer in the G-3 office that was thoroughly conversant with everything that was occurring in our headquarters.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, I will ask you, Colonel, whether you advised your corresponding number in the Navy, the chief of staff, that you were alerted only to sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, because that was not within my line of duty. That was not part of my job.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, now, you were the chief of staff of General Short in command of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And Admiral Smith was the chief of staff to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the primary function of the Army was to protect the fleet at its base?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And do you want us to understand that you did not tell Admiral Smith, then Captain Smith, the chief of staff, that you had alerted only against sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not personally. We had liaison officers in our staff, whose primary duty things of that kind [13153] were.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, you heard Admiral Smith testify, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe I did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, did you hear Admiral Kimmel testify?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you know both of them testified that neither of them knew that you had any alert other than a general alert? You knew that, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I heard Admiral Kimmel testify to that effect; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you know that Admiral Smith testified to the same effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know about that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The record shows that he so testified.

Senator LUCAS. Who is the liaison man?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Who is the liaison man?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Lieutenant Burr.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Lieutenant Burr?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was at that time; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What did you mean in the dispatch that you sent to the War Department in reply to their message of November 27, that liaison with the Navy had been made?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My impression of the meaning of that [13154] sentence was that General Short—that was his message, not mine—General Short intended to convey to the War Department that he was working very closely with the Navy, and merely telling the War Department, or assuring them that we were cooperating fully in that respect.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was the Army justified in believing that liaison with the Navy meant the invocation of the coastal frontier defense plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not think so at all.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You do not think that they were justified in so believing?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not think so.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that the only impression you wanted to create on the War Department was that you had very close relations with the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

[13155] Mr. KAUFMAN. And those close relations did not even contemplate your telling, or General Short telling to their corresponding numbers in the Navy the fact that you had alerted only to sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was not part of my duties, as I have just stated. We had liaison officers for that purpose.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now you had liaison officers with the Navy whose purpose it was to do what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. A liaison officer's purpose is to keep—liaison from the Navy—is to keep the Navy completely informed of everything that occurs at our headquarters.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that liaison officer was directly under you, was he not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was in G-3, under my G-3. No, he was not under me; no, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you make any inquiry from G-3, or from anyone else, as to what information the liaison officer with the Navy had given to them?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Personally I do not recall that I did. However, that was the biggest bit of information that had occurred in that headquarters for many weeks, and there was no question about everybody there knowing exactly what had happened.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then can you explain the testimony of [13156] Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Smith that they did not know that you were not on a general alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot explain the testimony of anybody.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It is apparent then that something went wrong either with your headquarters or with your liaison man?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Our liaison officer was a naval officer, liaison from Admiral Bloch's headquarters, whose duty it was to inform the Navy, and if there was any falling down or dereliction there on his part, I do not know about it. He was an officer of a very high type and had been specially selected, an outstanding naval officer.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Could I suggest, Colonel, that you have not answered the question that I just asked? Would you be good enough to read it, Mr. Reporter?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Colonel PHILLIPS. It may be it is apparent, but it is not particularly apparent to me that anything went wrong. Of course the liaison officer perhaps did not inform him about it, he may have forgotten it, but that was highly important and everybody knew of it. It is possible that the liaison officer from the Navy, although I do not know why, had no reason for it. He would be the best witness on that.

[13157] Mr. KEEFE. Will you permit an interruption at this time so I can get this clear in my mind?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Was this liaison officer sent to you from Admiral Bloch's Fourteenth Naval District?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or from Admiral Kimmel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Admiral Bloch.

Mr. KEEFE. So he would report to Admiral Bloch, would he not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And not to Kimmel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That man you spoke about was from the Fourteenth Naval District?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Under the command of Admiral Bloch, and not from the fleet command under the command of Admiral Kimmel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You testified before that the primary duty of the Army in Hawaii was to protect the fleet, did you not?

[13158] Colonel PHILLIPS. Protect the fleet, the installations on the Island of Oahu, the base of Oahu and the fleet when in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is right. So that you want this committee to understand that notwithstanding the fact that it was the prime duty of the Army to protect the fleet at its base, that nevertheless you did not conceive it your duty to make known to Admiral Kimmel, or to his chief of staff, that you had done nothing except to order an alert against sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My duty did not include informing Admiral Kimmel's staff. Our liaison, I will repeat again, was from Admiral Bloch's headquarters, and he knew everything that was occurring in our headquarters, and it is a reasonable assumption to expect that that officer was doing his duty at all times. He was a very high-type young officer.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I am not talking about his duty, Colonel, I am talking about your duty as chief of staff. Within a few hours after you

dispatched the answer to General Marshall's warning to the Army you saw a copy of the dispatch to Admiral Kimmel, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Which dispatch was that, sir?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Of November 27. It started, "This is a war warning."

[13159] Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, yes, sir. I was told of that dispatch by General Short. I did not see a copy of it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You were told about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you were told that it started out with the phrase, "This is a war warning"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now did that put you on your toes any further?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; but it went on say that Kra Peninsula, I believe. Could I see a copy of it to refresh my memory?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

(The document was handed to Colonel Phillips.)

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is your answer now that you have seen this dispatch?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was told of that dispatch by General Short. Of course I felt, and we all did, that war was a possibility, but not in Hawaii. That dispatch of itself there states where we should look for war.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You say that you regarded this dispatch as excluding Hawaii, is that right?

[13160] Colonel PHILLIPS. Certainly not including it. It was a possibility, but Hawaii was never mentioned.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I realize that it was not mentioned, but will you point to the language in that message that excludes Hawaii as one of the theaters of operation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There is nothing that excludes Hawaii. I did not so state.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that Hawaii was included with more direct emphasis on other places as more likely probabilities, isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know that Hawaii was included at all. It does not say so.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, will you tell me where Hawaii is excluded in that dispatch?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It perhaps is excluded by not naming it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the message of November 24 indicated an attack in any possible direction, did it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; Guam and the Philippines particularly.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, then, will you explain why the Army should have been warned at all if Hawaii was excluded from the field of operations?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Hawaii was not entirely excluded. [13161] We were there for that purpose. Our job was a defensive job.

Mr. KAUFMAN. A defensive job?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Purely and simply, and we were preparing in every possible way, if and when such a thing occurred. There was no indication up to that time that it was at all imminent or indicated in any way by any dispatch that we had received.

Mr. KAUFMAN. After the receipt of the message from General Marshall and your having been told of the Navy message to Admiral Kimmel, how many meetings did you have with Admiral Smith between the 27th of November and the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had no meetings with Admiral Smith as Chief of Staff.

Mr. KAUFMAN. No talk with him at all?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No. I had some meetings with General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and perhaps a member of his staff would come to Fort Shafter, that is the headquarters of the Army. I would attend all of those meetings. Admiral Smith never came with Admiral Kimmel at that time to Fort Shafter, and vice versa. I never went with General Short during that period to Admiral Kimmel's headquarters.

Mr. KAUFMAN. How many meetings were there between Admiral [13162] Kimmel and General Short during that 10-day period?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say, Mr. Kaufman. I believe General Short testified as to that and had the dates. I should say four or five.

[13163] Mr. KAUFMAN. And you attended those meetings when they were held at Fort Shafter, but you did not attend them when they were held in Admiral Kimmel's office?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So how many meetings did you attend?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not recall, during that period.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you explain how it is that during the several meetings you attended, there was no mention made of the fact as to the alert that you had given your men, your command?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The subject as such perhaps did not arise. These meetings were usually called for specific purposes. One subject was relieving the Marine garrison at Wake by the Army, and another one, I believe, was taking pictures of the Marshalls. Those subjects were discussed rather fully, as I recall.

I am not sure on that point.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now coming back again to this message of November 27, to General Short, you are familiar with the words, "You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." Do you recall that language?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You, in the memorandum you read to the [13164] committee a few moments ago, testified that you only had six reconnaissance planes, and therefore could not undertake reconnaissance.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Is that what you want us to understand?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was the Navy's job under the joint Hawaiian coastal defense plan to conduct distant reconnaissance.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Do I understand you to say that the Army could not undertake the carrying out of this order of General Marshall?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We were conducting at the time the only reconnaissance we were required to conduct, and that is inshore patrol from Bellows Field, with short-distance reconnaissance planes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You know that this order from General Marshall did not refer to inshore patrol, do you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Reconnaissance.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did not you want us to understand before, when you read that statement, that by reason of the fact the Army only had six reconnaissance planes, it could not undertake long-range reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, the Army's job was not to conduct long-range reconnaissance. Perhaps my memorandum, [13165] or purely notes, was misleading in that respect. That was the Navy's function entirely.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then you want the committee to understand that the coastal frontier defense plan had been invoked? Is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It had not, in its entirety; no, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Had any part of it been invoked?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had had many exercises, about 1 week, as I recall, as a matter of training for the distant reconnaissance with the Navy, and we expected that to go into effect whenever the Navy required our planes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel, I think we ought to stick to the question.

I asked you a little while ago with respect to the order of General Marshall directing reconnaissance whether you want us to understand that by reason of the fact that the Army only had six planes, you could not undertake reconnaissance. You said that your memorandum was misleading on that point, because it was the Navy's job.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It was the Navy's job to do the reconnaissance; is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The distant reconnaissance; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is right.

[13166] Now, the distant reconnaissance that was to be undertaken was under the coastal frontier defense plan, isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, you know, do you not, that the coastal frontier defense plan, before it became operative, had to be invoked by action of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel? You knew that, did not you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You know that that defense plan had not been invoked, do you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe so.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, will you explain to the committee then how you could have expected the Navy to do the reconnaissance under the coastal frontier defense plan, if the plan had not been invoked?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They had planes, I forget the number, of the kind that were capable of carrying on distant reconnaissance. They were to call on us for what long distance bombers we had, and if they needed them, we were to supply them.

That could have been done any time.

[13167] Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel, I still misunderstand you.

You told us a moment ago that you expected the Navy, under the coastal frontier defense plan, to do the long range reconnaissance.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You told us also that that reconnaissance was to be done under the provisions of the coastal frontier defense plan. You told us that.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You told us also that that was not to be done until the procedure under the plan was to be invoked by Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You told us also that the provisions of the plan had not been invoked, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, will you explain to the committee, if the plan had not been invoked, how you could have expected the Navy to make that long range reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The plan, as I recall, could have been invoked at any time. I am not extremely clear on that one point.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, now, it could have been invoked at any time, but it wasn't at any time, according to the [13168] testimony of General Short, and I understand your testimony to be to the same effect.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Captain Ford has given me a statement here, that I may read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Whose statement is it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This is from General Short's statement which is now an exhibit, I believe, page 28, covering this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask: Do you want to testify, Colonel, from General Short's testimony, or do you want to give the committee your testimony?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This is a statement of testimony from the Roberts Commission.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Whose testimony is it before the Roberts Commission?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Marshall's.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, do you want to testify from someone else's testimony, or give us your testimony; that is what I want to know.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I merely wish to state, sir, that long distance reconnaissance was the Navy's problem.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, if counsel will permit, Colonel, I don't think there is any doubt about that under [13169] this record, sir.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't think so either.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, why not answer counsel's question?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am trying to answer.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I am trying to inquire from you, Colonel—it may be that I haven't made myself clear—I am trying to inquire from you as to how you could reasonably expect the Navy to make the long range reconnaissance which you have testified was to be done under the provisions of the coastal frontier defense plan without an invocation of that plan by General Short, and Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you told us that that plan had not been invoked.

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was the Navy's duty to institute the long range reconnaissance.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It was the Navy's duty?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you blame it on the Navy that they didn't do their job; is that it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not. They were carrying out their reconnaissance in the way that they thought suitable for this purpose, as I stated in my notes here, with their [13170] task forces and with what planes they could afford to use.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, I read to you, Colonel, the provisions of paragraph 2, under subhead 2 of the coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaiian Department, Fourteenth Naval District, which is part of Exhibit 44 in this record. It says:

When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District) agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficient imminent to warrant such action, the Commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other Commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warrant, in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans—

That contemplates, does it not, Colonel, that there must be an agreement by the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and General Short that conditions warrant the invocation of this plan; isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It seems apparent, yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that until this plan was invoked, neither you, as Chief of Staff, nor General Short had the right to anticipate that the Navy was doing its job under [13171] this agreement until you agreed that they should do it, as a result of which you, the Army, would have certain reciprocal obligations; isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It seems apparent.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that that is apparent, is it not, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that nobody, apparently, in the Army or the Navy made inquiry from each other after these warning messages as to whether any new condition arose that required attention; isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. These messages at first were building up all the time. We were still waiting for some indication, if any, that we were in the line of fire, still considering that it was a possibility but only a possibility. There was no indication in any message that we got from Washington or that we got from the Navy that Hawaii was in the line of fire.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Is that the best answer you can make to that last question?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, Colonel, are you familiar with the so-called magic, now?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have heard a great deal of it; yes, [13172] sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Have you read it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Somewhat.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Somewhat.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you state in the statement that you make here, the memorandum that you read, that if you had had that magic you would have been able to come to a better conclusion; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

For instance, the dead line of the 25th, 29th, and the dividing up of Pearl Harbor, and things of that kind would certainly have given us a better idea of what was going on.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, you say there are three things, as I understand it, which, if you had had at the time, would have given you the basis for better decision; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct. Those three things, of course, any and all of the information which was pertinent, would have given us a much better idea of what was going on, and, of course, our decision was based on the information only that we had.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, now, what information do you claim there is in the intercepts that you did not get in the messages of November 24 and November 27?

[13173] Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot be specific on that, other than I have been, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, you have been specific to the extent of referring to the dead line date of November 25, and November 29; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Didn't you get a fair summary of everything that went before and even what came after in the telegram of November 27?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We didn't so consider it at all.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You didn't?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you disregard the message and the directions that you got from the War Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at all. We didn't get anything about a dead line date. We didn't get anything about dividing up Pearl Harbor.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, we will come to the division of Pearl Harbor in a minute. You are talking about the dead line date.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You have notice on the 27th that negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes?

[13174] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Isn't that a fair summary of everything that had gone before in the intercepts?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You don't know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know about that because I am not thoroughly conversant with all the intercepts.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then, if you are not thoroughly conversant with all of the intercepts, will you explain to the committee your statement that if you had had the intercepts you might have come to a different conclusion?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am merely stating what I heard here.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You stated that because you heard Admiral Kimmel and General Short state it; is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at all.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Do you know whether there was anything in any of the intercepts that mentioned Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that if you did have them all they wouldn't have helped you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of course, the chopping up of the harbor certainly mentioned Pearl Harbor.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, we come to that. When you are talking [13175] about chopping up Pearl Harbor, you are talking about the message on page 12 of Exhibit 2; is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I guess that is it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, now you heard the testimony of various officers with respect to that message, didn't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have heard some testimony; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Most of them have testified that this has no relation to an air attack. You have heard most of them testify to that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know about that, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Most of them have testified that this was a convenient way of charting the harbor so as to avoid extra words in messages; you heard that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; I have heard that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But you say notwithstanding that testimony and all of the facts with relation to the intercepts, that if you had had this particular piece of evidence on or about the date that it was translated, namely, October 9, 1941, that it would have changed your entire course?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It would have affected us, I am sure.

[13176] Mr. KAUFMAN. Affected you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Affected us very much in our decision.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, coming back again to the joint coastal defense, coastal frontier defense plan, did you not regard the war warning of November 26 and 27 as a sufficient basis for invoking the provisions of that agreement?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not have that in my power. That was General Short's, and I was his chief of staff.

[13177] Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you discuss it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The matter was discussed.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you discuss it with General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was discussed at the time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You and General Short discussed it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was discussed, I think, in the staff meetings.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When was it discussed in the staff meetings?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, we had many staff meetings after the 27th, sometimes two or three a day. The heads of the general staff.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you want us to understand that the question of invoking the joint coastal frontier defense plan was discussed?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that it was determined by General Short and his staff and that it was unnecessary to invoke the provisions of that plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no decision ever made in the staff meeting; the matter was brought up to the general's attention, and it was thoroughly discussed at the time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then do you want the committee to understand that it was suggested to General Short and that he just [13178] took no action with respect to the suggestions that were made?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at all; no, sir. The matter was discussed in staff meetings and there was no specific suggestion one way or the other, as I recall. I have no notes of those meetings, and it has been 4 years ago.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What action was taken on the subject, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no action so far as I know.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, the message of November 27 called for reconnaissance, and reconnaissance could only be had under the coastal frontier defense plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Short felt that the reconnaissance that the Navy was making at that time with their task forces and our inshore reconnaissance was fulfilling that directive.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, the directive was to the Army to make reconnaissance; was it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you didn't think that it was your duty to advise the War Department that you were just making the inshore patrols 20 miles out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The War Department had approved the plan of distant reconnaissance under the joint Hawaiian defense plan.

[13179] Mr. KAUFMAN. The War Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. And the Navy Department.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The War Department and the Navy Department both approved the joint coastal frontier defense plan that we have been talking about?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that, as I indicated to you, and read from paragraph 2, contemplated that it would be put into effect on the agreement of the commander in chief, Hawaiian Department, and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Now, under those circumstances, I ask you again whether Washington was not justified by reason of your statement of liaison with the Navy, your telegram of November 27, to assume that you had invoked the provisions of this coastal frontier defense plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not think so.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What information do you want this committee to understand you would have needed before you would have invoked the defense plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is very difficult to say. That was General Short's problem, and I am not capable of answering that question.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, Colonel, you testified a little while ago that by reason of this telegram of November 27 and parti- [13180] cularly that portion of it that directed you not to alarm the civilian population that you conceived that the only requirement was the one to alert for sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That seemed at the time to meet the situation.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And meet the situation because you didn't want to alarm the civilian population?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was only part of the requirements. We were to restrict the information in this message to the fewest possible number. If we had alerted to alert No. 2, which was against sub-surface, surface, and air attack, we would have put everybody out all over the island, not just running around with a helmet on as in training, but going to actual war with ammunition. If we had gone to alert No. 3, the worst that the enemy could do, we would have put troops in position all over the island, around the perimeter, digging position, and, of course, the information to the entire command.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, you say you wanted to do this thing very quietly because of the requirement not to—the requirement to avoid notifying except a limited number of officers?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And also to avoid alarming the civil [13181] population?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right; not to disclose intent.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Not to disclose intent.

Now, I read to you from Admiral Smith's testimony. It is at page 9,087 of this record. Admiral Smith testified:

I saw the Army go on the alert on the late afternoon of the 27th, the streets were full of them, going in all directions, manning the bridges, public utilities, but I did not know how far their alert went.

Then at a later point he testified that the roads were all blocked up with your men taking their positions.

So that the civil population did know that there was something going on, did it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They perhaps knew that there was something going on. We were moving into radio stations, we were moving to bridges, as a drill. That is very simple. You have a very small proportion of your command. But I do not believe that the streets were blocked by troops moving at that time. I believe the admiral perhaps is mistaken.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe the admiral perhaps was mistaken. We didn't have that number of troops out, there weren't that number required on the sabotage alert.

[13182] Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, now, were you here yesterday when Captain Layton testified?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was here a part of the time only.

Mr. KAUFMAN. He testified yesterday, as I understand it, I was not here, that he understood your alert was the highest type of alert that the Army could have. Can you explain that testimony?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot explain Captain Layton's testimony; no, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You knew Captain Layton, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. He was the fleet intelligence officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is true.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And did you have any contact with him at all?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, personally.

Mr. KAUFMAN. During the week preceding December 7 was your attention called to the fact that the Japanese consul in Honolulu were burning their codes and secret papers?

Colonel PHILLIPS. During the week preceding December 7, as a matter of fact on the morning of December 6, it was reported to my staff meeting that the Japanese consul was burning papers. Not codes, codes were never mentioned, [13183] but burning papers at that time, or had shortly before that. That was reported by the assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, and that fact was reported by me as well as Colonel Fielder, the G-2, to General Short, that the Japanese consulate were burning papers.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was that a suspicious circumstances in your mind?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not particularly. We did the same thing. It is customary on foreign stations to burn many.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you make any inquiry as to the extent of the burning?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No more than the report from Colonel Bicknell, Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell at that time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you know during the weeks preceding December 7 that the Navy was concentrating on training?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know that I knew that specifically. We were all training. All services.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you know that they were getting ready to carry out the orders under WPL-46?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not know that specifically.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Didn't you read that in the message of November 27 to the Navy when it was shown to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That message of November 27 of the Navy—I was only informed of that message. I saw the [13184] 24th message that I have testified about.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Didn't you know that the message of November 27 to the Navy directed them to take defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks provided for in war plan 46?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I may have been acquainted with that at the time. I don't recall just now. General Short told me the contents, informed me of the contents of that message.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But you didn't have it in mind at that time, apparently?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe that is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. If you had that in mind, would that not have imposed a greater obligation on the Army to protect the fleet while it was in the harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know that it would.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. It is practically 12:30. We will recess until 1:30. (Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[13185]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Does counsel have anything at this point?

Mr. KAUFMAN. No further questions at this time, sir.

**TESTIMONY OF COL. WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
UNITED STATES ARMY (Resumed)**

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have any statement you desire to make, Colonel, before your examination is resumed?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would like to amplify and finish a reply to a question that I was making this morning, by reading from the Army Pearl Harbor Board, volume 1, page 26:

General MARSHALL. Distant reconnaissance was a naval function, and the Army Commander was liable to furnish them such of the planes suitable for that purpose that could be provided.

Army Pearl Harbor Board, volume 1, page 43:

General MARSHALL. As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved in the deep reconnaissance, would have been in detaching the units to serve under the Navy.

Army Pearl Harbor Board, volume 1, page 47:

General RUSSELL. Well, is it your view that both [13186] having seen the message of November 27, without more ado, the Navy could have started their distant reconnaissance?

General MARSHALL. That is right. That is my view.

Now that was the view of General Short and General Short showed the message of the 27th to Admiral Kimmel.

That is all I have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, Colonel, what is your purpose in reading General Marshall's testimony before another inquiry to this committee?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The purpose was to complete my answer this morning, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you want General Marshall's testimony to stand as your testimony?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This was the testimony before the Pearl Harbor, Army Pearl Harbor Board, yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Why are you reading the testimony of General Marshall before the Army Pearl Harbor Board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is part of my answer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You are taking General Marshall's testimony as your testimony?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is part of my answer, sir, yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You want it understood, then, that you are taking part of General Marshall's testimony before [13187] another inquiry as your answer to questions presented to you here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you adopt that as your answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, as part of my answer, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did that have anything to do with your knowledge of the facts as they existed out at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at all. I know General Short's opinion. General Short's opinion was that he showed the message to Admiral Kimmel in regard to long-distance reconnaissance, and that was quite sufficient.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you know then what General Marshall said before the Army Pearl Harbor Board was exactly what General Short thought?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How do you know that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Because I know what General Short thought, and I have just read you what General Marshall testified, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Why did you not just tell us what General Short thought out there at that time, and not what General Marshall might have thought?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This was merely part of my reply [13188] this morning, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you knew what General Short thought out there at Hawaii at the time the thing happened, why did not you just tell us that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I tried to tell you that this morning, sir, that it merely added emphasis to it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You think by referring to General Marshall's testimony you can better tell us what General Short thought?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not necessarily, sir. I merely thought it added emphasis to my reply.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, as I indicated this morning, I do not think there could be any doubt from this record that it was the duty of the Navy to conduct long-range reconnaissance.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But that was not done, was it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Long-range reconnaissance was being conducted as the Navy commander, Admiral Kimmel, judged necessary, as far as we thought at the time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you know that long-range reconnaissance was not to be conducted by the Navy at that time?

[13189] Colonel PHILLIPS. They had task forces at sea——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about task forces.

I am talking about long-range reconnaissance from Oahu.

Did you know the Navy was not conducting that type of long-range reconnaissance back in December 1941?

Now, you would know now what you knew then.

Colonel PHILLIPS. We knew they had task forces at sea, and that those reconnaissance that the task forces conducted were certainly long range.

[13190] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you know the Navy was not sending any long-range reconnaissance planes out from Oahu in December 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Personally, I did not know that, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not know that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, you stated that you arrived in Hawaii March 1, 1941.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And became chief of staff, or, rather, took over the duties of chief of staff of the Hawaiian Department on November 5, 1941.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you spent about 8 months out there in Hawaii becoming familiar with your new duties as chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, most of your experience had been as a training officer, had it, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not entirely, by any means. I spent 9 years in general staff duty out of my service that I gave you this morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As I understood General Short's testimony, he indicated very clearly that one of the main [13191] reasons that he wanted you out there was because of your special qualifications for training purposes. That is true, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Had you served as chief of staff of a division or department before?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Only temporarily as chief of staff of the First Division.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How long?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Just a short period.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How long?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe about 2 weeks.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Two weeks. But you had had a great deal of experience as a training officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had had much experience as a training officer, and also in a staff capacity, and much command.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were recognized in the Army as a man with special qualifications for training purposes, weren't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is very flattering, sir. I do not believe I was particularly. I had done a fair job with the First Division.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, when General Short states [13192] that to this committee you accept the compliment, don't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Thank you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you know that is in substance what he stated here, don't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know that; no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is not that about the effect of what he stated here, that he especially wanted you because of your ability as a training officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know his testimony on that at all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He rather emphasized the training feature of it in discussing you before this committee, as I recall.

Now you state that you saw the Navy message of November 24 to Admiral Kimmel.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You read that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; to the best of my recollection, I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You, of course, bore the contents of that message very definitely in mind?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In your work out there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13193] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now this message states:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.

You understand that, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading) :

This situation coupled with statement of Japanese Government and movements their Naval and Military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility.

You considered what that message said in that respect, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading further) :

The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressee to inform senior Army officers their areas.

And it goes on about the necessity of secrecy, and so forth.

Now, just what did that message mean to you, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That message meant to me Guam or the Philippines were in an attack in any direction, but it did not say any distance. Hawaii is thousands of miles from that locale.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You make a distinction between the [13194] use of the word "direction" and the word "distance"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Much distinction; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, then tell me about it. I am interested to know.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Simply because you can attack Guam and the Philippines, and that is not so very far, or you can attack the China coast, or you can go down to Borneo and the Kra Peninsula and still you haven't gone very far, but that is in most every direction.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And because the word "distance" was not used in this message it did not mean much to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; it meant a great deal, but it did not mean as much as it certainly would have meant if they had mentioned Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I can understand that. But why would it have meant more to you if the word "distance" had appeared in it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Because distance has a great deal to do with the sailing of a ship, that is an amphibious attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the Army was not so much concerned with the distance that ships had to sail, was it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, we were concerned with how an attack was going to get there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. Did you ever consider that [13195] war was inevitable with Japan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, I think we all did. We thought it was imminent.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you reach that conclusion?

Mr. MURPHY. What was that last?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He said he thought it was inevitable and he thought it was imminent.

When did you reach that decision, please, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, I should say about that time, November 24 to 27, in that general period.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was your definite conviction that from about November 24 to November 27 war was inevitable and imminent?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We felt so; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was your personal view about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, then, let us look for a moment to the message of November 27. You stated that you did not see that message but General Short told you about it. That is the Navy message.

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Navy message; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Navy message of November 27.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13196] The VICE CHAIRMAN. From the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. You say you did not see it yourself but General Short told you about it, is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did he undertake to tell you in detail what the message contained?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And gave you full information about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Had you known or heard of any Army or Navy message before in your experience beginning with the expression, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have never heard that expression before, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And General Short told you that that was in this message?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And what did that mean to you then, by those words being used in this message?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Just as I have stated, sir, It meant war was imminent.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. War was imminent between Japan and [13197] the United States?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We already felt that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You already felt that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You then accepted this?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This is additional evidence.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As additional evidence?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And after you knew of these words in this message there was not any doubt in your mind at all that war was inevitable and imminent between Japan and the United States?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would not say there was not a doubt, sir, at all. I felt that—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You felt it was coming?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I felt that it was coming; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now the message goes on to say:

Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased.

You understood that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

Aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

You understood that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13198] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That aggressive action by Japan was expected within the next few days?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was within a few days from November 27, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now that is a period. Down at that point there was not any doubt in your mind as to what this meant, was there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

That was additional information that was given you, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13199] The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

That was a definite direction, a positive order, from the chief of naval operations to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then the message followed with about three or four more lines.

Now, Colonel, you have told us that you saw and studied, with General Short, the message from General Marshall to General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On November 27, 1941, the same date as this last Navy message we have been talking about?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, that message starts out:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

That was a direct, definite statement of information, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I don't believe I have that, sir.

[13200] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Can counsel supply the colonel with a copy of the message of the 27th from General Marshall?

(A copy of the message was handed to Colonel Phillips.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have it before you now?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It begins:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is a direct, definite statement of information?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You understood that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

That is another sentence. You understood that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You understood that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

That is a statement for information, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

This policy should not repeat not be considered as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

That is definite instruction to General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

That is direct order from General Marshall to General Short, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you so understood it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13202] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, you say that after you and General Short received and studied that message for about a half an hour, then you sent a reply, General Short sent a reply to General Marshall that he was alerted to sabotage and had liaison with the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Colonel, point out to me where the word "sabotage" appears in this message of November 27 from General Marshall to General Short.

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is not in the message. It does not appear, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

You stated this morning that you did not personally notify anybody in the Navy that the Army in Hawaii was alerted only to sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; that was my statement this morning. That was not my—I might amplify that, sir, by stating that liaison with the Navy was not part of my job. I was carrying out at General Short's directives, as he directed, how he desired his chief of staff to function. I was functioning strictly according to his directions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it has been a good many years since I served in the Army during the First World War, but the chief of staff to any commanding officer is [13203] just his right arm, isn't he?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The duties of the chief of staff are prescribed sir, but how the commanding general employs his chief of staff, or any other member, is entirely a matter up to him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is right. It is up to the commanding officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; the commanding officer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. One commanding officer or commanding general has a definite outline of duties for his chief of staff that sometimes are quite different from those of another commanding officer or commanding general; that is true, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Always different. I have never seen two alike.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think I agree with you on that.

In other words, it depends to a great extent on the personality of the commanding officer or commanding general, doesn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; entirely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Some of them rely more largely upon their chief of staff than others, don't they?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Some of them require much more of [13204] their chief of staff than others do; isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what was your experience with General Short? Was he one of those who relied a great deal upon his chief of staff, or not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He did, a great deal. He carried out the directions in our staff manual and my duties in the Hawaiian Department as well as the duties of Colonel Hayes whom I succeeded, were prescribed almost exactly in the staff manual.

If you care to have me read it, I will read it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No. But there isn't any manual or any written document that can cover all of the things that a commanding officer or a commanding general expects or requires of his chief of staff, is there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at all. That is quite correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was my experience, and I served a little while as regimental adjutant. My colonel always told me, "Captain, every time you come to me, it is an admission that you are just not big enough to handle it yourself."

You have had experiences of that kind, haven't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think most everybody has that has been on much staff duty.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Colonel, did you ever have a [13205] conference with then Captain, now Admiral, Smith, who was Admiral Kimmel's chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, sir. That is, what date do you mean? I have had conference with him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, he testified before this committee that he never had had any conferences with you from the time you became chief of staff of the Hawaiian Department to December 7, 1941.

Colonel PHILLIPS. After December 7, we had many.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After December 7, you had many?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. We had several, I should say. I don't say "many."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But they were after December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you also told us that you never had any conference with Captain Layton who was G-2 of the Navy in Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you have conferences with any of the Navy staff officers?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I had conferences with, oh, Captain DeLany, who was the operations officer; I had conferences with a number of Admiral Bloch's staff on various and sundry subjects, and at different times.

[13206] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you have any conferences with the members of Admiral Kimmel's staff before December 7, 1941, while you were serving as chief of staff of the Army there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe I did, sir. General Short handled that entirely himself, and he had naval liaison, a navy liaison officer, Major Fleming. He would—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you have answered my question. You said you didn't have.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I did not personally.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you read this morning a memorandum or a statement to the committee that you stated that you showed to General Short's counsel about 2 weeks ago?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you write that statement?

Colonel PHILLIPS. About that time; a little before that, I should say, maybe 2 weeks ago.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About 2 weeks ago?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; maybe three.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Maybe 3 weeks ago?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About 3 weeks ago you wrote this statement and showed it to Short's counsel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13207] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was Captain Ford?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Have you revised it or changed it any since you wrote it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Somewhat.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In what respect did you change it after you conferred with Captain Ford about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't think I changed it in any material way at all. I just had the one copy here, and I gave it—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The reporter took it away from you.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you remember any changes that you made in your statement that you wrote 2 weeks ago after you conferred with Captain Ford, General Short's counsel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

The only thing I think I put in was—I had “seize Marshall Islands,” instead of “raid Marshall Islands.” That is the only change I made.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you write this statement from your own personal knowledge?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You didn't confer with anybody or [13208] have any assistance from anybody?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At the time you wrote the statement?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is your own personal statement dictated by you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Written by me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Written by you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you write it out in your own handwriting?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then had it typed?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was about 3 weeks ago.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think so; 3 or 4, I am not positive about it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now it reflects your recollection then of things that transpired out there at Pearl Harbor in November and December of 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was an effort on my part to set forth what would have been in a written estimate provided we had written one.

[13209] It is provided in the manual that—I am a book man, I am an Army-school man of quite some experience, and in making an estimate we have a certain form of mental process that you go through and I merely drew this up to conform to that regular form of the estimate of the situation which we made at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Colonel, in writing this statement 3 weeks ago did you write it as you would have written it on December 7, 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I put some facts in there that I couldn't possibly put in on December 7, 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. So in some respects it is your present knowledge?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Your present knowledge up to date?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Four years after the attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, there wasn't any written estimate made by you back there the first part of December 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And was any written estimate made by you at any time after you assumed the duties of chief of staff?

[13210] Colonel PHILLIPS. There was not. I wrote a series of notes, just scratch notes, that I kept for a year or so and lost them in the shuffle somewhere. There was no written estimate at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Colonel, you mentioned three messages that would have enabled you to make a definite decision had you known about those messages at that time; that is true, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Mr. Cooper, I hadn't made a study of this magic at all. I haven't read the entire—anything like all that have been submitted, but I have heard here in testimony certain things that I can state now I am sure would have had a definite effect on our thinking had we known them at the time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, you mentioned three.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The message dividing up Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the first one you mentioned?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At least that is one of the three.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what was the date of that [13211] message dividing up Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, I—I have no idea.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it was some time before the attack, wasn't it? Several months, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. The 24th of September.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let me examine the witness.

Do you have any idea of what the date was?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had it here this morning, sir. I have heard it was the 24th of September.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You heard that just recently?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I heard it just now.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I was hoping to find out when you knew about it.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you think that if you had known of that message on September 24, the date of it, why, you would have been able to take definite action then?

Colonel PHILLIPS. September 27, it would have affected our decision—I don't mean September 27, November 27, it would have affected our decision much had we known that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In what way? What would you have done that you didn't do?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It would have give us more of a [13212] background than we had.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just what would you have done on November 27 if you had had this message of September 24 that you didn't do on November 27?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We at least would have thought that the Japanese were making a plan for the bombing of Pearl Harbor. I would say that that was a bomb plot, so far as I was concerned.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you first hear the expression "bomb plot" used?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Years ago. That is a normal thing in aviation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you first hear the expression "bomb plot"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you know it was years ago?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You know that it wasn't since this hearing started when Mr. Mitchell started using the term?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You heard it years ago?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had never heard "bomb plot of Pearl Harbor", but I had heard "bomb plot" used. You put a "bomb plot" out for bombing practice.

[13213] The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you first consider this message of September 24, 1941, as a bomb-plot message for Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I heard it here in testimony.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Here in this testimony?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you had never considered that term before, had you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had never heard of the message before.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. Now, did you know that Japan had requested somewhat similar information for other places?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Panama Canal or the west coast or other places?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it is your considered opinion then that this message of September 24, 1941, couldn't mean anything but a bomb plot for Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I didn't say that, sir. I think that is what it could mean. It might have meant something else but to me that is what it meant; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is what it means?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13214] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You do not agree with all the other witnesses here who have testified that it might simply mean the Japanese desired to get information of this type about this and various other installations?

Colonel PHILLIPS. What evidence is that, sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I say, you don't agree then, if evidence has been given to this committee that the Japanese desired to get this information, that that was rather in line with their desire to get detailed information about many other places and harbors and ports throughout the world?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot testify to what the Japanese desired.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. Now, the other two messages mentioned by you were the dead-line message of November 25 and the one of November 29?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what would you have done on November 27 that you didn't do if you had known about this message on November 29?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In making our estimate on November 27 we were influenced greatly by the small amount of information that we

actually had and any additional information that we could have gotten or that we might have had at that time [13215] would have its effect on our decision due to the fact that we must consider it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understand, but you told me that on November 27, when this war-warning message came, that you were definitely of the opinion that war was inevitable and imminent.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right; that is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. How much could have been added to that conviction that you already had by the messages of November 25 and 29?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Additional information. You cannot have too much intelligence in making a decision and we considered on the twenty-seventh that we had actually very little enemy information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you had a direct war-warning message in front of you, didn't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; we had a war-warning message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you had direct orders from the War Department to do certain things, didn't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you had the conviction at that time that war was inevitable and was imminent, didn't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We thought war was imminent but not [13216] war in Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You thought it was imminent between the United States and Japan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What you really wanted then was for the War Department to tell you when and where the attack would be made by Japan, was that it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It would have been very nice, but we hardly expected that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What did you expect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We expected, of course, some indication, some indication from the War Department that at least Hawaii was in the battle zone.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Didn't you consider the message that hostile action might be expected in any direction, didn't that cause you to think that Hawaii might be in the battle zone?

Colonel PHILLIPS. "In any direction." That is, again, the distance there, sir. We considered that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is there in the message——

Colonel PHILLIPS. Hawaii is a long way from Japan.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is there in the message of November 25 and November 29 that refers to Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I haven't made a definite study of [13217] those. I don't think there is anything that definitely says anything about pointing directly to Hawaii. However, it would have given us more information of additional enemy information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. You say Hawaii or Pearl Harbor, is not mentioned, referred to even remotely, in the messages of November 25 and November 29, the two deadline messages?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is true.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then what additional information would that have given you about an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The deadline message would have given us the idea that war is coming at that particular time. We would have had the time anyway.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you had had the time you would have been expecting the attack on Pearl Harbor, wouldn't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say that, no, sir; but that would be additional information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What, in either one of those messages, would have caused you to think it applied to Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We at least would have had one element. The time and place. The place wasn't supplied but the time was, and it would have been given due consideration by General Short in arriving at the decision as to what form of alert he would take.

[13218] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what was the time that that message would have given you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of course, the 25th; we would have had the 25th; the 29th we would have had the 29th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the attack didn't occur on either date?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Didn't come for over a week later?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So it wouldn't have been worth anything as far as time is concerned?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Just for consideration.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just for consideration?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It couldn't have been worth anything as a place because there wasn't any place indicated, was there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not so far as I know, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think that is all.

Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Colonel, you say you did see the naval message of November 24?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. In which it was stated that Japan might [13219] strike in any direction?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That was the effect of it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. With an enumeration as to certain places it was believed that the strike would come. I believe that is in this message of the 24th.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Guam and the Philippines.

Senator GEORGE. In any direction, including an attack on the Philippines and Guam as a possibility. And General Marshall's message of November 27, of course, came directly to the Army in Hawaii. That is, the message of General Marshall to General Short.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. That same message, of course, was sent to General MacArthur, and to the commanders everywhere in all of the areas. That was received and it was on that message that you immediately acted?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And alert No. 1 was put into effect. I believe it was alert No. 1. That is, the alert against sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And there was immediate notice given [13220] to General Marshall by General Short that he had so interpreted his message of the 27th. Did you have any information at all that the sabotage alert was not adequate, in the light of the message of the 27th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had no information on that, sir. As a matter of fact, that afternoon we got a message from General Miles, the G-2 in the War Department, which definitely directed sabotage, as I recall. I haven't the message here. We got one from General Adams on the 28th to which we replied at great length also on sabotage, and we received one also on the 28th from General Arnold also on sabotage.

Senator GEORGE. In other words, following the message of November 27, you had three messages, all dealing with sabotage from Washington?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. But you had no message that what General Short had done there was inadequate? That is, no direct reply asking that anything else be done by him?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, did you receive the December 3 message relating to the destruction of codes or machines by Japan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You didn't have any message of that kind?

[13221] Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you have any message from Washington indicating that the Japanese were destroying their codes from the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th of December?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. We received no messages other than the three sabotage messages from Washington until the message from General Marshall which came in about 3:30 on December 7.

Senator GEORGE. After the attack.

Colonel PHILLIPS. After the attack.

Senator GEORGE. I have the impression, Colonel, that the December 3 message was received by General Short. It is from OPNAV for action CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14 and COM 16:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

You say you didn't receive this message?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Well, did you have any information from the Navy in Hawaii that they had received this message, that the Navy had received it?

[13222] Colonel PHILLIPS. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Well, when you say that you didn't get this message, do you mean that you didn't get it as chief of staff, or that General Short didn't get it, so far as you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It didn't come in to our headquarters.

Senator GEORGE. It didn't come to your headquarters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And you had no notice from the Navy of the receipt of it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. It would have been the duty of the Navy to have furnished you with this information, would it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know, sir. We expected to get everything that pertained to us from the Navy that they had.

Senator GEORGE. And then there was another message of December 3, which possibly does contain the same information.

In that message you are not mentioned as an action addressee, that in the Army, but you are mentioned as an information addressee, and you had no information about that message?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

[13223] Senator GEORGE. That didn't come to the headquarters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you learn of a message from Washington relating to the burning of codes on the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. All you had was information that the Japanese consul was destroying certain official papers or important papers?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had information on the 6th, it was brought to our attention by the assistant G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, at the staff meeting at 8 o'clock on the 6th, that the Japanese consulate was burning papers. We had no information in regard to the codes.

Senator GEORGE. You had no information regarding burning of codes, and destruction of code machines, no such information was received in your headquarters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And you have already testified that you did not see nor know of the existence of the contents of the September 24 message, the one dividing Pearl Harbor up into areas?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you have notice or any information [13224] regarding a subsequent message calling for the display of lights in houses on the island?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. I never heard anything about that until much later.

Senator GEORGE. Until after the attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. I never heard anything about that until much later.

Senator GEORGE. Until after the attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Much after.

Senator GEORGE. Colonel, you say that you had become convinced that war with Japan was inevitable and imminent even by the 24th or 27th of November, the 27th being the date on which you received the Marshall message, but you had had no suggestion from any source after you became chief of staff identifying Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian Islands with the attack or with any direct attack by Japan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I believe I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. Did the Japanese have an extensive espionage system on the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know, sir. We always suspected that. I have no information about it. General Fielder is perhaps a better witness on that than I am. He will appear [13225] before the committee shortly.

Mr. CLARK. Do you mean that you, as chief of staff didn't know whether they had a system of spies on the islands?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not positively. They had consular agents, and there were a number of them. That is what they called them. We assumed that they were conducting espionage. There was no particular necessity for it because there was nothing concealed. It was all open, anybody could go anywhere.

Mr. CLARK. I think it was perhaps Admiral Ingersoll who testified here that they could stand on the hills around Pearl Harbor and see everything that went on there; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. CLARK. There is considerable elevation around Pearl Harbor, as I understand it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Did you know of the instance of wire tapping down there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, sir, not at the time. I learned of it much later.

Mr. CLARK. The Japs did have direct wire communications with Honolulu, I mean Tokyo, did they not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think so. I think they could use [13226] our commercial lines; and our radio, and whatever they pleased. There was no restriction so far as I know.

Mr. CLARK. Of course, any alert that the Army would go on would be immediately known to the Japs on the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say that it would, sir. I don't know that that would be the case. Incidentally, we were very careful in alert No. 1 when we went on that and attempted to carry out the restrictions as to the number of people who knew what we were doing; we attempted to carry out that to the letter.

It is very simple on a sabotage alert to put sentries here and there and say that you will keep everybody out. That doesn't restrict you to the Japanese.

In Hawaii you have Puerto Ricans, you have all manners of peoples.

Mr. CLARK. Colonel, was it your opinion that the Japanese on the Hawaiian Islands were reporting to Japan practically everything that was being done there by the Army and the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They certainly could, I believe.

Mr. CLARK. I say, wasn't that your opinion as chief of staff to General Short that they were doing that every day?

[13227] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, I agree with that. There was nothing to stop them.

Mr. CLARK. That was pretty well known in Army and Navy circles, was it not that they were doing that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Everybody knew that, I think everybody knew that they could do it. We didn't know that they were doing it, but there was nothing to prevent them from doing it.

[13228] Mr. CLARK. Did none of these intercepts that were made there indicate that they were doing that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not see those intercepts, sir. I don't know what you refer to.

Mr. CLARK. You didn't know much about what was going on around there, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Well, wasn't it a matter of highest concern to the safety of both the Army and the Navy that you should have information on that subject?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Excuse me; I did not get that. I wish you would repeat it.

Mr. CLARK. I say wasn't it a matter of highest concern to both the Army and the Navy as to what the Japs were doing in that respect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; that was of great interest, of course. Again I believe that General Fielder is a better witness on that than I, simply because he devoted much of his time to that work. He is to appear later before the committee.

Mr. CLARK. Yes. Well, you have laid some stress here upon the fact that you did not receive from Washington the so-called bomb plot information. Now, what comes into my mind is why steps were not taken either by you or by General [13229] Short or by the Navy to ascertain what the Japs were reporting to Tokyo right from Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not think we had any authority for interrupting traffic of that kind at that time, or traffic of any kind.

Mr. CLARK. But you know that the detail of the movement of every ship and of all the troops on those islands was being observed and likely being reported to Tokyo?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No; we did not know that positively. It was open and anybody could see it and, of course, it is a likelihood that that is what was going on.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I will put it this way: You knew that the Japanese spies on the island could see every movement of either the Army or the Navy, a company of soldiers or a battleship or a cruiser, and you knew that the means of communicating that to Tokyo were available?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right. There were approximately 160,000 Japanese on the islands, about 40 percent of the entire population, and they were most everywhere.

Mr. CLARK. Now, you say you did not hear of the wire tapping prior to Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK. All right. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

[13230] Senator LUCAS. Colonel, I want to discuss briefly with you the November 27 message of General Marshall.

As I understand from your testimony, you were completely familiar with that message that came to General Short on the day it was sent.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You have also given to counsel a prepared memorandum that you recall discussing with General Short as to what should be done in view of the receipt of this message. I direct your attention to the first statement in that message, which says:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue.

Now, what was your interpretation of that when you discussed that part of the message with General Short? What did that mean to you out there in this outpost in the Pacific?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, that was information on Japan, which would normally come in a combat order, under information on the enemy and that is where we put it. Negotiations—

Senator LUCAS. Now, isn't it a fact that that is the first command that your post had ever received from General Marshall?

[13231] Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. He was Chief of Staff of the Army?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. There had been a command the year before which I was acquainted with.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Colonel PHILLIPS. But that was not during my time.

Senator LUCAS. Since you were there as G-2 on General Short's staff—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Chief of Staff.

Senator LUCAS. I mean as Chief of Staff of General Short's staff, this is the first message in all that had been received out there that was signed by General Marshall?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure. That is the first to my knowledge; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, at least you do not recall any other messages coming from the Chief of Staff in Washington, D. C., directing General Short and his group out there to do certain things?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, did the fact of General Marshall directing General Short in the Pacific to do certain things have any different effect upon the manner in which you interpreted a message of this kind than if it had come from G-2 or some other official in Washington?

[13232] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. It did make a tremendous impression upon you, didn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. The mere fact that the Chief of Staff of the United States Army had seen fit in this particular crisis to send direct to General Short a message of this character?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. As I understand it, this type of a message is a command message and there is a distinction between an operational order and an order which is really mere information that is sent out. Am I right on that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is quite correct. I might say that there is a command directive and a combat order, and a combat order is our normal form for a command directive. A combat order is an order that we teach in our schools in the alert form and we start from our

lowest and teach it right straight through till we finish at Leavenworth.

Senator LUCAS. Well, a combat order is one that is used when you are in war, is it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. And he was not giving you a combat order because we were at peace at that time.

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was directing that we take up a [13233] formation here.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; he was directing you to prepare for any eventuality that might happen.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

Senator LUCAS. As a result of what he says in the first paragraph:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue.

Now, he said following that:

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Now, what did you understand that meant from this message:

Hostile action possible at any moment.

Colonel PHILLIPS. "Hostile action possible at any moment"? Why, we had, of course, the Navy message here of the 24th which we had gone through very carefully and—

Senator LUCAS. I am not talking about the Navy message. I am talking about the first message that you received from General Marshall, Chief of Staff.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And the first time you had received a [13234] message of this character he told you definitely that hostilities—or rather that negotiations were about to cease and he said further:

Future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, where did you think hostile action was going to take place?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We did not anticipate an attack by air on Hawaii. Possibly action—a form of possible action is sabotage. With 160,000 Japanese sitting right on our islands that is a form of hostile action. We divided our standing operating procedure into three forms of defense.

Senator LUCAS. Did General Marshall know at any time—

Senator FERGUSON. I don't think he was through.

Senator LUCAS. I am very sorry, sir.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Our first or safety alert was the first form of hostile action that I could visualize.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is hostile action right there.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

Colonel PHILLIPS. We took definite measures against that form of hostile action.

Senator LUCAS. All right, Colonel. When did you or General Short send to the War Department your 1, 2, and 3 alert?

[13235] Colonel PHILLIPS. Those alerts I have heard since I have been here, some testimony that they got there in March. I am not sure. It is a normal routine procedure that every—that a copy of every order, or perhaps six copies, I am not sure what the procedure is in the Adjutant General's office, but six copies of every order; I say six but I am not sure of that. At least one copy of every order is mailed as a routine matter to the War Department, every order that is issued in the Department and the normal thing was on November the 5th, when that was published and mailed, the normal thing would have been for the Adjutant General, Colonel Dunlop, to have put the number, as he mimeographed them to put the number on just as a routine matter, just as a mail clerk would have put them in the bag and they would have gone to the War Department.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the number 1, 2, and 3 alert procedures were prepared by General Short under your advice and assistance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't understand the question.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the 1, 2, and 3 alerts, Colonel Phillips—you and General Short and the staff had prepared those?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you prepared those without first taking it up with the Army here in Washington, D. C.?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; we prepared a tentative alert or a tentative standing operating procedure almost identical to the one that was adopted and a copy was sent to Washington in June and I think returned approved in September.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I would like to see that. If that is correct, I would like to see it.

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is the letter to General Marshall.

Senator LUCAS. Do we have a copy of that operating procedure that was sent in on July the 14th?

(No response.)

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, this is the message that came back from General Marshall. [Reading:]

The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional battalion of five hundred men for military police duty.

This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view [13237] of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of air-base defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are in Hawaii.

I wish you would give this your personal consideration.

Now, did you see that letter that was addressed to General Short dated October 10, 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. The standing operating procedure was taken and those changes made following or subsequent to this letter and the revised copy conforming to the recommendations not only of

the War Department, as stated there, were published on November the 5th and distributed.

Senator LUCAS. Well, whatever information you may have thought was sent, I think the record is very clear in this hearing before the committee that your orders, your operational orders of these three alerts never reached the War Department here until some time in March after the attack of December.

[13238] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. So the Army, as far as this hearing is concerned, had no notice of the fact that General Short had placed sabotage on Number 1 alert and then the Number 2 and Number 3 alerts.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes. For that reason, sir, you will find that in the tentative standing operating procedure the numbers of the alerts were just the reverse, in the tentative one. In this one—they were—in that one adopted on November 5, 1941, the No. 1 alert was the sabotage alert. No. 2 and No. 3 was all-out.

Senator LUCAS. But in the tentative they were just reversed?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Just reverse.

Senator LUCAS. Number 1 was the all-out alert for defensive actions, where the troops would be stationed in different batteries?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right and for that reason in General Short's reply to this message of the 27th the numbers were not used. It was called defensive, a sabotage alert, and not a number. The number was left out of the message in order not to be confusing.

Senator LUCAS. You have stated that in that connection a copy of it was sent or should have been sent, at least, to [13239] the Army here in Washington, D. C.?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall now whether or not the Army ever answered acknowledging receipt of the so-called alert where sabotage became the No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know whether that would have been necessary. I don't believe they ever did.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it may not have been necessary but in view of what happened it would have been a good thing to have followed that up after it was sent in, would it not, Colonel, to ascertain whether or not the Army agreed with that kind of an alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That is hindsight.

Senator LUCAS. Of course it is hindsight.

Colonel PHILLIPS. We did not number them for that very reason in General Short's reply to this, so that the sabotage could not be mistaken, could not be confused with a number.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in other words, your position is, insofar as this message is concerned, that when General Marshall was talking about hostile action and when he says in the latter part of the message:

Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan—

you contend that you thought that he was talking about sabotage?

[13240] Colonel PHILLIPS. I thought he was talking about hostilities.

Senator LUCAS. Well, he was talking about hostilities, but sabotage—

Colonel PHILLIPS. But sabotage is one form of hostilities.

Senator LUCAS. Sabotage is one form of hostilities?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That seemed to be our most imminent danger right there at the time.

Senator LUCAS. Well, when you take that part of the message, when it says further:

You are not restricted to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

Did you think that that would apply to sabotage activities of Japanese agents in Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We considered that at the time, sir, and the reconnaissance, of course, we were doing. The other measures that we thought should be carried out were:

So as not, repeat not, alarm the civil population or disclose intent—and:

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

It was deemed that the sabotage alert, which happened to [13241] be the number 1, was adequate.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you were not carrying out any reconnaissance there, were you, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had inshore reconnaissance from Bellows Field.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, and you thought that that was what he was talking about?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

Such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

You thought that he was talking about the short-range reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Short-range reconnaissance at that time and the fact that he knew that the long-range reconnaissance was a mission and duty of the Navy.

Senator LUCAS. So from that November 27 message you and General Short concluded that all that General Marshall was talking about in that dynamic message was the question of sabotage in Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That afternoon we received a message from General Miles, the next day we received two other messages which seemed to confirm us in our decision.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; I appreciate that fact that General Miles sent a message the following day, or the same day, and General Arnold sent a message the following day, but the point [13242] I am attempting to make is that you and General Short made up your minds with respect to what this message meant before either one of the other messages came in.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And the only thing that those other messages did was to confirm——

Colonel PHILLIPS. To confirm our decision.

Senator LUCAS (continuing). Your decision that you reached?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, I have been unable to understand just how you could construe that message in that manner. I am only a layman. I have examined it rather carefully. I have examined the reply of the commanding general of the Western Defense Command in San Francisco.

Have you seen his reply to this same message that General Marshall sent out to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, here is what he says and, mind you, the words are identical now in this message that was sent to DeWitt of the Western Command, of the Western Defense Command, as in the one that was sent to General Short. Here is what he said on November 28 [reading]:

Report following measures taken as per your radio [13243] November Twenty Seven: Your radio paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC, Second Air Force, Fourth Air Force, Ninth CAD, Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area and Commandants Eleventh, Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive activities intensified. Six infantry battalions and necessary motor transportation alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NCA to carry out his missions under Rainbow Five. Constant contact being maintained with Corps Area and Naval District Commanders and full cooperation assured. PCF, Sector and Subsector plans Rainbow Five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being made to carry out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies furnished CG SF P of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA for internment aliens at Angel Island. Paren in connection this report see my radio to CG GHQ Nov Twenty fifth which recommended that WPL Five Two be extended to include Pacific Coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps taken by me in preparation therefor. As air forces as well as other Army forces will be involved in the execution of WLP Five Two or the preparatory stage of Rainbow Five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to [13244] direct operations of Air Forces in defense of the PCF or that instructions be issued specifying air action and that I be furnished a copy of such directive. Should hostilities occur this command now ready to carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay.

Now, was there anything in Rainbow 5 that talked about sabotage on the island, or do you recall?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not recall, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know why DeWitt would construe that message any different than General Short himself did?

Colonel PHILLIPS. For one reason he does not have a standing operating procedure.

Senator LUCAS. He does not have what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He does not have a standing operating procedure. If I may, sir, I will read you what a standing operating procedure is and why we were directed in the Staff Officers' Field Manual which was in effect at that time to place in effect a standing operating pro-

cedure. It is FM-101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual, the Staff and Combat Orders. [Reading:]

SECTION VI

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

[13245] a.—Standing operating procedure covers those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. It should be provided that the procedure is applicable unless prescribed otherwise in a particular case; thus the flexibility necessary in special situations is retained.

b.—The purposes of standing operating procedure are:

- (1) To simplify and abbreviate combat orders, expedite their transmission, and permit their being understood easily and certainly.
- (2) To simplify and perfect the training of the troops.
- (3) To promote understanding and teamwork between the commander, staff, and troops.
- (4) In general, to facilitate and expedite operations and minimize confusion and errors.

c.—Standing operating procedure should not hamper the effective tactical employment of the troops.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you were working under that sort of a procedure, were you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We were working under that under this directive. That is what the standing operating procedure was drawn up for, simply because the situation in Hawaii was sim- [13246] ply a limited perimeter defense.

Senator LUCAS. And you don't think that the—

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't think the Western Command had anything of that kind in existence and he had to go into great detail in order to tell what he was doing.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the Western Command had no more information with respect to magic or in respect to what was going on in the Pacific than you did?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In fact, they did not have as much.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And, yet, notwithstanding that fact they interpreted this order entirely differently than you or General Short interpreted it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now I take you over to the Panama Canal Zone. Do you see any reason why the commander in Panama should interpret it any differently than you did, or the same as you did?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know about that, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, just briefly here is what he said. He sent a long telegram back and then he said that he was sending an air letter, which he did on November 29. He says:

[13247] In compliance with radiogram No. 461 from the Chief of Staff, dated November 27, 1941, report that the following measures are in effect for the protection of the Caribbean Area.

a. Naval Measures:—

He goes into it at great length.

At the present time, it is believed that the defensive measures for the Caribbean Defense Command center largely around the Panama Canal—

and so forth.

b. Measures for the Defense of the Panama Canal:

(1) Harbor Defense. Troops are on a continuous alert. Harbor defense is coordinated with the naval defense.

Here is a fellow down in Panama who has his troops all alerted. Here is this fellow on the west coast who has his troops all alerted and here you fellows who are 2,000 miles or more away, all you have your troops alerted to is sabotage.

Harbor defense is coordinated with the naval defense.

(3) Antiaircraft Artillery. All available antiaircraft equipment is installed and on a 24-hour alert.

(2) Aircraft Warning Service. The two detectors installed are on a 24-hour alert.

[13248] Would it have been possible for the aircraft warning service in Hawaii to be on a 24-hour alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think we could with the limited personnel we had. I don't know how long that could have lasted, I am not sure about that. General Powell is here and he will make a better witness on that than myself.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

Seven observation posts have been established at various places in Panama with direct radio communication to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

Did you have an information center there in Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have a liaison man between the Navy and the Army?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Navy had supplied us a liaison officer, I believe; Lieutenant Taylor, I believe.

Senator LUCAS. The Navy testified here that they never received any information from the information center with respect to what was going on, at least on December the 7.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. It was purely a training matter at that time.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I appreciate the handicaps that you were operating under at the time, Colonel, with respect to radar and a number of other things.

[13249] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. All I am wondering is whether or not you did the best you could with what you had and were really alert to the situation.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, antiaircraft artillery. Now, here is another one from the Panama Canal. Certainly it seems to me that if Panama is going to do these things under the same instructions, practically under the same message, that Hawaii should have done them, too. [Reading:]

All available antiaircraft equipment is installed and on a 24-hour alert.

Now, that was not true in Hawaii at all.

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. We had small care-taking crews in permanent antiaircraft installations.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have any antiaircraft equipment that was on any kind of an alert on the morning of December the 7th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. There were care-taking establishments in the permanent installations. There were care-taking troops in the permanent establishments on a sabotage alert. Of course, they were on 24 hours. They opened fire. I should say we had about six or seven, probably more, batteries. I have the report of Colonel Wing, who has [13250] made a report. I think it is an exhibit.

Senator LUCAS. Of only those that were on a sabotage alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right, that got into the action. I think 8 or 10 batteries.

Senator LUCAS. How many batteries did you have in all?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is a matter of record, sir. I do not recall.

Senator LUCAS. You cannot give a guess? I have forgotten it myself.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Thirty-two, the record shows.

Senator LUCAS. What?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Thirty-two, the record shows.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is about right.

Senator LUCAS (reading:)

(4) Antisabotage.

I am still reading from the report of General Andrews in the Panama Canal Zone.

Locks and other sensitive areas are continuously guarded, and all approaches to the sensitive areas are covered by mound bunkers. Approaches to bunkers and between bunkers where practicable, are covered by patrols. Transit guards are placed on all vessels transiting the Canal.

(5) Counter-espionage. Active counter-espionage measures are being taken continuously.

[13251] (6) Countersubversive activities.

(7) Air Force. A portion of the pursuit is on a continuous 24-hour alert. The Bomber Command headquarters maintains a 24-hour alert. This latter applies to the whole Caribbean Area.

Was there any more reason why the Caribbean area should be on a 24 bombing-command alert than there was at Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What is your opinion about it as an expert, Colonel, and a man who has had a lot of experience in the Army?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would have to know the conditions in Panama. I don't think the conditions in any two of those spots you have mentioned are similar at all.

Senator LUCAS. No; but the mere fact that you fellows were 2,000 miles closer to Japan, closer to the attack than either Panama or the west coast would indicate that at least the Army command and the Navy command should have been equally on the same type of alert as either Panama or the west coast.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, that is a matter of opinion. We were taking the facts as we found them in Hawaii and working on that basis alone.

Senator LUCAS. The point that I am making is that Panama [13252] Canal and the west coast had no more facts than in Hawaii. In fact, they did not have as many.

Colonel PHILLIPS. They had different circumstances to handle in a situation right there.

Senator LUCAS. They did, and they were on the alert, Colonel.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, it goes into the Caribbean theater, other than the Panama Canal Department.

It sets out about the Air Corps there, as to what they were doing.

Harbor Defenses: Less than one complete manning detail available for the harbor defense armament.

Signed, "F. M. Andrews, Lieutenant General, United States Army, Commanding."

In other words, it has always given me some concern as to why these two commanders on the west coast and the Panama command interpreted this entirely differently than General Short and his staff interpreted it, and in this message of November the 27th there is not a single word about where the Japs are expected to attack. That is true, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. On page 105 of the Pearl Harbor inquiry carried on by Justice Roberts as chairman, and others, General [13253] McNarney asked you this question:

What is your idea of the function of the Local Joint Planning Committee?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My idea is, of course, controlled more or less to conform to what we have as a joint plan, and I should say that whenever changes are necessary, why, that joint committee should meet and modify the joint plan that we have.

General McNARNEY. You did not consider that the situation as known to you on November 27 and 28 required any revision of the existing plans or any examination into the propriety of making a new plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We were all familiar with the plan thoroughly, sir, and a change was not deemed necessary at that time.

General McNARNEY. What is the normal routine method by which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, and the Commander of the 14th Naval District maintained close liaison and contact with reference to the existing situation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. By personal conferences at one or the other headquarters.

General McNARNEY. Did you, as Chief of Staff of the Department, confer with any Navy officers during the period [13254] November 27 to December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not. I was occupied with the duties of my office here at headquarters practically the entire period.

You probably have answered that question before in testifying here today, but can you give me again the reason why, Colonel, you, as chief of staff, failed to confer with a single Navy officer from November the 27th until December the 7th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Senator, I was carrying out my duties as chief of staff of the Hawaiian Department in conformity with the directions of General Short. I ran the headquarters and the staff. General Short attended personally conferences with the Navy, taking along his Navy liaison officer, as he called him, Major Fleming usually, General Martin, and perhaps maybe somebody from the Coast Artillery. I remained at his headquarters to free him of all the routine administrative work. That was his direction, and that was what I was carrying out to the letter.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, in view of what you know about the testimony that has been adduced before this hearing, do you believe that the liaison between the Navy and the Army is what it should have been?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is a matter of opinion, Senator. I think that we had liaison. Whether it could have been im- [13255] proved upon is another thing. The commanding general was a very active man, he was taking part in every conference, he was always present, he had all the facts at his fingertips and, after all, he is the man concerned, he is the commander, and if he has the facts in hand that is quite sufficient. We had, however, a liaison officer from the Navy, from Admiral Bloch's staff, Lieutenant Burr, who sat in and had a desk in G-3 and was always there.

Senator LUCAS. Don't you believe as chief of staff of General Short's army down there in Hawaii that you should have known practically everything that General Short knew?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He told me, he acquainted me with the results of every staff meeting and what messages, if any, he had seen. I was thoroughly conversant with all those facts.

Senator LUCAS. But you never sat in on a single conference after the war warning message was received through the Navy and after you received this message from Marshall, with a single Navy man. That was all done by General Short, was it, and his aide?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Short and our naval liaison officer. However, I believe that we did have—well, I am not sure of it. My memory is not good on that.

Senator LUCAS. What were your chief duties following this November the 27th message as chief of staff of that army out [13256] there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My chief duties following the 27th were, of course, first to initiate all orders, get them out to the troops concerned, right down through the staff, see that the staff sections, particularly the G-3, was out inspecting the positions and his entire office was out. I did some inspecting myself, although not required under my duties.

I went out to see if our message center was functioning at all times and, as far as the sabotage alert was concerned, that it was functioning fully.

Senator LUCAS. Had you ever had any previous experience on a joint command of this character?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, with the First Division in amphibious operations down in the Caribbean in 1937 and again in 1939, I believe, at the time we had joint operations off Puerto Rico. We defended there the southern coast of Puerto Rico for a strip of 35 miles and an amphibious operation landing under the Navy was made from the *Arkansas* and the *New York* by the Fifth Marines.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know on December the 6th the number of ships that were in Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say that I did; no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, if it was your duty to defend the Navy, it was the duty of the Army to defend the Navy, why [13257] wouldn't it be your duty to ascertain on December the 6th and every other day the number of those ships in and out of that harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That did not modify our defense in the least. Our defenses was a static proposition. We had so many guns and so many positions and whether there had been 1 ship in the harbor or 50 our defense would have gone into operation just the same.

Senator LUCAS. It would have been just the same?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It would have been just the same; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, the fact that there were two task forces out at sea and you did not know anything about that did not make any difference as far as the defense was concerned?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It made a difference as far as the reconnaissance was concerned; yes, sir. We knew of that; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know that the task forces were out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We knew of that; yes, sir. General Short had been informed and so informed me.

Senator LUCAS. General McCoy asked a couple of questions which I want to interrogate you a little further on, on page 109 of those proceedings. [Reading:]

[13258] The CHAIRMAN. What was the objection to putting in two or three, if any?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no particular objection, sir. It was considered that I was what we desired and required.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. I have one; I am not quite ready yet.

General McCoy. I have one: Colonel Phillips, under Alert No. 1, the very first line, the very first sentence, 14, page 3, it states: "This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands, with no threat from without."

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Now, here was a warning telegram that did mention hostile action and unpredictable action from without, from the War Department.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. So that that line is absolutely inconsistent, then, with the instructions from the War Department, is it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It says, "with no threat from without," sir.

General McCoy. So that Alert No. 1 is not consistent, [13259] I take it, with these instructions from the War Department. Had that inconsistency in the very first paragraph of Alert No. 1 occurred to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It had not, sir. At the time I saw no inconsistency, sir.

Do you care to comment any further upon that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; other than I have already testified in regard to the fact that we thought that form of hostility right in our very midst was what should be guarded against and we had no information, from the War Department or from the Navy, our only sources, that an attack was expected in Hawaii.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel, as I understand it, you testified before the Roberts Commission first; thereafter you testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, as well as before the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the Naval Court of Inquiry, as I recollect it, you made the answer, "I don't remember", at least 40 times. What have you done to refresh your memory since that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have attended some of the sessions [13260] here, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the testimony you are giving us now is what you have heard then during the hearings, is that it, and that has refreshed your memory, has it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. I at that time had had no opportunity to read the reports of the Roberts committee. I have read that and I have also read the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. At

that time I was testifying there before the Navy committee I had just flown in from Burma and had no time to refresh my memory on anything.

Mr. MURPHY. Did I understand you to say to Senator Lucas that you made the rounds to see whether or not the message center was operating? Did I understand you on that correctly?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean now by that the air warning service?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; I mean the message center.

Mr. MURPHY. That is a different thing than the air warning service?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Quite.

Mr. MURPHY. You did not know whether the air warning service was functioning or not, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was a training matter. It was a new thing.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know whether it was functioning or not?

[13261] Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On the morning of December 7th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; I did not personally.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt that that was under the Signal Corps?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was under the Signal Corps for installation and the Air Corps for operation. It was a joint control, a training problem.

Mr. MURPHY. Up to the time of the attack you had no information whatsoever as to whether there had been a warning order given as to the radar, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you say now that you knew the task forces were out and what they were.

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Short had told me; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you say you knew that on December 7—you knew on December 7 what task forces were out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, no. The testimony—we are speaking of the 27th; I am speaking of that.

Mr. MURPHY. I am speaking on the day of the attack.

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know immediately before the 7th where the task forces were, whether they were in or out of the harbor? I don't want hindsight. Do you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't recall just now.

[13262] Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, I would like to, so that we may have it in one place in the record. I am going to hurriedly run over that testimony before the three boards.

You never saw the Navy message, did you, "This is a war warning?"

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you testified on page 213 of the Roberts Board, page 1010 in the committee's transcript, that you did have some record or receipts of these different messages at Pearl Harbor. Did you or didn't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We could not find those in the records.

Mr. MURPHY. When the Roberts Board asked you the question, asked you to get the records, you could not find them, could you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the night of December 6 you were at a dance at Schofield Barracks; weren't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. A charity ball.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, with your wife. Was that at Isadore's night club or wasn't there some place called Eleazar's or Isadore?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is the Schofield Barracks Officers' Club.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the only thing?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is all there is; yes, sir.

[13263] Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now, the message of the 27th came in at 1:16 p. m. and you saw two messages that afternoon and you made answer at 5:40 p. m.; isn't that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not understand that question.

Mr. MURPHY. I say the message of the 27th, the one that you received from General Marshall, came in at 1:16 p. m. of that afternoon and that afternoon you saw a second message, did you not, and sent the reply called the Short reply as of 5:40 p. m. that day?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure as to the time. It was shortly thereafter.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you testified on page 220 and at page 104 before the Roberts Board:

Yes, sir. This was 1:16 p. m., the 27th, and this went out at 5:40 p. m., the 27th.

Was your recollection pretty clear at that time as to when it came in and when it went out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Apparently I checked that from the message. I did not have the message.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. You were head of the local joint planning committee, were you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And there never was a meeting of the local joint planning committee called at any time between November [13264] 27th and after the attack, was there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the question was asked you by General McCoy at page 229 of the Roberts board, page 108 of our hearing:

Were you informed that such distant reconnaissance was being carried out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know that we were in so many words. We assumed that we were carrying our part of the plan, and I don't know that there was even any thought of anything else.

Was that the knowledge you had of what the Navy was doing on distant reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was my estimate at that time, at least, in reply to that question. I also assumed that they were carrying out and were doing their job all the time.

Mr. MURPHY. On the same page General McCoy said:

Were you informed by the naval district of the arrival of the battleships in the harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was not, sir. I can't say whether the Department Commander was or not. I was not, sir. I never knew whether the ships were in or out.

Was that a correct answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

[13265] Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General McCoy. Wouldn't that affect any plan for defense that you might have, whatever?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, it should have affected that, sir, but as Chief of Staff I never knew.

Was that a correct answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have just answered that——

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, but not in this manner.

Colonel PHILLIPS (continuing). For Senator Lucas.

Mr. MURPHY. Is what you said——

Colonel PHILLIPS. Our defense set-up in the standing operating procedure was a static defense.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, that is what you said before the Roberts Board back in January 1942:

Wouldn't that affect any plan for defense that you might have, whatsoever?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, it should have affected that, sir, but as Chief of Staff I never knew.

Were you incorrect when you testified that way before the Roberts Board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is not a very good reply, "as chief of staff I never knew." I was never able to correct this or go over that. That does not make sense.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the fact is that General Short was [13266] with his own liaison officer principally with the Navy, wasn't he?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, he was the commanding general and he attended Navy meetings personally himself. He knew all the facts in the case. He had a liaison officer, Major Fleming, who also attended.

Mr. MURPHY. Both you and General Short in testifying here have talked about Major Fleming being your liaison officer. Was that really your liaison officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was the Army liaison; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the Roberts Board he said it was Captain Truman.

Colonel PHILLIPS. No; Captain Truman was the aide who accompanied General Short.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, we never heard his name in this record now after 12,000 pages until this minute.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Why is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was merely the aide who accompanied him. I don't know what the question was or what it was about. I have only heard that since I have been here, sir.

[13267] Mr. MURPHY. The question was:

Were not you usually with him at these conferences with the Commander of the Fleet?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I was not.

General McCoy. Were you with him when he had any conferences with the Navy during that period of November 27 to December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McCoy. Who was with him on those conferences? Are you informed as to that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe his aide, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is his aide?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Captain Truman.

That was your answer to the Roberts Board, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That should have been amplified.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the answer you gave the Roberts Board in January 1942?

Colonel PHILLIPS. His aide was with him. That is all incorrect.

Mr. MURPHY. What?

Colonel PHILLIPS. His aide was with him. That is all incorrect.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, that is who you said was with him and that is the only one you said was with him.

[13268] Colonel PHILLIPS. That should have been amplified. That was incorrect. I knew that aide.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General McCoy. At any time during the period of the alert from the 27th of November to December 7 did you have any conference with your vis-a-vis in the Navy or with any officer in the Navy?

That is on page 108 of the Roberts record, page 230 of our record. Your answer was:

No, sir, I did not.

General McCoy. Did anybody of your staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. None of my staff, no, sir.

Now, when I asked General Short this question he kind of laughed out. I asked whether or not there was any time when the Navy staff, Kimmel's staff and your staff sat down together? Did they at any time sit down that you knew of up to the time the war started?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They never had a joint staff meeting of that kind. That would have been a very unusual procedure.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you were asked this question by Justice Roberts at page 231, page 109 our number:

The CHAIRMAN. Why was it that that had not been activated prior to December 7, Colonel?

Referring to your radar.

[13269] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You made the answer:

We did not have Radars. They are still not installed. Making every effort that we can to get them in, sir, and that was the basis of the interceptor command, we felt: Aircraft Warning Service.

You were speaking there, I take it, about the permanent sets, were you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You were asked whether or not you had an aerial warning service with sirens in the tower downtown, and so forth. Your answer was that you did not have them until after December 7. Was that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you were asked this question by the chairman at page 234, our number 110:

Was there any discussion, in view of the possible outbreak of hostilities, of the necessity for working those Radar units 24 hours a day?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No discussion of that so far as I know, sir.

Was that a correct answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was not entirely correct. We had discussed that.

[13270] Mr. MURPHY. Well, the chairman then said to you:

Then in spite of the availability of those units your Department depended simply upon the scouting forces of the Navy and such intelligence information as the Navy might otherwise obtain to warn you of any hostile attacks?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would say so, sir.

That is the answer you made in January of 1942, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct. Our radar was working only on a training basis.

Mr. MURPHY. You said then on that same page, our page 111:

We had no trained operators. We were exerting every effort we could to train these men. They were all rank amateurs; nobody was a professional on the Radar. We were devoting—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Was that a correct answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. You considered everybody on radar then as rank amateurs; is that it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Perhaps that is the wrong adjective, but they were all learning. They were merely going to school. We only had two officers in the Department at that time prior to the return of General Davidson and Colonel Powell from the States, who we had sent here to observe—we only had two [13271] officers in the Department that knew anything about it and they were conducting a school. It was purely in the training stage.

Mr. MURPHY. The chairman then asked you:

Well, was it because of that deficiency that you didn't give orders for the Radar equipment to be worked full time, or was it because that expedient didn't occur to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; there was no discussion of that, sir.

Was that a correct answer in January 1942?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is not entirely correct.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is not entirely correct. There had been some discussion.

Mr. MURPHY. That is what you told the Roberts Board in January 1942, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

The radar and its operation was under the interceptor commander and also the Department signal officer at that time. He was training these people, and that was his function.

The CHAIRMAN. But inquiry could be made of one or [13272] both those men?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But as I understood your answer that expedient occurred to nobody and was discussed by nobody in the superior command?

Colonel PHILLIPS. So far as I know, sir, that was not discussed. It is possible that the Department Commander took consideration of that. I didn't.

Was that a correct answer in January of 1942?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No; there was discussion. I modify that just the same as I did the one before. There had been some discussion

of it. It was a training matter, I repeat, and it was purely in the training stage.

Mr. MURPHY. You paid no attention to this did you, as chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had a G-3 on the staff that—

Mr. MURPHY. I say you personally paid no attention to it as chief of staff, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; I did. I gave it much attention, but there were many things that I had to pay attention to at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me read that answer again:

So far as I know, sir, that was not discussed. It is possible that the Department Commander took consider- [13273] ation of that. I didn't.

That is pretty plain, clear English, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Colonel PHILLIPS. We felt secure against a raid, particularly with the Fleet here, yes, sir.

In other words, you felt more secure with the fleet in than with the fleet out; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir. It would increase the armament, the antiaircraft guns and all of that.

Mr. MURPHY. You thought that the Japs were more likely to attack Hawaii than to attack the fleet as such, is that it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, we were there to protect the installations when the fleet went in.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you talked about task forces and what you knew.

On page 236, our No. 11, the chairman asked you a question.

The CHAIRMAN. And you didn't know how many forces they had out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As I said a while ago, sir, I never knew what the Navy had.

That was your answer in January of 1942, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13274] Mr. MURPHY. Now, you were asked before the Roberts Board as to your conversation with General Marshall and you were asked to go out and prepare some notes as to your recollection of that conversation. Do you remember that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And then you subsequently came back later on with some notes as to what the conversation was.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, you talked to General Marshall on the afternoon of December 7 or sometime that day?

Colonel PHILLIPS. On the 8th.

Mr. MURPHY. This is in Washington you mean or Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I talked to him from Hawaii, called him on the scrambler phone.

Mr. MURPHY. General Marshall asked, then, of you, "Did you get a message?" Is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. "Did you get my message?"

Mr. MURPHY. That is right. And your answer was what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. "What message?"

Mr. MURPHY. And his answer was what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. "The message"—I believe, to the best of my recollection—"The message I sent last night or yesterday." I am not sure of the day, whether it was last night [13275] or yesterday, but following that I said, "No, sir; we did not receive that message."

Mr. MURPHY. Now, we have heard a lot of conversation here and testimony about a Lieutenant Burr. As I understand it, he is being blamed for the lack of the Navy not knowing what was going on. He is the one who should have told your liaison officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was liaison officer, a staff officer of Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was your liaison officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Major Fleming was the general's Navy liaison.

Mr. MURPHY. Who else?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had a Colonel Dingman who was in the harbor control post and we also had two officers at one time from G-3 who operated not definitely as liaison but almost continuously in the drawing up of the local defense plan.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you say anything about Major Fleming before the Roberts Board as a liaison officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure what I testified there.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, on page 243, our page 174, a question by General McCoy:

And who is the Army officer on duty over there at the District?

[13276] Colonel PHILLIPS. Lieutenant Colonel Dingman.

General McCoy. What are their respective duties?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe they have ever been given prescribed duties. They are liaison officers.

In other words, they had no particular duties; they were over there to look around and find out what they could; is that it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Our liaison officer is defined in our Army manual, it gives the definite duties, it tells them exactly what they are to do. An Army officer would know what those are.

Mr. MURPHY. Was this question asked of you in January 1942?

What are their respective duties?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe they have ever been given prescribed duties.

Did you say that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. "They are liaison officers." That was an interruption in that answer. "They are liaison officers," I stated.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now, then, when you were drawing up that standard operating procedure on November 5 did you have any meetings with the Navy since you were planning joint action? Did you have any meetings with the Navy, with Ad- [13277] miral Kimmel's staff, preparatory to bringing it to a completion?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is a matter that I am unable to answer. I am sure that the staff who were working on the various sections conferred with the Navy from time to time. I have no personal knowledge of it myself.

Mr. MURPHY. At page 245 of the Roberts Board, our No. 115, you said:

They had not been taken up with the Navy so far as I know, sir.

Was that your answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not officially. It was merely a publication of the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General MCCOY. Did you furnish the Navy with a copy of this Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say about that, sir. I did not myself.

General MCCOY. Did the Navy have a corresponding plan, so far as you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge were the naval commanders advised that you had put Alert No. 1 into operation?

[13278] Colonel PHILLIPS. They were, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that what was communicated to the Navy by General Short would be known by General Short and his aide, rather than by you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing came to your knowledge with respect to the state of preparedness that the Navy was in view of these warnings?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Was that a correct answer in January 1942?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In regard to the state of preparedness of the Navy?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. May I add there that the Navy—you will find later that the Roberts committee asked me to check on the Navy having received the standing operating procedure.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; and the answer came back that there were 10, yes, and 9 of them were still in the safe, isn't that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In the Navy safe.

Mr. MURPHY. What is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In the Navy safe.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; 9 of them were in the Navy safe and [13279] only 1 of them out of the 10 that you gave the Navy. That was the answer, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think it was.

Mr. MURPHY. I believe it was.

Admiral Standley—

you are speaking now about cooperative measures under the standing operating procedure:

Admiral STANDLEY. But wouldn't the normal thing be to have this commanding general and the Commandant of the District discuss such a procedure as that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That's right.

Admiral STANDLEY. Prior to putting it into effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Prior to its adoption, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether General Short had such a discussion or not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

Was that a correct answer in 1942?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot recall just now, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would like to go with you to the Army Pearl Harbor Board which commences at page 1107 Pearl Harbor Board, our number 2108. General Grunert asked you:

The relation of a Chief of Staff to a Commanding General is that of "right-hand bower", his advisor, his confidential assistant?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

[13280] That is a true description of his duties; is it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is fairly descriptive, sir. There is much more to it than that.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, on page 1116, our No. 2112, General Grunert said the same day:

The same day? But the decision on the sabotage alert was made as a result of the conference on the two messages that I have read?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

In other words, you had the message of the 27th from General Marshall and one from Adams; did you not? Is that the other message?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is not correct. No; we did not have any on the sabotage, we did not have any of the sabotage messages at that time. We had the message from General Marshall.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you not testified on three or four occasions that you did?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think I have testified there and that was incorrect.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you remember my referring to it in the Roberts Board. I will come to it in the Navy Board. [13281] Now, let me read the exact question, 49.

General GRUNERT. The same day? But the decision on the sabotage alert was made as a result of the conference on the two messages that I have read?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. What can you tell us about the state of mind of the Army and Navy, particularly the higher commanders and staff, as to the probability or possibility or imminence of war?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In my opinion, General, we were all thoroughly alert and fully conscious of the possibility, the Navy as well as the Army. I do not speak for the Navy.

General GRUNERT. Did you expect an attack on Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Did I?

General GRUNERT. Yes. You had better tell me what you expected, and not talk for the rest.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was fully aware of the possibility of such a thing. It struck me as possible.

General GRUNERT. But still you concurred with the decision of the Commanding General as to alerts, that the alert against sabotage was the proper one?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was his decision, sir.

Was that a proper answer in January of 1942?

[13282] Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct. That was the commanding general's decision.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of course, that is a proper decision and that is why the alert went in.

[13283] Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General GRUNERT. But still you concurred with the decision of the Commanding General as to alerts, that the alert against sabotage was the proper one?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was his decision, sir.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I testified here that I concurred fully.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now, then, you were questioned at page 1121, our page 2114, as to your training at Leavenworth and as to the proper way to make an estimate of the situation. Do you recall that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. When you make an estimate of the situation, you prepare for the worst, don't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt that war was a possibility in Hawaii, but you only prepared for sabotage; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I said war was a possibility, yes, sir; that the worst was a landing.

Mr. MURPHY. The worst was what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The worst was a landing and seizure of the installations by the Japanese. We considered all the enemy possibilities in our estimate of the situation which I presented this morning.

Mr. MURPHY. You considered the worst a landing, but [13284] you prepared for the least; did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We were prepared for what the information we had and the other circumstances concerned forced us to decide.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, at Leavenworth you were taught to prepare for the worst and bring that into your estimate; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. If the worst were probable. If it was possible, it was considered in the estimate.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean at Leavenworth they told you only to prepare for what was probable?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; when you arrive at your decision you must discard the least probable.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, in question 100, on page 1124, our No. 2115, General Frank stated to you:

You stated a minute ago that the normal procedure for a commander in meeting a military situation is to make an estimate of the situation, consider the worst thing that the enemy can do to you, and make your decision to meet it.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

General FRANK. Do you feel that that was done in this case?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The worst thing that the enemy could do was certainly considered. That was the possibility [13285] of an attack on the Hawaiian Islands. But that was the worst possible thing that could occur.

General FRANK. You haven't answered my question.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Excuse me, sir. I misunderstood.

General FRANK. Do you consider that steps were taken to meet the worst situation with which the Japs could confront you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am thinking now in retrospect. I am going back from here. That is a very difficulty question to answer, sir. At the time the General made a decision to put in the sabotage alert I thoroughly agreed with it.

General FRANK. You just will not answer that question, will you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't answer it specifically, sir.

General FRANK. Do you mean to tell me that, had Alert No. 3 been in effect, the damage would have been as great as it was?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is a matter of assumption. I don't know. I am not in position to say.

General FRANK. You were Chief of Staff, weren't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

General FRANK. How long would it have taken the planes to have gotten into the air had they been on No. 3 alert?

[13286] Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say as to that. It wouldn't have taken as long as it did take, of course.

I want to know, as chief of staff, how long it would take planes to leave the ground and go into the air.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I knew at the time but not after a year of combat.

Mr. MURPHY. What is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I knew at the time, yes, sir; but not at the time I was testifying here. I had just flown from Burma when I testified before the Board, with a very few hours intervening.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Question 135, Army Pearl Harbor Board, page No. 1128, and our No. 2117:

General FRANK. Yes; but you did not follow all this Leavenworth teaching that you were talking about here a little while ago, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

General FRANK. Now, did you consider a Jap attack of this nature possible?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. Did you consider it probable?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not probable.

General FRANK. Why was it not probable?

General PHILLIPS. Due to the distance.

[13287] You considered it possible but not immediately probable.

General FRANK. Did you so advise General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; I did not. This is when I first went to Hawaii. I made my decision—I made my estimate of the situation as a G-3 at that time in regard to the possibility of the attack, the probability.

General FRANK. Did you so advise General Short at that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I advised him that the attack was possible.

General FRANK. Well, did you advise him that it was not probable?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not.

Did you make that answer before the Army Board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On Pearl Harbor Army Board, page 1133, and our No. 2119, question No. 157:

General GRUNERT. Was the command war conscious, or peace-minded, or both?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think they were thoroughly war conscious, sir.

General GRUNERT. But you evidently thought war was in the distant future sometime?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Some did, perhaps; I did not.

[13288] Were you asked that question and did you make that answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now the question was asked you at page 1139, our No. 2121:

General FRANK. As a matter of fact, it would have been very easy to have carried on this anti-sabotage activity and, at the same time, have used the anti-aircraft and air force and air warning service on an active alert so as to have been prepared for this air attack, would it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, I am sure that could be done.

Was that a correct answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It could have been done but not comply with the provisions as stated in the Marshall message of the 27th, in not alarming the populace, not showing intent, and so forth.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you say one single word anywhere in your testimony before you came to this room about what you are saying now?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In my testimony?

Mr. MURPHY. Anywhere, yes; before you came to this hearing and have been listening to these witnesses.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; I said so when we first went over this message of the 27th.

[13289] Mr. MURPHY. You did? Before what board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not before any board.

Mr. MURPHY. The first time you ever said that was here, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I said it to General Short at the time of the consideration of the message of the 27th.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever say it before the Roberts board, the Army board, or the Navy board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was not asked such thing before the Navy board.

Mr. MURPHY. You did say, at any rate, "Yes; I am sure that could be done" before the Army board; did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And without qualification; isn't that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 1148, our No. 2125:

General GRUNERT. If you were war-minded, where did you think an attack was going to come?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, our mission was to defend Oahu from attack. The attack was coming on Oahu, if it came at all—the possibility.

That is the only place you had to defend, wasn't it, Oahu?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right; that was our mission.

[13290] Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General FRANK. Then why in the world did you not prepare for an attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was considered.

General FRANK. What did you think you had? You had some 8-inch guns, and you had some British 75's, and you had a lot of infantry around there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

General FRANK. You had those 8-inch guns and the British 75's, and all your infantry mortars, and the AWS system, and the bombers, and the fighter planes, and your anti-aircraft shore defense batteries—and you think that was all put there against sabotage, do you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. That was for Alert 3, sir.

General FRANK. You say you were war-minded?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. And you had all these facilities to prepare for a war situation, and yet you did not prepare for a war situation, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. Did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, we adopted a sabotage alert, sir.

General FRANK. That is not a war situation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No.

General FRANK. It is a local sabotage?

[13291] Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Were you asked those question, and did you make those answers to the Army Board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 1151 of the Army Board, our number 2126:

Colonel PHILLIPS. I told him of the possibility of an attack.

General FRANK. Yes. Did you present him with an opinion so it was possible for him to agree with you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I gave him no definite opinions.

General FRANK. Yet that was your duty as chief of staff, was it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly; if he desired it.

Were you asked those questions and did you make those answers?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 1155, our number 2127, speaking of the radar:

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure about that. That is also in the record. It was operating under the Signal Officer, and with the air, under General Davidson. Now, who gave the instruction I do not know.

[13292] Was that a correct state of affairs?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly. That was a matter of record, as to who issued that order. It could be found in the record. At that time I had nothing available, not even notes of any type. I did not know who issued the orders. It was under General Davidson and Colonel Powell. They were operating there on a training schedule, had been on the 28th, and we know the hours of operation of that.

Mr. MURPHY. At page 1157, our number 2128:

General FRANK. Did you read the Air Estimate prepared by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not recall. Undoubtedly I did. I can't say definitely.

And you were asked the question on page 1158, our number 2129:

General FRANK. That estimate anticipated an air attack by the Japs exactly along the lines and in the manner in which it happened, and since that was a part of the evidence in the files of the Hawaiian Department, it constituted a recommendation for the defensive action to be taken in a critical situation, did it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, undoubtedly.

General FRANK. Shouldn't you then, as Chief of Staff, have been conscious of it?

[13293] Colonel PHILLIPS. I undoubtedly should have known of it, but I must say again that I cannot recall ever having seen it.

General FRANK. And yet it was one of the outstanding plans, which, if carried out, would have prevented this catastrophe. And you don't remember it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't think that I have seen it, sir.

Was that a correct answer before the Army board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was not correct. Today I have refreshed my memory, and I recall that very clearly.

Mr. MURPHY. In 1944 you so swore before the Army board, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Correct. Again I will say I had no opportunity to read the evidence in the Roberts Commission, or fresh my memory on anything that had occurred almost 4 years before.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would just like to refer briefly to your testimony before the Navy court of inquiry, and you say before the Navy court of inquiry you had difficulty remembering most things, did you not, because of your peculiar situation at that time?

Mr. Masten, do you have that page?

You were questioned at page 477 of the Navy board. I [13294] will just go over this briefly. Question 20, page 4710, our number, their number 479:

And naturally, then, you probably do not remember where these guns were placed?

A. I do not.

Do you know now?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I know generally. I might say that I have never had access to that record. I have never seen that Navy board record.

Mr. MURPHY. I notice in reply to question 20 you say, "I do not." In reply to question 24, "I do not recall."

In reply to question 25, "I do not."

In reply to question 26, "I do not."

In reply to question 28, "I cannot say definitely as to that."

In reply to question 31, "I cannot."

In reply to question No. 40, "I have not."

In reply to question 45, "I cannot recall that."

In reply to question 50, "I do not."

In reply to question 49, "I cannot recall."

In reply to question 56, "I cannot."

In reply to question 57, "I don't remember."

Mr. KEEFE. What does that mean?

[13295] Mr. MURPHY. That is in the evidence. I did not want to go into this thing. You can go into it further.

Those answers were in reply to questions where you were asked if you recall—

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would like to see the book. I don't know what they are. I have never seen that evidence at all.

Mr. MURPHY. All right; I will go over it with you, sir.

13. Q. Were there any problems related to the defense of Pearl Harbor that you recall?

A. No. I don't recall any.

That was the question on the discussion that you had with the Navy.

20. Q. And naturally, then, you probably do not remember where these guns were placed?

A. I do not.

22. Q. Do you remember what the official Army name for this type of alert was, by number or anything else?

A. It was alert No. 1, I believe, or No. 3; I am not sure. It was one or the other. The alerts were divided into three; one for sabotage, the second requiring more troops with the idea of increasing the defense for anti-aircraft, and the third was an all-out defense against a landing.

23. Q. Under the condition of Alert No. 1, can you [13296] recall whether that alert required any of your anti-aircraft guns to be manned?

A. I cannot recall right now the details that were in the plan.

24. Q. Do you know whether or not under the condition, Alert No. 1, that gun crews were required to be at their stations continuously?

A. I do not recall.

25. Q. Can you recall whether or not under the condition of Alert No. 1, ammunition had to be at the guns?

A. I do not.

26. Q. Since you have testified that you do not know the positions of the guns that were designated for the defense of the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, and further you do not know where the men were quartered, you probably would not be able to give us any idea of how long it would take to man these guns in the event that a general alarm was given?

A. I could not.

27. Q. Do you have any idea as to the number of mobile guns that were available for antiaircraft fire in the Hawaiian Department just prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I knew at the time, but I have no idea now.

28. Q. Do you know if there was any plan in effect [13297] between 27 November 1941 and 7 December 1941, for coordinating the antiaircraft fire of Army units and Navy units in the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. I cannot say definitely as to that.

31. Q. Can you recall when the last meeting was held prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I cannot.

Now, then, the question was asked:

30. Q. Are you acquainted with criticism that has been made public through several sources of the lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy before the outbreak of the present war—that is prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I am, generally speaking.

40. Q. Do you have any idea of the source of these rumors or statements?

A. I have not.

41. Q. But in your opinion they are what?

A. Absurd.

Do you think it was right that you, as chief of staff, should know what the Navy was doing?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not understand that question, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you did not know what the Navy was doing, did you? You were not at the conferences, were you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was at some conferences—all [13298] conferences held at Fort Shafter I attended.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you at any conference with anyone in the Navy staff before December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; we had conferences before December 7—back before November 28.

Mr. MURPHY. Between November 27 and December 7 were you at a single conference?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; I did not attend any conference at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. If you had it to do over again, would you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is a matter that I would have to consider under the circumstances. I was carrying out the directives of General Short. I was General Short's chief of staff, and the way I functioned in my office as chief of staff was in conformity with his directions.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me put it this way: Do you think the way you acted as chief of staff between November 27 and December 7 was a model procedure?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did the best I could.

Mr. MURPHY. You do not think you made a single mistake?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would not say it just like that.

Mr. MURPHY. The Army and Navy were following pretty much a model procedure at Hawaii; is that it?

[13299] Colonel PHILLIPS. That is my opinion.

Mr. MURPHY. What is your opinion?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We are human, after all, and certainly have made mistakes, have made wrong decisions, which I stated in my testimony here.

Mr. MURPHY. You say the criticism is absurd. Now what did you mean by that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My answer to that question was it was criticism of failure to cooperate, I think. Isn't that correct? As I see it now, I heard the criticism about—if I may go back—

Mr. MURPHY. The question was: "Are you acquainted with criticism that has been made public through several sources of the lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy before the outbreak of the present war—that is, prior to December 7, 1941?"

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you think it was right that the Navy did not tell you about the destruction of the codes?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of course, I knew nothing at all about it then.

Mr. MURPHY. I am asking you the question now, sir: Do you think they should have told you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It would have been of great assistance [13300] to us.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think they should have told you about the destruction of the codes at Hawaii on December 6, the destruction of the system?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That also would have been of assistance.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think they should have told you whether or not they were having task forces out or in?

Colonel PHILLIPS. All of that would have added to our knowledge.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think they should have told you whether they were having reconnaissance or not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think they should have told you what kind of an alert they were on?

Colonel PHILLIPS. All that information added up.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think they should have given information to your intelligence officers in sanitized form?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not understand that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, that is the way they gave it—in sanitized form.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know what you mean by that, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think it was right for your Air Corps intelligence officer to get material from the Navy, [13301] Captain Layton, and not your General Fielder?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It should have gone, of course, through normal channels right straight back.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, before the naval court of inquiry, question 64, our number 4713 and the Navy number 435. First, your answer to question 63:

My personal estimate was that it was possible but not very probable.

That is talking about the attack on Hawaii.

64. Q. Did your estimate include the form of attack that might be made by the Japanese?

A. An air attack more probably than any.

That is what you told the Navy court, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

65. Q. Would you distinguish whether this air attack was bombing or torpedo, or both?

A. Generally, an air attack including everything concerned therein.

66. Q. Did you receive any further information officially or in your conversations with your Commanding General after the information set out in Exhibit 19 that led you to believe that an attack on the Hawaiian area was more imminent than it had been?

A. We did not.

[13302] In other words, you told the Navy court of inquiry you thought an air attack was more probable than any other kind, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. More probable than a landing attack.

Mr. MURPHY. You said, "more probable than any," did you not? Let me read your words.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY (reading) :

63. Q. What I am trying to get at, Colonel, is this: Did you form any estimate of your own based on the information you had on, say, 28 November 1941, as to whether the Japanese would attack any objective in the Hawaiian area?

A. My personal estimate was that it was possible but not very probable.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY (reading further) :

64. Q. Did your estimate include the form of attack that might be made by the Japanese?

A. An air attack more probably than any.

65. Q. Would you distinguish whether this air attack was bombing or torpedo, or both?

A. Generally, an air attack including everything concerned therein.

Did you make that answer before the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct. More probable than [13303] a landing attack, is what I meant to say.

Mr. MURPHY. You said, "more probable than any", without any qualifications, did not you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY (reading) :

80. Q. Then if it were functioning at that time, your answer is that you do not remember?

A. I do not remember.

That was speaking of the air warning service.

81. Q. Then you probably could not state what the set-up was in this Interceptor Command prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I cannot.

83. Q. You do not remember?

A. I do not remember.

85. Q. Do you know what the scheduled hours for this operation were?

A. I cannot say. I do not remember.

91. Q. What I am trying to ascertain, Colonel, is this: Was the flight scheduled, and if it was, do you know the hour that the flight was due to arrive on the Island of Oahu?

A. I do not.

That was speaking of the B-17's.

92. Q. Can you remember, whether between October 1, 1944, and December 7, 1941, any joint Army and Navy drills [13304] were held involving long-range air reconnaissance?

A. I do not remember.

93. Q. Can you recall whether or not there were any drills held between the same period involving Navy fighters and Army pursuit ships?

A. I do not remember.

102. Q. Can you remember how long after you gave the directive for the general alert that it took to man the anti-aircraft guns for the defense of the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor?

A. I do not remember.

105. Q. About how long did it take them to get into the air?

A. I do not.

106. Q. Can you state approximately how many pursuit ships did get in the air at that time?

A. I cannot.

107. Q. Do you know whether or not any bombers were able to take the air after the general alert you have described?

A. I do not.

I might say that what I am saying as our numbers are galley-proof numbers, but I have given the question numbers also.

I have no other questions.

[13305] Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have been advised that there is present in the room Sergeant Elliott, who, the record discloses, was one of the young men who had the radar first discover the approaching column of Japanese planes on the morning of the attack. Sergeant Elliott is just an observer here, and had no idea of being a witness, but I think the committee should hear his testimony, and I would like to ask the Chairman to invite him to be present at 9:30 in the morning when we reconvene.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be present at 9:30?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be very glad to have you.

Thank you very much.

Senator Ferguson.

Mr. GEARHART. He is not here at the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel, do you have personal knowledge as to how you were selected as chief of staff in the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Other than to state what General Short has told me, and also from what General Marshall told me.

Senator FERGUSON. What did General Marshall tell you as [13306] to why you were selected?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Marshall told me after I had arrived here and asked for an appointment with him, and he came down from New York, to discuss with him the proposition of going as Chief of Staff with General Short at Hawaii. I had known General Marshall for 20 years, having served with him in China, having been an instructor under him while he was assistant commandant at the infantry school. He made a number of efficiency reports on me and knew me quite well.

I asked him about the set-up. I was entirely satisfied in my position at that time as G-3 of the First Division, but General Marshall replied something in these words: He spoke very freely. He said, "General Short has asked me to approve your going to Hawaii as his Chief of Staff and," he said, "I approve it and am convinced that you are thoroughly qualified. I want you to go out to Hawaii, and raise the training standards of the Hawaiian Garrison up to that of the First Division, as we now have it here in America."

When I first went to see General Marshall I felt that perhaps I was doing the wrong thing in accepting the offer to go to Hawaii, but on leaving his office I was convinced that I was doing the right thing. As a matter of fact, he practically directed me.

[13307] I caught the regular Army transport going out about the middle of February, which was arriving in Hawaii on March 1, about 6 weeks after General Short had arrived.

Senator FERGUSON. Now do I understand then that the approval of the Chief of Staff is necessary in order that a commander may select a chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct. It was that way at that time. I was made chief of staff in the Hawaiian Department by War Department orders, by an arrangement through General Short with the Chief of Staff, and I did not become chief of staff until the War Department

issued those orders, which were effective on the departure of Colonel Hayes.

Senator FERGUSON. You stated that General Short also made a statement as to why you were selected. Will you give us such statement?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure what General Short's reasons were for my selection.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking for your personal knowledge.

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Short was also a very old acquaintance. He had been my commander here in the War Department in 1920-21, and he stated that he wanted me to come out to be his chief of staff. That, normally, to an Army officer, is quite sufficient. A man is not selecting [13308] someone for his chief of staff for whom he does not have respect and in whom he cannot trust and feel he is a loyal subordinate.

Senator FERGUSON. How many hours after you received the message of the 27th did you put the sabotage alert on, or was the sabotage alert put into effect, if it was hours?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was, I should say, not an hour.

Senator FERGUSON. Now could you sum up the reasons for putting the sabotage alert into effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The reasons for putting the sabotage alert into effect were brought out in my estimate of the situation from notes which I read this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel then that your reasons have been stated and summed up?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right. I haven't anything in addition.

Senator FERGUSON. You have nothing in addition to that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now was Colonel Bicknell present when the alert was determined upon?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Colonel Bicknell was not.

Senator FERGUSON. How is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was not.

Senator FERGUSON. He was not?

[13309] Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know if he was notified about the kind of alert that was put into effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. It was common knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. How?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was common knowledge throughout the entire staff in a very short time. We were, of course, limited by the directive in the message of the 27th and required to limit the dissemination of this information to the fewest possible officers. Colonel Bicknell, I am sure, learned of the alert on the 27th, or most certainly by early on the 28th.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you ever have any conversations with Colonel Bicknell between that time and the time of the attack, as to the kind of an alert you were on?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I never did. So far as I know, Colonel Bicknell made no recommendations as to anything of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversations with him at all, whether it was on the kind of an alert or not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any knowledge, as far as Bicknell or Mayfield are concerned, as to the burning of any code books or code papers?

[13310] Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; I heard nothing about the burning of any codes. Colonel Bicknell brought up to the staff conference on the morning of the 6th the burning of papers by the local Japanese consul. I was also told on—well, I am not sure when it was, perhaps that was later on the morning of the attack—I wish to correct my statement about Bicknell's Mori message that he had taken up with General Short and Colonel Fielder. I did not hear about that until the next day, I believe. That was the night of the 6th. I made a statement that I had heard nothing from Bicknell. That is wrong to that extent.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course you had no knowledge as to what the people in Washington were talking about, or thinking about, when they prepared, or at the time they were preparing the message that was sent on the 27th, signed by General Marshall.

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever seen Exhibit 45?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know that I have.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to show you Exhibit 45, which is a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, subject: "Far Eastern Situation, signed by "L. T. Gerow."

(The document was handed to Colonel Phillips.)

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I have never seen that before.

[13311] Senator FERGUSON. So you had never learned later as to what may have been in the minds of the people here in Washington when that message was sent?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you have been asked questions in relation to why General Short's reply to the message of General Marshall was not the same or similar to that of the Panama Command.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that General Miles, on the 5th of December, after the message had been sent to Panama, sent a wire to the effect—at least prepared it on the 5th—to this effect and in these words:

Japanese relations strained. Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent.

Signed, "Miles".

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have never heard of that message until this hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that they were not satisfied with the reply of the Panama Command, would it not, and they were cautioning him that they would tell him if and when relations, that is, severance of the diplomatic relations, was imminent?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That could be so interpreted; yes, sir.

[13312] Senator FERGUSON. Did you get any word in any way as to the interpretation of the reply?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We did not, except an interpretation that a message by General Adams on the 28th, which General Short felt was in reply to his message of the 27th; is a sabotage alert, and he

felt that in sending that message the War Department had asked further details as to exactly what he was doing. The result was that his reply was very full, I think, extremely lengthy. That, with the exception of a similar message from General Arnold, was the last—that is on the 28th—was the last information we received in regard to the situation until after the attack, about 3:30 on the 7th, when we got General Marshall's message.

[13313] Senator FERGUSON. How do you account, Colonel, for the fact that little attention was paid to the Intelligence Branch of the Army? Wasn't the Intelligence to tell you if a war was going to occur?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. And when it was going to occur and where the attack would be and the strength of the attacking force?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Certainly we must have that information of the enemy before you can arrive at any reasonable decision or issue any sensible order.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you feel that the intelligence system was at all at fault in the fact that we were attacked, and didn't know that they were coming?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, I have been astounded at the amount of intelligence I find that has been available since I have been listening at this hearing, and that we didn't get.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that apply to what you had on the island as well as what you had at Washington?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; we thought that we were getting all that was applicable to the Army from the Navy on the island. Locally—we had no source of intelligence, if I may go back a little bit—we had no sources of [13314] intelligence other than the War Department and the Navy. Locally our stuff was subversive and on spies, small, little stuff, that really didn't fit into the big picture.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this what happened at Hawaii that your intelligence branch had devoted itself to sabotage and had neglected the big question of whether or not a war was going to occur, when it was going to occur, where it was going to occur, and the strength of the enemy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't think they had any information to base those things on. We had no sources, just as I said, except the War Department and the Navy. We had no sources of our own. We were entirely dependent on those two sources for our information.

Senator FERGUSON. You agree now, after hearing and reading the testimony, that probably the Japanese knew more about what the Army and the Navy were doing than the high commanding officers did, as far as Hawaii was concerned?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Than the commanding officers knew about the Japanese, you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. No; knew about their own.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, that might be.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that they were going to shut off the radar at 7 o'clock in the morning, Sunday morning?

[13315] Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, yes; that was the end of the training day.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Four to seven.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be the exact time, Colonel, wouldn't it, if you were going to have an early morning raid they would come in on the sun?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, I didn't know—I will correct that—I didn't know on Sunday morning of the 7th that that radar was being cut off particularly at that time and everybody was quitting. Our normal was from 4 to 7.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel, if you had an alert intelligence branch, why would you have had a normal day?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The radar, of course, was in its pioneer stage. It was a new thing. We had very few who were capable of operating it.

Senator FERGUSON. It was an instrument of intelligence, was it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. It was an arm that would extend out at least one-hundred-and-some miles to ascertain if there was any danger within this realm?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, why was that neglected? Why [13316] did you not have that alerted? That arm?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Powell is to be a witness here and he can give you more information on that. He is a better witness than I am.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am getting at is that you were the chief of staff and, apparently, the Japanese Fleet knew more than you knew about that arm of intelligence, and I am wondering how, as chief of staff, you didn't know that that arm of intelligence was not working that morning.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, Senator, we were on a training schedule entirely during that period. We were operating each day from 4 to 7 with our Opana station, our mobile station, and we had five others that were operating part of the time.

We had an information center that was also functioning in a training way. We had but two officers on the island that knew anything about a filter center or an information center and the radar. That is, prior to the 3d of December.

On the 3d, General Davidson and General Powell returned from the States having observed an exercise, I believe in the Northwest. They were just in the process of taking over our whole radar set-up and re-organizing the thing to get it functioning as we really should.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel, on Sunday morning, at the [13317] break of day, war was coming over the horizon from the north?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. Here you were as chief of staff in a training state. Is it that you were not prepared for war?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Our radar was not complete by any manner of means; it was just in the initial stage. We didn't have sufficient operators. We didn't have sufficient officers who knew the whole story on the radar by any manner of means.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we come to the conclusion that you, as far as the chief of staff was concerned, were blind and deaf, as far as that is concerned, that war was coming that morning?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We did not expect an attack on Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Nobody expected an attack on Hawaii, did they?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I haven't found anybody that expected an attack, everybody was surprised that the attack came on the morning of the 7th of December.

[13318] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were utterly surprised out there, weren't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Entirely.

Mr. KEEFE. So am I to conclude that in the face of all the war warnings that were sent and all the messages that were sent, and which you did have information about, Colonel, that pointed to the fact that war was imminent, with Japan, as far as you people were concerned, liable to take place at any minute, you all felt that it was going to take place some place else, down in the Far East; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct; because every bit of information that we had pointed in that general direction, the Kra Peninsula, Borneo, the Philippines.

Mr. KEEFE. Thus, you continued the program for which you were sent out there, as I understand it and that was this training program?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Intensive training. A unit is no good unless it is trained. It is just like a weapon. You have to have ammunition. We were doing everything we could to get that training completed so that we would have an efficient weapon when we needed it.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, was there ever any talk or discussion [13319] among the officers out there as to the possibility of an attack on Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, yes; many, many discussions.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, they must have resulted in the feeling of security and that there wasn't any attack probable.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, we felt that there was not a probability of an attack at all. It was a possible one, but not probable.

We certainly expected to get further information if there was anything of that kind coming along.

Mr. KEEFE. There were newspapers published out there and which you read?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Newspapers were published, of course, but oftentimes the newspaper reports are based on very little. But we had our intelligence people operating and we, of course, expected to get any and all information from the War Department or from the Navy.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you read the newspapers that were published out there in Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I have finished reading the file of those newspapers, and have been reading the files of the newspapers here in the United States. It is a most astonishing thing. This committee ought to have some of those files [13320] brought in and put into this record to show the current information that was being given day by day, as it appeared not only in the press in Hawaii, but appeared in the press here in the United States.

Astounding information as to what the probabilities were.

Now, there must have been somebody out there that had some idea that Hawaii was liable to be attacked, when the newspapers carried screaming headlines. Did you see those?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not recall just now. We read all of the papers, of course, available.

Mr. KEEFE. In any event, you were attacked, and you were caught flatfooted, and you weren't ready for it; that is the truth, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; made a mistake in our decision; our estimate of the situation was wrong.

Mr. KEEFE. I have been wondering whether this old Army and Navy line of command business that you fellows adhere to so meticulously has anything to do with that matter.

Now, here you get this war warning message of the 27th and General Short replies, tells them that he is alerted against sabotage and nobody at Washington here, apparently, paid any attention to his reply.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13321] Mr. KEEFE. Then, that same afternoon you get a message from General Miles, Chief of G-2, cautioning about sabotage and espionage.

Then the next day he gets a wire from Adams, from the chief of staff, a long wire, telling him entirely about sabotage and espionage, and General Short makes a long reply and says what he has done as to sabotage and espionage.

Then that same day he gets a long wire from the Chief of the Air Corps, General Arnold, telling them to look out for sabotage of the airplanes, look out for espionage, and he replies again to that.

Still you fellows sat out there thinking that you were doing the right thing, and on the 7th, the Japs hit and everybody is surprised, including the people here in Washington.

All I have got to say, Mr. Chairman, is that you have put a pretty tough proposition up to this committee, so far as I am concerned.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, I want to ask you one or two question.

You said the Navy had a liaison officer, but you didn't say that the Army had one out there. Did you or not have one?

[13322] Colonel PHILLIPS. In the Navy headquarters, the Navy had a liaison officer who had a desk in the G-3 office of Army headquarters, Lieutenant Burr, and when I was G-3, I asked Admiral Bloch's headquarters that he be sent over and he was.

The Army had nobody that compared with Lieutenant Burr in the Navy headquarters.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the liaison was sort of a one-way street; it was carried on by the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. From the Army to the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nobody whom you sent over to the Navy headquarters to bring back information to you or to take information to the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Burr worked in both capacities.

The CHAIRMAN. You got no information from the Navy except when he came over?

Colonel PHILLIPS. When he arrived every morning he came directly from the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. If you got any information that the Navy ought to have, you didn't sent it over until Burr came along and picked it up?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was just a matter of a few minutes, perhaps 20 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. How often did he make the rounds?

[13323] Colonel PHILLIPS. Whenever he felt it necessary. He made two trips a day, I should say, a trip in the morning and one in the afternoon normally, whether there was anything or not.

The CHAIRMAN. If you got information that the Navy ought to have, he wouldn't know about that until he came over?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We would send it. Major Fleming was the Navy liaison officer. We also had Colonel Dingman, who was in the harbor control boat working over at the Navy. He was there, and they were coming and going all the time. That is, from the Army to the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you said that you saw the message of the 24th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In which it was stated that a sudden surprise attack might be made in any direction?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Including Guam and the Philippines?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You interpreted that neither to exclude nor include Hawaii; is that true?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The distance was considered in that by General Short, and we discussed that fully. They said [13324] "in any direction" but the distance from Japan to Hawaii was what ruled that out.

The CHAIRMAN. You decided that the distance was too great from Japan to Hawaii to enable them to make a surprise attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And thereby the Japanese surprised you; you didn't stop to consider that they would come that far from their home base?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right. The Navy didn't think they could, either. The Navy advised us to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. But the Japanese thought they could and did?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, when you were receiving information about the sudden attack, the surprise attack in any direction, what did you think about that surprise with relation to Hawaii? Why did you think the Navy Department had sent these messages to Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and the War Department had sent them to General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, merely to inform them of the situation; chiefly in the Philippines and Guam; and that war was perhaps imminent.

The CHAIRMAN. These were direct messages to Hawaii. [13325] They were not just for information?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When they said that, whether it was the Army or Navy, Chief of the Navy in this case, that a sudden surprise attack might take place in any direction, mentioning Guam and the Philippines, they merely emphasized the possibility of greater possibility or greater probability at Guam and the Philippines, but it did not eliminate Hawaii because "all directions" includes 360° around, doesn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Notwithstanding that, the War and Navy Departments here in Washington thought that it was important enough to give you this information, and when I say "you" I mean General Short and Admiral Kimmel and our set-up out there, you, in reaching your conclusions, and I am talking about all of you, decided that the War Department and the Navy Department here were wrong, because Hawaii was so far from Japan that they couldn't reach them?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you concluded that the War and Navy Departments here were all wrong about even warning you about an attack at Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We didn't think they had warned us [13326] about an attack on the Hawaiian Islands.

The CHAIRMAN. "Any direction" would include them, and merely to mention two other places wouldn't exclude them, would it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, not entirely, no sir, but "in any direction" including Guam and the Philippines, we immediately went right straight on down to Borneo and the Kra Peninsula and the China coast.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in the message that General Marshall sent to General Short in which he set out the diplomatic situation between Japan and the United States, and then he gave directions, he didn't make a request; he didn't say, "Will you please do this," he directed General Short to institute reconnaissance—you know the difference and General Short knew the difference between reconnaissance and sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that there wasn't any trouble about that. He didn't tell you—he didn't send you a message about sabotage. He didn't direct you to institute an investigation about sabotage. His direct instructions were to institute reconnaissance; isn't that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He must have known that your frontier [13327] war defense plan, whatever it is called, was not in effect, had not been invoked, because he was in touch with every situation, wasn't he?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That would have been implemented; it could have been implemented.

The CHAIRMAN. If he knew that the plan under which it was the exclusive duty of the Navy to indulge in distant reconnaissance had not been invoked, why do you think he instructed General Short to institute reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was the great question in General Short's mind at that time, when he got that message to institute reconnaissance, because the distant reconnaissance as General Short understood the Chief of Staff knew was the mission of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. But not at that time, because the plan under which it was the mission of the Navy hadn't been put into effect; isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct. It hadn't been implemented by Washington, but, of course, we had no means of making the distant reconnaissance unless the Navy took it over.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, the Army couldn't fall back on the alibi that the Navy wasn't doing it because it wouldn't be its job until this plan had been invoked?

[13328] Colonel PHILLIPS. Had been implemented at that time yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in replying to General Marshall did you and General Short collaborate in reply? Did you confer about what would be the answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You decided then that you would send this brief reply that you had alerted against sabotage and that you had liaison with the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. By which you meant that the Navy had liaison with you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, it is a two-way road.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be but it was a one-way horse, apparently it was not an entire chain of liaison officers, if you depended altogether on the Navy to do the liaison work. Did it occur to you or to General Short that if there was any misunderstanding about what General Marshall meant, that you could wire and ask what he meant to clear up any misunderstanding?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The normal procedure is that after an order is issued by a superior headquarters and there is any question about it being carried out in the way the superior desires, there is a check made by the superior.

[13329] We thought and of course General Short—I say, “we” which is General Short—General Short thought that when he received the message from General Adams on the 28th, first receiving General Miles’ message, he knew that couldn’t have come out before his reply got back to Washington, but the Adams message could, and he assumed that that was a reply to his alert for sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. General Short had replied to General Marshall before the Miles message, or the Adams message got to Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you or General Short think that a reply saying he was alerted for sabotage was in response to a direct instruction to institute reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was General Short’s idea, sir. I concurred.

The CHAIRMAN. He thought then, if I understand you, that an alert against sabotage was carrying out the order of General Marshall to institute reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He thought that General Marshall understood General Marshall knew that the Navy was responsible for reconnaissance.

The CHAIRMAN. He also knew that General Marshall would know that the Navy was not responsible for reconnaissance until this plan had been put into effect, and which had [13330] not been put into effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He concluded that General Marshall didn’t know what he was talking about, did he?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can’t say as to that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Thank you.

(The witness was excused.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will direct the reporter to note the exhibit No. 153 on the Hawaiian exhibit.

(The document was marked previously as "Exhibit No. 153.")

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, we will call Mr. Sonnett.

The CHAIRMAN. Come around.

**TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. SONNETT, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES**

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Sonnett, will you state your full name for the record?

Mr. SONNETT. John F. Sonnett; S-o-n-n-e-t-t.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is your official position at the present time?

Mr. SONNETT. I am Assistant Attorney General of the United States in charge of the Claims Division of the Department of Justice.

[13331] Mr. KAUFMAN. And prior to your becoming Assistant Attorney General, were you in the Navy?

Mr. SONNETT. I was.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And what was your rank?

Mr. SONNETT. While I was on active duty I was a lieutenant commander in the Naval Reserve.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And was there a time when you acted as counsel to Admiral Hewitt in connection with the so-called Hewitt investigation?

Mr. SONNETT. There was.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And when was that?

Mr. SONNETT. I acted as counsel for Admiral Hewitt in the spring of last year, running until about July.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And what were your functions in connection with the investigation conducted by Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. SONNETT. My functions were to investigate all prior investigations conducted by the Navy to recommend to the Admiral those subjects requiring further investigation, to interrogate witnesses and generally assemble documentary evidence in order that I might present to him such information as was deemed necessary to carry out the further investigation directed.

Mr. KAUFMAN. During the course of that inquiry did you have occasion to interview Captain Safford?

[13332] Mr. SONNETT. I did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And when was that, Mr. Sonnett?

Mr. SONNETT. I am sorry, I am not able to fix the exact date. It was sometime in the spring of 1945.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain Safford, in his testimony here at page 9696:

It was apparent to me on my very first meeting with Lieutenant Commander Sonnett that he was acting as a "counsel for the defense" for the late Secretary Knox and Admiral Stark rather than as the legal assistant to the investigating officer.

Have you any comment to make with respect to that?

Mr. SONNETT. Only that my instructions from the Secretary of the Navy were to get all of the facts, no matter where we could find them,

without regard to any special interest that any particular individual might have.

Concerning Secretary Knox, I might say I never had the pleasure of meeting him, nor to the best of my recollection, have I ever met Admiral Stark.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain Safford testified further on page 9697 of the record here:

I talked to Sonnett the second time on 18 May, 1945, and the third time a day or two later. On these latter occasions, like the first, Sonnett tried to persuade me [13333] that there had been no "winds execute" message, that my memory had been playing me tricks, that I had confused the "false winds message" with what I had been expecting and that I ought to change my testimony to permit reconciling all previous discrepancies and thereby wind up the affair.

In some cases the idea was stated outright. In some cases it was implied, and in other cases it was unexpressed but obviously the end in view.

Now, will you tell the committee, Mr. Sonnett, as nearly as you can, the substance of your talks with Captain Safford, and directing your attention particularly to any attempt by you to persuade Captain Safford to change any testimony that he had previously given?

Mr. SONNETT. In the first place, there was no such attempt at any time with respect to Captain Safford, or any other witness.

My instructions were to get the facts and nothing but the facts.

That is what I endeavored to do.

Any statement that I tried to get Captain Safford to change his testimony or any other witness to change his testimony is not true.

My experience with Captain Safford during the first several times I met him was that he produced at my request [13334] a memorandum in which he discussed the so-called winds message.

In that memorandum, in words or substance, at one point he said:

They have been accusing me of having hallucinations.

He implied that people, without identifying them, had regarded him as being of unsound mind.

I called him down after reading that memorandum—

Mr. KAUFMAN. When you say you called him down, you mean you called him to talk with him?

Mr. SONNETT. I called him on the telephone and asked him to come down so we could discuss it.

We discussed the memorandum. I held it for several days and discussed it with my assistant at the time, and then in a conversation with him subsequently, I said, "Captain Safford, I think for your own good, as a matter of your own personal welfare and just as a personal and friendly suggestion, I think you should withdraw this memorandum in which you state, in a formal Navy record, that people have been casting doubts on your sanity."

I told him that so far as I knew no one had ever cast any doubt on his sanity, that he was entitled to his opinion as to what the facts were, that all we wanted was his best recollection of the facts.

[13335] I told him that it didn't make any difference whether his recollection differed from someone else's, that what we wanted were facts and just facts.

I said, however, that his denial of the charge, in substance, was a denial of a charge that he was crazy. In a formal naval document it

seemed to me to put him in a very difficult position. I told him that I would forward his memorandum to Admiral Hewitt, if he wanted me to, but that as a personal matter, I didn't think it was good for him.

I told him that he would have the opportunity to testify fully concerning his recollection of the winds message.

Captain Safford withdrew the memorandum in question. He subsequently had the opportunity to testify fully concerning the winds message.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did he testify fully before Admiral Hewitt regarding his version of the so-called winds message?

Mr. SONNETT. He did, Mr. Kaufman.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, Mr. Sonnett, I show you Exhibit 153 produced by Captain Safford, and ask you to pick out that portion of the memorandum that he gave you in which he refers to people charging him with having hallucinations.

Mr. SONNETT. In the memorandum dated May 14, 1945, for me by Captain Safford, which is a part of this exhibit—

[13336] Mr. KAUFMAN. Part of Exhibit 151.

Mr. SONNETT. At paragraph 9, Captain Safford stated—and it was this paragraph that led me to suggest after my talk with him—that in his own best interest he should withdraw the memorandum:

There is one final place where written confirmation of the Winds "execute" message may exist—the record of proceedings of the Roberts Commission. I cannot believe that they could cover up so completely that some mention of the winds "execute" did not slip into the record.

First they said I didn't know what was going on around me: Now they claim I am suffering from hallucinations. Under the circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted to search through the record for such evidence in order to prove my sanity as well as my intelligence and my veracity.

It seemed to me that the least duty I owed to a fellow naval officer who was denying an accusation of that type in a memorandum, which accusation I had never heard from anybody in the Navy, was to give him an opportunity to withdraw it.

I did give him that opportunity and he did withdraw it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you never saw it, he took that memorandum with him?

[13337] Mr. SONNETT. He did, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. He produced that memorandum here and it has been offered in evidence as part of Exhibit 115.

You just testified, Mr. Sonnett, that you were assisted in that proceeding?

Mr. SONNETT. I was.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Who was your assistant?

Mr. SONNETT. Lt. Commdr. John Ford Baecher, who has been the naval liaison with this committee.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was he present at all of the meetings that you had with Captain Safford?

Mr. SONNETT. He was, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you at any time, in words or in substance, request Captain Safford to change his testimony?

Mr. SONNETT. I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did he testify fully before Admiral Hewitt?

Mr. SONNETT. He did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I have none. Mr. Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark?

Mr. CLARK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

[13338] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Sonnett, Captain Safford before us quoting Admiral Hart, said something to the effect that he misled him; second, he said he was not permitted to testify before the Roberts Board; third, he said he condemned, by gossip, General Marshall; fourth, he said there was a frame-up in the Chief of Naval Operations Office in 1941; fifth, he said the Chief of Naval Operations could not be trusted in 1944; sixth, he said there was some evidence of a conspiracy in the Army and Navy; seven, he talked of the destruction of records; eight, he gave some evidence of violation of security regulations; nine, he talked about falsification of records; ten, he talked about, apparently with some sinister implications, destruction of intercepting records at radio stations; eleven, he changed his own statement as to Pearl Harbor; twelve, he changed somewhat his statement as to the ability to receive messages in England; thirteen, he changed his testimony in some other particulars; and fourteenth, he charged you with subornation of perjury.

You say you did no such thing?

Mr. SONNETT. I cannot emphasize too much that Captain Safford had every opportunity to tell his story to Admiral Hewitt and to myself.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you received some citations for your service in the Navy?

[13339] Mr. SONNETT. I have, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What were they?

Mr. SONNETT. I received a citation from Secretary Forrester for outstanding service as his special assistant. I also received a commendation from Admiral Hewitt at the completion of the Pearl Harbor investigation.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I have a copy of them, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. MURPHY. You are a member of the bar of what State?

Mr. SONNETT. Member of the bar of the State of New York, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And have been practicing for how long?

Mr. SONNETT. Approximately 10 years.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you admitted to the bar of the United States Supreme Court?

Mr. SONNETT. I am not, sir, but I have appeared in the various Federal courts except that Court.

Mr. MURPHY. And have been rendering service for the Attorney General of the United States since you left the service of the United States Navy?

Mr. SONNETT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. It is apparent that I can't finish this evening

[13340] The CHAIRMAN. We will recess then until 9:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee recessed until 9:30 a. m. of the following day, Wednesday, February 20, 1946.)

[13341]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:30 a. m., in the caucus room (318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[13342] The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we have distributed to the committee this morning several additional documents, which we would like to mark as exhibits.

The first is the yellow folder entitled "Correspondence between General Arnold and General Martin."

I believe some of this is already in evidence, but this is a complete compilation, as I understand it, of the correspondence between those two generals.

We would like to have that marked as "Exhibit 154."

The CHAIRMAN. That may be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 154.")

Mr. MASTEN. Throughout the transcript there are various letters and dispatches on the subject of basing additional aircraft at Wake and Midway.

We have one additional letter, which is dated November 10, 1941, and signed by Admiral Kimmel, which we would like to have spread in the transcript at this point inasmuch as there is no exhibit on that general subject.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

5014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(The letter of November 10, 1941, follows:)

[13343]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.
L24/VZ/(95)
Serial 01825

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., November 10, 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet,

To: Commander Aircraft, Battle Force

Commander Patrol Wing TWO

Subject: Naval Air Station Wake and Naval Air Station Midway—Basing of Aircraft at.

1. In order to be able to meet emergency requirements for basing of aircraft at Wake and Midway, while minimizing logistic demands of those places for the present, the commander in chief desires that the following action be taken immediately.

(a) Make preparations at Wake for basing:

(1) 12 patrol planes.

(2) 12 Marine scout bombers or 12 Marine fighters.

(b) Make preparations at Midway for basing:

(1) 12 additional patrol planes (total 24).

(2) 18 Marine scout bombers or 18 Marine fighters.

2. These preparations shall include the following provisions and assumptions:

(a) When the aircraft movements are ordered, it [13344] shall be necessary only to fly the patrol planes and landplanes (from a carrier in the latter case) to the designated places and it shall be practicable to operate on arrival without attendant transportation of material or personnel by ship.

(b) It shall be practicable to continue operations on this basis for a period of six weeks, at the end of which time relief may be expected, either by air exchange of planes and flight crews or by provision of additional support transported by ship, or by combination of the two.

(c) Preparations shall, accordingly, include transportation to Wake and Midway of—

(1) Necessary tools, spares and equipment for minor repairs, adjustments and checks.

(2) Necessary minimum number of ground personnel to meet the requirements of subparagraph 2 (b) above, assuming the full availability of Naval Air Station personnel and Marine defense personnel already present for non-technical manpower assistance.

(3) Necessary additional bombs, with necessary additional bomb handling equipment. (Note: With delivery of the 48 1,000 lb. bombs approved for the patrol planes at Wake the bomb situation for patrol planes will be satisfactory at both Wake [13345] and Midway. The following additional bombs are needed for the Marine planes; Wake, 12 1,000 lb., 24 500 lb.; Midway, 18 1,000 lb., 36 500 lb., 150 100 lb. bombs each, of those already available at Wake and Midway, should be designated for the Marine planes. Aircraft machine gun ammunition already at Wake and Midway is sufficient).

(d) Patrol plane personnel at Wake shall base and subsist in excess accommodations available in Contractor's Camp No. 2 near the air station site. Patrol plane personnel at Midway shall base and subsist at the Naval Air Station with additional accommodations, if and as necessary, to be provided by the use of Contractor's space.

(e) Marine squadron personnel at Wake shall base and subsist adjacent to the landplane runways. Marine squadron personnel at Midway shall base and subsist on Eastern Island. At both places it is necessary to set up a suitable tent camp. The assistance of Marine defense personnel shall be used to accomplish this.

(f) Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall provide, by patrol plane tender, the necessary personnel and material transportation for both patrol plane and Marine aircraft preparations.

3. By copy of this letter the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is directed to take immediate steps to:

[13346] (a) Make available the 48 1,000 lb. bombs still due for patrol planes at Wake and the additional bombs for the Marine planes (paragraph 2 (c) (3) above).

(b) Provide for necessary storage of bombs and ammunition for Marine landplanes adjacent to landplane runways at Wake and Midway.

(c) Make available the Contractor's accommodations needed for patrol squadron personnel at Wake and Midway.

(d) Cover the bulk subsistence and potable water requirements of the personnel of the foregoing preparatory parties and anticipate the additional requirements resulting from actual aircraft basing.

(e) Expedite expansion of tank storage of aviation gasoline at Wake and anticipate the aviation gasoline and lubricating oil requirements at both Wake and Midway resulting from actual aircraft basing.

(f) Provide lumber needed for the tent camps of Marine aircraft personnel at Wake and Midway.

(g) Make available the needed assistance from Naval Air Station and Marine defense personnel for camp construction and, on arrival of aircraft, for aircraft operations.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

Combatfor
[13347] Comscofor
Combasefor
Comairscfor
Com-14
Nad, Oahu
C. O. Marine Air Group 21

/s/ P. C. Crosley,
/t/ P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

Received 8-C FILES, Room 2055, Nov. 26, 1941. Route to: 38. Op File No. (SC)A48/V2. Doc. No. 38467. Copy No. 1 of 2. PRN 711.

[13348] Mr. MASTEN. Exhibit 117 contains various correspondence relating to the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. That correspondence is in addition to other material which appears in the transcript or exhibits at various places.

We would like to add to Exhibit 117, as 117-A, the letter entitled "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," which is dated 17 February 1941, and signed by General Short.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit 117-A.")

Mr. MASTEN. Finally, we would like to add to Exhibit 123, which contains correspondence relating to joint operations centers on Oahu, the correspondence which was distributed to the committee this morning, and the first letter of which is dated January 10, 1942, from the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans, Admiral Turner, to the commander in chief, United States Fleet.

We would like to add that to Exhibit 123, as 123-A.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit 123-A.")

Mr. MASTEN. That is all we have.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander Sonnett.

[13349] TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. SONNETT (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, I believe you were to examine. Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. Sonnett, what is your present occupation?

Mr. SONNETT. I am an Assistant Attorney General of the United States and in charge of the so-called Claims or General Civil Division of the Department of Justice.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go to the Department of Justice at the time you left the Navy?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had spent all of your service in the Navy in the Secretary's office?

Mr. SONNETT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn that there was to be a new investigation under Admiral Hewitt?

Mr. SONNETT. Approximately in November of 1944, that there was to be a new investigation. The selection of Admiral Hewitt by the Secretary as the investigating, or hearing officer, came later.

Senator FERGUSON. About when did it come?

Mr. SONNETT. Sometime in the spring of 1945. I am unable to give you the exact date.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't it in May?

[13350] Mr. SONNETT. It may have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you conduct a personal investigation between November and May?

Mr. SONNETT. To the extent, Senator, of reviewing all prior Navy investigations to determine what subjects had not adequately been covered by the previous investigations.

Senator FERGUSON. You were familiar with the report of the Navy Board?

Mr. SONNETT. I was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And didn't it recommend that no further proceedings be taken? Wasn't the last recommendation:

The Court recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter, the court having finished the inquiry.

Then:

At 4 p. m. Thursday, October 19, 1944, adjourned to await the action of the convening authority.

Did you know that?

Mr. SONNETT. I am sure I did, Senator. I read the report at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, can you give us just what led up to the new investigation after the Board had recommended that no further proceedings be had in the matter?

Mr. SONNETT. The customary practice, Senator, under [13351] Naval regulations is that reports by courts of inquiry are advisory only to the convening authority.

The convening authority was the Secretary of the Navy.

In accordance with the usual practice under Navy regulations, he caused a review to be made of the proceedings of the court of inquiry. That review, in which I participated, led to the further investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did the actual reviewing of the testimony and the report?

Mr. SONNETT. Well, that was done by several people. It was done by myself, it was done by then Major Mathias F. Correa, who was a special assistant to the Secretary also, and it was done by the Secretary himself. How much of the actual record he read I am unable to state. I know that he read some of it.

[13352] Senator FERGUSON. Who was in charge of the review?

Mr. SONNETT. The Secretary of the Navy, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the Secretary of the Navy had many other things to do?

Mr. SONNETT. He did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't he designate you as the one in charge of review to get his report out?

Mr. SONNETT. I don't mean to argue, Senator, but I don't think I was in charge of the review. I assisted the Secretary in his review.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Mr. Baecher have to do with the review?

Mr. SONNETT. Mr. Baecher was selected by me as an assistant, Senator, in the spring of 1945, when it became apparent that further investigation was necessary. He reviewed documents, participated with me in the preliminary examination of prospective witnesses, and later participated throughout as assistant counsel during the Hewitt investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. What were your duties as counsel for Admiral Hewitt?

Mr. SONNETT. To explore the documentary evidence, to investigate in a preliminary fashion by taking statements of witnesses, to make recommendations to the admiral as to the witnesses to be interrogated by him, and to put questions to [13353] witnesses during the course of the hearings, to assist in the preparation of the final report, and to give the Admiral any assistance I could generally.

Senator FERGUSON. You had been in the Navy at that time how long?

Mr. SONNETT. I went—that requires a little explanation, Senator. I went to the Navy in the fall of 1943 as a civilian special counsel. I worked in that capacity until January of 1944 when, at the request of then Under Secretary Forrestal, I applied for a commission and was commissioned. I was on active duty from January of 1944 until May of 1945. I then was appointed a civilian special assistant at the Secretary's suggestion, and continued in that capacity until approximately the end of August of 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, in order that you might assist Admiral Hewitt, it was necessary for you to know what was to be developed or what your purpose was in conducting a further inquiry, was it not?

Mr. SONNETT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the purpose of the further inquiry?

Mr. SONNETT. To obtain all of the facts which had not adequately been obtained before, either by reinterrogation of previous witnesses, or, in addition, by the interrogation [13354] of other witnesses who had been in combat before and not available.

Senator FERGUSON. If a witness had fully testified before the Board, did you interrogate him if his testimony conflicted with someone else's?

Mr. SONNETT. Not unless there was some ambiguity or uncertainty in his testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any uncertainty in Captain Safford's testimony?

Mr. SONNETT. There was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it?

Mr. SONNETT. The uncertainty consisted primarily, as I recall, in the fact that Captain Safford had told varying stories, in the sense of the date when he thought he saw the winds execute message, the names of other people whom he said also saw that winds message. I am unable at the moment to recall any of the other conflicts in his statements, but there were such.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any conflict in Admiral Stark's testimony?

Mr. SONNETT. It was my personal opinion, Senator, that the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark both had been fully stated in the naval court of inquiry and I was unable to see any item on which further investigation was [13355] required in order to obtain their full statements.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Admiral Hewitt review the evidence so that he knew of these conflicts?

Mr. SONNETT. He did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any so-called leads prepared?

Mr. SONNETT. Well, the scope of the further investigation, Senator, was decided by Admiral Hewitt in the form of his own view, and then presented in formal fashion to the Secretary of the Navy for his approval of the further investigation. I can get that for you. Commander Baecher has produced the memorandum by Admiral Hewitt to the Secretary dated May 18, 1945, setting forth the items of further review.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to see those.

Mr. SONNETT. And the approval of the Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, prior to Admiral Hewitt coming in on the 18th of May, had you taken any statements or interviewed any witnesses?

Mr. SONNETT. I had, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What were the witnesses that you had interviewed prior to Admiral Hewitt's coming in?

Mr. SONNETT. I am unable to recall them all, Senator. I can recall, among others, Captain Safford; Captain Rochefort, [13356] I believe, was interrogated before the arrival of Admiral Hewitt. I can't give you offhand the names of the others.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you take any evidence down, or memorandums?

Mr. SONNETT. No. These were purely informal exploratory meetings, Senator, with the purpose of, in a preliminary fashion, arriving at some view as to what the witness could testify to.

Senator FERGUSON. Hadn't Captain Rochefort already testified and hadn't Captain Safford already testified?

Mr. SONNETT. They had, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Before Admiral Hewitt came in, you had a definite purpose that you were going to follow. Will you state what that purpose was, what were you going to prove or try to prove?

Mr. SONNETT. My instructions, Senator, from the Secretary of the Navy were to conduct a thorough review of all prior Navy investigations and upon completion of that to see whether in my opinion there was further investigation required. I did that. My later instructions from the Secretary of the Navy, when it was apparent that further investigation was necessary, were to obtain directly and as counsel to Admiral Hewitt all of the facts from whatever source.

[13357] Senator FERGUSON. Did you review the Roberts report?

Mr. SONNETT. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And was it your duty, under your instructions from the Secretary, to review that as well as the Admiral Hart report, the Navy-board inquiry?

Mr. SONNETT. I am unable to state, Senator, whether I had any specific instructions concerning the Roberts report. I can state that I did review it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you review the evidence?

Mr. SONNETT. I examined portions of the evidence, as I recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you review the Secretary Knox report?

Mr. SONNETT. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever read that?

Mr. SONNETT. I had not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Mr. SONNETT. I had not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not in the Department?

Mr. SONNETT. I assume it was, Senator, but I am unable to state. I have never seen that report.

Senator FERGUSON. You had access to magic?

Mr. SONNETT. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All of the magic, I assume?

Mr. SONNETT. I did, sir.

[13358] Senator FERGUSON. Did you go into the question in the Secretary of State's office?

Mr. SONNETT. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go into any question in the Executive Office—the White House?

Mr. SONNETT. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to find out what agreement or understanding there was if there was an attack on the British and not on America, what the policy was?

Mr. SONNETT. I didn't try to review any particular thing, Senator. As I stated before, my immediate function at the outset was to review the naval court of inquiry investigation and Admiral Hart's investigation; as part of the customary regular routine under naval regulations to assist the Secretary in his decision, whatever it might be, upon the advisory opinion of the naval court of inquiry.

[13359] Senator FERGUSON. You did not quite answer my question. My question was in relation to the A B C D understanding.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, I am not familiar with that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not familiar with that?

Mr. SONNETT. My attempt to answer your question was to state that I had my instructions and I complied with them. Those instructions were limited to the naval matters. I did not investigate outside of the Navy in any way, shape, or fashion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you take any testimony from any Army officers?

Mr. SONNETT. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with Exhibits 16 and 17?

Mr. SONNETT. I do not remember them.

Senator FERGUSON. They were signed by Admiral Stark. They had to do with the so-called line in the Pacific.

Mr. SONNETT. If I could look at them, Senator, I could refresh my recollection. I do not know the numbers of the exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is 16 and we will have 17 in a minute. This is 17 [handing documents to witness].

Mr. SONNETT. Looking at 16 first, Senator, I note the recommendations at the end of that memorandum by the chief of staff and the Chief of Naval Operations.

[13360] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And it indicates to me that I have seen it before. As to Exhibit 17, I do not recall having seen it before.

Senator FERGUSON. The Exhibit 17?

Mr. SONNETT. I do not, Senator; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I want to review your memo here of the 18th, so I am through at the present moment until I review it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. I do not have but a couple of questions.

I just wondered—I was not here at the beginning of your testimony, Mr. Sonnett—but I have before me the examination of Captain Kramer taken before Admiral Hewitt on the 22d day of May 1945. Now, prior to your interview with Captain Kramer he had previously testified, had he not?

Mr. SONNETT. He had, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He had testified before the naval court of inquiry.

Mr. SONNETT. That is my recollection, sir; yes.

Mr. KEEFE. I believe he had not testified in the Hart inquiry, and then followed the final Hewitt inquiry, of which you were a part.

Now, just what was the purpose of going all over that [13361] again with Captain Kramer?

Mr. SONNETT. Well, Mr. Congressman, there were a number of items upon the review of the prior investigations which were regarded as being important. Those items are in the document which Senator Ferguson is now examining. There were, I think, some 12 or 14 of them.

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon the interruption. Items drawn up by whom?

Mr. SONNETT. By the Secretary of the Navy, sir, and by Admiral Hewitt, in whose opinions I should say that personally, if you want my personal opinion, I wholly concurred.

Of those items, one was the winds code execute. The only real importance that had, in the judgment of the Secretary and in the judgment of Admiral Hewitt, was because there was a conflict between the witnesses and because the evidence of the existence of such a mes-

sage rested almost entirely on the testimony of one man and was disputed by many others. In order to resolve that point the winds-code investigation was done, along with the investigation on the other more important matters.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, of course, I fully realize that all of these subject matters were investigations pursuant to an act of Congress directing the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War to make investigations, with no prescribed method set forth in the resolution, and they could continue it in [13362] any form and in any manner that they saw fit.

Now, if I understand your testimony, when a review of the testimony taken by the Navy court of inquiry came before the Secretary of the Navy for review it was apparent that there were some disputes among the witnesses as to what were considered to be essential facts and you attempted to resolve those facts; is that right?

Mr. SONNETT. Not quite, Mr. Congressman; no. It was apparent that there were certain matters of great importance, particularly the question of the intelligence which Admiral Kimmel had at Pearl Harbor, apart from messages from Washington, was a matter of considerable importance.

That had not been adequately investigated. We investigated it and I trust did it adequately. That was important. The only importance the winds-code message had, as I indicated to you before, was because there was a conflict and that conflict required that there be further investigation. Captain Safford, for example, had named certain people as having seen the winds-code message, the execute or alleged execute. Those people had not been interrogated. We interrogated all of them and, incidentally, none of them—as you know, none of them saw the message; at least they so testified, but it was because—

[13363] Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't agree with that at all. The testimony is quite to the contrary before the committee.

Mr. SONNETT. Not the testimony I am referring to, Mr. Congressman. The people named by Captain Safford in his previous testimony as having seen the winds code execute testified before us that they had not seen such a message.

Mr. KEEFE. Captain Kramer was one of them, wasn't he?

Mr. SONNETT. He was one of them.

Mr. KEEFE. He certainly did not testify that he did not see this winds execute.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, I don't know what he testified to here, Mr. Congressman; I haven't been following this inquiry that closely, but I do know that before Admiral Hewitt he was unable to testify or state that he ever saw a genuine winds-code message prior to the attack relating to the United States.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't want to go off on a tangent about this winds execute. We have had 2 or 3 weeks about that kind of business and as far as I am personally concerned I don't care for my own thinking whether there was or was not a winds execute. Whatever the facts are they are before this committee and we can take them for what they are worth. I don't think, myself, that it was of very great importance in view of the other evidence and facts that were at hand, but I have before me Captain Kramer's testimony taken before the [13364]

Hewitt investigation. I note that he was examined at some length by Admiral Hewitt and then after Admiral Hewitt got through with him you examined him. That was on the second day of the examination.

Did you talk with Captain Kramer before you reduced his testimony to writing?

Mr. SONNETT. I am sure I did, Mr. Congressman; yes.

Mr. KEEFE. You went over the testimony that he had given before to point out the conflicts?

Mr. SONNETT. I don't know that we went over the exact testimony he gave before. I knew that we reviewed his recollection with him to try to find out what the facts were according to his best recollection.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, all I can say, Captain, after the full examination before the Army board, and the Navy board, and the Hart investigation, and the Hewitt investigation, and the Sonnett investigation, and this investigation here I think we are more muddled up than we were before we started so far as the winds message is concerned. We still haven't got any clear, definite picture as to exactly what did take place. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you ready to resume now, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will be as soon as I finish [13365] reading it.

The CHAIRMAN. In the meantime I will ask a question.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Reference has been made to the statement of the Navy board:

The Board recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.

That is a report to the Secretary of the Navy and I suppose it is based upon the last paragraph of their opinion, which says:

Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service.

In other words, they exonerated in that paragraph everybody in the Navy and then the first recommendation was that there be no further proceedings.

I suppose that might be interpreted to mean that inasmuch as they found no offense had been committed and no serious blame on the part of anybody, not to proceed against anybody under courts martial or any other legal proceeding, but regardless of that the Secretary was not satisfied that an adequate investigation had been had of all these matters and, therefore, he set up this supplementary investigation under Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. SONNETT. That is correct, sir, and after his re- [13366] view of the entire investigations and facts in all of them you will recall that his conclusions differed markedly from the court and were set forth in his endorsement.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. In other words, the mere fact that the board recommended that no further proceedings be had was not binding on the Secretary of the Navy, who had been directed by Congress to make an investigation, and the Secretary of War had been directed to make an investigation, and they had full authority to set up any commission or any board, or as many commissions or as many boards as they might think were necessary in order to get the facts?

Mr. SONNETT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And if it were not for the fact that after these investigations that had been had by the Army and the Navy Congress itself and probably the country felt that the matter had not been adequately gone into, this committee has been sitting here since the 6th of September to get further facts with reference to the matter.

In other words, after each investigation it had been felt that some further inquiry was necessary and that is why this committee was created. I don't know whether there will be another one or not, but I can guarantee one thing, that if there is another one that this member will not be on the committee that carries it out.

[13367] Senator BREWSTER. Is that a threat or a promise?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in your case it will be a promise, I think.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I ask that there be spread on the record at this point the citation from the Secretary of the Navy and the citation from Admiral Hewitt as to the witness on the stand at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered. That is all I want to ask.
(The citations referred to follow:)

12 JULY 1945.

From: Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: John F. Sonnett; Commendation of.

1. John F. Sonnett served from 14 May 1945 to 11 July 1945 as my counsel for the further investigation into the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, directed by the Secretary of the Navy's precept of 2 May 1945.

2. During this period he exhibited professional skill to a high degree, and was of the greatest assistance to me.

3. His efficient conduct of these hearings and thorough development of the testimony contributed immeasurably [13368] to the completion of the investigation.

4. It is respectfully requested that the substance of this correspondence be made a part of his official record.

H. K. HEWITT.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JOHN F. SONNETT

UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

"For outstanding services as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy from January 22, 1944, to May 5, 1945. Applying himself with keen foresight, effective resourcefulness, purposeful initiative and delicate tact to the complex problems inherent in confidential assignments of paramount importance, Lieutenant Commander Sonnett skillfully formulated and executed missions of the highest classification pertaining to, affecting and furthering the war effort. His constant devotion to duty and loyal discharge of weighty responsibilities reflect the highest credit upon Lieutenant Commander Sonnett and upon the United States Naval Service."

[13369] A copy of this citation has been made a part of Lieutenant Commander Sonnett's official record and he is hereby authorized to wear the Commendation Ribbon.

/s/ JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you ready, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. Sonnett, under "F" on page 2 you were:

To determine the basis for the statement at page 6 of "Battle Report" that "There were two powerful task forces sent against Pearl Harbor, the major elements of one lurking just over the horizon from its companion force to overwhelm any American attempt to engage the invaders. The United States, too, had two task forces at sea, and Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo.

Did you make any investigation of that "F"?

Mr. SONNETT. We did, yes. We made an investigation of every one of those items, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you find on that particular one?

Mr. SONNETT. That related, Senator, as I recall it, to the question of Japanese intelligence or espionage at Hawaii, a subject which we felt had not been fully explored.

The statement in the book Battle Report indicated [13370] that the Japanese espionage had advised Tokyo of the fact that two task forces of ours were at sea.

We wanted to find out whether or not that was so and, as I recall it although I am trusting to recollection a year old now, as I recall it we found there was no specific evidence so indicating, but that that was a fair inference from the various reports which the consul at Honolulu had sent to Tokyo.

[13371] Senator FERGUSON. Now do I understand then that the Hewitt investigation and your investigation prior to the Hewitt never made any report to the Secretary?

Mr. SONNETT. No; we made a report, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You did make a report?

Mr. SONNETT. We did, yes. My impression is it was before this committee. It is a rather long one with findings of fact and conclusions.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It is part of the Hewitt report.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have any discussion with the Secretary as to having the Court of Inquiry complete its work?

Mr. SONNETT. Not that I recall, Senator; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us any reason why the court was not continued to do this work? They had the previous history and they had all the facts that they had obtained, at least.

Mr. SONNETT. I am unable to give you any reason, Senator, except I am confident of one thing, that the Secretary wanted all of the facts and he wanted them accurately, and he wanted them from whatever source he could get them.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any dissatisfaction with the report that the Navy Court of Inquiry had made?

Mr. SONNETT. To the extent, Senator, that, first, their [13372] investigation was not complete, and second, that certain of their findings were erroneous; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That certain of their findings were erroneous.

Mr. SONNETT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What were those particular findings?

Mr. SONNETT. I cannot recall, but the Secretary's subsequent endorsement considers each one in detail and sets forth the Secretary's findings on the basis of the various findings of the Board.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Senator Ferguson, the Hewitt report is part of exhibit 107.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the third volume?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. And that includes the report by this witness?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this include your report also?

Mr. SONNETT. Senator, I made no report individually. I drafted, with the help of my assistants, Admiral Hewitt's report which he revised and then submitted to the Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have in the record the two exhibits, if they are not already in, the one creating the Hewitt Board and the other one the [13373] further investigation of the facts, and then it proceeded to give what was to be investigated, so that the record will be complete.

The CHAIRMAN. All these matters are in the record as exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am trying to find out.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Commander Baecher tells me that one of these is not in at the present time. Commander Baecher says the one dated May 18, which sets forth the scope of the examination, is not in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask then that that be made part of the record here in the transcript, because I think it is material to many other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The matter referred to follows:)

SECRET

18 MAY 1945.

From: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Further investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

Reference: (a) Precept 2 May 1945 appointing Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy to conduct further Pearl Harbor investigation.

[13374] 1. In accordance with reference (a) a study has been made of the report of the Robert's Commission, of the record of examination of witnesses directed by the Secretary of the Navy 12 February 1944, the record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry convened by order of the Secretary of the Navy 13 July 1944, and of various other documents relating to this matter. It appears that further investigation is necessary in order

(A) to obtain the information now available concerning the composition and movements of the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941;

(B) to obtain the information which was available at Pearl Harbor, at Cavite, and at Washington, during the period 26 November 1941 to 7 December 1941, concerning the location, composition and movements of Japanese naval forces, including (1) examination as to the activities of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor and the information obtained by it, with particular reference to the location of the major portion of the Japanese carriers, to the change in radio contact with units of the Japanese Fleet on or about 1 December 1941, and to the apparently erroneous belief that on 7 December 1941 the attacking force was located south of Hawaii; (2) examination [13375] as to ONI bulletins, such as the bulletin of 1 December 1941; (3) examination as to the information furnished by the Navy to the Army, at Washington and at Pearl Harbor, concerning Japanese naval movements and radio contact with Japanese units; (4) examination as to information of Japanese Naval units obtained by Army reconnaissance, with particular reference to the War Department's directions to General Short, about 26 November 1941, to conduct reconnaissance to Jaluit, to the

action taken, and to the question whether Admiral Kimmel was advised of this;

(C) to determine whether or not Japanese submarines operated in and around Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941, including (1) whether a captured Japanese map, as indicated in the Army Pearl Harbor report, establishes that such submarines were in Pearl Harbor before that date, or, as indicated in the book entitled "Battle Report", that the map was made on that date and erroneously fixed the positions of United States ships in the harbor; (2) what submarine contacts were made in or around Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941; (3) according to "Battle Report", at about 0500 on 7 December 1941, [13376] a naval radio station on Oahu intercepted and logged a conversation between the WARD and CON-DOR concerning the sighting of a submarine at approximately 1850. It should be determined what was done about this and why were the net gates allowed to remain open from 0445 until 0800;

(D) to obtain the information received in Hawaii through the interception of Japanese telephone and cable messages by the Office of Naval Intelligence, or so obtained by other agencies of the United States Government or of other governments and communicated to the Naval Intelligence at Hawaii;

(E) to determine who obtained the intercepted Japanese messages concerning ship movements, sent to and from Honolulu, which are set forth in Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court's Record, and how, when and where they were obtained and decoded;

(F) to determine the basis for the statement at page 6 of "Battle Report" that "There were two powerful task forces sent against Pearl Harbor, the major elements of one lurking just over the horizon from its companion force to overwhelm any American attempt to engage the invaders. The United States, too, had two task forces at sea, and Japanese espionage [13377] had so informed Tokyo."

(G) to determine whether or not there was a "winds code" message relating to the United States;

(H) to interview Admiral Wilkinson generally and with particular reference to combat intelligence and to the "winds code";

(I) to interview Captain McCollum generally and with particular reference to the "winds code";

(J) to determine what information the records of CInCPac and COMFOURTEEN contain concerning (1) Admiral Kimmel's approval of Annex VII to the Joint Coastal Defense Plan and the "Bellinger" estimate, (2) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of copies of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January 1941, and the Secretary of War's reply, (3) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of the second letter from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning air torpedo attack, (4) the date when Admiral Kimmel approved the aircraft schedules which were submitted covering employment of planes during the period 15 November 1941 to 31 December 1941;

(K) to determine what were the reasons for the air reconnaissance which Admiral Kimmel directed in [13378] or about July 1941, toward the Jaluits.

(L) to ascertain the facts in connection with such other questions as may arise during the investigation to be conducted by me.

2. Having found that such further investigation is necessary, I propose to examine the persons having knowledge of the facts in question and to obtain such documents as may be relevant thereto.

3. Counsel in this investigation will be John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting will be Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Griswold, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, U. S. N. R. Each of these men has taken a special oath to maintain the security of the information received during this investigation.

H. KENT HEWITT.

First endorsement:

5-21-45

The further investigation set forth herein is hereby approved.

(Copy)

FORRESTAL.

[13379] Senator FERGUSON. Did you, Mr. Sonnett, make a report after you made this preliminary investigation? Did you make a report to the Secretary of the Navy as to what you thought should be done?

Mr. SONNETT. I made no formal or written report, Senator, no.

Senator BREWSTER. As I understand, you made a draft of a report for the Secretary, on which his report was finally based, is that correct?

Mr. SONNETT. Well, on the Hewitt Report to the Secretary, I drafted that at the completion of the Hewitt investigation. Admiral Hewitt revised it and then submitted it to the Secretary as Admiral Hewitt's report.

Senator BREWSTER. Were there material variations from your recommendations, or did it follow substantially the outline of your conclusions?

Mr. SONNETT. There were some changes of substance which Admiral Hewitt made. He made a number of changes in form. Just what they were, off-hand I cannot state, but I know there were some.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you finished, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions? If not, thank you very much, Captain. I am not demoting you? Are [13380] you captain or commander?

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant commander, sir. You have promoted me.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Who is next?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Sergeant Elliott.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, please?

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE E. ELLIOTT, JR., FORMERLY SERGEANT, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Sergeant Elliott, will you state your name for the record?

Mr. ELLIOTT. George E. Elliott, Jr.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How old are you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Twenty-eight, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are not in the service at present?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I am lucky enough to have been discharged 4 months ago.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were on duty in Hawaii at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In what division of the Army?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I was in the Signal Corps, Aircraft Warning.

[13381] Mr. RICHARDSON. And that brought you in contact with the radar sets that the Army had on Oahu?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were present at one of those mobile radar sets on the morning of the attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you indicate on this map, Sergeant, where the mobile station was located, and where you were on the morning of the attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Indicate on this map where the station is located where you were on the morning of the attack.

Mr. ELLIOTT. The station was located at the top of the mountain, I believe they call it Opana, at the northernmost point of the island of Oahu, as I indicate here [indicating].

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, coming to this map, Sergeant, this colored chart of what is supposed to be a radar chart of approaching Japanese planes prior to the attack, you were at this point [indicating]?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you indicate with the pointer where you saw any indication of approaching planes, where it would be on this map?

[13382] Mr. ELLIOTT. At this point up here [indicating] 3° northeast at the azimuth that they came in on.

We picked them up at the mileage of 136 or 137 miles. That was the very first indication of the flight that we had picked up.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, follow with your pointer, just generally how the planes came down toward your station.

Senator BREWSTER. Will you place the time so it will be identified?

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the time when you first found any information of planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was 7:02.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right; now, follow with your pointer the course, as nearly as you can recall it, that the planes followed as you watched them on the radar.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe that they came in on a very straight line. I do not recall of their being any differences, as indicated here. It was fairly straight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when they approached your station, did they disappear finally from your radar?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; they disappeared at approximately 15 to 20 miles away from the island. We lost them due to distortion from a back wave from the mountains, and [13383] it was impossible to follow them further than we had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Up to the time they disappeared, had there been any diversion of the planes? Were they still all in the main group which you had seen at 7:02?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; they were all in the same group, so far as I know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the last you saw of them?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was with you, Sergeant, at the time these planes were sighted?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Another private, Joseph L. Lockard.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who first saw these planes? You or Lockard?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We actually both saw them together.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What discussion was there between you with reference to the matter when you saw them?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At the time I was receiving instructions on the operation of the scope. Lockard looking over my shoulder noticed that there was a target, so he, knowing more about the operation of the scope, actually took over the control there. I went over to the plotting board, and we got an azimuth and mileage and figured out a reading as to the location where the flight was, where the target was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long did that take you, would you [13384] say?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, just a very short time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. A minute or two?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Less than a minute.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right, go ahead.

Mr. ELLIOTT. At that time I suggested to Private Lockard that we send it in to the Information Center. Private Lockard, figuring that our problem was over at 7 o'clock, disagreed as to sending the reading.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean by your problem was over at 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The normal operating period at that time was from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was that true on weekdays as well as on Sundays?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, I believe it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. For how long a period prior to the morning of the 7th had you been on the 4 to 7 status?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, our particular station at that time had only been set up, it was only in operation about 2 weeks before December 7th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And during that whole 2 weeks, were you on the 4 to 7 schedule?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, I believe we were.

[13385] Mr. RICHARDSON. Had there been other men in the station up to 7 o'clock that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; the only ones present at the station were Private Lockard and myself.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, before that, during the 4 to 7 period that morning, had there been other men on this station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And what had become of them?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not quite understand.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What became of them? How did it happen that only you and Lockhart were left there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I will have to go back to December 6. It was a standing rule that we would keep two men at the unit at all times.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Twenty-four hours of the day?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was for protection of the unit. They were armed with .45 guns.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was to protect the unit? It was not to operate the unit as a radar system?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, they were there to protect the unit but they did not operate.

When the men that operated came to the station, the [13386] two men that guarded the unit were there at the same time, although they did not do any operation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right; go ahead now.

You got back to the 6th? What were your hours on the morning of the 6th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, we went out to the station at Opana to relieve the two men that had been on the unit, guarding it all the week. We went out there to give them a break, more or less, to come in and get a pass to go to town.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you go out as guards?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we went out as guards. The idea was we would stay there all night and be there at 4 o'clock in the morning, to start working on our problem.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This was the night of the 6th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead. When did the other men that had been on the station during the night leave?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, there had been no other men there since 12 o'clock on December 6, when we relieved them, when Private Lockard and I relieved them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, as a matter of fact, from 4 until 7 on the morning of the 7th you two were the only men at that station?

[13387] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We were the only two at that station from noon of December 6 through 8 o'clock on the morning of December 7.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that was the station at Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At the farthest north station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The station most immediately adjacent to the whole northwest sector north of Oahu?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, at 7:02 you two men discovered planes on your target?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You suggested that you contact the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At first Lockard did not approve of that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was after we had figured out the reading from the azimuth and mileage. At that time I spoke to Private Lockard. I even recall saying to him since he did not want to send it in, even if we sent it in and the Army and Navy would work together, they may not [13388] know just whose planes they are, but if we worked out through the information center and had it not on any scheduled problem, that it would be more effective as to actually going out there and intercepting like, say, the Army go out and intercept planes, or vice versa.

Finally, after mentioning a few of those things to Private Lockard, he finally told me to go ahead and send it in if I liked.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long from the time you discovered the planes was it until you concluded to phone the information center? How many minutes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would say offhand 7 or 8.

Mr. RICHARDSON. During that time, you could still see the target on your charts, these planes coming from the north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You called up the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We had two phones in the mobile unit: One was a direct line, a tactical line, as it was called. That was from the plotting board directly to the information center which was located at Fort Shafter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Which phone did you use?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I picked up the tactical phone on the plotting board, and I found nobody on the other end at the [13389] information center.

After that, I went to the administrative line and called the information center.

After getting the information center—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who answered?

Mr. ELLIOTT. A corporal or Private McDonald answered the phone. He was a switchboard operator at the information center.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

What conversation occurred?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At that time, I explained to Private McDonald what we had seen, and he told me that there was nobody around there, and he did not know what to do about it.

I asked him if he would get somebody that would know what to do and pass on the information, and have him take care of it.

Well, a few minutes later—

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many minutes? Just make a guess.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Two or three, I would say.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Two or three. All right.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Two or three minutes later, this lieutenant that is referred to, or was first referred to in the Roberts report, called back to the station, and Private Lockard [13390] picked up the phone and spoke to the lieutenant.

It was at this time that the lieutenant told us to forget about the flight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, you, of course, did not hear what the lieutenant said over the telephone.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you hear Lockard say over the telephone, to whomever he was talking?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, he only acknowledged that we were to forget it, that we were to forget the flight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did Lockard say anything to the lieutenant about having discovered planes coming on the chart?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I believe he did. He again repeated the distance that we had picked up the planes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When Lockard had finished his telephone conversation, what did he tell you the lieutenant on the other end said?

Mr. ELLIOTT. He told me that the lieutenant said to forget it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did he say anything about the lieutenant mentioning what these planes might be, or from where the planes might be coming? Did he make any statement that the lieutenant had mentioned that subject to him over the telephone?

[13391] Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not recall whether or not he did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am referring to the question of whether the lieutenant mentioned the fact that a flight of B-17's from San Francisco was expected in that morning, and that these planes were probably those planes.

Was there any discussion on that subject by Lockard in reporting the telephone conversation to you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is what I do not quite remember. I cannot place it together, whether we received that information then, or whether that came out after the publicity of the Roberts Commission.

I cannot say for sure.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what did you continue to do after the end of the conversation over the telephone with the lieutenant at the information center? What did you and Lockard continue to do, if anything?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Private Lockard at that time wanted to shut down the unit and just go off the air, and the original intention was that I was to have gotten further training on the unit. I insisted again, and we continued to operate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You could still see the plane target?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you followed it in until it got within about 20 miles of your station?

[13392] Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, then, did you make any chart of the course of those planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We had an overlaid chart; that is, a transparent paper that is put over the map itself, of the island, with true north on the overlay. That is, the grid lines on the overlay were true north on the map, and in the center is a radius, a mileage radius rule.

From your azimuth and your mileage you can plot exactly where your location is on the map. That is used so that you could have a record of all the flights that you had.

In other words, as you posted your target on this overlay, you could take it off of there and put it on a new sheet of transparent paper and continue on again.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you did complete a chart following the course of those planes as they approached your station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you make any readings?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we had a running log, a record of reading sheets that covered the time, mileage, azimuth, and coordinate readings.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you filled that out?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

[13393] Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you leave the station that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was approximately 15 minutes of 8.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where did you go?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Our station at Opana was 9 miles away to our camp where he billeted and of course coming down the mountain to the highway took some time, and then the 9 miles was from the highway.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How did you go?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At approximately just shortly before 15 minutes of 8, a private —

Mr. RICHARDSON (interposing). How did you go, by shank's mare or in a car?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is just what I am going to explain.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Just a few minutes before a quarter of 8, Private Farnback came out in a truck to pick us up, and take our bedding and ourselves back to the camp.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He took you back to the camp?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What time did you get back to the camp, do you think?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was very close to 8 o'clock.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have with you either your chart [13394] or your readings?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We only had the record of readings, the log.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did your record or reading log show the direction from which these planes were coming?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It could have been replotted on the map with the information given to get the exact location of the flight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you do with that log?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That log was turned over to a Lieutenant Upson, the commanding officer of the two platoons that were out in that particular camp.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it turned over immediately upon your return to the camp?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We were very proud of the reading that we had gotten; that is, the distance out, and we brought it along, not knowing what was taking place, but it was just the fact that the reading was a very good reading.

We brought it back to show it off, so to speak.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you gave it to your platoon commander?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know what he did with it?

[13395] Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was your platoon commander?

Mr. ELLIOTT. A First Lieutenant—at that time Second Lieutenant John Upson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And he was in the Aircraft Warning Division?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was his superior, if you know?

Mr. ELLIOTT. A Captain Tetley.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And where was he stationed?

Mr. ELLIOTT. He was stationed in Schofield Barracks, at the headquarters. That is where the main body of the company stayed.

We had several headquarters. We had the Fort Shafter, at the Information Center was one headquarters; and also within the same company we had the headquarters at Schofield Barracks, where most of the men stayed; and then, of course, we had the outlying platoons, where we had our individual stations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where and to whom would your platoon commander have reported to his superior?

Mr. ELLIOTT. He would have reported directly to Captain Tetley.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At Schofield Barracks?

[13396] Mr. ELLIOTT. At Schofield Barracks; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know who was over Tetley?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Offhand, I believe it was Colonel Powell, although I am not sure of the chain of command.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were all in the aircraft warning section?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am not sure about Colonel Powell. I believe he was head of the Signal Corps installations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the material which you had given to your platoon commander could have been read by any competent person to whom it came, and would indicate where you saw the planes, the direction from which they came, and when they disappeared from your view?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; very definitely, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. With the times of day involved?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; an identical chart could have been made, as is indicated up there on the map.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you remain in camp after you arrived there and during the attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we stayed in camp only long enough to get up our main belongings that we would need, and we went right back to the unit 9 miles away.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you stayed at the unit the rest of the day?

[13397] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we stayed there day and night from then on; we did not go back to the camp.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There were two operating phones to that unit?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did anyone call you up while you were there to inquire concerning what you discovered and the details?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; they did not call me. They called back, but Private Lockard answered the phone.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who called him, do you know?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, as I said before, it is explained as this lieutenant through the Roberts report. That is the only knowledge I have actually as to who called.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Someone called him?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, the information was relayed by Corporal McDonald at the switchboard to the lieutenant.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You do not get what I mean, I don't think, Sergeant.

Mr. ELLIOTT. You mean the lieutenant called—

Mr. RICHARDSON. After you came back from the camp on the morning of the attack, after you came in at 8 o'clock and turned over your reading, you then went back to the station, as I understand it.

[13398] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. While you were at the station did anyone contact you to find out what you knew about the incoming planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That, sir, I could not answer.

When we went back to the unit, we did not go back to—at least I did not, and I do not recall just what Private Lockard did—we did not go back to the operation. The operation of the unit was being manned by other men in the platoon.

As I recall, we were busy setting up tents, since we were not going to travel back and forth to our old camp.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, but, Sergeant, did anybody come to you during that day and ask you to tell them what you saw in the radar at 7 o'clock that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; only the men at our individual camp that were interested to know just what had gone on.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, by the time you had worked around there for awhile, all of the men at that unit knew the story of what had happened to you and your companion after 7 o'clock in that radar station that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; very definitely, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if anyone had called that unit on the telephone they could have gotten that information from [13399] practically anybody on the job, could not they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you went back from camp to your station, did you have any instructions from your officer in camp as to what you were to do, or anything of that kind?

Mr. ELLIOTT. None at the camp. We were just told to go back to the unit and that we would receive all of our instructions. That is, it was understood as to the working arrangement, what we were going to do, arranging the camp, and so forth, that would have been taken care of out there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you get any instructions after you got back to the camp?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Only as I said before, that we broke up into different groups.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I see.

Mr. ELLIOTT. And did the necessary work.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I see.

When did you first know of the attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At the time that we arrived at our camp. However, as we were going to the camp, and just, oh, about a quarter way away from the camp, we noticed from our truck all of the men from the camp driving very fast in the opposite direction in which we were going. They were going to the unit.

[13400] They had their field packs, and helmets, and what not.

We still had no indication as to what had happened until we arrived at the camp, when we were told that we had been attacked by the Japanese.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant, if I understand you, this unit up there on this mountain at the tip of the island, was under guard 24 hours of the day by somebody.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What were they guarding against?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, the only thing they were guarding against was to see that no one came around to interfere with the equipment we had.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, during 4 hours of that 24, or 3 hours, from 4 to 7 in the morning, the radar station was in operation?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why was it in operation during those particular hours?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, those were the instructions that we had from our company commander, and, as I imagine, they came from—

The CHAIRMAN. Headquarters.

Mr. ELLIOTT. He had taken the orders from higher headquarters. [13401]

The CHAIRMAN. Did the selection of those 3 hours from 4 to 7 have any relationship, as far as you know? Was it generally understood that those hours were selected because they might have some relationship to a possible air attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As a matter of opinion, as I would have looked at it at the time, I would say we were not operating under those conditions. I mean, it was more practice than anything else.

[13402] The CHAIRMAN. As far as you were concerned, and Private Lockard, you were students, in a sense, you were practicing to become more proficient in the operation of the radar station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But there must have been some reason why, from 4 to 7 o'clock in the morning was chosen as the hour during which the station was to be in operation. Would you be able to inform the committee, if you have any opinion, as to why those hours were chosen?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I could not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I could not form any opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Those hours were fixed by higher officers?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who determined that it should be done from 4 to 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, only through the information center, down through the chain of command from Captain Tetley, our commanding officer. But that was understood, that we were to work from 4 to 7 in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any information passed down to you as to why those hours were selected?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

[13403] The CHAIRMAN. Did you learn anything about that at any time, either before or after the attack, as to why those hours were chosen for the operation of the radar?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. That angle of the question of 4 to 7 never came up, that I recollect.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know whether it had any relationship to the general feeling that if an attack occurred there it would be sometime in the early morning, around daylight or sunrise?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no information on that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now how far were these planes when you first picked them up?

Mr. ELLIOTT. They were actually 137 miles.

The CHAIRMAN. One hundred and thirty-seven miles. And you traced them all the way in until they got within 20 miles?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I believe that is what it was, until they got within 20 miles.

The CHAIRMAN. How long did that take you, or how long were they in making that flight from 137 miles to 20 miles, within that distance?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am not particularly sure. I think it was about 20 minutes of 8.

[13404] The CHAIRMAN. About 20 minutes of 8?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Between 7:35 and 20 minutes of 8.

The CHAIRMAN. So from 2 minutes after 7 until approximately 20 minutes of 8 you were tracing these planes in toward the island?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did you call, or did Private Lockard, or either one of you, call the central information station while they were being traced in, or after you lost sight of them?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. We sent it in—I sent it in to the switchboard operator I would say about actually 7:07 or 7:08.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get that.

Mr. ELLIOTT. 7:07 or 7:08. I picked up the flight at 7:02.

The CHAIRMAN. You picked up the flight at 7:02?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. At 7:07 or 7:08, 5 or 6 minutes after that, after you picked up the flight, you phoned in to the central information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We gave them the reading as of 7:02.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you continue to call them as you got [13405] the reading as the ships came in closer?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just that one call?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was when we carried on, when he was told to forget.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall the name of the lieutenant who told you to forget it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir, at the time I did not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not know at the time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I think it was Lieutenant Tyler. I mean this information I received later.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Did you know anything about the expectation that some B-17's or P-17's were scheduled to come in from Francisco?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I know that I did not know about it before we picked up the target, and as I told Mr. Richardson here, I am not sure just when we actually did find out that those were B-17's.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not know that they were coming in from San Francisco? Would you have known whether they were coming from the north, the direction in which these planes you picked up were coming, or would they have come [13406] in more directly from the east?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we would not have known that.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not have known that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No. That would have been handled in the information center, probably by the liaison officer, and they would not pass that information to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, with your knowledge of the island out there, and the directions generally from there toward Japan and toward California, would you be able to say, if you thought they were B-17's, would you have expected them to come in from that direction?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From the north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Ordinarily; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would they do that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, that would have been the closest route.

The CHAIRMAN. From San Francisco to Oahu would they come in from the north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That would bring them in just about the place where the flight was picked up that morning, at 3° northeast.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. Cooper.

[13407] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Sergeant, you were then a private?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You and Lockard were both privates?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How long had you been engaged in this radar work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Only about 3 months.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Three months?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not quite three months.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were still being trained for that type of work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was Lockard your instructor?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; he was.

[13408] The VICE CHAIRMAN. How long had he been engaged in that radar work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am not sure. I believe that it might have been a year or so. I can't say on that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then he was considered as an experienced, capable radar man and qualified to give instructions to you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; so far as the operation of the unit went he knew the different phases of operation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you and he worked together there that Sunday morning in operating the radar?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. During the problem he operated the scope and I operated the plotting board. In other words, the targets that he would have picked up from the scope he would have relayed the information and I would have plotted it on the map and followed through on sending it to the information center at Fort Shafter where they would have coordinated with the liaison officers as to whether anybody had a flight in that particular area, and from then on they would have followed through.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was the name of that station where you were?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Opana.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. O-p-a-n-a?

[13409] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you had been on duty there from 12 o'clock noon on Saturday, the day before?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As guards of that station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then during the period from 4 o'clock on Sunday morning to 7 o'clock on Sunday morning you operated the station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you were due then to go off duty in the operation of the station at 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. The original plans were that we would stay there until 12 o'clock noon Sunday, December 7, and at that time the two men that we had relieved the day before would have been back on pass and they would have taken over the guarding of the unit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They would have taken over as guards?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. And then we would have returned to our camp. However, that was changed and it was decided that since they came back from there, on a pass, earlier, they figured they would come out to the unit at 8 o'clock in the morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you were due to stop operating [13410] the unit at 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And from 7 o'clock on until you were relieved you were to just serve as guards there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; but that also at that time we were to continue on with my instructions, my further instructions as to the operation of the unit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it was more or less voluntary on your part as you wanted to get as much training as you could?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And voluntary on Lockard's part to give you that training?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you were just staying on on a voluntary basis after 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you just continued to practice?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After 7 o'clock.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then at 7:02, why, you picked [13411] up this flight of planes coming in?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I wonder if I could make mention of the fact that at the time that we reported off the air to the information center by our clock at the unit I am very sure that time was 6 minutes of 7 and I can't recall just whether or not we had made a time check with the information center. But I know very definitely that the time

on the clock when we actually closed down the unit, that is, went off the air with the information center, was approximately 6 minutes of 7.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Six minutes before 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You notified the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We were told at that time that the problem was over and that we were to go off the air. In other words, we wouldn't forward then to the information center.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Anything you received after 6 minutes to 7 o'clock you would not send on to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. The point I am trying to bring out there is that it was 6 minutes before 7 and I don't recall whether or not we had made a time check to verify the time with the information center.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, your clock showed 6 minutes [13412] to 7 and you don't know whether you synchronized your time with the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So that from the time you were told by the information center at 6 minutes before 7 o'clock that you could go off, the remaining time then was just on a voluntary basis by you and Lockhart?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you picked up this flight of planes coming in at 2 minutes after 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And within 5 or 6 minutes after you first sighted them, why, you undertook to contact the information center to tell them about it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. It was between 6 and 8 minutes, offhand. I can't recall just what it was.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Between 6 and 8 minutes after 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Somewhere between there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And when you used the first phone there was nobody that responded at the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. That was the actual phone that went through to the actual plotting table in the information center.

[13413] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was the phone you were supposed to use to give that information?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And there was nobody that responded at the other end?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Or, at the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you used the other phone which you say was the administration phone?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And Private McDonald answered that switch-board?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you gave him the information and he told you that there was nobody there to tell him what to do about it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you asked him to please get word as quickly as he could to somebody who would know what to do?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I might mention that as I was explaining it to McDonald on the switchboard I spoke in a very nervous voice and from the time that I spoke that way [13410] Lockard seemed to take more note of what I was trying to do in sending in the reading, although I didn't know at the time that they were enemy planes. It was just that I did talk over the phone in a very nervous tone of voice.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was probably your first experience of that type, was it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, it was.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. ELLIOTT. It probably was the idea of getting such a large flight of planes at such a distance, because ordinarily before then we hadn't picked up anything really over 100 to 110 miles, I would say. But this was very big and it was very noticeable and it was just something out of the ordinary.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was out of the ordinary to the extent that you were a little bit excited about it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And also proud of your achievement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, yes, sir. I only wish that it could have been followed through. It could have saved any number of lives.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you really did do a good job in the work you did there.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I hope I did, sir.

[13415] The VICE CHAIRMAN. How many men were there at that time that operated this radar?

Mr. ELLIOTT. In our platoon we had, I believe it was, 18 men. Out of that 18 men there were three drivers, I believe, truck drivers, and I believe there were two cooks.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That would leave—

Mr. ELLIOTT. That would leave—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thirteen.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Thirteen.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Operators.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Operators; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, although you were still in training and had not had the experience that Lockard had, why, the events of that occasion showed that you had become rather efficient in that line of work.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, just how did you conduct this type of work Sergeant? Was there a platoon or squad or definite number of men assigned to each of these radar units?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We had the men assigned, we had what we called the crew chiefs, and I believe with the assigned strength that we had they only had two men under them, and the three men together each operated the unit in shifts of, as I recall it on December 7 especially, very close to that [13416] time, we operated 4 hours on duty on the radar, 4 hours on guard on the unit, and then 4 hours off, and then repeating 4 hours on the unit and so forth; and I believe at that time we had four different crews.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Four different crews of two men each?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. There were three men, actually three men, on each crew.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Three men on each crew and you had four crews?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I believe that is the way it was set up; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you had four crews?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, then you spent as much time on guard duty as you did in operating the unit?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. The number of men we had at that time was not a sufficient number to operate 24 hours a day.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, if all the operators had been used for operational purposes and ordinary infantry soldiers had been used for guard duty, you could have done that, couldn't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Oh, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And ordinary infantry soldiers could [13417] have been used for guard duty, and were used for guard duty at all other places around the island, weren't they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; but there were none assigned to us at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I know, but that could have been done, for the guard duty?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then that would have left all of you operators to work in shifts just in operational work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, yes, although in the Army they sort of put you to work to the best advantage. In other words, they wouldn't have considered us working 4 hours on the unit and 8 hours' rest, whereas they probably would have fixed it up 8 hours' work and 4 hours' rest.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; that could have been done.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I mean that is the general practice, so to speak.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was done in that respect after the attack, after December 7, how did they do it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, at the time I believe we received a few more men from the company. I would say offhand four or five to help out in the operations. We operated under those conditions for approximately 3 weeks.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After December 7?

[13418] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. And at that time our company was enlarged to a regiment and we had some men transferred there from the Infantry to enlarge our company and the infantrymen were to be trained in the operation of the unit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They assigned other men there on the island to train in radar work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was done after December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; approximately, I am not sure whether it was 2 or 3 weeks. It was somewhere in between that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The forces were greatly enlarged then?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. Instead of 18 men, as we had on December 7, we had approximately 40 men. That was 2 or 3 weeks after December 7.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. ELLIOTT. But they had to be trained.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But those same men had been on the island before December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what hours did you operate the unit after December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Twenty-four hours a day, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Twenty-four hours a day?

[13419] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You increased it from 3 hours to 24 hours a day?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, didn't anybody have to go to the hospital as a result of that, did they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, none that I recall, sir. They were probably afraid to go to the hospital.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask one other question.

You say that you called this information center about 7 or 8 minutes after 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And talked to Private McDonald at the switchboard. He was the switchboard operator?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long was it after that before Tyler came back and talked to Lockard?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Between 1 or 2 or 3 minutes, I don't recall. It was fairly shortly.

The CHAIRMAN. From the time of that conversation between Tyler and Lockard until you went into the information [13420] center did they call back any more to seek any information about these planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. The last time that we talked to the information center during the flight that we had plotted, the plane flight, there was no other conversation about it. Now then, when the flight was finished and we took the record of the reading sheets back to the platoon commander, he passed that on, I imagine, to the company commander.

The CHAIRMAN. That was about a quarter to 8?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At the time that we went.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the attack was on right away pretty soon after that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. As I understand it it was on about 5 minutes of 8.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There is one question I overlooked.

You told us that after December 7, why, the hours of operating the station were increased from 3 hours to a full 24-hour basis.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the men held up all right under that. Did this wear out the sets, radar sets, did they operate all right?

[13421] Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, our particular set was somewhat of a good set. I mean, we continued operating, I don't know just whether we were lucky or what, but we didn't have very much trouble. Another thing I might mention is that the different units on the island could overlap each other and where one went off for servicing, and incidentally we did go off an hour a day for servicing and repair they would cover the particular unit that went out.

But so far as having any serious trouble with the unit I don't recall any.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You don't recall any?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. You say you have been out of service about 4 months?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; since the 20th of September last year.

Senator GEORGE. When did you enter the service?

Mr. ELLIOTT. On November 12, 1940.

Senator GEORGE. Where did you enter the service, from what State?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I entered in Chicago, sir; Chicago, Ill.

Senator GEORGE. And do I understand that you and Mr. [13422] Lockard were the only two people at this station from midnight say, of the 6th until the morning of the 7th, when you picked up this flight of planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. There was no one else there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I might make a comment, if I may.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. On December 8, I believe it was—well, on December 7—Lockard, Private Lockard was called into the company commander, Captain Tetley, and Captain Tetley sent him back to the unit for a statement from Lockard and myself, a signed statement as to what had happened. And at that time Private Lockard told me that he wanted me to incorporate in the statement the name of a man that was not there, the man that ordinarily would have run the motor, the motored generator for the unit. It was put to me that they wanted to keep the records straight.

The C. O. called for no one to operate the unit unless the motorman was present to operate that motor and we were not qualified motor-men or mechanics to do that.

However, in that statement that I have given reference to I wouldn't agree to that, to incorporating this other man's name in that statement. The statement itself was just, it was put in the form of "we". Everything that was written [13423] in there was "we" did this and "we" did that. There was no individual "I" did this or "I" did that.

Senator GEORGE. But actually you and Private Lockard were the only two people at the station at this unit?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I fix the time arbitrarily from midnight on because that was the important time. And you say at 7:02 you picked up the planes on the radar 3° east of north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Could you tell anything about the number of planes in the flight?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; not definitely. You could just tell that there was a large number.

Senator GEORGE. Now, on that very point, Sergeant, I think the committee would like to have full information. Did you judge it to be a large number of planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; by the size of the echo we judged it to be a fairly large number of planes.

Senator GEORGE. And not merely one or two or three or four planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We knew that it was not one or two or three or four since at that distance the echo would have shown up very much smaller. This was very definitely very [13424] big.

Senator GEORGE. And you picked up this flight actually at a distance of about 137 miles?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, you say that when you called to make the report you did not find anyone at the station except Private McDonald, as I believe you said his name was?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; McDonald.

Senator GEORGE. And within a very short time, 2 or 3 minutes, someone did call and Private Lockard did the talking to the officer who called?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. Private Lockard was the nearest to the phone and picked it up and spoke to the lieutenant.

Senator GEORGE. You have since learned that the officer who called was a Lieutenant Tyler?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't believe at that time the name was mentioned, but the only thing that I knew was that it was some officer that had called and told Lockard to forget it.

Senator GEORGE. To forget it; just to forget it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. As I recall I never did know the name of the officer until sometime later.

Senator GEORGE. But your best information subsequently secured was that he was Lieutenant Tyler?

[13425] Mr. ELLIOTT. Not at that time.

Senator GEORGE. Not at that time, but I mean since that time. That is your present information, in other words?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Where is he now?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That I don't know, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did he remain in the service on the island after the 7th of December?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't know anything about Lieutenant Tyler, with the exception that he has, as I understand, been promoted through the grades to lieutenant colonel. That is all I happen to know.

Senator GEORGE. I wanted to find out if he had been promoted.

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is all that I know of the man in question.

Senator GEORGE. Now, I further understand you were able to follow this flight of planes in until your radar was broken by the projection of the mountains. In other words, you traced them in or followed them in until they were within about 20 miles of the island?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

[13426] Senator GEORGE. Were any other radar stations on the island in operation that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; there were. Offhand, I don't know how many. One that I do know definitely of was on until 7 o'clock.

Senator GEORGE. Until 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe they continued on a little after 7 also, and they had a partial record of the flight that we had picked up. It wasn't quite out as far as the one we had picked up because the station itself was right on the coast—it wasn't up higher in the air.

Senator GEORGE. It didn't have the elevation?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The efficiency wasn't as great, but that is the only station that I know of that actually picked up any portion of the flight that we recorded that morning.

Senator GEORGE. I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Sergeant, what do you mean by the technical term "echo"?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The screen goes about a circle—about a 5-inch circle. On this screen you will see a horizontal line, and that horizontal line was broken up from zero to 150 [13427] miles of scale. At the point that the target is hit by the transmission being sent out and referred back to the unit it will come up and there is a break in that line and there extends a vertical line up. Then, by the mechanism on the scope, we bring the air line over to the echo, and that is where you get your mileage. But the echo looks like a straight line, and at a right angle a vertical line up, which is the particular target that you see.

Senator LUCAS. When you first discovered these planes, did you find more than one?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As I recall it, there were a couple of other flights, but we only followed the main flight because we had all we could do to follow that one.

Senator LUCAS. Would you care to give the committee an estimate of the number of planes you thought, from radar, was in that flight?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Any figure that I would say, or that we did have in mind would be only a guess.

Senator LUCAS. I understand that, but it would be interesting to the committee to get the guess, from your experience out there with this radar.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I really don't recall even guessing that there were any particular number. We knew that there were probably more than 50, but, of course, we didn't know. I [13428] mean, it all enters into the picture just how high the plane is flying and just where you strike it, as to the size of the echo you might get.

Senator LUCAS. Now, do you recall when you talked to Private McDonald over the phone, whether you indicated as to the number of planes you thought might be in this flight?

Mr. ELLIOTT. There was no definite number stated. It was just that there were many, very many.

Senator LUCAS. Will you recall, and this may have been given before I came in, will you recall again the substance of the conversation that you had over the phone with McDonald?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I called Private McDonald on the administrative line and told him who I was and explained what we had found.

Senator LUCAS. Can you say what language you used? Can you remember the exact language that you used? I don't suppose you do recall.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. As I said before, I said it very nervously, and as to the exact wording, I couldn't say.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I gave him the information that there were a large number of planes coming in, and gave him the location, that is, the reading of those planes.

[13429] Senator LUCAS. Where was the information center on the island located with reference to Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, that was down in Fort Shafter. Fort Shafter itself was about, I believe 8 miles from Honolulu.

Senator LUCAS. And Fort Shafter is where General Short and his staff were located?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was the Hawaiian Department headquarters.

Senator LUCAS. You had a direct communication from the radar station to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We had two lines. One, a tactical line was connected directly to the information desk where the individuals would place their targets in respect to the map.

Senator LUCAS. What was your understanding as to what the information center was supposed to do with the information that you sent day after day while you were in that training program?

Mr. ELLIOTT. By plotting the different targets that we sent in, the plotters on the end of the information center would plot the targets on the table with the map.

Directly overhead in a balcony would be the liaison officers and signal officers and they would determine as [13430] they saw the target going up in that locality, each unit, each liaison officer would decide whether it was his flight or not, and if nobody could identify that flight, of course, they had prearranged routes that their planes would be taking, and if no one could identify that flight it was considered an enemy flight.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever learn, Sergeant, whether or not those men who were charged with this responsibility were on duty that morning, December 7, 1941?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I had no contact with them. I mean, I assume that they were there. That is all I can say. I didn't have any direct conversation with any of them, to know.

Senator LUCAS. I understand.

Now, how long had this training program been going on from 4 to 7 in Hawaii?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As I recall, it was going on all the time that we were in operation which was 2 weeks prior to December 7.

Senator LUCAS. Two weeks prior to December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

As to the other units and the time for duty, 4 to 7, I would not be able to state.

Senator LUCAS. Did you get any different information [13431] or orders after November 27, 1941?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; none that I can recall.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now these men in the plotting room, these men in that plotting room, as I understand it, were presumed to take your findings and were supposed to work them out, between the hours of 4 and 7 each morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And were they too on duty after 7 o'clock; is that your understanding?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. So could it be possible that the reason Lieutenant Tyler said, "Forget it," was because they had no one there to carry through?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It might be interpreted that way.

Senator LUCAS. But anyhow, if these men in the plotting room had taken this intercepted radar message and plotted it properly, there wouldn't have been any question but what they could have probably determined whether or not this particular flight was enemy planes or otherwise?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; they could have, but I think it would have possibly reverted to the same thing that came up, and that was the B-17's coming in. It is just my opinion, but I think the Japs knew every move we made.

Unless they considered that it was not the B-17 flight, [13432] as you say, nothing, probably, would have been done about it.

Senator LUCAS. If these men in this room charged with the responsibility of making that determination were there, they undoubtedly would have known how many B-17's were coming in from the coast?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; they would have had that information.

Senator LUCAS. And if they had that information and a flight of planes turned up on this radar screen to the extent that you said, possibly 50, then certainly they would have known definitely, under those circumstances, that there was something unusual and probably would have considered it an enemy flight of planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I don't believe there were over 14 B-17s.

Was there anything, when you picked up the planes, was there anything in the way the planes were flying so that you could make a determination as to whether or not they might be fighters, pursuit planes, or bombers, or what not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I don't recall offhand how fast they were going. We could have figured it out by the [13433] time element just how fast they were going, but that would not have been our responsibility. I don't know as though we could determine just whether it was a fighter plane going slow or a bomber going faster. But at that time it was very hard to identify whether it was one plane or a large number of planes.

Senator LUCAS. That is testimony in the record. It was difficult, according to the testimony, to determine whether it was a hostile plane or a friendly plane that was coming in.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes. As I said, from my knowledge of how the information center worked, the only way they could tell at that time whether it was enemy or a friendly plane, was by checking up on their own flights, and if they didn't have any flight in that particular area, it was considered an enemy plane.

Senator LUCAS. Sergeant, did General Short ever call you to headquarters to talk to you about this?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did Colonel Phillips ever talk to you about this?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

[13434] Senator LUCAS. Did anybody on General Short's staff ever take enough interest in this radar situation to call you and discuss it with you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. They hadn't called me in at all. Private Lockard was called in to speak to the company commander. Whether he spoke to anybody else after he spoke to the company commander I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. Did your own company commander ever talk to you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; he did not. He called private Lockard only, Private Lockard only testified before the Roberts committee.

Senator LUCAS. You did not. Have you testified before any committee heretofore?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have testified before the Army and Navy committees only.

Senator LUCAS. Your testimony, I presume there, was about the same as you have given here?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; only I have had a little more freedom, so to speak, here.

Senator LUCAS. You feel a little freer with Senators than you do with generals, is that it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Very definitely, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have got on a different uniform [13435] now.

Senator LUCAS. I want to include the Congressman in that, too.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He is wearing a different uniform now.

Senator LUCAS. So after the attack on December the 7th no one in the Army ever discussed this question with you at any time in trying to learn any additional or further information about what happened, until the Army Board got hold of you. I am talking now about anybody in General Short's command or any officer now. I am not talking about any particular private that you probably discussed it with.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't know whether you were in here when I told of the statement.

Senator LUCAS. No, I was not.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, anyhow there was a statement prepared by Lockard and myself to the effect as to what was done on that morning.

Senator LUCAS. Who asked you to prepare that statement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was relayed to me through Lockard from the commanding officer, Captain Tetley, when he had gone in to see the company commander.

Senator LUCAS. They merely asked you and Lockard to get together and make a joint statement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

[13436] Senator LUCAS. Nobody ever talked to you individually about it at all?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

Mr. ELLIOTT. The statement was very brief.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you, Sergeant.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire, Sergeant.

Mr. MURPHY. Sergeant, on December 7 it was then Private Lockard and Private Elliott, was it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. And you got your orders from Sergeant Murphy on Saturday, didn't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. There were supposed to be four men out there, weren't there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The set-up originally I believe was set for three.

Mr. MURPHY. You were supposed to have four or five, weren't you? Weren't you supposed to have a crew chief? Weren't you supposed to have somebody plotting? Weren't you supposed to have somebody on the other part of the instrument [13437] and somebody was there watching after the equipment? Farmbeck was supposed to be out watching the equipment, is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. They didn't show up, the other two; did they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was not adhered to. I mean the table of organization for the operation of the radar detector unit calls for—I believe it called at that time for five men, one motorman and the other a crew chief and three operators.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. And there were only two there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; there were only two.

Mr. MURPHY. How is that? Where were the other three?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, that I don't recall, other than just operating short-handed.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, isn't it a fact that you two were only out there to guard the machines with your guns as part of the antisabotage program?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would not go so far as to say that it was part of the program. It was just a—as we understood it a precaution that the company commander was taking for the equipment that was out at that station.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you tell the Army Board that you were there for antisabotage purposes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't recall whether they interpreted it that way or whether I said that or not.

[13438] Mr. MURPHY. Well, we will get your exact language, and I will get to that in a minute.

Now, I notice in that chart, Sergeant, you and Lockard were the only two at the Opana station, and you were there from Saturday noon until 7:39 on Sunday morning. Who was it that plotted those marks, "6:48, 6:45 and 6:51"? What about those planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The only thing that I can explain of that, as I can recall, was that there were no targets during the scheduled problem.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right. The evidence is you had no targets, and while the radio interceptor station was working, in all probability there are enemy scouting planes out, and when you have them and think they are identified, call the interceptor station and tell them while the enemy are at a distance.

Is that a fair question then?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, if those planes were out there and we had them on our chart—

Mr. MURPHY. You had it on your chart, but you never called and told about it; did you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You did not report it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we would have no reason for not [13439] reporting them.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the fact is that you had no chart of any kind and you were there on the machine, you and Lockard, and there are planes out there; there is no evidence that they were our planes. We had no planes to the north, this question of the B-17's, because they did not come in there, and the only thing that is left to infer is that there are enemy scouting planes and they are not turned in to the interceptor station by you or Lockard, are they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I wonder if you could produce the chart so that I could verify it to you in my own mind?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Will you produce the chart, please? My only purpose, Sergeant, in asking this question—I don't want to embarrass you. There is some question about that interceptor station working from 4 to 7 and you were only following out the orders you got, weren't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And at that time, that time of the morning was very vital?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Here is planes at 6:30.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. 6:45 is the first one.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

[13440] Mr. MURPHY. That is an important schedule. Now, the actual attack does not come until around 7:30 and the fact is that there are no American planes out to the north and that is to the north of the island and in all probability there are enemy scouting planes out in there and I am wondering, if the interceptor command station is working, why Lockard did not have a message reflected to it of an attack coming, especially in view of the fact that there is so much testimony about the *Ward* sighting a submarine.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What good does it do? This boy saw only one flight.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is, sir, no one asked him this question and they were both there on the machine. Somebody plotted it and he should know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, nobody asked him about it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, nobody asked him but I think he should be asked about it. We are coming to the end of this hearing.

Who was it, sir, if you know, that made that plot as to those planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Why, as I—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is this your plot as you made it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, we have the plot that he did make. We have a picture made by officer Murphy, certified to by [19441] Murphy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let him go ahead and finish his explanation.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ELLIOTT. This chart was not taken down after the completion of this schedule—I mean this flight at 7:02. That chart was left on the map and it was used on through, I believe for—I think you will find the times on there.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you had there a chart on which plots were made. Did you have a log book?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we had the log.

Mr. MURPHY. Did the log book remain there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That would have been—

Mr. MURPHY. Wouldn't that be the regular procedure, to leave the log book there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And wouldn't it be the regular procedure to leave the log sheet there on December the 7th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you have told counsel that you took that log sheet down and gave it to Captain Upson.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I took the log sheet down. The sheet that I took was a more or less scrap paper report.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever testify—

[19442] Mr. ELLIOTT. I mean it was not the official four to seven scheduled period that we had. It was just something that you plot in on another form.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever testify before any other board that you took that sheet to this captain?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I don't believe that I have.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever say it to anybody until you came into this room?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I told one of the gentleman off the record last night that was talking to me about that.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was that off the record? Who was it on or off? Whom did you talk to for the first time about taking the log sheet down town? Who was it? Name him, please.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe it was you, wasn't it, Mr. Richardson?

Mr. MURPHY. You mean only to counsel, our own counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I had a conversation with him yesterday afternoon.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I am just wondering if that is the one. Who was it that you told yesterday about this log sheet?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have been talking to so many.

Mr. MURPHY. No, you were only talking to one about the log sheet. Who was it? Don't have any hesitancy.

[13443] Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe I talked to Captain Ford also on that.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was it you told about delivering a log sheet to Captain Upson? I am going to go into that.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe it was Mr. Richardson.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the only one?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, when you called that morning Tyler said, "Forget it," didn't he?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; well, that is the information that was passed on to me; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Lieutenant Tyler said, "Forget it"; and the fact is, sir, you thought they were our Navy planes coming in, didn't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes; later.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, didn't you say before the other two boards that you thought they were our Navy planes coming in?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And you also thought that it would be a fine problem if we could have Army interceptor planes go out to meet our own Navy planes as experience; isn't that true?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; that was an opinion I expressed at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now, you testified here about [13444] nervousness on each occasion. Did you have the intimation at that time of morning that those were enemy planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I cannot truthfully say that I did.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. After Lockard said, "Come on, let's go home" you wanted to stay and you did stay until about 7:30, didn't you, after 7:30?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then the truck came and you went downtown?

Mr. ELLIOTT. To the camp.

Mr. MURPHY. To get breakfast?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And immediately upon getting there you found out that war was on, didn't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. And at that time you did not associate your chart at all with the war starting, did you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I wonder if you would repeat that last question.

Mr. MURPHY. I say at that time when you heard that war had started did you associate the idea of having charted planes up on the hills and Japanese planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. After we found out what had happened we very definitely knew that the flight that we had plotted was the enemy flight.

[13445] Mr. MURPHY. You knew it that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We were fairly sure.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that what you told the Army board?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't recall telling it to the Army board.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it may not be of any importance, but you have mentioned a captain and there has been a lot of testimony about the failure of the officials, the top command, in getting this information.

Now, you have designated a lieutenant. Maybe I shouldn't mention names. You have designated a Captain Upson, about having given that sheet to him, and you never said a single word about it until 2 weeks ago and you testified you even went downtown and got breakfast after the start of the attack.

Now, that puts a burden on Captain Upson that I want to straighten out, because the papers will carry that story all over America. If you did, I would like to know it. If you did not, I would like to know it.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am sure I did not have the question put to me before of what actually became of the record of reading sheets.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you never mentioned the sheet before, did you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, I—

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to interpose [13446] an objection, but I can't see how this is pertinent or material.

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman himself, Mr. Chairman, has asked a great many questions about that, if the Army knew about this thing and this witness has gone into it and I for one am not going to let some little second lieutenant carry the burden of this thing if it is not lying upon his shoulders, and there is not yet a single word of evidence in this case from Pearl Harbor about that little second lieutenant—maybe he is a big second lieutenant, I don't know; maybe he is a general.

Senator LUCAS. He is a lieutenant colonel now, I know that.

Mr. MURPHY. Maybe he is, but the fact is he is entitled to the same protection as anybody else and I think we ought to get the facts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Proceed, but let us keep to information that you know of your own knowledge, Sergeant.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Sergeant, that was your plot that morning and there were only you and Lockard there and how did you come to put those designations on that plot, if you know?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You mean the original chart of that flight?

Mr. MURPHY. No, no; I am going beyond 7:02. Here somebody has charted some planes, apparently, at 6:45, that is a quarter to seven, 6:48, 6:50, 6:51, 6:51½. You two put them on there. There were only two of you there. Who put them on?

[13447] Mr. ELLIOTT. The writing there shown on the record of reading sheets I believe very definitely is my writing; I am very sure.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, was that that you saw some planes out in there at that time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The plot would have gone through to the information center. I mean there would be no reason for me and Lockard to hold back any plots.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He is just asking you whether those plots were put on there by you.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Let me see it again.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have it.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Murphy, this is the original signed by Lieutenant Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Lieutenant Colonel Murphy?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Sergeant, maybe I can help you.

Before the Army Board in question 22 General Frank said:

What I am trying to ascertain is whether on the morning of December 7th there was more activity than usual or whether there was less activity than usual or was it average?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, during out problem on Sunday there was practically no activity at all.

[13448] General FRANK. Prior to this time?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Prior to seven o'clock, yes, sir. We had no plots to send in to our information center and had no targets.

General FRANK. That is, on the morning of December 7th. Now, it may be that at that time the Generals did not know about it, it may be that at that time you did not recall these particular indications on there and I do not want to place the responsibility on you.

All of these experts since Pearl Harbor, so far as I can see, have never gotten clear as to what those indications are, and it is getting one record for posterity, and certainly it is on the Board to show on the record what they are.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What difference does it make to this Board if somebody else found something else?

Mr. MURPHY. He is the one that charted them on the plots indicating it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What of it?

Mr. MURPHY. The question is, Did he send them downtown?

Mr. RICHARDSON. He certainly knows that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if that had been put on the chart, and he was sure about that, that there were planes out there, and we had no planes out there, and there may have been 20 planes out, he should have sent that information in.

[13449] Well, I won't press it, Sergeant. You made the plot on there. Do you recall whether you called and reported this information that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The only comment I can make is if those planes were picked up as a target it would have been reported. We would have been defeating our purpose, especially in getting up at 4 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, probably after 7 o'clock you were getting special training. Did you have the earphones on your ear in connection with the interceptor station before 7? Do you remember that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was it that had the earphones on, or did anybody?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Private Lockard was the one that had the—that did the visual detecting at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. And then apparently he said something to you and you wrote in these little indications there on the sheet, or was that only practice? Maybe there were no planes, but you plotted it on there. Now, do you remember that?

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield a minute?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; sure.

Senator LUCAS. Does that plot show, 6:48 a. m. or 6:48 p. m. up there? As I recall, there was some testimony, [13450] although I am not certain now—

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if it is his handwriting he was not plotting at night, so it must be morning. He did not go back to plotting.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that may be true.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I think you will find on this record-of-reading sheet, I believe the date is put in there and signed by a "Murphy". Will the gentleman take this apart, please?

Mr. MURPHY. May I just say this, Sergeant? The reason I am pursuing this, a witness before the Board here, the very first witness, Admiral Inglis, told us that the Japanese sent out scouting planes. That has not been pursued. It may be that those are the scouting planes; I don't know.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, on the 7th of December, as this record-of-reading sheet indicates and as I have admitted in my own handwriting, with the exception of the date—I don't believe that I put that in there. You notice the difference in the——

Mr. MURPHY. Is it your judgment, Sergeant, that the times indicated there from 6:45 on were in your handwriting?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And is it your judgment that you would not put them on there unless they indicated that there was a plane in that vicinity?

[13451] Mr. ELLIOTT. They would have been on the overlay; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. They would have been put on the——

Mr. ELLIOTT. If they were put on this chart here as a target.

Mr. MURPHY. But at any rate if you put it there, by you putting it on there it would indicate that on that morning that in their place there was a plane. Do you have any recollection of it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, do you know how——

Mr. ELLIOTT. I know now we had—you see, during the problem I don't think it was really necessary at that time to have an overlay. That is, it is very possible that I went ahead and took these readings figuring out where the location was giving me the code names and code letters to forward that information.

Mr. MURPHY. What I mean is you would not put something on that chart that morning if there had not been a plane there to the north of the island at 6:45?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you have no recollection now, or do you have a recollection as to whether you reported that through your head phone set via Lockhart to the station downtown?

[13452] Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I was under the impression, so far as remembering that, that there were no flights at all. If there were, there were very few, as the few here indicates.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, our information is that there were only a few scouting planes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. But you do not have any distinct recollection about reporting that or any conversation in connection with it, do you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No; I am afraid I cannot remember back that far.

Mr. MURPHY. And one of the reasons why your memory is dim now, this is the first time you have been asked about it since December 7, 1941; is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right. The things that happened prior to that time you wouldn't have time to note that, not knowing.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to make it clear, Sergeant. Far be it from me to want to embarrass you. We want to know the facts. And you don't have any recollection. The fact is there is a problem before this committee.

I have no other questions.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. I am through.

[13453] Senator LUCAS. What was the ordinary practice that was followed by you and Lockard when you did find a plane through radar? What would you do about it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Regardless of whether it was Lockard and myself or anyone else, the man operating the scope will get a line on the target, lining up the mileage and the antenna to get the azimuth. He will pass that information on to the information, on to the people—

Senator LUCAS. That was done every day that you were out there in the event that you located a plane or more than one plane coming in?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Was that part of your duty?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. To immediately transmit that information on to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And there was no reason why if you did locate these planes at 6:45, 6:48, 6:50, and at 7 that you did not turn that over, that you did not pursue the same course on December 7 that you had pursued at every other time that you had been out there operating this radar equipment?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes; and I might explain what seems to be a mix-up here, too, that ordinarily before December 7 I am [13454] sure we did not plot the actual plots on the overlay unless there was a fairly good-sized flight, because we had the record with the information that the scope operator passed over to the plotter and keeping a record of the plots that are made you could retrace any flight that you wanted to mark on there, but the point I am getting at is this: That the flight that we picked up at 7:02, that we had to follow a different course because it was our duty and we followed on that follow-up all the way in.

Senator LUCAS. The only point I am trying to make here to clear up the situation is that up to 7 o'clock on December the 7th, 1941, you pursued and followed the same course that you had been following day after day out there as far as transmitting information down to the information center.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, after 7 o'clock in the morning, when you knew that everybody was off duty and you sighted this big group of planes, you immediately thought that it was necessary to make a special call on that and get it to the information center and you so did?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I might make the comment, too, that so far as reporting to the information center, regardless of whether it

was a distinct overlay, as long as it was on those record of reading sheets that would have been [13455] reported to the plotter at the information center. I mean there would be no point in writing these records down and not send it in.

Senator LUCAS. And, of course, you couldn't tell if you did plot these planes at 6:45 whether it was an enemy plane or whether it was one of our planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we couldn't tell that.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator LUCAS. I took you off before.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the paper which the witness has in his hand, which indicates the 6:45 mark and the others that are in his own handwriting, be placed in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be done and spread on the record now as part of the record.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask, Mr. Chairman, that it be a photostatic copy because it is in his own handwriting.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the counsel will take care of that.

(The document, subsequently introduced as "Exhibit No. 155," is included in this committee's exhibits.)

[13456] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Elliott, I was called out of the room for a short time.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Some of the questions that I want to ask you might have been asked heretofore.

First of all I want to know about your tour of duty on this machine on the 6th and on the 7th.

Mr. ELLIOTT. How do you mean that? You mean to explain it to you?

Mr. GEARHART. Well, what I mean is what hours did you go on duty with the machine and what hour did you leave it on the 6th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I see. On the 6th of December we were sent out there to relieve two men, to so to speak, guard the unit. We were armed with .45 pistols.

Mr. GEARHART. You mean to guard the unit or operate the unit?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, to guard the unit.

Mr. GEARHART. All right; what time of the day did you arrive there on the 6th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was around 12 noon. We relieved the two men and in sending us out there we were to remain there and at 4 o'clock the next morning we were to operate our scheduled [13457] operating period, 4 to 7 a. m.

Mr. GEARHART. Do I understand you correctly, you arrived out there at noon on the 6th with instructions to guard the machines until 4 the next morning and at 4 the next morning you were with Lockard to operate the machine; is that correct?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir. I might explain about this guarding the unit. It was no walking guard post; it was not considered as such. That is the impression that we had. The impression that we had was that there were just to be men there in case anything came up, any prowlers around or anything like that and that is the reason

RECORD OF READINGS

Opama

DATE 12/7/41

TAKEN AT STATION 60N

SECRET

TIME	POLAR COORDINATES		GRID COORDINATES		
	AZIMUTH	DISTANCE	"X" AXIS	"Y" AXIS	PGHT
6:45	350	58	33	Edith	39
6:46	21	74	35	Edith	84
6:48	330	58	34	Florence	18
6:51	335	41	34	Florence	56
6:55	333	33	34	Florence	63
6:56	335	29	34	Florence	61
6:58	355	28	34	Florence	92
6:59	308	22	34	Edith	58
7:00	308	18	34	Edith	67
7:02	5	132	35	Olivia	32
7:05	5	120	35	Dinah	39
7:08	3	112	35	"	27
7:11	3	101	35	"	23
7:12	3	86	35	"	12
7:15	3	88	35	Edith	19
7:16	3	84	35	"	18
7:18	3	79	35	"	17
7:20	3	74	35	"	15
7:23	3	67	35	"	13
7:25	3	60	35	"	11
7:27	15	55	35	Florence	49
7:28	15	50	35	"	48
7:30	15	45	35	"	46
7:31	15	40	35	"	35
7:33	15	35	35	"	34
7:35	19	30	35	"	32
7:38	38	25	35	Edith	59
7:39	41	20	35	"	48
7:40	46	69	36	Florence	68
7:43	41	65	36	"	82

SECRET

Incl 3 to Secret Letter, HARMING, file MFGOT 40 413,684, sub: Original
 Photo & Data of Radar Stations on O.S.C. mailed on 12/41, at 24 Nov 41

we had the gun there, but so far as any walking guard, or patrolling around there was brought up, there was nothing like that. It was just that somebody should be there and we got arms in case any prowler came around.

Mr. GEARHART. And you and Lockard were there from noon on the 6th day of December 1941 until 4 a. m. on the 7th day of December 1941 and during that time the machine was not operated at all?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The machine between 12 noon and 4 a. m.; the machine was not operated; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was it warmed up?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; not that I recall.

[13458] Mr. GEARHART. Did you enter the compartment in which the machine was contained between those hours that I have just mentioned?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we had trouble with the oil pump on the generator motor in the power plant.

Mr. GEARHART. You spent some of that time repairing those particular items?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we repaired the oil pump.

Mr. GEARHART. How long did it take you to repair the oil pump on Saturday?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It took a good part of the afternoon.

Mr. GEARHART. Is that the reason why the machine was not operating for the entire day, or was it because you were not supposed to operate it that day?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't believe there were any direct orders not to operate it. It just was not operated.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, there was an officer's tent, war tent, near the mobile instrument, wasn't there, and that is where you slept that night?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Lieutenant Lockard slept there that night, too?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Private Lockard at that time, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Private at that time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. How were you awakened? By an alarm clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When was that set for?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Off-hand I do not recall. I imagine around a quarter of 4.

Mr. GEARHART. And when you got up did you have to do anything to the radar instrument to prepare it for service beginning at 4 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; as I recall, we had some small work to finish up on the oil pump. I believe we had worked through until it was dark and we stopped work on it, and all there was left was just to make the connections, and we planned to do that in the morning.

Mr. GEARHART. It was still dark at a quarter of 4, wasn't it.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As soon as you were awake did you start to work on your oil pump?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

[13460] Mr. GEARHART. Before 4 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you have the machine ready to operate at 4 o'clock in the morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We went on the air at 4:15, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You went on the air before you had completed the oil pump repair?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we finished our oil pump repair and reported on the air approximately 4:15.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. 4:15.

Mr. GEARHART. Then these repairs delayed you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Fifteen minutes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you went on the air?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now you said you came on duty, in reference to that machine, at noon on the 6th, the day before?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now had the men you relieved at that time been operating the machine, or had they merely been on guard on the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am not sure as to whether they operated it. [19461] I believe they did plotting. They knew how to do it, but they had them assigned there and that was their duty, their straight duty, was to remain there 24 hours a day.

Mr. GEARHART. But you don't know whether or not these men that you relieved at noon on the 6th were operating the machine or merely guarding it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And under your general orders you could have operated it after 12 o'clock if you wanted to and the instrument had been usable?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I am sure we could have.

Mr. GEARHART. You are definite on the point that you put the machine in operation at 4 or 4:15 o'clock in the morning of the day following?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And you kept it in operation until 7 on the morning of the 7th day of December 1941?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now there is some confusion in my mind in reference to the hours under which you were working. Did you have a different tour of duty on Sundays and holidays from that which you had on week days?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You mean in connection with the time for the problem from 4 to 7?

[19462] Mr. GEARHART. The operation of the machine.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe that was the same through the week, 4 to 7 in the morning.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, how many days had you been with Lockard assigned to that machine prior to the 7th day of December?

Mr. ELLIOTT. For actual operation, 2 weeks, and for setting up the unit another 2 weeks. We moved out there just about a month before December 7.

Mr. GEARHART. Now you want me to understand now that the hours during all that 2 weeks for the operation of that machine were from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As I have testified before, I am not sure just how long we had been working from 4 to 7. I believe that all the time we were out there in those 2 weeks we operated from 4 to 7, but I am not positive.

Mr. GEARHART. Now are you willing to say, as a matter of fact, that on weekdays the operation hours were from 7 in the morning until 5 in the afternoon, and that it was only on Sundays and holidays that you operated from 4 in the morning to 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not as I recall it; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I happen to have the sworn testimony of Lt. Joseph Lockard before me, in which these [13463] questions were propounded and to which he gave these answers:

Q. They were operating with approximately six men?

A. That is right. There were approximately six men of our unit. We had six in ours. We operated from 7 to 9 o'clock.

I think that 9 o'clock should have been "5," from the text.

Q. Nobody operated at night time, so far as you know?

A. If there was an alert, or if maneuvers were going on, or something of that kind, there was a night operation.

Q. From 7 to 5, except for lunch periods, you were on daily?

A. Yes, during the week.

Q. Sunday was a day off normally?

A. We had to operate Sundays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning. We took turns. That happened to be my Sunday.

Q. When did you first arrive on the island—

and so forth.

Now, that is the testimony of Private Lockard at that time, which is very definitely in conflict with that which you tell us now. Could you make a mistake of that wide variation?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not think I could have more than he [13464] could have. I make this testimony from what I remember. As I remember it, we worked from 4 to 7 in the morning straight through on a problem, as we had been scheduled throughout the week and also on Sunday. That is from what I remember. I may be wrong, I don't know.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you have been asked to make statements about this affair on several different occasions, haven't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And the first time you made a statement about it was shortly after the event, wasn't it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was there ever an investigation conducted in which you testified or wherein you were not asked what was your tour of duty?

Mr. ELLIOTT. In explaining my tour of duty, I do not recall whether I was asked about the other days of the week or not.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, are you willing to say that Lieutenant Lockard was entirely wrong when he said it was only on Sundays and holidays that they started the machine in operation at 4 in the morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, I would not know what to say on that, sir. The only thing I can say again is, as I remember it, we operated from

4 to 7 every day, and that that was our scheduled operating period for our problem. That is as I remember it.

[13465] Mr. GEARHART. You remember now that you were on this assignment from the first day of December 1941, at least. You first said about 2 weeks, but you are certain you were on for 1 week prior to December 7, aren't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You mean as to operating myself?

Mr. GEARHART. No; that you were on this particular assignment with Private Lockard.

Mr. ELLIOTT. That may have varied at any time. I mean they could have assigned Lockard and someone else. We did not work as a particular team. Any man in the unit could work with Lockard.

Mr. GEARHART. All right.

How many of the days of the first week of December did you work with Private Lockard?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That I cannot recall either.

Mr. GEARHART. How many nights during the first week of December 1941 did you sleep in this officer's tent at Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Only the 1 night, sir, the Saturday night before Sunday, December 7.

Mr. GEARHART. Then do you want to tell me that you did not work on that instrument from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock every day on the first week of December, including the morning of the 7th?

[13466] Mr. ELLIOTT. I cannot recall that either, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact you do not know what the tour of duty was on those instruments on Sundays and holidays, do you; it might be just as the then Private Lockard pointed out; is that correct?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That could be correct; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, when I returned to the room, I heard you testify when 7 o'clock arrived there that morning—

The CHAIRMAN. You are going into another phase of it. It is now 12:30.

Mr. GEARHART. I am perfectly willing to suspend here.

However, it is only 12:20.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. GEARHART. As I came in you were testifying when 7 o'clock arrived, Lieutenant Lockard, then Private Lockard, was about to turn the machine off, and you said, "No, let it go on for a while."

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. How is that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

Mr. GEARHART. Why did you want it to go on a while?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Because I was there for instruction purposes. I was there to learn more about the unit, and since [13467] we had had the unit on from 4 until 7, disregarding the 15 minutes late, I figured on continuing operating, that he could give me the instruction that I desired.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you want this committee to understand that the only reason why the machine was continued in operation after 7 o'clock on the morning of the 7th was because you asked Private Lockard for an opportunity for a little extra training on the instrument?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was prearranged. Permission was obtained from Sergeant Murphy, our platoon sergeant, and that was

the understanding, that I was to get further training after the problem, that we were to continue on the air.

Mr. GEARHART. But you had been on that instrument from 4 o'clock in the morning, clear down to 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did not you consider that training enough in one period?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was training in one field, sir. There was more than one type of training on the job. I was very familiar with plotting. The training I was to get was the operation of the scope where you actually detect the planes.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, has not this idea of additional training, your continuing on the instrument after the hour [13468] of 7, been suggested to you by a number of other people as something you might say to explain for having stayed on the instrument? Has anybody suggested to you that that would be a good explanation that you might give?

Mr. ELLIOTT. For picking up planes, you mean, on December 7?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No. He is asking you whether somebody told you what to say.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, as a matter of fact, did not you stay on that instrument, and, as a matter of fact, is it not true that it was not turned off for the sole and only reason that the truck that was to take you to breakfast had not arrived?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you read that question to him?

Mr. GEARHART. It is a little complicated. I will ask it in a simpler form.

As a matter of fact, did not that instrument continue in operation simply because the truck that was going to take you to breakfast had not yet arrived?

Mr. ELLIOTT. There also is some discrepancy—not discrepancy, but I do not recall exactly what the set-up was in this truck coming back. Originally, it was intended that we were to stay there until 12 o'clock. I believe when [13469] we called—when I called through the administration line, we had to call to our platoon, and they put us on through to the information center, and it was at that time, I believe that we were told instead of working until 12 noon, as was previously stated, we would only work until 8.

Then, after 7, why, we continued the operation.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, haven't you testified here before that the reason the instrument stayed in operation, the reason why you did not turn it off, was simply because the truck that was supposed to take you to breakfast had not yet arrived?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not recall making that statement; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, reading further the testimony of now Lieutenant Lockard, then Private Lockard—

Mr. ELLIOTT (interposing). Pardon me, sir. What testimony is that of Private Lockard? To which board or committee?

Mr. GEARHART. Testimony by Private Lockard given to the Office of the Chief Signal Officer in the Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C., on October 30, 1944.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I see, sir.

Mr. GEARHART (reading) :

Q. As you were operating this thing, [13470] you did not see anything at all until about two minutes after 7. When 7 o'clock came what did you say to Elliott?

A. We mentioned the fact that the truck had not arrived, and there was no particular point in closing up and sitting out in the grass when we could be comfortable inside.

Is that correct, or is that incorrect?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not know how much my word is against his, but in my opinion, if he made that statement, he lied, because at 7 o'clock he had already started to shut down the unit, and it was put on again through my efforts. The unit was already being turned off at 7 o'clock when we were told by the information center that the problem was over.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, will you say that his statement here, plain as day, is a lie?

Answer. We mentioned the fact that the truck had not arrived, and there was no particular point in closing up and sitting out in the grass when we could be comfortable inside.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I personally think it would have been more comfortable laying in the grass than working inside.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Then you are saying that that is a lie?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute, Mr. Chairman. I do not think the witness ought to be required to say that any [13471] testimony that has been taken is a lie.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, the witness has injected that word. I haven't.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; the witness did.

Mr. GEARHART. He said Lieutenant Lockard lied, and I am asking if this is one of those lies, since he has used a shortening of the word. Is it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I was not following you, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. I guess you were not following very much of anything, even then.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the member of the committee disputing the fact that this radar instrument was in operation?

Mr. GEARHART. I will not ask you again to pass upon the veracity of Lieutenant Lockard, since I think you have already done so.

Q. Then, you tracked it to about 22 miles. By that time the truck had arrived?

A. No. By that time we had lost it in the permanent distortion.

Q. You cut off the machine?

A. We looked around a little further for somebody else and did not see anything, so we closed down the machine.

Q. Had the truck arrived by that time?

A. Yes.

[13472] Is that a correct statement of what occurred at that time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The unit was closed, and off the air before the truck arrived. We were taking our bedding along to the officer's tent that you referred to, and were preparing to get on the truck when it arrived, but the unit was definitely shut down between 20 minutes of 8 and a quarter of 8. That was the time that we went off the air.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I just want to ask you this question in conclusion.

You had no regular written order telling you when you should be operating the machine and when you should be just there guarding the machine; is that correct?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; that was just a verbal order.

Mr. GEARHART. Who gave you those verbal orders?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was passed on to us by Sergeant Murphy, the sergeant in charge of the platoon.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, where did you work on the 5th, 4th, and 3d of December?

Mr. ELLIOTT. There again, I don't recall.

Mr. GEARHART. Were you assigned to operate other machines besides the one which was at Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I was not.

[13473] Mr. GEARHART. During the last week of November and the first week of December, your only connection with a radar instrument was the portable machine which was stationed at Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And you are not able to tell us whether or not your tour of duty was different on weekdays from the Sundays and holidays which occurred in that 2 weeks' period?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have made my statement from my memory. If my memory isn't right, why I don't know just what else I can say.

As I recall it, we worked from 4 o'clock in the morning until 7. That is, on the problem.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you went on duty on the afternoon of Saturday, or noontime Saturday?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And did not do anything but repair the instrument until the following morning at 4. Who told you to put it on at 4 the following morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Those were our instructions from Sergeant Murphy, to go on the air at 4 o'clock. That was understood that we were to work from 4 to 7.

Mr. GEARHART. How long had you been under training [13474] for this kind of work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Approximately a month and a half.

Mr. GEARHART. Where were you trained? At Schofield Barracks?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Partially, yes, sir. Partially there and partially in the field, after the unit was set up.

Mr. GEARHART. Was Lieutenant Lockard or Private Lockard, in those days, under training with you at the same places?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would not say he was under training. I do not recall that he was.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, he had been under training way back the previous June, had he not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I imagine he had.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, you regarded him as an expert in radar operation, did you not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. In the operation I might have; yes, sir. He knew how to do it. I don't know how much of an expert I would call him.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, he did the operational work, did he not, and you did the plotting and recording?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And he had supervision of your work as well, did he not?

[13475] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 1:30 o'clock.

You be back then, Sergeant.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., the committee recessed to 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[13476]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Sergeant Elliott.

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE E. ELLIOTT, JR. (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Sergeant, you had a sheet of paper there this morning. Would you let me know what that is? You said you had some figures on it.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That is a record-of-readings sheet. It has on it the log of all the plots that you make of the targets at the time that you make them.

Senator FERGUSON. And was that sheet made daily by the people who operated the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was made daily by the plotter.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would it show what time the machine was operating, what time you started to work, and what time you quit?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I don't believe that is covered on the log. The only indication that you would have there is the time of the plots.

In other words, the first plot to the last plot would give you, the interceding plots, would give you the time.

[13477] Senator FERGUSON. But it wouldn't indicate when you were working on the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; it wouldn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we have heard a lot about decorations from various witnesses. Were you decorated during the war in any way?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have received a letter of commendation from Lieutenant General Emmons, Major Tinker, and Brigadier General Davidson, of the Hawaiian Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that for the part you took in the events on the morning of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, your fellow private who was there, what decorations did he get for what he did at that time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The only one that I know of that he has is the Distinguished Service Medal.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he got it for his conduct that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Distinguished Service Medal.

Do you know whether Lieutenant Tyler, the officer that was called on the telephone, received also the Distinguished Service Medal for his part?

[13478] Mr. ELLIOTT. That I don't know, whether he did or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you told us something about a statement that you made. Did you sign that statement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us the substance of what was in that statement outside of what you told us this morning that they wanted you to certify that there were three men there and in fact there were only two?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. The statement, in substance, was that. As I mentioned this morning it was very brief. We didn't break it up actually into things that were done.

In other words, such as him doing the scoping and I doing the plotting. We just put down "we" picked up this flight and "we" gave the time, and so forth. It was very brief.

Senator FERGUSON. How many pages?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It only covered one page. I believe it was double-spaced type.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you sworn to it or not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe I was, by the officer that I signed it before.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it purport to state what had taken place that morning as far as you seeing this flight was concerned?

[13479] Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. Are you speaking of myself individually?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. What was in the statement.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No. Everything was "we."

Senator FERGUSON. It was a joint statement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it was a joint statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I am not quite clear on this record as to when you went back to where the machine was at Opana.

Mr. ELLIOTT. We arrived around 8 o'clock. The attack had been going on for about 5 minutes or so. The time element there was only the length of time enough to get our belongings or equipment and to get back on the truck and get back out to the unit which I imagine did not take more than a half-hour, to get back there.

Senator FERGUSON. You would say that around 8:30 to 9 o'clock you were back to the radar station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in a position at that time to ascertain if it was then being operated by some other men?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was being operated by other men; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you near the station; did you see any plotting then?

[13480] Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I didn't. You see, having our camp 9 miles away, we didn't have any living facilities at the unit itself. We went out there and started clearing off some ground to put up the tents.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you didn't pay attention to what they were doing on the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; not until my next tour of duty, which was much later in the day.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand this machine that you had, this radar, you couldn't tell the number of planes but by the sound wave you could tell there were a great number of planes, or more than two or three planes, is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not by the sound wave. By the visual electrical impulse which you see.

Senator FERGUSON. By the impulse?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We could tell that there was probably more than ordinarily by the size of the echo.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, "ordinary" doesn't mean much to the committee at the present moment. More than how many?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As I testified this morning it may have been 50 to 100, but I couldn't say.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you indicate when you telephoned [13481] in any way that your machine showed 50 or 100?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not by number, but just explaining that there were a large number of planes. I mean, we knew there were a larger number of planes than ordinarily.

Senator FERGUSON. So instead of the number being used the word "large" was used, the adjective "large"?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or "many." Which was it? Was it "large" or "many"?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Large.

Senator FERGUSON. Large?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there was a plat shown you this morning, a tissue plat. Do you recall that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I have it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is that the original paper that you made or used on the morning of the 7th of December, 1941?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it is.

Senator FERGUSON. Your own handwriting or markings are on there; is that true?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I notice that the line of flight was not as regular as this one on this chart that was [13482] made for us. Would you put those dots on that paper that is now before you.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that would be an accurate chart of everything that happened up until 7:40 as far as you were concerned that morning.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And after that, of course, you allowed the paper to remain on the machine so that some other private or some officer would use it from that time on?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were only speaking of it as of the time that you left there, which was about a quarter to 8?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I now ask that this original paper be made an exhibit in this case.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any reason, Sergeant, why you wish to keep that as your personal property? This is the original.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This is a part of the files. It doesn't belong to this witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the original be filed as an exhibit.

Mr. MASTEN. 155.

[13483] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 155.")

Senator FERGUSON. Sergeant, I have only a few other questions. On these markings, that is, 6:48 and 6:45, and the one that hasn't a number, could they be more than one plane, do you know? That doesn't designate one plane or more than one, does it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; that is one of the flights that I referred to, it was less or out of the ordinary—I mean it was ordinary.

Senator FERGUSON. It was an ordinary flight?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was an ordinary flight. I mean there was no exceptional echo on the scope.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this map show how far out the plane to our left on this map, 6:48, would be from your station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How many miles?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It doesn't show on the map. I mean, on the overlay. You would have to have the map in the radius room that this chart was made from. You see, the overlay is marked with two of the grids of the particular map that was used.

Senator FERGUSON. With a scale on it, is that what it is? [13484]
The overlay has a scale on it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The scale has been put in later. That was not on on December 7. We didn't put any scale rule on there. The scale that we used on the plotting table was just the radius rod, which is calibrated in miles.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you estimate the distance from this 6:48 to your Opana station here?

Mr. MURPHY. There are two 6:48's on there.

[13485] Senator FERGUSON. I mean the one to our left as we are looking at this map.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would judge about 95 miles.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear any conversation there on the day after you went back that they had used this machine to follow out the Japanese planes as they were leaving the island going back?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe they tracked some of the planes.

However, it was pretty much of a mixed-up affair. I mean they were dispersed. I mean, they didn't come—they didn't go out in the same formation that they came in. And I think that what happened was that they had plots here and there, and it was just almost impossible to keep up with all of the targets as they left the island of Oahu.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, after they got out, looking at the plot before you, there are some planes at 10:39, 10:27—you see them on that plot before you, going north? Are they on your original map?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am just wondering whether you are under the impression that the two targets you point out there are at that mileage away from the island. There is no indication up here. It would be very—I retract that. I see it.

Senator FERGUSON. Look on your original map. Do you [13486]
see those chartings?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There is a way on the machine to know whether a plane is coming in to the machine or going out, is there not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; very definitely, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Very definitely.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that the people operating the machine would be able to determine if there were planes leaving, as shown by this plat, that they were going north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That machine only had two methods of reaching the center, and they were both by telephone, there were no other means of communication. No teletype?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just by telephone?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Just by the two telephone lines; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew of no bombing in the vicinity of where you were working with this machine, so as to interrupt the telephones, so far as the center was concerned?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You are speaking of after the attack?

[19487] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was the communications center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Down at Fort Shafter.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether it was bombed?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir, I don't. I really couldn't say.

Senator FERGUSON. There was communication by road between Opana and Fort Shafter?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I understand that there was.

Senator FERGUSON. About how many miles; do you know?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Offhand, about 50 miles away from Fort Shafter.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is there anything that you could tell us here today that we haven't asked you about that may be of benefit to us on this question?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; there is one point.

In reading the Roberts report, it states in there in substance that a noncommissioned officer was instructing a private and at that time there was no noncommissioned officer involved. Private Lockard and myself, both privates, were there only.

However, when Private Lockard was called into the Roberts committee, a staff sergeant went along with Private [19488] Lockard, although I don't know whether he went before the committee.

Now, this staff sergeant was put in charge of the unit sometime during the day of December 7, over the Sergeant Murphy that had been in charge.

And, as I stated before, I don't know whether he testified before the Roberts committee, although I do know that he went in with Private Lockard, together, the day that he testified.

Senator FERGUSON. I have the language now before me, and I wonder whether this is the language you are talking about.

On page 11 of the Roberts report:

A non-commissioned officer who had been receiving training requested that he be allowed to remain at one of the stations and was granted leave to do so. At about 7:02, he discovered what he thought was a large flight of planes slightly east of north of Oahu at a distance of about 130 miles.

Was that the sentence that you had in mind?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it was.

Senator FERGUSON. You wanted to state that there were no commissioned officers, two privates were all that were there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

[13489] Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. I shall be very brief.

I gather from your testimony, Mr. Elliott, that you were operating this radar equipment fundamentally for training purposes, is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you went out to this particular task did you get instructions from any superior officer as to what you were to do and what reports you were to make, if any?

Mr. ELLIOTT. None other, sir, than just the reporting of any targets that we had found.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, who gave you those instructions?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, that came down through the chain of command from the commanding officer.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, you were directed to report any targets which you found in the operation of this machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And when were you to make the reports—immediately?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; as soon as possible.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is why that phone on the chart board was there on the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was the main purpose of our [13490] training, was getting that information as soon as could be possible to the information center.

Mr. KEEFE. So that it was considered to be part of your training to be able to spot a plane or a target, as you say, and to immediately report that, with the necessary directions and distances, and so on, to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that if the occasion came when it was necessary to utilize that information in that field you would be trained to perform properly; is that true?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you had no ideas that there were any Jap planes liable to come in on Oahu that day; did you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You hadn't any idea as a private in the United States Army that there was any thought of an attack on Oahu imminent or liable to take place?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that as far as your charting these targets on your report, it was merely routine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. It was more or less of a theoretical problem.

Mr. KEEFE. And you would have made your report whether those were Jap planes or American planes just the same?

[13491] Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. But I understood your testimony to be that you were concerned because of the large number of targets that showed up; is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that caused you some concern and some nervousness, as you said, when you reported it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, if there had only been an ordinary number of targets, three or four or five, you would have reported that exactly the same way; would you not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is definitely right.

Mr. KEEFE. How soon after you observed the planes or targets, as you have described, would you normally report to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would judge offhand 30 to 45 seconds.

Mr. KEEFE. So that I assume that when you found out later that the planes that you had noticed on your machine turned out to be Jap planes you were as much surprised as anybody else?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

[13492] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Sergeant Elliott, I notice on the chart there there are two 6:48's, so that would indicate that at least at that moment you sighted on your machine at least one plane in each of those locations; isn't that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir, if the times are both the same day.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I understand that that shows December 7. I will just show you what I mean.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe that this overlay here will show a little more than December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there is a plane there, or at least a pip in there at 6:48, there is another 6:48. Would that mean that you found a plane here, at least one plane here and another plane here at the same time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is possible; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And would you know whether or not there was one plane or several planes in each of those places?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Depending on the size of the echo.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, assuming there was only two or three, you couldn't tell the difference from whether it was one there, could you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; not at all.

Mr. MURPHY. Then I notice on this 6:58 and 6:59 there [13493] are red stars instead of white. Do you know what that would indicate?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I wonder if I may examine the chart?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; I wish you would, take your time. 6:58 and 6:59, as well as these three over here, 7:40, 7:43, and 7:53, are indicated by red stars, whereas the others are indicated by white blocks. Was there any set procedure as to one having a red star and the other having a white block that you know of?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; none that I know of.

Mr. MURPHY. I have one other thing. In answer to the Senator from Michigan you said that those at 6:48 were ordinary. By that you mean ordinary in size; is that it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one question, Sergeant. You were asked this morning about the testimony of Private Lockard in regard to the truck being late arriving at the station and also about some suggestion that it would have been more comfortable out on the grass than on the inside of the station.

Regardless of that, whether it would have been more comfortable or not on the grass, or whether the truck was late, the station was in operation at the time you have testified and it was taking these readings that you have described here [13494] to the committee?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. No matter what the cause of your delay in getting away from the station, whether you had prearranged to stay until 8 o'clock or whether the truck was late or whether it would have been more comfortable somewhere else, you were at the station and at the machine taking these readings as these planes came in?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And Private Lockard was there with you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. There was one other question, but I have forgotten what it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel wishes to ask a question.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Sergeant, you did put the information which came in over your radar station on this plot that you have been examining here all morning and at the time you saw these ships coming in from the north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You are referring to the 7:02 plot?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, did you take off at the same time a log which would be a station record showing the progress of [13495] those planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what was the paper, if any, that you took in with you that you gave to your platoon commander when you came to camp at 8 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was a copy of the record of reading sheets with the recorded plots on them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But the log that you took remained in the station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That I do not know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The one that you took in and gave to the company commander showing that was not the official record?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; there was no official record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any other record of the progress of the planes by way of a log, except the one you gave to your platoon commander?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are sure you gave that paper to him when you came to your camp at 8 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we gave it to him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That it all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. KEEFE. May I ask a question just to be sure?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[13496] Mr. KEEFE. I don't know a great deal about radar.

Would your scope—I believe you referred to it?

Mr. GEARHART. Oscilloscope.

Mr. KEEFE. Oscilloscope, would that show a ship that came on the surface of the water?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it would. Ordinarily you cannot pick up a ship at sea I would say over 30 some miles out because the ship is over the horizon and it is an impossibility to do that.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, if there was in fact a ship within that 30 mile visibility limit that you have expressed, it would show on your oscilloscope; would it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It might even be a whale surfacing; might it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It could; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or a submarine if it came to the surface.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't want to be quoted on that. I believe it would; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But as to planes, they would show on the oscilloscope at a greater distance because of the visibility above the horizon; is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not necessarily. I mean if you had a plane 30 miles out, the size of the echo would probably be much [13497] larger than an ordinary ship at sea at the same distance.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I am thinking of these pips or targets or whatever it is that shows on this oscilloscope that you can see visually.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You also hear; do you not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; you do not hear.

Mr. KEEFE. You do not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, these pips would be large or small, depending upon the distance away?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Depending upon distance and the size of the object.

Mr. KEEFE. I see. That is all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, sergeant, the lower the approaching object gets, the closer it goes to the surface of the sea or the land that you are looking over, the harder it is to pick it up with your radar; is it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct as to the training that we had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the fact that you could see these planes first 137 miles away showed they had a pretty good elevation in the air; did it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

[13498] Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you estimate what that elevation was?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I could not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. You speak of the echo throughout your testimony here. You referred to the echo. That is not a sound that you yourself heard. It is the registration on this instrument of the sound made by the planes at the distance?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not hear that at all but you would see it as it is recorded on this chart?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. We call it an electrical impulse or an echo.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not an echo as we—

Mr. ELLIOTT. Or it is commonly called a pip.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not an echo as we understand an echo that we hear?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I am sorry I have thrown you off.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted that explained. Thank you very much, Sergeant. We appreciate your willingness to come here and give your testimony and you are now excused.

Senator BREWSTER. Perhaps one question. I haven't been here much of the day. There has been a round robin questioning and maybe this has been asked before. Is there anything [13499] further that you know, that you have not been queried about, that you think would be helpful?

The CHAIRMAN. He was asked that by Senator Ferguson.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I believe that I do not have any more. I appreciate gratefully being called here. I just came down as an observer yesterday and I certainly did not intend to be here today and neither did my boss.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is your home now?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Long Branch, N. J., sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your occupation?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am with the New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.

The CHAIRMAN. In what capacity?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As a construction clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. I see, all right. Thank you very much.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Thank you again, sir.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the next witness?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would like to call Captain Creighton.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain Creighton, please come forward.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. We discussed the probability of Lieutenant Lockard being called as a witness in this case and I have [13600] ascertained that he has business that will consume the entire day. In view of this situation and the conflicts on some of the points in the testimony of the witness who has just left the chair, I think we should include the testimony of Lieutenant Lockard at this point in the record.

I have a copy of the transcript of his testimony given on October 30, 1944, in my hand. I ask that it be included in the record.

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Mr. RICHARDSON. Was that given in any of our reports, Congressman?

Mr. GEARHART. No; it is in addition. This is a special investigation conducted by the Signal Corps in preparation for the writing of a history of that part of the Army.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that it at least is of the grade of the Clausen affidavits, to say the least. I do not see any objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I see no objection to making it part of the record at this point.

(The testimony of Lieutenant Lockard referred to follows:)

[13501]

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TRANSCRIPT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION OF LT. JOSEPH LOCKARD (SIGNAL CORPS—SCAWH), WHO, ON THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, DETECTED THE APPROACH OF JAPANESE PLANES TO PEARL HARBOR

Place of examination: Conference room: Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C., October 30, 1944.

[13502]

INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT LOCKARD

FRASER. When you were in the islands, there were six 270-B's; were installed?

LOCKARD. There were no 270-A's. The 270-A was a unit that was initially designed. We never had any of them. There were only six units on the island.

F: That was the latest machine available?

L: It was the latest available to us. They may have had other equipment in the laboratories, but it was not yet available to us.

F: They were operating with approximately six men?

L: That is right. There were approximately six men per unit. We have six in ours. We operated from 7 to 5 o'clock.

F: Nobody operated at nighttime so far as you know.

L: If there was an alert or if maneuvers were going on or something of that kind, there was night operation.

F: From 7 to 5, except for lunch periods, you were on daily?

L: Yes, during the week.

F: Sunday was a day off normally?

L: We had to operate Sundays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning. We took turns. That happened to be my Sunday.

F: When did you first arrive on the islands.

[13503] L: I landed on December 10, 1940.

F: You were really there only three days under a year.

L: That is right.

F: Did George Elliott come there at that time.

L: I don't know. He was an Air Corps man.

F: How old was he?

L: About 21 or 22.

F: What was the first job assigned to you when you arrived in 1940?

L: At that time, I went directly to this particular outfit that I was with all the time I was here. At that time we had no equipment and were carrying on training and a program similar to Signal line-up.

F: Was there instruction in the use of the 270-B's.

L: No, because we had no equipment.

F: Did your instruction cover any sort of machine at all or was it all of a general nature?

L: We were at that time conducting a company school in radio theory. Most of our operation was as a radio Signal company. We had the old 171 and 131's, a small field transmitter.

F: What is the maximum range of these equipments?

L: The 171 is good for ten miles. We are lucky if we get two or three miles out of the 131. Those are actually World War I sets.

[13504] F: When did the first radars arrive?

L: They came in July and there were six of them, all 270-B's.

F: You went right to work learning how to use them?

L: No. One of these units was set up adjacent to the company area. No one seemed to know too much about them. We had the manuals which came with them. We proceeded to learn the functioning and operation of the equipment. The entire company was trained in the operation.

F: Was there somebody there who really knew how to operate the equipment from the beginning?

L: I don't know. There didn't seem to be too much information available. Shortly thereafter, Lieut. Bell came over. He was very familiar with the equipment.

F: Did he train the men in the operation of the equipment?

L: No. He was more interested in the maintenance and logging and the operational abilities of the equipment.

F: Was there a school or course which trained the men?

L: There was no established school. The company was running the training program.

F: Is Col. Murphy whom you speak of the Colonel William H. Murphy who was killed in an automobile accident in Florida last winter?

L: I don't know if it was he or someone else.

F: Is it very difficult to learn to operate a 270-B?

[13505] L: No. The biggest problem in the operational function is that of being able to distinguish and interpret the pictures which appear upon the screen.

F: I suppose to set down the log and track would take some mechanical knowledge.

L: No.

F: Do you recall if any of these machines were out of order while you were there?

L: Certainly. No machine is mechanically perfect. We had to do most of our own maintenance at first.

F: Do you recall when you first started using the particular machine that you were using on December 7?

L: It was about the middle of November. The unit was set up at Schofield Barracks and we dismounted it and moved it to Opana and set it up there.

F: Was there any particular reason why they moved the equipment?

L: It had been set up at Schofield for purposes of training. We were living in the old Chemical Warfare Barracks in Opana. It was set up right in that vicinity. It wasn't sent to Schofield for operational purposes. It was used merely for training. After we moved the equipment to Opana, we were doing our training on the job. As new individuals came into the outfit who hadn't had the training, they were allocated for training.

[13506] F: Did you train Elliott?

L: I helped.

F: You had been working on that machine since about Thanksgiving Day?

L: I guess so. Yes.

F: When you speak of a truck that was supposed to come, was it a regular army truck?

L: It was what is called a four by four.

F: It came every Sunday or holiday morning to pick up whoever was operating the machine and carry them back to wherever they were living?

L: We hadn't been under that set-up for too long a time prior to that date. We didn't usually operate on Sunday. We had been doing it for only three or four weeks.

F: Did you have any written instructions as to whom to report to, if you saw anything extraordinary on the scope?

L: No.

F: On that particular Sunday morning, you were sleeping in a small tent almost next to the machine. Was it any particular type of tent?

L: It was an officer's war tent.

F: Then you had to walk only a few feet to the 270-B?

L: Yes.

[13507] F: How was the equipment housed?

L: It was a mobile unit, mounted on two trucks. The trucks are van-type.

F: The antenna is the same antenna they have on all 270-B's?

L: Yes.

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F: In order to operate the machine, you had to mount the truck?

L: We had to unlock the vans and open them.

F: There was nothing in this van except the machine itself?

L: That is right.

F: Was Elliott doing the actual computation or were you?

L: I was doing the computation. Elliott was doing the plotting and keeping the log.

F: What do you mean by "operating the equipment"?

L: Operations consist of controlling the movement of the antenna and reading the information from the oscilloscope, both on the screen and on its mileage scale.

F: As you were operating this thing, you didn't see anything at all until about two minutes after seven. When seven o'clock came, what did you say to Elliott?

L: We mentioned the fact that the truck hadn't arrived and there was no particular point in closing up and sitting out in the grass when we could be comfortable inside.

F: At about two minutes after seven, you were the first [13508] to notice anything on the scope?

L: Yes.

F: You noticed it as a big thing coming up?

L: Yes.

F: What did you say to Elliott when you first saw that thing?

L: I don't know offhand. I asked him to look at it. I thought at first there was something wrong with the equipment.

F: That was at a range of 136 miles?

L: Approximately.

F: You kept observing it to 132 miles and at 132 miles you decided to call?

L: We reported it in at 132 miles. We had accomplished all the preliminaries to a telephone conversation. It takes a relatively short amount of time to check the equipment.

[13509] F: Can you estimate the time elapsed between 136 miles and 132 miles?

L: An average airplane travels three miles a minute. It was about one minute and a half.

F: Then you called the main switchboard operator. When you told this fellow you had something you wanted to report—

L: Yes, I called the switchboard operator and told him I wanted to report. I asked if there was anyone around the Information Center. He said they had all left. I asked him to find somebody.

F: Do you recall his name?

L: Yes. Joe McDonald.

F: He left the switchboard or did he call up somebody?

L: No. He left the board and relayed the information.

F: Couldn't he plug in and ring somebody at their quarters?

L: No. Not with that switchboard; it merely connected the various radar stations on the island with the I. C.

F: You couldn't have plugged in if you wanted any commanding officer?

L: I don't know really how the exchange was set up.

F: He left his post and found somebody?

L: Yes. McDonald relayed the information I had given him. The officer he spoke to didn't appear interested and I asked to talk to him.

F: Then when you spoke to him, can you recall what you said?

[13510] L: I merely mentioned the fact that there was something unusual on the scope both in size and direction. They were expecting a flight of B-17's that morning from California. He probably assumed that was what it was.

F: The B-17's did come in?

L: Yes and they got a hot welcome too.

F: Didn't you also say that "I have never seen anything like this in my experience"?

L: That is right. I said it was the largest formation I had ever seen.

F: You said that it was coming in due north and what did he answer?

L: I don't recall exactly. He said it was all right, that that was all he wanted to know.

F: Then you went back to your scope. How had the situation changed?

L: The formation appeared a little closer.

F: Did Elliott make any comment and did you try anything else?

L: There was nothing else we could do.

F: Did Elliott seem to be alarmed?

L: No, we were just interested.

F: Then you tracked it in to about 22 miles; by that time the truck had arrived.

L: No. By that time, we had lost it in the permanent distortion.

[13511] F: You cut off the machine?

L: We looked around a little further for somebody else and didn't see anything so we closed down the machine.

F: Had the truck arrived by that time?

L: Yes.

F: Then you got in with Elliott. He was in back of the truck and you were up front with the driver.

L: That was about right.

F: Did you mention to the driver what had been puzzling you?

L: No.

F: Then you went back to Kawalloa. About halfway back, you met a similar truck carrying some of your colleagues.

L: Yes. They were going very fast back toward the unit.

F: They simply waved?

L: We blew the horn and slowed down. We wanted to ask why they were going back but they simply blew their horn and went on very fast.

F: Would you say that was at approximately a quarter to eight or about seven thirty?

L: It would have to have been about 7:55. That is supposedly when the first bomb fell.

F: How long did it take you to go from your radar unit to your base?

L: It would take about 20 minutes or 25 minutes. It was about a mile and a half or two miles over a very bad dirt road. [13512] We had to go down this dirt road to get to the highway.

F: Was it during that mile and a half that the Japanese planes actually struck?

L: I don't know. It shouldn't have taken very long. After I lost them at 22 miles, it shouldn't have taken them very long to get those last miles.

F: Can you tell how many minutes elapsed between losing them in the distortion and the arrival of the truck?

L: As I recall it, not over five minutes.

F: When you got back to your base and the truck drove up, what did it carry besides you and Elliott?

L: Nothing. It came up for the purpose of bringing us back.

F: When you reached your base the first thing you saw was a group of men looking at the sky?

L: That is right. Lt. Carcarus was there.

F: They all had the information that Pearl Harbor had been attacked and as soon as you got the information, you turned to Elliott and said: "I bet that is what we saw."

L: Something like that.

F: Then you joined the crowd and they questioned you as to what you had seen?

L: Yes. We told them what had happened.

F: What did you do next?

L: After a hurried breakfast, we put a few things together and went right back to the unit. The other crew had it [13513] in operation when we got there and we started taking shifts.

F: Each unit had six men?

L: Well, six or more.

F: It could be operated with only two men?

L: It wasn't comfortable. Twenty-four hour operation with six men means that you pull a four-hour shift and at the same time you had to do guard duty. We had to conduct the operation, the maintenance, and guard the equipment 24 hours a day.

F: Normally you didn't have to have any guard.

L: No.

F: Was it difficult to operate with only six men when you didn't have to have a guard?

L: No. That was all right; It gave everyone something to do.

F: On the way home to your base, you noticed these heavy oil clouds?

L: We noticed this black oil smoke in the sky. The island on two sides is mountainous. Down the center is a plateau which starts from the sea level area and runs up gradually between these two ranges of mountains to the plateau where the palms grow. On the other side, it goes down approximately 200 feet to the sea again.

F: These clouds were so heavy that, by the time you got [13514] half way to your base, they were visible?

L: They were visible to us and we knew they were coming from the harbor.

F: When you saw these oil clouds, they didn't have any particular meaning to you?

L: We thought there might have been some sort of an accident or a fire.

F: After you got back to your base, did you get any official request from anybody to report your own findings on the scope?

L: No, the story wasn't accredited yet.

F: When was it first taken notice of officially?

L: It must have been about a week.

F: Can you recall how Colonel Murphy looked?

L: He was rather short, heavy set, with graying hair and a florid complexion. (At this point Mr. Fraser referred Lt. Lockard to the large detailed map of Pearl Harbor, supplied by the War Department, and traced his (Lt. Lockard's) movements thereon from Kawaihoa base to Opana and return. Lt. Lockard also noted position—as of December 7, 1941—of the five other radar (271-B's) installations on the map.)

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Lieutenant, you have been very helpful.

LOCKARD. I am glad to have been of any help.

(Termination of interview.)

[13515] TESTIMONY OF CAPT. JOHN M. CREIGHTON, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you state your name, Captain, for the record?

Captain CREIGHTON. My name is John M. Creighton.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, your name was brought up into this hearing in connection with the examination of Admiral Hart; that is, in connection with a message received by Admiral Hart which had some reference to what has been designated here as the A B C D.

In that connection Senator Ferguson asked that you be presented as a witness.

I think, Mr. Chairman, with your permission and in view of that fact, we would probably save time if I turned the witness over to the committee to permit the Senator to conduct the examination he wishes of this witness.

The CHAIRMAN. It is entirely agreeable and if the counsel has turned the witness over to the committee, the chairman of the committee will turn him over to Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Creighton—

Mr. MURPHY. I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the objection is overruled.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Creighton, the other day Admiral Hart stated that you had been the naval attaché at [13516] Singapore and that you had sent him a message some time on the 6th. Have you made a search to ascertain whether you could find that message and have you found it?

Captain CREIGHTON. When I read in the evening paper on the day of Admiral Hart's testimony a record of what you have just related it meant nothing to me at all, nor could I remember what he was referring to, and after thinking about it that night and again the next morning and still recalling nothing that he might have meant by his testimony, I called him up to tell him that I could remember nothing of the sort and while we were very busy in Singapore and many messages were sent and received, at least I could not support his evidence by recalling the matter.

So he said, "Well, you sent it all right because I can produce a copy of it." So I made an appointment with him this morning at the hotel and he called his office and authorized his secretary to give me the key to this file and sent me down there to get it and on the way down I picked up a Reserve officer named John Moser, now a captain on duty here in the Navy Department, who had been my assistant in the 6 months I was in Singapore before Pearl Harbor.

Like myself he recalled nothing of the kind either, so we came in together and found the telegram and read it and after reading it I am sorry to say that our memory is no more clear [13517] than before having seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. But you have the cablegram?

Captain CREIGHTON. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you produce the cablegram?

Captain CREIGHTON. I have it here.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, all right. Now, will you read it into the record?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the number and all that is on the page.

Senator BREWSTER. The date.

Senator FERGUSON. The date and the hour and all that.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you do that, may I ask, Senator, whether the witness is able to identify it as a telegram or a cablegram that he sent?

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Creighton, do you now identify this as a cablegram that you did send on the 6th or 7th?

Captain CREIGHTON. I have no better memory of having seen it before than before having seen it, but if that sounds a little odd I will explain, if you will give me a moment or two, what we were doing in Singapore, for we had two offices 18 miles apart, one in the city attached to the consulate and another in the dockyard.

I was alone, except for a Reserve officer and a chief yeoman. [13518] I felt it my duty to be so physically acquainted with everything taking place in the dockyard that if contingents of our fleet came there I could guide them to all of the shops and put them in touch with the proper people to get repairs done on guns, batteries, or anything else.

I was also the routing officer for all American merchant ships in that area and our office in town was constantly filled with merchant captains and shipping agents. We were in intimate relationship with the consulate across the hall, whose shipping adviser was constantly in our office, and besides I was equipped with special passes to get a constant stream of American people out of airports, where they arrived with dispatches and money and sometimes pistols which they could not get through the gates, so we were living in a very fast-moving

life and because I cannot remember that telegram even is not as important as it might otherwise look.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not purport to say that this was not a telegram sent from your office under your authority to Admiral Hart?

Captain CREIGHTON. Not at all.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, you identify it, do you not, as being a copy of a telegram from your office to CinCAF?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, he has not identified it at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you identify it as that?

[13519] Captain CREIGHTON. I do so on one premise.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, what is it?

Captain CREIGHTON. That I have such a trust in the fidelity of the Navy communication system that I accept this as such a telegram.

Senator FERGUSON. As a genuine telegram?

Captain CREIGHTON. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, may I interrupt there for just a minute?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever talk with Admiral Hart about this telegram since you found it?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes, I did this morning, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And does he identify it as the one that he received and was testifying about the other day?

Captain CREIGHTON. He does in that he said, "You will find that in my office" and I went to his office and got it and here it is.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, now will you read it?

Captain CREIGHTON. This is in December 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. What date?

Captain CREIGHTON. The time of the dispatch is 06, meaning the 6th of the month; 1526, meaning the hour, 3:26 p. m.

[13520] Senator BREWSTER. What kind of time is that?

Senator FERGUSON. Is that Greenwich?

Captain CREIGHTON. Since it is not marked otherwise I presume that it is Greenwich time.

Senator BREWSTER. What time would that be here in Washington?

Captain CREIGHTON. I do not know offhand and it never came to Washington, but in Singapore it was about 9 p. m. of the 6th and also in Manila.

Senator BREWSTER. That would be 9 p. m. of the 5th here?

Captain CREIGHTON. Roughly, yes.

Senator BREWSTER. And about 10 o'clock in the morning under Washington time.

Captain CREIGHTON. I can't do it that fast.

The CHAIRMAN. It couldn't be 9 p. m. and 10 a. m. both at the same time.

Captain CREIGHTON. In any event the telegram came from one address to another, both in the time zone of Singapore. It was not addressed to Washington and never came there.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Captain CREIGHTON. This is the telegram:

Brooke Popham received Saturday from War Department London Quote "We have now received assurance of American armed support in cases as follows:

Afirm we are obliged [13521] execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of Kra or take action in reply to Nips invasion any other part of Slam XX Baker if Dutch Indies are attacked and we go to their defense XX Cast if Japs attack us the British XX Therefore without reference to London put plan in action if first you have good info Jap expedition advancing with the apparent intention of landing in Kra second if the Nips violate any part of Thailand Para if NEI are attacked put into operation plans agreed upon between British and Dutch" Unquote.

This is marked as having been received in Manila on the 7th of December. The hour is not marked.

Senator FERGUSON. Who signs it? Does it show who sends it?

Captain CREIGHTON. It shows that it came from "ALUSNA," which was my code title in Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom?

Captain CREIGHTON. To Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be Admiral Hart?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was in Manila?

Captain CREIGHTON. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the first name used—what is it, [13522] Popham?

Captain CREIGHTON. Brooke-Popham.

Senator FERGUSON. Brooke-Popham?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was he?

Captain CREIGHTON. Brooke-Popham was an air marshal who was at the same time in command of the Royal Air Force in Malaya and of the British Army Forces.

Senator FERGUSON. You were personally acquainted with him?

Captain CREIGHTON. Not well at all. There was in addition to myself in Singapore a colonel in the United States Army named Francis G. Brink. As Brink was an Army officer, he was between us the person to consult with Brooke-Popham and not I, who was there for liaison with Admiral Geoffrey Layton, the British Navy commander.

Senator FERGUSON. You were liaison or naval attaché to whom in Singapore?

Captain CREIGHTON. Well, the right title was naval observer.

Senator FERGUSON. Naval observer?

Captain CREIGHTON. And my business there was to keep in liaison with the British Admiral but not with Brooke-Popham.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Captain CREIGHTON. I say not with Brooke-Popham.

[13523] Senator FERGUSON. The Admiral was Admiral Phillips?

Captain CREIGHTON. Admiral Phillips arrived in Malaya only 3 or 4 or 5 days before he was killed in the *Prince of Wales*. His predecessor was Sir Geoffrey Layton and after the death of Admiral Phillips, Admiral Layton, who was prepared to depart, reassumed command of the naval forces there.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you come to the conclusion that the Japs were going to attack somewhere on the 6th or the 7th?

Captain CREIGHTON. On the night of—now, I must guess at something which there is no difficulty in establishing elsewhere. The 4th or the 5th of December we received a report in Malaya which had

come, we were told, from the pilot of a British reconnaissance airplane whose duty it was to fly from a certain point in northeast of Malaya on a regular patrol up toward Siam.

The report reaching me was that on his passage over that area in the late afternoon he had encountered a large convoy of what looked to him like transports, several old battleships, an aircraft carrier, and attendant destroyers. They were headed west and almost south of the south point of Siam.

The report said further that when he went closer in his plane to observe them that Japanese fighter planes came up off the deck of the carrier and went straight at him, making it [13524] perfectly evident that they would keep him from approaching the convoy. That is when we presumed that one of the following things would occur. Whether after nightfall they would continue west to the Kra Peninsula, north of Malaya, or shift northwest toward Bangkok, toward which many threats had been made recently, we could not tell. So when you ask me when I thought something would happen, that is when I concluded that.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you answered my question.

Now, when did you know or receive word that they were going to attack the Kra Peninsula? They did attack the Kra Peninsula, did they not?

Captain CREIGHTON. They did.

Senator FERGUSON. They did. Well, when did you first know that?

Captain CREIGHTON. I did not know it until the same night that Singapore was bombed, when word reached us that the Japanese were disembarking troops and supplies not only at Khota Baru but at a harbor the name of which I think is Petani, on the Kra Peninsula, just to the north of the Malayan boundary. In other words, I heard it when the whole world knew it and not before that.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever received any word as to what America's policy was, other than the word that you sent [13525] here, the one that you have read, in case there was a Japanese attack upon the British and/or the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies?

Captain CREIGHTON. I had not.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no word as to what our policy was other than contained in this message?

Captain CREIGHTON. I had not and this itself is a matter of hearsay.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but it comes to you from a commander that you were taking information from in Singapore.

Captain CREIGHTON. That is a presumption that is not justified by my knowledge. If one reads the opening phrase here, I do not blame you for thinking so, but actually, looking at this with the wisdom that one has now and which he hardly had then, I must tell you that I never knew Brooke-Popham intimately enough to have received from him directly such information as this, nor did I receive this information directly from him.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get the information?

Captain CREIGHTON. I am sorry to tell you that I haven't the faintest idea at the moment to be able to tell you who Brooke-Popham had told that to—who told me that Brooke-Popham had told him of those things.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you wired it as a fact to the Asiatic commander in chief? [13526]

Captain CREIGHTON. If the language had been as long as a legal document invites, but that the Navy rules out in telegraphing, it might be that all of that might have been put in there that somebody told me that somebody had said something.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what code it was sent in?

Captain CREIGHTON. Will you repeat that?

Senator FERGUSON. Was it sent in the Navy Code to Admiral Hart?

Captain CREIGHTON. I can't tell from this text but I am confident that it was.

Senator FERGUSON. It would be sent as a secret message?

Captain CREIGHTON. Of course.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know as to whether or not the Japanese were intercepting and translating any of your messages?

Captain CREIGHTON. I did not know it, and I presumed that they were not.

Senator FERGUSON. You were acting on that assumption when you sent messages?

Captain CREIGHTON. Of course.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever seen the note or the message that Admiral Hart sent to Washington after he received [13527] your message?

Captain CREIGHTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I show you Exhibit 40.

Captain CREIGHTON. I have read it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will now ask you again, have you ever learned of that?

Captain CREIGHTON. I do not understand your question.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of that before you saw it here today?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes; in a newspaper the day before yesterday, but prior to that, no.

Senator FERGUSON. Not prior to that. Do you know of any other messages you sent from, say, the 4th to Admiral Hart in relation to an attack, or that might help us here?

Captain CREIGHTON. I know of no other message related to this as a matter of policy, for example, nor except for my telling about the convoy coming west around the south end of Siam, anything about a portending attack.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you did send the information that you obtained about the fighter planes leaving the deck?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And what you have related. That was all wired to Admiral Hart?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes. It was, according to my memory, [13528] also sent to Admiral Kimmel and the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have copies of those messages?

Captain CREIGHTON. When we left Singapore, Senator, it looked so much as though it were going to fall promptly that we burned everything we had except a small folder of the most recent messages which I carried out to Java myself and 6 or 7 weeks later we were

being driven out of Java and leaving on a night when you either left or did not go away, we burned everything else except a further group of dispatches that I carried to Australia and I have no records from Singapore to help me remember or tie to or rejuvenate a memory of those things.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would you know on what day that you sent to Admiral Hart the message of what the British planes had ascertained in the Gulf of Siam?

Captain CREIGHTON. I do not, sir; but I do not think my memory is necessary to determine it. I am sure that the message I sent was received in the Navy Department and can be found here.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, do we have that message? I had not seen it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I haven't seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. Commander Baecher?

Commander BAECHER. I never heard of it before, Senator.

[13529] Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you look it up and try to provide it?¹

Commander BAECHER. Very well, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is all, then.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, did you know this man Brooke-Popham of whom you speak?

Captain CREIGHTON. I knew him only to this degree, sir; that he was the most important military figure in Malaya and while it was my housemate's duty to know him well, since they were both Army officers and that was the business of Colonel Brink, my housemate, I saw him at several conferences, really, after the war.

The CHAIRMAN. What was his title, if you know?

Captain CREIGHTON. Well, I know his proper title in the RAF. It was air marshal.

The CHAIRMAN. Air marshal. He did not tell you this, he did not give you this information or this rumor or whatever it was that you wired to Admiral Hart in person?

Captain CREIGHTON. He did not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not tell you that?

Captain CREIGHTON. He did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Somebody else told you that he had been told that?

Captain CREIGHTON. He couldn't have because I was never in [13530] a private circumstance with the air marshal.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get that.

Captain CREIGHTON. I say I had not, sir, nor was I ever in a circumstance where he could have.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, now, did Admiral Sir—

Captain CREIGHTON. Geoffrey Layton.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, did he ever give you this information or anything like it?

Captain CREIGHTON. He did not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know or recall who it was who told you that he had gotten this from somebody, the substance of what you wired to Admiral Hart?

Captain CREIGHTON. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

¹ See memorandum dated May 10, 1946, from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5484.

Captain CREIGHTON. I do not, sir. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know where he got it?

Captain CREIGHTON. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know how many hands it had gone through before it go to you?

Captain CREIGHTON. I do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that when it got to you it was really nothing more than rumor?

Captain CREIGHTON. That is right.

[13531] The CHAIRMAN. But you thought it your duty to pass that on to Admiral Hart, for whatever it was worth?

Captain CREIGHTON. I might say, sir, when I went to Manila en route to Singapore it was plain to me, in being on Admiral Hart's flagship for about 6 weeks, in a course of education going to Singapore, at least he felt he was constantly suffering from a lack of information from home, and I felt it my duty, wherever I was, to try to give him any current information or reports I received.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if that information did not come from home?

Captain CREIGHTON. Of course.

The CHAIRMAN. You realize, of course, as a naval officer, that a policy involving whether we were going to assist Britain in a contingency had to come from Washington and not London?

Captain CREIGHTON. Of course I do.

The CHAIRMAN. This so-called rumor, or information, or report, or whatever it was, that Mr. Brooke-Popham was said to have gotten from the British War Department in London, you have no way of knowing how reliable that was as it came out of London to him, or from what source it came?

Captain CREIGHTON. I have none. I did not know that Brooke-Popham actually said this.

[13532] The CHAIRMAN. You did not know whether the fellow who gave him the information, or rumor, knew what he was talking about either?

Captain CREIGHTON. I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Hart has testified that based upon your message to him he wired Washington, the Chief of Naval Operations, that he had gotten this message from you and that he had received no corresponding instructions from the Navy Department here, and that he received no reply to that message.

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that indicate to you, whatever this information may have been, or whatever rumor or statement may have come out of London, was or was not authentic insofar as any commitment of the United States Government to Great Britain in any of the contingencies were concerned?

Captain CREIGHTON. I would think, sir, even if the Navy Department were perfectly sure that the report had no substance, that they would, in time, have told Admiral Hart their conclusions.

The CHAIRMAN. In the meantime, though, the war took place immediately, the attack on Pearl Harbor was almost on at the time that you sent this message?

Captain CREIGHTON. That is correct.

[13533] The CHAIRMAN. After that the war came and we were involved and there was no particular reason to follow up your message, was there?

Captain CREIGHTON. I would conclude that that was the cycle of events; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

[13534] Senator FERGUSON. I have some questions since the Chairman has asked questions.

I show you page 5125 and I show you a longer message signed by Admiral Phillips as well as Admiral Hart, to Washington, that was replied to, and the reply follows the message that I handed you, and I want you to see whether or not that does not reply to the message of Admiral Hart, and also to your message as to what our intentions were.

(The document was handed to Captain Creighton.)

Captain CREIGHTON. You are asking my opinion about something very intricate, that I never heard of before, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Commander Baecher telling you just now?

Captain CREIGHTON. He was trying to explain that this matter which had been produced since the war, that Admiral Hart had sent it in. Quite frankly, I was so busy reading, I did not pay attention.

Senator FERGUSON. It was prior to the war, and it was a reply prior to the war, but that actual message was not sent until after the attack. It shows an answer to Admiral Hart's inquiry.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Captain CREIGHTON. Are you asking my opinion on this matter, sir? [13535]

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, if you know anything about it.

Captain CREIGHTON. It means nothing to me at the moment.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you very much, Captain.

Mr. KEEFE. Let me ask a question of the Captain, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I understood you to say, Captain, that you were pretty busy all the time at the dockyards to arrange for incoming ships, their repairs, berthing, and all that sort of thing, that you were tremendously busy where you were.

Do you have any recollection of the convoys that came into Singapore consisting of American ships carrying British troops late in November 1941?

Captain CREIGHTON. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any recollection of the American liner *Manhattan*, which had been converted into a troop carrier, which came into Singapore in the latter part of November 1941?

Captain CREIGHTON. I recall only that she arrived there with troops after we were in Java. I do not remember the circumstances that you are speaking of. [13536]

Mr. KEEFE. It did not come until after you had gotten out of Singapore?

Captain CREIGHTON. I think by the difference between the date you give me and the one I remember, there were two different arrivals. I am thinking of February, and you of November.

Mr. KEEFE. The reason I ask you that, I just finished reading last night a diary of a sailor on this *Manhattan* who described the course of this convoy from Halifax to Singapore.

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Convoying or carrying troops, one of a large number of ships, American warcraft, that went to Singapore convoying these troop carriers.

I am wondering if you were there when they arrived.

Captain CREIGHTON. If they came in November, I was there, but I do not remember their arrival. They could come very easily without my seeing them, or being aware that they were there.

Then, too, they might have gone to the civilian anchorage, which is very large, of course, or to the dock yard itself, in which case I would have seen them.

[13537] **Mr. KEEFE.** Well, if American men-of-war came with them as part of the convoy, you would have known about that, would you not?

Captain CREIGHTON. I can hardly imagine not knowing about it, because some of our officers would have come ashore and they would have come right to the consulate, and to my office, too.

Mr. KEEFE. But you have no recollection of it?

Captain CREIGHTON. I have not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman give the source of his articles, so we can check it?

The CHAIRMAN. He can do that without the witness remaining on the stand.

Thank you very much, Captain. We appreciate your appearance. You are now excused.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call Colonel Bicknell.

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE W. BICKNELL¹

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you state your full name, Colonel, for the record?

Mr. BICKNELL. George W. Bicknell.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Colonel, were you in the Army at [13538] Hawaii prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir; I went on duty in October 1940.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were there during 1940 and 1941?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was your section?

Mr. BICKNELL. I was the Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, and also the contact officer for the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you explain to the committee what your general duties were under your assignment?

Mr. BICKNELL. My general duties were to keep the department commander thoroughly informed as to activities within the civil population on the Island of Oahu, and the other Hawaiian Islands, and to contact all visiting officials and businessmen coming back from the Orient especially, in order to obtain any information which they might have on the general situation in the Pacific area.

¹ Formerly colonel, Army of the United States.

I also was responsible for the internal security of the islands, and for observations of all measures necessary, counter-intelligence measures necessary, to protect any information from getting into enemy hands, or prevent any espionage that might be conducted in the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Colonel, with what other organizations [13539] did you have immediate liaison?

Mr. BICKNELL. I had immediate liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy, the Federal Communications Commission and, in fact, all Territorial and Federal departments, such as customs, immigration, and Treasury.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was your immediate superior?

Mr. BICKNELL. My immediate superior was General Fielder, who was at that time Colonel Fielder, of G-2 of the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. From what source did you seek to get the information that you were supposed to report?

Mr. BICKNELL. We used every available source. Our principal source for obtaining economic information and information about the Far East was from businessmen returning on liners or coming in on the clipper ships from the Orient, interviewing them, getting their opinions; interviewing any officials of the British or other national military organizations that came through Hawaii, as well as picking up the intercepts on all Japanese radio stations, reading the Japanese-language papers and obtaining some papers from the Orient and piecing all of that information together.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Colonel, was your job a uniform job, or did you do most of your work in civilian clothes?

[13540] Mr. BICKNELL. Practically all of my work was done in civilian clothes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you have to do with the furnishing of the information based on the alleged burning of codes and papers by the Japanese consul?

Mr. BICKNELL. That information was given to me by the agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and I in turn passed it on to the chief of staff and staff of the Hawaiian Department at their regular staff meeting on Saturday morning, December 6, 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How often were staff meetings held?

Mr. BICKNELL. Staff meetings were held every Saturday.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And who was supposed to attend those staff meetings?

Mr. BICKNELL. All members of the general and special staff of the department commander.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was the department commander?

Mr. BICKNELL. At that time, General Short.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would he attend these Saturday convocations of his staff?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who would attend in his place?

Mr. BICKNELL. The chief of staff, Colonel Phillips.

[13541] Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there a general discussion at those meetings of the fact, or of the intelligence, that you would report?

Mr. BICKNELL. There was hardly ever any discussion of it. The facts were simply laid out. Once in a while there would be a question asked about the significance of the fact, but very seldom.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall the incident of the Mori message?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who brought that to your attention?

Mr. BICKNELL. That was brought to my attention by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What steps did you take to acquaint General Short with that message?

Mr. BICKNELL. I called Colonel Fielder and told him that I had some information that was extremely important, that it should be given immediately to the department commander, and Colonel Fielder said that they were planning on going out for dinner, but he would talk with General Short.

I asked him to urge the importance of it upon the General, that we see him, and he told me to be out at Fort Shafter within the next 10 minutes, that they would wait for me.

[19542] So I went out there, and did arrive. General Short and Colonel Fielder were waiting and the message was shown to them.

It had been in my hands only a matter of less than an hour.

I told them I felt that the thing was highly suspicious and highly significant, that I had not had time to evaluate the message but it did seem to me of utmost importance at that particular time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They heard you?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long was your conference?

Mr. BICKNELL. Not more than 5 minutes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was no unpleasantness or criticism in connection with it?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there a remark made there by General Short that indicated he thought you were a little too sensitive on the question of intelligence?

Mr. BICKNELL. I would not say there was any remark made like that. The remark made by General Short was that the message was a very true picture of what was going on in Hawaii at that time.

I remember I thought that was just the trouble with it; [19543] it was too accurate a picture.

I would say that the general reaction was perhaps I was somewhat intelligence-conscious, but nobody told me so in so many words.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You spoke a moment ago about the fact that the espionage condition in Hawaii was part of your duty.

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will ask you whether you have prepared, as a part of your notes, a statement in relation to your estimate of the espionage situation there in Hawaii?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, I have, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I wonder if you would consult that and read it to us? It is not very long, as I remember it.

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I might say, for the information of the committee, that I feel, and have felt that our testimony here, specifically on questions of espionage, was a little vague.

I went over this statement. It seemed to be a very admirable statement and it would save time if the Colonel was permitted to read it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Colonel, go ahead.

Mr. BICKNELL. From the angle of security Hawaii, [13544] during the period 1930-1941, was totally unguarded and presented a mecca to agents and observers of any foreign government. This state of affairs, however unwelcome to the Army and Navy, had the full protection of our civil law, a condition which should never be allowed to exist again.

Pearl Harbor, lying low under the surrounding hills, was constantly in view of any and all who cared to look. Japanese training ships, tankers, and auxiliary vessels frequently called in port with all crew members, both officers and men, fully equipped with binoculars and cameras, enjoying shore leave and the hospitality of the local Japanese colony. Invariably, parties of officers were entertained in Japanese homes, on the heights, where the entire installation of Pearl Harbor, Hickam Field, and other airport facilities could be leisurely and minutely observed. At some of these homes, situated on the crown of high ground, elaborate, lattice-work orchid houses had been constructed from which careful observation could be made by large parties of individuals who would remain completely screened from observation by neighbors or others passing on nearby roads.

Photography, in the earlier part of this period, flourished in Hawaii. As late as 1939, after the visit of the United States Fleet, a large photograph showing the entire panoramic view of Pearl Harbor, with each ship clearly defined [31545] at its anchorage, was publicly displayed in the show windows of a Japanese photography shop. There were no prohibitions except those placed in effect by the commanding officers of various posts, stations, or cantonments. General prohibition of photos of the crater in Diamond Head as well as certain other specific military and naval areas were adopted and placed in effect by Territorial law which restricted flying over these areas. It was physically impossible to prevent promiscuous photography inasmuch as every road, every hilltop, and many private homes offered the most excellent vantage points for obtaining clear and detailed photographs.

Because of these topographical features, practically all of the islands' protective installations were accessible to photographic recording. In view of this, it was perhaps an exercise of good judgment on the part of the military authorities not to waste much effort in attempting to put an end to this practice.

Another source of complete, detailed, and vital statistics as readily available to enemy agents as to other interested persons, were the many publications issued at frequent intervals by official and semi-official agencies of the Government. Reports of planning commissions, including detailed and accurate drawings, charts, and statistics on all matters such as communications, telephones, electric power plants, [13546] distribution lines, transformer stations; public transportation such as railroads, busses, and streetcars; water supply, including sources, reservoirs, distribution mains, gates and shut-offs; and all such data could be purchased for 35 or 50 cents.

In some instances the demands for appeasement and betterment of labor conditions added to the problem. Many of the plantations, uti-

lizing the services of Japanese labor, made every endeavor to improve their morale and contentment. Such a program included the maintenance of homeland culture and practices with the erection of temples, entertaining of visiting Japanese priests, officials or crew members in large parties, sometimes given at company expense.

Personal contacts would thus be established with individuals who often had detailed information relative to maneuvers, new gun placements, and other similar matters. In many instances, friends or relatives of these employees lived adjacent to the channel into Pearl Harbor and were intimately acquainted with the movements of naval vessels in and out of the base, their silhouettes, new equipment, and other features viewed from only one or two hundred yards away.

No positive identification was required of seamen leaving and returning to a visiting Japanese vessel. Passes were [13547] issued, but not photographic passes. To the average customs guard one Japanese closely resembled another. It was not impossible for an individual to leave the boat and for another, entirely different, person to don the uniform and use the pass to reembark with no suspicion being aroused. Hence, all precautions against illegal entries were frustrated.

In considering such illegal entries, it should be remembered that a great many Japanese ships passed by and entered into Hawaiian waters. Precautions were adopted against smuggling by having each ship closely followed into port by a Coast Guard cutter. However, the ever-present Japanese fishermen, equipped with sampans having cruising ranges of thousands of miles were quite capable of meeting the larger ships many miles away from any possible observation. Indications do exist that such methods were employed to bring in some undesirable individuals who were not discovered prior to the opening of hostilities.

The sampan fleets were divided into three main classes; deep-sea and long-range; offshore and short-range operations; and shallow-water, bait-catching equipment. In the first classification, the boats were large, seaworthy, radio-equipped, and quite capable of prolonged cruising at sea. The second classification included smaller but often equally well equipped craft which cruised around each of the islands [13548] in the Hawaiian group, and whose crews were intimately acquainted with reefs, caves, landing places, tides, currents, and local wind and sea conditions. Thirdly, small boats operated within the bays, locks, and harbors, netting small fish to be used as bait for the larger craft.

The operators of these boats knew every detail of these waters, the depths, nature of bottoms and, most important of all, were always present to observe any operations or maneuvers. Through 1938, 1939, and part of 1940 these small boats had access to Pearl Harbor itself, cruised about where naval craft were at anchor, enroached upon landing areas of large seaplanes, and were constantly aware of any change in details of channels, currents, and other features.

The fishermen themselves were a clannish group, having their own "huis" or associations and acting for their own interests in maintaining price levels, demanding special privileges, and so forth. They also made trips back to the homeland and spent periods of time in the Japanese fishing schools in order to become more efficient in their art.

At intervals, officials from these schools visited Hawaii and brought new ideas, methods, or operation, and perhaps, even other thoughts from the Empire. When these fishermen were back in Japan they were "entertained" by various officials, and it is safe to assume that their information was carefully [19549] evaluated. In some cases they were royally entertained and visited certain naval establishments in Japan. Every indication points toward a well-planned system of total espionage with perhaps the individuals themselves having little or no knowledge of their own direct contribution.

The Japanese themselves developed a system of such total espionage which perhaps outranks any other similar system in the world. Even at home, in everyday life, it is carried out meticulously. The supervisor of the organization in the Government directs his state or provincial deputies. They, in turn, direct the district or city leader. Under these the territory is broken down into areas or wards, then to neighborhoods and, finally, to blocks. The block leader has in his possession a plan showing each house in his block. He has further data on who lives in the house; how many children; where each is employed; details as to possession of an automobile, electric ice box, telephone, radio receiver, sewing machine, and other information, including a list of visitors who call at regular or irregular intervals, where mail is sent and from whom received. All such data is minutely recorded and reported periodically. Should an individual move to another block, the information on him is passed on to the new block leader and dropped from the records of the first. Such a means of constant surveil- [19550] lance precludes any suspicious acts on the part of the individual from passing unnoticed. Mail and communications from relatives or friends abroad, and the business and financial affairs of the family, are always under complete observation.

Everyone is familiar with the usual depiction of the prewar Japanese tourist or traveler. His field glasses, camera, and sketch pad were always in evidence. He took pictures by the millions and all went back to Japan for examination. As a tourist, member of a trade mission, a minor official, an observer, a priest, or a student, he flooded our country as well as others, always taking photos, collecting picture post cards, vital statistics, trade journals, pamphlets—in fact, everything on which appeared even a scrap of vital information. These, too, always went back to Japan and became available for evaluation, compilation, and file. Japanese banks, business houses, transportation companies, tourists, bureaus, and so forth, were opened in many cities and localities both in Hawaii and on the mainland. Each formed a little collection center of its own and gathered data of a specific nature.

No comparable system either for the collection of world-wide information or to protect the interests of our country existed in the United States prior to the war. The American [19551] people have always demonstrated a complete lack of appreciation of such institutions and a simple, naive belief that these practices are not in keeping with the American way of life. Nevertheless, this Nation seems somewhat alone in such ideals. Others carry on intelligence activities in times of peace to prepare for war. Under normal peacetime conditions we rely solely on our military, naval, and commercial attachés for such information and ignore the fact that they are handicapped from the start through their official status and that their movements and

activities are greatly curtailed. No further argument is required when we realize the great wealth of information in the hands of Japan at the start of this war as compared to the meager dribbles of similar information in our possession on Japan and the Japanese.

It can be safely stated that the enemy had complete knowledge of our Hawaiian fortifications, general defenses, armament, naval and air strength, as well as many details of our military, naval, and air facilities. The only thing they lacked was knowledge of our secret military plans, which had been well guarded, resting solely in the hands of military and naval commanders and members of their immediate staffs.

The much-debated question as to whether the attack by [13552] Japan could have been foreseen in time to have taken protective action is involved and highly controversial. During the entire year preceding Pearl Harbor, the situation had been developing in steady steps with an absolute certainty of the result.

The Japanese had long been discussing, preaching, and advocating the greater East Asia sphere of coprosperity. Selected representatives of many Asiatic countries convened in Japan to hear discussions of the principles of East Asian coprosperity. In these delegations were many Japanese residents of each area represented. Some Japanese from Hawaii participated.

The war with China gave clear indication of Japanese action and a pattern of the methods adopted by and to be expected from their Government. We had felt the ever-increasing tension with the bombing of the *Panay* and other similar events which took place in the Far East. We had listened to their great volume of radio propaganda directed toward those countries included in their conception of the sphere of prosperity. These programs clearly indicated the working of the master minds and gave every reason to believe that it was their intention to build up an empire in Asia from which would be expelled every influence and semblance of control by the British, Dutch, and Americans. There was [13553] no denial of this intention. Japan desired to strengthen her economic and military position. Raw materials needed in her island empire were to be obtained in China, India, Burma, Thailand, and the Dutch East Indies. Strong points for the defense of this empire also were to be located in these countries.

Should it be possible to oust western influence and power from the countries included in the greater East Asia sphere of coprosperity, Japan would be able to control the Asian situation. With the Dutch and British already involved in war with Germany, the opportunity for expansion was present. Should the United States become involved in the war in the Atlantic, her resources and strength might well be diverted from the Pacific. If Japan had assurances from Germany that the attention of our forces could be held in the Atlantic, there seemed to be no logical reason why the Japanese should not strike.

To assure a successful coup, it was only required that what strength the United States and Britain had in the Pacific be neutralized in one great blow. Germany had demonstrated the power of the blitzkrieg—an example for the master minds.

As a result of the years of gathering information from every conceivable source, Tokyo was well aware of all strong- [13554] points and defenses, as well as the general offensive strength which could be thrown against her in the Pacific. She had been softening up the peoples of Thailand, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies through general fifth-column activities and radio propaganda. Her military and naval machines were fully equipped, well supplied, and ready to move at the moment's notice. All was in readiness. It was only to be determined how and when the strike would be made.

To succeed fully, Japan had to predetermine what counter-action unsympathetic nations would be able to take against this great move to envelop all eastern Asia. American forces in the Philippines, particularly the Air Force, might cause some trouble and delay. Reinforcement of the garrison in these islands must be prevented. To obstruct reinforcement it would be necessary to prevent any American or British naval support from becoming available for convoy and protective service, without which no troop or supply movements could be made into the Philippines in the face of Japan's superior naval strength, submarine, and air support.

The espionage system was working well; information was available daily from Hawaii, reporting ships in port, arrivals, and departures. Other sources kept Tokyo well informed of the location of Dutch naval units and the few British ships [13555] then available. The Japanese staff had a complete picture and could readily determine the plan for action.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Colonel, let me ask you this question:

From your experience in Hawaii, as Assistant G-2, your observation of espionage development there, did you have any doubt at any time during the 2 months prior to Pearl Harbor that Tokyo had complete information as to Pearl Harbor, the location of the ships from time to time in Pearl Harbor, the way in which our fleet was using Pearl Harbor, and all of the details in reference to the military occupation or military use of the harbor as a base?

Mr. BICKNELL. I have no doubt whatsoever.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then in estimating your espionage problem in Hawaii, you took it for granted that Tokyo knew all of those details?

Mr. BICKNELL. I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you communicate your information and judgment with respect to that to General Short, or Colonel Phillips?

Mr. BICKNELL. Those estimates were submitted, Mr. Senator, through the form of intelligence estimates.

The CHAIRMAN. Written?

[13556] Mr. BICKNELL. Written. They were mimeographed, I think some 50 copies were printed.

The CHAIRMAN. How often were those estimates furnished?

Mr. BICKNELL. They came out at least biweekly, and in some cases weekly.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your size-up of the situation, as you have outlined it here in this memorandum was known to the commanding officers in the Hawaiian Islands, and at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Both military and naval?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you got this message on the night of the 6th of December, which you felt was important enough to take it over to General Short and Colonel Phillips—

Mr. BICKNELL. Colonel Fielder.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Fielder, who was with General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not Phillips?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Fielder was your immediate superior?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They were both going to the same dinner [13557] that evening?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was it that they instructed you to take this message?

Mr. BICKNELL. To Colonel Fielder's quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. To Colonel Fielder's quarters?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General Short was to be there?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes. Both waited there for me.

The CHAIRMAN. They waited there to receive it before going to the dinner?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And they went on to the dinner after they got the message?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it in the manner or bearing of General Short that created the impression in your mind that he was a little impatient with your intelligence complex, if that is the proper word?

Mr. BICKNELL. Well, it was the general reaction that the points in the message which I considered most suspicious seemed to be everyday affairs in their minds.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, what you had thought was unusual and therefore that you were impelled to seek them out [13558] to divulge, was by them regarded as just a matter of routine, and of no more importance than any other message they had received?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What time in the evening was that?

Mr. BICKNELL. That was somewhere in the vicinity of 6 o'clock in the evening.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not see them after that?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Until after the attack?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the equipment, by way of airplanes and antiaircraft and all other equipment, radar stations, and all the whole series of things that were there both on the part of the Army and Navy at the time of the attack and immediately before it?

Mr. BICKNELL. Only in a general way; that is, I did not know the complete details of where every gun or where every position was.

The CHAIRMAN. You were familiar with it in a general way?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you had an over-all picture of what was there?

[13559] Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it part of your duty to form an estimate as to the effectiveness of what was there by way of material and equipment?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir; that was not within my province.

My province was more counterintelligence and external intelligence, rather than anything pertaining to operations which was more of a combat intelligence nature.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you be able to express an opinion as to whether the fullest possible use was made of what was there in the way of equipment, men, and material, on the day of the attack or immediately before it in preparation for it, or in an anticipation of any possible attack?

Mr. BICKNELL. Well, I am in a position to say that I could observe the action of the Navy, because I saw the attack from a point 2 miles behind Pearl Harbor, and 900 feet above it.

Within 4 minutes, 3 or 4 minutes after the original torpedo had been dropped, into Pearl Harbor, the entire naval forces opened up with all of their antiaircraft and in fact on the second round of that one plane that was shot down there in Pearl Harbor. So I should say, from what I could observe, a very effective and efficient use was made of all of the equipment which the Navy had [13560] on hand.

That was all that was within my immediate line of vision.

I could not say anything as to the Army equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you be in a position to express any opinion as to whether the steps taken in anticipation of a possible attack, or to avoid it, or to counteract it, were fully realized and appreciated, and made effective?

Mr. BICKNELL. I would not know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not know about that?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As I understood it, Colonel, you were G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. BICKNELL. I was the Assistant G-2.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You made these evaluations as to the local situation existing there with respect to espionage?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Every week for some of the time, or [13561] part of the time every 2 weeks?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And those reports went to the commanding officer, General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That continued throughout the whole period that General Short was in command there?

Mr. BICKNELL. Those reports were originated, if I am not mistaken, late in September of 1941, and continued through the time of the attack.

I believe around October 17, one of those reports included the paragraph that war would be expected to break out with Japan either at the end of November, or if not then, then not until April of 1942.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was your estimate that you made?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Based on the information you had been able to secure?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That war might be expected to break out between the United States and Japan toward the end of November?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

[13562] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of 1941?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And if it did not occur then, that it might go until the following April?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was in your estimate, in your report submitted?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, as I understood from you, you received this information about 5 o'clock on the afternoon of December 6, 1941, from the FBI agent in charge there at Honolulu, about the Japanese consul burning these important papers?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir; that was the Mori message I received at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of December 6.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. BICKNELL. The information in regard to the burning of the codes came to me from the FBI, I believe, on the 5th of December, and that information on the burning of the papers was given to the assembled staff on the morning of December 6.

The Mori message did not come to my attention until 5 o'clock on the afternoon of December 6, and it then was reported immediately to General Short.

[13563] The VICE CHAIRMAN. By 6 o'clock you had reported it to General Short in person?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Together with General Fielder?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then it was that you got the impression that he thought you were too intelligence-minded?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark?

Mr. CLARK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, when you received this message on December 6, what was the conversation that you had with the FBI about the message?

Mr. BICKNELL. I was at home on the afternoon of December 6, and Mr. Shivers, the agent in charge, called me at home and said he had something of high importance that he thought I should see immediately. I went down, and was in town within 20 minutes, and he showed me this message, which had just been finally translated, and said this thing looked very significant to him, that something was going to happen. I read the message over and agreed with him, and immediately called General Fielder.

[13564] Senator LUCAS. How long had you known Mr. Shivers?

Mr. BICKNELL. I had known Mr. Shivers ever since he came to the islands in 1939.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know that the FBI were tapping the telephone lines of the Japs at the time?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know that the Navy was also tapping telephone lines?

Mr. BICKNELL. I did not.

Senator LUCAS. The Navy never gave you that information?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, what information was exchanged in the way of intelligence between your Intelligence Department and the Intelligence Department of the Navy?

Mr. BICKNELL. As far as my Department was concerned, everything that we received was given to the Navy.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, whatever you received in the way of intelligence, you evaluated it and transmitted it to the Navy?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In Hawaii?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What about the Navy giving to you the information that they had?

[13565] Mr. BICKNELL. They gave us whatever they thought was proper to give, but I know that certain information never was received from them.

Senator LUCAS. What do you mean by that?

Mr. BICKNELL. Well, just as an example, these intercepted telephone calls. I knew they were intercepting them, I knew what calls they were intercepting, but they never told me anything about it. I know when the original winds message came down that Captain Mayfield knew about it, but he never told me anything about it. Instances of that kind, where I felt there was certain information which they were not allowed to pass on to their corresponding numbers in the Army.

Senator LUCAS. Was that a regulation that the Navy had, not to permit to pass that on?

Mr. BICKNELL. I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. Even though it might have been the regulation not to transmit magic word for word, was there any regulation which prohibited them from transmitting to the Army the substance of whatever they received, regardless of where they got it?

Mr. BICKNELL. I would not know that, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Anyhow, there were certain important matters that came to the Navy in the way of intelligence that [13566] you, as the intelligence officer, did not receive?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Now the Army was out there to defend the Navy in case of attack. That was its primary duty, was it not?

Mr. BICKNELL. According to the orders, that is correct.

Senator LUCAS. I understand according to the orders that was the primary duty of the Army. And in order to defend the Navy, is it a fair assumption that the Intelligence officer should have evaluated and transmitted to him all the essential information that the Navy might have?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is the only system I know of whereby Intelligence can function.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, were you in on the meetings when General Short decided to put alert No. 1 into effect, which was the sabotage alert?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know anything about that?

Mr. BICKNELL. The warning message of November 27 was read to the assembled staff by Colonel Phillips. I was present at that meeting when that message was read. But when General Short conferred with other staff members relative to the type of alert, I was not present.

Senator LUCAS. Did he ever discuss that question with [13567] you?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You were the Intelligence officer at that time, were you not?

Mr. BICKNELL. I was the assistant Intelligence officer.

Senator LUCAS. The assistant Intelligence officer?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Well, did General Fielder ever discuss that question with you?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know that the Army was alerted to sabotage only on December 7?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. How did you get that information?

Mr. BICKNELL. I saw where the troops were, and after the movement had started I learned that the order had been issued to alert No. 1. In my outfit a counter-intelligence crew had been on a full alert since the 1st of November. We had been on a 24-hour watch, and had been since the 1st of November, so it made no difference to us. When the order was finally issued that alert No. 1 went into effect, then we learned of that, but it made no difference to our set-up, because we were already in full alert.

Senator LUCAS. Regardless of the fact that the order [13568] was issued, your outfit continued to be on the alert that you had been following previous to the time of the last order that came out by General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Had the FBI man received similar messages previous to this, or had he tapped wires to obtain information of this kind?

Mr. BICKKNELL. To the best of my knowledge, that was the first one that had been received.

Senator LUCAS. Now here it is:

(J) Hello, is this Mori?

As I read this I would like to have you stop me, if you will, and point out, if necessary, what you consider the significant part of this message which caused you and the FBI man to become somewhat worried about the situation.

(J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

What does the (J) mean there?

Mr. BICKNELL. J?

Senator LUCAS. J says "Hello, is this Mori?"

Mr. BICKNELL. That is Japan.

Senator LUCAS. And "(H) Hello, this is Mori."

What does the "(H)" mean?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is Honolulu.

[13569] Senator LUCAS (reading):

Japan: I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

Honolulu: Not at all.

Japan: I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily?

Hawaii: Yes, lots of them fly around.

Japan: Are they large planes?

Honolulu: Yes, they are quite big.

Mr. BICKNELL. That is all significant—are the airplanes flying daily, and what type. If they are quite big they could be long-range reconnaissance planes, and "They are flying daily" gives some idea of whether they were carrying on long-range reconnaissance in daylight hours.

Senator LUCAS. Now did you discuss that phase of it with General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Or General Fielder?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did they read this message in its entirety?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did they say anything about that particular [13570] phase of it?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir; they said that that was a very true picture of what was going on in Hawaii.

Senator LUCAS. That is all they said?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. They were in a hurry, were they?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

Japan: Are they flying from morning till night?

Hawaii: Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is another significant statement, I take it?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading) :

Japan: I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

Hawaii: There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.

Japan: Is that so?

Hawaii: I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.

Japan: Are any Japanese people there holding meetings [13571] to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is very significant. I believe there was a great doubt in the minds of the Japanese officials as to what the Japanese in Hawaii would do in case war should break out between the United States and Japan.

They had been subjected to American influences for a long time. Many of the American-Japanese had been back to their mother country and had found that they could not speak that language, that they had lost their taste for Japanese customs of old, and that they did not like Japan, and that they were happier back at home in Hawaii.

I believe the Japanese, in thinking of any possibility of reaction in Hawaii, were especially apprehensive themselves as to what the younger Japanese would do, whether they would support Japan or whether they would support the United States. They had no doubt whatsoever as what the older ones would do, they were bound to be loyal to Japan, but they did have a very great doubt as to the action of the younger generation of Japanese.

As to holding large numbers of meetings, at that time, as you perhaps recall, Japan was beaming propaganda in large degrees to the countries which it was about to attack. They also beamed more innocuous stuff to Hawaii. They were perhaps looking to find out whether or not their propaganda [13572] was bearing fruit, and were these ideas which were being broadcast on the radio being taken up, and were the people holding meetings, and was there any indication of activity amongst the local Japanese.

That is a possibility; I do not say it is a probability.

Senator LUCAS. Were they holding meetings at that time in Hawaii?

Mr. BICKNELL. They were holding meetings, but they were holding meetings at that time in Hawaii at our instigation, where we were trying to Americanize them and cement their loyalty to the United States, so any information they got on that might be misleading.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, did you feel that the Japanese situation in Hawaii was so desperate that nothing but a sabotage alert should have been in existence after that war-warning message came on November 27?

Mr. BICKNELL. My feelings on that question have been expressed to practically every commanding general whom I have come in contact with, and that was that we would never have any sabotage trouble with the local Japanese, and we did not.

Senator LUCAS. Were you there in 1940?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You had an all-out alert at that time; [13573] did you not?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And did you experience any difficulty with the Japanese people at that time?

Mr. BICKNELL. None whatsoever.

Senator LUCAS. And following the attack on Pearl Harbor, do you know of any acts of sabotage that were committed by the Japanese?

Mr. BICKNELL. There was not a single act of sabotage on December 7 or thereafter; no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the message goes on:

Japan: Are any Japanese people there holding meeting to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

Hawaii: No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

Japan: Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

Hawaii: Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd [13574] things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

Japan: That's fine.

Hawaii: Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amused.

Japan: Has there been any increase in—

and there is a blank there—

of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.

Hawaii: There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.

Japan: What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

Hawaii: Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

Japan: Are there many big factories there?

Hawaii: No, there are no factories, but a lot of small [13575] buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

Japan: Is that so?

Hawaii: It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

Japan: How large is the population?

Hawaii: The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

Japan: What is the population?

Hawaii: About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

Japan: What about night time?

Hawaii: There seem to be precautionary measures taken.

Mr. BICKNELL. That is significant, that taken together with the next question.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, the next question is:

Japan: What about searchlights?

Hawaii: Well, not much to talk about.

Japan: Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

Hawaii. No.

Mr. BICKNELL. That is very significant. If we put the searchlights on at night when the planes are flying around, that means long-range reconnaissance ships are trying [13576] to find the island to come back. That is the only reason the searchlights are turned on, to help the ship find its way back after a trip. If the ship leaves in the

morning and it does not come back until after dark it gives you some idea as to how far the reconnaissance may be.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, as the assistant intelligence officer, did you have the right to make any significant suggestions that you thought this message contained when you talked to General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. I would have had the right, sir, if I had more time to evaluate it, but I just received the message in my own hands, and realizing that it was significant, I went directly to the general with it. I had not had time to even give this thing more than one or two readings.

As I said, I felt it was highly significant, and I still feel it was highly significant. It may be perfectly innocent, but from an intelligence angle, and putting it together with the information that we already had, that the Japanese consul was burning papers, and we knew that the condition in the Pacific was serious, a message of this type did, and still does, seem highly significant to me.

Senator LUCAS. If you had not thought it was significant you would not have requested an interview with General Short around his dinner hour; would you?

[13577] Mr. BICKNELL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Did both General Short and Colonel Fielder read this message?

Mr. BICKNELL. As I remember it, they put it down on the table and Colonel Fielder read it over General Short's shoulder as he turned the pages.

Senator LUCAS. Then this telephone conversation continues:

Japan: What about the Honolulu newspapers?

Hawaii: The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

Japan: What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

Hawaii: A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

Japan: Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

Hawaii: There are almost none wishing to do that.

Japan: What is the climate there now?

Hawaii: These last few days have been very cold with [13578] occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate.

Mr. BICKNELL. That information would be very helpful about the weather, especially the fact that it was unusual weather, to a task force commander. Of course I do not want to be accused of taking advantage of information we had after the attack, but to inquire about weather conditions and the extent of any cold front, that information right there would be extremely valuable to them.

I have felt that it was quite possible, in reconstructing the attack on Pearl Harbor, that the Japanese task force came in behind the cold front which they used as a screen against a possible observation from the air. The official Japanese movies of the attack show a cold front when the airplanes were taking off from the carriers. The timing of the attack is such that there is a strong possibility in my mind that that is how it was planned, to move behind that cold front and use it as a screen to prevent any aerial reconnaissance from sighting

the fleet, and therefore the date of the attack was primarily the date when they could come nearest to the islands, within striking range of the islands behind that cold front. It might even have been the 6th, 7th, or 8th. But that type of information in that [13579] one paragraph would be extremely helpful to anyone desiring to know those conditions.

Senator LUCAS. Well, this fellow Mori was not just talking for his health.

Mr. BICKNELL. Mrs. Mori was talking.

Senator LUCAS. What is that?

Mr. BICKNELL. Mrs. Mori was talking. This is his wife. The doctor did not talk.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever find out to whom she was talking?

Mr. BICKNELL. It was a Japanese newspaper that the call originated from. But there is one thing again that must be borne in mind. This conversation was between Honolulu and Tokyo. It was scrambled. The Japanese had the scrambler in Tokyo in order to unscramble it. Anybody in the Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and Tokyo with a scrambler could unscramble this and listen to it, whether they were in Tokyo or whether they were a thousand miles from Hawaii.

This information is open to interception by anybody having the scrambling device which was used on that circuit.

Senator LUCAS (reading) :

Japan: Is that so?

Hawaii: Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian Ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. [13580] He made no statements on any problems.

Japan: Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

Hawaii: No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

Japan: Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

Hawaii: Yes.

Japan: What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

Hawaii: A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

Japan: Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

Hawaii: Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

Japan: Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

Hawaii: No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet.

Mr. BICKNELL. That, to me, is also very significant. That could be a very nice cover-up. The Japanese already knew all about the fleet, they did not have to talk on the [13581] telephone about that. They were getting daily reports from their consul as to movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. They did not have to ask any questions about that at all.

Senator LUCAS. Hawaii further says:

At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't know if all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

Japan: Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is significant.

Senator LUCAS. Why is that significant?

Mr. BICKNELL. Perhaps I am too intelligence conscious, but in the last war I spent a lot of my time in intelligence and cryptography, and

an open code is one of the most commonly used methods of passing on information.

What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

What in the world does a Japanese newspaper want to know about flowers in Hawaii? Then, as you go on, you see that this conversation will pick out the two flowers, only two flowers of the many that were blooming in Hawaii at that time. And there is some misunderstanding about the poinsettias which you will discover in the next question.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

Hawaii: Presently, the flowers in bloom [13582] are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.

Then there is a note:

Japan does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

Japan: Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?"

Well, when the fellow in Japan who was talking did not catch the significance of poinsettias undoubtedly the so-called secret code, or whatever they had, was not working quite properly.

Mr. BICKNELL. The thing is, on the original record of this interception, there seems to be somewhat of an argument in there. It is badly mixed up with static. But the best we could make out of it in listening to the original was there was some question in his mind as to what the real point was in this.

Senator LUCAS. Continuing further:

Japan: Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

Hawaii: Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

[13583] Japan: What do you lack most?

Hawaii: I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

Japan: Thanks very much.

Hawaii: By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

[13584] (H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamune", that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the *Taiyo Maru*. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roes for this year's New Year celebration.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

Mr. BICKNELL. We go back to that same question.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. You explained that before.

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading) :

(H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

Mr. BICKNELL. Highly significant.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Mr. BICKNELL. They are again trying to find out what [13586] the Japanese feelings are; are they more inclined toward loyalty to Japan or loyalty to the United States.

Senator LUCAS (reading) :

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) Off phone.

Now, Colonel, did the Navy, the Army, or the FBI pick up Mrs. Mori following the outbreak of war?

Mr. BICKNELL. We picked up, on the afternoon of the 7th of December, both of them, Mrs. and Dr. Mori.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever have a talk with Mrs. Mori about this conversation?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[13586] Senator LUCAS. What did she say?

Mr. BICKNELL. Nothing.

Senator LUCAS. She didn't have much to say?

Mr. BICKNELL. No.

Senator LUCAS. What happened to them?

Mr. BICKNELL. The last I knew they were still over here in detention somewhere on the mainland.

Senator LUCAS. What was Mori's business there?

Mr. BICKNELL. I have forgotten his business.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Dentist.

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right; dentist.

Senator LUCAS. Was this conversation picked up through his office or his home?

Mr. BICKNELL. This was his home. Of course, the reason that this was intercepted was the fact that he was already on our suspect list.

Senator LUCAS. How long had he been there?

Mr. BICKNELL. Ever since we had one.

Senator LUCAS. Ever since what?

Mr. BICKNELL. Ever since we had a list.

Senator LUCAS. Were you surprised that the attack came?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know of anybody that wasn't?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

[13587] Senator LUCAS. Notwithstanding all of this information that you had, notwithstanding the fact that you transmitted it on the night of the 6th to General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. I think it would have been very difficult indeed to make any conclusions out of this that would have predicted accurately that we were to be attacked on the following morning by air. I think it is an indication that something will happen and quickly, but to draw the inference that it was going to hit Pearl Harbor would really be stretching the imagination.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know about the ship movements; did you know that the Japanese were reporting ship movements in and out of the harbor?

Mr. BICKNELL. I did not know that until after this. I knew it on the day of the 7th.

Senator LUCAS. How did you learn that?

Mr. BICKNELL. Because the minute the war started we placed the Japanese consulate under protective custody of the Honolulu police force. The boys went in the consulate and found a large tub of papers burning in one of the rooms. So they explained to the consul that that was considerable of a fire risk and put the fire out, put the papers in burlap bags, which later we received, and found in them portions of messages, portions of code books, being burned, [13588] and these were transmitted immediately to Captain Rochefort and within a short time he was able to give us some information on some of these messages, a few of them being movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor.

Then on the next day or two we also subpoenaed all of the records of the various cable companies and from those we got a complete file of the reports they had made.

Senator LUCAS. Were any of these messages, that you pieced together there and found that the Japanese consulate had received, decoded, and translated previous to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. BICKNELL. Not that I know of.

Senator LUCAS. What was this conversation that you had with the general staff about the burning of papers—on December 5, was it?

Mr. BICKNELL. The 6th.

Senator LUCAS. The 6th.

Mr. BICKNELL. That was at the regular weekly meeting of the staff where all matters of importance were brought up, and I told them that reliable reports had been received to the effect that the Japanese consulate were burning their secret papers.

Senator LUCAS. Was General Short there when you made that statement?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

[13589] Senator LUCAS. Was Colonel Phillips there?

Mr. BICKNELL. Colonel Phillips was there; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. He was?

Mr. BICKNELL. He was there.

Senator LUCAS. There is some question as to what you said. According to the evidence here it is contended that they believed that it was another routine daily duty of where they burn a lot of papers.

Mr. BICKNELL. If it was a routine duty why would one of the trusted members of the consulate be telephoning to somebody else in great

excitement about it? If it was a routine affair they certainly wouldn't be telephoning to each other about it.

Senator LUCAS. Was that explained?

Mr. BICKNELL. At that time I didn't know that; at that conference I didn't know those facts.

Senator LUCAS. Did any members of the staff know of this conversation?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What did you say, in substance, about these particular papers when you discussed the question before the staff?

Mr. BICKNELL. I said, substantially, that I had received confidential information of a very reliable nature that the [19590] Japanese consulate were burning all of their secret papers.

Senator LUCAS. All of their secret papers?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And that information came from the FBI?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know whether or not that information was ever transmitted to the Navy?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir; it was.

Senator LUCAS. Whose responsibility was it for having that transmitted to the Navy?

Mr. BICKNELL. That was Mr. Shivers' responsibility.

Senator LUCAS. So it not only went to the Army, that they were burning all of the important papers in the consulate, but it also went to the Navy?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That was on December 6th?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That very question was discussed at the staff meeting at that time?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And it was following this meeting with the staff where you had the discussion as to the burning of important papers that the Mori message came along?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[19591] Senator LUCAS. That was submitted on the same day to General Short and Colonel Phillips?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel Bicknell, I want to ask you two questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to announce that at the conclusion of Colonel Bicknell's testimony I desire to have a brief executive session.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel Bicknell, what difference do you think it would make in the disposition of the forces in Hawaii up to December 7, 1941, if General Short and Admiral Kimmel had the magic which was available to Washington?

Mr. BICKNELL. That would be rather hard for me to say, but I would say that if we had had in Hawaii all the information which was available from all intelligence sources, I feel certain that General Short would have gone into a full alert.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I am going to separate the two. First of all, there was considerable information in Hawaii which the Navy had which you didn't have?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then assuming that there was available to [13592] you the information that was available to the Navy so that you could in turn make recommendations to General Short, what difference would it make, in your judgment, in the disposition of the forces?

Mr. BICKNELL. I feel that the information that the Navy had, especially with regard to the winds message, and perhaps some other items that I can't recall at the moment, but there were a number of others, that we would have been able to put up a much stronger case and to argue, if necessary, with the department commander on the seriousness of the situation.

Mr. MURPHY. Assuming you had known on the 3d of December that the Japanese were destroying their codes in the different centers of the world, and that information was available to the Navy at Hawaii, what recommendation would you have made based on that?

Mr. BICKNELL. We had that information.

Mr. MURPHY. You did have it?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. General Short said he never got it.

Mr. BICKNELL. I didn't get it officially, either.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you suppose General Short had it?

Mr. BICKNELL. I don't think so.

Mr. MURPHY. When we were questioning General Short about [13593] the message of General Marshall, when he was questioned about the message of General Marshall, he said the most significant thing in that message to him was the information about the burning of codes; that was highly important.

Do you know whether or not he had information about the Japs burning these codes before December 7?

Mr. BICKNELL. I doubt very much that he had, other than what information I have just related about the local Japanese consulate. There was a great deal of confusion existing that we didn't get straightened out until after the attack. The message that you have mentioned, relative to the Japanese burning their codes, destroying their codes in other parts of the world, and the local Japanese situation. That came about due to the fact that Captain Mayfield, district intelligence officer, called Mr. Shivers, I believe somewhere around the 3d or 4th of December, and asked him if he knew that the Japanese consuls were burning their codes. The FBI did not know about it and thought he meant the local consulate. They redoubled their efforts and observation of the local consulate and then discovered that the local Japanese consulate was burning their codes. That was turned back to the Navy as confirmation that they were burning the codes, but at that time the FBI did not know that Captain Mayfield was talking about another message.

[13594] Mr. MURPHY. Well, the confirmation as to the Japanese at Hawaii, that wasn't until the 6th of December, was it?

Mr. BICKNELL. There is some question as to date on that. My belief was that I received that information late on the 5th, but I may be mistaken.

In refreshing my memory with Mr. Shivers while he was in Hawaii just recently, he seemed to think it was the 4th. I can't remember those dates.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the Navy at Hawaii had messages on the 3d about codes; they had messages on the 4th about codes. Did they pass that on to the Army?

Mr. BICKNELL. They didn't pass it on to me.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you hear about it on the 3d or 4th?

Mr. BICKNELL. I heard about it.

Mr. MURPHY. What difference do you think it would make, in your judgment, if you knew that on the 3d?

Mr. BICKNELL. If I had known that on the 3d I would have gone to the General with that message and pointed out to him the significance, the probable significance of that, the same as I did with the other ones.

Mr. MURPHY. What significance would you give to it?

Mr. BICKNELL. I would say that when an Embassy or legation starts destroying its codes it is a sign that we are coming to a very rapid end of peaceful relations.

[13595] Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you had no contact directly with Captain Layton, did you?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did General Fielder have any contact directly with him?

Mr. BICKNELL. I don't know.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know that Captain Layton was giving in sanitized form certain information to the intelligence officer of the Air Corps?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you wonder why he would give it to him and not to your office?

Mr. BICKNELL. It didn't make much difference so long as I got it.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you get it from the Air Corps?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, the Air Corps man would get it from Captain Layton and transfer it to you?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you were never permitted to see any of the messages, as such, were you?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You got it in sanitized form second-hand?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[13596] Mr. MURPHY. You do think it would make a difference if you had magic in Hawaii?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right; no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. In the answers to the Senator from Illinois when he read you the Mori message, do you want to convey to the committee that you conveyed all that information to General Fielder and General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what is now known as hindsight?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. An examination of the details of this message leads you to that conclusion.

Mr. BICKNELL. Exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, after you told them about the message and the information that you gave them that evening, did you examine it again in detail until after the attack?

Mr. BICKNELL. I took that message back to the office and examined it for about an hour, and we had then just ended a period of 24-hour duty and I decided that I needed [13597] to get some rest and so I locked it up in the safe and went home about 9 o'clock to get rested up. Needless to say, I didn't have a chance to look at the message for some time thereafter.

Senator FERGUSON. You indicated that an examination of the Mori message led you to the opinion that they were speaking there as to what the attitude of the Japanese would be in the case of attack. Did you know a man by the name of Saiki?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a full-page advertisement in the Hilo Tribune Herald calling a mass meeting of alien Japanese at 2 p. m. on Sunday the 7th?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As an intelligence officer, did you ever look into that question?

Mr. BICKNELL. Never heard of it before, sir. That is on the Island of Hawaii. It never got to me.

Senator FERGUSON. It never got to you?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that there was some claim that they got mixed up on their dates, because of the international date line; would that refresh your memory?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

[13598] Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, as I understand it, you didn't get directly from the Navy the fact that they were burning codes in Washington or destroying the code machine?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever convey that message to General Fielder, then Colonel Fielder?

Mr. BICKNELL. I never received any information that I could substantiate enough to say that it was authentic.

Senator FERGUSON. So you didn't convey it to anyone else?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It had never reached even a good rumor stage; is that it?

Mr. BICKNELL. That's right.

Senator FERGUSON. I noticed in your affidavit to Colonel Clausen this language:

Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941 I learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila and elsewhere.

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you and I have been talking about?

[13599] Mr. BICKELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That you thought it was from Navy sources?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But it wasn't such that you conveyed it to anyone?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then that should be added to your statement to Colonel Clausen?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In explaining that message?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, had you ever known the Embassy in Hawaii to burn any papers in the yard?

Mr. BICKNELL. I have known that everybody in Hawaii burns papers in the yard, but they don't burn them inside.

Senator FERGUSON. When was it they first burned them inside, was that on Sunday?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir; that was the date that I am in doubt about. It was either the 3d or 4th, when the FBI intercepted a telephone call from one of the attachés of the consul saying that they were burning all of these secret papers.

Senator FERGUSON. But you learned later that that [13600] was not a fact because they were burning them on the day of the attack?

Mr. BICKNELL. They had to retain one code right up to the very last minute. There was a tremendous volume of messages to burn. They were burning those inside the house in a tub. They couldn't possibly burn all of the papers there were to burn in such a short period of time. When the police went in there on the morning of the 7th there was five burlap sacks of stuff that still had not been burned, but which had been torn in pieces. There was a pile of ashes there of all the papers that had been burned.

So it was the volume that prevented them from getting rid of it. If they had built a bonfire outside they could have disposed of them, but they were burning them inside the consulate.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you mention to General Short or General Fielder that this message, the Mori message, had been on a scrambler phone?

Mr. BICKNELL. I don't think I mentioned it because it was so obvious. All messages were scrambled.

Senator FERGUSON. You say all messages were scrambled?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir; every message was scrambled.

Senator FERGUSON. Between private citizens?

Mr. BICKNELL. All radiotelephone, overseas telephone [13601] calls, all messages are scrambled, to protect the privacy of the conversation. If it weren't for that, you could tune in and listen to any conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the man in Hawaii who was calling, did you ever learn?

Mr. BICKNELL. The man in Tokyo, you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. BICKNELL. I don't know who that was.

Senator FERGUSON. You stated at one place in your testimony that it was the wife that was talking and when they ended up they say:

Oh, no. That was fine. Best regards to your wife.

Mr. BICKNELL. As I remember the original record, it was a woman's voice. We may be mistaken. It may have been Dr. Mori himself. But he denied that he had the conversation and said that it was his wife who did the talking when we examined him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever figure out what the hibiscus and the poinsettias meant?

Mr. BICKNELL. I don't think anyone will ever figure that out unless somebody tells us what it meant. It would be almost impossible to draw any conclusion with only one reference of that type. If we had more identification, or more messages, with the recurring phrase, it might be possible [13602] to get what they were talking about.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you didn't have the code words to ever figure that out?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you look over these ads in the various papers, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and the other papers, the Advertiser?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever look over those ads?

Mr. BICKNELL. You mean the jumbo silk ad?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever find anything?

Mr. BICKNELL. Absolutely nothing.

[13603] Senator FERGUSON. At this time, I would like to make this statement:

I asked Captain Zacharias about that ad. Since then I have had a letter from the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, and also a memorandum from Riley Allen on the same question.

I think to complete this record, that this ought to go in the record. I have shown it to Mr. Kaufman.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that may be done.

Do you want it printed in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. I think that it ought to be spread on the record.

Mr. MURPHY. May I inquire if it is claimed there is any significance to it?

Senator FERGUSON. No; it is claimed there was not. This witness' testimony was along the same line. You saw no significance about this ad at all?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be spread on the record.

(The letters referred to follow:)

[13604]

HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN.

Honolulu 2, Hawaii, U. S. A., February 5, 1946.

Senator HOMER FERGUSON (Mich.),

Member Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR FERGUSON: News dispatches from Washington report that an advertisement which appeared in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin December 3, 1941, has become a matter of inquiry and discussion by the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee.

5116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The question appears to be whether this advertisement was inserted for a subversive purpose by agents of, or sympathizers with, the Japanese government, and whether such agents or sympathizers sought to disseminate information unfriendly to and dangerous to the security of the Hawaiian Islands at a time when the Japanese carrier fleet was approaching Oahu to strike on the morning of Sunday, December 7.

It was perhaps natural that immediately after that surprise attack, and when we who live in Hawaii had ample reason to fear another and greater assault, rumors of information and propaganda "planted" in the newspapers and in radio broadcasts should become current.

[13605] The story of the Hawaii Importing Company's ad is one of those rumors, which quickly grew to considerable proportions by word of mouth repetition, but which, like other reports of sabotage and "fifth columnist" activities, proved under competent, impartial examination, completely baseless.

Our own office, in common with the intelligence service of the Army and the Navy, and the FBI, investigated this particular rumor. All were satisfied the advertisement had no enemy motive or design.

The facts are covered in the enclosed affidavit from Porter Dickinson, assistant general manager of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, who, at the time of the Japanese attack and thereafter was advertising manager of the Star-Bulletin.

I send this to you so that if you feel there are any unanswered questions concerning the authenticity and the bona fides of this advertisement, the answers will, I think, be apparent. Like some others of the imaginative reports which leaped into circulation here and on the mainland after Pearl Harbor, this rumor may be hard to exterminate forever, and we are ready at any time to reiterate the accompanying statement.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Riley H. Allen,
/t/ RILEY H. ALLEN,
Editor.

[13606]

FEBRUARY 1, 1946.

Memo to Riley Allen.

Re Hawaii Importing Co. Ad of December 3, 1941.

Now that the Hawaii Importing Co. ad which appeared in the Star-Bulletin on December 3, 1941 has been brought up before the Pearl Harbor investigating committee, it might be well to review what happened at the time and shortly after publication of this ad.

1. The same ad appeared in both the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and the Honolulu Advertiser. The Star-Bulletin published the ad on December 3, 1941, and the Advertiser published it on December 5, 1941.

2. It had been the practice of the Hawaii Importing Co. to repeat ads which appeared first in the Star-Bulletin a few days later in the Honolulu Advertiser.

3. The Hawaii Importing Co. had run practically the same ad a year previous on December 2, 1940. The ad was of the same size, and carried the same illustrated heading. A good many items were the same as carried in the December 3, 1941 ad.

4. The Hawaii Importing Co. had run for several years previous on approximately the same date, ads of similar type.

5. The names carried in the ad were questioned by [13607] many, but proved to be bona fide names of materials.

6. The drawing used for the heading of this particular ad was the same that appeared in the ad of December 2, 1940.

7. Shortly after December 7, 1941 the FBI, office of Naval Intelligence and Army Intelligence, all investigated this copy through the management and personnel of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Hawaii Importing Co.

8. Following a very close examination of the copy and all persons involved in the placement of this copy, the three agencies gave the Hawaii Importing Co. a clean bill of health.

/s/ Porter Dickinson,
/t/ PORTER DICKINSON,
Assistant General Manager, Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this Second day of February, 1946.

[NOTARY SEAL]

/s/ JOHN F. STONE,
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit, Territory of Hawaii.

My commission expires July 15, 1949.

[13608] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not your testimony or your ideas as to the conversation between you and General Fielder on the night of the 6th in any way conflicts, or have you talked it over since that time?

Mr. BICKNELL. I haven't had an opportunity to talk with General Fielder on that. I don't think there is any conflict.

Senator FERGUSON. So there can't be any doubt about the record, I wish that you would try to recall as nearly as you can, if not the exact words at least the substance of the conversation that you had in relation to the message, the Mori message on the 6th.

Mr. BICKNELL. It is 5 years ago. Five years is a long time.

The one thing that I do remember is General Short saying, in effect, that he didn't see anything very wrong with the message, because it was a very accurate picture of what was going on in Hawaii, and I ventured the remark that I perhaps felt it was too accurate a picture.

Now, I haven't any recollection other than that.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the substance of the conversation as you remember it today?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know of anything that [13609] you can give us here that would aid us in the solution of this problem that we are confronted with, as to how this could happen and Hawaii not be alerted to it?

Mr. BICKNELL. I might say, if it is not the wrong thing, that I feel we might expect another Pearl Harbor unless we can develop an intelligence service that is a coordinated and efficient intelligence service, where all information obtained from all sources comes to some one central point and is properly evaluated and made available to all the agencies involved.

Unless we do that and unless we place ourselves in such a position, and if we have one or two or three or four separate agencies working on intelligence and not coordinating their endeavors, we are not safeguarding the interests of our Nation.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, when you divide intelligence and do not give all of the services the entire picture, you really destroy the value of intelligence?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is true. I think that this trouble we have had, that you are now trying to solve, is not a question of personalities. It is a question of system, the system was wrong.

We did not have trained intelligence people. We had very few trained intelligence officers in the Army and Navy [13610] anyway, and when you try to put that information in a pigeonhole and do not give it proper circulation in relation to other available information, you are destroying the entire objective of your plan.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Army in a way treat this intelligence as a minor branch, in your opinion? Did they give it the full meaning that it should have had?

Mr. BICKNELL. I think that is a question of personality.

Some few general officers that I have known give intelligence the highest regard. Others give it little.

General Herron, formerly department commander at the time I went on duty in Hawaii, gave it the highest importance. That is one of the reasons he called me back, was to reorganize his Intelligence

Department and his G-2 in such a way that it would function properly, should any emergency arise.

Senator FERGUSON. And, now, should we understand that you personally feel as an Intelligence officer in G-2, second in command, that you did all that you could with the information that you were furnished, that you feel that if you had had all of the information here in Washington, as well as elsewhere, that America had, that you would have been able to see a different picture at Hawaii on the 6th and 7th of December 1941?

[13611] Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Colonel, all of this—from all of the intelligence that you had, and all of the information that was available to you as Assistant Chief of Intelligence, of G-2 in Hawaii for some time prior to the 6th of December, did you have or obtain any impression or idea that Hawaii was to be the object of an attack by the Japs?

Mr. BICKNELL. There was nothing, sir, to give you any idea as a definite idea, but there was always—in considering intelligence, one of the first precepts is to avoid surprise.

And probabilities are just as important.

I believe that in figuring out any military problem that the possibilities and probabilities must be given consideration.

Now, the fact that the fleet was in Hawaii, the fact that our air forces were in Hawaii, and the general evaluation of the Japanese plan to work down through the Indies and Singapore, which seemed evident, it would appear that the only thing that would deter them in doing that would be interference from our air or Navy forces. Therefore, it would seem to me that Hawaii could be placed very near the top of [13612] a list of possible attacks by the enemy.

Mr. KEEFE. I gathered the impression from a statement that you made a few moments ago that it was your opinion that if you had had certain intelligence that was available in Washington, and which was not furnished the Hawaiian Department, that you perhaps would have been in a better position to stand up and argue with the commanding general on the question of alerting.

Mr. BICKNELL. I think that is true. If we had had all information, we might have been able to do that.

If we had had meteorological information as to the formations to the west and northwest, if we had had the full import of the so-called winds message, if we had had the magic, it would have been much easier to say that the possibility of an attack was increasing in importance rather than decreasing.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you surprised, yourself, by the attack?

Mr. BICKNELL. Well, naturally, when you are looking out of your window on a peaceful Sunday morning and see a battleship blow up under your eyes, you are pretty apt to be surprised.

Mr. KEEFE. I don't mean that, of course. I mean, was the fact that the Japanese attacked on Sunday morning a surprise to you, as the Assistant Chief of G-2 of the [13613] Hawaiian Department?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir; I think it was.

Mr. KEEFE. I am trying to find someone among all of these witnesses who have been here, who was not surprised. You were veering pretty close to that position.

Mr. BUCKNELL. I think I must admit I was surprised.

Mr. KEEFE. You finally landed in the same category with everybody else. Everybody was surprised here in Washington and in Hawaii.

That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel, you said that General Herron had placed intelligence as being of the highest importance.

Where did General Short place it?

Mr. BICKNELL. I never became as well acquainted with General Short as I was with General Herron, perhaps due to the fact that I had not served with General Short long enough, and that he did not have much confidence in a Reserve officer. But I have the feeling that with intelligence from the information that I was passing on, that I have previously reviewed this afternoon, and these estimates in these military attaché reports that went to Washington every week, and all of the information that was going [13614] through, it was rather uncommon not to have some questions asked about it by the department commander.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you had predicted war at the end of November, had you not?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you ever asked about your prediction?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Nobody paid any attention to it, did they?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir; they did not.

Mr. MURPHY. And the reason you shifted it over to February because of the weather conditions?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, if they didn't attack toward the end of November, there would be such a change in weather conditions that you predicted an attack in February?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You said that you didn't have the meteorological information.

Mr. BICKNELL. We didn't have it.

Mr. MURPHY. But the Navy had some pretty good men on it, didn't they?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[13615] Mr. MURPHY. And they did have quite a Navy set-up for meteorological data, which was not furnished to you?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right. That is the point that I made in my remarks about a correlated intelligence agency. The information should be available.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know anything about the lost carriers, the carriers that couldn't be accounted for?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know anything about the expectation that there were carriers in the Marshalls?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know about the submarines that were sighted at Saipan and were predicted as moving eastward?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. If you had had the data which you now know the Navy did have at Hawaii, do you think that the magic at Washington would have added much to it in order to inform you so that you could predict more likely a possibility of attack?

Mr. BICKNELL. You are telling me something that I never heard before. I will say again that if we had information of that type, perhaps I could go even further in my statement to you and say that we would have been in a better position to make more definite predictions as to [13616] what might be expected.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you in Intelligence shown the message of the 24th of November which said that there is a possibility of an attack in any direction? Did you know such a message was sent to Hawaii that there was a possibility of an attack in any direction, on November 24?

Mr. BICKNELL. I have a vague recollection of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you shown the war warning of the 27th?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir; I heard that. Colonel Phillips read it to the staff.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he read it on that Saturday morning, or before that?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, that was the day it arrived.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you see the Navy message, "This is a war warning"?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever know they had sent a message "This is a war warning"?

Mr. BICKNELL. I knew it after the 7th.

Mr. MURPHY. You never heard it before?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you in Intelligence were pretty much in the dark as to what the Navy was doing in Hawaii?

[13617] Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. Colonel, I have been interested by your statement in regard to the consolidation of the intelligence service, and I have also noted what you said about the use of magic had it been available in Hawaii.

You recognize also the great importance of carefully safeguarding the information gained through magic?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. It played a tremendous part in the subsequent conduct of the war?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And the system that seemed to have been followed was to receive the magic here in Washington.

Mr. BICKNELL. Right.

Mr. CLARK. And carefully safeguard it.

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And then issue orders to the command in Hawaii. There is something to be said for that system, too, is there not?

Mr. BICKNELL. I didn't understand.

Mr. CLARK. I say, there is something to be said for that system too? [13618] Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir, but in these days of modern communications, and in these days of situations we are so rapidly facing, that question is not as important as it used to be.

For instance, here on the mainland, we can handle information of a highly secret nature over protected wire circuits.

It could be sent from Washington to San Francisco in perfect safety over a special wire network. It is now possible to go from Hawaii to—from San Francisco to Hawaii in 9½ hours by airplane with courier. It isn't like the old days when it used to take many many hours to get a message through by codes and ciphers and all the machinery that is gone through.

A courier might be well on his way to a distant point with the message in the time that it would take to do that, with the message in personal custody.

Mr. CLARK. Under conditions as they existed in the last war, General Marshall seems to have taken particular precautions to safeguard the secrecy of magic by confining it to just as small a circle as possible.

Mr. BICKNELL. That is true.

[13618A] Mr. CLARK. Now, do you agree or disagree with that?

Mr. BICKNEL. I think it is perfectly possible in a case like that that you do not have to send out the information that you obtain from magic sources, but orders could be properly prepared based on that information and forwarded to the necessary commanders.

Mr. CLARK. Well, you think those orders should have gone beyond what were issued in this case?

Mr. BICKNELL. I do not know enough about the Washington angle of this thing to form an opinion.

Mr. CLARK. I will take as an illustration the message from General Marshall of the 27th. Do you think that more should have been stated in that order?

Mr. BICKNELL. There again is a question of judgment. My personal point of view is that the department commander is to judge what the local conditions are and take action that he considers appropriate. That is why we have a department commander and a lieutenant general, who does not wait for somebody else to tell him what to do. He must draw his own conclusions and take action.

Mr. CLARK. And when he receives a message of that character he would be supposed to exercise that independence of judgment?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[13619] Mr. CLARK. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask one question on that point, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. You were familiar with the message sent by General Marshall on the 27th?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Were you also familiar with the reply of General Short's?

Mr. BICKNELL. Only from what I have read in the newspapers.

Senator LUCAS. You were not consulted?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You never saw the message?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You know what it is. All he said in reply was, "Alerted to sabotage, and liaison with the Navy." Do you think that was responsive to that original message of the 27th? Maybe I shouldn't ask you that.

Mr. BICKNELL. I don't think I can answer that.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say you were a Reserve officer?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I think you remarked that General Short [13620] did not think much of Reserve officers.

Mr. BICKNELL. I have that feeling.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a chronic attitude of Regular Army officers toward Reserve officers?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not. What is your present occupation?

Mr. BICKNELL. I am regional manager of the Veterans' Administration in Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see. Under General Bradley?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Colonel, the committee thanks you for your appearance here and for the trouble you went to to get here from Honolulu to testify and appreciate very much your cooperation.

Mr. BICKNELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You are now excused.

(The witness was excused.)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a memorandum here that Colonel Bratton referred to, he got it from the Army, made by Pettigrew, that he had written for Bratton and that Bratton had turned it over for higher authority, but I would like to have it marked as an exhibit, not part of the record, but as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be marked as Exhibit 156, I think.

[13621] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I am just wondering on that exhibit of Pettigrew, if it is the whole exhibit. I thought it was a lot bigger than that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Five pages.

Mr. MURPHY. I know, but isn't that the beginning of a big exhibit?

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. I thought there was a lot that followed that.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 156.")

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, we have prepared in our office a complete list—there is in one of the exhibits in some one of the earlier hearings a partial list—of the current newspaper headlines in the Hawaiian and Honolulu daily newspapers relating to the general international war situation.

We have prepared a complete copy of those headlines which we would like to have extended in the record so that there will be in the record a complete list.

The CHAIRMAN. You want that printed as part of the hearings?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The headlines referred to follow:)

[13622]

HONOLULU ADVERTISER

HEADLINES

November 7, 1941

Kurusu Carrying Special Note to F. D. R. From Premier Tojo—Japan Ready to Act Unless Tension Eases.

Japan Waits Before Move in Far East—Aggression in Pacific Appears Shelved Until Kurusu's Mission has been Completed in U. S.

Invasion Held too Difficult by Officials—Offensive May Start in Middle East Soon; Invasion of Continent Impracticable at Present.

November 13, 1941

Tokyo Radio Asserts War Is Already on—Any Military Moves Only Logical Result of Encirclement Policy, Japanese Staff Says.

Envoy Undismayed—Carries Broad Powers to Act—Kurusu Denies Taking Message, Implies Errand of Bigger Scope.

[13623] *November 14, 1941*

Japanese Confident of Naval Victory.

November 26, 1941

Americans Get Warning to Leave Japan, China.

Hull Reply to Japan Ready.

November 27, 1941

U. S.-Japan Talks Broken Off as Hull Rejects Appeasement—Full Surrender Demanded in U. S. Statement.

Evacuation Speeded as Peace Fades.

November 28, 1941

PARRIS ISLAND, S. C.—This is the tail assembly of the captive barrage balloon at Parris Island, S. C., looking for all the world like an air monster. The wench controlling it is in the sandbagged structure protected there from bomb splinters. The helium sausage may be used to protect beachheads, bridgeheads and other strong points, thereby differing from the British technique which keeps them flying over London. The Marines encamped on Parris Island, S. C., have a special training school on these balloons.

[13624] *November 29, 1941*

U. S. Rejects Compromise in Far East—Washington Insists on Maintenance of Status Quo, Withdrawal from China by Japan Army.

U. S. Warplanes May Protect Burma Road—Protective Force of 200 Planes, 500 Pilots Held Sufficient to Ward Off Attack by Japanese.

November 30, 1941

Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready for Battle—Foreign Affairs Expert Attacks Tokyo Madness.

Leaders Call Troops Back in Singapore—Hope Wanes as Nations Fail at Parleys; Nightly Blackouts Held in P. I.: Hawaii Troops Allerted.

December 1, 1941

Japanese Press Warns Thailand.

Burma Troops Are Reinforced—British, Indian Units Arrive at Rangoon.

F. D. R. Hurries to Parleys on Orient Crisis.

December 2, 1941

Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace With U. S.— [13625] Thailand Now in Allied Bloc, Press Charges.

Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations—Prepares for Action in Event of Failure.

Malaya Forces Called to Full Mobilization.

Quezon Held to Blame in P. I. Defense Delay.

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December 3, 1941

Huge Pincerattack on U. S. by Japan, France Predicted—Pepper Visions Nations Acting as Nazi Pawns.

U. S. Demands Explanation of Japan Moves—Americans Prepare for Any Emergency; Navy Declared Ready.

December 4, 1941

Hawaii Martial Law Measure Killed for Present Session.

Japanese Pin Blame on U. S.—Army Paper Charges Violation by F. D. R.

December 5, 1941

Probe of Japanese Activities Here Will Be Made by Senate—Spy Inquiry Rapidly Gets Tentative O. K. by State Department.

[13626] *December 5, 1941*

Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today.

Japan Calls in Nationals.

Japan Has Secret Shanghai Agents.

December 6, 1941

America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China—Hull May Ask Proof, Suggest Troop's Recall.

Japan Troops Concentrated on Thai Front—Military Observers Say Few Units Have Been Posted In North.

December 7, 1941

F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis—Japanese Deny Massing Troops for Thai War.

British Fear Tientsin Row, Call Up Guards—May Isolate Concession to "Prevent" Agitation over U. S.-Japan Rumors.

Hirohito Holds Power to Stop Japanese Army.

[13627]

HONOLULU STAR BULLETIN

HEADLINES

November 10, 1941

Navy Control for Honolulu Harbor.

December 1, 1941

U. S. Army Allerted in Manila—Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows.

Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension.

December 4, 1941

Japan Spurns U. S. Program—Press Holds Acceptance Not Possible.

December 5, 1941

Japan Parries Open U. S. Break.

Further Peace Efforts Urged—Tokyo Claims Policy "Misunderstood" in Washington as One of Force and Conquest.

December 6, 1941

Singapore on War Footing—Sudden Order Calls Troops to Positions—State of Readiness Is Completed; No Explanation Given.

New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo—Joint Commission to Iron Out Deadlock with U. S. Proposed.

[13628] Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I should like to request that Exhibit 143, which is the so-called Roberts report, consisting of the transcript from that hearing and the exhibits, and Exhibit 144, consisting of the Hart transcript of evidence and the exhibits, and Exhibit 146, the Navy court of inquiry and exhibits; Exhibit 149, which is the Hewitt transcript and exhibits; Exhibit 145,

which is the Army Pearl Harbor Board transcript and exhibits; Exhibit 148, which consists of the volume of Clausen affidavits and attached exhibits, and Exhibit 147, which is the so-called Clarke report, be received in evidence as such exhibits, the evidentiary part thereof to be received by the committee with the same force and effect as though the witnesses who were then in these various respective reports sworn and testified—with the same force and effect as though the witnesses had been heard and their testimony taken in this proceeding.

With reference to that part of my request affecting the Clausen affidavits, there was extensive examination here about them. While I do not regard them as of the same grade of evidence as I do the sworn testimony by question and answer which was taken on the other groups of so-called investigations, my reason for including them in my request is that I think the committee is amply able to give those affidavits the weight that they may consider them entitled to, and in view of the fact that much reference has been made to various of the [13629] affidavits here and considerable testimony taken concerning them, it would be wise to include the Clausen affidavits and exhibits as a part of this testimony and as a part of the recording this proceeding from an evidentiary standpoint.

Now, it has not been our intention to include in these exhibits as thus identified the various conclusions and findings and decisions of whatever nature that may have been reached in, upon or concerning any of these prior investigations. It had been our intention to include those documents in a separate volume which could be available for the examination of the committee in a volume by itself, which raises the question as to whether you would rather have it in that form or have the particular findings and conclusions and whatever decisions there may be appear in the record adjacent to the particular exhibit, which would be the report of the transcript and exhibits themselves.

It struck us that the separate volume idea, containing all of those reports and decisions, would be better as a reference matter particularly than to bring them into exhibits relating to transcripts of testimony and other exhibits which are a formal part of this record as a matter of the factual record.

The CHAIRMAN. That matter was suggested some days ago and I thought that we had decided that all these opinions and findings, and so forth, to which you have referred would be printed [13630] in a separate volume for convenience.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We agreed to that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that we decided to do that.

Mr. RICHARESON. All right, if that is the understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered without objection, to have them handled in that way rather than to have to run back through a lot of other volumes and pick out the findings and opinions that have been rendered by all these various boards. I thought we had decided to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I noted one thing that Mr. Richardson has asked us. In effect we are stating that we are going to treat the evidence, for instance, given in the Hart and the Hewitt evidence as if it were produced here in open hearing.

I don't think that we were going that far, I think that we as members of the committee should consider it but I think it has a different value

than that which is given here and where every member of the committee has had the right of examination with the aid of counsel, and I don't think we should agree as a committee that we are going to give it the same weight as the evidence in open hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair did not understand that the counsel suggested that. That it would be considered for whatever weight it has as if the same testimony were given here.

[13631] Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the point.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The point that I have in mind is that you have the right to quote from the testimony of Mr. X, who testified in a particular investigation as a factual basis for a conclusion you arrive at if you believe that the testimony therein given is credible and true.

The CHAIRMAN. That is satisfactory. The committee will agree in determining what weight to give any of this testimony that is filed here but which has not been produced in our hearing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would doubt your right to use that testimony as testimony if it was not as testimony made a part of your record here as distinguished from being simply an exhibit.

Mr. CLARK. Not with the same force and effect, necessarily.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The force and effect is entirely up to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter for the committee.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is dependent upon the extent and character and propriety of the examination and the circumstances of cross-examination or no cross-examination and the presence of counsel and all those things.

[13632] Senator FERGUSON. The fact that it was not a public hearing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you will permit me to say for the record one thing—

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done. If you are through with that point, that will be done as a part of the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me say for the record in connection with my request, that there are two phases in connection with it. There are, first, a considerable group of witnesses who have testified here orally, whom you have examined and cross-examined, whose testimony also appears in one or more of these earlier hearings. That constitutes, in my opinion, the best grade of testimony that you have because you then connect it up in your own examination.

The second group of testimony here is with reference to the very numerous witnesses who have testified in these various hearings who have not been called here and whom you have not examined. In that case it would seem to me that it would be necessary for the committee to make a very careful examination of the circumstances under which they testified, their cross-examination, the applicability of the questions that were asked them and the breadth and intelligence of the investigation before you depended on their testimony with the freedom that you would the testimony of the witnesses you have had to examine here.

[13633] So there is that difference, but to my mind the reason that I make that request is that it is all testimony and the weight that ought to be given it in the last analysis depends upon your estimate of what it is worth.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else for the record now?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Masten has some matters that he wishes to bring in the record and then there is one further matter I would like to call to your attention, since the record is being closed here.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Masten is recognized.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, from time to time various members of the committee have made requests which we have endeavored to comply with and obtain the information requested. We have recently gone through the transcript and forwarded to the War, Navy, and State Departments complete lists of any unanswered requests and we will do the same with the testimony during the last week or so, which we have not completed.

We have received some answers to certain requests which run back fairly early into the transcript and the reason for that is because of our having brought it to the attention of the respective departments only recently.

The first is in response to a request of Senator Ferguson at page 209 of the transcript for information regarding the vessel known as the *American Leader*. In response to that re- [13634] quest we are advised by the Navy Department that the captain of the *American Leader* in November and December of 1941 was Capt. Haakon A. Pederson, whose present address is 9701 Shore Road, Brooklyn, N. Y.

In answer to further questions regarding the departure of the vessel from Honolulu, the Navy Department refers us to the log of the U. S. S. *Boise*, which is Exhibit 68 in this proceeding, for the period November 20 to December 7, 1941, which states that the ship arrived at Manila Harbor, Philippine Islands, on December 4, 1941, having been part of a convoy consisting of steamships *Cape Fairweather*, *President Grant*, *Dona Noti*, *John Lykes* and *American Leader*.

At page 547 of the transcript Mr. Gearhart made a request for the specific data from which Captain Kniskern made his report to the Bureau of Ships on damage at Pearl Harbor.¹

The Navy Department advises that these reports and data relating to the capital ships at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, consist of 9 volumes and 3 lengthy letter reports with photographs and charts, and they suggest that this material be retained in the Navy Department for examination by the committee if it is still so desired.

At page 549 of the transcript Mr. Gearhart requested Admiral Kimmel's circular letters re berthing of ships at Pearl Harbor.

The Navy Department has forwarded to us copies of Pacific [13636] Fleet confidential letter 2CL41, dated February 15, 1941, and Pacific Fleet confidential letter 2CL-41 revised, dated October 14, 1941. The latter letter is a part of Exhibit 44 and with your permission we will have the earlier letter included in the transcript at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection that will be ordered.

¹ See Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2677-2678.

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(The document referred to follows:)

[13636]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF1/
A4-3/QL/(0271)
Confidential

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., February 15, 1941.

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CI-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: FLEET.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference:

- (a) U. S. Fleet Conf. Letter No. 8CL-40.
- (b) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
- (c) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 9L-40.
- (d) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
- (e) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
- (f) Section 4, Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian Area may reasonably be based on two assumptions:

(A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

- (1) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor,
- (2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pearl Harbor [13637] by sinking an obstruction in the Channel,
- (3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(B) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

- (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
- (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
- (3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part or in their entirety as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

(A) *Maintain continuous patrols:*

- (1) Channel Entrance plus a ready duty destroyer moored near coal dock.
- (2) Boom.
- (3) Harbor.

(B) *Intermittent patrols:*

(1) *Patrol Wing TWO* shall search assigned operating areas and vicinity prior to entry therein by operating forces and in early morning on subsequent days.

(2) *An off-shore destroyer patrol* of three destroyers beginning twelve hours prior to the sortie and/or entry of heavy ships to search that part of the circle of a radius of ten miles from the entrance buoys not patrolled by [13638] the Channel Entrance Patrol. This patrol shall be furnished by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, on request of Task Force Commander.

(3) *An air patrol* shall be established at least two hours prior to the sortie of the first heavy ship to search that part of the circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is South of latitude 21°-20' N. This air patrol shall be furnished: for sortie, from ship or carrier-based aircraft by the Senior Officer Present Afloat of unit remaining in the Harbor on the request of the Sortie Task Force Commander: for entry, by the Task Force Commander entering; when a sortie and entry occur in succession, by the Task Force Commander entering.

(4) *Daily sweeps.* Sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

(C) *Operating areas:*

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (e).

(2) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and patrol aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. The organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

[13639] (a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available in the priority:

Priority 1—BBs

Priority 2—CVs

Priority 3—CAs

Priority 4—CLs

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wing TWO and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require

(D) *Sortie and Entrance:*

(1) Comply with instructions in U. S. F. 10.

(2) Patrols outlined in (B) (2) and (B) (3) above, shall be established and commanded by the Sortie Commander except when forces are entering only, in which case they shall be established and commanded by the officer commanding the Task Force entering. When forces sortie and enter consecutively the command of the patrols will be turned over to the entry Task Force Commander on completion of the sortie by the Sortie Task Force Commander. These patrols shall continue until released by the Task Force Commander of the sortie in case of [13640] sortie only, or by the Task Force Commander entering in case of entry or successive sortie and entry.

(3) Degaussing coils, if calibrated, shall be energized in water of less than sixty fathoms. Unless the Entrance Channel has been swept for magnetic mines, Commander Base Force shall furnish a tug, minesweeper, or small ship without protection to precede the first heavy ship in which the degaussing gear is inoperative. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(E) *Conditions of ships at sea:*

(1) Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor in unprotected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului may be considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(2) Task Force, or Task Group Commanders, if directed by the former, shall maintain inner air patrol for disposition or formations, when in assigned operating areas.

(3) Maintain inner anti-submarine screens insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(4) Maintain condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition or readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges [13641] ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless specially directed.

(5) Maintain material condition XRAY, or equivalent, in all ships.

(6) Steam darkened at night in defensive position either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(7) Restrict use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(8) Maintain horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(9) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.

(10) Submarine operations, except (9) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarines squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian Area.

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While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they will maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

(11) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (9) and (10) above, shall be on the surface.

[13642] (12) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.

(13) Commanders of surface task forces, when they have been designated, shall be furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. Commanders of surface task forces shall ensure that all air patrols are properly notified thereof.

(F) *Condition of ships in port:*

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (b), (c) and (d).

(G) *Defense against air attack:*

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) As a basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire, berths in the harbor [13643] are assigned to air defense sectors as follows:

Sector I—Berths F2-F8, *2, C1 to C5. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 045° to 190° true from assigned berth.)

Sector II—Berths F1, F9, B1-3, Dry Docks, DG Calibrating Buoys, T1-4, WL-2-3, D2-7, X22, X23. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 190° to 270° true from assigned berths.)

Sector III—Berths D1, D9, F10-13, X2, X15, X18. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 270° to 000° true from assigned berths.)

Sector IV—Berths X3, X4, X5, X6, to X14, X17, C6. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 000° to 045° true from assigned berths.)

Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships moored at that sector's berth. But ships at other sector berths may be used to augment fire outside their sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall [13644] normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and will be responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he will:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for co-ordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Co-ordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

[13645] (6) Notify all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships will not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure will be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(2) Prepare carrier with one division of plane [13646] guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(3) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(4) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea advised.

(b) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit.

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require.

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines of action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks, or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit will execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) *Action to be taken if submarine attacks in operating area:*

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

(a) *Ship Attacked.* Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F. T. P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details and addressed to all ships present in Hawaiian Waters. To insure rapid delivery of this despatch should be transmitted by the attacked ship to the Task Force Commander, to all ships present in Pearl Harbor on the harbor circuit in effect, and to Radio Honolulu (NPM) on 355 kes. for Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, and relay on schedule. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

Ships other than one attacked

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except all aircraft will be placed in Condition ONE, armed. Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched

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unarmed. (At [13648] least one squadron with depth charges when they become available). Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) *Cruisers*. Same as for battleships, except that one-half available aircraft (armed) will be used for own inner air patrol. The second half will be sent to scene of attack, armed, to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers*. Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) *Submarines*. Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zig-zagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minecraft*. Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base Force*. If ship attack is damaged, tugs in operating areas slip tows and join her at best speed, prepared to tow. Report in code positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels [13649] proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol Wing TWO*. Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft*. Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval District*. Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) *S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor*. Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task Force Commander at sea*. Co-ordinate offensive and defense measures. When immediate defense measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines [13650] awaiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution:

(List II, Case 1):

O; X; AA1; AAA1; EN1; EN3; NA12; ND11AC; ND11-12-13-14.

P. C. CHOSLEY,

Flag Secretary.

[13651] Mr. MASTEN. At page 2064 of the transcript Senator Brewster made a request for information regarding the relative strength of the Japanese and United States Fleet and Air Forces in 1932.

In answer to that request the Navy Department has forwarded a table which we request permission to spread in the transcript at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

[13652] OP-23-F141

16 JANUARY 1946.

Fleet and air strength of United States and Japan as of 1932

UNITED STATES			JAPAN		
Fleet :			Fleet :		
BB-----	15	(456, 300 tons)	BB-----	10	(301, 220 tons)
CV-----	3	(78, 700 ")	CV-----	3	(66, 000 ")
CA-----	8	(74, 000 ")	CA-----	12	(124, 400 ")
CL-----	10	(70, 500 ")	CL-----	18	(85, 170 ")
DD-----	184	(220, 800 ")	DD-----	67	(77, 860 ")
Small DD's-----	13	(13, 000 ")	Small DD's-----	34	(27, 230 ")
Fleet SS's-----	7	(18, 920 ")	Fleet SS's-----	24	(38, 108 ")
SS's-----	31	(27, 000 ")	SS's-----	35	(29, 175 ")
Total Combatant Tonnage-----			Total Combatant Tonnage-----		
959, 220 tons			749, 163 tons		
Air:			Air:		
Army : (no figures available)			Army :		
			Total, all types----- 938		
			Total Operational ---approx--- 500		
			Training ----- " -- 80		
			Reserve ----- " -- 250		
Navy :			Navy :		
Fleet-----approx--- 570			Fleet----- 329		
(Carrier Air—194 on board)			(Carrier Air—136 on board)		
Marine Air-----approx--- 160			Shore ----- 472		
			(Includes Training Types)		
Total Navy Operational---- 730			Total Navy, all types----- 801		

R#127

[13653] Mr. MASTEN. At page 4031 of the transcript Senator Ferguson requested that certain documents be submitted to the War, Navy, and State Departments for information as to whether the papers could be located in their official files.

The War Department advises that there has been found in the War Department files a copy of all the material inclosed except for (a) the page listing oil reserves of principal foreign countries as of January 1939 and (b) the heading of the May 16, 1941, letter to the Honorable Gifford Pinchot.

The Navy Department advises that a thorough search of their files fails to disclose any of the papers or any of the references thereto.

The State Department advises that a careful search has been made of the State Department files but no record can be found of the correspondence referred to and the State Department has returned to us the papers originally submitted by Senator Ferguson.

At page 5327 of the transcript Mr. Murphy asked for a copy of Admiral R. K. Turner's memorandum of February 5, 1941, which was referred to by a handwritten note at the end of April 17, 1941, ONI memorandum on the British-Japanese crisis.

The Navy Department advises that a thorough search of its files fails to disclose any copy of the memorandum in question.

At page 5368 of the transcript Mr. Murphy requested [13654] copies of Commander Ansel's daily "Short Strategic Summaries of

the International, Military, and Political Situation, which were prepared by Commander Ansel, under Admiral Turner and Captain Wright, for Admiral Stark to submit to the President.

The Navy Department has furnished us those summaries. I am going to hand them to Mr. Murphy for his examination.

At page 7236 of the transcript further information was to be furnished regarding the state of watertight integrity of certain of the vessels in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

The Navy Department advises as follows:

The logs of the USS *California*, *Maryland*, *Nevada* and *Tennessee* have been examined for any record of any inspections, and for any references concerning watertight integrity precedent to or in preparation for any inspections on 5, 6, and 7 December 1941, with negative results.

We would like the transcript to show that in response to Mr. Murphy's request at page 7567 for a photographic copy of intercept SIS 19631, that that intercept has been previously handed to Mr. Murphy.

At page 7584 of the transcript Mr. Murphy requested information about the condition of the B-17's that flew to Hawaii immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In response to that request we have received a number of [13655] documents from the War Department which we request be spread on the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be so ordered.
(The documents referred to follow:)

[13656]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF.
OPERATIONS DIVISION.
Washington 25, D. C., 26 January 1946.

Memorandum for L & L Division.

(Att: Lt. Col. Duncombe.)

Subject: B-17 Flights to Hawaii.

1. Reference is made to a memorandum of 21 January 1946 to Lt. Col. Duncombe from Mr. Richardson requesting information regarding the B-17's that were flown to Hawaii immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

2. Inclosed herewith are pertinent documents from the files of the Army Air Forces. Inclosure No. 1 is a copy of a memorandum from the Chief of the Air Staff to the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command confirming a telephone conversation on 8 December 1941 making arrangements for a 10 December flight of nine (9) B-17's to Hawaii. Inclosure No. 2 is a copy of a 6 January 1942 letter from the Adjutant General to the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command, concerning the transfer of aircraft and crews to Hawaii.

S/G John C. Catlin,
JOHN C. CATLIN,
Major, GSC,
Current Group, OPD.

[13657] Incls

1. 2 cys memo fr C*AS to CG, AFCC
2. cy ltr 6 Jan 42 fr TAG to CG, AFCC

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. _____
Tally No. AAF _____

A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Subject: Transfer of nine (9) B-17's to Hawaii.

From	To	Date	Comments	AAF/A-3 MMacC-ek
AAF C/AS	CG AFCC	1941 12-9	This confirms a telephone conversation on December 8, 1941, between Colonel Naiden and Colonel Chauncey: It is desired that nine (9) B-17's be transferred from the United States to Hawaii departure to be made on Wednesday, December 10 1941.	

It is desired that these airplanes be flown over by the Hawaiian crews with the guns properly manned. The additional combat personnel will be transferred to the Hawaiian Department.

[13658]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, January 6, 1942.

Secret.

AG 580.81 (1-3-42) MSC-G-M.

Subject: Transfer of Aircraft and Crews.

To: The Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command.

1. It is desired that you issue the following instructions, to transfer nine B-17-E airplanes from Sacramento Air Depot, California, to Hawaii. These planes are to depart from the United States as soon as practicable.

2. It is also desired that you provide the Combat Crews, and they will be made available for transfer to Hawaii.

3. The airplanes will be fully equipped and ready to combat before release to the Chief of the Air Corps.

4. Each airplane making the flight will be manned by a combat crew consisting of the following:

- one (1) officer pilot
- one (1) officer co-pilot
- one (1) officer navigator
- one (1) enlisted man, bombardier-gunner
- one (1) enlisted man, assistant aerial engineer-gunner.
- two (2) enlisted men, radio operator-gunners
- one (1) enlisted man, aerial engineer-gunner

[13659] 5. The flight will be under the command of the Chief of the Air Corps after crews and planes are released by you, until arrival in Hawaii.

6. All personnel will be equipped with both summer and winter clothing.

7. This is a PERMANENT change of station.

8. The Chief of the Army Air Forces will be notified where practicable, of the arrival and departure of the flights by secret codes.

9. Secret Code will be used in transmission of all messages.

10. Obligate the following procurement authorities to the extent necessary:

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[13660]

Travel of the Army

FD 1492 P 1-06, 3-06, 15-06, 17-06, A 0412-2

(For travel of officers, and enlisted men; and for travel of dependents of officers and enlisted men of the first three grades.)

Army-Transportation-Commercial

QM 1615 P 54-01, 54-02, 54-13, 54-07 A 0525-2 "D"

(For packing, crating, and shipping authorized household goods allowances of officers and enlisted men of the first four grades)

11. It is desired that a copy of all travel orders involved in this movement be furnished the Chief of the Air Corps (attention Fiscal Section) with the estimated cost by procurement numbers under procurement authorities listed above.

12. a. All personnel will require physical examinations as prescribed by Paragraph 14 AR 40-100 prior to departure from home station.

b. The following immunization in conformity with War Department instructions will be initiated and completed if necessary after arrival at destination.

(1) Revaccinate with smallpox vaccine and complete all typhoid inoculations as required by AR 40-215 provided these have not been completed within twelve months prior to departure from continental United States.

(2) Vaccinate with tetanus toxoid as directed in Circular letter, SGO, No. 34, April 16, 1941.

[13661] (3) Vaccinate with yellow fever vaccine as directed in Circular letter, SGO, No. 9, February 12, 1941.

13. Dependents will not accompany troops. See letter June 7, 1941, AG 341.1 (5-26-41) MO D-M, subject: Transportation of dependents and household goods to overseas stations.

14. Attention is invited to Section II, War Department circular No. 220, October 17, 1941, which directs that extract copies of SECRET orders, without SECRET markings, will be furnished to the unit personnel section or other reporting source in order to permit the preparation of reports of changes (SD AGO Form No. 303) for units of individuals covered by such SECRET orders.

15. The soldiers will be provided with identification tags in accordance with Circular 142, WD, 1941.

16. Upon arrival at destination personnel will be advised to have their friends and relatives address their mail to them using the mailing address of unit at that station.

17. Direct communication consistent with the SECRET classification of this directive is authorized by all concerned in effecting the movement referred to herein.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ J. L. CLARK,
Adjutant General.

[13662] Mr. MASTEN. We have received from the War Department a further memorandum regarding the microfilms received from General MacArthur's headquarters. Copies of the enclosures to this memorandum have been distributed to the committee and to the press.

With your permission I would like to read the covering memorandum into the record as it is the only copy we have and the press is not informed as to the nature of the enclosures.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MASTEN. The memorandum is dated February 15, 1946, and reads as follows:

A memorandum to Mr. Mitchell, dated 9 January and read into the record at page 7874 of the Committee transcript, noted that General MacArthur's headquarters had forwarded 12 reels of microfilms, which contained a Japanese file

relating to negotiations between the United States and Japan prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. Four of the 12 reels had then been processed, and their contents were described. Photostats of the remaining eight reels have now been made from the microfilms and have been examined by qualified Japanese linguists. The examination shows that the eight reels contain the following.

1. The Japanese texts of 374 diplomatic messages [13663] practically all sent either from Washington to Tokyo or from Tokyo to Washington. Of the 374 messages, 362 were intercepted by the U. S. Army or Navy at the time of transmission in 1941. Two others, which were intercepted only in part, are found in their entirety in the Japanese file:

a. Message No. 881, Washington to Tokyo, dated 30 September 1941, Part 1 of which is printed at page 45 of Committee Exhibit 1. A translation of Part 2, recently made from the copy in the Japanese file, it attached as "Inclosure A."

That is the first document that was distributed this afternoon.

b. Message No. 941, Washington to Tokyo, dated 13 October 1941, Part 4 of which is printed at pages 67-68 of Committee Exhibit 1. The message gives a lengthy account of a conversation between Mr. Wakasugi and Under Secretary Welles. In view of the very full account of that conversation given in Mr. Welles' memorandum (pp. 680-86 of Volume 2, Foreign Relations of the United States), the other parts of the message found in the Japanese file will not be translated unless the Committee so requests.

The remaining 10 of the 374 messages were not intercepted in 1941, and have been translated by the War Department during the past few weeks. Only three of the 10 messages [13664] appear to be of any possible interest to the Committee: Tokyo Circular 2288, dated 8 November 1941; the somewhat similar Tokyo Circular 2313, dated 12 November 1941; and Tokyo Circular 2193, dated 10 November 1941.

These three messages are attached as "Inclosure B," and are the next three of the papers that have been distributed.

2. A small number of statements and other documents in English text. Most of these appear in Peace and War or in Foreign Relations of the United States. It may be of interest to the Committee to note that the file contains the English-text version of the Japanese 14-part memorandum, Tokyo to Washington message No. 902 (printed at pp. 239-45 of Committee Exhibit 1), and that in the margin opposite the 14th part there is some Japanese writing which means in English: "Part 14 is to be held up until 4:00 p. m. on Sunday". (As appears from Committee Exhibit 41, the 14th part was filed by the Japanese in Tokyo at 4:38 p. m., 7 December, Tokyo time, or 2:38 a. m., 7 December, Washington time.)

3. Memorandum of three conversations in the latter half of August 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and the Japanese Foreign Minister and Vice-Minister attached as inclosure C).

4. Two memoranda, dated September 1941, relating to proposed conditions for peace between Japan and China [13665] (attached as inclosure D).

5. A memorandum dated 26 November 1941, on the progress of Japanese-American negotiations (attached as Inclosure E).

It may also be of interest to the Committee to know that the films do not contain Tokyo to Berlin message No. 985, dated 30 November 1941 (Parts 1 and 3 of which appear at p. 204 of Committee Exhibit 1).

(Signed) HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

The last message referred to is the message, Senator Ferguson, which you have inquired about several times as part 2.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission we would like to add these to Exhibit 132, which was the exhibit in which were placed the other memoranda submitted, and ask that these be received now as Exhibit 132-A.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered and filed.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you locate part 2?

Mr. MASTEN. No. The memorandum states it was not included in the microfilms.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 132-A").

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Mr. MASTEN. We have also received from the War Department a short memorandum dated today, February 20, 1946, reading as follows:

[13666] Inclosed is a report, dated 1 February 1946, just received from General MacArthur's Headquarters, on the subject "Pre Pearl Harbor Transmission of Coded Messages from Hawaii". The report is based on information obtained from Lt. Comdr. Suzuki, formerly of the Japanese Navy, who was aboard a Japanese warship during the Pearl Harbor attack. It is to be noted that at the bottom of the report the following evaluation appears:

Of source—D (Not usually reliable).

Of information—4 (Doubtful).

The memorandum is signed "Harmon Duncombe" and we request that this material be spread into the record at this point.

Senator LUCAS. What is the substance of that? Can you give it to me just briefly.

Mr. MASTEN. I haven't yet read all of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You want it printed in the record as a part of the record?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to follows):

[13667]

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS—UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

APO 500.

1 FEBRUARY 1946.

CI 750105.

Subject: Pre-Pearl Harbor Transmission of Coded Messages from Hawaii.

To: Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Forwarded herewith is Summary of Information dated 25 January 1946. Subject: Pre-Pearl Harbor Transmission of Coded Messages from Hawaii. This information was obtained from Lieutenant Commander SUZUKI, formerly of the Japanese Navy, who was aboard a Japanese warship during the Pearl Harbor attack.

2. This headquarters is attempting to determine the present whereabouts of Lt. Commander KIYOSUKE, formerly of the Japanese Navy, and HIYOSHI of the Foreign Department, so that they may be interviewed regarding the transmission of coded messages from Hawaii and the United States prior to the Pearl Harbor Incident.

3. Forwarded for your information.

4. Distribution of Report:

[13668] 2 copies MIS WAR Dept

2 copies AC of S, G-2, AFMIDPAC

2 copies AC of S, G-2 AFPAC

1 Copies File

For the Chief of Counter-Intelligence:

CONFIDENTIAL

T. P. MATHEWSON,
Lt. Col., Infantry,
Asst. Exec. Officer.

1 Incl: Incl. 1. Summary of Info.

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS—UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

441ST COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

Advance Echelon.
APO 500.
28 January 1946.

Subject: Pre-Pearl Harbor Transmission of Coded Messages from Hawaii.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

A confidential informant of this headquarters reported that a Lieutenant Commander SUZUKI, formerly of the Japanese Navy had information regarding pre-Pearl Harbor transmission of coded messages from Hawaii. On 7 January 1946 SUZUKI, Sadoaki, was interviewed at the Sendai Police Radio Station [13669] where he is now employed as chief operator and gave the following information.

On 4 December 1941, the Japanese fleet was alerted by the message "Fujisan nobore 1208" which when decoded meant "Attack Pearl Harbor 8 December." Those were the only attack instructions that the fleet received from Radio Toyko.

In Hawaii, there were two telegraph stations and one commercial radio station (location unknown by SUZUKI) which transmitted coded messages to Japan. It is SUZUKI's opinion that there were Japanese agents in these three places who had in their possession all the latest Japanese codes and they might have used the following method to send out messages.

A signal from the operator in Hawaii that the frequency was bad and that he was about to change frequencies, followed by a series of dots and dashes, would mean to the operator in Japan that there were so many battleships, or aircraft carriers, etc., in Pearl Harbor. Different series of dots and dashes signified different ships.

If the famous poem by General NOGI were broadcast three times in one day, from Radio Tokyo, it was a signal to these agents in Hawaii to broadcast a report on the American naval strength at Pearl Harbor.

Japanese submarines off the coast of Hawaii also sent coded messages to Japan concerning the arrival and departure [13670] of American ships at Pearl Harbor.

On 6 December 1941, the Japanese consul at Honolulu made a pleasure flight over Pearl Harbor, after which he sent a coded telegram to Tokyo telling how many and what type of ships were at Pearl Harbor. Tokyo relayed the information to the Japanese task forces by means of a number code—a certain combination of numbers meaning a certain types of ship, for example, an aircraft carrier 53247, a battleship 44598.

On either 6 or 7 December 1941, a Japanese journalist in Honolulu had a telephone conversation with Tokyo wherein he said that it was almost Christmas time, and that there were a lot of sailors in town having a good time. From this conversation, it was apparent to the officials in Tokyo that there was quite a large concentration of American naval strength in Pearl Harbor.

SUZUKI stated that it is his opinion that most of the spies in Hawaii were either Iseis or Niseis.

SUZUKI said that he is not familiar with any methods of communication employed by Japanese intelligence agents other than codes and wireless, and that the above information is all that he knows concerning those two methods.

On 11th and 12th of January SUZUKI was interrogated regarding detailed information he might possess relative to Japanese intelligence activities prior to the attack on Pearl [13671] Harbor. Also a personal history of SUZUKI was obtained at this time.

SUZUKI states that while he was at the Tokyo Main Naval Bureau, May 1940–April 1941, he did not know of any messages being received from Hawaii other than the messages that were in the diplomatic code.

He delivered some of the messages to the communication section of the Foreign Office where they were decoded. The personnel of the Naval Bureau did not normally have access to the diplomatic codes. SUZUKI remembered one time when the communication section of the Foreign Office was so busy that he

had to go over and help them decode their messages. All that he remembers about the messages he decoded was that some of the messages were from Naval Attachés in Washington, D. C., and one of the messages was about an American ship being in New York and one was a weekly message which contained the week's news events in the United States; what the American attitude was toward the events that were taking place in Europe; matters pertaining to state problems and reaction of American people; expansion of army and navy installations; new ships built and launched. These messages had been sent by Postal telegraph SUZUKI claimed.

SUZUKI stated that a man by the name of Hiyoshi, (FNU), who was at the Funabashi Foreign Department wireless station might be able to furnish more information about the diplomatic messages, that were received from Hawaii. Suzuki stated that he did not know the text or substance of any intelligence messages that might have been sent from Hawaii until, a few days before the Japanese Fleet attacked Pearl Harbor.

During the latter part of November and early December 1941 SUZUKI claimed that he listened to commercial broadcasts from Hawaii so that the navy could keep up with events that were going on there, but he did not receive any messages that were coded in any way.

On 4 December 1941 this message was received from Tokyo, "Fujisan Nobore 1208". SUZUKI said that this message meant that the Japanese Fleet was to attack Pearl Harbor 1208 unless the following message was received, "Niitake Yama Nobore (with another date to be given)".

On 6 December 1941 he received a message from Naval Intelligence in Tokyo which told about number of sailors on shore leave in Pearl Harbor; that there was no blackout preparation; that the streets were brightly lighted; and that there was much gaiety of the coming celebration for Christmas. That this message stated the source of the information had been a telephone conversation between two newspaper correspondents, one of whom was in Hawaii and the other was in Japan.

He received another message on 6 December 1941 from [13673] Naval Intelligence in Tokyo giving the number of ships of the various classes that were in Pearl Harbor; the number of men on shore leave; and stating that an aircraft carrier was not in. This message gave as its source of information a consul who had flown over Pearl Harbor.

On the night of 7 December 1941 he got a message stating that Oklahoma or Nevada had entered Pearl Harbor. By noon 7 December 1941 the message "Niitake Yama Nobore" (with another date) had not been received by the Japanese Fleet and Vice Admiral Nagumo, Shuichi on board the aircraft carrier Akagi, flagship of task force flashed the message to the fleet that they would attack Pearl Harbor on 8 December 1941.

SUZUKI informed this agent that he didn't know that there was going to be any commercial broadcast of Intelligence information by means of any coded advertisement or anything else of that nature before 8 December 1941. SUZUKI stated further that he had no code on his ship that was designed to decode any messages that might be sent out over the commercial radio. SUZUKI informed this agent that he found out when the Japanese fleet was returning from Pearl Harbor from Lt. Commander Iwasa, Kiyosuke, communication staff officer for 6th Destroyer Group on board the light cruiser Abukuma that several messages had been sent out from Hawaii by means of commercial radio advertisements and gave as an [13674] example this message:

"I lost my black dog. If anyone finds it for me he will get a reward of \$5.00"—and then the owners address was given. SUZUKI said that the size of the reward meant something and the number in the address meant something else. SUBJECT states that although he didn't have the code for this type of message Iwasa, Kiyosuke might have had it.

SUZUKI also stated that he heard later that some submarines had sent out some intelligence messages concerning American forces in Pearl Harbor. He did pick up a message from Japan on 7 December 1941 stating that there was no American Fleet at Lahaina Anchorage. This message gave as its source of information a report from a submarine.

SUZUKI claimed somebody (he doesn't remember who) told him sometime after 8 December 1941 that if a poem by General Nogi entitled "Made out of the Castle Kinshu" were broadcast from Tokyo three times in one day that that meant that the spies in Hawaii were supposed to send out intelligence information. He stated that he did not know about the other poem by General Nogi con-

cerning bill 203 being broadcast and having any special meaning. SUBJECT stated that he didn't remember of any other example of messages being sent in this manner.

Personal History of SUZUKI, Saddaki:

[13675] 13 April 1914—Born in Yokohama.

1927-1932—Attended Yokosuke Middle school.

1932-1937—Attended Naval College. Did not specialize in any field.

1937—Graduated from Naval College as a midshipman and was stationed on board heavy cruiser Iwate for ten (10) months for training in navigation.

November 1937-June 1938—Stationed on board light cruiser Kinu as deck officer; assistant torpedo officer; and assistant communications officer.

July 1938-November 1938—Stationed on board 2nd class destroyer Susuki as junior officer in charge of gunnery and communications.

December 1938-October 1939—Stationed on 1st class destroyer Asauagi as officer in charge of communications and as assistant navigation officer.

October and November 1939—Stationed on board battleship Yamashiro as assistant communications officer.

November 1939-April 1940—Stationed on board heavy cruiser Ashigara [13676] as communications officer.

May 1940-April 1941—Worked in communication section of Tokyo Main Naval Bureau making codes; deciphering codes; and delivering messages that came in. While here SUZUKI first learned about an electric machine that was used to encode and decode messages. SUZUKI stated that he did not learn anything about invisible inks during the time he was at Tokyo Main Naval Bureau and that all he knows about invisible inks is what he has read in detective stories.

April 1941-March 1942—Stationed on board light cruiser Abukuma, flagship of 1st destroyer group, as communications officer.

September 1941—Light cruiser Abukuma was in Ariake Bay Kyushu participating in Fleet training.

October 1941—Abukuma was at Kure Naval Base.

November 1941—Abukuma was in vicinity of Kure Naval Base participating in fleet training. [13677] Abukuma and remainder of 1st destroyer group left vicinity of Kure Naval Base when commander of the 1st destroyer group, Rear Admiral Oomori, Sentaro announced that war might start between Japan and the United States.

22 November 1941—1st destroyer group arrived in Chishima, Kurile Islands. During this time preparations for battle were made.

26 November 1941—1st destroyer group left Chishima following a zig zag course in direction of Hawaii.

April 1942-June 1942—SUZUKI was stationed on board heavy cruiser Mikuma as communications officer.

July 1942-October 1943—SUZUKI was stationed in communication section of Tokyo Main Naval Bureau supervising young officers.

November 1943-March 1944—Stationed at Yokosuka Naval wireless communication school as student. The course consisted of a review of communication [13678] principles and instruction in radar.

March 1944-January 1945—Stationed on board heavy cruiser Miyoko as communications officer.

January 1945-March 1945—SUZUKI was at Singapore awaiting a ship.

March 1945—Until end of war—SUZUKI was at Yokohama Naval Headquarters making code books.

Evaluation

—of source..... D

—of information..... 4

Previous Distribution:

441st CIC Det.

Sixth CIC Region.

Distribution:

MIS War Department—2 copies.

G-2 AFPAC—2 copies.

G-2 AFMIDPAC—2 copies.

File—1 copy.

[13679] Mr. MASTEN. At page 8635 of the transcript Senator Ferguson requested information with respect to the planes which were

sent through Hawaii to the Philippines from July to December 7, 1941.

We have received a memorandum from the War Department in this connection, which we request be spread in the record at this point, together with the enclosures.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The documents referred to follow:)

[13680]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ROOM 4D757, THE PENTAGON,
Washington, D. C., 6 February 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson.

At page 8635 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked for information on what planes were sent through Hawaii to the Philippines from July to 7 December 1941, what planes stopped in Hawaii, and how they completed their journey.

War Departments records show that the only planes flown from the United States through Hawaii to the Philippines during the period in question were 26 B-17's. A detailed description of their transfer is contained in a 19 November 1941 report by the Commanding Officer of the 19th Bombardment Group, inclosed herewith.

/S/ Harmon Duncombe,
HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

[13681] HEADQUARTERS—19TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H), AF USAFFE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER

CLARK FIELD, P. I., November 19, 1941.

Subject: Ferry Flight of B-17 Airplanes to the Philippines.

To: Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command,
Bolling Field, Washington, D. C.

1. In compliance with Paragraph 2 *m.*, Letter, W. D. File AG 370.5 (10-7-41) MC-C-M, Subject: Movement of Air Corps Units, dated October 9, 1941; the following report is submitted.

2. On October 17, 1941, twelve (12) airplanes were ferried from Hamilton Field to Hickam Field. For purposes of control the flight was divided into two elements of six planes each. The second element took off 30 minutes behind the first and planes within elements took off at two-minute intervals. After a study of the weather it was decided that it was better to fly from Hamilton Field to Latitude 28° N Longitude 135° W to Hickam Field rather than the great circle course. This added 140 miles to the total distance but favorable winds more than offset this extra distance. Each airplane commander reported his position to his element leader hourly and each element leader reported hourly to NPG and NPM (see Communication Annex to Operations Order No. 2. [13682] Air Echelon, Hq., 19th Bomb. Gp.). Airplane position reports were made accurately and on schedule. On October 20, 1941 thirteen (13) airplanes left Hamilton Field and arrived at Hickam Field after traversing the same route taken by the first flight. The same radio procedure was used by both flights. On October 21, 1941 the 26th airplane, which had been left behind to complete fuel consumption test, took off for Hickam Field. It arrived on the morning of October 22, 1941. All airplanes arrived at Hickam Field on schedule. The navigation was excellent. No mechanical difficulties were encountered.

3. From Hickam Field to Clark Field it was planned to operate with three flights of nine, nine, and eight airplanes. Because of minor mechanical difficulties and adverse weather, maintenance of this flight organization became impracticable. Airplanes were located in the following places on the following dates:

Oct. 17-----12 planes took off for Hickam.
 14 planes at SAD or Albuquerque.
Oct. 20-----12 planes at Hickam.
 13 planes took off for Hickam.
 1 plane at Hamilton (fuel consumption doubtful).
Oct. 21-----25 planes at Hickam.
 1 plane took off for Hickam.
Oct. 22-----7 planes took off for Midway.

- [13683] 19 planes at Hickam.
 Oct. 23-----7 planes took off for Wake.
 2 planes took off for Midway.
 17 planes at Hickam.
 Oct. 24-----7 planes at Wake.
 1 plane took off for Wake.
 10 planes took off for Midway (1 returned—broken oil tank).
 1 plane at Midway (tail tire flat).
 7 planes at Hickam.
 Oct. 25-----6 planes took off for Port Moresby.
 2 planes at Wake (1 broken aileron).
 10 planes took off for Wake.
 8 planes at Hickam.
 Oct. 26-----6 planes at Port Moresby.
 3 planes took off for Port Moresby (1 turned back—Weather).
 9 planes at Wake.
 8 planes took off for Midway.
 Oct. 27-----8 planes took off for Darwin.
 10 planes at Wake.
 8 planes at Midway.
 Oct. 28-----8 planes at Darwin.
 10 planes at Wake (Weather).
 8 planes at Midway.
 [13684] Oct. 29—8 planes took off for Clark Field.
 10 planes at Wake (Weather).
 1 plane took off for Wake.
 7 planes at Midway.
 Oct. 30—8 planes at Clark Field.
 11 planes at Wake (Weather).
 1 plane took off for Wake (bringing parts).
 6 planes at Midway.
 Oct. 31—8 planes at Clark Field.
 8 planes took off for Port Moresby (1 turned back—engine trouble) (1
 landed—Rabaul).
 4 planes at Wake.
 6 planes took off for Wake.
 Nov. 1—8 planes at Clark Field.
 6 planes took off for Darwin.
 1 plane took off for Port Moresby from Rabaul.
 11 planes took off for Port Moresby (1 turned back—engine trouble)
 (2 landed at Rabaul and then continued on to Port Moresby) (2
 continued on to Darwin after landing at Port Moresby).
 Nov. 2—8 planes at Clark Field.
 3 planes took off for Clark Field.
 5 planes at Darwin.
 9 planes took off for Darwin.
 1 plane took off for Port Moresby.
 Nov. 3—11 planes at Clark Field.
 [13685] 8 planes took off for Clark Field.
 6 planes at Darwin.
 1 plane took off for Darwin.
 Nov. 4—19 planes at Clark Field.
 5 planes took off for Clark Field.
 2 planes at Darwin (engine changes).
 Nov. 5—24 planes at Clark Field.
 1 plane at Darwin (2 engines out).
 1 plane took off for Clark Field.
 Nov. 6—25 planes at Clark Field.
 1 plane at Darwin (2 engines out).

4. Several minor incidents occurred on the entire flight from Albuquerque to the Philippines. At Hickam Field one airplane scraped the wing tip of another while taxiing, due to a sudden loss of brake pressure. The wing tip was repaired locally. One airplane had an engine changed at Hickam Field and another had a broken oil tank replaced. At Midway Island one plane was held up one day with a flat tail tire. A spare arrived in the following flight. At Wake a truck backed into the aileron of one plane causing considerable damage. The

broken aileron and two sections of cracked engine cowling from two other ships were repaired at Wake with the aid PAA and the Contractors. The battery charger at the Marine Detachment at Wake was also used. Three airplanes returned to Wake Island after starting for [13686] Port Moresby. One returned because of weather and the other two returned because of ignition trouble encountered at high altitudes while trying to fly over the equatorial front. At Darwin two airplanes developed trouble in the internal blower sections of one engine each. This necessitated sending two replacement engines from Manila. One of the two airplanes took a good engine from the other and continued on to Clark Field. The airplane which remained at Darwin had both bad engines replaced and at present is held at Darwin because of poor field conditions due to rain.

5 Statistics of the flight:

Average Flight Time

Hamilton Field—Hickam Field.....	13: 20 hours.
Hickam Field—Midway Island.....	7: 10 hours.
Midway Island—Wake.....	7: 10 hours.
Port Moresby—Darwin.....	5: 50 hours.
Darwin—Clark Field.....	11: 00 hours.
Wake Island—Port Moresby.....	13: 30 hours.
Total Time.....	58: 00 hours.
Average Gasoline Consumption.....	157 gal./hr.

6. Notes and comments on Landing Fields and Facilities.

a. Midway Island. An excellent field with three hard-surfaced, all-weather runways. Parking area and tie-down rings sufficient to accommodate twenty-five (25) heavy bombardment airplanes. Parking area is crushed, graded coral and will hold an airplane in any weather. Facilities available for gassing three airplanes at a time from pits. Accommodations ample for twenty-five (25) crews. Cost: one dollar (1.00) per day for officers. Sixty cents (60¢) per day for enlisted men. Officers stay at Navy Base, men at Marine Detachment.

b. Wake Island. One crushed, graded coral and shell runway. Parking area crushed, graded coral and shell sufficient for twenty-five (25) heavy bombardment airplanes. Tie-down rings not spaced properly to accommodate B-17 type airplane. Landing and parking areas good in any weather. One 1500 gallon gas truck is available but it requires two hours to refill. Six portable gasoline-powered pumps were left at Wake and the majority of the refueling must be done from drums with the aid of these pumps. Caution should be exercised to avoid water as gassing is from unsealed drums. Facilities for accommodation of crews vary due to turnover of contractors' personnel. Should be O. K. on completion of Navy and Marine Base buildings. Cost: One dollar (1.00) per day for both officers and enlisted men. Both officers and men stay in Contractors' barracks and eat at Contractors' mess. Can always accommodate nine (9) crews. Inquiry should be made beforehand if it is contemplated taking in more than [13688] nine (9) airplanes.

c. Rabaul, New Britain. The field is located approximately ten (10) miles South and slightly west of the Town of Rabaul. The field is one strip, 5,000 feet by 300 feet. Both ends slope slightly towards the center. The northwest 3,000 feet is sod over pumice, the southeast 2,000 feet is newly graded pumice, and is soft. Hills to the southeast are definite obstacles on takeoffs to the southeast. Approaches are clear to the northwest. Prevailing winds from southeast. At present a company of Australian infantry is camped along the edge of the field. No parking space is available for airplanes other than on the landing strip. The field is definitely suitable for operation of only lightly loaded B-17s. Landings must be confined to the sod portion of the field. Full load operation should not be attempted at Rabaul even if the landing strip were hard surfaced, because of hills to southeast. Refueling is from drums and must be accomplished by use of the emergency hand pump installed in the bomb-bay. Personnel accommodations are extremely limited. Food can be provided for possibly six (6) airplane crews by the Australian Army Company. Several members of the crews which stopped at Rabaul suffered intestinal upsets which were caused by poor water or food or both. [13689] No sleeping accommodations available. Personnel accommodations at the town of Rabaul, 15 miles over very primitive road, very meagre. A limited supply of 100-octane gasoline available in drums.

d. Port Moresby, New Guinea. Landing Field at Port Moresby is one hard surfaced strip, 3,600 feet by 180 feet, running northwest, southeast. There is no hard surfaced parking area. There are hills on both sides of runway but approaches are clear. The runway could be easily extended at least a thousand feet. Area off runway would be soft during wet weather and it is believed that it would not support a fully loaded B-17 then. Four portable gasoline-powered gas pumps were left there. 100 Octane gasoline available in drums. Port Moresby is poor to approach in bad weather because of hills in immediate vicinity of field and high mountains to the northeast, and east. The homing beacon is low powered and not reliable except very close to field. Due to a haze condition which exists on the south coast of New Guinea the field is hard to locate and it is recommended that flights be timed to arrive there not earlier than 10:00 A. M. local time. Personnel accommodations are furnished by the R. A. A. F. in the town of Port Moresby. Accommodations are not available for more than ten (10) B-17 crews at present. The officers were charged \$2.00, [13690] and the enlisted men \$1.00, a day. Sanitation is primitive and health conditions are very poor.

e. Darwin, Australia. Four graded, dirt runways. Not good during rainy season. Extremely dusty during dry season. Could accommodate twenty-five (25) heavy bombardment airplanes. Ample grassed parking area. Hard-surfaced runways are under construction. 100 Octane gasoline is available in drums. One portable pump was left at Darwin, others were available from the R. A. A. F. Accommodations sufficient for twenty-five (25) crews. Cost: Two dollars (\$2.00) for officers, one dollar (\$1.00) for men, per day. Officers stay at officers' mess. Men stay at R. A. A. F. barracks.

7. Recommendations.

a. That future flights not be dispatched on such short notice. The requirement for an earlier departure than originally planned entailed hardships on the crews, many of whom departed from Hamilton Field in a fatigued condition. It also disrupted squadron organization which should be maintained as near as possible. Careful planning was difficult and orders and instructions were necessarily hurried. Some airplanes arrived at Hamilton Field as late as 7:00 P. M. on the evening of take-off, which was at 8:30 P. M. One airplane had to make the flight from Hamilton to Hickam individually because sufficient time was not [13691] available to test it prior to the departure of the flight. If at all possible, the crews should be given twenty-four (24) hours complete rest prior to the Hamilton to Hickam flight. The Hamilton-Hickam flight should be timed so as to arrive at Honolulu between dawn and sunrise plus one hour.

b. That an airport be constructed at Guam as soon as possible. This would shorten the trip by more than three thousand (3,000) Nautical miles and, in addition, would give a route over which better weather and better weather information are available. By use of this route it would be possible to fly from San Francisco to Manila in six (6) days, and in easy stages. For example: First night—Hamilton to Hickam. Second day—rest. Third day—Hickam to Midway. Fourth day—Midway to Wake. Fifth day—Wake to Guam. Sixth day—Guam to Manila. In case of emergency it would be possible to make the trip in four days, if competent ground servicing and maintenance crews were available at each stop. For example: Sunday night—Hamilton to Hickam. Monday—rest. Tuesday—either Hickam to Midway to Wake or Hickam to Wake, direct. Wednesday—Wake—Guam. Thursday—Guam—Philippines.

c. That no airport be used which has not at least one 5,000 feet runway (preferable hard-surfaced) and ample parking area for the airplanes.

[13692] d. That army radio facilities (homing, direction finding, and communications) be installed at all stops along the route if it is planned to make frequent flights of this sort. The Navy and PAA cooperated willingly but their facilities were severally overtaxed. At Wake Island especially the communications load was too great for the equipment and personnel. Weather forecasts arrived too late for adequate planning. If use of Navy facilities is to be continued an extra frequency should be assigned for flight communications only.

e. That a substantial supply of spare parts, jacks, energizers, oxygen, etc., be stationed at each stop along with a substantial ground crew. In this way the load carried in each airplane could be considerably lessened both in parts carried and personnel.

f. That more detailed maps of stopping places and auxiliary fields be obtained. These maps should be of a large scale (Similar to our sectional aeronautical charts of the U. S.) and cover the area within 100 miles of the airport.

g. That qualified weather officers be sent to Midway and Wake at least a week prior to any projected flight in order to keep an accurate check on the weather. The equatorial front, and ever-present weather phenomenon between Wake and Port Moresby, offers a flight problem [13693] worthy of much consideration. This front was successfully penetrated by this Group at altitudes from 1,000 to 28,000 feet. Clouds in this front are characterized by severe turbulence at intermediate altitudes and are to be avoided. Moonlight aids in the perception and avoidance of these clouds.

h. The G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force compiled a route book and communications annex which is far superior to the route book supplied by the Office of the Chief of Air Corps. It is much more detailed and contains maps, drawings, photographs, and other valuable information. In view of the very great assistance this book gave on this flight, it is recommended that every effort be made to keep the information contained therein up to date.

DAVID R. GIBBS,
Major, Air Corps,
Commanding.

FAF File:

373x452-1 Ferry Flight of B-17 Airplanes to the Philippines B-17D/34
Secret.

[13694] Mr. MASTEN. At page 7693 of the transcript Mr. Murphy requested information as to whether or not the files of the Navy Department reveal the sending of a message to Hawaii on 6 December.

We have received a memorandum dated January 24, 1946, from the Navy Department which we request be spread on the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be so ordered.

(The document referred to follows):

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 24 January 1946.

1083A(HLB).

R#114.

Memorandum.

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

Subject: Search for dispatches sent from the Navy Department to naval commanders in the field between noon, Eastern Standard Time, on 6 December 1941 and 2:30 p. m., Eastern Standard Time on 7 December 1941.

1. In response to the suggestion to the Committee that a dispatch may have been sent from the Navy Department on the evening or during the late hours of 6 December 1941, or during the early hours of 7 December 1941, released either by the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Naval Operations, [13695] to some of the naval commanders in the field, including possibly Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, of a warning of war nature, please be advised as follows:

2. All appropriate files of the Navy Department have been searched for any dispatches of a war-warning nature from the Navy Department to naval commanders in the field between noon, Eastern Standard Time, on 6 December 1941 and 2:30 P. M., Eastern Standard Time, on 7 December 1941, inclusive. This will certify that no such dispatches are contained in those files.

3. There is no record or notation in the files of the Chief of Naval Communications of any telephone warning message that may have been phoned to Admiral Kimmel.

(Signed) JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R.

Mr. MASTEN. We have received another memorandum from the Navy Department in response to a request of Senators Ferguson and Brewster regarding the governmental authority of the United States and Great Britain during 1941 over Johnston, Canton, and Christmas Islands and we would request that that also be spread in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.
(The document referred to follows):

[13696]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 25 January 1946.

Memorandum.

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. In response to the request of Senators Ferguson and Brewster regarding the governmental authority of the United States and Great Britain in 1941 over Johnston, Canton and Christmas Islands, the following information is submitted:

(a) Johnston Island was under the sole jurisdiction of the United States.

(b) Canton Island was the subject of an exchange of notes between the governments of Great Britain and the United States published on April 1939 (Executive Agreement series #145). These notes provide for the joint administration of Canton Island and Endurberry Island, without prejudice to claims of sovereignty for fifty years and thereafter indefinitely unless the agreement is changed, modified, or terminated. Under the terms of the agreement these islands are subject to such joint *ad hoc* regime, the details of which are determined by the two governments in consultations from time to time. Each government is represented by an administrative official and the islands are available for communications and use as airports for international aviation, but [13697] only commercial aviation companies incorporated in the United States or in any part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, for purposes of scheduled air services.

(c) Christmas Island came under the jurisdiction of the British High Commissioner of the Pacific (also called the Acting Administrative Office of the Ellice and Gilbert Island Colonies) whose headquarters are in Suva. The United States had and has no part in the government but claimed a sea plane base. The United States and Britain both claimed sovereignty based on occupancy. The British, however, have administered the island from 1919 through 1941.

(Signed) JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lt. Comdr. USNR.

Mr. MASTEN. On February the 5th a memorandum was read into the record regarding the burning of all codes in Washington by the Japanese consulate.

The War Department in response to a request made by Senator Ferguson advises that the Colonel Holbrook referred to in the memorandum was the head of the Administrative Section of the Counter Intelligence Branch of the War Department Military Intelligence Division, and that the initials "JTB" which appear over the date line in the lower right-hand corner of the memorandum are the initials of Colonel Bissell, who was the head of the Counter Intelligence Branch of the War Department Military Intelligence Branch.

[13698] The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that spread on the record?

Mr. MASTEN. I have read the substance of it into the record, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. MASTEN. At page 7868 of the record Senator Ferguson asked whether or not a memorandum prepared, I believe, by Mr. Max Hamilton in the State Department, regarding a proposal that New Guinea be transferred to the Japanese, ever reached the President.

The State Department advises as follows:

It is the recollection of Secretary Hull and of other officers who were in the Department at the time that no action was taken on this memorandum and that it did not reach the President.

At page 11261 of the transcript Mr. Murphy requested that any information available in the State Department regarding the substance of the intercept (No. 104) which appears at the bottom of page 252 of Exhibit 1 be obtained.

We have received from the State Department a photostat of a message sent from Washington to the American Legation in Budapest which reads as follows. The message is dated December 5, 1941:

Please transmit secretly at the earliest possible moment a note verbale with the following wording to the Hungarian Government:

[13699] "The American Minister presents his compliments to His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Royal Hungarian Government and, at the request of His Britannic Majesty's Government, has the honor to transmit to the Hungarian Government the attached communication from the British Government:

"On November 29th His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom conveyed to Hungarian Government through the United States Minister Budapest, a message to the effect that unless by December 5th the Hungarian Government had ceased military operations and had in practice withdrawn from all active participation in hostilities against the U. S. S. R., His Majesty's Government would have no choice but to declare existence of a state of war between the two countries. Since Hungarian Government have returned no reply to this communication and since information at the disposal of His Majesty's Government affords no indication that they intend to comply with above conditions a state of war will exist between the two countries as from 12:01 a. m., Greenwich Mean Time on December 7th."

That is the message, we understand, which is referred to in the intercept (No. 104) at the bottom of page 252 of Exhibit 1.

Senator LUCAS. Did you say that was a verbal message or a garbled message?

Mr. MASTEN. A verbal message.

[13700] Senator LUCAS. A what?

Mr. MASTEN. A verbal message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. An oral message.

Mr. MASTEN. The Navy Department has furnished us the exact transmission times of three dispatches which are referred to on pages 6714 and 6713 of the transcript. These messages are the Navy war warning message of November 27 and two other messages which were sent just prior to the sending of that message.

These memoranda show that message No. 270038, which appears in the transcript at page 6714, was sent from Washington on November 26 at 9:09 p. m., Washington time; that message No. 270040, which also appears in the transcript at page 6714, was sent from Washington on November 27 at 12:58 a. m., and that message 272337, which is the war warning message of November the 27th and appears at page 36 of Exhibit 37, was sent from Washington on November 27 at 8:06 p. m.

At page 12180 of the transcript Senator Ferguson requested a report that had been made by Colonel Pettigrew in 1941. That has been delivered to Senator Ferguson and is the report which he has now requested be made an exhibit.

To complete the record with respect to the Hewitt investigation we would like to include in the transcript the following two memoranda.

(The memoranda referred to follow :)

[13701]

18 MAY 1945.

From: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy.
To: Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, U. S. Naval Reserve.
Subject: Preliminary investigation at Pearl Harbor.
Reference: (a) Precept from SecNav to Adm. H. Kent Hewitt, USN, dated 2 May 1945.

1. Upon your arrival at Pearl Harbor you will conduct preliminary investigation as set forth herein in connection with the further Pearl Harbor Inquiry directed by reference (a).

2. You will determine what information the CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN records and files contain concerning: (1) Admiral Kimmel's approval of Annex VII to the Joint Coastal Defense Plan and the "Bellinger" estimate; (2) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of copies of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January 1941, and the Secretary of War's reply; (3) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of the second letter from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning air torpedo attack; (4) the date when Admiral Kimmel approved the aircraft schedules which were submitted covering employment of planes during the period 15 November 1941 to 31 December 1941.

3. You will determine what information the CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN records and files contain concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces during the period 14 October 1941 to 7 December 1941.

4. You will determine what information the records of [13702] CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN contain concerning the movements of Japanese submarines in and around Pearl Harbor on or prior to 7 December 1941.

5. You will determine what information the CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN records contain which was received through the interception of Japanese telephone and cable messages prior to 7 December 1941.

6. You are authorized to obtain copies of any of the records relating to the foregoing matters, for delivery to me.

7. You will report the results of this preliminary investigation to me at Pearl Harbor on or about 28 May 1945.

H. KENT HEWITT.

[13703]

6 JUL 1945.

From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN.
Subject: Modification of precept.
Reference: (a) Precept of 2 May 1945, directing further investigation of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941.

1. Paragraph 7 of reference (a) is hereby modified as follows:

Upon completion of your examination, you will submit the record direct to the Secretary of the Navy, attaching thereto a report stating your findings and conclusions.

James Forrestal.
JAMES FORRESTAL.

[13704] Mr. MASTEN. That, I think, is all we have.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, there are two things that I want to have in the record before you pause.

The first was that I wanted to express for myself and my associates our very great obligation to Commander Baecher and to Colonel Duncombe for the aid which they and their liaison staff in the Army and Navy, respectively, have given to us. I know of no time when we have made a request of them where there has not been what we were satisfied constituted the very fullest response. It has not been without difficulties on their part because at times I feel that I was rather irascible in dealing with them. I do not know how we could have carried on without their cooperation.

Second, I wanted the record to show particularly that all of us on our counsel's staff feel that it would have been exceedingly difficult

to have gone through with this hearing had we not had the advantage of the extraordinary preparation in detail and extent which was bequeathed to us by Mr. Mitchell and his staff and the effort that Mr. Mitchell made during the last week he was here to get this testimony in shape and to give us the benefit of the numerous memorandums which he made to aid us, which each day became more definite in our minds as a very extraordinary help to us, and I wanted to give voice to our appreciation of that aid that we had from Mr. Mitchell before you formally closed your record.

[13705] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to make a statement at this time with reference to the proceedings of this committee.

It was created by a concurrent resolution adopted in the Senate on the 6th of September and a day or two later in the House of Representatives. It went immediately to work to prepare for the open hearings which we have been holding and on the 15th of November 1945 this committee began the open hearings and it has been conducting them daily morning and afternoon, and on some occasions at night.

The committee had some differences within the committee with respect to procedure but those differences were no doubt inherent in the situation; but they have not been too serious, and I want to congratulate this committee upon the diligence that the committee has shown in attending these hearings and has participated in this investigation.

I have been a Member of the two Houses of Congress for a long time. I have served on many special committees and many standing committees. I do not recall in my entire service where a committee, either special or standing, has consistently and daily held open hearings and has enjoyed such a full attendance of members as has been the case in this investigation and of this committee.

[13706] Some of the members have had to be absent now and then on account of other committees and other work, but on the whole the attendance of this committee and the interest it has manifested in the testimony of all the witnesses has been extraordinary, and I want, as chairman, to thank the committee for that manifestation of their interest in this important job which was wished upon all of us.

I wish also to add my thanks, and I am sure the thanks of the committee, to the liaison officers of the War Department, the Navy Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for the valuable assistance which they have rendered to us.

I would also like to express the appreciation of the committee to the press and radio and photographers and all others who have been as diligent in their attendance as the committee itself.

I wish also to thank the officers here who have been waiting on us during the weeks in which we have been holding these hearings.

I might say that the committee and counsel have a vast amount of work yet to do before we get our report ready for the Congress, and I am sure we will pursue that phase of this task with the same diligence and I hope the great thoroughness with which we have conducted the hearing. I wanted to make that statement publicly before we conclude [13707] today's session.

If I have omitted anybody who ought to be mentioned or thanked I would be glad to be reminded of it.

I wish also, of course, to thank not only the present counsel, but their predecessors for their cooperation. You still have got quite a lot of work to do, but most of that will probably be done behind closed doors or in executive session or in working rooms, and I may not have another public opportunity to thank the counsel for the outstanding work, the tremendous, almost superhuman task of going through all the records of all the investigations and all the transactions to bring to the committee's attention this evidence.

That not only applies to the present counsel, but it applies with equal force to their predecessors.

I think it is a tribute to the ability and the understanding and comprehension of those of our present counsel who succeeded the former counsel that they were able, after a short time, to pick up the broken threads and go on with it.

I would not want to conclude this brief tribute without a special tribute to the counsel, Mr. Masten, who has been with us from the beginning, for whom we have contracted an unbounded regard, and I hope he will be able to cooperate with us further.

[13708] I also want to thank the official reporters who have taken this vast amount of testimony not only for the efficiency with which they have done it but the rapidity with which they have made it available to us. I do not think I have ever observed a more competent corps of stenographic reporters. I am sure the committee has the same opinion of them that I have.

I wanted to say this at this public meeting, as we now conclude this phase of our work.

Senator LUCAS. I just want to concur in everything that the chairman has said.

I also want to add this: When General Mitchell left I made some remarks in the record as to what I thought with reference to his service. I think the committee should be grateful to Mr. Richardson and Mr. Kaufman who have come into the middle of this lengthy and important hearing and carried on the tremendous burdens which they have had. They have done a magnificent job.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p. m., February 20, 1946, the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.)

Part 11—April 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946—follows.

×

5152

44. P31, P31 H. 11

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK



HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)


A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 11

APRIL 9 AND 11, AND MAY 23 AND 31, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack





PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946

**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

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4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
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6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in the caucus room (318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel; and Mrs. Flo E. Bratten, executive secretary to the joint committee.

[13710] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Stark, will you come and take the witness chair?

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK, U. S. NAVY (RETIRED)—Resumed ²

The CHAIRMAN. You have already been sworn, haven't you?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, in your former testimony my notes show, about page 5812 and again 6099,³ you were interrogated on the subject of where you were on the evening of December 6.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you testified, speaking generally, according to my notes, that your date calendar had been disposed of and that you had no recollection which permits you to say where you were on the night of December 6.

Since you testified in that regard, information has been received that during the afternoon of December 6 there was a party given for the Canadian Minister and his wife, at which, according to the information that we have, a number of naval officials of high rank were invited, and among them, you and Mrs. Stark, Admiral Ingersoll and his wife, Capt. Theodore Wilkinson, and others.

I wanted to ask you, Admiral, whether you have any [13711] recollection of about that time, or at that time, attending an affair given for the Canadian Minister?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I do not. I might say, however, as regards our date calendar, our home engagements calendar, that Mrs. Stark

¹ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

² See p. 5512, *infra*, for corrections in his testimony submitted by Admiral Stark.

³ Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2183 and 2290, respectively.

finally found it, after a long search back for several years. It shows that Canadian party that afternoon, but it does not show whether we were there. Her remembrance is she did not go. I hardly ever went to those parties. Frequently I asked her to go to represent us, but I have not the slightest recollection of going, and I think I did not go.

I might say also with reference to that calendar, that it shows nothing for that Saturday night, but it does show the Canadian party.

Mr. RICHARDSON. My preliminary idea in asking you about that party was that it frequently happens that an afternoon affair is culminated by some of the group present continuing on at other affairs later in the evening, and there has been testimony offered here that during the evening of the 6th the President sought to contact you and was advised, according to his immediate report as to information he received over the telephone, that you were at the National Theater, giving the number of your box or seat, whichever it may have been, and that he then said that he would not disturb you while you were at the theater but would contact you later.

From that information I gathered that during the evening [19712] of December 6 you had attended the National Theater. Upon inquiry I ascertained that the play produced on that evening was the very familiar musical comedy The Student Prince, which is an operatic production which has been extant for many years, and I think every year or 2 years revived, and embraces the tale of a prince who went to college and tried to keep up his college associations, with the usual feminine interludes.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean "usual"?

Mr. RICHARDSON. The interludes which you and I recall from our college days, but which the Chairman does not.

There are several very celebrated songs in it, and I refer to those things simply to find out from you, Admiral, whether you have any recollection of ever having seen The Student Prince?

Admiral STARK. I remember very clearly having seen a revival of The Student Prince, but I had not connected it with that Saturday night, and I do not now. When I first heard of it, when someone had said I had seen The Student Prince, my recollection was it was in Philadelphia, and I contacted my daughter and her husband who were there, and they said no. The next I heard of it was in connection with Commander Schulz' testimony. It does not ring any bell with me that I was there that night, but I can only assume, in view of the testimony of Commander Schulz and of others who tried to contact [19713] me, and my remembrance of having seen the revival, that I probably was there.

I found out at the theater that they had no way of telling whether I was there or not. They said not, but they told me it was The Student Prince.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you have any recollection, Admiral Stark, of ever having seen The Student Prince more than once?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think I saw it earlier.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We haven't even that help to help us then, have we?

Admiral STARK. No sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, you were living at that time out in Spring Valley?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I was living in the Chief of Naval Operations' quarters.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right on Massachusetts Avenue?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You had at that time always somebody in your home to answer the telephone?

Admiral STARK. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if it should be that you attended a performance of The Student Prince at the National Theater on the night of December 6, there would still be someone in your home, according at least to your arrangements, to receive [13714] information that might come there over the telephone?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would that person there be someone directly connected with the Naval Establishment?

Admiral STARK. One of the servants, who would be in the Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you went to your office on the morning of the 7th—the exact time being uncertain—from your own recollection, is it your recollection now that that is the first time you found out there had been a reply by the Japanese to the earlier Hull message to them?

Admiral STARK. That is my very clear and very distinct recollection.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now before you arrived at your office on the morning of the 7th, had anyone given you any information that there was in existence such a message, or any part thereof?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; to the best of my knowledge and belief there had not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, Admiral, would you be able to state positively that no one either sent you a message or telephoned to you on the night of December 6 or the morning of December 7 telling you of this message, of its receipt or of its contents?

Admiral STARK. That is my belief; yes, sir.

[13715] Mr. RICHARDSON. Your visit to your office on the morning of Sunday, December 7, was a routine visit, was it not, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It was just the same kind of a visit that you were accustomed to make to that office every Sunday?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And had nothing to do with any specific dispatch or any specific information concerning which you were interested in seeing or being advised concerning?

Admiral STARK. There was a dispatch—I have forgotten just when it was received, I think the day before but I am not certain—from Admiral Hart. If you will recall, Admiral Turner stated that I called him to get the answer out to Admiral Hart. I do not have definite recollection whatever.

Now whether that dispatch might have come on that morning and I then called Turner, I am not positive without reference to the record, but I think we had it prior to that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now you would be able to state positively, would you not, Admiral, that you did not spend any nights away from your residence on Massachusetts Avenue during November or December 1941?

Admiral STARK. I would not state that without a check-up. I do not recall any.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any information of having spent [13716] any night away from your residence on Massachusetts Avenue within 2 or 3 days of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; nor within 2 or 3 weeks, but occasionally we went and spent a night with our children in Philadelphia.

Mr. RICHARDSON. According to the procedure that you followed in your staff, Admiral, would it have been the duty of any of your staff, upon being advised of the receipt and contents of an important message connected with magic, for any of them to contact you about it?

Admiral STARK. If they had thought it sufficiently important they undoubtedly would have.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now it appears here in the testimony that on the evening of the 6th, while Admiral Wilkinson was entertaining General Miles and Admiral Beardall at his home socially, the first 13 parts of this so-called 14-part message were delivered to Admiral Wilkinson by Captain Kramer; that the message was read by all of you officers at that dinner, and that their recollection is that Admiral Wilkinson did some telephoning.

I wanted to ask whether under your procedure it would have been expected that upon reading a message of that kind Wilkinson would have been expected to have contacted you?

Admiral STARK. If he considered it sufficiently important. [13717] If he were in doubt he might have contacted Ingersoll or Turner, and I believe he did contact Ingersoll, whose testimony, as I recall it, is to the effect that he considered it nothing but a restatement and unimportant, that is unimportant as regards doing anything about it at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you have no recollection now of having any telephone or other type of communication from any of your staff in connection with this message until late the next morning when you got to your office?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now that includes, does it not, Admiral, no information of any kind on the evening of the 6th or the morning of the 7th from either Secretary Knox or from Secretary Stimson, or from Secretary Hull?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. It is all-inclusive.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you have no information at all, or you had no information at all, did you, Admiral, until after you reached your office on the morning of the 7th, that a meeting had been called between Hull and Knox and Stimson to consider this particular dispatch?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I did not know of that meeting.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you do not know to this day of any effort that anyone made in connection with that meeting to advise you concerning it, or ask you to be present at it?

[13718] Admiral STARK. That is perfectly correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you find out, if you found out at all, Admiral, that these three Secretaries were meeting on the morning of December 7?

Admiral STARK. I do not recollect having found out about it. I might have, because I saw Colonel Knox later in the day, he may have mentioned it, but as to their being together that forenoon, I have no recollection, except as I learned of it subsequently.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you learned of it first after the contact between you and General Marshall had been completed?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was not prior to that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, I see what you mean. Now, did anyone tell you, or did you receive any information which would disclose to you, that the 13-part message, which had grown to the 14-part message by the time you got to your office, had been exhibited to the President on the night before?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have any information of any kind that upon an examination of that dispatch the night before the President had characterized it in this language, "This means war"?

Admiral STARK. I never heard of it until I heard of it here.

[13719] Mr. RICHARDSON. As Chief of Naval Operations, would such an expression from the President with reference to an intercepted dispatch have been an important item for you to consider in looking over such a dispatch?

Admiral STARK. I would have said yes, provided that were an opinion held after perhaps a second reading and looking over it more carefully, and if I had had anything of that sort I would have taken some action, I would have gone to the office and gotten out a dispatch and seen my advisers, but I had nothing on that evening.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me put it this way, if it is a proper question, Admiral: If you had been advised on the night of the 6th of an examination of this 13-part message by the President and his conclusion within the meaning of the phrase "This means war", acquiesced in by his associate Mr. Hopkins, would your itinerary on the morning of December 7 have been changed, so far as going to your office is concerned?

Admiral STARK. I feel certain I would have gone there that Saturday night, if I had had any such intimation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, so far as the evening of Saturday, December 6, is concerned, events leading up to it, what occurred during the evening, your recollection cannot help us?

Admiral STARK. That is right.

[13720] Mr. RICHARDSON. But you would be able to say, Admiral, definitely, that you received no communication from the President of the United States on that night?

Admiral STARK. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the President did not call me that night.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you think it would be possible, Admiral, for you to have forgotten such an incident had it occurred?

Admiral STARK. Yes, it would be possible, but I think it would not have been possible that I had had the intimation that there was a dispatch down there which was clear-cut and which meant war. While I felt we had every warning that war was coming, we all felt that, we were practically certain of it, nevertheless if there had been anything definitely clinching it of that nature and any such expression from the President, I think I would not have rested until I had seen that dispatch.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, the testimony on the President's use of the phone in order to speak to you and his report that you were at the theatre would indicate that he had received information over the telephone from some source that you were at the theater. Now what would have been your usual routine if you did go to the theater, as to leaving information as to where you were going?

Admiral STARK. With the duty officer at the Navy Department [13721] and my flag lieutenant. They would normally have been acquainted with it, as well as at the house.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you think it would have been possible—it would have been possible, but do you think it would be at all probable that you went to the theater, if you did go, without leaving that information as to where you were going?

Admiral STARK. It would have been possible but not probable. I never went out of the house at evening without leaving word as to where I was going.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, if you went to the theater on that evening, when the theater was over you expect that you went directly home, do you not?

Admiral STARK. After the theater?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you would remain there during the night?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And there were during that night and every night about that time, people in the house who could have answered the telephone if it had rung?

Admiral STARK. Oh, yes; and I had one right at my bedside.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, just one question.

[13722] I believe you stated in your former testimony that you regarded the 13 parts of this message, when you did see them the next morning, as routine, or rather as a rehashing of the attitude of the Japanese towards the situation which had been accumulating over a period of weeks or months?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that the 13 parts by themselves carried no implication to you beyond that, that it was a rehashing, a restatement of their attitude; that was your impression when you saw it the next morning?

Admiral STARK. It was; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated, I believe, that based upon those 13 parts you did not regard it necessary to give any additional warning.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Because warnings had been given to all the officers, that you regarded as sufficient. If you had seen the 13 parts of that message on the night before, would your opinion of it have been any different from what it was the next morning?

Admiral STARK. I think not. I think my reaction would have been the same as the testimony of, so far as I know, everyone else who was here indicates, that it was not of any urgency, that it was a restatement.

The CHAIRMAN. But if you had been called by the President, [13723] or had been communicated with by him following his re-

ceipt of that message, and he had told you that he thought that that was leading to war, or that meant war, you would have taken such steps as that incident might have impelled you to take, in view of the President's opinion of it, and in that case you would have gone to the office, or gone down to look at the message and examine it further and see upon what basis the President thought those 13 parts meant war?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That did not take place?

Admiral STARK. That did not take place. I had no intimation of the President's reaction. I did not know that the President had read that dispatch that night, until it was brought out here before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, as I recall, the effect of your previous testimony was that the first 13 parts of the so-called 14-part message, the 13 parts having been received on Saturday night, indicated nothing to attract any attention about Pearl Harbor.

Admiral STARK. Absolutely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And as I recall Commander Schulz' testimony to this committee, Pearl Harbor was not mentioned by the President, or Mr. Hopkins, during their discussions on the [13724] first 13 parts of this 14-part message.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. Nor did I ever hear anyone else mention Pearl Harbor in that connection.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the fact that that might have indicated war, there was nothing there to attract any attention or give any indication that Pearl Harbor was involved?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Stark, on the 27th of November, you had already sent out the war warning, had you not?

Admiral STARK. We had; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you sent this message, and you said in that message "This is a war warning", you sent it to the different Pacific theaters; that is right, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And then the President, sometime prior to December 1, said that he expected we would be attacked probably by Monday, did he not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. That was previous to December 1?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[13725] Mr. MURPHY. Now we have a Navy man saying that the President saw the first 13 parts and said "This means war." The fact is most of those in high command, if not all of those in high command, were expecting very definitely the possibility of war at that time, were they not?

Admiral STARK. We were. We had sent out warning messages regarding it. The President himself had directed either one or two messages to be sent in that connection.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you present at the White House, Admiral, on December 7?

Admiral STARK. No, sir, I was not in the White House, as I remember, on December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. We have here the stenographic report on the words of the President of the United States on December 7 before some of the great men of this country. Mr. Chairman, I think those notes ought to be produced by counsel so they can be made a part of the record in this case.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Has not that already been done?

Mr. MURPHY. They have not been made part of the record. They should be.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will wait until we have a chairman here.

Mr. MURPHY. You were not present, at any rate, when the leaders of the Senate and House and others were present at the [13726] White House with the President on the evening of Sunday, December 7, at which time he discussed the reactions of those in the White House, the reactions of themselves and others in the days preceding December 7?

Admiral STARK. My recollection is that I did not leave my office from the time I got there Sunday morning until early Monday morning.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, on the evening of December 7, 1941, there were certain persons, leading Americans, at the White House, and as I understand it further, there was a stenographic report of the remarks made by the President at that time. In view of the fact that we have seen fit to have a witness come here to tell what the President said on the 6th of December, I think that the remarks of the President on the 7th of December 1941 ought to be made a part of the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest, we are now having that full stenographic report mimeographed for introduction as an exhibit, largely in connection with the Stimson statement, because it much more directly relates to that than it does to this witness' testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. The one I have reference to consists only of about 4 pages, or maybe 5 and maybe 6 at the most.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There is only one and that is the one [13727] we are having mimeographed.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, I think that should be made a part of the record. I will not press it now, but I think it ought to be made a part of the record at some time.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be presented to the committee for inclusion as an exhibit, as I understand.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes; as soon as it is mimeographed.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Is that all?

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, did not your duty officer at your office have a log where he entered all telephone calls if you were not there, so that the next day, or at the time you would come in, the log would indicate who called and if they had a message?

Admiral STARK. I think not. If there had been a message or anything definite to be brought to me he undoubtedly would have told me, but I know of no log kept by the duty officer. There may have been one, but I just do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Is not that the ordinary practice in the Navy, that if you have a watch officer he keeps a log?

Admiral STARK. Of anything worth while; yes, sir.

[13728] Senator FERGUSON. Would not a communication from the President of the United States on Saturday evening, December 6, to be a worth-while item to enter in a log if you were not there and a telephone call was made to your duty officer to reach you?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I would say so.

Senator FERGUSON. You would say that would be worth while, would you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever looked for such a log?

Admiral STARK. No; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, or Mr. Masten, do you know whether or not there has been a search for such a log?

Mr. MASTEN. They gave us a list of the people who were in the office, and that is in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask you now that counsel request that an examination be made to see if there is such a log.

Did you have naval aides at your home?

Admiral STARK. Have what, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Naval aides.

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you just have civilian servants working for you personally or were they Government employees?

Admiral STARK. I understood your question to say did I [13729] have naval aides.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I was thinking of that, when you said that, of my flag secretary. The servants were Government servants.

Senator FERGUSON. What classification in the Navy would they have?

Admiral STARK. Mess attendants, steward, cook and mess attendants.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a secretary or anyone like that at home?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Anyone to take phone calls?

Admiral STARK. The boys—they were intelligent, good boys, would take a telephone call.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they Filipino boys?

Admiral STARK. No, sir, they were colored.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not recall getting any message from any servant?

Admiral STARK. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. About a call from the President?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall any calls from Kramer?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

[13730] Senator FERGUSON. Captain Kramer?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a policy or a plan that you were going to undertake if war actually came? You had one of these cards, did you not, that you could be telephoned on the winds message? Do you recall that?

Admiral STARK. No; I do not recall any card with regard to being telephoned on the winds message.

Senator FERGUSON. A memorandum that "East wind rain" meant war?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never saw such a card?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or memorandum?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. If anything important on that would have come in I would have been notified, but I was given no card.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you knew that they were alerted to the receipt of a winds message?

Admiral STARK. I know it now, and I testified that my recollection on the winds message was not clear, except to the extent that it was my belief that an implementation of the winds message never came in. We covered that.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to go further than that. I [13731] want to know what you knew about the fact that your Department was expecting a so-called winds message which would indicate certain things, as set out by the Japanese messages. You are familiar with those messages now that we have had them here?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now will you state to the committee what you knew about that set-up? Did you know anything about it?

Admiral STARK. I know what it is now. I do not recall being familiar with the details of that set-up at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now if it was important enough for your staff under you to arrange it so that any member could be called on the phone and he would have in his possession information that he could tell what they were talking about without giving away any secret—in other words, the testimony now indicates that if your inferior officers had called you on the telephone and said, "Admiral, East wind rain", that that had a significant meaning and that you would have known that that was a reply to the wind code message.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall having that at that time. My office was about 10 minutes from the Navy Department and any message could have come up there very quickly. I say 10 minutes, but maybe 15, say, at the outside.

Senator FERGUSON. I know, but you also were out of the Navy office at times.

[13732] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not recall any such set-up, as far as you are concerned?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I take it you had no policy or plan as to what the Navy would do at the time you received a winds intercept?

Admiral STARK. No, we had no special policy or plan if the winds message had come in showing a break, for example, or strained relations because we already had them.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. But the Dutch themselves said that the winds code would mean war. Did you know that?

Admiral STARK. I have heard it since. I do not recall at that time of having any interpretation of the winds message, the meaning war. It has been much discussed since then.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to get at is if the President did come to the conclusion Saturday night that, reading the 13 parts and the other messages connected with it, this meant war, as the Dutch had interpreted the winds code message, if it was received, would mean, the Navy Department of the United States of America had no plan as to what they would do upon the happening of that event, is that true?

Admiral STARK. That is true. We had a plan in case of war, which of course, you are all familiar with, and when war [13733] came we simply sent out the execute of that plan.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, you say that relations were very strained on Saturday and Friday?

Admiral STARK. I certainly would say so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did you have a plan that if you received word, or something that would indicate that America was going to war, that the United States Navy had a plan that you were going to do something, that you would act?

Admiral STARK. Well, we had already sent in the war warning an alert against the possibility of war. Until the clash came we had nothing else. When the clash came we were fully covered.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you felt that the message of the 27th was your full plan and that you had no part to take, that you had no steps to take until war actually broke out?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. We considered we had fully alerted them with the directives which were given both by the Army and by ourselves.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how do you explain the calling of the meeting Sunday morning in your office of the various officers?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there such a meeting called?

Admiral STARK. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief. [13734] That has also been covered, I believe, in previous testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there various officers assembled in your office Sunday morning?

Admiral STARK. Not that I recall, except those that came in on routine business, and with the message, but as for a meeting that morning, a regularly scheduled meeting, I think it did not take place.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do I understand from the testimony that you gave to Mr. Richardson, the counsel, this morning, that your mind is rather a blank on what took place Saturday afternoon and Saturday night?

Admiral STARK. As regards the 13-point message; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, as to where you were?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and as to where I was, except that I was in the office Saturday afternoon.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it do any good to try to refresh your memory on the people that were at this party? I think we have a list.

Admiral STARK. No, it would not, I can tell you that in advance. My opinion is and my belief is that I was not at that party.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the naval attaché from Canada, Mr. and Mrs. Brodeur? Do you know them?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think I knew them.

[13735] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know the McCarthys?

Admiral STARK. Well, I knew so many people of slight acquaintance that I would remember their faces and perhaps not their names.

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose you look at the society column in the Sunday Star, Admiral (handing document to Admiral Stark).

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you just look and see whether or not the write-up on that party would in any way refresh your memory?

Admiral STARK. I would like to say as regards parties, Senator Ferguson, that in a very recent important party to which I had been invited, and at which I was not present, but the press having the list put me down as one of the important persons there.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not mean to prove by the fact that the press listed you as being there, that you were there, but I thought that the write-up of the society editor would give you some information that would refresh your memory as to being at that kind of party.

Admiral STARK. I will gladly read it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. For the record, the Star you mentioned is the Washington Star?

[13736] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You referred to the Star.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the Washington Star.

Admiral STARK (after perusing document). No, it does not. It says I was there, but my knowledge on reporting things of this sort does not make that at all conclusive.

Senator FERGUSON. Would the fact that the Minister from the Commonwealth of Australia, Mr. Casey and Mrs. Casey, are listed there, would that in any way refresh your memory?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I knew Mr. Casey quite well. I saw him frequently.

Senator FERGUSON. So that does not refresh your memory in the least?

Admiral STARK. It does not. There were many such parties, to which I did not go generally.

Senator FERGUSON. We have some more information on the question as to what happened Saturday. I want to know whether or not you were consulted by the President in relation to a message received from the Prime Minister, sent to the President of the United States, in relation to a message to be sent by the British Government and the Dominion Government. I will show you that document and let you read it.

(The document was handed to Admiral Stark.)

Senator FERGUSON. Does counsel want to offer that in evidence now? [13737]

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think it would probably be just as well, if it suits the Chairman, to have it included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this the document on our desks here?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. It might be included in the record instead of making it an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Dated December 7, 1941?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I will read it into the record, or suppose we let Mr. Masten read it into the record?

Mr. MASTEN. I think the record should show in addition, Senator, the covering letter from the State Department, which reads as follows:

Dear Mr. RICHARDSON: In further reference to Mr. Masten's memorandum of February 23, regarding the clearance of certain documents, the British Government has now notified us that clearance has been obtained for documents numbered 6 and 8. We are informed, however, that the Australian Government has requested that document No. 8 should only be released together with a paraphrase of a telegram from the Australian Minister of External Affairs relating to this document. A paraphrase of that telegram as received from the British Embassy is therefore [13738] enclosed herewith.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ Herbert S. Marks

HERBERT S. MARKS

Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Senator, do you want me to read this?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, you may read that.

Mr. MASTEN. The documents enclosed are as follows, and the first is a memorandum dated December 7, 1941, which appears to have been on stationery bearing the British seal, and reads as follows:

The Prime Minister would be very glad of any comments which the President may have on the attached draft of a declaration to the Japanese Government.

The Dominion Governments have yet to give their views on this text. They are being consulted urgently.

The Netherlands Government have been given a copy of the draft.

The next one is:

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have been instructed to make the following communication to the Imperial Japanese Government on behalf of His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, the Commonwealth [13739] of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa.

His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa have followed closely in consultation with the United States Government the negotiations in which the latter have been engaged with the Japanese Government with a view to relieving the present tension in the Far East. His Majesty's Governments viewed with the same concern as the United States Government the rapidly growing concentration of Japanese forces in Indo-China which prompted the enquiry by the United States Government to the Japanese Government on December 2nd. They have found Japanese reply to that enquiry extremely disquieting. However valid the explanations in regard to North Indo-China as to which they expressly reserve their views the reply entirely fails to explain the fact that the bulk of Japanese forces are stationed in South Indo-China and are being constantly and heavily augmented.

There is no threat from any quarter against Indo-China and this concentration in South Indo-China is only explicable on the assumption that the Japanese Government are preparing for some further aggressive move directed against the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya or Thailand.

Relations between the Governments of the British Commonwealth and the Netherlands Government are too well known for [13740] the Japanese Government to be under any illusion as to their reaction to any attack on terri-

stories of the Netherlands. In the interest of peace His Majesty's Governments feel it incumbent upon them however to remove any uncertainty which may exist as regards their attitude in the event of attack on Thailand.

His Majesty's Governments have no designs against Thailand. On the contrary preservation of full independence and sovereignty of Thailand is an important British interest. Any attempt by Japan to impair that independence or sovereignty would affect the security of Burma and Malay and His Majesty's Governments could not be indifferent to it. They feel bound therefore to warn the Japanese Government in the most solemn manner that if Japan attempts to establish her influence in Thailand by force or threat of force she will do so at her own peril and His Majesty's Governments will at once take all appropriate measures. Should hostilities unfortunately result the responsibility will rest with Japan.

These two documents, Senator, came from President Roosevelt's file.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked that they be cleared, and then, as I understand it, before they could be cleared the Australian Government insisted upon attaching the paper that you read now.

Mr. MASTEN. That is correct.

[13741] Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield for the purpose of making an explanation?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Were those produced by Miss Tully some months ago?

Mr. MASTEN. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But we were waiting for clearances until just recently.

Mr. MASTEN. That also is correct. The final document is the paraphrase of a telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the United Kingdom, which is the telegram referred to in the letter to Mr. Richardson from the State Department, and is as follows:

Subject to conditions that President gives prior approval to text of warning as drafted and also gives signal for actual delivery of warning, we concur in draft as a joint communication from all His Majesty's Governments. I point out that message from Australian Minister at Washington just received notes that,

1. President has decided to send message to Emperor.

2. President's subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by him from the [13742] Emperor by Monday evening,

(a) he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening,

(b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until Wednesday morning, i. e. after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, my question on that is: Were you ever consulted by the President of the United States in relation to that document, the one first read?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that I was, Senator Ferguson. We often talked over the Thailand situation, and that entire area, but as to this specific document, I do not recall that I was ever consulted by the President with reference to it.

Senator FERGUSON. You were the Chief Naval Officer and it would be very important. If any steps were to be taken, you were the man that would take them, isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Well, I would be very much interested, along with the Army. He may have talked that over with me. I recall so much conversation with reference to that whole area that I do not pin

it down to that specific document dated the 7th of December, and to which the reply would be made after the 7th.

[13743] Senator FERGUSON. This does not state that a reply would be made necessarily after the 7th, unless you relate it to the last page.

Admiral STARK. I was relating it to the last page; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The first item—now, this would indicate it was prior to 9 o'clock on the 6th of December, because the message to the Emperor was sent at 9 o'clock or shortly after, on the 6th of December 1941, and it appears that the Australian Minister had a message from the President to this effect, "President has decided to send message to Emperor." That would indicate that it was not sent, that he had decided to send it, and prior to sending it he had notified the Prime Minister, or the Australian Minister, which would be Mr. Casey.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the President had decided to send that message prior to its being sent on the night of the 6th?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I recall the talk of the President sending a message to the Emperor. I did not see the message beforehand, as I recall, but it had been discussed when I was present.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how long before the 6th—or was it on the 6th—that you discussed it with the President?

[13744] Admiral STARK. I think that message to the Emperor was discussed some days before, as I remember. I have forgotten just when.

Senator FERGUSON. The next item, "President's subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by him from the Emperor by Monday evening" that he would do certain things, first, "he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening." Did the President consult you in relation to that?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be a very important matter, would it not?

Admiral STARK. It would be a very important matter.

Senator FERGUSON. That he was going to send the message?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then he was going to wait until Monday evening as to whether or not a reply was made by the Emperor, and if no reply was made, that he was going to issue his warning. That would be a warning to Japan, I take it, on Tuesday afternoon or evening.

Admiral STARK. It would be a very important State Department matter in that sphere, and, of course, we would know of it. We might not necessarily be particularly consulted about it beforehand, although I do recollect the thought of a message to the Emperor.

[13745] Senator FERGUSON. When we were on the verge of war a diplomatic move would be very material to the Navy, would it not, and you would not be consulted with relation to that?

Admiral STARK. Not necessarily. It would be very important, but the President's principal adviser in that connection was Mr. Hull, and while we would probably learn of it, we would not necessarily be consulted.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do I understand that you had practically washed your hands of the matter 10 days before and had sent a warning and were just sitting and waiting until something happened?

Admiral STARK. No; I do not mean to convey that at all. We were intensely interested. When you ask me if the President would not consult me as regards that message, he might and he might not have.

Senator FERGUSON. Had not Mr. Hull told you and General Marshall sometime before that he was through, that it was up to the Navy and Army?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not recall being consulted by anyone, or hearing about "We will wait until Tuesday afternoon or evening before we will reply," or something of that sort?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that point at all; no, sir. [13746] I might have known of it, but I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the (b) "warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until Wednesday morning, i. e., after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and Washington," that is the President's own warning.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I do not think, Senator Ferguson, that because Mr. Hull stated he had washed his hands of it and it was now up to the Army and Navy, that that would in any sense indicate that Mr. Hull would not be the primary adviser of the President on anything of this sort, and would not continue to be until war actually broke.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not this to be a military or naval decision, if a warning like this was to be given? I take it from the original, that is, the original memorandum from the Prime Minister of Great Britain, that they were talking about an ultimatum, they were talking about real action, they were going to warn Japan and she could not move any further, and therefore if you wanted to stop the movement by an army or a navy, you would have to stop it not by diplomacy, you would have to stop it by might. You and General Marshall controlled the might of the United States, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Well, we fight for peace after it has been lost by diplomacy and not beforehand. I would consider that the message which went out would be diplomatic and would be a [13747] state matter from the State Department political angle, and that that would be primarily their responsibility.

Senator FERGUSON. You were controlling the Navy. Would not you have to be ready that if this warning was sent it might and could possibly mean war, and that war might or could possibly start immediately, and therefore a new alert, something new would be necessary?

Admiral STARK. Not to my mind; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think so?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. We felt we were fully alerted. Our plans were ready, if war broke, in all theaters.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I have another item here. I show you a message from OPNAV, which was your Department, to CINCAF, which was sent about noon prior to the attack on the 7th. Would you just read that and tell me if you know anything about it? I received that March 6 from counsel. It was requested prior to that but was sent to me on that day.

(The document was handed to Admiral Stark.)

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield before we go on to another subject?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I wonder if there is anything to show that this suggested paper, which has been read into the record, was ever sent by the British Government?

[13748] Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the first sheet shows that the British Government sent it to us.

Mr. MURPHY. No; but I mean to Japan. Did the President send that message to Japan?

Senator FERGUSON. No, it does not show.

Mr. MURPHY. This is just a tentative suggestion, isn't that right?

Mr. MASTEN. That is correct, so far as we know.

Mr. MURPHY. So far as you know, there never was a message sent by the British to Japan?

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to say here, Counsel, Mr. Hull nowhere in his statement mentions this item. So far the records have not shown that any message was delivered to the Australian Minister, or that the President had decided to do what is set forth here by the Australian Minister. I wish you would now check the records of the Secretary of State and White House to ascertain what memorandum we have about what the President had determined to do, when he determined to do it, and when the messages were sent, and when this message was sent to the Australian Minister. I think that is very important in this record.

Mr. MASTEN. We will be glad to do that. I think if there were any further documents in the State Department about that they would have turned it over in response to the numerous [13749] requests we have made to them, and the request which was made originally to them. We can ask them again.

Senator FERGUSON. I just cannot conceive of the fact that our Government would send this kind of message to the Australian Minister and keep no memorandum of it. Our State Department functions in the way we have been shown by the record, that of anything that is done a memorandum is made.

Mr. MASTEN. Senator, this is not a memorandum from our Government.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that very much. It comes from the Australian Government, but it indicates clearly that the Australian Minister had this information from our Government, and I have never known our Government to give verbal information; they would make a memorandum of what they had given to another Government. Governments do not function along that line. For that reason I ask that the Secretary of State's office again be asked for this information.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield just for the one matter of the insertion in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. There would be a memorandum of a conversation, because if they have a conversation they make a memorandum of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

[13750] Mr. MURPHY. Don't you think the record should show what you are reading from is a paraphrase of a telegram from the

Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the United Kingdom?

Senator FERGUSON. That has already been read into the record.

Mr. MURPHY. I do not believe it has.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask one question about this. The first paper you read is dated December 7. That is the day on which the attack was made, and it refers to the papers that were read later.

Now obviously that message, that memorandum was made before the attack, otherwise it would have no purpose whatever, and when the attack came of course it vitiated and nullified all this talk of what was going to be done in that suggestion.

Does the record show at what time that memorandum was received or made or sent? It must have been on the morning of the 7th.

Mr. MASTEN. There is nothing on that shown in the document. We have photostats of the original here.

The CHAIRMAN. It is obvious it must have been made before the attack.

Mr. MASTEN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. There would be no point to sending it after [13751] the attack, because the whole situation had changed.

Mr. MASTEN. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There is only one date, Mr. Chairman, on this entire photostat, and that is in the first memorandum, the first note of the Prime Minister, that bears the date on the bottom of December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. It bears the date December 7, and it refers to these other documents you have read, and it seems obvious to me that all this must have happened on the morning of the 7th before the attack, because there would have been no point in having such documents or making any such suggestions or recommendations after the attack became known.

Senator BREWSTER. Will the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I am just trying to straighten this out here.

Senator BREWSTER. When you say it all transpired earlier, it appears that the message from the Prime Minister of the Dominion Government could have been 1, 2, or 3 days earlier. It does not appear as to the date that message was submitted to our Government on the 7th, and there also appears no time on the paraphrase of the telegram. Do you know why that is? Why should not we have the day and time of that?

Mr. MASTEN. I understand we asked the State Department for that date.

[13752] The CHAIRMAN. This December 7 document, the only one that has any date on it, must have been submitted to the President on that day, because it says the Prime Minister would be glad to have any comments which the President may have on the attached draft. Whenever that other draft was written does not seem to appear.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think it is material if you look at the original photostatic copy, the first sheet, which is a small paper from the British Embassy. It is mimeographed and therefore does not show it. At the top of it it has the seal of the British Government, indicating that they attached the sheet sent to our State Department, or to the President, the next two sheets. But the sig-

nificant part of that is that the last page indicates the negotiations were going on with Australia prior to that, because the President had not sent his message to the Emperor until the night of the 6th, and this says, "The President has decided to send a message to the Emperor." It would indicate that he had not sent it, that he had just decided to send it, and that this is what he is going to do after it goes, he is going to wait until Monday.

I think it is very material that we get all these dates.

The CHAIRMAN. That was all thrown out the window by what happened at noon Sunday, which must have been not very long [13753] after this thing was delivered to the President, because it was delivered to him on the morning of the 7th. There seems to have been a confusion there as to the time. I do not know that it makes much difference when these other papers were drafted. They were evidently submitted to the President on the 7th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. My view, and the interpretation we have made at our office of it was that this proposed dispatch from the British Government to Japan, consisting of two pages here in this photostat, was a document prepared by the British Government without date, for the purpose of being transmitted to the President. That is the idea the British Government had as to what the President might do, and as to its reliance on it. That, in connection with the preparation of this document by the British Government, the Australian Minister for External Affairs put a condition on his agreement to it. Then that added to the other was to be presented to the President.

Now, it seems perfectly clear that it was intended to be presented to the President, and it seems perfectly clear that before the Australian Minister made up his dispatch the President had not yet sent his message to Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. He had not received these papers, either.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The Australian Minister must have received the proposal of the British Government, because a [13754] part of the Australian Minister's answer is that the President has decided to send a message.

Now, apparently they were not through with contact with the Dominion Government at that time, at the time this first note of December 7 was made, because of the recital that the Dominion governments have yet to give their views on this text. Consequently, it would seem as though the thing was all tentative and was to be crystallized when the President issued his message to Japan.

The important thing about it, from our standpoint, was the second clause, which indicates a knowledge on the part of the Australian Minister of what the President proposed to do if he received no reply from Japan.

Now, the interesting thing is, or was, to us as soon as we saw this, which was recently, and that is where did the Minister from Australia get his authority to state what the President's procedure was to be? Now, if that was a conversation between him and the President, then we have to look in the Presidential files possibly for the basis for that conversation.

If the State Department had anything to do with it I am satisfied we would find in the State Department records a memorandum of the President's procedure, but until this Australian document came in we found nothing that indicated [13755] any procedure on the

part of the President at all after his message. Of course, it is true that before any of it could be crystallized into action the attack came about; but that still does not dispose of the question as to whether the President had made up his mind as to what he intended to do.

[13756] Mr. CLARK. I would like to ask, counsel, if you have any evidence that the President ever saw these papers before he sent his message to Japan.

Mr. RICHARDSON. These papers came to us from Miss Tully in answer to our request that she take from the Presidential records anything that had any reference to Pearl Harbor.

So they went to the President. There is nothing to indicate here that the President saw them before the Pearl Harbor attack.

Mr. CLARK. I mean before he sent his message to Japan, to the Emperor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There is nothing in these papers to indicate that the President saw any of these documents before he made his address to the Emperor.

Mr. CLARK. Then what is the significance of them here?

Mr. RICHARDSON. The only significance—I won't say the only significance—but the sharp significance to us, Mr. Congressman, was that Australia seemed to have learned from the President that if the Japanese did not reply to the prospective message that President Roosevelt was to send to the Emperor, that then President Roosevelt had determined that he would issue the Presidential warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening.

Up to now we have had no such information from any source.

[13757] Mr. CLARK. But he did actually send it on the 6th?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. The night of the 6th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He sent it on the 6th. Now, did he receive a reply to his message to the Emperor?

Mr. MURPHY. Not until after the attack.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then before he could act on it, under the procedure identified by the Australian Minister, presumably the attack on Pearl Harbor came about.

The CHAIRMAN. The message sent on the night of the 6th was not the warning contemplated by these papers.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. His message was more in the nature of an appeal.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Not a warning. These papers indicate that if he got no reply by the following Tuesday, he then would issue to the Japanese Government what was regarded as a warning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The attack cut that all off.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I don't think the record should stand as it now stands, that the Australian Minister knew facts and circumstances that the Secretary of State of [13758] the United States did not know. For that reason I would like to clear up as to whether it is possible that the Australian Minister in Washington knew these facts set forth which our own Secretary of State didn't know, and which the American people haven't known until this morning.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. I think that we ought to look into the facts in the Secretary of State's office to see whether that is possible.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to inquire whether, since this has been known long enough for us to have clearance from the British Government, if counsel, or anyone has asked the State Department that specific question, or Sumner Welles, as to their knowledge as to this particular document.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Welles was examined in detail.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that we had to wait until counsel got clearance through the State Department.

Since it was known that it was going to be introduced, has the State Department or Mr. Welles, formerly with the State Department, been asked this question, as to whether the American State Department knew about it?

Mr. MASTEN. That question has not been asked.

[13759] Mr. MURPHY. I don't think it is a fair inference to say that our State Department did not know, and that it was not known by the American people until this morning, then.

Mr. MASTEN. I think perhaps the record should show where the documents came from, and when.

The two British documents were found in the President's file by Miss Tully, and were not found in the State Department files. They were in the papers that were submitted to the committee informally several months ago, and it was decided to request a clearance. That request was made as soon as the instructions were given by the committee.

Clearance was not given until this letter from the State Department was received, last Friday, I believe. It is undated, but I understand that it came in the office last Friday. And the reason clearance was held up was because the British Government advised the State Department that they wanted to submit this document to the Dominions—because the first memorandum says the Dominions were being consulted at the time it occurred. The documents were then mimeographed and were distributed here this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. So the record may be clear, I don't purport to state what the Secretary of State knew. I merely stated that our record up to date indicates that he didn't know this, and that is why I think he ought to have a chance [13760] to look into it.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel will inquire of the State Department any further facts relating to these documents that are on record.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, we can prove one fact here this morning, can we not, that the Navy, as far as you were concerned had no knowledge of the contents of these documents that we have been speaking so much about this morning?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, to the best of my remembrance; and after hearing the discussion, I don't think I could be expected to have any, in view of the time and date.

Senator FERGUSON. All of this discussion has not refreshed your memory?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

¹ See p. 5507 et seq., *infra*, for further information in this connection.

Senator BREWSTER. May I interrupt?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. What you say as to the timing, Admiral, is not quite relevant, as, if this document of the Australian is correct, and that a decision had been reached on procedure. That must have been, I would assume, prior to December 7, as the clear implication of the document is that the Australian Government had sent this message to the Prime Minister and had received prior thereto word from the Australian Minister in Washington as to what was contemplated would be done. That [13761] must have been a decision at or earlier than December 6, and would, presumably have been the result of consultations between the responsible authorities, among whom you would be included.

So I don't think you can dispose of the matter by saying it was simply relating to December 7. If there were a decision, it must have been certainly some days earlier.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I see your point.

Senator BREWSTER. You would agree that that was so?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. It seems to me that this illustrates very clearly the necessity of thorough exploration and the tremendous value of cross-examination—not in any hostile sense, but in simply seeking out all of the relevant material, since we have been on this question now for nearly 6 months and here is something which would appear to be the basis for decision relating to this affair which none of us have been previously advised of, and either the Secretary of State did not know about it, which seems unlikely, or didn't consider it material in his review of the situation.

The result is to leave one pondering how many other documents, or material of this character may still have not been developed.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go on to your next matter [13762] Senator Ferguson, there is a question of procedure that has to be settled.

I have got to be on the floor at 12 o'clock on account of the housing bill, and the members of the House tell me that they have to be over in the House.

The other day you indicated to me that you couldn't be here tomorrow.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And I can't be here tomorrow because I have to be before another committee.

Under those circumstances we cannot hold a session this afternoon. It may have to go over until Thursday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. On Thursday I couldn't reach Washington until about 11 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. General Marshall advises me that he is extremely anxious to return to China on account of the situation that we are all familiar with. He is getting daily requests to return immediately. For that reason I don't like to hold him here longer than necessary.

This is off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Come around then, General. Maybe we can finish with you now.

Admiral Stark, you will be available?

[13763] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.¹

The CHAIRMAN. It is very essential that we conclude these hearings at the earliest possible date. Time is running against us. We are all hoping that there will not be another request for an extension of time to make a report.

But that is another matter.

Go ahead, counsel.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMIES GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Mr. RICHARDSON. General, where were you living on the 6th and 7th of December 1941?

General MARSHALL. Fort Myer, Va., sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The evidence that has been taken here indicates, at pages 2930 and 3091,² that your records show nothing to indicate that you were not home on the night and evening of December 6th.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was at all times at your home, people who knew your whereabouts?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And who could answer telephone inquiries as to your whereabouts?

General MARSHALL. Correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You recall when you came to your office [13764] on Sunday morning, the 7th, seeing the message that was referred to as the 14-parts message?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you first saw that message, it was complete was it not, General?

General MARSHALL. It was complete.

Mr. RICHARDSON. With the 1 o'clock p. m., notice in connection with it?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was the first time, as I understand your testimony, which you already have given, that you ever saw that message, or any part of it?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did anyone at any time prior to your seeing that message, tell you the nature of the intercept which constituted the 14-part message?

General MARSHALL. Only to the extent that when I came in from a ride on that Sunday morning of December 7, I was told, either after I got in the shower, or as I went into it, that the officer in charge of the "magic," Colonel Bratton, desired to come out right away to show me an important message. But the contents were not mentioned. The fact that it was important was mentioned. And my reply was that I would reach the Department immediately, not to come out to the house.

[13765]. Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you first contacted by your aide?

General MARSHALL. I had no aide. My orderly gave me the message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He gave you the message that Colonel Bratton—

General MARSHALL. Wanted to come out to the house.

¹ Admiral Stark's testimony is resumed on p. 5202, infra.

² Hearings, Part 3, pp. 1110 and 1174, respectively.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then your reply was, Colonel Bratton testified, to take it to your office, and that you would come to your office.

General MARSHALL. Correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The only description of what the message was, was that it was an important message?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any attempt, do you know of any attempt prior to Colonel Bratton's contact with your orderly, to engage your attention in connection with any part of this 14-part message?

General MARSHALL. I know of no such attempt.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would there, in your opinion, have been any difficulty in reaching you on Saturday night at your home?

General MARSHALL. None whatever.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you be able to testify definitely, General, that no one did reach you with any message in reference to the 14-part message on the night of December 6? [13766]

General MARSHALL. No one did reach me in regard to that message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And when you rose in the morning, went for your ride, you were entirely without any knowledge whatever that any such message, any part of the message, had been received the night before, or that the balance of it had already been received on the morning of the 7th?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was no communication to you that the 13-part message had been presented to the President?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Or that the President had characterized its nature?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And, so far as you know, no one made any attempt whatever to get information to you until Colonel Bratton attempted to on the morning of December 7?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. No questions.

Mr. Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just one point, if I may, General.

As I recall, Colonel Bratton testified that he called you home Sunday morning, and talked to your orderly there, and was told that you had gone for your horseback ride and that he asked the orderly if he knew how to get in touch with you and he stated that he did; that Colonel Bratton thereupon requested the orderly to get in touch with you and ask you to go to the nearest telephone and call him; and, as I recall Colonel Bratton also stated that his recollection was that you called him about 10:30 and that he told you that he had an important message that he wanted to show you and that you told him you would be at the War Department in a short time.

Do you have any recollection of having called Colonel Bratton that morning, and having such a conversation?

General MARSHALL. None whatever.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. General, there is just one matter that I wanted to have a little more formally established than was before in your evidence.

It seems to have some significance.

[13768] That is, your expression of opinion—I do not know how casual it was, which appears on page 1149 of the printed proceedings now, page 3,028 of the record, concerning the decision of the Japanese, and this was the language which you used:

Had they—

meaning the Japanese—

not attacked on December 7th, had they waited, for example, until January 1st, there is a possibility that they would not have launched the attack.

That, I assume, represents a rather considered judgment as to, at least, what was a possibility?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And that was based, as the context shows, on the events around Moscow, where the German attack was going forward, but the turn came at just about that time.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. In the early days.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. The Japanese found themselves then committed.

General MARSHALL. Yes. It also related to what we were going to be able to do in the interim.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Between, we will say, the 1st of [13769] December, and the 1st of January.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. You and Admiral Stark had both concurred in hoping that decision might be deferred for at least 2 or 3 months.

General MARSHALL. That was our great desire.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. That was the occasion of the discussion of the *modus vivendi*?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. And the documents in relation thereto?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. To what extent was there knowledge in our Department here, and your information, if you have any recollection at this time, as to the imminence of any change in the situation around Moscow at that time, do you recall?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall what the status of that information was on December 6 and December 7. I recall when the cumulative information came in, we became aware that the change of weather had ruined the Germany Army, in addition to the added troop defense of Moscow. But whether that came to us on that date or later, I couldn't say. The newspaper files could tell us a great deal on that.

Senator BREWSTER. Did we have intelligence operating at that time regarding those events?

That is, what sources did we have?

[13770] General MARSHALL. Our sources were largely those that came from the Russian Government in its official communiques.

Senator BREWSTER. From what?

General MARSHALL. The Soviet Government, in its official communiques.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, didn't the British have additional Intelligence, as a result of their involvement?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall whether they gave us anything at that time.

Senator BREWSTER. But whether they would have had it?

General MARSHALL. They might have had.

Senator BREWSTER. My question was as to whether they would have any more means, as they were actively involved.

General MARSHALL. Yes. I don't know how well their system was built up at that time, but they might have had more.

Senator BREWSTER. Would there be records as to the interchange of information between our Government and the British Government at the military level regarding the developments prior to December 7?

General MARSHALL. There might be in the G-2 files.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, presumably there was a great change after December 7.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[13771] Senator BREWSTER. What I am concerned with is how far you had gone in developing the interchange of the military information regarding enemy movements.

General MARSHALL. At that time, I am quite certain that the facts of the British source of information was not known to us—I am quite certain of that, naturally, it was not known to us—but in addition they were not giving us the facts. They were not jeopardizing the source.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, and they would probably—

General MARSHALL. It was quite some time after that, quite a long time after that before they took the risk of telling us exactly what they had. They gave us the sense of the reports, but the actual authoritative statements of what it was, and who said it, we did not know.

Senator BREWSTER. Would it be a fair inference that prior to December 7, the British were in all probability far better informed regarding events around Moscow, in the month of November than was our own Intelligence?

General MARSHALL. I couldn't give an opinion on that, Senator Brewster, for the reason that I don't know just when the British accomplished the break-down of the German codes. It was not only a question of breaking it down, but the rapidity with which you could pick up the changes. All of which was a tremendous development. I don't know what that was at [13772] that time. They may have been 3 or 4 weeks behind the events.

Senator BREWSTER. Didn't the British necessarily have some form of liaison with the Russians during that period?

General MARSHALL. I don't know that they had any better than we had.

Senator BREWSTER. They were at war and we were not.

General MARSHALL. Yes; but after we were in the war we still depended largely on the Soviet communiques for a long time. The Soviet Government didn't trust our security.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General MARSHALL. And they were very reluctant to open that up to us.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you think they may have been equally skeptical regarding the British?

General MARSHALL. Well, the British have a pretty firm law on the question, which we do not have.

Senator BREWSTER. That is right.

General MARSHALL. They have the means of maintaining security which we lack.

Senator BREWSTER. There might be closer coordination between two nations that were actually involved in war on the same side, and another country which was not.

General MARSHALL. I was judging that through the back side [13773] of my knowledge of our relationships with the Soviet Government later on.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. What interested me was the dropping of the modus vivendi around November 26, concerning which Secretary Welles testified, which apparently occasioned some surprise to Lord Halifax, who, as he said, came down quite early the next morning, and wanted to know what happened with the modus vivendi, and was simply surprised that London had indicated the day before that they thought it had better be dropped.

That may have been a very important turning point, if your opinion is correct, if the modus vivendi which, apparently was being very seriously considered, and had been approved by you and Admiral Stark on November 25, I think it was, as adequate to protect our interests, had gone into effect for 3 months, then we should have had exactly the situation you envisaged in your opinion, the Japanese having discovered meanwhile that the Moscow retreat was on, and it might have reoriented their entire view. Would that be a fair inference?

General MARSHALL. That might be, but as I recall—I am trying to think back to the terms of discussion of that day, and the documents—the Chinese reaction was quite pertinent to the occasion; as I recall that was the most vigorous opposi- [13774] tion to the affair, and that the real decision was largely based on that, where we dropped the matter; that the Generalissimo was terribly upset over the psychological reaction to China.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you recall discussion of the decision to drop the modus vivendi around November 25, when that decision was reached? Do you recall, Secretary Stimson's report to us showed, and Colonel Knox's that some 2 days before they carefully considered this modus vivendi, in conference with you and Admiral Stark, and had decided that it would adequately protect us. Then, Secretary Stimson showed, a day or two later, that that had been dropped. This showed it was on November 25.

Mr. HULL. This was a very full day indeed. At 9:30, Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for 3 months truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all of our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don't think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic.

Mr. MURPHY. I think you said Mr. Hull. Those are Mr. Stimson's words, aren't they?

Senator BREWSTER. If I said Mr. Hull, I meant to say Mr. Stimson [13775] Mr. MURPHY. I think you did.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. This is Mr. Stimson's report of his conference with Mr. Hull and with Colonel Knox.

Now, immediately following that, 2 days later, this was dropped and Mr. Hull reported that they decided to drop the modus vivendi, and were going forward with the document which has been variously discussed as to whether it was an ultimatum or not. Do you recall any conversations following the approval of the modus vivendi as adequate, which, I assume, Secretary Stimson had arrived at after consultation with you, do you recall any conversations following that as to the dropping of the modus vivendi?

General MARSHALL. My recollection is, and I have a fairly clear recollection of our disappointment, that from the military point of view, meaning Army and Navy, that we would not gain any more time; our relationship to these discussions was on the one side the desire to gain as much time as we possibly could and on the other to see that commitments were not made that endangered us from a military point of view.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you recall the day you went away?

General MARSHALL. I left, I think, the night of—I wasn't here the 27th—

[13776] Senator FERGUSON. The night of the 26th.

General MARSHALL. I left the night of the 26th.

Senator BREWSTER. On the 26th, Mr. Stimson records in his diary

Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over—to tell them that he has no other proposition at all. The Chinese have objected to that proposition—when he showed it to them; that is, to the proposition which he showed to Knox and me, because it involves giving to the Japanese a small modicum of oil for civilian use during the interval of the truce of the 3 months. Chiang Kai-Shek had sent a special message to the effect that that would make a terribly bad impression in China; that it would destroy all of their courage and that they (it) would play into the hands of his, Chiang's, enemies, and that the Japanese would use it.

A few minutes later I talked to the President over the telephone and I asked him whether he had received the paper which I had sent him over last night about the Japanese having started a new expedition from Shanghai down towards Indo-China. He fairly blew up—jumped up into the air, so to speak and said he hadn't seen it * * *.

[13777] The decision by Hull was, apparently, arrived at in a 24-hour period there, but it is not clear as to the considerations other than the objections of the Japanese—

General MARSHALL. Chinese, you mean?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, the Chinese.

The British message, meanwhile, as I recall it, the only cable we have regarding it, the morning of the 26th, to which Secretary Welles referred, said, speaking of the Chinese opposition,

Isn't this a pretty thin diet?

That was the comment. Now, can you recall any conversations in those 2-day periods, the 25th and the 26th, regarding the dropping of the modus vivendi, which was of, certainly, great significance from your viewpoint, because it, instead of giving you the 3 months that you and Admiral Stark desired, it meant that you might have to face the eventualities in the immediate future?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall the specific conversations. I do recall our disappointment that the objections made by the Chinese Government had caused the matter to be dropped, as I recall, at the time.

Senator BREWSTER. Counsel reminds me that there was a memorandum to the President from you and Admiral Stark regarding this period. Do you recall that?

[13778] Senator FERGUSON. Dated the 27th of November.

Senator BREWSTER. What was the date of it?

Mr. MASTEN. The 27th of November.

Senator BREWSTER. Have you got it there?

(Exhibit No. 17 was handed to Senator Brewster.)

Senator BREWSTER. Exhibit 17.

Senator FERGUSON. There were two messages that were very similar, one of November 5, which is Exhibit 16, and this, which is Exhibit 17.

Mr. MURPHY. November 5 was the one at the time they were going to go into Hunan Province; the 27th was before you went south?

General MARSHALL. Oh, yes.

Senator BREWSTER. That is a matter of record. Undoubtedly it represents your views on the matter at that time. But you do not recall whether you had any conversations regarding the matter with Mr. Stimson or Admiral Stark on the 25th or 26th following your approval of the *modus vivendi*?

General MARSHALL. I would be pretty certain that I did discuss it with Mr. Stimson because we were talking every day a number of times a day, on what was going on.

Senator BREWSTER. My attention is called to this, I don't know what significance it may or may not have, but on December 7, 1941, in the Sunday Star, Washington, in a review [13779] of the war, there appears this report, apparently summarizing the events of the preceding week:

By Friday, Moscow claimed 4,000 square miles re-won. Berlin admitted reverses but minimized their extent and emphasized Russian losses. Although the present phase of this Red counter-offensive is an early one, the immediate effect is to relieve for the present the threat to the Nazi entrance into the oil areas of the Caucasus.

That, apparently, is the information which we had here. Now, to what extent was consideration of the Russian situation entering into your calculations in estimating probable Japanese actions at that time? Did you at that time think of that as a factor?

General MARSHALL. I would have great difficulty in giving an accurate answer to that. It was quite evident to us, of course, when the German Army was repulsed, and had to retreat, that there had been a tremendous change in the European situation.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General MARSHALL. But until we knew that, until that was conclusively established, and not subject to the suspicion of over-propagandized communiques, we were going along, you might say, from day to day in the general battle. The German advances had been consistent throughout and here came [13780] a turning point.

Until we knew that, of course, I doubt if great emphasis was being placed by us on the current situation in Russia, other than the fact that so far as the Japanese would be concerned, the Russian Army

was imperiled, and, of course, their situation was vastly simplified if the Russian Army was out of the picture because of Manchuria.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Well, to what extent were you revising your estimates of the Russian strength in the light of developments? In the earlier case there had been a pretty general opinion that they probably wouldn't be able to hold out. As the time went on, I assume your respect for their military potential increased.

General MARSHALL. Respect for their endurance and their prodigious ability to take losses increased. Later on, beginning with the Moscow incident, our respect for their technical, military capabilities rapidly increased and came to a very decided point with the surrender of the German Army before Stalingrad.

Senator BREWSTER. This is the memorandum which was referred to of November 27, when, as I understand it, you were out of town. (Refers to Exhibit No. 17.)

General MARSHALL. Yes.

[13781] Senator BREWSTER (reading):

Memorandum for the President.

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

It must have been prepared——

General MARSHALL. Prepared on the 26th, I think, after a Joint Board meeting.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. That would be coincident with Mr. Hull's advice to Mr. Stimson that he thought he would drop the mod vivendi, that he would drop that arrangement which had been approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy the day before the 25th, and now he thought he would drop it.

General MARSHALL. Whether or not that is coincident depends whether or not we knew the minute that thing was being drafted with the Secretary said.

Senator BREWSTER. You said you thought it was probably prepared the day before.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That happens to be the precise time, November 26, when Mr. Stimson records in the diary,

Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day, to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over * * *.

And so, on the 27th, this memorandum goes to the President [13782] signed by yourself and Admiral Stark which emphasizes apparently, the importance of delay. This is a portion of your language:

The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time. Consequently Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines, but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence.

Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval and air base. * * *

And then you conclude:

It is recommended that:

Prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counter-action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens the United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined; * * *

This is where you used the latitude:

[15783] However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100 degrees East or South of 10 degrees North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.

That is your reference to the threat.

Continuing your recommendations:

In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken; * * *

And, finally:

Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

That, apparently, was what may have been a factor in the President's decision regarding these warnings, but the thing which is of significance, in the light of all that transpired, is the extent of the British expression of viewpoint on that; that is the thing I think becomes of possible significance in the light of Lord Halifax's apparent surprise on the morning of November 27 that the *modus vivendi* had been dropped. Apparently he was not informed of the communications. And Secretary Welles said, "Well, that is not the way London [13784] sounded yesterday," I think, was his comment on it to Lord Halifax.

Now, do you have any recollection as to any emphasis on the British viewpoint in the situation at that time apart from the Chinese?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection.

Senator BREWSTER. Would that have been a matter that would have come to your attention under any normal circumstances?

General MARSHALL. Normally, I think I would have heard it from the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, the report of Secretary Stimson to the committee, which is now before the committee, on page 18, reads:

Later, Mr. Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow. General Gerow was Chief of the War Planning Division. General Marshall was absent, having left the Department to attend certain Army training maneuvers which were going on that day. Both Admiral Stark and General Gerow were urging that any crisis be postponed as long as possible, to enable our preparations to proceed. A memorandum had been prepared by General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President on this subject. The opinion of our top military and naval advisers was that delay was very desirable but [13785] that nevertheless we must take military action if Japan attacked American or British or Dutch territory or moved her forces in Indo-China west of 100 degrees east or south of 10 degrees north. I told them, which was the fact, that I also would be glad to have more time but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation of the United States or of backing down on any of our principles which would show a weakness on our part.

That represents, apparently, a summary of what went on as far as the War Department and your advice was concerned.

Now, to what extent, since you have ventured :
nese psychology and action, in connection with y
if they had delayed until January they might n
what extent would Japanese opinion be affected b
contemplated action?

General MARSHALL. What action are you referr

Senator BREWSTER. There are two hypotheses.
the President's statement to Admiral Richardso
Japanese attacked the Philippines he wasn't cer
go to war. The other, the discussions which in
that this Government had reached the point whe
that if there was an attack on the Dutch or Briti
would be obliged to participate. That was the ex
of the Cabinet, that it would be supported by the
your [13786] opinion you could not allow
any further south or west without taking action.
tent would the Japanese decision be affected by l
contemplated action?

Let us assume first that they knew that we were
if they attacked Malaya or any portion of that
assume on the other hand that they knew we we
ticipate unless we were directly attacked ourselv
would their decisions as to action be affected by t

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You must also take into consid
August 17 to the Japanese. The note we gave
August 17 stating what our position was.

General MARSHALL. Japanese psychology being
Japanese Army domination being what it was, t
for the assumption of power throughout the Far E
Southwest Pacific, being known now, I don't thi
had any particular effect one way or the other.

Their misjudging regarding us I think was mo
willingness, our energy, our ability to fight eff
They had misjudged us on that. They thought we
after we started to fight, that we could not organiz
effectively.

They felt that we were highly dangerous wit
was actually in being, but it requires support, it re
bases at distant points, which means land troops
air forces for a real protection. Beyond that I d
would be deterred from their purpose.

To that extent they would have felt that it w
isolated out of the war in order that they might
obstruction of British power and, of course, the l
the Dutch, in the Southwest Pacific. That is a re
ment.

Senator BREWSTER. I think it is clear, General
that their estimate of our potential military strik
that they didn't care particularly whether we wer

General MARSHALL. Except as to the fleet.

Senator BREWSTER. Except as to the fleet.

General MARSHALL. And they recognized with the fleet that we were incapable at that time, apparently, of furnishing the fleet with a base in the Far East, unless we took Singapore, because, as you recall, and I think the testimony showed, that [13788] with, I think it was 26 ocean-going submarines sent to the Philippines, we couldn't even give them 1 antiaircraft gun for coverage.

The matter of Russia would have had dominant importance in their minds because that affected the picture.

Senator BREWSTER. Because of the Manchurian picture?

General MARSHALL. Because of Manchuria, and because of the effect that would have on the conduct of the war in Europe, which up to that time had been assumed as a certain eventual German triumph.

Senator BREWSTER. In other words, you think that the elimination of Russia from the war was something of far more significance to them than the possible participation of the United States in the war?

General MARSHALL. Very much so.

Senator BREWSTER. That is, of course, interesting, and in a way complimentary to our Russian friends.

General MARSHALL. It is a humiliating admission but that was the judgment of the Japanese I think. One of their greatest errors was their misjudgment of our fighting capacity.

Senator BREWSTER. Yet you would agree that, simply from the immediate military situation, that if they had felt at all sure that they would have had 6 months or a year to carry on their conquests in the Orient without intervention by the [13789] United States, they would have felt that was a considerable advantage?

General MARSHALL. Well, I think they would have felt it was an advantage to conduct that campaign without the intervention of the United States because our naval force that remained after Pearl Harbor was sufficient to enable us to establish bases in Australia.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Now, the Japanese had appeared with their heavy war vessels in the Indian Ocean, which meant that the line to Australia was very definitely threatened from that side. If the line to Australia was also impossible to establish in the Pacific then the problem of the Japanese in the long run was infinitely simpler.

Senator BREWSTER. Has there ever been any indication that the Japanese did anything in breaking our codes?

General MARSHALL. We have had no indication of that.

Senator BREWSTER. That has been explored?

General MARSHALL. I think conclusively.

Senator BREWSTER. Of course, this is all hypothetical and has no particular relation to the primary purpose here except as the object of this inquiry is to keep us out of another difficulty of this kind, but would this be a fair inference that if the Japanese knew that we were going to [13790] intervene in the event of attack on Malaya, they would then recognize that they must, if possible, eliminate our fleet on their flank, and, therefore, strike at the only real potential we then had, which was our fleet?

General MARSHALL. That is a possible assumption.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, wouldn't that be, from a military standpoint, almost inevitable, that the Japanese would never dare move out of Malaya if they knew it was going to mean our participation in the war, without undertaking to eliminate the fleet on their flank?

General MARSHALL. It depends on what you mean by "eliminate." They had already established themselves. They were stretched, we thought, even then, into Siam. It was whether they would boldly go with their ships into the Gulf of Siam. They could have dominated the China coast and the bulge of Indochina all under that time. We had no bases. If we had tried, with our numbers, to take Singapore, which was the only place in the Far East, we would have come under the Japanese attack and out of Siam.

So there was a very restricted use for our fleet. Guam. Manila was hopeless. It would have been a mistake to put the base in Manila. So that whatever we would have to be based back on Hawaii, and there we might say, most of the time, on the end of a period of our operations.

Under those conditions, the Japanese could have moved as freely as they could if we were severely damaged. They spread out so much as they did if we were not severely damaged. That might have been to their advantage also, because of the large extension of perimeter; but they still could have dealt with their affairs with the limitations I have just stated.

But it would be a very difficult thing for the fleet to operate in the Western Pacific without any base of any kind unless it had a base that lacked all the essentials necessary to maintain the character which we had. And also that would have been an attack from the Japanese air establishments that already were in China and were, apparently, creeping into Siam.

Senator BREWSTER. You would emphasize then that the reason for which the Japanese had much respect, as far as our fleet was concerned, was our fleet?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. That was at least potential. The main considerations and factors entered into your estimate of why you did not expect an attack on Pearl Harbor.

General MARSHALL. I will say as to the attack on Pearl Harbor, we felt that was a vital installation, but we also felt that it was the only installation we had anywhere that was reasonable. Therefore, we were not worried about it. In our opinion, our commanders had been alerted. In our opinion, there was no other place we could give them at the time for the purpose of our opinion, that was one place that had enough within itself for a reasonable defense.

MacArthur, in the Philippines, was just beginning. His position was pitiable, and it was still in a state of transition with the ships on the ocean en route out there and not yet delivered and half still to go.

[13793] The Panama Canal was quite inadequate. It was seriously inadequate in planes, and, of course, of course, of course, of course, of anything in the Pacific.

The only place we had any assurance about was Hawaii. That was the reason we had less concern about Hawaii because

very industriously, we had a tremendous amount of correspondence about it, and we felt reasonably secure at that one point. Therefore we felt that it would be a great hazard for the Japanese to attack it.

Senator BREWSTER. I hadn't intended to reopen those questions but to go into the broader question of your estimate of whether the Japanese attack might be logically expected.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I read Mr. Stimson's report this morning, and his summary of the conditions, and that expresses my opinion very well. We had these positive conditions, a little by magic mainly by reconnaissance of the various movements being carried on in the Far East, so it was quite evident that the most serious intentions were there, which was the case in the general campaign.

Senator BREWSTER. Hindsight is, of course, easier than foresight, General MARSHALL. Much more convenient.

[13794] Senator BREWSTER. In the light of your review now, it would appear that if the advice which you and Admiral Stark had given had been accepted, on November 25, 26, and 27, to enter into a modus vivendi which, it was the considered conclusion of the Army and Navy, including the Secretaries of War and Navy, was adequate to protect our interests, we do not know what the course of history would have been.

General MARSHALL. No, we do not know what would have happened. You might have had a complete collapse in China which would have had a tremendous effect on the balance of the war.

Senator BREWSTER. It would be interesting when you have conceded your labors, to know. I address myself to this only for posterity. They have got to gather as much wisdom as they can from this conduct.

General MARSHALL. I might add there, that is what I am engaged in in China now. This war started out there, and now the desire is to find in some way to arrange it so there will not be a recurrence.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. General Marshall, you have read Secretary Stimson's memorandum. I want to go to page 12 and ask you if you were satisfied of this—quoting the Secretary of War: [13795]

The President at the meeting undertook to take an informal vote of the Cabinet as to whether it was thought the American people would back us up if it became necessary to strike at Japan, in case she should attack England in Malaya, or the Netherlands in the East Indies. The Cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the Army would support such a move.

What comes from the diary as of November 7.

Were you advised as to that vote?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of it, but I am pretty sure he must have told me, because he was telling me the results of the meetings.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I go to page 27 (page 46) of his memorandum. This is on November 25. This is the day before the Secretary of State sent his message to the Japanese. He is quoting the President:

On, at 12 o'clock, General Marshall and I went to the White House where we were until nearly half-past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, and myself. There the President, instead of bringing up the Victory
e * * *

He says of the Victory Parade:

This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan of national action in case of war in Europe.

[13796] Going on:

* * * brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition.

Do you recall that discussion with the President?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How was it thought that we could maneuver them into firing the first shot? Was that discussed?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall the details of that particular phase of the matter.

Senator FERGUSON. This takes place before we sent the message of the 26th.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or before you had sent your message to General Short on the 27th.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What were we going to do to maneuver them into firing the first shot? What was the plan of operation?

General MARSHALL. You are talking, I take it, about [13797] diplomatic procedure?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I am assuming that it is the diplomatic procedure that is being discussed at the present time. We knew our resources. We knew our deployment. It was impossible to change that on any brief notice. We were committed to deployment thousands of miles away from the United States.

So far as the war plan goes, the concern was whether or not the final alert should be given.

I took a discussion of this kind—at least I take it now—was a discussion of the diplomatic procedure involved, having in mind that it was the accepted thought in all of our minds at that time, that if we were forced to take offensive action, immediate offensive action that it would be a most serious matter as to its interpretation by the American people, whether we would have a united nation, or whether we would have a divided nation in getting into a world conflict.

Senator FERGUSON. But this—

General MARSHALL. The planning they are talking about is the discussion that came later, as I understood.

Senator FERGUSON. You would take it that Mr. Stimson has in mind that we were going to maneuver diplomatically into a position where they would be compelled to fire the first shot?

[13798] General MARSHALL. No, I don't mean to imply that. I mean the expression he is using relates to what would be the diplomatic procedure we would follow, so we would not find ourselves in a dangerous position where we had to do something initiating a fight. He was not trying to provoke the Japanese to fight.

nator FERGUSON. Let's take his language:

the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.

General MARSHALL. That is exactly what I said, sir. When you are going back and the other man is doing all of the maneuvering, you are in a very dangerous position. The question and the desire at that time was to delay in every way possible a rupture in the Pacific.

Now, if they were going to attack, it was very important—

nator FERGUSON. Right there, General, may I interrupt to ask, were we of the opinion at that time that they were going to attack?

General MARSHALL. That was the general opinion, that they were going to attack, definitely, in the Southwest Pacific.

nator FERGUSON. And we wanted to lay our course diplomatically so that we would make sure that they would fire the [13799] shot?

General MARSHALL. So that we would make sure that we would not be in such a dangerous position that we would be forced to fire the shot ourselves. That is another way of putting it, but that is what he is talking about.

nator FERGUSON. That is one of the things that led to this repeated language in the message of the 27th.

General MARSHALL. So far as the first shot is concerned; yes, sir.

nator FERGUSON. And also as to—well, the first overt act is the first thing as the first shot.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

nator FERGUSON. And that was leading up to that message; is that correct?

General MARSHALL. No, this was leading up, as I understood it, as I recall it, to what the diplomatic procedure was to be. The procedure, to a certain extent, you might say, is a routine. Not in one sense, but alert for war is ever routine, but the arranging, the phrasing of the alert to fight. What the diplomatic and political situation was, was another matter.

nator FERGUSON. Now, was this discussed at the same meeting?

Mr. Stimson said, at the bottom of page 47:

pointed out to the President that he had already taken [13800] the steps toward an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that when she crossed the border into Thailand, she was violating our safety, and that before he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on carrying that.

Now, I take it he was talking about the memorandum and the conclusion he had on the 27th of August. That is when the President returned from the Atlantic Conference.

He had taken, as Mr. Stimson defines it, the first step in an ultimatum, and that if America wanted to, we could rely upon that particular message as saying—

we have warned you. Therefore if you do anything you take the first step and fire the first shot.

Is that correct? Is that a fair analysis?

General MARSHALL. I think that is the rough idea of the thing; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And it says then:

So Hull is to go to work on preparing that.

What did he mean by "preparing that"? Have you any idea?

General MARSHALL. You are having me act as both Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the reason I am asking you, General, is that you were supposed to be at this meeting.

[13801] General MARSHALL. Yes. As I said, they were trying to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than firing off a gun, that would not only protect our interests, by arranging matters so that the Japanese couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but also that anything they did do, they would be forced to take the offensive action, and what we were to do had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not a military order. It was not a military arrangement.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand it correctly then that it was agreed that day among you and Admiral Stark, the two Secretaries, and the President, that this message of the 17th of August was, in effect, a first ultimatum?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that that specific thing was discussed other than the statement Mr. Stimson makes here. I am not the judge of that.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. General, did you have one of these messages in the Army that if the winds code came in that you could receive a telephone call—"east wind," and so forth?

General MARSHALL. I had no such arrangement, that I would receive a telephone call. I knew that they were monitoring to receive this message, to pick up this message if it came, and that would be in the general arrangement whereby anything [13802] of importance was conveyed to me as quickly as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you have a plan or a policy as to what steps you would take if such a message had been received?

General MARSHALL. Once the alert had been given, of course, the commanders were supposed to be in a state of readiness. If such a message as that had come in, showing conclusively its relation to previous magic, that they were going to attack, it is probable that we would have acted toward that in some way as we endeavored to act toward the 1 o'clock Sunday message.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, another alert?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. Not another alert. An item of information.

Senator FERGUSON. An item of information. Now, the language of the President, as given here by Commander Schulz is:

When the President saw or read the first 13 parts of the message, he said, "This means war."

That would be equally as definite as the winds message, would it not—"This means war"?

General MARSHALL. You mean the President's statement?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Now, if you had had the President's statement Saturday [13803] evening, "This means war," in relation to the 13-part message, would

have acted on that the same as you did at 11:35, or whatever the time was, on Sunday, the 7th of December?

General MARSHALL. I don't think I could give you an accurate back-story on that, Senator. There was some discussion over the 1 o'clock message. I thought the 1 o'clock should go in, because that was a new piece of information of a very peculiar character.

Now, whether the President, making that statement would have inspired me, as Chief of Staff in the War Department to start off another message, I couldn't tell you now, as a hindsight.

We had given certain definite instructions, which we assumed were being carried out, and which were being carried out, in most places.

Senator FERGUSON. General, it is a very significant fact that the President stated: "This means war"; and if that message had been conveyed to you, that language, the President saying, "This means war,"

General MARSHALL. Does the record show that the President told the Secretary of War, "This means war"?

Senator FERGUSON. Not the Secretary of War.

General MARSHALL. He didn't tell me, and he didn't tell the Secretary of War. So he made a statement offhand on reading the thing. [13804]

Senator FERGUSON. But I am trying to get what your opinion would have been.

General MARSHALL. I can't say. I doubt if I would have sent anything on that statement of the President at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, this is not clear in the record, General. I don't know as you can help clear it up, but I would like to ask it.

Do you know how the 13 and the 14 part message, the whole of the 14 part message, got on your desk on Sunday morning? We haven't any evidence to show how it got there. Do you know? Have you been told?

General MARSHALL. Well, I know that when I came to the office, it was there. Colonel Bratton was on the heels of it waiting to see me. General Miles came in. I had General Gerow come in. While I was reading the message—I have stated previously, in answering Senator FERGUSON, how word came to me that they had important information for me, and I went down to the War Department to receive that important information.

It was going anyway, because that was my regular Sunday morning routine, in contrast to Monday or Saturday, when I got down at 7:30. The procedure that they had gone through I don't know. I think my diary will show whether it was here or before the Board, that the reaction at the moment was [13805] that they told me that the message had come in the evening before, and during the night that the other half had come, sometime in the middle of the night, and had been parcelled out, the War Department, as I recall, the translating from Japanese into English having been sent over to the Navy—they having actually deciphered the Japanese message.

Now, that is my recollection of the affair at the time. The other part was that the particular part which affected me and caused me to read was not the 14 parts, it was the one o'clock, which, unfortunately, was put on the bottom of the pile and I read through everything else I came to that.

Senator FERGUSON. General, on page 7984 of our typewritten record, under General Short's testimony, we find this language:

* * * Japan had been semiofficially told that:

"If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan."

And the American Government had, and believed, reports that:

"* * * Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President, or the coming of Mr. Kurusu will have any effect on the general situation."

Now, my question is, Did you know that the Japanese knew [13806] semiofficially—and, as I understand this testimony, it would appear that Postmaster General Walker, or someone operating between the State Department and the Japanese, was conveying certain messages, and that this was one of the messages that was delivered, that if Japan invades again the United States——

General MARSHALL. If Japan invades again?

Senator FERGUSON. Again, the United States will fight with Japan. Did you know that they were semiofficially notified to that effect, that if she moved south we would fight?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall.

Mr. MURPHY. She had official notice in the note of August 17.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

Mr. MURPHY. That was official.

Senator FERGUSON. But at this late date that he was telling us—this was in November, that she had the notice.

Have you any knowledge as to who wrote Exhibit 17, being the 27th of November?

General MARSHALL. I have no accurate knowledge. I assume that it was drafted in the War Plans Division under General Gerow's direction. It may be that it was drafted initially in the Navy Department, but my assumption was that it was drafted in War Plans Division, and I assume that because my [13807] signature being on the document and its date of November 27, meaning that I possibly signed it on the night of the 26th, but they didn't get Admiral Stark's signature, naturally, until the 27th, and they dated it accordingly.

Senator FERGUSON. I think the facts show it was on Navy stationery, but there isn't any doubt that it represents your idea at that time?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, you were sitting here this morning while we were discussing this memorandum from the British Government and the one from the Australian Government?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I heard the discussion.

Senator FERGUSON. I now ask you, did the President of the United States or anyone else ever take up with you any of the things mentioned in those memorandums that we discussed here this morning?

General MARSHALL. Well, I have to answer that this way, Senator. I never heard of those memorandums until this morning, and as to did he ever discuss any of these things, of course, they were related to a good many things, including this document here [indicating].

Senator FERGUSON. The reason I put an all-inclusive question was that I wanted to finish as soon as I could.

[13808] When did you first learn that the President had decided to send a message to the Emperor?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it before——

General MARSHALL. Mr. Stimson would have told me, I would have said it that way, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether you knew it before the

General MARSHALL. No, sir. I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn:

President's subsequent procedure—

What is after he sent the message to the Emperor.

What if no answer is received by him from the Emperor by Monday evening.

He will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening

Warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until Wednesday morning, i. e., after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and Washington.

General MARSHALL. I have no knowledge of that whatsoever. I believe that was washed out by the actual attack on Pearl Harbor. I was interested in other matters.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you were not consulted prior to the time of this memorandum?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not consulted?

General MARSHALL. To the best of my recollection I was not consulted.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire, General.

Mr. KEEFE. General, the testimony of Commander Schulz indicates that after the President on the evening of December 6th, read the short message, in effect, turned to Mr. Hopkins, and said "This is war," and indicated that he would have to get in touch with him, meaning Admiral Stark, immediately.

Now, as one member of the committee, and I speak only for myself, I was impressed, that the President did, or had in his mind, as a result of the conclusion after reading that message, "This means war," that the thing which we would expect the Commander in Chief to do, was to immediately contact his Chief of Naval Operations.

The evidence further indicates that he took the phone, called the War Department, and was advised that Admiral Stark was attending the National Theater; he hung up the phone and indicated, according to Commander Schulz's testimony that he [13810] wouldn't call Admiral Stark out of the theater because it might cause some public comment, but that he would get him later.

Now, in view of that testimony, which I have sketched without any attempt to state the testimony exactly, we are left in the dark as to whether or not the Commander in Chief contacted you as Chief of Staff that evening of December 6.

Can you state definitely whether or not you have a present recollection as to whether the President did in fact contact you?

General MARSHALL. I am quite certain that he did not.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, could there be any question about it?

General MARSHALL. There is no question in my mind; no. That is a positive answer.

Mr. KEEFE. And you are certain that you did not attend any meeting when, at the White House that night?

General MARSHALL. I am absolutely certain of that.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

General MARSHALL. I might say that since I appeared before the committee I learned one little item that I had forgotten at the time and that is not only had I no dinner engagements of any kind between the 1st of November and the 7th of December, except one family dinner, as a matter of fact with Mrs. Nicholas Longworth, whom I see sitting here, [13811] but that Mrs. Marshall was convalescing from having broken three or four ribs and we didn't go out anywhere; we certainly were not going out under those conditions and I found out afterwards that that morning, Sunday morning, that I had breakfast with her in her bedroom, by her bed.

So, all the evidence, in my own mind, short of my absolute knowledge of the matter, is that I was home, as was customary.

Mr. KEEFE. That is your present recollection, that on the evening of the 6th of December you were at home?

General MARSHALL. I can't say that is my recollection. I am certain I was at home, but I don't recall anything about it.

Mr. KEEFE. But you are certain of one thing and that is that you received no communication from the President on the evening of the 6th of December and that you didn't attend any meeting at the White House that night?

General MARSHALL. That is correct. I will add that the first information I had of anything unusual was, as I have testified, after I got into my shower, or was going into my shower when this message was relayed to me from Colonel Bratton that he wanted to come out to the house with an important matter.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, General Marshall, do you have a clear present recollection as to the meeting at the White House on [13812] Tuesday, November 25?

General MARSHALL. I have gotten most of my recollection out of reading Mr. Stimson's report, he having the only diary.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, in answer to the questions that have been asked you with respect to that meeting of the 25th, am I to infer that your memory has been refreshed by reason of your having read the memorandum submitted to the committee by former Secretary Stimson?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any independent present recollection of the events that took place or the conversations that took place at this meeting of November 25?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not. What he is talking about here, had been talked about back and forth through so many combinations that I cannot recollect the events of a particular meeting at this moment.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any independent recollection of having been told by Secretary Stimson of the Cabinet meeting of Friday November 7, when a poll was taken of the Cabinet on the question as to "whether the people would back" the Cabinet and the President "in case we struck at Japan down there, and what the tactics should be?"

I am quoting from Secretary Stimson's language.

3813] General MARSHALL. I testified a little bit ago, I think, in regard to that, that I had no recollection of it, but I am quite certain Mr. Stimson must have told me that.

Mr. KEEFE. Of course, in connection with what took place on the 7th, when you were present with the President, and the Secretaries of War, Admiral Stark, it would be quite important to have known of the previous action of the Cabinet, when that question was presented, and the unanimous vote was recorded, as recorded in Secretary Stimson's diary, so I ask you now, at the time you met with these people on the 25th, do you have any present recollection now of having been present at this meeting on the 7th, and its possible influence on the conversation which took place on the 25th?

General MARSHALL. I can only say what I said a few moments ago: I have no recollection of being told about the vote, and I assume that it was told.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you agree with Secretary Stimson when he sets forth in his diary as follows:

"Pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps towards a ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into Thailand, she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only one thing to do (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a policy which we had already given."

3814] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I am in agreement with what he is saying. The actual terminology he uses in regard to an ultimatum—it certainly was a very definite notification.

3815] Mr. KEEFE. Now, do I understand you to say, General Marshall—that this will shorten the thing up, because I am as anxious to include this examination as you are—that you have read the statement of Secretary Stimson and that Secretary Stimson's statement, insofar as you are concerned, conforms to your own knowledge and recollection of the events set forth, and you agree with that statement?

General MARSHALL. I will put it this way, that there is nothing in his statement here that I take exception to in my recollection, and his statement has reminded me of a great deal that I had entirely forgotten, and I am in general agreement with all that he states.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, to narrow it down one step further, is there anything in this statement that you do take exception to?

General MARSHALL. I can think of nothing now, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And is there anything in his record, as set forth in his statement, which is appended to his general statement, that you consider it to be in accordance with the facts, in accordance with your present recollection?

General MARSHALL. There is nothing that I know of, of that character.

Mr. KEEFE. So that as a member of the committee I am safe in accepting the statement of Secretary Stimson, together with the memorandum contained in his diary, as being in full [19816] accordance with your own attitude toward the things and events which he has described?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, including that about the War Department General Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean by that, the criticism, if it is criticism?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I didn't have particular reference—

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you meant by that?

General MARSHALL. I didn't understand.

Senator FERGUSON. That there was some criticism.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I accepted that.

Senator FERGUSON. You accepted that.

General MARSHALL. I don't take exception to it.

Mr. KEEFE. I want to say, General Marshall, that so far as my question was concerned, I was not specifically referring to the conclusion as to responsibility which Secretary Stimson sets forth in his statement.

General MARSHALL. I was trying to make perfectly clear my agreement with what he says.

Mr. KEEFE. I am trying to limit my question to the factual information which is contained in his statement and the matter of conclusion I assume, will be the prerogative of this committee.

[13,817] But on the factual information set forth in his statement and in the diary, you are in accord?

General MARSHALL. I noted nothing that I would take exception to.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you think of anything that you would add to the statement that Secretary Stimson has excluded?

General MARSHALL. I suppose if I took a few hours off I might bring up a great many things, but I think he covers the general question of the whole affair very well.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. General Marshall, I should like to ask you, as a military man, as one who has had at least some contacts with diplomatic activities, as to whether there was, in your opinion, anything in the 13-part message any more indicative of war than what had been received up to that time?

General MARSHALL. I am sorry, I can't give you a categorical answer to that, for the reason that I read it that morning very hurriedly, and then I never read it again until just before I came up here, and I tried to time myself in reading it that time, and I was interrupted before I finished, and I never read it since; so there we stand. I have been busy and I just haven't read it all.

[13818] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. For the record there has been question after question about Commander Schulz saying the President said "This means war", and I would like to read Commander Schulz's exact words page 12441 of the transcript.

Commander SCHULZ. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed the back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance—I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance—"This means war." Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps five minutes, the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their deployment and—

Again on page 12443.¹

There has been a statement made that the President called the Navy Department.

¹ Hearings, Part 10, p. 4663.

Page 12443:

Commander SCHULZ. There was no mention made of sending any further message or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the war going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he believed he could talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was determined—I do not recall exactly, but I believe the [13819] House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached at the National Theater.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. General, to carry Mr. Keefe's question further, but whether the President had seen the 13-part message, I want to ask you whether or not you had any information that the President had seen this message and made any remarks about it prior to the time of the attack?

General MARSHALL. I had no such information.

Senator FERGUSON. One more question.

In page 53 of the Secretary of War's statement, he has this language—talking with the President:

I told him I could see two. His alternatives were—first, to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again—

and he says "ultimatum again".

I am going a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at once. I told him that only two were the last two, because I did not think anyone would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said of the other two, my choice was the latter one.

What was to fight at once.

Now, did Secretary Stimson ever discuss with you that language or that idea?

[13820] It doesn't purport to have you in the conversation.

General MARSHALL. I wasn't in the conversation. I was just trying to think of his conversations with me.

He was very much afraid—he feared that we would find ourselves involved in the developing situation where our disadvantages would be so great that it would be quite fatal to us when the Japanese finally broke peace.

He also felt very keenly that, and thought about this part a great deal more than I did, because it was his particular phase of the matter, that we must not go so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature as to sacrifice the honor of the country. He was deeply concerned about that.

My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistic. I was hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did happen we would be better prepared than we were at that time, that particular time.

So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will say, of the United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure which allowed the Japanese to continue movements until we would find ourselves in a hopeless situation before the peace was broken, and mine, which I say, were much more materialistic, as I think they should have been, that we should get as much time as we could in order to make up for the terrible deficiencies in our defensive arrangements. [13821]

ts.

This particular statement that he makes here, that he made to the President, I don't recall of his ever making it quite so flat-footedly to me, that we would strike first.

Senator FERGUSON. At least the substance of this was discussed with you?

General MARSHALL. Oh, yes; we talked many times about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it generally agreed between the War Cabinet, as it has been described, that we would not strike first?

That was generally agreed on, was it not?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall exactly the time the President enunciated the directive that we must not make the overt act.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. So it was finally agreed, Secretary Stimson's idea to fight at once was overruled, and we took another course?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Which was carried out.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Your idea was, as you say you were more realistic—

General MARSHALL. I said "materialistic."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Materialistic. You realized what [13822] we had to fight with, did you not, and that is what caused you to hesitate?

General MARSHALL. Mine was, in a sense, a technical job. I was struggling with the means to fight.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and you wanted time.

General MARSHALL. I wanted time, and the question was how much time could be given to us and still maintain the honor of the United States and not get ourselves in a hopeless position.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get to the point of discussing the point where you would attack if you did attack first, or was that ruled out because the President made a policy?

General MARSHALL. We went back, of course, to your arrangement with the British, as to the prospective deployment of the fleets, who would assume the burden of responsibility here and who would receive the burden of responsibility there.

As a matter of fact our first issue, undoubtedly, would have been to protect our convoys, and to have continued the reinforcement of the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. As I recall the testimony, General Marshall, [13823] with respect to the sending of this message of the 26th there was some question in your mind, and in the record it was not clear just what the events and circumstances were with respect to the preparation of that warning message that was sent to General Short.

Now, if Mr. Stimson's report is correct, and I assume that it is, that question seems to be resolved, because he states that on the 27th, on page 19 of his report:

We then discussed the message that might be sent to the commanding officers of the various theaters, including in particular General MacArthur, who was in the Philippines and in the forefront of the threatened area. We had already

sent MacArthur a warning but I felt that the time had now come for a more definite warning. In talking with the President on the telephone that morning, I had suggested, and he had approved the idea, that we should send out a final alert, namely that they should be on the qui vive for any attack, and explaining the exact situation. Ordinarily, of course, there would be no reason for me to participate in the sending of any such message which was the normal function of the military staff. As the President himself, however, had now actually directed the sending of the message, and as I wanted the message clearly to apprise the commanding [13824] officers in the various areas as to exactly what the diplomatic situation was, I undertook to participate in the framing of this message myself.

So it now appears from his statement that that message was actually framed on the 27th while you were attending maneuvers. Do you so understand it now, General Marshall?

General MARSHALL. My confusion was with relation to the previous evening. My recollection was that before I left for North Carolina I had discussed with General Gerow the general terms of such a message.

Mr. KEEFE. But it was not prepared?

General MARSHALL. He was in the business of preparing it and I think he brought in to Mr. Stimson the draft. That is my recollection of the procedure. What Mr. Stimson says is accurate. My trouble was trying to orient what I had said before the message was prepared and what my reaction was after they showed me the message on my return.

Mr. KEEFE. So you did have a discussion with General Gerow the night before?

General MARSHALL. I say that was my recollection, that before I left, the afternoon before, I had a discussion with him. I don't know what General Gerow testified. I was in a confused state of mind as to whether that was correct or whether it was my reaction when I saw the message that had [13825] already been sent, and I couldn't remember which was which.

Mr. KEEFE. You are in agreement with the thesis that so far as the actual message was concerned it was prepared on the 27th and that Secretary Stimson himself participated in the preparation of that message?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And did the unusual, as he says, in that matter, because it was on what he conceived to be direct orders of the President that such a message be sent?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And he wanted to be sure that it accurately conveyed the necessary information to the commanders in the field?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That clears up that little bit of discrepancy that existed in the other hearings, and I am glad that it has been cleared up in accordance with Secretary Stimson's statement.

That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything further?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

(No response.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there any reason why General Marshall

[13826] cannot now be excused?

(No response.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General, we thank you for your appearance and the additional information you have given the committee and you are excused.

General MARSHALL. Thank you very much.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair is advised that Chairman Barkley and Senator Ferguson have agreed that we will adjourn at this point until 11 o'clock Thursday morning.

We will ask Admiral Stark to be back at 11 o'clock Thursday morning.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 11 a. m. Thursday, April 11, 1946.)

[13828]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 11 a. m., in room 312 Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman) and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, and Mrs. Flo E. Bratten, executive secretary, to the joint committee.

[13829] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we have three exhibit numbers that we would like to assign just before the examination proceeds.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MASTEN. At page 13630 of the record the committee decided that the reports, findings, and conclusions of the various prior proceedings should be made an exhibit separate from the transcripts of testimony in those proceedings. We would like to assign Exhibit No. 157 to a compilation of those reports and findings.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 157.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit No. 158, we would like to offer the additional documents released by the British Government, which have been previously distributed to the committee and which were released for publication yesterday. This exhibit will consist of 14 documents and attachments.

I would like to point out that document No. 9 in this exhibit relates primarily to Exhibits Nos. 16 and 47 but has been included in Exhibit No. 158 due to the fact that the printing of the prior exhibits has proceed past Exhibits Nos. 16 and 47.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 158.")

[13830] Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit No. 159, we would like to offer the additional documents released by the Chinese Government, which also have been distributed to the committee previously. This exhibit will consist of five documents and enclosures.

The CHAIRMAN. Those will be filed as exhibits, accordingly.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 159.")

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Stark, will you come around?

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK, UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED)—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, I think you were examining Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would read that into the record and then I want to ask you some questions about it. It is a message from OPNAV to CINCAF, is it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Before the attack, from OPNAV to CINCAF on Sunday, December 7; is not that correct?

Admiral STARK. Yes, 7 December, 71722, which is 5:22. That Greenwich time, however.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK (reading):

The State Department is informing the Japanese Government the SS *Madison* is enroute to Chingwangtao to arrive about December 10 and depart for Manila 3 days later and requesting that in view of arrangements made for *Tatuta Ma* now enroute Los Angeles to evacuate [1931] Japanese citizens the Japan direct her sea and land forces to allow *Madison* to proceed freely and without hindrance and provide her necessary facilities at Chingwangtao. Advise this office of any change in the *Madison's* schedule.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, had you known about that message before it was sent?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall knowing about it before it was sent. I remember the picture very conclusively on the sending that ship up there, so distinctly that I wanted to verify my memo and I thought it would be well to get the record on it, so I asked the Department to have copies of dispatches in relation thereto, as they are now available to the committee if they want them.

I think, before giving you my answer, which would be based on those, I might read them, because the dispatches in question, from the record, give a very good picture of this whole affair.

Senator FERGUSON. I would be glad to have you give any information you have on that. My inquiry was going to be as to why the message was sent. You knew that war was coming and you wanted to try to get an agreement on the safe passage of two ships, one of ours and one of theirs.

Admiral STARK. It was sent for the reason that we were [1933] worried about that ship. We took a deliberate chance when we told Admiral Hart, in response to a dispatch from him on 1 December, to send her up there. We had left in North China approximately 200 Marines. We had received a dispatch from the Embassy, rather Admiral Hart sent us word that there were about 6,000 Americans up there and he noted that a ship could be made available to go up there. He recognized the risk and put it up to the Department for decision.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you say "the risk," you mean the war would break out while it was enroute?

Admiral STARK. I mean that war might break out.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you just considering it a "might" then?

Admiral STARK. At that time; yes, sir. We felt reasonably certain that war was coming but we could not tell when. It was a matter of timing.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were concerned with it and it was a grave question, so grave that you were working on it on Sunday?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We had guaranteed the safety of the Japanese ship which was then enroute to San Francisco, and as I recall, it was to go from there down to the Canal Zone picking up Japanese nationals and taking them back.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Had the Japanese asked for [13833] a guarantee of a safe passage of their ship?

Admiral STARK. As I recall, they had asked that she be given free passage, and we had granted it, and we were asking for a similar treatment for the American ship.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that both countries, at the time this request was made, were anticipating a war, and that if war broke out in the meantime these two ships were to have safe passage? Is not that a correct view?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is what you arranged for here [indicating dispatch]?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. And then—

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. I do not want to cut off any testimony you may have or any instruments that you may want to refer to that can aid us along this line.

Admiral STARK. They are short, and I think the record should be complete on this, and it would be well to put them in here.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you put them in?

Admiral STARK. I will read them if you would like to have them.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. The first is a message from the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, our forces in the Pacific, which was [13834] sent by him on 1 December, and which reads as follows—Before I read it, it was to OPNAV and it was for information to the Commanding Officer, U. S. Marine Forces in North China.

Embassy advises six one one five American nationals in Peiping Tientsin area. Estimate civilian requirements uncertain. *President Madison* now available for withdrawal Marines from North China. Ship can arrive Chingwangtao about December 10th and depart about three days later. If Department thinks advisable accept attendant risks and attempt this withdrawal request authority to use this vessel. Advise.

Mr. KEEFE. The date of that is December 1?

Admiral STARK. December 1, yes, sir.

Now, on the same day we have a dispatch from the Department. We answered it immediately, and the message is from the Secretary of the Navy, released by me. I remember the incident, because we recognized the situation as grave at that time and were taking it up with the Secretary for decision, and the reply is to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic, and information of the U. S. Marine Forces in North China:

Your 010300 approved.

That message is the message that I just previously read from Admiral Hart.

Authority granted charter *President Madison* [13835] at tariff rate for one trip Chingwangtao to Manila. Inform State Department officials North China of prospective schedule.

The next message is from Admiral Hart, dated 2 December, to the Commanding General of the Marine Forces in North China, a communication of the Marine Corps and OPNAV in Washington. This was on the second, and priority:

Withdraw North China Marines via *President Harrison* due arrive Chinwangtao December tenth expected turn around. Nonmilitary property that can be evacuated to be sold or left Peiping. Notify consul Tientsin and Embassy APL authorized to book civilian passengers in normal manner. Advise exact time of sailing when determined.

Then, there is another dispatch from the Commander in China Asiatic to OPNAV on 3 December.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute, Admiral Stark. Is the reference in the dispatch you just read to the *President Harrison* an intentional change from *Madison*?

Admiral STARK. That is what got me looking up this dispatch. The dispatch that Senator Ferguson gave me to read said the *Madison*, and my remembrance is that it was the *Harrison*. I started to check up on the *Harrison* and ran into the rest of the dispatch. They used actually the *Harrison* [13836] and not the *Madison*.

Fourth Marines 796 officers and men arrived Olongapo 1 QM clerk 3 enlisted remain Shanghai temporarily. *President Harrison* vice *Madison* departing Manila 4 December for Chinwangtao evacuate personnel and such equipment reaches there by arrival date. *Luzon* and *Oahu* well on way Manila successful completion voyage expected.

I might add those were two gunboats which we had left in China. We wanted to leave them until the last minute, and they had arrived.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the last minute before the war started?

Admiral STARK. I mean we had debated a good deal when to bring them out. We were debating for some time on this. We finally decided at this time it was time to get them out.

Senator FERGUSON. That you were at about the last minute?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was getting close to it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. When I say the last minute, I have forgotten just when—

Senator FERGUSON. That is near the deadline?

Admiral STARK. I have forgotten just when the dispatch directing Hart to bring those gunboats out was made, but we [13836] thought it was time to get our nationals and our marines out of China.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember—if I may interrupt—that we had a memorandum here from the British to our State Department and on the end of it Mr. Hamilton said—it was about the 3d or 4th December—they wanted us to act on a parallel course with them, and remember the exhibit, if we could get it. It would speak for itself. On the bottom of that it said that that was a matter that would have to be taken up with the President, that it would indicate we were going to war and thereafter they could not pass on it. Do you remember that document?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I do not particularly at this moment remember that particular document, but I do recall that in evacuating our nationals and in evacuating our marines it was taken up with the White House. Of course, the State Department was as much interested as anybody else in that picture, and more so as regards national

Senator FERGUSON. Did you personally have any conversation with the President or with the State Department—I am talking about prior to the 7th of December—about the removal of our nationals?

Admiral STARK. Oh, yes. Not only our nationals, but we had talked about our marines, and so forth, for some months. We [13838] had evacuated, for example, all naval families out of Manila a considerable period before this.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the policy adopted by the President or the State Department, as far as you knew, about the nationals?

Admiral STARK. We were endeavoring to get them out.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was because you anticipated war?

Admiral STARK. That was certainly because of the possibility, and in the interest of safety to them. We gave them the opportunity to get out, and the State Department, I believe, chartered the ships which we sent over there.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anything that was done between the 27th of November and the 7th of December about getting our nationals out?

Admiral STARK. This matter in hand is between that time.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean outside of these, that were taken up directly with the President.

Admiral STARK. At the moment I do not recall anything else. We had been getting them out for some time.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. There is considerable information on the Japanese and what they did for some months before they started to get their ships home, and their nationals, too.

[13839] Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I appreciate that.

Admiral, you may proceed, if you do not recall any of the others now.

Admiral STARK. I recall the earlier incidents.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. As to this ship, we took what we call a calculated risk, in the interest of getting our people out, balanced against the possibility of losing the ship.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

[13840] Admiral STARK. If we got them out, fine; if we did not get them out, we might lose the ship and would not be any better off.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were working for a safe voyage, if possible, even though war had broken out; is not that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We were asking for transit.

Senator FERGUSON. For a safe voyage?

Admiral STARK. For a safe voyage. Whether that would cover the contingency if war actually broke or not, I do not know, because we canceled the massed after the war broke out.

Senator FERGUSON. You were endeavoring to do it?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And did we grant safe voyage to their ship so it would apply after war started?

Admiral STARK. I don't remember any application after war. They had asked us to facilitate this voyage, and we had agreed to it. The details of that would probably better come from the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not familiar with it then?

Admiral STARK. Not on that point, not enough to make a positive statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Whether or not it applied in case of war, the instruments will probably speak for themselves, [13841] when you get them all in.

Admiral STARK. I started reading that dispatch and I guess finished reading it.

The next dispatch is the one which you gave me yesterday.

The State Department is informing the Japanese Government the SS *Madison* enroute Chingwangtao due to arrive about December 19 and depart for Manila 3 days later and requesting that in view of arrangements made for *Tututa Ma* now enroute Los Angeles to evacuate Japanese citizens that Japan direct her sea and land forces to allow *Madison* to proceed freely and without hindrance and provide her necessary facilities at Chingwangtao. Advise this office of any change in the *Madison* schedule.

Then, there was one to Admiral Hart, the text of which was:

Give appropriate instructions to *Madison*. Cancel my 971722.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, this message sent on the morning of the 7th about the safe voyage, the safe course, was sent after we had canceled our codes, or destroyed our machines in Tokyo, and we knew of their messages in relation to their codes, and you had in your department the full 3 parts, and the 14th part, and 1 o'clock message, and some of these other messages; isn't that true?

[13842] Admiral STARK. It was after the codes' destruction. The time group on this is—

Senator FERGUSON. Twelve-something, isn't it? Can you figure that out from the Greenwich time?

Admiral STARK. Yes; it is 1722.

Senator FERGUSON. Which would have been 5 hours and a half?

Admiral STARK. Which would have been about 12 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. About 12 o'clock noon on Sunday?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. It is my impression that the codes were not destroyed by 12 noon in Tokyo. Ambassador Grew said they were not, did he not?

Senator FERGUSON. I am speaking more about ordering them destroyed. The record will speak for itself.

Admiral STARK. We had sent the message regarding the destruction of their codes.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. And we had authorized our people in the outlying islands, and Guam and authorized Kimmel to direct them to destroy what he considered necessary.

Senator FERGUSON. That all being true, the language [1384] used in this message that I had you read the other day, and questioning about this morning, would indicate, would it not, that we knew war was coming, and this was to take place after the war came.

Admiral STARK. We felt war was coming; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The language indicates that the armies and navies of Japan were to allow this ship to have a free course, a safe passage.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. At the time when this was initiated, it was the first of December, and that was the first correspondence with reference to it, and it was, of course a matter of timing.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Are there any other messages you have there now?

Admiral STARK. That is all I have on it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire from counsel, if you have a memorandum to Mr. Hull from Admiral Schuirmann on December 4, 1941 in relation to the Dutch?

Mr. MASTEN. We do not have it here, Senator. Do you want it? It is down in room 201.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have it. I did not like to use a copy of it, I wanted to be exact on its language.

Mr. MURPHY. As long as you are sending down there, will you be sure to have the notes of the President on the 7th here [13844] too?

Mr. MASTEN. They will be here this noon. They are being mimeographed.

Senator FERGUSON. Until we get that, I will pass this for the moment.

Admiral, since you were on the stand, we have received a memorandum that was sent from the military observer, Captain Creighton, from Singapore to Admiral Hart. Are you familiar with that message about von Papen?

Admiral STARK. I do not know just to what you refer without looking at it.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the message from the military observer in Singapore to Admiral Hart. You remember the original memorandum in relation to Admiral Hart, that he sent to your department, that we had agreed to give the British support in three or four eventualities?

Admiral STARK. That he had heard that we had?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Admiral STARK. And he asked us about it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Yes, I remember that message; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you are not familiar with the other message that was sent from Captain Creighton, are you?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it at the moment.

[13845] Senator FERGUSON. Would you locate that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, were you familiar with the fact that the Navy Department had a special file that they kept the communications between Britain and the President, that were sent through the Communications of the Navy, and that the file was kept in the Navy?

Admiral STARK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. When the British, Mr. Churchill, and others in the British Government would cable or communicate with the President at times they used your facilities; that is, the Navy facilities, and that there was a special file kept in the Navy Department with those papers, or those coded messages, or decoded messages, but they retained them in the Navy Department.

Were you familiar with that fact?

Admiral STARK. I was not familiar with it, but I would say if it occurred, it would be a very normal procedure to keep the President's messages separate on a thing of that sort. We did in London.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the President had used your communications to communicate with the British? In relation to the Far East I am only talking about now.

Admiral STARK. Well, I know he used our communications.

[13846] Senator FERGUSON. That being true, would you not keep copies, or at least the papers in your files in relation to those communications?

Admiral STARK. It would be a very natural thing to keep one copy in a very secret status.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it true that there was a very secret file which you now describe, kept under secret orders, so that when Captain Lavender, who is one of the counsel here, made an inquiry he could not even see it, and he has not seen it? Did you know that?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it be such that no one could see, that would be super-secret?

Admiral STARK. I do not know.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

Admiral STARK. That is a detail of filing which could be obtained from the Department. So far as my knowledge goes, I thought we could get anything we asked for. I did not know until this morning that anything had been refused at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know it now?

Admiral STARK. I do not know it now; no, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There has nothing been refused. It is all in the record.

[13847] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in view of the Senator's statement about Captain Lavender—

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking questions now.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to object to the Senator testifying until such time as we know who Captain Lavender is. The Senator stated something that is not in evidence. I think in fairness to the record, and to other members of the committee, if that is true, we ought to find out who this Captain Lavender is, and his connection with the case.

Senator FERGUSON. I will find out now.

Do you know Captain Lavender?

Admiral STARK. I do, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Has he been acting as counsel for anyone in this case?

Admiral STARK. He has been associated with Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MURPHY. Is he in the room? May we have a look at him?

Senator FERGUSON. Is Captain Lavender in the room?

(No response.)

Admiral STARK. I might state that he was up here yesterday, and I think he can be made available if you would like to get him.

Senator FERGUSON. Does not counsel have a letter in relation to this file?

Mr. RICHARDSON. All of it is in the Navy. It has been [13848] furnished us by the Navy and it has been in evidence here.

Mr. MASTEN. We have a memorandum from, I think, Commander Baecher. I think the memorandum was dated sometime in November or December of last year. It states that all of the messages from the President, which were found in that file, are now in the record.

My recollection is, Senator, that the only two messages in it were the two messages to the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want to find out now about the file. Your statement now is—and I do not think this was put in the record before—that the only two messages in that file are in the record. Are they in the record itself?

Mr. MASTEN. I think so, Senator. There is a memorandum from Commander Baecher which I think is in the record. If it is not, we will check this noon.

The CHAIRMAN. It is my recollection that memorandum was put in the record at the time it was received.

Mr. MASTEN. At the time the messages were put in, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. There isn't a question but that Congress ought to know about this thing, because a letter was written, and the request was refused.

Mr. MURPHY. My only reason for interposing is if there is some Captain Lavender, this is the first time that his [13849] name appears in this hearing, after 13,000 pages, and the statement has been made that he has been refused something.

I do not think the record should go on without knowing who he is.

Senator FERGUSON. I think this requires putting the President's letter in the record.

Would you, Mr. Masten, get a copy of the President's letter in relation to this file?

Mr. MASTEN. There was no letter of the President, Senator, that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not the President write a letter to someone, either Rugg, or Kimmel, or Lavender?

Mr. MASTEN. I have no recollection of that. You mean President Roosevelt?

Senator FERGUSON. No, no. President Truman.

Mr. MASTEN. I have no recollection of that. I will have to look through the file. All the letters that President Truman wrote, or the memoranda, are in the record, that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. The Congressman has made it appear that the Senator from Michigan wanted the record to show that there was a denial. I am trying to ask questions. I am certain there was a letter written by the President of the United States, but I cannot tell you to whom it was addressed.

[13850] **The CHAIRMAN.** There were letters written by the President to the heads of all of the departments.

Senator FERGUSON. This is a special letter in relation to this particular file that I was making inquiry about. I will try to ascertain it.

Is there anyone in the room who represents Admiral Kimmel?

Ensign PHELAN. Yes; I am.

Senator FERGUSON. Ensign Phelan, do you know of any letter—

The CHAIRMAN. If he is going to testify, we had better swear him. (Ensign Phelan was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Senator FERGUSON. Better give your first name, now.

Ensign PHELAN. John Phelan.

TESTIMONY OF ENSIGN JOHN PHELAN, UNITED STATES NAVY

Senator FERGUSON. Ensign, will you tell us as to whether or you had any knowledge in relation to a special file of communication between the President of the United States and the British Government, or any member of the British Government, that was kept at the Navy Department?

Ensign PHELAN. I have no personal knowledge of that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not any letter was written in relation to it, as far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned? [19851]

Ensign PHELAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have a copy of that letter, or do you know where we can get a copy of it?

Ensign PHELAN. No, sir; I haven't a copy of it here. I believe Admiral Kimmel has a copy of it.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do know a letter was written by the President?

Ensign PHELAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom was it written?

Ensign PHELAN. To Admiral Kimmel.

The CHAIRMAN. Which President?

Senator FERGUSON. President Truman.

Ensign PHELAN. President Truman.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. About when was that letter written?

Ensign PHELAN. Since these hearings have been in progress.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Lavender was one of the counsel, was he not?

Ensign PHELAN. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not this file was delivered to him, and it had to be taken up directly with the President, and the letter was written on it?

Ensign PHELAN. I so understand, Senator.

[19852] Commander BAECHER.¹ I can explain it.

Senator FERGUSON. All I want is an explanation.

Commander BAECHER. I know all about it; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us get it all, so there will be no mystery about it.

Commander BAECHER. I hesitate to inject myself, but as I understand it, Admiral Kimmel desired to get into this file, which is a White House file of the Navy Department.

Under the direction of the President, as we interpreted the directives, the committee alone had the right to go into the departmental files, so Admiral Kimmel was not permitted to do it, so he wrote a letter to the President as a naval officer, which went through the proper channels, and asked for that permission, and the President answered and said under his directives only this committee could have access to these departmental files, and this committee could have anything it wished, and this committee has.

That is the entire story.

¹ Navy Department liaison officer to the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the request made by Captain Lavender instead of Admiral Kimmel personally? I want to get the record straight.

Commander BAECHER. I do not know who acted physically, but it was done in Admiral Kimmel's name.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

[13853] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Why cannot we get the letters here?

Senator FERGUSON. If we can get them, and make them a part of the record, that is all right with me.

Mr. MURPHY. Put them in. I would like to see what date they were written, and when they started inquiring about this file, in view of it being several months ago, in December, and it just coming out now.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything done with the file?

Commander BAECHER. It was submitted to this committee.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All of it?

Commander BAECHER. There were two dispatches in it, and copies of it have been submitted to this committee along with the letter saying they are all there is.

Senator FERGUSON. Could we get now from you, Commander, what dispatches were in this supersecret file?

Commander BAECHER. As I recall it—and it is a hazy recollection—they were to the High Commissioner of the Philippines.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We can get them.

Senator FERGUSON. They were to the High Commissioner of the Philippines?

Commander BAECHER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That would not be a message between [13854] the British Government and the United States Government?

Commander BAECHER. I understand there were none. The record will speak better than I can now. It has been several months. We submitted a box full of dispatches between the Navy and the British Admiralty, which would be intergovernmental, you might say.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted what the Admiral was talking about. When the communications were made from the President, the Navy's communications were used, and the copies ordinarily would be kept in the file and that would be a super-secret file.

Commander BAECHER. We wrote a letter in answer to a direct request on that, Senator, and it is here. That letter states that we have submitted all of these dispatches that were in the so-called White House file, and we submitted them along with the letter.

There were no others.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand there were only two papers in this White House file, and they related to the High Commissioner of the Philippines?

Commander BAECHER. I think that is the purport of the certification we made, although I prefer you see that certification before you conclude that issue.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have personal knowledge of this, [13855] Commander, that when the file was obtained, there were only two papers in it? Are you speaking from personal knowledge?

Commander BAECHER. No; I am not. I did not go into the material.

Senator FERGUSON. It is what someone has told you?

Commander BAECHER. Yes. Someone who is very responsible.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you state who is very responsible? I told you?

Commander BAECHER. The Director of Naval Communications. The officer in charge has changed in the last several months. Adm Stone is in charge now, and before Admiral Stone, it was some other admiral.

Admiral STARK. Redman?

Commander BAECHER. Redman, yes. It was either Stone or Redman.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When a request is made of you, you send that to the officer that has charge of the papers that you are asked to produce?

Commander BAECHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who produces that information and you convey that information to us here? You do not yourself go into the matter and handle the papers physically yourself?

Commander BAECHER. Very seldom; if I am not satisfied with what I get on it.

[13856] Senator FERGUSON. Were you satisfied in this case?

Commander BAECHER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to, if possible, get the letter from President Truman. I think it ought to go into this record, to make it clear.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Mr. Masten has gone down to get that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I do not think we have the letter from President Truman. I have not seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. May I reserve the right to obtain from Ensign Phelan a copy of that letter, or the original, so it will be inserted in the record?

Mr. MURPHY. Together with the letter from Admiral Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

[13857] Commander BAECHER. I can furnish a copy of the letter.

I would not be surprised but that I may have the original in my files.

Senator FERGUSON. You will be able to get us copies?

Commander BAECHER. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We will get it for you, Senator.¹

Let us see what we have right here now.

(The documents were handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Mr. MASTEN. Senator, I think all of those should be read into the record, if they are not in.

Senator FERGUSON. These are not the letters we are talking about.

Mr. MASTEN. They are the memorandum from Admiral Cole to the President. Those are the only things we have had. The two messages are the two messages that are already in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. The messages are already in the record?

Mr. MASTEN. That is my recollection. I am not sure whether the memorandum is.

¹ See p. 5493, *infra*.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want these read into the record or filed and printed in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. They ought to be printed.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me they might as well be printed at this point instead of read. They are photo- [13858] static copies.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are they at all significant? It seems to us they were entirely irrelevant.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not claim they are, but I certainly do not want to keep them out.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The first one, Mr. Chairman, is with reference to the Philippine matter and the second is also with reference to the Philippine matter. I have examined them and thought they were entirely irrelevant as to our examination here. Unless somebody says they are, why should the record be further encumbered?

Senator FERGUSON. But the record still stands, I think I am not commenting on the evidence, except insofar as it relates to what we may inquire about here.

The CHAIRMAN. The letters would at least show that it is not claimed the President wrote to Churchill, and for that purpose probably they might as well go in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

(The documents referred to follow:)

[13859]

DECEMBER 1, 1945.

Memorandum to Admiral Colclough:

It is our understanding that there is in the office of the Director of Naval Communications a file designated "White House File", containing communications sent by President Roosevelt to England and other points through Navy communication channels. This is to request that we be furnished, as promptly as possible, copies of all messages contained in this file sent to or received by the President or other White House aides during the period October 1, 1941, to December 7, 1941, inclusive, with reference to Japan or matters pertaining to political or military developments in the Far East. It is probable that the request submitted by us under date of November 28th, emanating from Congressman Keefe, will include some of this material, and in this event it will be sufficient in response to that request.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY.

Washington, 10 December 1945.

Memorandum to: Mr. William D. Mitchell.

1. There are forwarded to you herewith copies of two dispatches as follows:
(1) #261854 of 26 November 1941 from the President to the High Commissioner of the Philippine Islands.

(2) #280228 of 28 November 1941 from Cincaf to the President.

2. These dispatches are delivered in response to your request of 1 December 1945 for copies of dispatches in the Navy Department's "White House file" during the period October 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941, inclusive, "with reference to Japan or matters pertaining to political or military development in the Far East."

3. No other dispatches responsive to your request have been discovered.

4. It is requested that you receipt for the above two copies of dispatches on a copy of this memorandum.

/S/ O. S. Colclough,
O. S. COLCLOUGH,
Rear Admiral, USN.

5214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[13861] Naval Message
From OPNAV To: CINCAF
Released by: H. R. Stark
Date: 26 Nov. 1941
261854

Navy Departm

Priority

From the President. For the High Commissioner Philippines.

ADMIRAL HART WILL DELIVER TO YOU A COPY OF A DESPATCH WHICH WITH MY APPROVAL THE CNO AND THE COS ADDRESSED THE SENIOR ARMY AND NAVY COMMANDERS IN THE PHILIPPINES. ADDITION YOU ARE ADVISED THAT THE JAPANESE ARE STRONGLY REINFORCING THEIR GARRISONS AND NAVAL FORCES IN THE MINDANAO REGION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AGAINST A POSSIBLE ATTACK BY US FORCES. HOWEVER I AM MORE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED OVER INCREASING OPPOSITION OF JAPANESE LEADERS AS BY CURRENT SOUTHWARD TROOP MOVEMENTS FROM SHANGHAI TO JAPAN TO THE FORMOSA AREA. PREPARATIONS ARE BECOMING APPARENT IN CHINA FORMOSA AND INDO CHINA FOR AN EARLY AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT OF SOME CHARACTER ALTHOUGH AS YET THERE ARE NO CLEAR INDICATIONS AS TO ITS STRENGTH OR WHETHER IT WILL BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE BURMA ROAD THAILAND MALAY PENINSULA NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES OR THE PHILIPPINE ADVANCE AGAINST THAILAND SEEMS THE MOST PROBABLE. I CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE [13862] THAT THIS NEXT JAPANESE AGGRESSION MIGHT CAUSE AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE US AND JAPAN. I DESIRE THAT AFTER FURTHER INFORMING YOURSELF AS TO THE SITUATION AND THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF NAVAL AND MILITARY PLANS THROUGH CONSULTATION WITH ADMIRAL HART AND GENERAL MACARTHUR YOU SHALL IN GREAT CONFIDENCE PRESENT MY VIEWS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH AND INFORM HIM THAT AS ALWAYS I AM RELYING UPON THE FULL COOPERATION OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND HIS PEOPLE. PLEASE IMPRESS UPON HIM THE DESIRABILITY OF AVOIDING PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT OR ACTION SINCE THAT MIGHT MAKE THE SITUATION MORE DIFFICULT. ROOSEVELT XX.

Copy to Op-12 War Plans Div. U. S. Army
No other persons to receive copies

[SECRET]

[13863] Naval Message
From: CINCAF
To: OPNAV
Date: NOVEMBER 28, 1941
280228

Navy Department

Routine R

From High Commissioner Sayre Personal for President Roosevelt

YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 26TH IS GREATLY APPRECIATED. I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY PRESIDENT QUEZON TO INFORM YOU THAT YOU MAY BE ABSOLUTELY ASSURED THAT TO THE LAST MAN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH, AND THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, WILL STAND BEHIND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
ACTION: WHITE HOUSE.
SS FILE.

[13864] Senator FERGUSON: It still remains, Admiral, that there were communications, using the Navy facilities between the President and the British Government in relation to the Far East; is not that the correct statement?

Admiral STARK. I think so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the copies would be kept in a supersecret file in the Navy Department?

Admiral STARK. I have no personal knowledge of that, but that would be a perfectly plausible thing to assume.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, did you find the message or memorandum to Mr. Hull?

Mr. MASTEN. This is it (handing document to Senator Ferguson).

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, we have a memorandum for the Secretary of State dated December 4, 1941.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the whole memorandum put in, but I particularly want to question the Admiral about the last several paragraphs.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You want the whole memorandum inserted in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. I want the whole memorandum inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

[13865]

NAVY DEPARTMENT.

Washington, December 4, 1941.

Memorandum for Secretary of State.

November 22nd the Special Naval Observer London informed the Chief of Naval Operations that Vice Admiral Furstner, Minister of Marine of the Dutch Government in London and Commander in Chief of All Dutch Naval Forces had received information that the Japanese were concentrating an expeditionary force in the Pelew Islands and that the Dutch Government were considering what it should do in case a Japanese expeditionary force should cross the Davao-Waigeo line or the equator east of that line, and that the Dutch Government were inclined to regard such a movement as a direct threat to the territories and interests of Great Britain and the United States, which should immediately be countered by force. The Dutch stated that before making up their minds they would like the views of the Chief of Naval Operations.

The Chief of Naval Operations replied that he discounted the information as to the assembly of an expeditionary force in the Pelews. That he was not in a position to offer advice as the question asked involved political questions, but authorized the Naval Observer London to express his views as to the importance of the Pelews for the protection of the Mandates and for an offense against the Philippines or the Netherland East Indies.

[13866] December 3 the Special Naval Observer London reported that he has kept the British Admiralty informed of the above as the same subject has been discussed by the Dutch with the British. He suggested to the British Admiralty that it might be necessary for the Dutch to declare the area south of the Davao-Waigeo-Equator line an area dangerous to shipping, in order that Dutch forces might be free to take prompt action against suspicious vessels crossing from the North and from the East. The British Admiralty concurred that this would constitute a useful defense measure from the naval point of view. However it was essential for political reasons that the zone should be declared in as unprovocative a manner as possible and should be represented as a defense zone rather than as a dangerous zone.

The British Admiralty informed Furstner that they also doubted the accuracy of his information and suggested the Dutch take the matter up with the Foreign Office.

When the Dutch Foreign Minister visited Eden his proposal went beyond that of Furstner as it invited a joint declaration of a defense zone by the United States or Great Britain. After consulting the Admiralty, Eden replied to the Dutch Foreign Minister as follows: (A) That during the continuance of the present negotiations between Japan and the United States, it was undesirable that any declaration be made unless there was the plainest evidence that the Japanese were preparing an expedition against the Netherlands territory, and that until [13867] more definite evidence becomes available that Japanese concentrations are threatening Dutch territory no declaration should be made. (B) That Great Britain recognizes the military value the declaration of a defense zone would have, but that it considers it would be less provocative to

Japan and less prejudicial to the Washington negotiations if it were confined to a unilateral declaration by the Netherlands East Indies of a zone manifestly designed as a defense measure for their own shores. (C) That in similar circumstances His Majesty's Government had been compelled to make a unilateral declaration of a defense zone on the open seas off the coast of Johore when Japanese concentrations on the border of Indo China began to constitute a threat to Malaya; the declaration of this zone in waters adjacent to British territory was plainly a measure of defense and at the time was accepted as such by Japan without serious criticism.

Mr. Eden therefore suggested that if a declaration should prove necessary the Netherlands Government should declare that certain military and naval defense measures have been taken in the area south and west of the Davao-Waigeo-Equator line and that accordingly all vessels intending to enter the zone must notify the Netherlands Naval authorities of their intention and at specified ports for routing instructions. Such a declaration would be analogous to that made by His Majesty's Government off Johore and would not be likely to increase existing tension.

[13868] On December 4 the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Special Naval Observer in London to transmit to the Dutch and British Admiralties in London, the following views on the military aspect of this subject.

While the Chief of Naval Operations believes the November reports of Japanese concentration in the Pelews were unfounded, the possibility of a Japanese attack from that region against the Philippines or Netherlands East Indies cannot be ruled out.

In regard to the Dutch project to declare areas south and west of the Davao-Waigeo-Equator line dangerous to shipping in order that Dutch Forces might attack suspicious vessels entering from the North and East, if this were done it would apply to all merchant shipping regardless of nationality and to British and United States Naval vessels as well as those of Japan. It is doubtful if the Dutch could establish promptly a control system which would not cause excessive delay to shipping important to the United States particularly to the ships carrying reinforcements to the Philippines as all United States shipping between the United States and the Far East is routed via Torres Straits.

The declaration of this large area as a defense zone would hardly be analogous to the British declaration of the Johore area, as the latter area is a small one. The declaration of a large area of the high seas as a defense zone would create a precedent for Japan to close the Okhotsk Sea, Sea of Japan, [13869] the western part of the South China Sea, and the Gulf of Siam. If the United States acquiesced in the Dutch declaration, it would be difficult to object to similar declarations by the Japanese.

At present aid to Russia is being shipped via the Okhotsk Sea and Sea of Japan. The Dutch, British and United States are taking reconnaissance measures to cover areas considered dangerous. Shipments to Siberia and other measures should continue. The Chief of Naval Operations is convinced that the closing of the area west and south of the Davao-Waigeo-Equator area by the Dutch would be prejudicial to the naval and military interests of all the powers.

If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese the Chief of Naval Operations believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that during the current situation Japanese Naval vessels or expeditionary forces crossing the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act and the forces crossing this line would be attacked.

Ambassadors Winant and Biddle have been informed by the Special Naval Observer London of the contents of the memorandum.

/S/ R. E. SCHUIRMAN
By Direction

[13870] Senator FERGUSON. I never believed we should take unrelated paragraphs out without putting the whole memorandum in. This is a memorandum by Admiral Schuirmann.

I will read you several items in it.

On December 4 the Chief of Naval Operations—that would be you—

directed the Special Naval Observer in London to transmit to the Dutch and British Admiralties in London, the following views on the military aspect of this subject.

I am just taking one paragraph.

Mr. GEARHART. Will the Senator state the date?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. The 4th of December, 1941. It is a memorandum for the Secretary of State from R. E. Schuirmann, by direction. R. E. Schuirmann was an admiral, was he not, or a captain?

Admiral STARK. He was a captain at that time. He is a rear admiral now, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. May I just ask one preliminary question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, indeed.

Mr. MURPHY. How long have we had the memorandum before the committee?

Mr. MASTEN. That memorandum has been in counsel's office since last November and available to every member of the committee. Yesterday, Mr. Greaves came down to look through [13871] various papers and this question I imagine is based on that examination yesterday.

Mr. MURPHY. Fine.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the paragraph I want to read to you, and it follows the paragraph I did read and is the second from the last paragraph in this memorandum, is as follows:

If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese, the Chief of Naval Operations believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if during the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act and the forces crossing this line would be attacked.

Now, this is a message from Captain Schuirmann to the State Department, and it is on your direction, and I read you that part:

If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese, the Chief of Naval Operations—

that is you—

believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if during the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act and the forces crossing this line would be attacked.

Attacked by whom?

[13872] Admiral STARK. Attacked by the Dutch.

Senator FERGUSON. Why were you dictating the message that the Dutch were to give to Japan?

Admiral STARK. I remember that. My remembrance is that it came up before, but I am not certain, but we were undoubtedly asked, and that was our opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if you can give us the answer, why were you consulted as to what kind of a message the Dutch Government would give to the Japanese Government in a question solely between the Dutch Government and the Japanese Government, as to the Japanese Government moving troops or moving vessels across a certain line?

Admiral STARK. Well, we were—

Senator FERGUSON. Were you taking parallel action?

That is the question.

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I think the witness ought to be given an opportunity to answer the question. It seems like an important question.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a very important question.

Mr. MURPHY. Then, let him answer.

Admiral STARK. No; we were not taking parallel action. We could not take a parallel action.

Mr. MURPHY. I submit the question has not been answered [13873] Senator. The second question was just answered, but the other question has not been answered.

Senator FERGUSON. Read the question, please, Mr. Reporter.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Admiral STARK. My remembrance of that is that the Dutch ask us for an opinion and we gave it to them. There is much in the record showing an interdependent interest more or less in this whole area.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, I will ask you upon what you based your opinion that you had a right to tell the Dutch that they should give a message to the Japanese Government that if this line was crossed by the Japanese it would be considered a hostile act and the forces crossing this line would be attacked, that you believed that the Dutch should say that if the Japanese crossed that line the Dutch should attack? What did you base that on?

Admiral STARK. I based that on the fact that if they did, it would look like an attack on the N. E. I., on the Netherlands East Indies, and if they could consider it such, it was my opinion an attack, and in the event to repel it. I might draw a similar line—perhaps, exaggerate it a little bit—by saying if they attempted to go into Manila Bay—

Senator FERGUSON. That was in our territory?

[13874] Admiral STARK. That was in our territory. But they asked me for an opinion, and that was my opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you contact the President before you gave this opinion? It is an important opinion, is it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It might have meant war between the United States and Japan? This kind of advice, could it not mean war?

[13875] Admiral STARK. It could have meant war between the Dutch and the Japs. What the ultimate reaction to it would have been I do not know.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. That is because you had written to Admiral Kimmel that God alone would know what was going to happen? That the reason you did not take it to mean war between the United States and Japan?

Admiral STARK. Well, I could not tell whether it meant war or not. Under our Constitution the Congress had to declare war, and we could not take any independent action, so far as hostilities were concerned.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to object on the ground that there is a "yes, sir" answer in there, and there were two questions and the record does not show which question the answer "yes, sir" is to. The first was: "Did you ask the President?", and then there was another question asked and the answer was "Yes, sir." The record does not show to anyone reading it whether the "Yes, sir" is to the first question or the second question.

Senator FERGUSON. One question was: "It is an important message, isn't it?"

What is your answer to that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[13876] **Senator FERGUSON.** Is your answer to the other question the same, "Yes, sir"?

Admiral STARK. As to whether or not I consulted the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall definitely having consulted the President on that point, but I would assume that any dispatch of that nature would have been taken up with the Secretary and with the State Department, and probably with the President. It was along a similar line of the line which we had drawn in our memorandum of the 5th and the 27th.

Mr. MASTEN. Senator, may I suggest something there that would be helpful to you?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. The memorandum which you have is a memorandum which describes the final message which appears in Exhibit No. 79 and which was introduced last December.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I have that here.

Mr. MASTEN. This exhibit gives the entire background of most of that memorandum, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. But it is dated subsequent, is the only thing?

Mr. MASTEN. It appears that that is the telegram referred to in the memorandum, because the language is practically [13877] identical with the descriptive language in the memorandum.

Mr. MURPHY. For the record, when you said "this memorandum," you had one in your hand?

Mr. MASTEN. That was Exhibit No. 79.

Admiral STARK. You say you have just taken a paragraph out. I would like to see the dispatch and see the correspondence, what is in it.

Mr. MASTEN. This is the final dispatch in Exhibit No. 79, Admiral.

Admiral STARK. I do recall that myself.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you will notice what you are reading, Admiral, is dated the 5th, which is the day following, and I cannot quite get the record straight in my own mind, how you can rely upon something that came subsequent to the time that you directed this advice to be given. Can you straighten that out?

Mr. MURPHY. Now, will the Senator yield?

Admiral STARK. What I would like to see is where we start on this and who asked what.

Mr. MURPHY. The record shows the 5th where? The 5th here or the 5th with the Dutch?

Mr. MASTEN. The final telegram in Exhibit No. 79 bears the date December 5, whereas the memorandum that Senator Ferguson is using is dated December 4. But the fact is that the language of [13878] the memorandum and of the telegram are practically identical, so it would seem to be clear that the memorandum is referring to the telegram.

Admiral STARK. This is the memorandum where they started?

Mr. MASTEN. That is the memorandum under discussion.

Admiral STARK. May I take the time to read it, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, certainly.

Mr. MURPHY. I think, Mr. Chairman, the record should also show that the dispatch of the 5th is addressed to our own naval attaché in London.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Is there anything here showing any dispatch directed to the Dutch?

Mr. MASTEN. The memorandum refers to a dispatch of the 5th. There is a discrepancy on the dates.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield while the Admiral is reading?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I think, Mr. Chairman, the record should show that Exhibit No. 79 consists of 10 dispatches. Exhibit No. 79 was admitted in the record some month ago, and the part on which the Admiral is being questioned now, as to what the Chief of Naval Operations said, is in the dispatch of December 5. It has been in the record for 10 months.

[13879] Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but the record did not show before that this was all under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, which is the witness.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, it does show it. It says,

If Dutch authorities consider some warning should be given Japan, it believes it should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of the current situation Japanese naval vessels, or expeditionary forces crossing the Davao-Waigeo line would be considered hostile and would be attacked. Communicate these views to the Admiralty and the Dutch Naval Command in London.

[13880] Senator FERGUSON. It does not cover what I am inquiring about now.

Admiral STARK. I have read these, and to make it clear I would suggest, if they are not already in the record in connection with the questioning, that it would be well to put them in, or refer to them at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be referred to now, because through the counsel's statement, the exhibit number has been put in.

Admiral STARK. That shows the entire discussion. This memorandum was a memorandum by Schuirman at my direction to the Secretary of State, with whom these things had been considered, and I said if the Dutch were going to do something, I suggested the following.

Now, I may state with regard to this picture in general, that it has been suggested at times that we rule out certain parts of the sea and call them defensive sea areas, that nothing could come in there.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say "we," whom are you speaking about?

Admiral STARK. We had to consider the same thing in the Southern Philippine waters.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean you as the Navy, or the President, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy?

[13881] Admiral STARK. The Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. The Navy Department?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

As I recollect, we had had some correspondence with Admiral Lamberton about it, about making a defensive sea area which would prohibit vessels coming in there except they asked permission to come in, so that we would know what was going through that area.

As noted here, the British had declared one such area. I recollect clearly when the question first came up, as opposing it, because if we did, we could have no complaint of the Japs, perhaps, closing the Sea of Japan, or closing the northern waters where we were sending vessels into Russia.

That is mentioned here, and that was our thought on the subject.

It is all in these dispatches.

Then we went on to say finally—

If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese, the Chief of Naval Operations believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if during the current situation, Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act, and the forces crossing this line would be attacked.

[13882] That is very much the same thing as the defensive sea area. They cannot get into what they consider vital waters to them without asking permission, or being attacked.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you read just the next paragraph?

Admiral STARK. May I go on just a little further?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Those questions had been discussed in the Navy Department and in the State Department. This first memorandum is to the State Department, and I think we were all pretty much of one mind with regard to it.

Now as to your question, as to whether this was taken up with the President, I do not recall. The last paragraph that you suggest I read is:

Ambassadors Winant and Biddle have been informed by the Special Naval Observer, London, of the contents of the memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think today that you described this important matter as to advising the Dutch to do this without taking it up with the President of the United States?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not think I would. I certainly would not do it without taking it up with the Secretary of the Navy, and without a complete interchange with the State Department.

[13883] As I remember the first instance, when we were talking about the southern Philippine waters, of discussing it with the President, but I just cannot say absolutely that I took up that particular paragraph with the President.

I am under the impression I did, but I hesitate, when he is not here, to state positively that I did, when it is not perfectly clear to my mind that I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Unless it is your memory that it is perfectly clear, I would not want you to.

Admiral STARK. On things of that sort, we just could not go along by ourselves. It had to involve the State Department, and things of that sort were always taken up with the President, and we were very close to him.

Senator FERGUSON. What I want to get at is, in your opinion now, if they had moved across this line, and the Dutch had attacked, would you have said that that meant war also with the United States?

Admiral STARK. No; I would not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I want to read to you out of Mr. Stimson's memorandum.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield before you?
Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. How does this Davao-Waigeo line set forth in the areas described in the memorandum of November 5?

Senator FERGUSON. It was over in the Neth area, and, as I recall, would have put an amphitheater right on the doorstep.

Admiral STARK. Of the NEI.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the NEI?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But it had nothing to do with what General Marshall established in your memorandum of 27th of November?

Admiral STARK. That is a different line.

Mr. MURPHY. Is not there a paragraph in the memorandum as to what the recommendations of our staff were if the NEI were attacked?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I want to bring out.

Admiral STARK. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. "Friday, November 7, 1941, Secretary Stimson's diary.

Cabinet meeting this afternoon. The President opened with Lincoln and his Cabinet—how he polled the Cabinet at "no," and then he said "The ayes have it." With that [13885] what he said was the first general poll of his on the question of the Far East—whether the people would follow us or strike at Japan down there, and what the tactics should be.

Now, he has got a note there, and the note is:

See statement, page 11, as to this Cabinet meeting.

Now, continuing reading from the memorandum:

It was a very interesting talk—the best Cabinet meeting I had since I have been there. He went around the table with himself, and then around through the whole number, asking how the country would support us.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Don't you think the Admiral ought to have a chance to say what he has to say?

Admiral STARK. I brought that up with me.

Senator FERGUSON. It is on page 42, Admiral.

Admiral STARK. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. About half way down.

He said that this time the vote is unanimous, he felt that we had made a good presentation of the general situation. I pointed out to him that we had followed up the steps which had been needed to be done in the future. The thing would have been stronger if the Cabinet had known—and they did not know what the Army is doing with it. Hull and the President—what the Army is doing with it. We are ready to pitch in.

Now, that is the end of the memorandum.

Mr. MURPHY. At that point, Senator, don't you think that he did not include Secretary Knox? Certainly not.

Senator FERGUSON. I can only read from the diary of the Secretary of War. I am not putting any language in it. It may seem strange.

Admiral STARK. I may state Colonel Knox did know.

Senator FERGUSON. You say Colonel Knox did know?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; he knew everything I did, and I was perfectly familiar with that program.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were familiar with what is contained in the diary of the Secretary of War?

Admiral STARK. I did not recall that vote. It may have been I was told, but I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I will go to pages 11 and 12, because it refers to that, and I will keep this record straight.

On Friday, November 7, we had the usual weekly Cabinet meeting. The Far Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our minds. Mr. Hull informed us that relations had become [13887] extremely critical and that we should be on the outlook for an attack by Japan at any time.

Now, this is November 7.

"Our military advisers"—and you would be one of those would you not, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Reading on:

—while desirous of delay, had urged military action if Japan attacked territory whose security was vital to us, and in this connection specified American, British, or Dutch territory.

Now, I will ask you whether or not the Dutch territory was the same territory that was described in the memorandum of Schuirmann on your direction?

Admiral STARK. In effect; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you had given the opinion to apparently the President, and apparently to the other members of the War Cabinet, that we should attack if this territory south of this particular—what is the name of it? Davao-Waigeo?

Admiral STARK. Davao-Waigeo.

Senator FERGUSON. "South of this particular Davao [13888] Waigeo line, "isn't that true? That was your opinion as early as the 7th?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and on that same 7th, I wrote that war might be delayed a month longer, but I did not see how it could go beyond that.

I might say with regard to that—and I have a remembrance that in my previous testimony I said that—what I was afraid of was one at a time, and then a squeeze play, and I think I am on the record as saying under certain conditions we would have to fight for our own safety.

Senator FERGUSON. Coming back to my question, here on the 7th of November, you are of the opinion, and have advised the President and the War Cabinet, as one of our military advisers, that if Japan attacked the territory of the Dutch, which includes the very territory that you are now telling the Dutch to give this warning about, and that they are to attack, you would say then that it did mean war, in your opinion; is that not a correct statement?

Admiral STARK. No, it is not. There is a distinction there.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what it is?

Admiral STARK. It is this, that while it would mean that Mars and I, these advisers—which is a matter of record—had advised that we could not say that our advice [13889] would be followed.

What the Congress would do if this was put up to them, I had means of knowing. That is why I say it did not mean war, because we thought it ought to.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, did you ever consider on the question of whether or not we would start war with Japan, whether there would be shots from the Japanese side, and, therefore, we would be in war; whether that question would ever be submitted to the Congress of the United States?

Admiral STARK. Our instructions were very clear on not to commit an overt act. So far as I was concerned, I could do nothing in that without authority higher up.

Unless something had occurred, such as did occur, the normal procedure was for a declaration by Congress, in accordance with the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did not you know that Colonel Kimmel advised the President of three alternatives, and he advised as the first that we should attack?

Mr. KEEFE. You mean Colonel Stimson?

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Stimson.

Admiral STARK. That paragraph which is in here—

Senator FERGUSON. It is on page 53.

Admiral STARK. In view of the rest of the paragraphs in which where Colonel Stimson states—

[13890] Senator FERGUSON. It is on page 53, if it will help you.

Admiral STARK. I want to finish that sentence.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Where Colonel Stimson states, on page 55 of the memorandum, and I quote:

It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the force it went by without any warning, on the one hand, which we didn't think could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go.

and so forth.

There Colonel Stimson puts himself on record as stating that he could not strike without warning.

Now, I think that there is another paragraph here that bears that same thing, if I may look for it, while this talk is on this matter.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Look on page 56.

Admiral STARK. I will come right back to it.

On page 28, Colonel Stimson further states:

On the other hand we also decided that we could not attack without a further warning to Japan, and we discussed what form that warning should take. The President suggested a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. After some discussion, it was decided that he would send such [13891] a letter to the Emperor, which would not be made public, and that at the same time he would deliver a special message to Congress reporting on the danger and reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened.

Now, Colonel Stimson, I think, in those two statements, which I have quoted, and there may be others here—clearly states, in

opinion, that he could not go ahead and make an attack without first warning, and he suggests that the President should go to Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not he also advise the President that he believed the message of the 17th of August—he calls it the 19th, but apparently that is wrong—

Admiral STARK. Yes; that is an error.

Senator FERGUSON. That the message of the 17th of August was such a warning, that if they crossed that line, we would be justified in attacking without congressional action?

Admiral STARK. I do not gather that he considers that. That message of the 17th of August—and while I have not refreshed my memory on it for a long time, as I recall wound up with some statement to the effect that if the Japs encroached further in southeast Asia, we reserved to ourselves the right to take any action which we saw fit in our national interest.

[13892] Senator FERGUSON. Now, would not one of those actions be that we would attack if we would take any action?

Admiral STARK. I would not say it would be to attack without warning. I feel so strongly on that, that my only suggestion is—you are asking me to interpret Colonel Stimson's thoughts. He is available to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. I will come back to it.

Did you expect this war to start by the Japanese doing the first shooting, after Congress had declared war upon Japan? Is not that contrary to all of the philosophy of Japan, that they would allow us, if they were going to make war, to declare war first?

Admiral STARK. Again I would like to state this with regard to that: My thought was that the Japs would strike without warning. That was their history.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Admiral STARK. Now, as to the second part of your question—

Senator FERGUSON. I think you testified to that before.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

As to the second part of your question, as to our striking after declaration of war on our part, if the situation became intolerable to us, and our national safety, if the Japs had not struck and we thought then that our safety was imperiled, [13893] if we did not fight, I think it would have been done in a constitutional manner.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, you expected Japan to attack without warning?

Admiral STARK. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would be before we declared war?

Admiral STARK. At that time; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Therefore, the war would start before Congress declared war, because we would not allow Japan to attack us and not even shoot back, would we?

Admiral STARK. Well, I think your question is just stating what has happened.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what you anticipated? My original question was prefaced, and I am carrying out the idea, by what happened prior to the 7th.

It is exactly what happened, but I want to know whether that is what you anticipated would happen.

Admiral STARK. I did.

I did anticipate an attack without warning. I had written letters for over a year. I stated so unequivocally in the latter part of November.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it true that that was at the War Cabinet meeting, as related in the Standard?

Admiral STARK. If you will give me the page, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Look at page 47.

Then, at 12 o'clock, we (viz. General Marshall and I) were where we were until nearly half-past one. At the time General Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President, in the Victory Parade, brought up entirely the relations with Japan up to the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps the day, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack. The question was what we should do. The question was to put them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing it to ourselves.

It was a difficult proposition.

Now, is that not exactly what the whole War Cabinet had submitted to Congress and have America declared war?

Admiral STARK. We thought action by Japan about to start, and we said so.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[13895] Now, I come to the question here.

Wasn't it also true that you expected that Japan would declare war upon Japan?

Admiral STARK. Yes, because I thought it was coming offing.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. But I do again make the statement clear on the record, so far as my thoughts are concerned. Japan had not attacked, and if conditions had become unfavorable to Japan because of what she was doing, it was that there would have been only one road for us to take. It had to be through the Congress.

It did not have to be, because she attacked.

Senator FERGUSON. And you expected she would attack?

Admiral STARK. Yes; at that time there was it in our minds. I said so at that time, on the 25th.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not change your mind, you know, the President did not change his, at least up to the 7th of December?

Admiral STARK. No one changed their mind. You will recall on the 6th we sent a dispatch to the Japanese, to hold on to the last minute. That showing that minute to happen at any time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, he states:

The question was how we should maneuver them—

I take it that means the Japanese—

into the position of firing the first shot without allowing it to ourselves.

Now, did you discuss with the President and those present at that meeting how you would maneuver the Japanese into shooting the first shot?

Admiral STARK. I have no recollection of that. My recollection of that meeting, on which I testified before—and which the record, the written record shows—is that I wrote Kimmel about both the President and Mr. Hull stating that they would not be surprised at a surprise attack.

But as to our maneuvering them, if you take the language baldly, just what it says, that it was trying to get them to shoot at us, I do not recall any such conversation.

I do recall the meat of the thing, and which meant what Colonel Stimson meant, that we should not commit the first overt act, and I heard Marshall's testimony yesterday when he said he thought this was to keep the record clear, and that it was to be political. Maybe that was it; I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say, "political" or "diplomatic"?

[13897] Admiral STARK. Diplomatic, perhaps it was.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, is that your own opinion, that we were to keep the diplomatic record in shape so that Japan would shoot the first shot rather than America declaring war?

Admiral STARK. I do not recollect that having gone through my mind at that time. As I said, I did not recollect discussing this, just as it is here, except that we would not commit the first overt act.

I do know, however, that there was a desire to keep the record straight on our offers, for example.

To go back a little bit, I think it was back in July when I was present with Nomura, and with Welles in the White House, when Nomura brought up the subject that what they were concerned with was raw materials, and particularly food, rice; and the President then offered, so far as he possibly could, to guarantee that they would get these things if Japan would stop her aggression.

I remember his remark afterwards, that she probably would not stop her aggression. But that was to keep the record straight, and they were continually trying to prevent war in the Pacific.

I think the record is clean on it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand it, you do not [13898] remember this being taken up at that meeting, and you do not remember that the "maneuver" meant diplomatic maneuver. You do not remember either?

Admiral STARK. No; I do not, Senator Ferguson.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Was Admiral Stark at this Cabinet meeting?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I was.

Senator FERGUSON. It was the War Cabinet meeting.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. You were present?

Admiral STARK. I was present at that meeting; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you wrote to Kimmel advising him that the President had expected the war by Japan attacking by—what was it? Monday?

Mr. KEEFE. The following Monday, December 1.

Admiral STARK. That is what the President said. If you rec when you questioned me about this before, I said I thought we w into all phases of it, but my memory was not clear as to just w we had discussed in detail, but that I had written Kimmel of the Pr dent's and Mr. Hull's belief that a surprise attack might come a time, and as early as "next Monday."

There are things in here, of course, from Mr. Stimson's [138] diary. I kept none.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does Mr. Keefe desire to inquire?

Mr. KEEFE. May I have the diary?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to have it perfectly clear, if I can—and listened attentively to the questions and answers that have been p pounded by Senator Ferguson, and that you have given, Admi Stark—

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But according to Secretary Stimson's diary, under d of November 7, 1941, in which he described the Cabinet meeting h that afternoon, Friday afternoon, where the President polled t cabinet on the question "whether the people would back us up in c we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be," whetl the fact that such a vote was taken by the full Cabinet, and they h voted "aye," expressing their respective opinions that the peop would back them up if they struck at Japan, whether that was kno to you when you attended the meeting of the War Cabinet on Tuesd November 25?

Admiral STARK. I do not think it was. I do not recall Colo Knox having given me that information.

Obviously I would not have gotten it from anyone else, [139] unless Marshall had gotten it from Stimson and told me.

I have no recollection of it.

Mr. KEEFE. It is obvious from the memorandum prepared by Sec tary Stimson and appearing in his diary that that whole question v gone over by the Cabinet.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I think there is no question of that. states so, from his note made at the time.

Mr. KEEFE. But you, as Chief of Naval Operations, state to us n that you had no knowledge that that question was discussed at tl Cabinet meeting of November 7?

Admiral STARK. I have no recollection of it.

Mr. KEEFE. Then, am I to understand that it is a mere lapse memory that you do not have a recollection; that it may have b discussed and you have forgotten it?

Admiral STARK. It is possible that I might have. In my opinior did not know.

After all, that is going on 5 years, and there was an awful going on. But I have no recollection of that vote, until I read it he and I think I did not get it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the reason I am asking that, Admiral Stark, because it impressed me, when I read it, that it was a very import matter, reflecting itself on subsequent actions, perhaps, of the Cabi and subsequent action of the so-called War Cabinet, but your fi

judgment before [13901] this committee today is that when you met with the war cabinet on the 25th of November, or at any other time, that the war cabinet met subsequent to November 7, you do not have any present recollection of ever having known of its meeting and its determination and vote on the 7th of November?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. If I had had it, I do not know that it would have affected my independent judgment.

Mr. KEEFE. The thing that impressed me about this memorandum of the former Secretary Stimson is the fact that they apparently were concerned about the imminence of war, and how we were to meet it without being put in the position of having it said that we had fired the first shot, or committed the first overt act. You were concerned about that too, as Chief of Naval Operations, were you not?

Admiral STARK. I was concerned with the imminence of war, and surprise attack by the Japs which we were expecting at any moment at that time.

I say "at that time," my message of the 24th put it down as a possibility; my message of the 27th was positive, and you recall the subsequent messages to the 27th about the codes and so forth. We were expecting such an attack.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I understand that clearly, but I [13902] gained the impression from reading Secretary Stimson's statement to this committee, together with the excerpts from his diary which he has submitted to the committee that there was a question in the minds of the Cabinet officers as to whether or not there was such a division among the people of this country with respect to the possibility of war in the Pacific, or whether or not the country was so solidified on that question that they would back up the President and the Cabinet if they did actually, in view of the circumstances, strike at Japan and commit the first overt act, and the Cabinet, when polled on that question, said they thought the country would back them up. Did you share that belief at that time?

Admiral STARK. Well, I certainly would not have had any such unanimity with regard to the country backing them up as was indicated there by the Cabinet poll.

I had recalled when I thought we would get the draft without any question, we got it by one vote, after a good deal of contest, and the sentiment of the country, which is portrayed here by Colonel Stimson—for example, may I quote here, speaking of the officers and what the military was working on at that time, Colonel Stimson said, "Yet they were surrounded, outside of their offices and almost throughout the country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief [13903] in danger which now seems incredible."

Mr. KEEFE. You felt that way too, did you not, because you wrote Admiral Hart on that same thing, did you not?

Admiral STARK. I wrote I did not know what we would do and there has been a good deal of comment on that in articles one way or the other, as though it might seem strange that the Chief of Naval Operations did not know what to do under certain conditions.

Mr. KEEFE. You would have good—

Admiral STARK. May I finish?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Admiral STARK. It would have taken a brave man right here Congress at that time to have predicted what would have to be done if it was put up to Congress.

Mr. KEEFE. I recall a letter which you wrote, which is in the record here—I cannot quote it exactly—but I do recall a letter which you wrote to Admiral Hart in which you said to him, in substance, that you could not understand the attitude of the people of this country and especially the people up on the Hill that were debating the question of arming the ships and so on, that they apparently did not realize that the country was already at war, that we were at war in the Atlantic, and you said to him, “You and I know it.”

[13904] Do you have that letter?

Admiral STARK. I remember very distinctly a letter in which I stated, “Although the country does not realize, we are in war in the Atlantic.”

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Admiral STARK. We covered that in the previous testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. You, as Chief of Naval Operations, knew it, but you expressed the opinion at that time, that the people of the country and the Congress itself did not seem to understand and know the facts.

Admiral STARK. That is correct. You remember the testimony I think, to the effect that we did not have belligerent rights, and that went with the full declaration of war. There were a number of things we could not do, but technically, in certain areas, we had given an order to shoot at any Axis craft we saw, and the public had been fully informed on that by the President.

Mr. MURPHY. In the speech of September 11, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. September 11; yes, sir; I think that was the speech. It has all been covered.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now; in answer to the questions of Senator Ferguson, you indicated that you have very little present recollection of what actually took place at this [13905] meeting of the War Cabinet on the 25th, as described here by Secretary Stimson.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I searched my memory just as carefully as I could. I kept no diary. I have the written record of Kimmel that, in which I referred to that meeting. The only thing additional that I want to bring up, and was refreshed on in Colonel Stimson's memorandum was what I knew at the time, that we were not to commit the first overt act. That could be one interpretation of the statement which he makes there, and also the President and Mr. E.A. Tamm stating unequivocally that they would not be surprised if the Japanese attacked us without warning. I immediately transmitted that to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. KEEFE. The attack which was in your mind, and the possibility of attack which was in your mind, and in the minds of all the others as far as you knew it, was an attack down in the Far East, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. That is where we were looking for it; yes, sir.

We knew the other was a possibility. For example, the dispatch we sent made both the Commanders in the Pacific action address it made King in the Atlantic “information,” but we expected an attack in the southeast Pacific, and we were surprised when they struck at the time they did in [13906] Hawaii.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Admiral, I understood you to say when you were here the last time, a couple of days ago, that you had since located an engagement book, or something of that kind.

Admiral STARK. That was Mrs. Stark's engagement book, in which everything of a social nature, or in going out, was kept.

Mr. KEEFE. Is it here?

Admiral STARK. No; I haven't got it here, but I would be glad to give it to you, if you want to see it. I will tell you, there was nothing there regarding that Saturday night, at least we could not find that.

Mr. KEEFE. When you first testified, you testified you could not find it, it was not available, and you have since located it, since the last hearing?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and I so stated in my testimony here.

Mr. KEEFE. Is it available so you can bring it to the committee?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to see it.

Admiral STARK. Aye, aye, sir. I will give it to Baecher.

[13907] Mr. KEEFE. You told us there was absolutely no entry for Saturday, the 6th of December, did you not?

Admiral STARK. None for Saturday evening, the 6th of December.

Mr. KEEFE. Is there anything for Saturday afternoon?

Admiral STARK. Yes, there is for Saturday afternoon, about the Canadian party.

Mr. KEEFE. Then, that refreshes your recollection that you were present at that Canadian party, does it?

Admiral STARK. It does not.

[13908] Mr. KEEFE. That simply was an entry?

Admiral STARK. It simply was an entry. Those parties usually were put down, and our answers to them always were if anything was required I would go if I could, but actually I practically never went. I was too busy. I did not have time to go to cocktail parties.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any present recollection as to whether you did go to this cocktail party on December 6?

Admiral STARK. My recollection is I did not go, and Mrs. Stark said she did not go. Often, particularly where friends were concerned, I would ask her to go, just as a matter of good will, to represent me. I did not have time.

Mr. KEEFE. Your testimony is you did not attend that cocktail party on that afternoon, December 6, is that right?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that the newspaper statement is simply a list of the guests that were there, and it was just perhaps taken from those that were invited, and so far as you are concerned, you were not at that party?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any recollection as to where you were that afternoon?

Admiral STARK. Well, my recollection, the only recollection I would have of that business, or anything else, is in the office. [13909] That is where I usually spent it.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any recollection as to where you spent the evening?

Admiral STARK. Well, I can only assume that I was at the National Theater.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Admiral, I am not asking you to assume anything. I am asking you whether you have any present recollection as to where you were.

Admiral STARK. No; I do not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, from where do you obtain the assumption that you were at the National Theater?

Admiral STARK. Commander Schulz' testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any present recollection as to where you were at all Saturday evening?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not. I had been under the impression, have previously testified, that I was at home, because I have no other recollection of being anywhere else. The testimony makes it rather clear, I would say, that I was not, and that I was at the National Theater. As I have also testified, I do recall having seen the revival of "The Student Prince," but I did not connect it up with that Saturday night, and I still draw more or less of a blank on it, except I did see a revival of "The Student Prince."

Mr. KEEFE. Do I understand your testimony to be that [13910] you can state with positiveness and certainty that you did go to the White House that night, December 6?

Admiral STARK. I am absolutely certain of that.

Mr. KEEFE. And are you also absolutely certain that you received no telephone calls from the White House that night?

Admiral STARK. I am certain the President did not call me that night.

Mr. KEEFE. And you are also certain that you did not see the 13-parts of the Jap 14-part message that night?

Admiral STARK. I am; yes, sir; perfectly. I am perfectly certain of that.

Mr. KEEFE. Did anyone tell you, or have you any present recollection of any one of your servants telling you that Captain Kramer had called and tried to locate you that night?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Are you certain that you had no telephone message that night from Secretary Knox?

Admiral STARK. Well, I haven't the slightest recollection of that. Yes; I am certain that I heard nothing that Knox said that night.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have any telephone message from Admiral Wilkinson?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I think Wilkinson has also testified that same fact, and also Kramer.

[13911] **Mr. KEEFE.** Well, I might say, Admiral, it is rather amazing to me that you have a pretty clear negative memory that certain things did not happen, but you cannot recall anything that you actually did that night.

Admiral STARK. That is the fact, Mr. Keefe. Whether it seems strange to you or not, that is the fact.

Mr. KEEFE. I understood your testimony, in response to questions asked by Senator Ferguson, that your visit to your office Sunday morning was just a normal, ordinary routine matter and there was no meeting with an extraordinary show-up of naval officers there that morning out of the ordinary.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Admiral STARK. Mr. Keefe, I will bring that book up to you and show it to you personally.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Stark, when you were questioned previously about what you would have done, had you known that the President, in substance, uttered some words which the witness interpreted as "This means war," referring to the 13-part message, as I understand it, you said you would have gone to your office. Is that what you said you would have done?

Admiral STARK. If I had known that a message had been [13912] received which caused the President to make any explanation to the effect "This means war," of course I would have been so interested that I might have picked up the telephone and called him. I would not have hesitated to have called him or seen him. My relations were such that I could have at the time, or I would have called Ingersoll, or someone, and I would have followed through on it until I had seen that message. I have read Schulz' testimony since I was up here the other day, and I am not convinced from it that the President did say "This means war."

Mr. MURPHY. The witness said that the President said something which, in substance, he interprets "This means war."

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he use the word "interprets"?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. Let me get his exact words. I will come back to that.

At any rate, if you had known that the President did say something in substance "This means war," about the 13-part message, was there anything you would have done that night except to read the message? Is there anything you could now tell us you would have done, in the way of backsight or hindsight that you would have done that you did not do?

Admiral STARK. It would not be backsight or hindsight, because when I read it on Sunday morning I saw nothing in it to [13913] cause me to take any further action on it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the actual testimony, at page 12,441, of Commander Schulz was, in the transcript:¹

Commander SCHULZ. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance—I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance—"This means war." Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps five minutes, the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their deployment and—

Now, then, if you had known that the President said, in substance, that, you would no doubt have gone and read the 13-part message, would you not?

Admiral STARK. There isn't any doubt in my own mind but that I would have.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, is there anything in Commander Schulz' testimony, you having read it, that would have given you the slightest indication that there was to be any attack specifically at Hawaii?

¹ Hearings, Part 10, p. 4662.

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there has been some testimony about the Cabinet meeting of November 7. You were not at the Cabinet meeting where the vote of the Cabinet was taken?

[13914] Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. As to the attitude of the American people, were you?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know anything of the plans that were made either at that Cabinet meeting or immediately subsequent to the Cabinet meeting, to have the different members of the Government in his places address the American people on the war question?

Admiral STARK. No, not as a result of or tied up with that meeting. There were talks by—I have forgotten just what the talks were.

Mr. MURPHY. It was done by Sumner Welles on November 11, Armistice Day; do you remember that?

Admiral STARK. I do not remember. I think he stated we might be in the war at anytime, or something to that effect.

Mr. MURPHY. Subsequent to the Cabinet meeting there were so many talks, I believe, by leading Americans on the possibility of a war coming.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You were not, as I understand it, at any meeting where the necessity of having those talks was discussed?

Admiral STARK. The only one that I remember with regard to action of that sort was the one—and I am not sure just [13915] when it came up—was the President's message to the Emperor.

Mr. MURPHY. That is on the night of December 6th?

Admiral STARK. Yes, along about then. I am not sure.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, in Colonel Stimson's diary there is a suggestion—let me see that diary. The entry of November 27, this page, about the question of firing the first shot. Was there ever at any time any discussion by anyone in the Government that you know of who there ever was any intention on our part of avoiding doing anything possible to prevent war with the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Was not that our intention right up to December if it could be done without sacrificing American honor and principle?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and we had been working for months that way, and the record is complete in regard to that.

Mr. Hull stated we tried to avoid war, in his testimony. As you recall, I recorded that over the period of months. I stated in my opinion there was always one stumbling block which we could not get around, and that was the Chinese-Japanese War.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, about the so-called first shot, the first shot is the Japanese had fired a great many shots previous to November 7, 1941, had not they?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

[13916] Mr. MURPHY. They had sunk the *Panay*, they had bombed our missions in China, and they had also attacked another ship and committed a great many acts which would be unfriendly to America; had not they?

Admiral STARK. The *Panay* incident I remember very distinctly. The bombing or the near-bombing of our diplomatic residence I a

remember. I think there was a near-attack or miss that could not be called an attack on another gunboat. I forget where it was.

Mr. MURPHY. There were also attacks on American property on a number of occasions?

Admiral STARK. That had been going on for a long time.

Mr. MURPHY. Despite all those acts we were still continuing in a state of peace with the Japanese up until December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Stark, you recall rather definitely what you were doing during the Sunday upon which the attack occurred; do you not?

Admiral STARK. There are certain things, of course, that [13917] stand out on that Sunday, the 7th, that I am very clear on. One is in regard to the 1300 message and the conversation almost exactly as it took place. The other was the message that came in stating, "This is no drill." That is when the Japanese attacked. And the rest of it was, of course, messages coming in during the afternoon. I was in the office from that morning until about 2:00, as I recall, the next morning. We also went to work immediately, in the late hours, shifting some ships from the Atlantic back to the Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. Just how long after the news of the attack reached Washington was it before Secretary Knox began to talk about his desire to make a trip to Hawaii, so he could personally inspect it?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that. He went shortly after, but just when he started talking about it I do not know.

Mr. GEARHART. You were in constant consultation with him; were you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Until the time of this tragic event?

Admiral STARK. I was always in touch with him; every day.

Mr. GEARHART. Cannot you recall when he first mentioned his desire to go there?

Admiral STARK. It was shortly after that he said he better go out and take a look himself. That was after he had talked [13918] with the President.

Mr. GEARHART. After he decided he would go to Hawaii did he ask you to make any investigation for him, to inform him of any facts or things that might have happened theretofore?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. He had everything we had which had come in, in the way of dispatches.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, how long was it after the event before you began to hear about the possibilities of a Roberts Commission being organized.

Admiral STARK. Just about the time it happened, just about the time the Commission was formed here.

Mr. GEARHART. That was right immediately, or almost immediately after the bombs fell at Pearl Harbor that there was talk in the United States about creating a nonpartisan national commission to go to Hawaii to make an investigation with respect to the causes and responsibilities involved?

Admiral STARK. There was talk, of course, about an investigation. I could not give you the date, but it was shortly after December 7 that that investigating commission went out.

Mr. GEARHART. It was only a few days until the Congress acted and a commission was authorized, the President made the appointment of Justice Roberts, is that correct?

Admiral STARK. I have forgotten about the Congress authorizing it. It was only a few days.

[13919] Mr. GEARHART. I am in error. It was only a few days that the President made the appointment and made the announcement of the Commission?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I think the record should show that the Congress did not authorize it.

Mr. GEARHART. I did make that correction. It was not necessary for you to interpose.

Now, as soon as it was determined to have an investigation by an impartial board it became necessary to amass testimony and evidence for the benefit of the Commission, did it not?

Admiral STARK. During the process; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And did you assist in the gathering of the information for the Roberts Commission?

Admiral STARK. No, sir, except that I testified.

Mr. GEARHART. And you heard the testimony of General Marshall that he immediately busied himself in getting evidence together for the benefit of the Commission, did not you?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Then, there were other investigations that were conducted, some informally and some formally, were there not, following in rapid succession, right on down until the Army board was organized and until the Navy Court of Inquiry was organized, and there were investigations after investigations [13920] following one after another?

Admiral STARK. I remember of none other except that of the Roberts Commission, unless you call Colonel Knox's trip out there to see what had happened one. I do not recall any other up until the summer of 1944, I think, when the Army and Navy held their—There was one other. Admiral Hart was sent by the Secretary of the Navy, I believe—I did not appear before him, I was in Europe—on an investigating committee, and the Army may have sent someone at the same time, but I am not clear on that. But the only ones I remember were the Roberts Commission and Hart prior to the Regular Army and Navy courts.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, there were investigations following the Army and Navy inquiries?

Admiral STARK. Yes, there was Admiral Hewitt. He was appointed by the Secretary to make a follow-up of the Navy inquiry.

Mr. GEARHART. And the Colonel from San Francisco was appointed to conduct a parallel investigation on the part of the Army, was not he?

Admiral STARK. I have not paid any attention to that. I think they made further investigations.

[13921] Mr. MURPHY. Colonel Clausen.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then after that time, there was a still further investigation, was there not, prior to the beginning of this investigation, the Clarke investigation?

Admiral STARK. I do not remember that.

Mr. GEARHART. In how many of those investigations did you testify?

Admiral STARK. I testified before the Roberts Commission; I testified before the Navy, and I testified before this committee.

I was not interviewed by Admiral Hart, nor was I interviewed by Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. GEARHART. In relation to those investigations that you did not testify in, did you have anything to do with the collection of evidence for the benefit of those investigations?

Admiral STARK. Nothing whatsoever; no sir. I was not here; I was in Europe.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, were you interrogated when you testified before the Roberts Commission as to where you were the previous Saturday night?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that. I think I was not. I do not recall.

[13922] Mr. GEARHART. What?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall.

Mr. GEARHART. You had testified prior to the commencement of this investigation that you did not know where you were on the previous Saturday night, had you not?

Admiral STARK. I have forgotten for the moment whether that came up in the Navy Court, or not. That would be the only one where I was questioned.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, it was generally known, before we came together in this investigating body that you had testified or stated theretofore that you did not know where you were on Saturday night?

Admiral STARK. That would be logical.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you had told some people, some investigating body before this hearing began that you did not know where you were the previous Saturday night?

Admiral STARK. If I did, that would have been in the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, do you remember whether or not that question was asked you in the Roberts Investigation?

Admiral STARK. I think it was not. I have no recollection of it.

Mr. GEARHART. When were you first asked as to where you were on the previous Saturday night?

[13923] Admiral STARK. I would have to check that in the Naval Court of Inquiry. I may have been asked at that time.

Mr. GEARHART. Were you not asked informally by some other people prior to that time?

Admiral STARK. Not that I recall; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, this has been quite an old question with you as to where you were the previous Saturday night, has it not? It has been asked you over and over again?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. What effort have you made to ascertain, prior to this investigation, where you were the previous Saturday night?

Admiral STARK. Only to search my memory, Mr. Gearhart, to see if I could recollect anything, which I had been unable to do. When

I heard "The Student Prince" mentioned—and as I testified before, I cannot think of anything which I have not covered on it—I immediately contacted my daughter and her husband in Philadelphia. I have an impression that I had seen the revival there, and they said "no." I let it go at that, until it came up here that I was at the National Theatre that night. You will recall that in previous testimony I said I doubted if they had tried to contact me on Saturday night, because it was not clear to me, from reading Kramer's testimony or Wilkinson's testimony, that they had contacted [13924] me.

Kramer said he thought Wilkinson was going to do it.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Now, did you and Mrs. Stark give any theater parties about that time?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall without looking at the record.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, do you—

Admiral STARK (interposing). Now, just for a minute. Perhaps with impropriety, do you recall any parties that you gave about that time?

Mr. GEARHART. No; and that is just the difference between you and me. I have no reason to think about what I did the previous Saturday night until I was appointed on this committee, but you have been working with the evidence in this case constantly, from the very beginning of the case, after the tragic event. Your mind has been constantly kept upon it, and this question has been constantly propounded to you, "Where were you the previous Saturday night?"

Admiral STARK. May I ask what you mean by "constantly?"

Mr. GEARHART. Just as I have pointed out, in these various investigations.

Admiral STARK. I had no reason to stop and recall where I was that Saturday night until the question was propounded to [13925] me by the investigating committee some years after the event.

Mr. GEARHART. You were constantly interrogated in presenting evidence, were you not, and digging up evidence in connection with this affair, until you left for London?

Admiral STARK. No, I was not. I was busy fighting a war up until the time I left for London.

As I previously recorded here, I was not going into post mortems. We were just as busy as we could be looking ahead and fighting a war every minute of the day and night, and on the record, it shows, I think, about 16 hours a day or 18 hours on the job.

Mr. GEARHART. Where should you have been, Admiral Stark, on that night, when an attack was expected any moment? Don't you think you should have been with your Commander in Chief?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not. If that had been maintained as you state, and as Colonel Stimson states, I would have been with the Commander in Chief constantly for several days.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, had you not been as a matter of fact in his company very, very frequently, prior to the 7th of December?

Admiral STARK. I was always able to get in touch with him. Everybody was always able to get in touch with me. I would not say we were placed in confinement.

[13926] Mr. GEARHART. Let us drop this matter.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

What is the wish of the committee about continuing?

Senator FERGUSON. I have some questions, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral STARK. So far as I am concerned, I could go on indefinitely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We will try to get through with Admiral Stark.

Mr. GEARHART. When did you send Admiral Ingersoll to London to discuss the possible naval cooperation of the British and American Navies?

Admiral STARK. I did not send Admiral Ingersoll to London to discuss such a point. That occurred prior to my tenure of office as Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. MURPHY. 1938.

Mr. GEARHART. And he was sent by whom?

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you know.

Admiral STARK. Well, Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations prior to my going there. If it was in his tenure of office, he would have been sent undoubtedly by concurrence with the Secretary, or direction of the Secretary, but he was sent previous to my time.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, directing your attention to the year 1940, did you request the British Government to send [13927] naval experts to the United States to discuss the possibility of naval cooperation?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I did. I think it was May of 1940, but those meetings were held in early 1941, as I recall, and completed in March of 1941.

Mr. GEARHART. But it was in 1940, the fall of 1940 that you communicated with Admiral Sir Dudley Pound of the British Navy, requesting that he send his naval experts to the United States to discuss collaboration between the two navies?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, in case of war.

Mr. GEARHART. Upon whose responsibility was that message sent?

Admiral STARK. My own.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you discuss the subject with the President?

Admiral STARK. I sent that on my own, and I did not notify the President until after I had done it.

Mr. GEARHART. After you had sent the message, or after they had arrived for consultation?

Admiral STARK. I think I notified him sometime in January.

Mr. GEARHART. And you want the members of this committee to believe that you opened negotiations with the British first sea lord, requesting him to send a committee of experts from [13928] England to the United States to consult with you in respect to possible naval cooperation without your even telling the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States?

Admiral STARK. I so stated, and I hope the committee believes me.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. He so stated several months ago in this record.

Mr. GEARHART. Does that help the situation right now?

Mr. MURPHY. I mean we covered it then.

Mr. GEARHART. And as the result of that message that you sent to Sir Dudley Pound, a commission did arrive in the United States from England?

Admiral STARK. They did; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And they came in civilian clothes?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And a number of consultations were held at which you were present?

Admiral STARK. Generally speaking, I was not present with the working committee, but of course I was in consultation with them, and was informed as to what was going on.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you attend all of the meetings that were held in the United States?

[13929] Admiral STARK. No, no; very, very few of them.

Mr. GEARHART. Where were those meetings held?

Admiral STARK. They were held in the Navy Department.

Mr. GEARHART. Are you sure they were not held in private apartments?

Admiral STARK. My recollection is that they were held in the Navy Department or the War Department. I consulted Marshall with regard to sending that message. We were in agreement, and I think the meetings were held in the Navy Department. They were not held in private apartments.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you read this little article that appeared in the October issue of Reader's Digest?

Admiral STARK. I think not. That is this year?

Mr. GEARHART. In October of 1944, an article which is from the pen of Frederick Sundern, Jr. Do you recall it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I have read that. The meetings, which were held quietly, there were one or two Canadian meetings, where Canadians came up to my house.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, I have another appointment. I ask that we adjourn until 2:30.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, we will stand adjourned until 2:30.

(Whereupon at 1:10 p. m., the committee adjourned to 2:30 p. m., of the same day.)

[13930]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we have two exhibits, the first of which is a memorandum which has been distributed to the committee, and the first page of which is on White House stationery, dated December 13, 1941. It is entitled, "Remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his Cabinet at 8:30 and continuing at 9:00 o'clock with legislative leaders, on December 7, 1941."

We would like to offer that as Exhibit No. 160.

I should like to point out that at the top of the second page, in parentheses, there is a note to the effect that a series of periods in the memorandum "indicates inaudibility." I call your attention to that note in connection with your reading of the memorandum.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let me inquire. The first page reads:

Remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his Cabinet at 8:30 and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on December 7, 1941.

Is that a. m. or p. m.?

Mr. MASTEN. Presumably that is the evening of December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that the context shows clearly that it is in the evening.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It just so happens that I was one of [13931] those present. I know they had one at that time. I just wanted to know if it was the same one.

Mr. MURPHY. I think you will find your name, Mr. Chairman, mentioned in the contents.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman, just what the evidence will show as to what time this memorandum was received by counsel?

Mr. MASTEN. Senator, that was received last October or November, I believe, from Miss Tully, and has been available to the committee members ever since. I think it was last mentioned on the record by Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I requested that, in view of the fact we have gone into the night of December 6, and what the President's attitude was, in view of the fact that there was a discussion here as to the mind of the President and what had occurred for the weeks preceding Pearl Harbor, I thought we ought to have the whole picture.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt we ought to have it. But I don't recall this, Mr. Masten. I thought I had seen all the papers that weren't in evidence.

Mr. MASTEN. This was in the papers that you looked at.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't recall this.

Mr. MASTEN. I have the photostat here, which was in the papers you examined.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't recall the "indicates [13932] in-audibility."

Mr. RICHARDSON. You will notice, Senator, that there are through the whole thing lapses. Evidently the stenographer was a little overcome in the situation.

Mr. MURPHY. All the papers have been furnished copies of it, have they not?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes, they have.

The second exhibit which we would like to offer as Exhibit 161, consists of two documents which are drafts of a proposed message to the President, which drafts were prepared by Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson.

They are referred to in Secretary Stimson's statement and his notes, at pages 28, 29 and 56. We would like to offer them as Exhibit No. 161.

I might add that these drafts are the papers referred to by Secretary Hull on page 2 of Exhibit No. 19 in this proceeding, where he says, in his memorandum to the President "there is attached a draft of a proposed message to Congress, to which draft the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy made material contributions."

It is our understanding which these two drafts, which we now offer as Exhibit No. 161, are the material contributions referred to in Exhibit No. 19.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The exhibits will be received, as indicated by counsel.

[13933] (The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 160 and No. 161," respectively.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all from counsel?

Mr. MASTEN. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Very well.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, do you have anything further you desire to say before your examination is resumed?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, the last exhibit, which is the one from the Secretary of the Navy, dated November 29, 1941 (Exhibit No. 161) contains this sentence on page No. 5:

Unless Japan renounces such purposes and withdraws this threat of further conquest by force, the four nations involved must resort to force to prevent this aggression, since arguments appear to have failed.

Were you consulted by the Secretary in relation to that?

Admiral STARK. No sir; I don't—I don't know what this document is.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it is a memorandum which gives his version as to what should be said to Congress by the President.

Admiral STARK. Well, I know his thoughts on that, and he [13934] talked about it a great deal. In fact, I don't know that there was much of anything we hadn't gone over.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted by Secretary Knox about the fact that a message was to be prepared for Congress and what he should put in it, you being the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral STARK. May I read this over, just to reflect a little on it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Pause.)

Admiral STARK. He states here,

I have had the assistance of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner in the summation of the military situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. So it is apparent that we were consulted.

Senator FERGUSON. But you don't recall it?

Admiral STARK. I recall having talked over every phase of this situation as it went along, and I have no doubt if he was preparing a memorandum of this sort that he talked to me about certain phases.

Senator FERGUSON. It shows that you were present at the meeting. It is on page 55 and 56 of Secretary Stimson's memorandum, where that message is spoken about. Did you discuss the contents at that meeting?

[13935] Admiral STARK. Well, I would just like to look at the record. Page what?

Senator FERGUSON. Pages 55 and 56.

(Pause.)

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, you have read over this proposed message or information for a message. You note it is dated November 29th.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It says.

The President—en route to Warm Springs, Georgia.

You also recall, do you not, that the 29th was the final deadline. That is the one where they said, "spell it out." The 29th.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you anticipated an attack immediately following the 29th, isn't that correct?

Admiral STARK. We anticipated an attack following the 29th. I wouldn't say immediately. You may recall that on the very day of this deadline a dispatch came in from Tokyo to make one more try.

I think we, as I recall, broke that down on the 30th. And in the case of Italy, I had seen deadlines come and go until I was leary of them. That is why in my first dispatch, instead of putting down the 29th, which, like the 25th, had [13936] passed, I said, "within the next few days." We didn't know just when.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you remember—and the reason I cite the Secretary of War is that he kept a diary.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You will recall that somewhere—

Admiral STARK. This is Colonel Knox.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. The Secretary of War, I was saying, kept a diary.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You recall that he stated that the President had said an attack by Monday, when you were holding a meeting, immediately preceding the first of December?

Admiral STARK. Yes sir, I recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when did it change, after the President told you an attack would take place any day, and probably by Monday?

Admiral STARK. Well, we—

Senator FERGUSON. Which would be immediately following the 29th.

Admiral STARK. We didn't know, Senator Ferguson, just when that blow would fall. We were expecting it any day. But just when, we didn't know. And we didn't know until December 7.

[13937] Senator FERGUSON. Well, does this change your opinion of this warning that you anticipated that an attack would be made by Japan rather than America declaring war? Would this message of Secretary Knox have been a request of Congress to declare war? It wouldn't, would it? As I read it.

Admiral STARK. No, sir. The last paragraph, I think, makes that fairly clear, in which it states:

In a final effort to prevent an extension of hostilities in the Far East, I have addressed an appeal to the Emperor of Japan to join me in my efforts.

Those efforts being toward continued peace in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing): She can go no further without seriously threatening the vital interests of Great Britain, the Netherlands Indies, Australia and ourselves. Unless Japan renounces such purposes and withdraws this threat of further conquest by force, the four nations involved must resort to force to prevent this aggression, since arguments appear to have failed.

In a final effort to prevent an extension of hostilities in the Far East, I have addressed an appeal to the Emperor of Japan to join me in my efforts. In the meantime, while I await the result of this latest effort toward peaceful solution, I felt it incumbent upon me to apprise the Congress, and through you, the people of the United States, of the [13938] serious situation with which we are confronted.

Admiral STARK. That, I take it, is Colonel Knox's way, the way he would have put it, had he been President.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct; but it wasn't understood at the meeting that Colonel Knox was to submit a draft, and the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of War, that those drafts were to be calling for a declaration of war?

Admiral STARK. I don't quite get your question on that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. When you held the meeting and it was suggested that the three Secretaries give to the President a rough draft, or a draft of what they thought ought to go into a message to Congress, there was no idea that that message to Congress was to be a declaration, a request for a declaration of war from Congress, it was merely to advise the people of the United States, through their Congress, as to how serious the situation looked to the President of the United States; isn't that correct?

Admiral STARK. It was certainly to show the people of the United States and Congress how serious he considered the situation. Whether or not anything would have been put in there which in certain contingencies the President might request or ask authority to go ahead, I don't know.

[13939] Senator FERGUSON. But I am asking you, was there anything discussed at the meeting—

Admiral STARK. I don't—

Senator FERGUSON (continuing).—That is was contemplated by the President that he would request Congress to declare war?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall so.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it would be fair to say that this was a fair appraisal of what they were to do, at least this was Mr. Knox's part in the situation?

Admiral STARK. That was the way he felt about it. He wrote it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, is that as you understood it?

Admiral STARK. Well, as I have stated before, my recollection of that is that they would make a final appeal to the Emperor and that they would also inform the Congress of the picture. I don't recall particularly that in that address to Congress it was to be mentioned that the President—that it was to be considered a request for a declaration.

Senator FERGUSON. That was your understanding of the situation.

Now, I want to call your attention, so that the record may be straight, Mr. Gearhart is not here, but there was some question as to whether or not you had been asked the [13940] question as to where you were on Saturday in the evening, before the Navy board.

Admiral STARK. Yes sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 166 of the Navy Court of Inquiry transcript, August 11, 1944:

Q. Do you recall two occasions on either the fourth or fifth of December when Captain Wilkinson and Commander McCollum came to your office to confer about intelligence relative to the Pacific and Japanese situation that you considered of such import that you called a conference with Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, and Admiral Noyes?

A. No, I don't recall.

Q. Do you recall the events of Saturday, December 6, 1941?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall what time you left the office after the routine day, the time in the afternoon or evening?

A. No, I do not.

Q. Do you recall what you were doing Saturday evening, 6 December?

A. No, I couldn't say what I was doing that evening. My remembrance is—I think I was home but I couldn't say. I don't recall clearly.

Q. Do you recall receiving at your home, or wherever [13941] you were, between 9 and 10 p. m., Washington time, important intelligence information brought by an officer messenger?

A. No, I haven't the slightest recollection of anything of that sort on that evening.

Q. Do you remember whether there was a Lieutenant Commander Kramer stationed in Naval Communications or ONI?

A. Yes, there was.

Then they go to another subject.

Admiral STARK. Yes sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Doesn't that refresh your memory that you were questioned at the 1944 hearing on August 11 in that regard?

Admiral STARK. Yes, it is evident I was.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to straighten the record. This morning there was some question asked about the passing of an act relative to the draft in 1941.

Admiral STARK. Yes sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the extension of the draft, was it not, so that they would be kept in longer than one year, which was originally called for? The draft bill would have gone on just the same, they would have been drafted and kept in their year, but those that were about to get out would have been retained; isn't that correct?

Admiral STARK. It probably is, if you recall it. I [13942] remember that we wanted to extend the time. Marshall did.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. We had a 6-year enlistment at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. You had enlistments, so you had a different proposition.

Now, Congressman Murphy asked you whether or not this was the first shot, and I take it that was as to the first shot in the war between America and Japan. Was there any other shooting prior to this, in this war, other than Pearl Harbor?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't remember asking him that. I asked him about the *Panay* and the other boat, and the American missions, and the American property in China. I said that those things had all occurred before Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to get it from the Admiral.

So far as you were concerned, this was the first shot in the war between the United States and Japan, at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. In the war between us?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. There wasn't any shooting at sea, at [13943] submarines, Admiral Stark?

Admiral STARK. Well, to be perfectly accurate, and I think it is in the record, there was a submarine attacked by our forces that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I am talking about this Pearl Harbor attack on the 7th.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And I include——

Admiral STARK. That would include that, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But no others that you know of?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall any others, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do you recall the so-called gists, when you would receive these messages you would get a gist, that is a memorandum or a flag, saying what was in the various papers that you got?

Admiral STARK. I think—are you referring to magic?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. The word would come in, it wouldn't be a gist, it would be a clip on the messages which were considered of importance.

Senator FERGUSON. We have in evidence now a gist which was attached to the October—no, September 29—it is the bomb plot message.

Mr. MURPHY. September 29.

[13944] Senator FERGUSON. 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. Translated on October 9 or 10. October 9 or 10.

Senator FERGUSON. The testimony shows that that had a gist attached to it indicating the contents of it.

Could you find that testimony, the testimony on that gist, Mr. Masten?

Mr. MASTEN. I don't know whether we can put our hands on it immediately. We will try.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Congressman Murphy asked some questions of Captain Kramer at page 11,096 of the typewritten record:

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you also referred, in your letter from the South Pacific, to the possibility of certain summaries.

Did you retain summaries, or was that just to meet the situation from day to day in order to explain to the recipients of magic what the developments were?

Captain KRAMER. I meant simply the gist that I have just referred to, sir.

But I didn't find the gist.

Does that refresh your memory?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; not at all. I don't know what he is referring to, unless he kept a gist for his own running [13945] information. I kept a gist, what I call a "do list", also, things that I wanted to follow through on.

Senator FERGUSON. The testimony showed that these gists were attached.

Now, I asked you the other day, the last day you were here, about the logs at your office?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I have a paper purporting to be the log dated December 6, from "1145-1900, December 6, 1941."

What time of day would that be?

Look at the top of that, Admiral, and tell me.

(The log above referred to, later marked "Exhibit No. 162," was handed to the witness.)

Admiral STARK. That would be from 11:45 in the morning until 7 in the evening, that first one, December 6.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the next one?

Admiral STARK. The next one is 061535. That would be on the 6th, 3:35 p. m. And between that and 1730, which would be 5:30.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would that indicate that you were not in between those hours and that message was left for you?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; this is simply the log of the watch officer.

[13946] Senator FERGUSON. And——

Admiral STARK. The duty officer. As you mentioned the other day, the duty officer usually keeps a log of any happenings.

Senator FERGUSON. I want you to read into the record the log. If I might see it again, I will tell you the part I would like to have.

It begins, "1900, 6 December, to 0200 7 December."

What is 1900?

Admiral STARK. 7 p. m.

Senator FERGUSON. This message:

"At 2000"—2000 is 8 o'clock?

Admiral STARK. 8 p. m., yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. 8 p. m.

Would you read that item into the record. I want to ask you some questions about it.

Admiral STARK. "1900, 6 December, to 0200, 7 December."

Senator FERGUSON. The next item appears to be "2000". Read that.

Admiral STARK. At "2000", which would be 8 p. m., "Major E. L. Harrison, aide to the Secretary of War, telephoned that the Secretary of War desired the following information by 0900, Sunday"—morning.

Senator FERGUSON. What time is 0900 Sunday morning?

[13947] Admiral STARK. 9 a. m.

Senator FERGUSON. 9 o'clock Sunday morning. Will you continue?

Admiral STARK (reading):

Compilation of men-of-war in Far East, British American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian. Also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with locations——

I suppose—well.

with locations, and a list of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without locations. Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted, and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000——

which would be 10 a. m.——

Sunday, December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the end?

Admiral STARK. That is the end.

The next thing is Sunday, 7 December, at 2030, which would be 8 o'clock that night.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, the Secretary of War of the United States was inquiring from your office through his aide that the Secretary of War desired the following information by 9 o'clock Sunday morning, December 7:

Compilation of men-of-war in the Far East, British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian. Also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with locations.

[13948] Now, can you explain the Secretary of War of the United States at 8 o'clock Saturday evening was requesting from your office, OPNAV, all of the warships—and that is what they mean by men-of-war?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. That was the entire strength of the allied fleet in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; with the locations. That would mean that he wanted to know where the ships were, whether they were in Pearl Harbor or where they were; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes. He also refers to the Far East, Russian, and the whole business.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But the Secretary of the United States on Saturday evening through his aide was requesting your office to give him the location of every man-of-war of the United States in the Pacific, and that would include where the ships were, whether laying at dock or in Pearl Harbor or what, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Well, it would indicate whether they were in Pearl Harbor or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. What was in Pearl Harbor and what was in Manila, and what was in the N. E. I., et cetera.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us why the Secretary of War wanted to know what ships were in Pearl Harbor and wanted [13949] it by 9 o'clock Sunday morning?

Admiral STARK. I don't know Senator Ferguson why he wanted it, unless at that time, and whether he did or not, I don't know, the record will show, he had received the 13-point message, or how he considered it—I don't know why he wanted it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Not yet. I don't want the witness interrupted at the moment.

Admiral STARK. I really don't know why he wanted it.

Senator FERGUSON. That is 8 o'clock on Saturday evening.

Admiral STARK. Yes. I have got the thing perfectly, just exactly what he wanted, and the time he wanted it, but I don't recall the incident.

Senator FERGUSON. "Admirals Ingersoll, Stark"—and that would be you, would it not?

Admiral STARK. That would be myself.

Senator FERGUSON. "and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted"—which was Frank Knox—"were consulted"—and this is prior to 8 o'clock Saturday evening.

Admiral STARK. It doesn't say prior to 8 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. He telephoned it in at 8 o'clock.

Admiral STARK. They came over and contacted our watch officer at 8 o'clock for this information. Why both Inger- [13950] soll and myself were to be contacted, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. No, you hadn't been contacted. You were consulted.

"and the Secretary directed"—that is the Secretary of War—"that the information be compiled" and delivered to him prior to 10 o'clock Sunday morning, the 7th of December.

Mr. KEEFE. You mean the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Secretary of the Navy.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is 10 o'clock.

Admiral STARK. I can make an assumption in view of the testimony I have heard since then.

Senator FERGUSON. No. You were consulted at least prior to 8 o'clock.

Admiral STARK. I don't think it states that I was consulted prior to 8 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Admirals Ingersoll, Stark and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted.

Admiral STARK. It doesn't say prior to 8 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. This was entered at 8 o'clock. How would the man write in there that you were consulted if you weren't consulted?

Admiral STARK. I would like to recite on that, because I have a different idea from that what you are stating.

[13951] Senator FERGUSON. I was reading.

Mr. MURPHY. Are there copies for the other members of the committee?

Senator FERGUSON. The surprising thing is, to this member of the committee, that it took almost 4 months to get from the Navy Department this log.

Commander BAECHE¹. It was requested for the first time day before yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understood it, all papers were to be delivered by the Navy to counsel. Counsel has nothing to do with us not getting it because counsel didn't know it existed. In fact, I do not think the committee knew it existed until the questions were asked the day before yesterday.

Mr. MURPHY. Does the record show the request was made day before yesterday.

Commander BAECHE. The record shows that, yes, sir. In view of the situation maybe the answer to Mr. Richardson should be produced.

Admiral STARK. "At 2000", which is 8 p. m., "Major E. L. Harrison, aide to the Secretary of War, telephoned that the Secretary of War desired the following" — Now, I do not read into that, that it was prior to 8 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. At 8 o'clock, the aide telephoned that the Secretary of War desired it. So the telephone call would [13952] be at 8 o'clock.

Admiral STARK. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. I am just assuming that if he telephoned it in that at least a fraction of a second before that the Secretary of War wanted the information.

Admiral STARK. Oh, I see what you mean. It was just a case of construction. I thought you meant he had telephoned prior to 8 o'clock or that I had known prior to that. That is plain.

Senator FERGUSON. That the Secretary of War desired the following information by 9 o'clock Sunday morning December 7. What does he want?

Admiral STARK. He wanted the disposition of the fleet in the Pacific and the knowledge of what we had in the Atlantic without reference to location in the Atlantic.

Senator FERGUSON. But he wanted the exact location of the ships in the Pacific, every man-of-war, didn't he?

Admiral STARK. Yes; and I wanted it, too, Senator Ferguson and I kept a running record of it, to show what our strength was in the various quarters, and to get a clear picture of the fleets of the world. That was the most natural way in the world to show it, just as he gave it. I also kept the Atlantic Fleet, complete with the British, French, and Italian.

¹ Navy Department liaison officer to the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. He wanted to know the exact location of [13953] each man-of-war by Sunday morning?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At 9 o'clock.

Now, I ask you was that information furnished to the Secretary of War by 9 o'clock the next morning?

Admiral STARK. Well, I suppose so. I have no record of that but unquestionably if he wanted it at that time that information was available and he got it.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be in writing, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask that we get that record.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Not now.

Commander Baecher, will you get that information that was furnished by 9 o'clock that morning?

Commander BAECHER. If it is available.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean, if it is available. That is, if you can find it; is that what you mean?

Commander BAECHER. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield on a point of information?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; to the Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am not clear on one point. It seems, from what you have read and what the Admiral has said, that the [13954] Secretary of War requested this information by 9 o'clock Sunday morning, and it seems, as I caught it, that the Secretary of the Navy asked that the information be furnished him by 10 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. We will clear that up.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I had assumed that when this request came from the Secretary of War to the Navy Department, that the Secretary of the Navy, naturally being anxious to comply with a request of his Cabinet colleague, the Secretary of War would request that the information be assembled and that it would be furnished to the Secretary of the Navy to be transmitted to the Secretary of War, which would look to me like it obviously should come to the Secretary of the Navy before it went to the Secretary of War, but yet the note read indicates that the Secretary of the Navy requested it to be sent to him an hour after the Secretary of War had requested that he get it. That is the way it reads.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment until I try to clear something up. Admiral—

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There isn't any doubt after you read this that this was a request by the Secretary of War for information [13955] relative to the location of each man-of-war in the Pacific by 9 o'clock on Sunday morning?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when is the first that you knew that the Secretary of War wanted this information?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall this, Senator Ferguson. It would be unusual for both Ingersoll and myself to be called on this. That

sort of information I had. It was readily available. But this particular thing here, I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that you knew where every ship, every man-of-war, was in the Pacific on Saturday?

Admiral STARK. When you say where every man-of-war was, we knew, for example, the constitution of the Pacific Fleet, and that it was basing in the Hawaiian area. Just where they were we could not generally have told day by day, because they had their exercises, and so forth.

Now, as to Hart's fleet in the Pacific, we knew exactly what he had. We knew that certain craft he had sent south, because that had been reported. Just what he had out at that time, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. He wanted the location.

Admiral STARK. Well, we could have said, "basing," for example, "on Manila," but if he had four or five submarines reaching out to the northwest on reconnaissance duty we would [13956] not have known it necessarily.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't you have found it out and told him that you had ships out at sea, the submarines were in certain locations?

Admiral STARK. Not necessarily.

Senator FERGUSON. The battleships were in Pearl Harbor, the destroyers were so and so; Halsey's fleet was at a certain location?

Admiral STARK. No. You will recall that some of the movements which were made we did not know of until after Pearl Harbor. That is all in the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't this chart in your office show the location?

Admiral STARK. Not the exact location. That has been made plain before, that the commander in chief, within his area, moves the ships around. We know the area. We do know where they are, according to our major schemes. When a ship goes into overhaul, where they are holding target practice, the periods for it, and so forth, but just what is in and out we do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you get us the records in the office that were used to give this information to the Secretary of War by 9 o'clock the following morning?

What was done by the Navy Department to get the information [13957] for the Secretary of War?

Admiral STARK. Well, that, I take it, you want directed to the Navy Department; not to me?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You haven't access to it?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. Commander Baecher is here for that purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. I address that through the Chair. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have those.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. An effort will be made to supply the information requested.

Admiral STARK. This is off the record. You can get that, Commander Baecher, in Intelligence—or Brainerd might be able to furnish something. The ship movements and foreign business will all be in Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell us why the Secretary of War wanted the location of the men-of-war by 9 o'clock Sunday morning?

Admiral STARK. He wanted to know where they were.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why he wanted to know?

Admiral STARK. Except he was interested in it. No; I could not state exactly why he wanted it. He was making his estimates of the picture, and he wanted the entire picture.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you discussed this question prior to 8 o'clock with anyone?

[13958] Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Particularly not the Secretary of War?

Admiral STARK. Not that I recall. And I may state that a record of that sort was something that I was always keeping. And periodic reports.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, we come to the "period."—"without locations," as far as the Atlantic Fleet was concerned. That is a "period." And then we start out:

Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000"—

10 o'clock—

Sunday, 7 December.

That would indicate that at least prior to 8 o'clock on Saturday evening you were consulted about this and the Secretary of the Navy was consulted and Admiral Ingersoll was consulted. Will you state whether or not you were consulted prior to this?

Admiral STARK. Well, there is nothing here, again, I would say, to indicate that I was consulted prior to 8 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if this was written at 8 o'clock and it said you were consulted, it would indicate that you were consulted prior to that, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Not to me; no, sir.

[13959] It states "Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted." This was after the 2000 call, as I make it.

Senator FERGUSON. The next——

Mr. KEEFE. Right there, Senator: Do I understand Admiral Stark to mean that his contention is that this message came to the watch officer, he made a notation of the request, and then he says that Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and somebody else were consulted, and that they were consulted after the call came in?

Admiral STARK. That is what it says to me; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Below "7 December" at 2030—that is 8:30?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So then you would say that under your reading prior to 8:30 that night you had been consulted, because if this man is keeping proper records he entered the next entry at 8:30.

Admiral STARK. This is something else again.

Senator FERGUSON. Sure.

Admiral STARK. This states:

At 2030 the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned to the Operations Duty Officer. Commander Feinold read Secret Dispatch 070715. No action taken.

[13960] That is part of his log. Whether it has any bearing whatsoever on the former question I don't know, and I could not tell unless I saw that dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't you say the log officer, when keeping his log, would write them down as they came in?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, his next entry, being at 2030, that which had happened prior to that he put prior to 2030—which is 8:30?

Admiral STARK. That could be an assumption, Senator Ferguson, as I see it, but not necessarily an accurate one.

You may put down a telephone call and try to do something. Perhaps the line is busy. You may have to wait; meanwhile, another call may come in. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, I will—

Admiral STARK. It might be right; it might not.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you: Did this log officer reach you or anyone representing you between 8 and 8:30 so he could get this information?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't you recall if someone was telling you that the Secretary of War wanted to know the location of every one of your men-of-war in the Pacific and he had to have it—or wanted it, at least—prior to 9 o'clock the [13961] next morning and you were consulted?

Admiral STARK. I wouldn't necessarily remember it after a lapse of 5 years, Senator. I had furnished Mr. Stimson data from time to time. He was intensely interested in the broad picture and from time to time we furnished that data to different people, but I do not recall at this particular instance that evening. He may have. I don't deny that he did, but I do not recall it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

I think there is an answer to what you are looking for right here. Secretary Stimson's diary tells you what he is looking for.

Senator FERGUSON. I will take that later. I want to find out what this witness knows.

Do you know why the Secretary of the Navy would direct your office to furnish him this same information as to the location of your men-of-war in the Pacific which would have told them that your fleet was in Pearl Harbor, to be compiled and delivered to him prior to 10 o'clock?

Admiral STARK. No; I do not. Unless he had been in touch with Stimson, and, of course, we do now know from the record that they met together that morning. Whether it was 1000 or 1030, I am not sure. But I did not know it.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not consulted about it?

[13962] Admiral STARK. I state that I do not recall, Senator Ferguson, this thing at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you read the Stimson statement?

Admiral STARK. I have; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. May I see that log, Senator?

Admiral STARK. I will give him this one.

Senator FERGUSON. I think there is a difference in them.

Mr. KEEFE. What is that?

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

At 2030 the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned—

Mr. KEEFE. It follows after the 2000 entry.

Senator FERGUSON. Mine is:

telephoned to report the following.

What does that one say? It is on the third page.

Admiral STARK. It starts at the bottom of one of the pages.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000 Sunday 7 December.

Then, another notation under 7 December:

At 2030 the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned—

Senator FERGUSON. But read the next line. "telephoned to" what?

Mr. KEEFE. "Telephoned." It doesn't say.

[13963] Admiral STARK. OPDO—operations duty officer, he probably means.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, yes. "OPDO—Commander Feinald."

Senator FERGUSON. That is not in here, if you will compare them. The commander's name is not in the photostatic copy. It may have been torn off the top when they were clipped.

Mr. KEEFE. The sequence may be wrong.

Mr. MURPHY. The sequence is wrong. It is a different page. One says "telephoned to report the following."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. It is a different page.

Senator FERGUSON. They just got them clamped together in the wrong order. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you turn to Colonel Stimson's statement, Sunday the 7th.

Admiral STARK. Page 59.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you know of anything in here that will give us any light on what he wanted these locations for?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I saw nothing in here to indicate that until I saw that this morning.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[13964] Mr. MURPHY. On Sunday, December 7, 1941, page 60 of the Stimson papers:

"Well, I have heard the telegrams which have been coming in about the Japanese advances in the Gulf of Siam." He said, "Oh, no; I don't mean that. They have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii." Well, that was an excitement indeed. The messages which we have been getting through Saturday and yesterday and this morning are messages which are brought by the British patrol south of Indochina, showing that large Japanese forces were moving up into the Gulf of Siam. This itself was enough excitement and that was what we were at work on our papers about.

I read that as an answer to your question.

Admiral STARK. May very well be.

Senator FERGUSON. What did that have to do with the location of the men-of-war?

Admiral STARK. I gather this, from Congressman Murphy, and he can correct—

Senator FERGUSON. You tell us what you say about it.

Admiral STARK. I say this would mean that we had been getting messages of the disposition of the Japanese and Colonel Stimson wanted to know what we had in that same area and he wanted to see just what picture we had of the Japanese ships.

[13965] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield further to read just three or four more lines?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

The observer thought these forces were going to land probably either on the eastern side of the Gulf of Siam, where it would be still in Indochina or on the western side, where it would be the Kra Peninsula or possibly Malaya. The British were very much excited about it, and our efforts this morning in drawing our papers was to see whether or not we should all act together. The British will have to fight if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three all thought that we must fight if the British fought. But now the Japs have solved the whole thing by attacking us directly in Hawaii.

There are the papers he was preparing on the morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what papers he was preparing, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, how do you know that this memorandum, request for the location, had anything to do with what they were preparing at the time of the attack?

Admiral STARK. Well, if they asked for them, and if they were preparing something, it might have been they were studying the relative forces. I don't know. I never heard it discussed since. I have no way of knowing.

[13966] Senator FERGUSON. You haven't heard that an order from the Secretary of War, direction by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, had not been complied with by 10 o'clock Sunday morning?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you have every reason to believe they had the location of every man-of-war of our fleet?

Admiral STARK. I think unquestionably it was the duty officer's job to get that through to somebody, Ingersoll, or me, or somebody, to get the Secretary of War's request made up, and usually when we got those requests we sat up all night, if necessary, to comply with them.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I ask that the man that made this report, I can't tell his name from this—would you be able, Mr. Masten, to tell us who made this report—be called and also that the aide of Secretary Stimson be called as witnesses that we may get a detailed explanation of this log.¹

Commander BAECHER. The person who wrote that item in the Navy log is named C. D. Glover. He is now a rear admiral and is in Honolulu.

Senator FERGUSON. That is only a few days from Washington. Do you know who the aide is?

[13967] Commander BAECHER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is in charge of the Army liaison here today? Do you know who the aide is?

¹ See p. 5482, *infra*.

Captain NELSON.¹ No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you notify the committee, please, where the aide is located?

Captain NELSON. I will attempt to locate him.

Mr. MASTEN. Senator, we have located the page reference to this gist matter.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to see the gist matter. What is the first paper?

Mr. MASTEN. It begins at the first paper, and the reference you wanted is the second.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, instead of calling two or three witnesses, it might be a good idea to ask Secretary Stimson if he got the memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I have asked the Commander if he would get us what information was furnished to the Secretary. I have directed quite a number of questions to Secretary Stimson and I will be glad to add to that list. We haven't gotten answer to the others, though.

Now, going to page 11,000 of this paperbound volume, 11,207 in this paperbound volume,² the Senator from Michigan is asking the question:

[13968] Senator FERGUSON. And what was there on that? Read what is on there.

Captain KRAMER. The gist of this message is: Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations.

Now, that is a sheet of paper attached to the magic, which was the bomb plot as we describe it here, and the record shows what we are talking about, and the gist was a flag, in other words, from which you would be able to read this language:

Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into 5 areas for the purpose of showing exact locations."

Now, that would point out the significance, would it not? The next question by the Senator from Michigan was:

Now, this particular paper that I have in mind and have shown you with this written on it.

And then I read this report, or part of it. That would be a flag to you, would it not, Admiral, telling you the substance of what the Japanese were trying to find out about our ships in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. It shows very clearly what they wanted.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; what they wanted.

[13969] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Someone had boiled this down, summarized it, and gave you in a few words, or gave in this gist which was attached to this message, what it was?

Admiral STARK. Well, now, when you say "gave you," which means "gave me"—

Senator FERGUSON. Do you claim you never got any gists?

Admiral STARK. I do. We have been over this bomb plot thing from start to finish, all of us in the front office, and I still not only have no recollection of having seen it, it is my honest opinion that I did not see it.

¹ Capt. C. Roger Nelson, U. S. Army, liaison officer to the committee.

² Hearings, Part 9, p. 4196.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that you have gone over it with people in the front office?

Admiral STARK. No. I say this, that the testimony shows—Ingersoll, as I recall his testimony, stated that he had not seen it. What came to me always came to him in the magic. I have forgotten definitely about Turner but I believe he states he did not see it.

Senator FERGUSON. So—

Admiral STARK. The message was—well, go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to add something?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I was going to say we have covered it in the light of hindsight, and one thing or other indicated in the light of hindsight, that we did not see them; either the [13970] Army or Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember seeing any gists on any of the magic that came to you?

Admiral STARK. It is customary and routine in the Navy, frequently, if we get a dispatch that refers to two or three other dispatches, you may have typed on the bottom of it what the other dispatches were, to give you a complete picture without you having to send for those dispatches. If you call that a gist—that was routine.

Senator FERGUSON. No, that is not what we are talking about.

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I do not recall, except as from time to time estimates were made—McCollum would sometimes make an estimate.

Senator FERGUSON. I would want to read a paper to you and ask you some questions on it.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

From Batavia, dated September 22, 1941, received 10:45 a. m., September 23, 1941.

149, September 22nd, 4 p. m.

The following summary of statements to newspaper [13971] correspondents by the Right Honorable Duff Cooper, who arrived at Batavia September 19 and returned to Singapore September 21.

One. His plan is to form a council or body in Singapore to pass on Far Eastern political questions; to discuss the entire political situation with the Governor General and to obtain his views concerning the above-mentioned council which is to function as does that under Lord Lyttleton at Cairo and which will relieve the military authorities of political responsibility.

Two. An effective liaison exists between the British and the Dutch and Commanders in Chief have a complete understanding. Asked if the British would welcome a Dutch expeditionary force, he said that the British were adequately manned and that Dutch troops would be more effective here. However, if the hub of activity should shift to British territory the understanding between Commanders in Chief would cover any requirements.

This is the part I wanted to read particularly. This is the part I am interested in—

Admiral STARK. That is headed Batavia?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It is signed by "Foote," to our Secretary of State.

[13972] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was one of our State officials there as I understand it.

In response to a question concerning the use of the base of Singapore by the United States he said that there is no "agreement on paper but the answer is obvious," asked if the ABCD front was merely wishful thinking he said "Emphatically no. It is a fact." When questioned by an American newspaper correspondent he was not so emphatic. For example, "I deem the ABCD front to be a fact."

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know about that, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall it. I could comment on it easily enough—the ABCD front. If it means that we were tied up with the Dutch, or if it means that we had an approved plan with the Dutch and British out there at that time, we did not.

You will recall in the record exhibits showing the rejection of what has been proposed out there, and that the scheme of working together, between the British and ourselves, was finally not approved, until—I think we sent it out the night of December 7. It came in from Hart and Phillips just about that time, around the 6th.

[13973] Senator FERGUSON. But it was written before the attack.

Admiral STARK. We had directed them to find a means of working together so that if and when the thing happened the effort would more or less dovetail. We had done it here in Washington for the entire world, in the spring of 1941, and as I have stated it was my job to do it and we were directing it be done out there, and we had done it in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I want to get to.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Not this moment. If Duff Cooper was telling the world through a newspaper correspondent, when questioned by an American newspaper correspondent—he was not so emphatic—"I deem the ABCD front to be a fact"; would not that notify the Japanese that in fact there was an ABCD front?

Admiral STARK. It would be a fact to the Japanese that he had said so if they believed it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Not this moment. Now, have you any doubt that the Japanese did believe that statement?

Admiral STARK. I don't know, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. If the Japanese believed that statement, [13974] then I want to know, from a military and naval point of view, whether or not you would judge, if there was this threat to attack the Kra Peninsula, and we had a front, between the American and British and Dutch and the Chinese, that we should have considered that Japan would attack the only thing that was the deterrent in the Pacific, that was our fleet? I am talking from a military and naval point of view.

Admiral STARK. Well, that is some question. May I boil it down to see if I have it correctly?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. That assumes that the Japs believed what Duff Cooper stated, that we had a combined front.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. That is what Duff said.

Admiral STARK. Therefore, they assumed that if they attacked the Kra Peninsula, that, in effect, Britain would go to war, and the Dutch, this combined front. We would be involved.

Senator FERGUSON. And we would go to war if we had a combined front. You can't have a combined front and have three of them in war and one not.

Admiral STARK. I am working on a premise which I do not admit to be a fact. That is, fighting the problem.

Senator FERGUSON. It doesn't make any difference whether it is a fact or not if the British said it and if the Japanese [13975] believed it.

Admiral STARK. If the British said it and if the Japanese believed it, if they attacked one they would probably attack the combination so as to do the most damage.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. But there is an "if" in that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way you want to leave the answer?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know this, as to whether or not publicly it was ever denied that there was an ABCD front?

Admiral STARK. I do not know why we should have denied it if we never had one.

Senator FERGUSON. The question was: Do you know whether it was ever denied publicly or to the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall any specific denial from high authority but I certainly also don't recollect any hint that such a thing existed by high authority.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that. That wasn't the question I was asking you.

Admiral STARK. No; but I think it belongs in the answer.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is going to be there. Now, I am going to talk about another subject.

[13976] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield before going on to another subject?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I think the record should show the official position of Duff Cooper. At the time he was in charge of British propaganda, wasn't he?

Senator FERGUSON. I read all I knew about it.

Mr. MURPHY. I think you will find that at the time he was in charge, Director of Public Information and Propaganda, for Great Britain, and they were at war. Apparently he was putting forth the strongest possible front he could for his country.

[13977] Senator FERGUSON. Of course, I am not asking for the Congressman's opinion. I am trying to point out, from a military or naval viewpoint, we didn't anticipate certain things in this attack on Pearl Harbor. Now, going to the next subject. You remember we contemplated an attack upon the Azores?

Admiral STARK. I don't know that the word "contemplated" is a correct one, Senator Ferguson. We were ordered to draw up plans for that. We had, as I previously testified, drawn up plans for Martinique. It is our business to draw up plans for any contingency.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't you even get the ships ready?

Admiral STARK. We brought—

Senator FERGUSON. For the Azores?

Admiral STARK. Yes, we brought some ships to the Atlantic, and we brought some Marines to the Atlantic, who were afterward sent to Iceland.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why the plan not to attack the Azores was arrived at?

Admiral STARK. Do I know what, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why we did not attack the Azores? Do you know whether it was decided between the British and ourselves that we would be attacking a neutral, which was Portugal, and therefore we decided not to do it, and we took [13978] another tack and went to Iceland?

Admiral STARK. I would say that the occasion for attacking the Azores simply did not arise. It just went on diplomatically there. I may not be completely informed of it, but there was worry and had been worry as to the possibility of the Axis attacking Portugal, going down through the Spanish Peninsula, and possibly compromising the Azores. We couldn't afford to have the Azores in anybody else's possession.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it ever contemplated, as far as you know, to come to Congress to declare war on Portugal and take the Azores?

Admiral STARK. I never heard of it, or I never thought of it until this minute.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you were preparing the fleet, and preparing ships to take the Azores, it wasn't just a drill, was it?

Admiral STARK. We prepared to take the Continent of Europe too.

Senator FERGUSON. That early?

Admiral STARK. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That early? That early, back in 1941?

Admiral STARK. Well, I dare say that the Army was working on plans, and they were asking for men, and so forth, for a big and huge Army. But I mean, I was referring to when you spoke [13979] of declaring war on Portugal.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you attack and take the Azores without a declaration of war on Portugal? She owned them.

Admiral STARK. I can tell you one way. Suppose the Germans had taken Portugal. Would we have to declare war on Portugal to take the Azores? I don't think we would have.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume you are right on that, if it was captured and in the hands of the Germans it would be German territory, and we would have to declare war on Germany.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I always construed that situation, with regard to the Azores, as to have plans ready, and be ready, if an emergency arose there.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, let's go to Iceland.

Mr. CLARK. You are a long way from Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I am not. My questions will come around to Pearl Harbor. They will come around to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. CLARK. I didn't mean to interrupt.

Senator FERGUSON. We did go and land in Iceland?

Admiral STARK. We did; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you wrote letters and said that we had a shooting war in the Atlantic?

Admiral STARK. In effect; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You know what Admiral Ingersoll [13980] said about it. It wasn't a "legal" war but it was a war.

Admiral STARK. Well, when I think of the term "legal"—

Senator FERGUSON. It wasn't a declared war.

Admiral STARK. It wasn't a declared war. What we were doing was a limited defense against German aggression in what had been termed our waters. We didn't, for example, go over to Germany at that time or attack Europe.

Mr. MURPHY. The Senator misquoted the witness—unintentionally. Admiral Ingersoll corrected his testimony, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I took his original statement. You know what I am talking about, don't you?

Admiral STARK. I think I know what you are talking about. We covered this same point before.

Senator FERGUSON. But I am going to lead up to this question, to show that I am still at Pearl Harbor:

Do you know whether it was ever discussed in the War Cabinet—and you know who that would be—that it would be necessary for Germany to fire the first shot? We had a plan and a policy in the Pacific that Japan—I don't want to quote the Secretary of War again—but it was to be for Japan to fire the first shot and for us not to be harmed too much by it. You said that was the studied plan and the design.

[13981] Now, I want to know why, if you know, there was a distinction between the Atlantic and the Pacific about the firing of the first shot.

Admiral STARK. Germany had attacked and sunk one of our ships in June. She had attacked three destroyers in the Atlantic, sinking one of them—I think it was in October or November, along in there, between September and October. And certainly the 1st of December she had attacked and wounded badly one tanker, the *Salinas*, I believe it was, which got back to the Canadian coast. The Congress of the United States had voted billions for material to go to Britain. We considered it our job to get that material through, not simply to use this money for material and let it be sunk without taking any action on it. There were certain waters defined, and limits established, which, I believe, we called our waters. The President's speech shows it very plainly, in which he stated, if the Germans came within that area they would do so at their peril. They came in and attacked us. As a result, we got together what we called the hemispheric defense plans, which I have outlined previously and which provided for shooting at any German combatant ships which came within that area, and we did do it.

Senator FERGUSON. We did shoot?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. But I think that that situation is not comparable to what was going on in the Pacific, [13982] where the Japs had not attacked our ships, unless you go back to the *Panay* incident.

Senator FERGUSON. If you go back to the *Panay*, it is the same situation?

Admiral STARK. No; I don't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Not as bad?

Admiral STARK. I think it is different.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, "different."

Is that what was discussed by the war cabinet? Was that discussed by the war cabinet, so that you would have one policy in the Pacific and another policy in the Atlantic?

Mr. KEEFE. You can't be all-inclusive in the Pacific, because I understand the evidence clearly shows that in certain areas, in the Southwest Pacific, this shooting war applied.

Senator FERGUSON. It did apply in the Southeast Pacific.

Admiral STARK. Off the west coast, the Southeast Pacific, we made one of the hemispheric defense plans apply to the area which we outlined there.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the Southeast Pacific?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Take the other part of the Pacific where this not-firing-the-first-shot policy was.

Admiral STARK. American material was going in a steady stream across the Pacific, I don't know how big a stream, in [13983] Russian ships and into Russian territory. I can think of no instance where anything we had commercially going across the Pacific was attacked until the *President Harrison* was lost after December 7. In other words, our ships were moving freely. However, I took no chance, you know, and in October I directed all our Pacific ships into port and thereafter routed them and kept them on routes where I thought in emergency they could duck for safety or we could give them some protection.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Mr. MURPHY. I have one or two questions, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Stark, will you refer to the memorandum of December 13, 1941?

Will you give the admiral a copy of it (Exhibit No. 160)?

I understand these to be notes of the remarks of the President of the United States on the night of December 7, 1941.

Toward the middle of the first page I note the following:

About 2 weeks ago we began to realize that the probability of Japan being in earnest was so slim that it was time to make a final and definite effort to pin them down on the one subject that they had never ever been pinned down on, and that was that they were to agree to cease their acts of aggression, and that they would [13984] try to bring the China War to a close.

You know that to be a fact, do you not, from your experience, that they had not agreed to that, and we were attempting to get them to agree on it, in diplomatic negotiations?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In the next paragraph I read again:

From that time on we were getting more and more definite information that Japan was headed for war, and that the reply to the Secretary of State would be in the negative.

That was the Secretary of State's message of November 26, was it not?

Admiral STARKS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, at the bottom of the page:

* * * Geographically Indochina was at a hub, from which any attack can be made in a number of directions. It is only a very short distance from there

to the Philippines in the east. It is a relatively short distance from there down to the Dutch East Indies, which is the most industrial part—southwest there is Singapore—fortified.

Then I skip seven or eight lines.

We are getting a very large proportion of our supplies—rubber, tin, et cetera—from that whole [13985] area of Southwestern Pacific * * *.

And then again, coming to the next paragraph:

In addition to that, of course, is the fact that if the Japanese did move to the south, to the Dutch East Indies, from Indochina, the Philippines would be virtually surrounded. They would have the Japanese on both sides—Indochina—the mandated islands to the west, this side of the Philippines, and the Dutch Indies and the Japanese possessions in the south. They would be completely encircled by a military power.

Did you have that particular circumstance in mind when you sent this memorandum to Spenavo, about which the Senator from Michigan questioned you this morning, the fact that the Philippines would be endangered by that situation if the Davao-Waigeo line was crossed?

Admiral STARK. Yes. It flanked us on the south; and we were already flanked on the west and north.

Mr. MURPHY. It would make the position of the Philippines much more dangerous, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Unquestionably.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Mr. KEEFE. I have a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. In connection with the questions of the Senator from Michigan, I note in the diary of Secretary Stimson of the conference which was held at the office of Secretary Hull on the morning of December 7, Sunday, where former Secretary Stimson records a portion of the conversations in this manner:

Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture of it, and I made him dictate it to a stenographer and I attach it to the end of this. Knox also had his views as to the importance of showing immediately how these different nations must stand together, and I got him to dictate that and that is attached hereto.

Now, turning to page 67 of the Stimson report you will find the suggestion dictated by Secretary Knox in which he lists six paragraphs. In the first four paragraphs he refers to the possibility of the Japs attacking Singapore and the Dutch. Then, in paragraph 5, he says:

If the above be accepted, then any serious threat to the British or Dutch is a serious threat to the United States; or it might be stated any threat to any one of the three of us is a threat to all of us. We should therefore be ready jointly to act together, and if such understanding has not already been reached, it should be reached immediately. Otherwise we may fall individually, one at a time (or somebody may be left out [13987] on a limb).

That indicates that so far as Secretary Knox was concerned, he apparently was in an indefinite mood as to whether or not an understanding had already been reached.

Admiral STARK. That is correct. That is the way I read it.

Mr. KEEFE. Between these nations.

Admiral STARK. He says:

* * * and if such understanding has not already been reached, it should be reached immediately.

Which, to my mind—

Mr. KEEFE. It is surprising that he wouldn't know of such an understanding if one had been reached, and that he would express it in that rather indefinite manner.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I have also expressed, several times, the fact that I didn't know of any agreement.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Admiral, I listened attentively to the questions asked you by the Senator from Michigan with respect to this log prepared, apparently, by the watch officer at the Navy Department, and I confess that at the end of it I am very much confused and I would like to get straightened out if I can.

Admiral STARK. I am somewhat confused myself on it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, when I read it and get it in chronological form—it was all mixed up as it was stapled together— [13988] but when I get it in pamphlet form the confusion, to me at least, seems to vanish, and I wonder if you will agree with me. It reads:

1900, 6 December, to 0200, 7 December. At 2000—

That is 8 o'clock, is it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

Major F. L. Harrison, Aide to the Secretary of War, telephone that the Secretary of War desired the following information by 0900, Sunday, 7 December: Compilation of men-of-war in Far East; British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian. Also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with locations, and a list of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without locations.

That is perfectly clear as to what he requested?

Admiral STARK. Perfectly clear; yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, to depart from the quotation, I understood your testimony to be, in response to questions asked by Senator Ferguson, that it would be the duty of the watch officer, in the event of receiving a request of this kind, to put it through by contacting someone with authority to direct that the compilation be made?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. So that, when Major Harrison called the watch [13989] officer and stated the request of the Secretary of War, it was then the duty of the watch officer to attempt to contact someone in authority to put the order through?

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, if you follow through—and I will read what is further indicated on this statement—the watch officer states this [reading]:

Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted—

That is clear, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000 Sunday, December 7.

Now, to me that is just as clear as a bell. It means that the watch officer consulted Admirals Ingersoll and Stark and the Secretary of the Navy in order to put through this request, and that the Secretary of the Navy instructed them to deliver the compilation to him before 10 o'clock, the time when he was to meet at the Secretary's office, in Secretary Hull's office, with Secretary Stimson,

Now, the inevitable question arises in my mind, If this watch officer made this written record, stating that he [13990] consulted with Admirals Ingersoll and Stark and the Secretary of the Navy, either he did or he didn't.

Now, you say you have no recollection of his having consulted with you?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, if he did consult with you, as he says he did in this memorandum, he must have consulted with you subsequent to 8 o'clock, the time the request came in.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And you must have been some place where he could contact you.

Admiral STARK. If he did; yes, sir. Assuming, from what he said, that he did.

Mr. KEEFE. Well—

Admiral STARK. He says that we were consulted; that he got in touch with us. Why he would have gotten in touch with both me and Ingersoll, I don't understand. Whether he means he had telephoned, or what, I don't know. The plain statement is that he did consult me. I don't recall it. But if he did, it had been sometime subsequent to 8 o'clock.

Mr. KEEFE. Being a person who is inclined to accept somebody's word for something in this hearing, especially when it is written, and there is no reason to assume a man would write something down in a public record that didn't occur, it seems [13991] to me a reasonable assumption to believe that the watch officer charged with the responsibility of meticulously writing down the information that comes to his attention, wouldn't say that he consulted you and Admiral Ingersoll and the Secretary of the Navy unless he did.

Admiral STARK. I quite agree with you.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, we are in a position, then, if you were not at the theater, you weren't at home, you don't remember where you were, somebody ought to be able to trace this down, we finally are on a lead where, if we get this man, we might be able to find out, he might be able to remember where he got you that night; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. He might be.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Admiral, let me ask you this simple question—I would like to get through with this thing sometime and pin one of these things down so we have something definite—

Admiral STARK. So would I. I wish I could recall that incident.

Mr. KEEFE. I wish you could, too.

Admiral STARK. That has been blank in my mind all through, and when people have stated something, I have accepted it, and I have no reason to doubt what he put down there, but I just don't recall.

[13992] Mr. KEEFE. Yes. You have told us that a number of times. What I would like to know is this—perhaps it appears heretofore, but it won't hurt to have it appear once more.

As I understand it, it is the fundamental practice in the Navy Department, and had been for a long time, for a man in the position of Chief of Naval Operations to let someone know where he is at every hour of the day.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And if you were going to the National Theater on Saturday evening, December 6, you would, in accordance with your usual custom, practice, and procedure, advise someone in the Navy Department where you could be found; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Would this watch officer, who made this report that has just been read into the record, be the one with whom you would leave that information?

Admiral STARK. As a rule, he was always told when I went out; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that the watch officer who made the memorandum which we have just read into the record would be the person with whom you would leave the information where you [13993] could be found?

Admiral STARK. Normally; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Would there be a memorandum or a record made by the watch officer that would be preserved, indicating or showing where the Chief of Naval Operations would be?

Admiral STARK. Well, I don't know about that, Mr. Keefe. It was the practice to telephone. I don't know that we made any record of that type. He probably put a slip on his desk as to where I could be found.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, I don't go to the National Theater very often—

Admiral STARK. I don't either.

Mr. KEEFE. But my recollection is, from the few times I have gone down there, it was about 8:30 or 8:45, that is about the time the show opens.

Admiral STARK. I think that is correct; around 8:30, I think, maybe 8:15; maybe, sometimes 8:45.

Mr. KEEFE. That would have given the watch officer an opportunity to contact you some place before you even got to the theater, wouldn't it, if you did go there?

Admiral STARK. Yes; depending on the time I left the house.

Mr. KEEFE. If the watch officer called your home, wouldn't there be somebody there to answer the telephone?

[13934] Admiral STARK. Yes. I may have been there myself. I may not have left for the theater when he called. I don't recall the incident. If the theater opened at 8:30, it is not over a 10-minute trip from the house down there.

Mr. KEEFE. If anybody called your house and you were away, wouldn't the person that was in charge at your home make a memorandum of it and give it to you?

Admiral STARK. Yes; we always left word in the house with the boys who would answer the telephone, where we were.

Mr. KEEFE. Weren't you told that Commander Kramer called your home and tried to get you that night?

Admiral STARK. I have no recollection of that.

Mr. KEEFE. You have no recollection of anybody having called you at your home?

Admiral STARK. I have not,

Mr. KEEFE. And you have no recollection of giving the instructions to this watch officer to furnish this information to Secretary Stimson and to Secretary Knox?

Admiral STARK. No; I do not recall that incident.

Mr. KEEFE. Do I understand that this watch officer is now an admiral?

Commander BAECHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He is in Hawaii?

Commander BAECHER. He is ComAirPac, I am informed. That [13995] is his job. He is a rear admiral. He is stationed in Hawaii.

Mr. KEEFE. What was his rank at the time he made this memorandum?

Commander BAECHER. He was a commander. I am not certain.

Mr. KEEFE. You can't read his signature?

Commander BAECHER. Yes. It took me a while.

Senator FERGUSON. Would the Congressman yield just for information, not for questions?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have been going over this memorandum that we received today, and that the Congressman has been questioning the witness on, and on which I had questioned the witness previously. There are quite a number of messages indicated in that memorandum. I would like to request of Commander Baecher that they furnish to committee counsel all of these various messages that are indicated.

[13996] Mr. KEEFE. I am interested, too, in those messages because there is some rather astounding information contained in the report of this watch officer as to the seizure of certain Finnish ships by the Coast Guard and what disposition was to be made of them, this, that, and the other.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that effort will be made.

Mr. KEEFE. Maybe we will run finally onto something that may help clear up this situation that has bothered you, Admiral, and which I, as a member, have wondered at.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the Commander will note the request.¹

Mr. KEEFE. Is there any way to contact the watch officer?

Commander BAECHER. I will do that. I will ask him whether he remembers whether he got in touch with Admiral Stark, if he remembers it at all, and have a positive answer from him shortly.

Mr. KEEFE. He ought to be able to remember that. It is in his handwriting. Maybe he can remember that he wrote it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are an optimist.

Mr. KEEFE. Counsel suggests that I am an optimist. I have done my best to get the facts. That is all.

Admiral STARK. I have done my best to give them to you.

[13997] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Mr. MURPHY. In this log, Admiral, that has been handed to us, I notice that there are entries made in first one handwriting and then after that the entries are made by Glover, now Rear Admiral Glover, and then there are entries made by a man named Wyatt, on the 6th

¹ See p. 5482, *infra*.

of December, and then under the date of the 7th of December there is an entry:

The following officers entered 2601.

Then there is a list of names:

Lieutenant Commander—

some name I can't decipher—

Captain Beardall, Lieutenant Kramer, Captain Wilkinson, Captain Schuirmann, Captain Metcalfe, Lieutenant Commander Mason.

And

Captain Griffin, Captain Metcalf, Captain Wilkinson, Commander Cary, Commander Glover, Commander Alexander.

Then it says:

Action taken as indicated on dispatches.

Would that mean there was some watch officer who was making entries as to who came in at certain times?

Admiral STARK. I don't know what that means. I don't know who occupied room 2601.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you yield? Not for a question.

Mr. MURPHY. I will be glad to.

Admiral STARK. One of those mentioned is the next witness.

[13998] Mr. KEEFE. What is that time, 2601; what time would that be?

Admiral STARK. That is the room number.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

Senator FERGUSON. What I wanted—

Mr. KEEFE. What is the time specified?

Mr. MURPHY. It says something about 11:45., about the Coast Guard called for release of information on Finnish ships. It was advised to call Captain Schuirmann. Then it says: "The following officers entered 2601." The list of names follows. Then, it says: "Action taken as indicated on dispatches."

Senator FERGUSON. You read that previously.

Mr. MURPHY. There are entries made as to entering a certain room, 2601, for what reason I do not know, and apparently there aren't any entries as to the rest of December 7, as to you being there, and as to Admiral Turner and Admiral Ingersoll, so these notes are certainly not such as to purport to show who went into the Navy Department on December 7, are they?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; oh, no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Whose room was this, 2601?

Admiral STARK. I don't know; but the Department can furnish that. That is the second floor, 6 Wing. One of the first rooms. But I do not know who was in that office. You [13999] could establish it. You could not do it by going to who is there now, because the people have been shifted a good deal. But if you want that information, the Department can give it to you. Admiral Beardall is here. He may possibly recall.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Are there any further questions?

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, that is one of the meetings which one of the witnesses described, some place in the 13,000 pages here, that has

been the unusual assemblage of all the top-flight boys that happened to get down just accidentally on Sunday morning.

Mr. MURPHY. The top flight was not there. I ask, Mr. Chairman, that the particular entry in question, in view of the fact that we have read only excerpts, that this particular group of papers be marked as an exhibit and made a part of the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request? The Chair hears none. What will be the number of the exhibit, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. MASTEN. Exhibit No. 162.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 162.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions? Does counsel have anything further?

[14000] Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel for Admiral Stark have anything?

Mr. OBEAR. No questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, do you have anything further?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I can think of nothing I haven't covered in any connection in this whole thing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there any reason why Admiral Stark cannot now be excused?

Senator FERGUSON. I think it should be understood that when some of these witnesses come in that have been requested it may be the desire of at least one member of the committee to ask more question of the Admiral.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we thank you for your appearance and the additional information you have given the committee. You are excused.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to present Admiral Beardall.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Beardall, will you come forward, please, and be sworn?

(The witness was sworn by the Vice Chairman)

[14001] **TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. JOHN R. BEARDALL,
UNITED STATES NAVY¹**

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, will you state your full name, please?

Admiral BEARDALL. John R. Beardall, Rear Admiral.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were aide to the President at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long had you been such aide?

Admiral BEARDALL. Since May 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What had been your previous assignment?

Admiral BEARDALL. Previous to that I was in command of the U. S. S. *Vincennes*.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy up to now, Admiral?

Admiral BEARDALL. Forty-two years, from the time I entered the Naval Academy.

¹ See p. 5512, *infra*, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Adm. Beardall.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What were your duties as naval aide?

Admiral BEARDALL. The duties of aide are not prescribed by any regulations but are such duties as your chief, who in my case was the President, might give.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where did you have your office, Admiral?

Admiral BEARDALL. My office was in the Navy Department.

[14002] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have an office in the White House?

Admiral BEARDALL. No, not regularly assigned.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anyone else there with whom you divided your duties at the time you became naval aide?

Admiral BEARDALL. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was later appointed to assist you there in your duties?

Admiral BEARDALL. Commander Schulz and then later on some other officer. He was one of the first that was detailed to assist me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Commander Schulz came to assist you just before the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At that time did you have any office or place at which you could have a desk in the White House?

Admiral BEARDALL. We were endeavoring to set one up, and it was a little difficult to get space so they gave us a small space down near the mail room, which is on the west side, on Executive Avenue, just across from the State Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If any communication was brought to you physically, to the White House, then that would be the place where ordinarily you would be found?

Admiral BEARDALL. Not I. The watch officer would be there but I would probably be up in the military aide's office [14003] or the Secretary's office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You know what we mean when we speak of magic, Admiral?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were familiar with the delivery of magic to the White House?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It has been generally testified here that it was delivered in a locked pouch. You are familiar with that method of delivery, are you, Admiral?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have a key to the pouch—when it was brought to the White House?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You would, therefore, be entitled to see the magic yourself?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And when that magic was brought there it was for the purpose of giving it to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What would be done with it in the ordinary routine way if it was brought for delivery to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. It would be delivered to him.

[14004] Mr. RICHARDSON. By whom?

Admiral BEARDALL. By me, normally.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would the pouch be opened by you before it went to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. It might or might not be.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you recall the Saturday before the Pearl Harbor attack, December 6?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you advised in any way during the afternoon of that day that there was expected to be ready for delivery to the White House and the President a dispatch of unusual importance?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you remember how that information came to you?

Admiral BEARDALL. I don't recollect accurately. Probably from Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who usually brought the pouch to me, either in the Navy Department, or wherever I might be.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were acquainted with Captain Kramer?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any recollection that Captain Kramer at other times had advised you in advance that there would be a message in the near future?

[14005] Admiral BEARDALL. Yes. In the afternoon, late in the afternoon, in the Navy Department, when it came about time to go home, sometimes he would say, when I would inquire, "There is no magic ready for the President now," or "There might be something later," or "Nothing until tomorrow morning." Something of that sort.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Commander Schulz testified here that he had been advised by you in the afternoon of December 6, Saturday, to remain in attendance, because you had been advised that there would be an important dispatch for delivery to the President; is that your recollection?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir; that is my recollection.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you leave the White House that afternoon?

Admiral BEARDALL. To the best of my recollection about 5:30 or a quarter to 6.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you go back to the White House at any time that day?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have no recollection about it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You do recall being at Admiral Wilkinson's house for dinner that night?

Admiral BEARDALL. I do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the evidence indicates that with you were Admiral Wilkinson and General Miles, you recall that?

[14006] Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You spent the evening there?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it an evening where you were accompanied by your wives?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was your wife with you?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where were you living then?

Admiral BEARDALL. In Washington, on Phelps Place, Northwest.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, do you recall the incident of Captain Kramer coming there?

Admiral BEARDALL. I do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And delivering a message?

Admiral BEARDALL. I do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was that a magic message?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it brought in the pouch, locked pouch, in the way those messages were brought?

Admiral BEARDALL. I am not sure on that, but I imagine it was. I don't recollect.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you read the message there?

Admiral BEARDALL. I glanced through it.

[14007] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did the other officers there read it?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any recollection of any of you doing any telephoning after the message was read?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have none. We moved around but I have no recollection of any telephoning, of my telephoning or seeing the others telephone.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain Kramer says that Admiral Wilkinson did some phoning. You couldn't verify that?

Admiral BEARDALL. No, sir. He may have.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know about how long it was after that message was delivered to you there that you left the Wilkinson house?

Admiral BEARDALL. Well, I should say about a half hour, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is it your recollection that you went from there to your home?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall during that evening at all checking up with Schulz at the White House?

Admiral BEARDALL. I don't recollect that, but I noted he has testified I did, and I accept that, because it was the normal thing to do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would it be a routine thing for you to do [14008] to contact him to see what had happened in the White House during that tour of duty?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes; in the case of a message like that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long would he be expected to remain at the White House? •

Admiral BEARDALL. I think his instructions at that time—this was before we had the situation and map room, before the war—was until after the President had turned in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Had gone to bed?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall going to the White House Saturday morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. I do now, after refreshing my memory, recall going there Saturday morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you go before you went to your own office in the Navy Building?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would Schulz have been at the White House when you arrived there in the morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. Not necessarily. I don't think he had any instructions to come back.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you have any recollection of having any conversation with Schulz on Sunday morning at the White House?

[14009] Admiral BEARDALL. None that I know of.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson, your previous question stated "Saturday."

Mr. RICHARDSON. I meant Sunday. Admiral, do you recall any conversation of any kind that you had when you came to the White House on Sunday morning on your way to your office in the Navy Building with reference to what had happened the night before with respect to the delivery of any messages?

Admiral BEARDALL. None.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You then, except for this report which passed between you and Schulz on Saturday night, had no further knowledge of what happened to the magic message that was sent by Kramer to the White House on the evening of Saturday, December 6?

Admiral BEARDALL. None.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, in event the President should desire to send any messages from the White House, would they be sent through you?

Admiral BEARDALL. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you have any knowledge of what telephone conversations he might have had out of the White House?

Admiral BEARDALL. Never.

[14010] Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the only way you would know anything about what the President did there would be when he requested you as his aide to do something for him?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall the President or anybody for him made any request of you either on the night of December 6 or on the morning of December 7 with reference to the conveying of any dispatches or information or directions?

Admiral BEARDALL. None.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You had no contact with him at all then from the time you left the White House on the afternoon of December 6 until after the Pearl Harbor attack?

Admiral BEARDALL. This is Schulz?

Mr. RICHARDSON. This is the President.

Admiral BEARDALL. The President; I may have gone to see him that Sunday morning after I went to the White House.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you have any recollection you did?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have a hazy recollection I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any recollection of any conversation with him that had any relation to any messages?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes; as I recollect it, I went into his room, early, about 10 o'clock on Sunday morning, with a message or messages, which I presume, to the best of my recollection, was the 14th part of this 13-part message that [14011] came in the night before, which I delivered to him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any discussion or conversation with him when you made that delivery?

Admiral BEARDALL. No discussion. We never discussed magic. I do recollect him saying though which marks this in my mind, that it looked as though the Japs are going to sever negotiations, break off negotiations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anybody else present?

Admiral BEARDALL. None.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Your recollection is it was just between you?

Admiral BEARDALL. Just between us.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you recall what the occasion was of your seeing him? Was it simply to inquire whether he had duties for you?

Admiral BEARDALL. Normally that would be the case, but I think on this occasion I must have taken some message to him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There is a notation here, which has just been referred, the watch officer's log in which he says: "The following officers entered 2601." Do you know what room that would be?

Admiral BEARDALL. I don't know definitely, but I think, from the people's names mentioned there, it was the watch officer's room there, where they gathered, and since Kramer [14012] was there, where we delivered the magic, or had contact with people who did. That is the best of my recollection.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you have any recollection of what the occasion would be for the number of persons who are noted in the log as having come to that room at that time on Sunday morning would be?

Admiral BEARDALL. I don't except perhaps to keep in contact with what might be coming in in reference to these messages.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you see anything of the 14-part message on the morning of December 7 yourself?

Admiral BEARDALL. Not that I recall, except I may have seen it, if this was the one that I gave to the President.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you, yourself, read the 14th part?

Admiral BEARDALL. My recollection is not clear on that. I may have or may not have.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you remember seeing the 1 o'clock delivery?

Admiral BEARDALL. I don't remember.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have any contact with anyone while the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, was examining the instrument in the Navy Department?

Admiral BEARDALL. No; no.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you have any knowledge as to who [14013] delivered the 13-part or the 14-part message or the 1 o'clock message in the Navy Department on Sunday morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. None.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You had nothing to do with that?

Admiral BEARDALL. Nothing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the only knowledge you have of that message is in connection with the event which occurred at the White House that you have testified to?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. No further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, as I understood, you stated you are not certain whether you saw the fourteenth part message or not?

Admiral BEARDALL. I am not dead certain whether I saw it or not. I sometimes read dispatches and sometimes I didn't. If it was the fourteenth part I probably read it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have no present impression that you did read it?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have a present impression I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, is it your recollection that that fourteenth part message was what you delivered to the President Sunday morning?

[14014] Admiral BEARDALL. That is my impression.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About what time, would you say?

Admiral BEARDALL. About 10 o'clock, I should say.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And there was no discussion between you and the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. No discussion at all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Other than the remark, I believe you said, that he said it looked like Japan was going to break off negotiations?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Something to that effect?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. May I have that last part read?

(The sentences referred to were read by the reporter.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You say there was nobody else there with the President at the time you saw him?

Admiral BEARDALL. Nobody else, to the best of my recollection.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was that the only time on Sunday that you saw him?

Admiral BEARDALL. To the best of my recollection that is the only time on Sunday I saw him until after the Pearl Harbor attack, when I joined him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did join him after the attack?

[14015] Admiral BEARDALL. After the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About what time was it?

Admiral BEARDALL. About 2 o'clock, I was at home, at lunch, just after lunch, when I got the word that Pearl Harbor was being bombed, "This is no drill," and went immediately to confirm it, and then over to the White House and joined the President.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You stayed there then the rest of the day?

Admiral BEARDALL. The rest of the day and rest of the evening; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, thank you. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, when you went to the White House after the bombing, did the President make any comments to you?

Admiral BEARDALL. This is after the bombing?

Mr. MURPHY. After.

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes. When I got there only Mr. Hopkins. Harry Hopkins, was with him, and he was on the phone. To whom he was talking I don't know; but evidently he got some call from Admiral Stark, and he told me, he said, "Take over the [14016] phone to the Navy Department," and so I went out in the lobby and kept on the job, trying to get the news of what was going on in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. And you were reporting to him?

Admiral BEARDALL. And reporting to him.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you at any time talk to the President about his reactions on Saturday night when the paper was delivered to him by Commander Schulz?

Admiral BEARDALL. Never.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you at any time on Saturday evening, after you went to Admiral Wilkinson's, talk to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. Never.

Mr. MURPHY. Between that time and Sunday morning at 10 o'clock?

Admiral BEARDALL. Never.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you at any time on Saturday night or early Sunday morning talk to Admiral Stark?

Admiral BEARDALL. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you at any time Saturday night or early Sunday morning make any inquiry or attempt to locate Admiral Stark?

Admiral BEARDALL. No; I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

[14017] Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, going back to Saturday evening—rather Saturday all day—in the morning do you recall any messages being delivered to you as aide to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have no recollection of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you handle messages from the Secretary of State?

Admiral BEARDALL. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Who handled those, to the President, as far as the President was concerned?

Admiral BEARDALL. I do not know that. I think—I don't know who handled the State Department messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the State Department messages were never delivered in a locked pouch, is that correct—or were they?

Admiral BEARDALL. I am not sure. I don't know the method of delivery of the State Department messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, we have here in the evidence a message from the Ambassador in London telling us, about 10:40 on Saturday morning, telling us about a movement of ships, and it is addressed, as I understand it, to the Secretary of State's office.

That would not come to you in your regular duty?

Admiral BEARDALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any messages, magic [14018] messages, delivered to you while you were on duty on Saturday, and that you delivered to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. None; have no recollection of any.

Senator FERGUSON. So then you would say, as far as your testimony is concerned, no messages were delivered to you, or through you, to the President on Saturday?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that we might have the time as to when someone notified you there would be messages after you left, or after the time of notifying you, will you tell us who notified you that there would be messages that evening or that afternoon?

Admiral BEARDALL. As I previously testified it must have been Lt. Commander Kramer because he was the one who used to bring me

regularly this pouch for delivery. He was the distributor of these messages.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say "must" you mean because he was the distributing agency?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you assume that that is who gave you that message?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you place the time?

Admiral BEARDALL. I should say about 5:30, because normally I stayed at the Navy Department until about that time [14019] and often inquired if there was any magic coming in that might be destined for the White House, for the President, so that I could take it to the President at the end of the day, when it would be delivered.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understood Captain Kramer's testimony, he indicated that he would take these messages to the White House and deliver them to you, as the aide?

Admiral BEARDALL. No. He did toward the end, when the watch officer was there. Sometimes Kramer would bring them over, later on, after the war started, but before Pearl Harbor there was no situation room and no map room in the White House; we didn't have one, and he would bring them to me in my office at the Navy Department and I would carry them myself.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you know of any occasion when he delivered messages to you as the naval aide to the President in the White House and that you would take them to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have no recollection of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to Pearl Harbor, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BEARDALL. I can't recall any.

Senator FERGUSON. Well then, as I understand it, Commander Schulz, then Lieutenant Schulz, wouldn't be at the White House while you were on duty on Saturday?

[14020] Admiral BEARDALL. No, not necessarily; no. At that time. Prior to Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to Pearl Harbor. Now, do you know where Schulz was when you instructed him to go to the White House and wait for the messages that would be delivered later?

Admiral BEARDALL. Well, he may have been in the Navy Department and he may have been over in that mail room we established.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that?

Admiral BEARDALL. Well, I don't recall it; no, but I know that was the normal procedure.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall whether or not as your—what did you call him, assistant aide?

Admiral BEARDALL. He was a communication watch officer.

Senator FERGUSON. He didn't classify as an aide?

Admiral BEARDALL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. He was a communication watch officer. Did you at all times have a watch officer in the White House?

Admiral BEARDALL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you start putting a watch officer in the White House?

Admiral BEARDALL. After Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if Commander Schulz, Lieutenant [14021] Schulz at that time, indicated on this record that he was in the White House from the time he received, at least, this message from you, I mean the message as to the fact that there would be another message delivered, then you would say that he was acting as a watch officer in the White House?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir. The watch officers were instructed, if it came in, to take it to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you give him any instructions as to how to deliver this message to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. I may have. I am not positive in my mind. But that would have been the normal thing for me to do.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anyone tell you that day that this would be important, this message?

Admiral BEARDALL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever had a man remain on duty to deliver to the President a message, the time being 5:30 that you received this notice, prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have no recollection of it.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would say this was the first time you designated a watch officer to remain so that he could deliver a message to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. I would.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I take it that there must have been something said indicating that this was an important [14022] message, that it would have to get to the President immediately, or it would have happened as in the case of all normal messages, that it would have remained in the Navy Department until the next morning, Sunday; is that a fair statement?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is a fair statement, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So we find that the first time in the history of the Navy Department, in your experience as naval aide—and you were naval aide for how many years?

Admiral BEARDALL. I was naval aide for about 7 months.

Senator FERGUSON. During that entire 7 months' period no occasion had arisen that you had placed anyone else—or that you had delivered a message after the ordinary day, which was 5:30 or 6 o'clock; is that a correct statement?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is a correct statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you check that evening, this being an unusual situation, did you check with Schulz later that evening, and before the next morning, as to whether or not he ever received and delivered to the President this important message?

Admiral BEARDALL. I accept his statement that he called me up and told me that he had delivered this 13-part, this message, he didn't know what it was, this part to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say "part" or "13 parts"?

Admiral BEARDALL. I don't recall what he said but the [14023] message that he received from Commander Kramer.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if it turns out from the testimony that there was more than one message you would say that he probably told you that he had delivered, plural, the "messages"?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir; the messages that were in the pouch.

Senator FERGUSON. That were in the pouch. Now, had you any instructions or information that that would be the last delivery that night or evening?

Admiral BEARDALL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you tell Schulz about remaining on duty?

Admiral BEARDALL. I don't recall what I told him. I accept his statement that he asked permission to go home and that he did go home.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you assume from that that your instructions would be that he could leave?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you received the message, 13-part message. Were there any other messages with that message—when you were at Admiral Wilkinson's home?

Admiral BEARDALL. I recollect none with it.

Senator FERGUSON. You recollect no other message?

[14024] Admiral BEARDALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then as far as the record will show now, no messages were delivered to you, or you had no knowledge of any messages, on Saturday, as far as magic was concerned, or messages to the President, except the 13-part which you read at Admiral Wilkinson's?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I assume that evening you and Mrs. Beardall left the Wilkinson home and went home?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any idea what time you got home?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have no clear idea.

Senator FERGUSON. Well—

Admiral BEARDALL. Probably somewhere between 11:00 and midnight, as I recollect.

Senator FERGUSON. And during the time you were home that evening did you get any calls?

Admiral BEARDALL. None at home that I recollect.

Senator FERGUSON. Were any messages delivered to you or did anyone come to your home?

Admiral BEARDALL. Not to my recollection.

[14025] Senator FERGUSON. Then the next morning were you on the alert, was your department alerted, so that you anticipated or expected something to happen?

Admiral BEARDALL. By my department—

Senator FERGUSON. What department would you be in at the Navy as aide to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. I was aide to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Well, were you on the alert for war?

Admiral BEARDALL. I was on the alert for the delivery of these messages to the Secretary of State by the American Ambassadors of Japan. I mean, I was concerned about that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you had a department, which I assume you did have, as naval aide to the President, one man in it, your department was alerted?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were alerted; is that correct?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were then anticipating a fourteenth part, because of the information you received at Admiral Wilkinson's?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know a man named Carson, a Navy officer?

[14026] Admiral BEARDALL. I have heard of him since I have been back to Washington this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who he is? What his rank is? Was he connected with this department of yours?

Admiral BEARDALL. I understand—he was another youngster that we had got hold of to use as a relief for Schulz. I mean, as an extra watch officer after we established this mail-room communication center.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, why did you establish a watch office in the mail room and put Schulz in and have a man named Carson as his relief man?

Admiral BEARDALL. Well, so that Schulz could be off sometime, acquaint, break this boy in so we could use him.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you establish this watch office in the White House?

Admiral BEARDALL. I should say about; oh, 2 days, 3 days before Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Two or 3 days before Pearl Harbor is the first we find that a watch place was in the White House. And can you tell us why it was established?

Admiral BEARDALL. Well, it was established so that there would be someone there to receive this magic who was more or less in the way of officer-messenger so that if I wasn't available there could be someone there. These messages were [14027] coming in. The situation was getting more tense in the diplomatic relations, and I wanted somebody there in case I was going out for dinner or somewhere else, that could receive this and be trusted to deliver it.

Senator FERGUSON. Who advised you that the situation was getting more tense, causing you to come to the conclusion that a watch office should be set up in the White House? How did you come to that conclusion that it was getting more tense?

Admiral BEARDALL. I just think my own reasoning and—

Senator FERGUSON. You had examined all magic that came through you, and, therefore, you drew the conclusion that the situation was changing, rapid enough, at least, that you wanted to establish a watch office?

Admiral BEARDALL. Correct, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that these messages were so important at that time that they were to be delivered at once to the President instead of having to wait until Admiral Beardall was found, there would be someone on duty, either Schulz or Carson, to deliver these messages; is that a correct statement?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is a correct statement; and to keep them secure.

[14028] Senator FERGUSON. At that time, let's say the 5th, before you established the watch office, what were your hours at the White House, or on duty?

Admiral BEARDALL. My hours at the White House, I would probably go there in the morning and in the afternoon, unless the President had some other instructions for me, and I would spend the balance of the day in my office at the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. What were your office hours in the Navy Department and at the White House both?

Admiral BEARDALL. Well, I should say from 9:30, from 9 in the morning until probably 5:30, and sometimes 6.

Senator FERGUSON. About 9 or 9:30 to 5:30 or 6 were your regular hours?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you establish longer hours for the delivery of these messages either through you or these two assistants?

Admiral BEARDALL. I don't understand the question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Schulz goes on night duty at least on Saturday. Had you established this watch for longer hours than daylight hours that you have given us, from 9 to 6?

Admiral BEARDALL. No, not regularly. As I recollect. Immediately after Pearl Harbor we set up—

[14029] Senator FERGUSON. I just want before Pearl Harbor.

Admiral BEARDALL. Before.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall. So this would be the first night duty?

Admiral BEARDALL. First night duty that I can recollect.

Senator FERGUSON. Or first special duty; is that correct?

Admiral BEARDALL. First special duty, yes; to the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you working Sundays prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BEARDALL. No, not necessarily, because I was perhaps the only aide, or secretary, around the White House on Sunday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean, previous. For instance, on the 1st. Did you work Sunday?

Admiral BEARDALL. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you worked previous to the 7th?

Admiral BEARDALL. On Sunday?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral BEARDALL. If I had something to do, I had some special duty, if I had been directed by the President, I may have gone to the White House or Navy Department on that Sunday depending on what was going on.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to the 7th had you ever remained [14030] on duty Sunday to deliver any messages?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have no recollection of doing that.

Senator FERGUSON. So, the first time on a Sunday that you were on duty to deliver messages was the 7th; is that correct?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is a correct statement, sir, to the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, when did you first receive instructions to appear for duty on Sunday the 7th?

Admiral BEARDALL. I received no instructions.

Senator FERGUSON. You never received instructions to go on duty on the 7th?

Admiral BEARDALL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. From no one?

Admiral BEARDALL. No one that I know of.

Senator FERGUSON. How does it come that you got on duty on the 7th?

Admiral BEARDALL. Well, my own initiative.

Senator FERGUSON. Why, what caused you to—well, you being the only man in the department, I was going to say, instruct yourself to be on duty—but you being the only one in that department, and being the superior officer, how does it come that you went on duty that morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. Well, my recollection is because I had perused those 13 parts that evening at Captain Wilkinson's [14031] and there must have been some indication there was another part coming to be delivered, which might have occasioned me, through a sense of duty, to look into it.

Senator FERGUSON. I take it then the reading of the 13 parts caused you to believe there would be another part come in and therefore you went to duty and were on duty Sunday morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go to the White House?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did you arrive at the White House?

Admiral BEARDALL. To the best of my recollection I would say about 9:30.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see the President before you received any messages?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have no recollection of that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No recollection of that?

Admiral BEARDALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then when did you first know that another part had come in, and that you were going to receive one for the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have no recollection of receiving any word that another one was coming in.

[14032] Senator FERGUSON. Did anyone deliver a message to you, magic, on Sunday morning, to be delivered to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir; they must have, else I wouldn't have had it.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were you when it was delivered to you?

Admiral BEARDALL. I think either in the little mail room or in the office upstairs, in the military aide's room.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, not to repeat, but you have given us the hour, about 10 o'clock, and you haven't any reason to state that it was before that, because if you got there about 9:30 it would be about 10 o'clock; is that correct?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it would come, I take it, in the same pouch. Did you read it before you took it to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. I do not recollect that clearly, whether I did or not. I might have or might not.

Senator FERGUSON. Don't you think that the fourteenth part of this message would be rather vivid in your memory if you had read it before you took it into the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. I think it would; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. For that reason it would seem that you hadn't read it. You think you hadn't read it?

[14033] Admiral BEARDALL. I don't know. I may or may not have read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any message beside that fourteenth part that came to your attention or to your knowledge that morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have no recollection of any.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no recollection of any other message, whether it was the 1 o'clock message, or a message that indicated no one was to typewrite the message except the Ambassador himself?

Admiral BEARDALL. Correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you have no recollection; that doesn't refresh your memory?

Admiral BEARDALL. Not a bit, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When you took this to the President, in what room was the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. In his bedroom.

Senator FERGUSON. He was in his bedroom; is that correct?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, prior to the reading of it by the President, did you have a conversation or did he say anything?

Admiral BEARDALL. I don't recollect him saying anything except "Good morning."

[14034] Senator FERGUSON. Then did he sit and read whatever was in that pouch that morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. He did.

Senator FERGUSON. And you remained there while he read it?

Admiral BEARDALL. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Then what would you say he said after, giving us the exact words or the substance.

Admiral BEARDALL. To the best of my recollection the substance of his words were: "It looks like the Japanese are going to break off negotiations."

Senator FERGUSON. That is the substance of what he said?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is the substance.

Senator FERGUSON. He handed back whatever was in the file and whatever he had read; is that correct?

Admiral BEARDALL. To the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. No other delivery to your knowledge was delivered to him that morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. To the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what did you do with that pouch and where did you go for the rest of the day up to the time of the attack?

Admiral BEARDALL. The best of my recollection—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral BEARDALL. I took the pouch back to the Navy Department. [14035]

Senator FERGUSON. And remained at the Navy Department?

Admiral BEARDALL. I remained there until lunch time.

Senator FERGUSON. Then went home and were having lunch when the attack came?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other conversations you had, for a week, with the President, other than the one that you state, in relation to the Far East?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes; I recollect one very clearly.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Admiral BEARDALL. That was about the 4th or 5th, in connection with the delivery of the magic. I took the liberty of inviting special attention as significant the message about the burning of codes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you had a conversation with the President about the burning of codes; is that correct?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us as near as you can, in substance if you can't give us the exact words, what that conversation was by you and by the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. To the best of my recollection the conversation was, I said, "Mr. President, this is a very significant dispatch," which he read very carefully, and he said [14036] "Well, when do you think it will happen?" I said, "Most any time." That was the gist of the conversation.

[14037] Senator FERGUSON. What did the President say, did he give you any time when he said, "When do you think it will happen," and you said, "Most any time," did he reply as to what his opinion was?

Admiral BEARDALL. Not at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you recall any other conversations with him about the Far East?

Admiral BEARDALL. None.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, of course, you knew what he meant when he asked you when it would happen?

Admiral BEARDALL. Well, I can't state what was on the President's mind, but I understood him to mean——

Senator FERGUSON. What did you understand, from what had taken place?

Admiral BEARDALL. I understood him to mean, When is war going to break out, when we are going to be attacked, or something.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That is why you said that "almost any time," is that correct?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Because from your knowledge it indicated that war could be at any moment, an attack could be at any minute. Is that correct?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct.

[14038] Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, when did you come to that conclusion, when did you come to the conclusion that war was immediately imminent?

Admiral BEARDALL. I can't exactly say when I came to that conclusion that it was immediately imminent, but I will say that that message of burning codes influenced me very much, that we were getting through with these diplomatic negotiations, and there was going to be war.

Senator FERGUSON. You are a graduate of Annapolis?

Admiral BEARDALL. I am, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Your career is that of a Navy man?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you had a right to apprise what was going on, to determine whether or not there would be war. I want the record. I want the record merely to show your experience, so that we may value your opinion.

That is correct.

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct, that I am a graduate of Annapolis, and a naval officer.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have been a naval officer all your life?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have had a great amount of experience in the Navy.

[14039] (No response.)

Senator FERGUSON. You came to the conclusion that, by reading these codes, then, that war was imminent, and you replied to the President "almost any time"?

Admiral BEARDALL. Correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall, Admiral, any other conversations?

Admiral BEARDALL. Those are the only ones.

Senator FERGUSON. With the President, about the Far East?

Admiral BEARDALL. Those are the only ones I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You can't recall any prior to that now?

Admiral BEARDALL. No, no; he never discussed it with me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any with Harry Hopkins?

Admiral BEARDALL. None.

Senator FERGUSON. About the Far East?

Admiral BEARDALL. None.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice in Commander Schulz's testimony, he said, on page 12451:

The first time I was ever in the White House was on the 5th of December.

That would refresh your memory as to when you put the [14040] watch on?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you, on the morning, on Sunday morning, while over in the watch room, have a conversation with these other men who were in that room, as indicated by this Watch Log, any conversation about the Far East?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have no recollection of any conversation with them. I may have had in regard to the situation, but I have no recollection of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I see that memorandum. Was it the usual situation for Sunday morning to have eight or ten officers sitting in the watch office, or were they in the watch office, in the Navy Department?

Admiral BEARDALL. Well, about that time—it previously hadn't been. I would say it was an unusual situation to have that many coming in and going, so far as I can recollect.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that would be unusual?

Admiral BEARDALL. I think so. I don't know—I mean that is just my opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. At least that is the first time you knew of any such experience?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would you say that you had been back to the Navy Department after the delivery of this [14041] message so that you would be in the watch office in a position to deliver any further messages to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes; I should say that, along with other reasons for going back, to see what was going on, and a natural interest in the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, this was a very, very tense moment, not only in your life but in the country's life, and you realized it, as a Navy officer, did you not, that morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. I think that is a correct statement, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you were waiting in this office with other Navy men?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes. Well, I—yes. I wasn't waiting in this office.

Senator FERGUSON. No; I don't want to indicate that you were wasting any time, or loafing, or anything like that, but you were on duty there with the other Navy men?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir; but I could have come and gone, I had no special instructions.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that.

There was a Captain Schuirman, Captain Wilkinson, Captain Metcalfe. I think that is all the captains. You were a captain at that time, is that correct?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct.

[14042] Senator FERGUSON. And you can't recall any conversation among these men who were in this office No. 2601 at about 11:45 that morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. I can't recall any specific conversation with them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they indicate that they were waiting for something to happen?

Admiral BEARDALL. I don't know that they indicated they were waiting for something to happen, but they were interested in the situation before us.

Senator FERGUSON. They were there because of the very tense situation?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just as you were there?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see Admiral Stark?

Admiral BEARDALL. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. On Sunday morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in his office?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversation with him?

Admiral BEARDALL. No direct conversation. I listened [14043] into what might be going on and sat in a while.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did you first get to the Navy Department on Sunday morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. To the best of my recollection, I should say it was, around 11 or 11:15.

Senator FERGUSON. What time would you say you went into Admiral Stark's office?

Admiral BEARDALL. I think about 11 or 11:30. I am not certain of the time there.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us, to the best of your knowledge, if you can't remember the exact language, the substance of the conversation that took place in Admiral Stark's office?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have one recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have that.

Admiral BEARDALL. That the phone rang from General Marshall's office and something was said about "include the Navy" in this message, or that message—is o. k. Some conversation to that effect. That is the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, first, you would get that from Admiral Stark?

Admiral BEARDALL. Well, yes; I got that on the phone. I don't know what was coming in.

[14044] Senator FERGUSON. From what he said, you took it, it would be all right to include the Navy?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir; or words to that effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Was anything said about the kind of a message?

Admiral BEARDALL. No, sir; not to my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would you say was in Admiral Stark's office during the time that this phone call came in?

Admiral BEARDALL. Well, I can't recollect who was in there then. There were some officers coming and going. There may have been Admiral Ingersoll. He was in the office next door. May have been Captain Wilkinson. I can't recall now just who did come and go during the time I was there.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall what would take you into Admiral Stark's office, he being the Chief in charge, did you go in to discuss anything with him, or just drop in?

Admiral BEARDALL. No; I often went in his office.

Senator FERGUSON. Because of your rank, you had free access to the Admiral's office?

Admiral BEARDALL. Correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You weren't called in for consultation?

Admiral BEARDALL. I was not, sir.

[14045] Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall any conference that you had with the Admiral about the situation as it stood?

Admiral BEARDALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you get anything from that conversation that the Admiral had with General Marshall, that things were very serious?

Admiral BEARDALL. No; I gleaned that they were sending some message to the fleet, sending some message out.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Ambassador Hu Shih of China had called on the President on Sunday morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no knowledge of that? I assume, then, that you had no knowledge of anyone calling on the President Sunday morning?

Admiral BEARDALL. No one.

Senator FERGUSON. You can't give us any information on this conversation, any more of this conversation in Admiral Stark's office, than you have?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is all I can recollect.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Beardall, as I understand it, you did not have other naval officers at the White House until [14046] 2 days before Pearl Harbor. That would be December 5, 1941?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. So that the only occasion you ever had before December 6 to assign anyone to remain after 5:30 was 1 day, that would be the evening of December 5?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Before that, do you know whether or not it was true that Captain Kramer sometimes in the evening delivered messages to the White House?

Admiral BEARDALL. I do; I heard it.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, he himself, without the necessity of having an officer take it from him and deliver it to the President, had delivered it personally?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. To the President, himself?

Admiral BEARDALL. I think often to the President himself, from what I have learned, and sometimes, if I wasn't there, to General Watson, too.

Mr. MURPHY. There was a reference made that this was unusual. The only time before December 6 you had done it was December 5, because you had no assistant up until then?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On the morning of December 7, you went to [14047] the President with this particular message, and you would state that he said, "It looks as though they are breaking off negotiations." You had observed the President on many previous occasions, had you not?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In your judgment was there anything in his manner which would indicate to you that he was expecting an attack within a period of hours?

Admiral BEARDALL. There was not, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you state for the record why you come to that conclusion?

Admiral BEARDALL. Well, there was no alarm, or no mention of this, mention of war, or of any actions on his part that would indicate that he was expecting an attack.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he say anything at all to you, as his naval aide, at that time, that would indicate to you that he, the President, felt that war was a matter of hours?

Admiral BEARDALL. Nothing at all.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there was before us as a witness, Commander Schulz. Did anyone make any attempt to inquire from you as to who was your assistant on duty at the White House on December 6, your aide, or whatever naval person was there on December 6, 1941? Do you understand my question?

Admiral BEARDALL. I don't quite follow it, sir.

[14048] Mr. MURPHY. Strike that question. Did anyone ask you who was with you at the White House on December 6, 1941, by way of other Naval personnel?

Admiral BEARDALL. No; to the best of my recollection, Commander Kramer, who handled this message, and who would be the one who would deliver anything that came in.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, Admiral, are you the one that submitted the name of Commander Schulz?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. As a witness for this committee?

Admiral BEARDALL. Correct.

Mr. MURPHY. To whom did you give that name?

Admiral BEARDALL. To Lieutenant Commander Baecher here.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you have anything to do with Commander Schulz when he got to Washington?

Admiral BEARDALL. No. I haven't seen him.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you have anything to do with shielding that witness from this committee or its investigators?

Admiral BEARDALL. Nothing at all.

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask from Commander Baecher, there has been a national magazine article to the effect that steps were taken to shield Commander Schulz from the investigators and attorneys of the committee and the members of the committee. Did the United States Navy do any such thing?

[14049] Commander BAECHER. No, sir; positively not.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was it that brought Commander Schulz here?

Commander BAECHER. We did; the Navy did.

Mr. MURPHY. On whose request?

Commander BAECHER. At the request of prior counsel. They enquired, through me, of Admiral Beardall, who his assistants were.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you, Commander, attempt to conceal this witness or keep him from any members of this committee, or the investigators of the committee, prior to his going on the stand?

Commander BAECHER. Absolutely not. We wrote several memoranda to counsel explaining where Commander Schulz was and the difficulties that might be involved in bringing him here and generally what he would testify to. And I interviewed him personally before he was brought to the committee room and I reported the substance of his testimony to Mr. Richardson, to Senator Ferguson, and to Senator Lucas.

[14050] Mr. MURPHY. Did you attempt to conceal him from this committee over the lunch hour so that the committee couldn't talk to him or the committee investigators couldn't talk to him?

Commander BAECHER. Absolutely not.

Mr. MURPHY. One other question, Admiral Beardall. Did you know about the war warning having gone out on November 27?

Admiral BEARDALL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You did not know we had sent such warning to the theaters in the Pacific?

Admiral BEARDALL. No, sir; I had no such knowledge.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, you weren't in Washington for the last few months, were you?

Admiral BEARDALL. No; I have been away.

Senator FERGUSON. You have been in Panama?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And Peru?

Admiral BEARDALL. Panama and Peru.

Senator FERGUSON. How long have you been out of Washington?

Admiral BEARDALL. Since last August.

[14051] Senator FERGUSON. You are just returning to testify here and you are returning to Panama?

Admiral BEARDALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the Duty Officer Carson was on duty on Sunday?

Admiral BEARDALL. I don't definitely, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall leaving anyone at the White House while you went to the Navy Department?

Admiral BEARDALL. I have no recollection of it.

Senator FERGUSON. The record should show that Schulz was your Deputy Watch Officer at the White House, should it not?

Admiral BEARDALL. What record?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the records of the Navy should have shown that his duty on Saturday was a deputy or assistant watch officer as aide to the President?

Admiral BEARDALL. The knowledge would exist there but whether they had a record of it I couldn't be sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't it customary to assign the duty of a man?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, but Schulz was on temporary duty in the White House at that time. He was permanently attached to the Navy Department and I made a request on them to send an assistant over there, and whether they made a record of that I am not sure.

[14052] Senator FERGUSON. When were you first consulted as to who received and delivered this message to the White House, this 13-part on Saturday night?

Admiral BEARDALL. When I came back here to see the former counsel. That was in November. Last November.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in the city of Washington last November?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When in November?

Admiral BEARDALL. I arrived here about the 25th, somewhere around there.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you then asked as to whom was your associate or assistant at that time?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir. I spent a lot of time trying to find out who he was.

Senator FERGUSON. You had forgotten who he was?

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you find out who your assistant was?

Admiral BEARDALL. Inquiring around with different people and trying to remember his name, and I finally struck somebody who remembered what his name was, and I went to the Navy Department and Lieutenant Commander Baecher here, to find out where he was and see if he was the right man.

[14053] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why he wasn't brought here as a witness until about the week of the 20th of February?

Admiral BEARDALL. I haven't the slightest idea.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you locate him back in November?

Admiral BEARDALL. I think we located him——

Commander BAECHEER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Let the Admiral answer.

Admiral BEARDALL. I think he was located.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk with him?

Admiral BEARDALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't talk with him?

Admiral BEARDALL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. But you knew he was located.

Admiral BEARDALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. This room, 2601 you say, was the watch officer's room in the Navy?

Admiral BEARDALL. I think it was, sir. We can check that. I haven't any knowledge.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It wasn't your office?

Admiral BEARDALL. It wasn't my office, no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And all these officers whose names have been read here, they just came in and went out, passed through there?

[14054] Admiral BEARDALL. Exactly. I take it it wasn't a regular office which anybody kept, except the watch officer, or some sort of a mail censor, or something of that sort.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The fact that all these names are listed would not indicate that they were all assembled there at any one time?

Admiral BEARDALL. Not all all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It would just indicate that they had passed through there sometime during the day?

Admiral BEARDALL. Correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Is there anything further? Does counsel have anything further?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No; nothing further from the witness.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything further, Admiral, that you desire to give to the committee?

Admiral BEARDALL. I can think of nothing, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your appearance and the information that you have given us. You may be excused.

(The witness was excused.)

[14055] Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that the members of the committee cannot attend for several days, if you could give us another half hour we could clear the record so as to help the printer out on the record. We need but one faithful committee member to remain with us while we put this material in.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. May I ask what it will be?

Mr. RICHARDSON. This is a summation of requests heretofore made. and counsel is now prepared to present the matter. Mr. Morgan will present it.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, at page 879 of the record Congressman Gearhart requested the log of the U. S. S. *Helena*. Commander Baecher has provided the log, which we would like to offer as Exhibit No. 163.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received.

(The log referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 163.")

Mr. MORGAN. At pages 8342 and 8346 Congressman Murphy requested reports supplied by General Short with respect to the attack on Oahu. These reports were shown to Mr. Murphy and we have them compiled and will offer them as Exhibit No. 164.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They will be so received.

(The reports referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 164.")

Mr. MORGAN. We have a communication from the Army liaison [14056] office dated April 10, 1946 reading as follows:

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

In response to Congressman Murphy's inquiry at page 4532 of the committee transcript, there is enclosed a copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a 23 February 1941 conference between German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima. The partial translation was obtained from the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality.

This document was distributed among the members of the committee. We would like to offer it as Exhibit No. 165.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 165.")

Mr. MORGAN. Some time ago there was distributed to the members of the committee a copy of the dispatch from Ambassador Winant to the State Department dated November 2, 1941. Instead of offering this as an exhibit we would like to have it spread on the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The document referred to will be spread on the record.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14057] TEM This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

London

Dated November 2, 1941.

Rec'd 7:36 a. m.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

5213, November 2, noon.

PERSONAL AND SECRET TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

As your Naval people have already been informed, we are sending that big ship you inspected into the Indian Ocean as part of the squadron we are forming there. This ought to serve as a deterrent on Japan. There is nothing like having something that can catch and kill anything. I am very glad we can spare her at this juncture as it is more than we thought we could do some time ago. The firmer your attitude and ours, the less chance of their taking the plunge.

I am grieved at the loss of life you have suffered with *Reuben James*. I salute the land of unending challenge!

WINANT.

ALC

[14058] Mr. MORGAN. Pursuant to the request of Senator Lucas at pages 154-5 of the record, we have a communication, dated November 30, 1945, from Commander Baecher, the Navy liaison officer concerning:

Subject: Time of receipt of the message from the U. S. S. *Ward*, by Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel.

We would like to have this communication plus the enclosure spread on the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The communication and the enclosure will be spread on the record at this point.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14059]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 30 November 1945.

Memorandum to: Mr. William D. Mitchell.

Subject: Time of receipt of the message from the U. S. S. *WARD*, by Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel.

1. Pursuant to your request there is enclosed a report indicating the time the message, from the U. S. S. *WARD*, was received by Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER
Lt. Comdr. USNR

Acknowledge receipt of the above enclosure.

TIME OF RECEIPT OF *WARD*'S MESSAGE BY ADMIRAL BLOCH AND ADMIRAL KIMMEL

RECEIPT BY ADMIRAL BLOCH

Robert's Report page 1727:

The dispatch from the *WARD* was received by Lt. Comdr. Kaminski, the watch officer for the 14th Naval District, at 0712.

Robert's Report page 1747

Captain John B. Earle, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District, states that he received this message from Lt. Comdr. Kaminski at 0710 or 0712, and that he immediately [14060] called Admiral Bloch, Commandant, 14th Naval District.

Murfin Court Vol. 2, page 401.

Admiral Bloch states that he was informed of the *WARD*'S message at about 0715 by Captain Earle. They discussed the possibility of this report being another false contact, and before the matter had been clarified, the air attack had begun.

RECEIPT BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL

Robert's Report Page 1727:

Lt. Cdr. Kaminski, the watch officer for the 14th Naval District, states that he phoned the message to CincPac's duty officer a minute or two after receiving it at 0712.

Murfin Court Vol. 2, pages 332-3:

Admiral Kimmel (CincPac) states that on receiving the message from his duty officer between 0730 and 0740, he presumed that this report was another false contact, and while waiting for amplification of it, the bombing attack started.

Roberts Report Page 1544:

At 0800, CincPac sent a message to all ships and stations, stating: "Air Raid on Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill."

Mr. MORGAN. At page 185 of the record, Senator Ferguson inquired as to why the B-17s which were sent to Hawaii shortly before the attack were unarmed. We have a communication from the Army liaison officer, dated 2 April 1946, in this regard, which we would like to have spread on the record at this point.

5294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be spread on the record.
(The communication referred to follows:)

[14062]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, Room 4D757, The Pentagon, 2 April 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

At page 185 of the Committee transcript, Senator Ferguson asked why the B-17s which arrived at Oahu from the west coast on the morning of 7 December 1941 were without ammunition. Testimony on this subject by General Marshall will be found in the Committee transcript at p. 2060 and in the Army Pearl Harbor Board top secret transcript at pages 20-21, and by General Arnold in the Army Board's secret transcript at page 108.

/s/ **CARL R. NELSON,**
Capt., AUS.

[14063] **Mr. MORGAN.** Pursuant to a request made by Senator Ferguson at pages 200-201 of the transcript for all drafts and notes in connection with Admiral Inglis' statement of the attack, we now have a communication from the Navy Department dated January 25, 1946 which we would like to have spread on the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be spread on the record.
(The communication referred to follows:)

[14064]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 25 January 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. Reference is made to the request of Senator Ferguson (transcript pages 200-201) that all drafts and notes in connection with Admiral Inglis' statement of attack be furnished the Committee. All of the material involved was destroyed as, in the course of work, it was superseded by more finished drafts, and when the final draft was completed on 24 November, all previous material was destroyed.

/s/ **JOHN FORD BAECHER**
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

[14065] **Mr. MORGAN.** Pursuant to a request made by Mr. Gearhart at page 276 of the record with respect to a search of the Navy Department files concerning any instructions relative to maintenance of radio silence in effect in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets at the time of Pearl Harbor, we have a detailed memorandum from Commander Baecher in this regard, dated February 19, 1946, which we ask be spread on the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be spread on the record at this point.
(The detailed memorandum referred to follows:)

[14066] 1083A
R#120

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 19 February 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. Pursuant to committee request, a search has been made to determine the conditions of radio silence in effect in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets at the time of Pearl Harbor.

A. ATLANTIC FLEET

In accordance with a directive issued by the CinC, Atlantic Fleet [CINCLANT Op-Plan No. 7-41, dated 1 September 1941, file A4-3(4)/(00164)] and under which the fleet began to operate about 1 October 1941, radio communication was prohibited except that which was authorized by the following portion of the directive:

(1) "To forward contact and important amplifying reports which it is impracticable to transmit by visual methods."

(2) "All traffic pertaining to operations in progress for which plans are being made, may be transmitted by radio if trans- [14067] mission by visual methods or mail are considered impracticable."

(3) "Information considered vital to the accomplishment of the task and of a greater importance than the preservation of communication security may be transmitted by radio to units not within visual communication."

B. PACIFIC FLEET

In accordance with CinCPac directives to individual Task Forces (for example, CinCPac dispatch 280447 of November 1941 to Task Forces TWO and EIGHT), the fleet was operating under Radio Condition 19 which prohibited radio communication except that which was authorized by the following:

(1) "To forward traffic vital to the accomplishment of an assigned task when no other means of transmission would suffice."

(2) "To make the limited transmissions necessary for a parent vessel to recover lost planes."

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER
Lt. Cmdr., USNR

[14068] 1083A
R120

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 2 April 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. By memorandum of 19 February 1946 (1083A R#120) information was forwarded you by the undersigned in respect of the conditions of radio activity and silence in effect in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, including that the Atlantic Fleet was operating under Op-Plan 7-41. In amplification of the information in that memorandum, it is desired to further advise you that Op-Plan 7-41 was placed in effect in the Atlantic Fleet at 1200 hours dated 10 December 1941.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

[14069] Mr. MORGAN. At page 299 and again at 780-2 of the transcript, Congressman Gearhart requested records relating to the transfer of ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic, or vice versa, from May to December 1941. This material was rather extensive and detailed, and for purposes of the record we would like to indicate that it was delivered to Congressman Gearhart on April 10, with the request that he advise as to what portions, if any, he desired incorporated in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. May I request the Chair that the aide to the military, the Army, furnish us with all logs kept in the Secretary's or Chief of Staff's office for the month of November and the first 7 days up until the 7th of December.

Mr. MASTEN. What kind of logs?

Senator FERGUSON. Any logs like we have seen here today.

Mr. MASTEN. Telephone operators?

Senator FERGUSON. Duty-officer logs and watch-officer logs. And I would like to have the Navy produce their logs for the same period.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The liaison officers will take note of the requests.¹ Proceed.

Mr. MORGAN. At page 7844 of the record, Congressman Murphy requested a copy of the order which stopped the formation of [14070] the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces after they had set up a command.

¹ See War Department communication on p. 5506, *infra*.

This information has been supplied by the Navy. For purposes of the record we would like to indicate that it was presented to Mr. Murphy on April 10, 1946, with the request that he indicate what portions he desired incorporated in the transcript.

At page 7940, Senator Ferguson requested identifying data concerning a message dated November 29, 1941, from the Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaii, which was read into the record at pages 7937-7938. This has been supplied in a communication dated January 22, 1946, from the Army liaison officer, Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe, which we ask be spread on the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be spread on the record.

(The communication referred to follows:)

[14071]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 22 January 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

The Office of the Adjutant General has supplied the following information concerning radio message No. 489, dated 29, November 1941, from the Adjutant General to the Commanding General, Hawaii:

a. "AG 381 (11-29-41) MC-E" in the upper right corner is the file notation for the message. "AG 381" is the designation for "Far Eastern Situation"; "(11-29-41)" is the date of the memorandum directing the preparation of the cable. "MC" shows that the cable was prepared in the Miscellaneous Division, Confidential Section of the Office of the Adjutant General. "E" indicates that the memorandum directing the preparation of the cable was issued by the War Plans Division.

b. "EHB/cdm-1712" shows that Elmer H. Boughton in the Miscellaneous Division, Secret and Confidential Section of the Adjutant General's Office was in charge of the physical preparation of the cable, that it was typed by Corrine D. Moss, and that the work was done in Room 1712 Munitions Building.

c. The signature is that of Colonel A. P. [14072] Sullivan, who at the time of the preparation of the cable was in charge of the Operations Branch, Adjutant General's Office.

d. The handwritten notation "No. 489" is the number assigned to the message by the War Department Message Center.

e. "BASED ON: WPD 4571-5, 11/29/41" in the lower left shows that the cable was prepared from a War Plans Division memorandum having the file number WPD 4571-5, of 29 November 1941.

f. The stamp "47 AGO DEC 8 1941 Received" in the lower right shows that this copy of the cable was received on 8 December 1941, by Classifier No. 47, in the mail room of the Office of the Adjutant General.

g. "File Dec 23 1941 BJS" in the lower right corner shows that the cable was received in the classified files of the Office of the Adjutant General on 23 December 1941; the initials are those of Betty J. Sherbourne.

h. "Green cy w/d & destroyed by burning, 12/30/41, CDM-1705" in the lower left shows that the green-paper duplicate copy of this cable retained by the Miscellaneous Division, Secret and Confidential Section of the Office of the Adjutant General was withdrawn and destroyed by burning on 30 December 1941. [14073] "CDM" are the initials of Corrine D. Moss, Room 1705 Munitions Building.

i. "Ro 1-6-42" in the lower left corner shows that this cable was indexed on 6 January 1942 by Rose Coccaro.

HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

[14074] Mr. MORGAN. Pursuant to a request made by Senator Ferguson at page 8531 of the transcript for information on the number of priority dispatches sent to Hawaii by the War Department on 7 December 1941, we have a communication, with enclosures from the War Department, dated 27 February 1946. We request that the letter of transmittal and enclosures be spread on the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN: The material will be so spread on the record.
(The material referred to follows:)

[14075]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, Room 4D757, The Pentagon, 27 February 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

In response to your 31 January memorandum forwarding Senator Ferguson's request for information on the number of priority dispatches sent to Hawaii by the War Department on 7 December 1941, and to Senator Ferguson's further inquiry (Tr. 8530-1) as to what priority messages were decoded in Hawaii before the 7 December Marshall warning, the following information is submitted:

a. In a search of the War Department records, file copies have been found of four radios to Hawaii, each marked "priority" and bearing the notation "Sent 12/7". Three (Nos. 524, 525 and 527) are dated 6 December; the fourth, No. 530, is dated the 7th.

b. No. 529, the Marshall warning, which was sent over commercial facilities, carried in its heading the notation "U. S. Govt", entitling it to priority in transmission in accordance with Western Union and RCA tariffs then in effect (Inclosure No. 1). Testimony concerning additional measures taken to expedite transmission of No. 529 appears at page 195 [14076] of the Army Pearl Harbor Board transcript and page 1843 of the Roberts Commission transcript.

c. No. 529 was received by RCA Honolulu at 7:33 a. m., delivered to the Signal Office, Fort Shafter, about 11:45 a. m., and decoded at 2:41 p. m. No records are available showing when the four messages mentioned in paragraph a were received and decoded in Hawaii. A delivery book of the Headquarters Hawaiian Department shows that the three, dated 6 December, were delivered (presumably after decoding) as follows: No. 524 at 7:25 p. m. on 6 December; No. 525 at 5:14 p. m. on 7 December, and No. 527 at 9:25 a. m. on 8 December, all Hawaiian time. The delivery book shows that No. 530 of the 7th was delivered at "1002A", probably on the 7th (messages entered in the delivery book immediately before and after No. 530 have "12-7-41" in the "date delivered" column; the date space for No. 530 contains initials rather than a date). If delivered at 10:02 a. m. on 7 December, No. 530 must have been decoded before the Marshall warning was decoded. It will be noted, however, that No. 530 could not have been decoded before the attack, since, according to the time stamp on the back of the War Department copy, No. 530 did not leave the War Department until sometime after 2:14 p. m. Washington time (8:44 a. m. Hawaiian time).

/s/ HARMON DUNCOMBE,

Lt. Colonel, GSC.

2 incls.

[14077]

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

Received at

DI 56 74/73 US GOVT

DI WASHN DC DEC 7 1941 1201 PM

CG

Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.

529 Seventh

(NOTE—Text omitted.)

1217 PM

MARSHALL.

[14078]

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in code

SECRET

1549WS WASHINGTON DC 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P

CG

Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.

529 7th JAPANESE ARE PRESENTING AT ONE PM EASTERN STANDARD TIME TODAY WHAT AMOUNTS TO AN ULTIMATUM ALSO THEY ARE UNDER ORDERS TO DESTROY THEIR CODE MACHINE IMMEDIATELY

5298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

STOP JUST WHAT SIGNIFICANCE THE HOUR SET MAY HAVE WE DO NOT KNOW BUT BE ON ALERT ACCORDINGLY STOP INFORM NAVAL AUTHORITIES OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

MARSHALL.

Received as a $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{SECRET} \\ \text{CONFIDENTIAL} \\ \text{RESTRICTED} \\ \text{Strike out two} \end{array} \right\}$ communication

Answer should be marked "Answer to Code Message No. 529 7IH"

Decoded by:

Lt. J. H. BABCOCK,
251P Dec. 7, 1941.

[14079]

THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY
TARIFF BOOK No. 73—1941

LONGRAMS are telegrams accepted at rates lower than telegram or serial rates as a deferred service subordinated to telegrams and serials in transmission and delivery. These messages are identified by the symbol "LG". The service is available between points in the United States only.

The rate for a **LONGRAM** of 100 words or less between points at which are located Western Union offices or agencies is twice the rate for a ten word telegram between the same points and an additional charge for each group of five words or less in excess of 100 words as indicated in the following table:

<i>Where the full telegram rate for 10 words is</i>	<i>A LONGRAM of 100 words or less costs¹</i>	<i>Each additional 5 words or less cost</i>
.20	.40	.02
.25	.50	.02
.30	.60	.03
.32	.64	.03
.36	.72	.03
.37	.74	.03
.40	.80	.04
.42	.84	.04
.48	.96	.04
.60	1.20	.05
.72	1.44	.06
.90	1.80	.08
1.20	2.40	.10

¹ LONGRAMS of 60 words or less take the lower day-letter rates.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MESSAGES

DEFINITION.

1. United States Government messages are those sent by duly accredited representatives of the Federal Government (this includes U. S. Senators and Congressmen) on official business of the Federal Government or its various bureaus and agencies and paid for out of Federal Government funds.

2. Such messages are identified by the symbol "GOVT." The messages of the U. S. Weather Bureau, while actually government messages, are classed separately as weather messages and are identified by the symbol "WEA."

CLASSES OF SERVICE.

3. Any of the following classes of service may be used for government messages:

Telegram
Day Letter
Overnight Telegram
Serial
Timed Wire Service

ACCEPTANCE OF MESSAGES.

4. Government messages have priority in transmission and delivery over all other messages of the same class of service.

5. All messages offered for transmission at government rates must be endorsed "Official Business" by the sender. The endorsement shall also include the sender's name and title and the name of the department, bureau, agency, etc. with which he is connected. Such messages not so identified will be charged for at commercial rates.

6. Messages offered by telephone for transmission at government rates will be accepted without prepayment of tolls if telephoned from a subscriber's telephone, but will not be accepted without prepayment of tolls from public telephone stations. The sender of such a message will be required to furnish his full name, title, and the name of the department, bureau or agency with which he is connected and to state that the message is on official government business.

7. Messages of United States Marshals and United States District Attorneys should not be sent "collect" to the Department of Justice at Washington, but should be prepaid by the senders. Other Government messages addressed to Washington, D. C. will be accepted "Collect."

COUNT OF GOVERNMENT MESSAGES.

8. Government messages will be counted at commercial count, address and signature free. Extra words, code signatures, etc., will be counted as in commercial messages.

CHECKS OF GOVERNMENT MESSAGES.

9. The check will show the designation "GOVT.," the number of words according to commercial count, and in the case of day letters, overnight telegrams, serial or timed wire service, the class of service designation.

10. Care should be taken to check all messages sent collect at government rates "Collect Govt." The omission of "Govt." in the check causes serious difficulties.

RATES

11. Government telegraph rates apply to official United States government business exclusively, and no private individual, association, company or corporation should in any way be benefited thereby. In cases where it becomes necessary for a government official to use the telegraph on any business in the special interest of any private person or persons, in which the government has no interest, the party for whom the service is performed will be required to pay for the messages both ways at commercial rates.

12. The this-line charges for government telegrams, day letters and overnight telegrams are 60% of the charges for the same messages at commercial rates.

13. The this-line charges for government serials and timed-wire-service messages are 80% of the charges for the same messages at commercial rates.

14. In calculating the charges on government messages, if the result shows a fraction of a cent, such fraction will be dropped if less than one-half and will be counted as an extra cent if one-half or over.

15. The following minimum charges apply to government messages between points where there are offices of the Company:

For an Intracity Telegram.....	\$0.20
For all other Telegrams.....	.25
For a Serial.....	.54
For a Timed-wire-service message.....	.45
For a Day Letter.....	.45
For an Overnight Telegram.....	.30

16. The government tolls must be computed on each separate message. It is not permissible to bill a series of government messages at commercial rates and then apply the government percentage to the total.

17. Except as indicated below, other-line charges to one-star points in the United States will be computed at sixty per cent (80% if serial or timed-wire-service) of the commercial other-line rates at commercial count with the same minimum charges as shown in paragraph 15.

18. Exception: On government messages to one-star points in Alabama listed via York; to one-star points in Arizona listed via Holbrook; to one-star points in

Texas listed via Laredo; to points in Minnesota listed as "30-2.5 more than Square 478, ck. Minneapolis"; to one-star points in Idaho listed via Weiser; to one-star points in Minnesota listed via Duluth; to one-star points in Georgia and North Carolina listed via Cornelia, Ga.; and to one-star points in Idaho and Montana listed via Armstead, Mont., the other-line tolls will be charged for at the full commercial other-line rate shown in the directory of stations.

19. To certain other one-star points government messages are carried by the other-line free or with a special rate. This is shown by special notation in connection with the listing of such one-star points.

20. On government messages going to two-star, three-star or four-star points the this-line rate will be at government rates, and the other-line rate will be the regular other-line rate shown in the directory of stations unless otherwise indicated in connection with the listing of the point in question.

21. In no case shall the rate charged for a government message exceed the amount charged for a commercial message of the same class of service and of the same length between the same points.

22. The rates for government messages between points in the United States and points in Canada, where there are offices of the Canadian National Telegraphs, and points in Newfoundland and Miquelon Island are shown in the table below. For rates to points in Canada other than those where there are offices of the Canadian National Telegraphs, and the other-line rates shown in the directory of stations to the rates computed from this table.

23. The rates for government messages between points in the United States and points in Alaska and Mexico are shown in the directory of stations with the listings for Alaska and Mexico respectively.

**F. C. C. NO. 15
6TH REVISED TITLE PAGE
(CANCELS 5TH REVISED TITLE PAGE)**

**[14081] R. C. A. COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
TELEGRAPH TARIFF**

FOREIGN RADIO-TELEGRAPH AND WIRE-TELEGRAPH RATES

FROM

Baltimore, Md.
Boston, Mass.
Camden, N. J.
Chicago, Ill.
Detroit, Mich.
Los Angeles, Cal.

New Orleans, La.
New York, N. Y.
Philadelphia, Pa.
San Francisco, Cal.
Seattle, Wash.
Washington, D. C.

TO

All Foreign Countries (Except Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Newfoundland and St. Pierre-Miquelon), Guam, Hawaiian Islands, Midway, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and to Ships at Sea

AND FROM

Honolulu, T. H. and San Juan, P. R.

TO

All Countries, Including Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Newfoundland and St. Pierre-Miquelon and to Ships at Sea Applicable to All Classifications of Service Shown Herein and Subject to Rules and Regulations Shown Herein

Transmission by Radio-Telegraph or Wire-Telegraph or a Combination Thereof

Issuing Date: Feb. 28, 1940.

Issuing Officer: C. Sandbach, Manager Tariff Bureau, 66 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.

Effective Date: April 1, 1940 except as otherwise indicated. Original tariff effective February 1, 1936.

F. C. C. NO. 15
1ST REVISED PAGE NO. 10B
(CANCELS ORIGINAL PAGE NO 10B)

[14082] R. C. A. COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

The sender of an Ordinary Press telegram must write before the address the indicator "PRESSE" which is counted and charged for as one word. Ordinary Press telegrams take equal rank in transmission with ordinary Full Rate and CDE telegrams.

Press telegrams may, if the sender desires, be sent as Urgent Press telegrams. The sender of such a telegram must write before the address the indicator "URGENT PRESSE" which is counted and charged for as two words. Urgent Press telegrams take equal rank in transmission with regular URGENT and CDE URGENT telegrams.

To certain countries a Deferred Press service is also available. The sender of a Deferred Press telegram must write before the address the indicator "LCPS" which is counted and charged for as one word. Deferred Press telegrams take equal rank in transmission with regular Deferred telegrams.

The supplementary services, Reply Paid (RP), Collation (TC), Notification of Delivery (PC or PCP) are not admitted in Press telegrams.

(f) Government Telegrams

Government telegrams must be properly endorsed to the effect that they are on official business of the Government in whose behalf they are sent.

The telegrams of consular agents carrying on private business are only regarded as Government telegrams when they are addressed to an official person and relate to official matters.

Government telegrams are given priority of transmission over all other classes of telegrams, except telegrams relating to safety of life at sea or in the air, unless they are filed as Deferred rate, or Radioletter rate, or unless the sender renounces the priority privilege at the time of filing.

Government telegrams are repeated back by the receiving office at each stage of their transmission.

Unless special reduced Government rates are in effect, Government telegrams are charged the Full Rate or CDE rate according to the language in which they are written.

Issuing date: April 8, 1941

Issuing Officer:

C. Sandbach, Manager Tariff Bureau.

66 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.

Effective date: May 12, 1941

[14083]

SECRET

TELEGRAM

Official Business—Government Rates

From: War Department

Bureau: OCSigO, Signal Intelligence Service

R. W. Minckler

R. W. MINCKLER, Lt. Col., Signal Corps

PRIORITY—SECRET

DECEMBER 7, 1941.

734 SIGNALS MANILA, PI.

530—FORT SHAFTER, TH.

403—PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

SEND TO WAR BY PRIORITY ENCIPHERED RADIO ALL JAPANESE CLEAR MESSAGES ENDING WITH ENGLISH WORD QUOTE STOP UNQUOTE SPELLED REPEAT QUOTE STOP UNQUOTE SPELLED COPIED SINCE NOVEMBER TWENTYSEVEN AND HEREAFTER

COLTON, Acting.

SENT NO. 734 to Manila, 12/7

SENT NO. 530 to Hawaii, 12/7

SENT NO. 403 to Pres of S. I., 12/7

[Stamped on reverse side:] Code Section. W. D. M. C. 1941 Dec. 7 PM 2:14.

5302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[14084] Mr. MORGAN. Pursuant to a request of Senator Ferguson at pages 8579-80 of the transcript we have the following communication from the Army liaison officer, dated February 21, 1946:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 21 February 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson.

At pages 8579-80 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked what the radar stations at New York City, San Francisco, and Seattle were doing on 6 and 7 December 1941, and whether they were alerted and operating 24 hours a day.

In response to Senator Ferguson's request, there are transmitted herewith:

- (1) a paraphrase of a 31 January 1946 radio from the Commanding General Eastern Defense Command (Inclosure No. 1);
- (2) an 8 February 1946 memorandum from the Commanding Officer of the Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, Bradley Beach, New Jersey (Inclosure No. 2);
- (3) an 18 February 1946 memorandum from the Headquarters First Air Force (Inclosure No. 3);
- (4) a 4 February 1946 radio from the Commanding General of the Fourth Air Force (Inclosure No. 4).

Incls.—4

(Signed) HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lieutenant Colonel, GSO.

We would like to have these inclosures spread on the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They will be spread on the record.
(The inclosures referred to follow:)

[14085]

RADIO FROM COMMANDING GENERAL EASTERN DEFENSE COMMAND TO WAR
DEPARTMENT, DATED 31 JANUARY 1946

(Paraphrase)

On 6 and 7 December Twin Lights, Atlantic Highlands, N. J. (radar equipment not stated) and SCR 270 at Mount Cadillac, Maine were operated by First Interceptor Command 24 hours a day. Foregoing from 1st Air Force historical records. Officer this command, then Arty Eng Ft. Hancock, informally advises that in December SCR-268 sets operated in secret area Ft. Hancock.

ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
HEADQUARTERS, SIGNAL CORPS ENGINEERING LABORATORIES,
Bradley Beach, New Jersey, 8 February 1946.

Refer to: SPSGS-CO

Memorandum for: Major General G. L. Van Deusen, Chief, Engineering and Technical Service.

Subject: Telephone Request of Captain Carl R. Nelson.

1. These Laboratories are in receipt of a request for information concerning radar operation on the dates of 6 and 7 December 1941. This information was requested by Capt. Carl R. Nelson, Legislative and Liaison Division, War Department Special Staff, Room 4D761, the Pentagon (Ext. 71470).

[14086] 2. As nearly as may be ascertained from a survey of files currently available at this organization, and from discussion with individuals who were present during December 1941, there were no radar sets in tactical operation manned by employees of Signal Corps Radar Laboratory, presently part of Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories. During the month of December 1941, there were in operation by this organization, one SCR-271 at Twin Lights, Atlantic Highlands, N. J., one SCR-271 at Atlantic City, N. J., an experimental 400 mc unit in the vicinity of Fort Hancock, plus a number of sets which were in varying stages of assembly. All of these equipments were being run only for technical observation, such as: life test of components, performance test of newly assembled equipments, and experimental work on new designs. Data from these tests would be in statistical form only and would not include dates of operation or times of day operated. Accordingly, it is not known what equipments under

control of this organization were in actual operation on the specific dates of 6 and 7 December 1941.

3. Based purely on the memory of individuals present during that period, it appears that some Radar Sets SCR-270 were in operation in Long Island by the First Signal Air Warning Company and some Radar Sets SCR-268 were in operation by Coast Artillery personnel of Fort Hancock. Since there is no organizational tie between these organizations and the [14087] Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, there is no detailed information available here on location, method, or times of operation of this equipment.

4. It is requested that if you see no objection to the above it be forwarded to Capt. Nelson.

/s/ Victor A. Conrad
VICTOR A. CONRAD,
Colonel, Signal Corps,
Commanding.

In Reply Refer To: J 413.44

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST AIR FORCE,
Mitchel Field, New York, 18 February 1946.

Subject: Photostatic Copy of Logs of Radar Sets in Operation on 6 and 7 December 1941

To: War Department Special Staff, Room 4D761, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. (Attention: Capt. C. R. Nelson)

In accordance with letter of Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command, dated 5 February 1946, above subject, to forward copies of radar logs of radar sets operating in the New York area during 6-7 December 1941, a search was made of records. An SCR-271A set was operated at sites 8A on [14088] dates in question by 1st Air Warning Company (SC) as a training measure. Existing records fail to reveal these logs. It is assumed these records were destroyed along with other confidential material due to lack of storage space and no apparent need for preservation by the New York Air Defense Wing prior to its deactivation.

For the Commanding General:

RAYNOR GAREY,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

WAR DEPARTMENT

Classified Message Center

INCOMING CLEAR MESSAGE

From: CG, 4th Air Force, San Francisco, California

To: War Department

No: 4 AF 6 E 293 4 February 1946

From Hale CG 4th AF to WDGS attn OPD Wash DC 4AF 6 E 293 ref yr WCL 43319

No radar stations were in operation in Seattle area on 6 and 7 December 1941. Stations in San Francisco area were operating during daylight hours on 6 and 7 December but only for testing and calibration in preparation for a proposed maneuver. No stations were alerted prior to 1400 7 December 1941.

End
[14089] Action: OPD

Info: L & L Div

MC IN 53328 (6 Feb. 46) DTG 042835Z mec

[14090] Mr. MORGAN. Pursuant to a request of Senator Ferguson at page 9550 of the transcript for a copy of a letter written by Admiral Nimitz, then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, dated 25 November 1941, we have now been supplied by the Navy Department a copy of this letter, which we ask to have spread on the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be spread on the record.
(The letter referred to follows:)

[14091] Nav-1-MM
Confidential

NOVEMBER 25, 1941.

MY DEAR KIMMEL: I am enclosing a memorandum which will give you a pretty clear picture of what we are doing in connection with Radar instruction.

This, as you know, is highly important and while we have been working at it for sometime, we have been handicapped by the inability to obtain any Radar material. That is coming along now and we are pushing these schools as fast as possible.

From a morale point of view, we felt that it would be most desirable to take radiomen second class and give them this training, but in view of your strong protest, we are endeavoring to obtain recruits having basic knowledge of electronics. The field has been pretty well combed over by Army, Navy, and British agencies and it is impossible to get men with the necessary qualifications to enlist as seamen second class. We are therefore taking them in as second class petty officers and will send them to the Fleet as first class or chief petty officers. They will be specialists in their particular line and while they will have had no previous seagoing experience, I hope they will be found satisfactory. For such specialists we are creating a new rating as specialist third class, second class, first class, or chief specialist, so as to reduce the discontent that would otherwise be felt by petty officers of long standing at sea if men who have had no seagoing experience were placed over their heads as would undoubtedly have been the case if we would send them out as radiomen first class or chief radiomen.

We are constantly keeping your needs in mind and endeavoring to do everything possible to fill up the Fleet, but we do have problems that are most difficult for solution. With the expanding Navy, our recruiting is not producing sufficient men and we have asked for language in the supplementary appropriation for 1942 and in the appropriation bill for 1943 to utilize men from Selective Service. We had to come to this, but men must be obtained and if we cannot get them by straight recruiting, we will have to go to Selective Service for they have to be produced. The Pacific Fleet, I think, is in many ways fortunate. The percentage of men is greater than in the Atlantic which, at present, is engaged in active operations, and the number of Reserves in the Atlantic Fleet is considerably greater than in the Pacific.

With kindest regards and best wishes to you, I am,

Most sincerely,

[C. W. NIMITZ, *Admiral*]

ADMIRAL H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, U. S. S. Pennsylvania,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

[14092] Mr. MORGAN. In accordance with a request of Senator Lucas, at page 9917 of the transcript, with respect to a false weather message, we have a communication from the Navy liaison officer, dated February 6, 1946, which we ask be spread on the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be spread on the record.

(The communication referred to follows:)

[14093] "Winds"

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 6 February 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. On 4 February 1946 Senator Lucas made a query as to a false weather message (Transcript Page 9917). These were two messages intercepted on 4 and 5 December 1941 by the Federal Communications Commission at approximately 2200 GMT and 2130 GMT respectively.

2. These messages were in NCI Exhibit #65 and the full text of each can be found in the Narrative Statement, Volume II, Page 550 and Pages 573-574. Confirmation of the transmittal of these messages by the Federal Communications Commission to the Navy 20-G Watch Officer may be found in the Federal Communications Commission watch log which is Exhibit 142A in the present investigation.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHE,
Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R.

[14094] Mr. MORGAN. At page 12996 of the transcript, Congressman Murphy requested that there be incorporated in the record information concerning the organization of lend-lease. We now have a detailed letter from Chester T. Lane, Deputy Commissioner, Office of Foreign Liquidation Commission, Department of State, which we would like to have spread on the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be spread on the record.
(The letter referred to follows:)

[14095]

OFFICE OF FOREIGN LIQUIDATION COMMISSIONER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

Room 506, 1818 "H" Street, NW

Mr. SETH W. RICHARDSON,

General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: 1. This is in reply to your letter dated March 6, 1946, addressed to Mr. Benno C. Schmidt, General Counsel of this Office, requesting a statement, for insertion in the record of the Committee's proceedings, "as to the organization which was set up by this Government (i. e. the United States) for the purpose of determining what distribution should be made under lend-lease and what officials were responsible for such distribution". It is apparent from your letter that our reply may generally be limited to the method of allocating military equipment rather than the method of determining the distribution of non-military items, such as raw materials and supplies for civilian consumption.

2. On December 6, 1939, the President appointed an informal inter-departmental committee for the coordination of foreign and domestic military procurement which became known as the President's Liaison Committee. This Committee functioned as the coordinating body for all foreign military procurement in the United States until it was abolished in April 1941 after passage of the Lend-Lease Act. The membership of this Committee consisted of Rear Admiral Ray Spear, [14096] Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, representing the Navy, Major General James H. Burns, representing the Army, and Mr. Philip Young, representing the Treasury Department. All early requests for lend-lease aid were channeled through this Committee to the appropriate agency of the Government for actual procurement and transfer of defense articles.

3. On May 2, 1941, the Division of Defense Aid Reports in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President was established by Executive Order. The President appointed Major General James H. Burns as Executive Officer of the Division. The Division of Defense Aid Reports was established to provide for the effective administration of the Lend-Lease Act. This Division succeeded the President's Liaison Committee as the channel through which requests for lend-lease aid were forwarded to the procuring agencies.

4. By Executive Order dated October 28, 1941, the President established the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, and transferred to this Administration all the functions previously vested in the Division of Defense Aid Reports and most of the powers conferred on the President by the Lend-Lease Act. Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. was appointed Administrator, a position which he retained throughout the period with which this letter is concerned.

[14097] 5. Military supplies transferred under the Lend-Lease Act prior to Pearl Harbor may be divided into three categories:

(a) equipment procured by the War and Navy Department with funds appropriated prior to March 11, 1941 (a limit of \$1,300,000,000 was placed by the Lend-Lease Act on the value of material transferred out of this category);

(b) equipment in the possession of the Army or Navy, but procured with funds appropriated after March 11, 1941;

(c) equipment procured with funds appropriated to the President for lend-lease purposes, under U. S. contracts placed with suppliers directly in response to requests submitted by foreign governments.

Section 3 (a) (2) of the Lend-Lease Act provides that the equipment described in (a) and (b) above could be transferred to foreign governments only after

consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy. Most of the pre-Pearl Harbor lend-lease transfers were in category (a), and all transfers in that category were personally approved by the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations. Procurement of defense articles covered by (c) above, was effected by means of requests filed with one of the agencies described in [14098] paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above. After approval by one of these agencies, procurement was subject to priorities and controls established by the Office of Production Management, which operated in consultation with the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

6. There was created in the War Department by order of the Secretary of War of April 8, 1941, a Defense Aid Division of the Office of the Undersecretary. This Division was responsible for coordinating and maintaining records on the lend-lease operations of the War Department. The officers in charge of the work of this Division were Colonel Henry S. Aurand, Lt. Col. Edward E. MacMorland and Major John H. Franks. Army Air Force lend-lease activities were under the direction of Lt. Col. Benjamin Meyers. In the Navy, Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, Liaison Officer for the Secretary of the Navy on lend-lease matters, and Rear Admiral Ray Spear, Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, were chiefly concerned with lend-lease operations. The requests of the foreign governments for military supplies, which were first submitted for approval to the agencies described in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this letter, were routed to these officers in the War and Navy Departments for allocation and procurement of such supplies.

7. A special committee handled allocations of aircraft during the period under discussion, known as the Joint [14099] Aircraft Committee, with membership consisting of General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces, Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, two representatives of the Office of Production Management, a representative of the President's Liaison Committee and representatives of the British Air Commission. This Committee controlled the allocation of all aircraft production in the United States prior to Pearl Harbor. The presence of General Arnold and Admiral Towers on this Board assured that no other governments would be allocated any aircraft which in the view of our military authorities was more urgently needed by our own forces.

8. I trust that this explanation will be found to be a satisfactory description of the procedure followed in allocating lend-lease military supplies prior to December 7, 1941. The period in which you are interested was during the formative stages of these operations when the assignment machinery as it ultimately developed was not entirely in operation. However, I believe that it is evident that at all times the allocation of military supplies was subject to the approval of the high officers of the Army and Navy, and this fully safeguarded the interests of the United States Army and Navy in the distribution of valuable equipment.

Very truly yours,

/s/ CHESTER T. LANE,
Deputy Commissioner.

[14100] Mr. MORGAN. We have a series of communications from Admiral Noyes, Mr. Sonnett, former Secretary Hull, Captain Kramer, and Captain McCollum, with respect to certain corrections they would like to have indicated in their testimony.

We would like to have these communications placed in the record at this point.

(The communications referred to follow:)

[14101]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY,
Washington 25, D. C., 25 February 1946.

Memorandum for Counsel, Joint Pearl Harbor Inquiry Committee.

Enclosure: (A) List of Typographical Errors Found in Record of Proceedings, Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack.

In reading over my testimony I noted that I failed to bring out the following point, which, however, is supported by my previous testimony and by documentary evidence.

In connection with the alleged telephone conversation with me on 5 December to which Colonel Sadtler testified and which I did not recall in that form:

On 5 December there was received by the Navy Department the message from Colonel Thorpe in Batavia addressed to General Miles in the War Department. This message was transmitted by the *Naval Attache* to *Navy Department* for delivery to General Miles. As I have already testified, the subject matter was under discussion between me and the War Department during that day. It is very probable that I would have called Colonel Sadtler and notified him of the fact that this message had been received and was being delivered to the War Department [14102] for General Miles on account of its importance. Since discussion took place between me and the War Department during that day on the subject matter of this message and the War Department recommended that we should make no change in our original translation of the setup of the Winds Code (see previous testimony), it would appear that any possible authentic or false execute of the winds message would have also been discussed and settled during that day.

Very respectfully yours,

/s/ Leigh Noyes,
LEIGH NOYES,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Enclosure A

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY,
Washington 25, D. C., 25 February 1946.

Memorandum for Lieut. Comdr. Baecher, USNR.

Subject: Corrections in Report of Proceedings, Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack—testimony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy.¹

1. The following is a list of corrections to be made [14103] in the testimony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy:

- Page 12,559—line 18: Change Bidell to Biddle.
- Page 12,559—line 25: change to read, "Chief of Staff to Commander".
- Page 12,560—line 15: change to read, "No, September 1944, in San Francisco."
- Page 12,561—line 10: change to read, "what I do now."
- Page 12,562—line 1: Witness Noyes.
- Page 12,564—lines 13, 14: strike out, "Who acted in my place" insert "or".
- Page 12,568—line 18: change to read, "they could not decipher the diplomatic traffic and send it all to Honolulu."
- Page 12,571—lines 13, 14: strike out, "or by ML the important ones."
- Page 12,574—line 14: "Inkling."
- Page 12,580—line 12: change "words" to "worries".
- Page 12,581—line 19: change to read, "knew what the rules were."
- Page 12,586—lines 20, 21: change to read, "Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff to the Commanding General."
- Page 12,592—lines 21, 22: change to read, "Naval Communications."
- Page 12,595—lines 20; change to read, "several booklets and the Chief of Naval Communications."
- [14104] Page 12,598—line 7: change to read, "I do now".
- Page 12,603—line 9: change "mine" to "mind".
- Page 12,614—line 6: change "present" to "presented".
- Page 12,615—line 9: change to read, "Safford said".
- Page 12,625—line 19: change to read, "I believe a reference to forty-six words".
- Page 12,643—line 14: change to read, "and it was some time after I got back."
- Page 12,686—line 15: change to read, "information to the Naval Attaches."
- Page 12,687—line 24: change to read, "At the time when Italy came into the war, which".
- Page 12,688—line 14: change "by" to "but".
- Page 12,689—line 21: change "warning" to "morning".
- Page 12,710—line 6: change "technical" to "tactical".
- Page 12,711—line 21: change "Canada" to "Japanese".
- Page 12,729—line 1: strike out, "and I supposed the record was supposed to bear on subsequent events".
- Page 12,735—line 23: change "execute" to "setup".

/s/ Leigh Noyes,
LEIGH NOYES,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Enclosure B.

¹Adm. Noyes' testimony appears in Hearings, Part 10, pp. 4710-4792.

5308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[14105]

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, February 27, 1946.

SETH W. RICHARDSON, Esquire

*General Counsel for the Joint Committee on the Investigation
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: The Navy Department has made available to me Volumes 66 and 67 of the transcript before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, which contain my testimony along with the testimony of various other witnesses.

In examining the transcript of my testimony I have noted a number of minor typographical and grammatical errors, which I have indicated on the transcript, and respectfully request be corrected.

Very truly yours,

/s/ John Sonnett,
JOHN F. SONNETT.²

Enclosure A.

[14106] The following is a list of corrections to be made in the testimony of John F. Sonnett:

Page 13,330—line 25—add "of Justice" after "Department"

Page 13,331—line 6—add "a" after "was"

Page 13,331—line 17—change "investigate" to "review"

Page 13,331—line 20—add "and in general" after "tion"

Page 13,331—line 22—change "was was" to "as might be"

Page 13,332—line 5—change "1944" to "1945"

Page 13,332—line 16—add "in the Navy" after "where"

Page 13,333—line 13—change "at tempt" to "attempt"

Page 13,334—line 16—change "t en" to "then"

Page 13,335—line 6—change "is" to "was"

Page 13,335—line 6—add "This was in" after "crazy."

Page 13,335—line 7—add "and" after "document"

Page 13,336—line 20—change "Navy" to "Navy,"

Page 13,351—line 6—change "lation," to "lations,"

Page 13,351—line 13—change "S. Correa" to "F. Correa"

Page 13,353—line 9—change "civil" to "civilian"

Page 13,353—line 13—change "civil" to "civilian"

Page 13,358—line 16—change "be" to "be,"

Page 13,359—line 9—change "the Navy" to "Naval matters"

Page 13,362—line 11—strike out "which I have mentioned"

Page 13,366—line 3—strike out "which"

[14107] Page 13,366—line 4—change "so were set" to "and were so set"

Page 13,369—line 25—change "Reports" to "Report"

Enclosure B

[14108]

CORDELL HULL

Wardman Park, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: It will be appreciated if you will cause the following corrections to be made in my testimony as it appears in the transcript of the Pearl Harbor hearings:

Volume 9, page 1460

Line 5: "Explore" should read "expose".

Line 8: "Money" should read "cotton".

Volume 9, page 1470

Line 9: Omit "and for 90 days".

Volume 10, page 1594

In reference to the first sentence of my reply to the Vice Chairman's question I find, upon careful rechecking of the time, that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor occurred at 1:20 p. m., Washington time, so that the telephone message from the White House must have occurred shortly after 1:20, at which time the appointment to see the Japanese Ambassador had already been postponed upon the Ambassador's request to 1:45 p. m.

² Mr. Sonnett's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 10, pp. 5009-5027.

Volume 10, page 1612

In reference to Senator Lucas' question beginning at line 5, to which I replied, "No," I had in mind the question whether the Army Board had conferred orally with me on this point. As to correspondence, the Secretary of War in a letter [14109] dated September 14, 1944, reciting that it was at the instance of the Army Board, asked me as to the truth or falsity of an allegation that an ultimatum had been delivered to Japan on November 26, 1941. I replied in a letter dated September 28, 1944, stating that my communication to the Japanese representatives on November 26 was in no sense an ultimatum. I added that if I could further assist the Board in its investigation I would be glad to do so. The correspondence was made public by the State Department on August 30, 1945.

Volume 10, page 1614

Line 4: Enclose in quotation marks, "poor, innocent, peace-minded".

Sincerely yours,

/s/ CORDELL HULL¹

The Honorable SETH W. RICHARDSON,

General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States.

[14110]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 11 March 1946.

Memorandum to: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. Forwarded herewith is a letter of Captain Alwin D. Kramer, U. S. Navy, requesting corrections in the reporter's transcript of his testimony before the Joint Committee.

/s/ John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 8 Mar. 1946.

Mr. SETH W. RICHARDSON,

Chief Counsel, Congressional Committee Investigating the Attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: At the request of the reporters, I have checked the transcript of my testimony before the Congressional Committee, [14111] and request that the corrections listed on the attached pages be made in the record.

Very respectfully,

/s/ A. D. Kramer,
A. D. KRAMER,²
Captain, U. S. Navy.

Italics indicates error or omission.

Volume 55, of 6 February 1946

Page Line

Change

10432 19 After "San Diego in" add "1935 and".

433 16 "area" should be "Arear".

435 20 should read "known as OP-20-GZ, OP-20-G being" etc.

436 18 should read "until 9 or 10 or 11" etc.

441 2 "knowledge of"

444 4 & 5 Word after "indicating" should be "punctuation." Text should therefore read: "three letter code groups, indicating punctuation of various kinds."

445 25 "stronger in language".

¹ Mr. Hull's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 2, pp. 403-457, 551-560, and 605-615.

² Captain Kramer's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 8, pp. 3893-3927; and Part 9, pp. 3930-4221.

5310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- 450 8 "believe *at*".
- 451 20 After "folder" add ", i. e. (close quotes).
- 454 21 Should read: "features *required* in handling".
- 462 24 Put a period after "Fort Myer".
- 464 17 Should read "heading *only, and to*".
- 22 Should read "this code *message, because*".
- [14112] 467 17 "between "*him*", Mr. Hull", etc.
- 470 19 "about *to leave*".
- 20 Change to "*plain* language Japanese *message*."
- 21 Change to "that carried".
- 471 9 & 10 Should read "(blank) country, (*name to be inserted*) was not in accordance with expectations".
- 11 Should read "yeoman the sense".
- 10472 6 Change "days" to "months".
- 477 20 Insert comma after "interruptions".
- 478 22 Change "quarters" to "country".
- 484 20 Should read "supplements to that, *four or five in*."
- 488 8 Change "Russian" to "Russia".
- 489 22 Comma after "before".
- 489 23 Read "there was *effected at* about".
- 10498 20 Read "message of 7 December".
- 510 13 Read "the GY *section* for".
- 513 14 Read "Yes, sir, *if* I can finish, etc.

Volume 56, of 7 February 1946

- 10524 8 Change "text" to "technique".
- 12 Read "cancelled".
- 526 17 Read "so indicated".
- 536 3 Read "machine. *My* presumption."
- 552 24 Read "called for by".
- 553 4 Read "execute"
- [14113] 555 5 Read "reference to England. *Things* more emphatic" etc.
- 7 Read "been. *That* is the scheme" etc.
- 10 Read "Thailand *with* Japan. We knew" etc.
- 558 17 "*This*".
- 18 Read "*indication*".
- 21 Comma after "Germans".
- 568 6 "*Romaft*."
- 572 9 Comma after "messages".
- 583 25 "alone".
- 584 6 Read "running to 12 and 15 *feet* in length", etc.
- 16 Read "news broadcast".
- 10605 25 Should read "originating an encoded or enciphered message", etc.
- 606 23 Should read "in a Division of Naval Operations" etc.
- 611 13 "subsist out" should be quoted.
- 618 5 Read "from Alusna, Batavia".
- 625 25 Should read "riji yori no tugoo aru ni tuki".
- 627 7 Read "the code indicator "STOP"."
- 635 19 Read "call KANA Morse," etc.
- 654 5 & 6 Read "intercept *net* and" etc.
- [14114] 660 7 Read "designated as J-12, in my" etc.
- 586 16 & 17 Read "messages 901 to 910".
- 589 8 Put the word "beginning" in quotes.
- 593 11 Should read "That is, presumably *other codes intended* for distribution."
- 662 7 Read "The *JD* number" etc.
- 664 10 Read "which I might characterize" etc.
- 690 9 Read "impression *on* that point."
- 694 22 Should read "Captain Kramer: That is" etc.
- 706 25 Omit comma.
- 710 5 Read "particularly certain" etc.
- 716 19 Omit "must as".

Volume 57, of 8 February 1946

- 10728 16 "shirts" should read "shifts".
 730 14 Should read "broadcast, one of", etc.
 731 9 Read "impression of irritation" etc.
 733 24 Change "should" to "shall".
 735 2 Read "number *for*" etc.
 4 Read "last night, *and* there" etc.
 736 2 & 3 Read "during the war in interrogation", etc.
 7 & 8 Read "corresponds in Japan to our Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the months preceding Pearl Harbor."
 743 12 Add "*of the*" at end of line.
 746 21 Read "inserted".
 747 17 Insert comma after "down".
 748 6 Omit "and now" to read "at the time presumed".
 755 25 Change "was" to "were".
 775 20 Change "day" to "say".
 789 2 Change to "negotiations, *but*" etc.
 [14115] 780 12 Read "other than that I knew that the Naval" etc.
 794 3 Read "approximately 8:15," etc.
 809 3 Change "sited" to "sighted".
 5 Read "contact with *it*, special" etc.
 809 25 Read "Intelligence, deals, perhaps 90 percent *is more accurate, is of any-*
 810 2 thing but a positive nature."
 814 20 Change "At" to "*—was the arrival*" etc.
 816 12 Change "he" to "we".
 837 3 Change "no" to "not".
 837 13 Read "Pearl Harbor *at*" etc.
 838 14 Extend answer to read: "I did, yes, sir, but the matter of the time of crew's mess, and of the number of ship's personnel above or below decks were simply part of the factors in my mind when I was remarking on 7:30 Sunday morning being the quietest time of the week. These factors were not stated, however, in my present best recollection."
 844 2 Read "refresh my memory *on that point*. I do not" etc.
 847 7 Change "characters" to "character".
 848 20 Change "hearings" to "hearing".
 875 2 Read "the Japanese word '*KORYAKU*', which means" etc.
 18 Read "Alusna, Batavia".
 [14116] 877 24 Omit comma after "at least".
 879 18 Change "Javorach" to "Jabberwock".
 888 17, 18 & 19 Should read: "translation of the Japanese *version*, which, in the light of seeing the work sheet just a few days ago I believe reads: NIHON TO TO NO KANKEI KITAI NI HAN SU".
 904 12 Read "through 1941, the only" etc.
 907 13 Expand to read: "Yes, sir, the original letter."
 912 17 Read "*made by me* only".
 919 22 Insert comma after "questions".
 927 6, 7, & 9 Change "Wilkinson" to "Kimmel" on these 3 lines.
 931 14 Read "and no reply to *it*".
 937 4 Read "impose *on any friendships*" etc.
 23 Read "what I already had. Not to" etc.

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- 10960 8 Read "Greenwich *Mean Time*, yes, sir".
 961 19 Read "Those *trips*, however," etc.
 984 7 Change "confirmation" to "consummation".
 10 Change "know" to "knew".
 990 23 Read "between about 8:15 and 9:30, at" etc.
 996 23 Read "Pearl Harbor than" etc.
 997 2 & 3 Read "with Admiral Kimmel's request" etc.
 9 Read "hoped that it would *not* be" etc.
 11006 25 Read "numerous".

5312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- [14117] 11008 7 Add comma after "Sunday".
 010 8 Read "gotten up to it", etc.
 012 17 Read "Have no information" etc.
 018 2 Read "him *only* rarely" etc.
 18 Read "understanding" etc.
 016 11 Read "Thank you. I *hope* I don't" etc.

NOTE: The following corrections on pages 11,020 and 11,021 apply to the page numbers as corrected by the Official Reporters in their note of 10 Feb. 1946.

- 11020 2 Read "Communications. When" etc.
 021 5 Read "—by the watch officer" etc.
 027 25 Read "A." "On receipt of" etc.
 031 9 Read "who presumably would get it".
 20 & 21 Read "East Wind, Rain" *meaning* United States;
 "West Wind, Clear" *meaning* England;
 "North Wind, Cloudy" *meaning* Russia.
 051 10 & 11 Change capital to small "i" in the word "Investigation" on both lines.
 11052 8 & 9 Read "It was only, incidentally, in" etc.
 053 12 Read "and which was subsequently" etc.
 077 22 Read "by comparison *with* days" etc.
 078 21 Read "amounted to perhaps 100 feet" etc.
 097 22 & 23 The statement: "Senator Barkley informed me of that proposal" should appear as a remark of Senator Brewster rather than of the Vice Chairman.
 [14118] 098 14 & 15 Insert to read "Yes, using the touch system. I have never" etc.
 104 8 Read "Colonel Bales" etc.

Volume 59, of 11 February 1946

- 11117 10 & 11 Read "classified papers, reading from this: (brown wrapping paper)", originated" etc.
 119 18 Read "the questions".
 121 19 Read "I therefore feel it" etc.
 127 8 Read "before *that* hearing" etc.
 129 4 Read "Will show him these *later*."
 131 22 Read "for the past month because" etc.
 23 Read "they consist" etc.
 133 8, 9, 10, 11 Rearrange to read: "read these papers from mid-day 1944 to this moment, other than to glance at the headings or first paragraphs of each on certain days and times last December" etc.
 134 22 Read "It was *her* I was about" etc.
 137 22 Read "teletype. Station 2 was" etc.
 24 Read "by Army and retained" etc.
 138 5 Read "except possibly Christmas" etc.
 142 4 Read "for periods varying" etc.
 147 20 Read "I most certainly" etc.
 160 12 to 17 Repunctuate to read: "I recollect that this was interpreted, I am uncertain of the precise wording of the interpretation, this was considered [14119] and I believe it was approximately my consideration at the time, as being an attempt" etc.
 11160 23 Read "Diplomatic posts were" etc.
 25 Read "were usually *pared*," etc.
 165 6 to 9 Read "the Japanese shoehorned, if I may use that term, *military men* into the delegation conducting those negotiations. The Ambassador, or Special Envoy, as I recall it, was named Yoshizawa."
 165 17 Read "In Panama and in *all* parts of" etc.
 170 6 & 7 Read "who, when I was speaking to him, was about ten or fifteen feet away from the conference table, and just outside the closed door of the room, Mr. Hull's office, where the three secretaries were conferring."

- 170 21 Read "because the names associated with each other in my mind."
 172 15 Insert comma after "officials".
 177 14 Read "Lasswell, Commander Roenick," etc.
 181 23 Change "Halsey" to "I".
 188 13 Read "testified to,"
 18 Read "engagement, which I previously testified to, at" etc.
 188 4 Read "That is Greenwich Meridian Time, is it?"
 202 14 Change "code developed" to "word developed" etc.
 17 Read "has" "1, 10, 12, 2X, P, S, G, MIS, BE. B". What is that?"
 [14120] 11202 19 & Read "Pound sign. "AF, X, Y, MONO". Is that correct?"
 204 25-- Read "we actually never used it, sir".
 205 9&10-- Read "'B", "BE" not used. "B" OP-16-B, I think. What is that?"
 17-- Read "'AF". CinCAF, Asiatic Fleet. "X" 20-GL--".
 207 12,13 Read "'Tokyo to Honolulu, 24 September," that being the originator's date; originator's message "number 83", and an asterisk meaning "an interesting message".
 208 16-- Read "would see exhibit 2," etc.
 212 18-- Read "gists were" etc.
 213 12-- Change "Talk" to "Take".
 215 17& Read "footnote says: "JD-1; 6944". "I relayed"" etc.
 18--
 217 7-- Read "that latter".
 250 12-- Read "'No", is a postposition identical" etc.
 16-- Read "mean" for "means".
 258 25-- Read "There you have 4".
 4-- Change "12-41" to read: "12-4-41".
 259 10-- Read "4 or 5 December dates".
 11-- Read "dividing" etc.
 261 24-- Read "Nos. 7152 to 7184 run chronologically" etc.
 262 23-- Change "fact." to "facts."
 263 13-- Read "testified, and those shown" etc.
 [14121] 267 4-- Read "simply to give Admiral Halsey" etc.
 11-- Change "what" to "that", and change "onr" to "our".
 268 12-- Read "did I have that conception" etc.

[14122]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
 Washington, 1 April 1945.

Memorandum To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. There are forwarded as enclosures A and B, respectively, a letter from Captain A. H. McCollum, U. S. N., requesting that certain typographical and grammatical errors be corrected in the transcript of his testimony before the Joint Committee and a list of the items by page and line number.

/s/ John Ford Baecher

JOHN FORD BAECHER
 Lieutenant Commander, USNR

U. S. S. HELENA (CA 75).

Fleet Post Office, New York City, N. Y., March 18, 1946.

The Honorable ALBEN W. BARKLEY,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I have but recently had the opportunity of reading over the transcript of the testimony I gave on January 30, 1946, [14123] before your committee investigating the Japanese attack on our Fleet at Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, 1941. In reading over the transcript of the record furnished me, I find what appear to be either clerical errors and omissions or errors due to lack of clarity of expression on my part. There are not many of these, and in the interests of clarity and precision I venture to suggest that, subject to the Committee's pleasure, I may be permitted to correct my testimony as transcribed in accordance with particulars listed on a separate page.

5314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

May I again express to you and to the Committee my appreciation for the thoughtful consideration and courtesy shown me during my testimony before you.
Respectfully,

/s/ A. H. McCollum,
A. H. McCOLLUM,¹
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

Enclosure A

U. S. S. HELENA (CA 75)

SUGGESTED CORRECTIONS TO TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN A. H. MCCOLLUM, USN

Page	Line	
9115	18	Change 6th word from "destroyer" to "transport"
9116	5	Change 7th word from "June" to "January"
[14124]	9116 10	After last word of the line add "and"
9117	6	Change last word from "billing" to "billet"
9117	11	After 5th word insert "I served in the Mediterranean and"
9117	22	After 6th word insert "as head of"
9119	24	After 4th word insert "intelligence"
9121	22	Strike out 5th, 6th and 7th words—"on the idea"
9121	23	Strike out 2nd and 3rd words—"and it"
9122	25	After 1st word insert "of it"
9123	21	After 6th word insert "that". Change 8th word "to" to "or"
9128	9	Strike out 4th and 5th words "me and", and 9th word "the". Change 11th word "Plans" to "Operations"
9132	2	After 7th word insert "towards"
9132	12	Change 8th word from "Hurd" to "Heard"
9138	15	After 3rd word insert "had to make"
9139	7	Change 12th word from "much" to "such"
9139	8	Change 8th word from "much" to "such"
9140	14	Change last word from "the" to "a"
9142	19	At end of line insert "from watch standing"
9142	21	Strike out first three words "I take it"
9143	2	After 1st word insert "Saturday night"
9146	12	Change 7th word from "withint" to "without"
[14125]	9146 24	Change 6th word from "is" to "was"
9147	23	Strike out first three words "as they appeared"
9149	22	Change 4th word from "taking" to "checking"
9152	21	Change 1st word from "movement" to "unit"
9152	22	Change 7th word from "movement" to "unit"
9152	24	Change 3rd word "sets" to "setup working"
9152	24	Change 10th, 11th and 12th words "route of entry" to "unit"
9153	21	Change 3rd word "that" to "as"
9158	18	Change 2nd word "a" to "back the"
9161	22	After 11th word insert "no"
9170	11	After 9th word "on" insert "Japanese"
9178	22	Change 4th word "discovered" to "so covered"
9219	13	After 7th word "might" insert "not"
9220	15	Strike out 4th word "and"
9221	12	Last two words change "they did" to "did they"
9252	9	Change 7th and 8th words "at the" to "as to"
9275	24	Change 8th word "1907" to "1904"
9287	15	Change 2nd word "Hurd" to "Heard"

Enclosure B

[14126] Mr. MORGAN. At page 7625 of the record Senator Brewster requested information concerning the sources from which the time table of attacks appearing on page 7622 of the record was prepared. A rather detailed reply has been received from the Navy Department under date of April 4, 1946, and we would like to have this communication spread on the record.

¹ Capt. McCollum's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 8, pp. 8381-8448.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be spread on the record at this point. (The communication referred to follows:)

[14127]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 4 April 1946.

Memorandum To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

Subject: Time Table of Japanese Attacks—source of material.

Reference:

- (a) My memorandum to Mr. William D. Mitchell, dated 29 Nov. 1945.
- (b) My memorandum to Mr. Seth W. Richardson, file 1083A (HLB) R#112, dated 22 Jan. 1946.
- (c) My memorandum to Mr. Seth W. Richardson, file 1083A (HLB), R#112, dated 24 Jan. 1946.

1. In response to the oral request of 28 March 1946 from Counsel for more specific data as to the information and sources of information which were heretofore forwarded in reference (a) at the request of Mr. William D. Mitchell, in reference (b) at the request of Senator Brewster (Record of Proceedings, page 7625) and in reference (c) at the request of Congressman Keefe, concerning the times of attacks by the Japanese on various places in the Pacific Ocean areas, the information, supplemented as requested, is restated and summarized for purposes of clarity as follows:

Place	Local time	Greenwich time	Washington time	Source of information
Kaneohe, NAS...	7:50 am, 7th...	6:20 pm, 7th...	1:20 pm, 7th...	War Diary of Commandant 14th Naval District.
Pearl Harbor.....	7:55 am, 7th...	6:25 pm, 7th...	1:25 pm, 7th...	Report by Admiral Nimitz dated 15 Feb. 1942 of the attack at Pearl Harbor and War Dairy of the Comdt. 14th Naval District, dated 3 Feb. 1942.
Singapore.....	3:00 am, 8th...	8:00 pm, 7th...	3:00 pm, 7th...	Statement by Captain John M. Creighton, U. S. N., who was at Singapore. This information obtained by oral inquiry of the War Department, Col. McNall, USA, G-2 MIS File.
Khota Baru.....	3:40 pm, 8th...	8:40 pm, 7th...	3:40 pm, 7th...	War Diary of U. S. S. Wm. B. Preston.
Davao Gulf, P. I.	7:10 am, 8th...	11:10 pm, 7th...	6:10 pm, 7th...	War Diary of Comdt. U. S. Marine Corps, dated 31 March 1942.
Guam.....	9:10 am, 8th...	11:10 pm, 7th...	6:10 pm, 7th...	This information obtained by oral inquiry of the War Department, Major R. E. Guest, USA, G-3.
Hong Kong.....	8:00 am, 8th...	Midnight, 7-8th	7:00 pm, 7th...	Report of Comdt. U. S. Marine Corps, dated 31 March 1942.
Wake.....	12:00 noon,	1:00 am, 8th...	8:00 pm, 7th...	This information obtained by oral inquiry of the War Department.
Clark Field, P. I.	9:27 am, 8th...	1:27 am, 8th...	8:25 pm, 7th...	Log of the Coast Guard Cutter WALNUT.
Midway.....	9:30 pm, 7th...	9:20 am, 8th...	4:30 am, 8th...	Report of 16th Naval District Intelligence Officer, file 40207.
Nichols Field (Manila)	3:00 am, 9th...	7:00 pm, 8th...	2:00 pm, 8th...	

(sgd) John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

[14130] Mr. MORGAN. At this point, I would like to read a portion of a memorandum supplied by the War Department, dated January 14, 1946, as follows:

Reference is made to Mr. Mitchell's memorandum of 31 December 1946 forwarding Senator Ferguson's request for any records showing who was in charge of the offices of the Chief of Staff and of General Gerow on the night of 6 December 1941.

General Gerow indicated to the Committee that as of 6 December 1941 War Plans Division had an arrangement whereby a duty officer was designated for the 24-hour period and, though not required to remain at the office throughout the night, was required to stay within calling distance of a telephone (Tr. 4320-1). The Office of the Secretary General Staff maintained a similar duty officer arrangement for the Chief of Staff. A thorough search has been made for the duty rosters of War Plans Division and of the Office of the Secretary General Staff for the period including 6-7 December 1941. Those rosters have not been located and apparently it was not the practice to preserve such rosters.

5316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Pursuant to a request made by counsel we have a communication from the War Department dated 21 February 1946 setting forth the authority under which Lieutenant Colonel Clausen administered oaths during the course of his investigation. We would like to have this letter spread on the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be spread on the record.
(The letter referred to follows:)

[14131]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 21 February 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

With reference to your inquiry concerning Lt. Colonel Clausen's authority to administer oaths during the investigation which he conducted at the direction of the Secretary of War, your attention is invited to U. S. Code, Title 10, Section 1586 (Article of War 114), reading as follows:

1586. Authority to administer oaths (article 114).

Any officer of any component of the Army of the United States on active duty in Federal service commissioned in or assigned or detailed to duty with the Judge Advocate General's Department, any staff judge advocate or acting staff judge advocate, the President of a general or special court-martial, any summary court-martial, the trial judge advocate or any assistant trial judge advocate of a general or special court-martial, the president or the recorder of a court of inquiry or of a military board, any officer designated to take a deposition, any officer detailed to conduct an investigation, and the adjutant, assistant adjutant or personnel adjutant of any command shall have power to administer oaths for the purposes of the administration of military justice and for other purposes of military administration; and shall also have the general power of a notary public in the administration [14132] of oaths, the execution and acknowledgment of legal instruments, the attestation of documents and all other forms of notarial acts to be executed by persons subject to military law; Provided, That no fee of any character shall be paid to any any officer mentioned in this section for the performance of any notarial acts herein authorized (as amended Dec. 14, 1942, ch. 730, 56 Stat. 1050).

(sgd) HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

[14133] Mr. MORGAN. At various places in the transcript, particularly at pages 5484 and 11853-11854, information has been set forth concerning the air situation in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war. We have received a communication from the War Department dated February 1, 1946, enclosing additional material in this regard, and we would request that this letter and the enclosures be spread on the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The material will be spread on the record.
(The material referred to follows:)

[14134]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
The Pentagon, Room 4D 761,
Washington, D. C., 1 February 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Three memoranda have been submitted by this office in response to requests by Committee members for information concerning the air situation in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war. The first, dated 27 December 1945, forwarded an account of the initial Japanese air attack against the Philippines contained in the Army Air Force narrative entitled "Army Air Forces in the War Against Japan 1941-1942". A second memorandum of the same date transmitted the available information on (a) the total number of planes in the Philippines on 7 December 1941, (b) the number of bombers at Clark Field when the Japanese first attacked, and (c) the number of bombers lost at Clark Field in that attack. The third memorandum, sent to you on 30 January,

forwarded material from the War Department files with regard to Japanese air reconnaissance over the Philippines and other U. S. possessions in the Pacific prior to 7 December 1941.

Transmitted herewith is further information from the War Department files relating to the initial Japanese [14135] attack against the Philippines. Inclosure No. 1 consists of photostats of documents on which the account of the Japanese attack contained in "Army Air Forces in the War Against Japan" was based. Inclosure No. 2 is a memorandum concerning the command organization of the United States Army Forces in the Far East and the Far East Air Force as of 7 December 1941.

/s/ HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

Incls.—2.

[14136]

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 925

HISTORY OF THE FIFTH AIR FORCE (AND ITS PREDECESSORS)

PART I, DECEMBER 1941 TO AUGUST 1942

December, 1941, Instalment

INVENTORY SHEET accompanying package bearing Message Center Registration No. H43.

1. APPENDIX I, *Maps and Charts, History of the Fifth Air Force (and its Predecessors), Part I, December, 1941–August, 1942.*
2. APPENDIX II, *Documents, History of the Fifth Air Force (and its Predecessors), Part I, December 1941–August, 1942.*
3. NOTE: Narrative to which these appendices are transmitted is sent by photo-mail, title: *Narrative, History of the Fifth Air Force, (and its Predecessors), Part I, December, 1941–August, 1942, December, 1941, Instalment.*

[14137]

DESIGNATION SHEET

(Official designation, including number of unit and of each echelon in chain of command)

AIR FORCE:	FAR EAST AIR FORCES
COMMAND:	-----
WING:	-----
GROUP:	-----
SQUADRON:	-----
AREA:	-----
BATTALION:	-----
CENTER:	-----
COMPANY:	-----
DEPOT:	-----
DETACHMENT:	-----
DISTRICT:	-----
DIVISION:	-----
PLATOON:	-----
REGIMENT:	-----
REGION:	-----
SCHOOL:	-----
SECTION:	-----
UNIT:	-----
ETC.:	-----

Has Security Classification of material been checked? YES.

5318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[14138]

EXPLANATORY NOTE RE HISTORY OF THE FIFTH AIR FORCE, PART I, DECEMBER 1941 TO AUGUST (DEC. 1941 INSTALMENT).

This document and its appendices purport to represent only a portion of the story of aerial operations in the Southwest Pacific Theater for December 1941. It incorporates such information as was found during the period of its preparation—namely between January 1944 and June 1944—in the files of Hq. Far East Air Forces (which were the files of Hq. Fifth Air Force until 15 June 1944), Hq. U. S. Army Air Forces in the Far East, and Hq. G. H. Q., S. W. P. A., augmented by personal interviews with several persons who were present in the theater in December 1941. It is expected several additional statements from persons in the latter category will still be obtained at A. P. O. 925.

According to information obtained during the preparation of these documents, and from other sources, the following additional sources of information exist in the U. S.:

1. The office of the Adj. Gen., G. H. Q., S. W. P. A., states that a number of records from the Philippines were transmitted to the War Dept., Washington in October 1942.

2. An oral report states a report on the modification of the P-40E was sent from the Philippines to Washington.

3. Operations reports and unit casualty reports sent from the Philippines to Washington.

4. At the Fighter Command School (later the Army Air Forces School of Applied Tactics), Orlando, Fla., some detailed transcripts of statements by returned pilots, including those of a combat pilot's round table, were taken during the summer, fall and winter of 1942. These included a statement by Lt. Col. Boyd D. ("Buzz") Wagner. The latter also supplied a statement to the A-2 and A-3 offices of Hq., Army Air Forces, Washington.

5. The papers of Lt. Col. W. E. Ryess, and his published book.

6. General Eugene L. Eubank, Commanding General of Army Air Forces Board, Orlando, Fla. He was commander of the 19th Bombardment Group in the Philippines.

7. Lt. Col. H. G. Thorne. In charge of certain phases of P-38 training near Los Angeles. Was 1st Lt. in command of 3rd Pursuit Squadron, Iba, Luzon, P. I., at outbreak of war.

8. Col. Orrin L. Grover. Was stationed at Army Air Forces Tactical Center, Orlando, Fla. in Jan. 1944. Was C. O. of 24th Pursuit Group in the Philippines, and is said to be the author of the History of the 24th Pursuit Group (Doc. I, App. II).

9. Various members of 19th Bombardment Group in the U. S.

Additionally is Major General Lewis H. Brereton who was commanding General, Far East Air Force, in the Philippines.

[14139]

HISTORY OF THE FIFTH AIR FORCE (AND ITS PREDECESSORS)

PART I DECEMBER 1941 TO AUGUST 1942
DECEMBER 1941, INSTALMENT

Narrative

[14140]

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[14142]

Section I—The Far East Air Force

When the month of December, 1941, opened in the Philippines the Far East Air Force was under the command of Major General Lewis H. Brereton. Units were fully alert. Due to the tense international situation, from November 15¹ "all pursuit aircraft were fully loaded, armed and on constant alert 24 hours each day with pilots available on 30 minutes notice".² Throughout the Air Force intensive training was in progress and a number of newly arrived units were being integrated into the Air Force. Despite this fact, the Far East Air Force had but small forces to meet the attack which was about to be launched.

Organization and Equipment of the Far East Air Force

In the Philippines the Far East Air Force was itself a new organization. The name had undergone two recent changes. The first change had followed the creation of the United States Army Forces in the Far East. Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur had assumed command of USAFFE on July 27, 1941.³ Following this he had redesignated on August 4, 1941 the Philippine Department Air Force as the Air Forces, United States Army Forces in the Far East.⁴ This operated "directly under the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, except for routine administration and supply, which will continue through Headquarters, Philippine Department".⁵ At this date the Commanding General of the Air Forces was Brigadier General Henry B. Clagett, who had arrived in the Philippines on May 4, 1941. Subsequently, on October 7, 1941 (West Longitude Time), the War Department designated Major General Lewis H. Brereton as the air commander.⁶ He brought with him a number of officers, including a new Chief of Staff, Colonel Francis M. Brady. The War Department, on October 28, 1941. (West Longitude Time) redesignated the Air Force as the Far East Air Force. This redesignation became effective on November 16, 1941.⁷

Staff of the Far East Air Force

With the arrival of General Brereton, his staff was organized as follows: (Table I, P. 2).

(Footnotes in original.)

¹ In this narrative all time is given as Philippine Department Standard Time and all dates are East Longitude unless otherwise indicated.

² *History of the 24th Pursuit Group in the Philippines* (Document I, Appendix II). This document is from Fifth Air Force Files, and is dated October 10, 1942. Lieutenant Colonel Allison W. Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau, and Colonel L. A. Diller, Public Relations, GHQ, SW7A, both state that this history was written by Colonel Orrin L. Grover, who was the Comm. of the 24th Pur. Gp. in the Philippines.

³ G. O. No. 1, United States Army Forces in the Far East, July 27, 1941.

⁴ G. O. No. 4, USAFFE, Aug. 4, 1941 (Doc. 2, App. II).

⁵ G. O. No. 4, USAFFE, Aug. 4, 1941 (Doc. 2, App. II).

⁶ *Chronology of the Fifth Air Force*, War Department, Washington, D. C.

⁷ G. O. No. 28, USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3, App. II).

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TABLE I.—Organization of Far East Air Force

COMMANDER, FEAF
Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton

CHIEF OF STAFF
Col. Francis M. Brady

GENERAL STAFF

G-1
Not Known

G-2
Maj. R. F. C. Vance

G-4
Maj. K. J. Gregg

Eng. O.
Capt. Harold Eads

Signal
Capt. L. Mason

Adj. Gen.
Capt. J. R. Mamerow

Q. M. C.
Lt. Col. McConathy

Armament
Capt. H. O. Porter

LINE UNITS

5th Bomber Command
Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank

19 Bomb Group
27 Bomb Group
7 Bomb Group (part of ground echelon only)

2d Observation Sq.

5th Interceptor Command
Gen. Henry B. Clagett
Col. Harold H. George

Far East Air Service Command
Col. Lawrence Churchill
Executive, Lt. Col. Maitland

Philippine 36 Air Base
Air Depot Group
24 Pursuit Group
5 Air Base Group
20 Air Base Group
803 Eng Bn. (Avn.)

[14144]

Components of the Far East Air Force

Next in chain of command in the Far East Air Force were the Fifth Interceptor Command, Fifth Bomber Command, and Far East Air Service Command. The Fifth Interceptor Command was commanded by Brigadier General Henry B. Clagett, with Colonel Harold H. George as Chief of Staff. The authority for activation of this unit in the Philippines has not been found, but it is listed as operating on December 8, 1941, in the document tracing the chain of command of the Far East Air Force, which is in the USAFFE.⁹ The Fifth Interceptor Command also appears on the movement order to Bataan (Dec. 23),¹⁰ and in subsequent General Orders of USAFFE.¹¹ In the first available strength report this unit is shown as having five officers and fifteen enlisted men.¹²

The Fifth Bomber Command and Far East Air Service Command were activated on November 16, the same day as the creation of the Far East Air Force.¹³ Lieutenant Colonel Eugene L. Eubank, also the commander of the 19th Bombardment Group, became the commander of the Fifth Bomber Command. This was only a skeleton unit, and although authorized full Table of Organization strength, had only one officer and twenty enlisted men on December 23.¹⁴ The Far East Air Service Command, under Colonel L. S. Churchill, had eight officers and sixty enlisted men.¹⁵

Pursuit Units

The pursuit units in the Philippines consisted of the five squadrons of the 24th Pursuit Group, commanded by Major Orrin L. Grover.¹⁶ This unit was an outgrowth of the Fourth Composite Group, which at the start of 1941 had as its components all of the tactical air units in the Philippines. The three pursuit squadrons in this group, the 3rd, 17th, and 20th, were all equipped with P-26's until May, 1941. At that time they were re-equipped with F-35's.¹⁷ Next, in July 1941, one squadron was equipped with P-40B's, and still later, P-40E's were received.¹⁸ On September 16, 1941, the 24th Pursuit Group was activated and the three pursuit squadrons transferred to it from the Fourth Composite Group.¹⁹ In November, two additional squadrons, the 21st and 34th, arrived from the United States. They were a part of the 35th Pursuit Group, but pending the arrival of the rest of its units, were attached to the 24th Pursuit Group.²⁰

[14145]

Training of Pursuit Pilots

In the summer of 1941 "100 new pilots from training schools" in the United States arrived and were used to build up the three original pursuit squadrons to strength. Because these pilots had not received combat training a training unit was formed at Clark Field.²¹ In addition it was necessary to train these pilots in gunnery, so a gunnery training camp was established at Iba.²² In October 35 more new pilots were assigned to the pursuit units and the same program of

⁹ BEAF Chain of Command. (Doc. 4, App. II.)

¹⁰ (Doc. 5, App. II.)

¹¹ GO No. 40, USAFFE, Mar. 14, 1942 (Doc. 6, App. II.)

¹² Movement Order to Bataan (Doc. 5, App. II). It should be noted that Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron of the Fifth Interceptor Command was under movement orders from the United States when war started. It had been activated from the Second Interceptor Command (under WD letter, 14 October, 1941, AG 320, 2 (10-1-41) MR*M*AAF "Constitution and Activation of Air Corps Units"). Under command of Lieutenant Colonel Willis R. Taylor, this unit, with eight radar sets sailed from San Francisco at 1800 on December 6, 1941 (San Francisco Time) on the Tasker H. Bliss. This ship put back into port on December 6 (San Francisco Time) and the Hq. and Hq. Sq., Fifth Interceptor Command debarked and returned to Seattle. *History of the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, II Interceptor Command, II Fighter Command and V Fighter Command.* May 1941-December 1942. By Major Edward J. McCormick, Jr., pp. 10-15. This history also states that the 557th Signal AW Battalion, also under orders to proceed to the Philippines, was in the Port of Embarkation at the time, but was also ordered back to Seattle.

¹³ G. O. No. 28, USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3, App. II.)

¹⁴ (Doc. 5, App. II.)

¹⁵ (Doc. 5, App. II.)

¹⁶ History of 24 Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II.)

¹⁷ History of 24 Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II.)

¹⁸ G. O. No. 10, USAFFE, Sept. 16, 1941 (Doc. 7, App. II.)

¹⁹ History 24 Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II.)

²⁰ History 24 Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II.)

²¹ History 24 Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II.)

training was started with them.²¹ At the gunnery camp at Iba "an extreme amount of difficulty was experienced in the malfunctioning of the guns, due to improper adjustment and mal-installation. In order to properly function it was imperative that all gun installations should be modified".²²

Bombardment Units

In the fall of 1941, the 19th Bombardment Group (H), with B-17's arrived in the Philippines. This group was commanded by Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank. Prior to its arrival the bombers in the Philippines had been B-10s and B-18's, which were not suitable for combat. These planes had been assigned to the 28th Bombardment Squadron of the Fourth Composite Group. With the arrival of the 19th Bombardment Group the 28th Bombardment Squadron was transferred to the 19th Bombardment Group, re-equipped with B-17s and redesignated from medium to heavy on November 16, 1941.²³ This gave the 19th Bombardment Group a headquarters squadron and a total of four instead of three subordinate squadrons. The group had a grand total of 35 B-17s.

On November 20 the 27th Bombardment Group (D) arrived in the Philippines. This unit was commanded by Major John H. Davies. All of its aircraft (A-24s) were on a later convoy, which was on the high seas at the time war broke out, and had to be diverted to Brisbane, Australia. The non-arrival of the dive bombers left the bombardment component of the FEAF unbalanced, there being no unit specially adapted for use against shipping.

Also in the Philippines was part of the ground echelon of the 7th Bombardment Group (H).²⁴ On December 7 (West Longitude) part of the air echelon, flying from California landed at Pearl Harbor; but none of the air echelon reached the Philippines.

Observation

With the transfer of all units except the 2nd Observation Squadron from the 4th Composite Group, Headquarters squadron of this group was abolished on November 16 and the 2nd Observation Squadron was thus placed directly under Headquarters, FEAF.²⁵ The squadron was equipped with observation type aircraft and was commanded by Captain J. Y. Parker.²⁶

Airdromes

At the start of 1941 there were three major military airfields in the Philippines, Clark Field, near Ft. Stotsenburg about 60 miles north of Manila, and Nielson and Nichols Fields on the outskirts of Manila. These were all extended during 1941. Because of the shortage of suitable fields some had to be used even while under construction, which increased the accident rate among the pursuit.²⁷

[14146] By December 1, the following fields were in use, or rapidly nearing completion: (For location see C. I. U. Map, Chart 1, App. I).

Pursuit Fields²⁸:

- Nichols Field
- Nielson Field
- Clark Field
- Iba Field
- Rosales Field
- Del Carmen Field

Bombardment Fields²⁹:

- Clark Field
- Del Monte Field, Mindanao

Fields Nearing Completion³⁰:

- O'Donnel Field
- San Fernando Field
- Ternate Field
- San Marcelino

²¹ *History 24 Pur. Gp.* (Doc. 1, App. II).

²² *History 24 Pur. Gp.* (Doc. 1, App. II).

²³ GO, 28 USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3—App. II).

²⁴ *Statement of Colonel R. L. Fry* (Doc. 8, App. II) and *Statement of Colonel Ray T. Elmore* (Doc. 30a, App. II).

²⁵ GO, 28, USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3, App. II).

²⁶ *FEAF Chain of Command* (Doc. 4, App. II).

²⁷ *History 24 Pur. Gp.* (Doc. 1, App. II).

²⁸ *History 24 Pur. Gp.* (Doc. 1, App. II).

²⁹ *Statement of Colonel Harold Eads* (Doc. 3, App. II).

³⁰ *History 24 Pur. Gp.* (Doc. 1, App. II).

In addition to the fields listed as nearing completion a more extensive air-drome construction program had been started in Luzon, but had not reached a point where it affected the situation prior to evacuation to Bataan.²¹ The fields provided did not allow for sufficient dispersion, nor for sufficient mobility of the air force. This was a cause of concern to General Brereton.²²

South of Luzon, Del Monte in Mindanao was in use as already indicated. Santa Barbara on Panay, and Cebu, Cebu, together with a few other fields in Mindanao were also used after war started.²³ (See Chart 1, App. I).

Co-Ordinated With Other Commands

It was recognized that any defense of the Far East would demand the closest coordination with the British, Dutch, and Australians. Much of the work to this end was carried out by military staff missions of foreign governments in Washington in consultation with the War Department and does not fall within the limits of this narrative.²⁴ However, a considerable amount of planning was carried on through direct consultation. In the early summer of 1941 General Clagett received instructions to proceed to Singapore and China, where he carried on a number of conferences.²⁵

[14147] Still later, General Brereton, went through the Dutch East Indies, the Australian Mandates, and Australia. He held a number of conferences, concerning the improvement of ferry-routes to the Philippines, and the arrangement of routes for ferrying pursuit aircraft from Australia via Koepang, Kendari, Sandakan, Balikpapan, Tarakan, Del Monte (in Mindanao) and Santa Barbara (on Panay).²⁶ Before the start of the war supplies of bombs and gasoline had already been sent into Rabaul, Port Moresby, and Darwin. Arrangements were also under way to send such stocks to Singapore and Balikpapan, but the war came first. Also General Brereton arranged future plans for staff coordination with the Australians and the Dutch, which paved the way for later developments. Among the most far-sighted of his arrangements was the development of Projects 1 and 2, which envisioned the use of Australian maintenance facilities, and called for considerable expenditures. These plans were left with Sir Charles Burnett, Chief of The Australian Air Staff in Melbourne. Some work was in progress when the war started. This was then speeded up and proved capable of meeting many of the actual requirements of the situation which developed early in December.²⁷

Air warning system and communications

The development of the Air Warning System in the Philippines was based primarily on a system of native observers. These reported in over the lines of the Philippine Telephone System to Interceptor Headquarters at Neilson. Data was then reported to the plotting board at Clark Field and based on it, orders were issued to the various squadrons. Commercial lines of the Philippine Telephone Company were all that existed for receiving reports. Delays were frequent. Clark, Nielson, and Nichols Fields were linked by teletype, and this circuit, supplemented by telephone when necessary, was used for direct communication. The third means of communication was radio, the major fields, each having an SCR 297 which was used for both point to point and ground to air communication.

In addition to the ground observer system the first radar had been installed in the Philippines at Iba. A second was being assembled near Aparri, and a third was enroute to Legaspi. The set at Iba was in tactical use, and operated on a 24 hours per day basis.²⁸

Antiaircraft Artillery

Next to the inadequacy of the Air Warning System, was the shortage of AAA. General Brereton in March 1942, stated that before he left Washington in 1941,

²¹ Radio, General Brereton to General Arnold (Doc. 9, App. II) and *History 24 Pur. Gp.* (Doc. 1, App. II).

²² Radio, General Brereton to General Arnold, March 2, 1942 (Doc. 9, App. II).

²³ *Journal of 19th Bombardment Group*—(Doc. 11, App. II).

²⁴ *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff 1941-1943* (War Department), p. —. [No page number in original].

²⁵ Lt. Col. Allison W. Ind (*Bataan*) (*Mss.*). This book, as an unofficial source, is used only for material where the author was a direct participant, and where the subject discussed falls within his field of military specialty, which is Intelligence. In this case, for example he went on the trip with General Clagett. Permission for use in this official history has been granted by Lt. Col. Ind.

²⁶ Ind. *Bataan* (*Mss.*), p. 186 ff.

²⁷ Colonel Merle-Smith to General Clagett, Dec. 24, 1941 (Doc. 12, App. II).

²⁸ *History 24 Pur. Gp.* (Doc. 1, App. II).

he declared that—"To put a bomber force in the Philippine Islands without providing adequate anti-aircraft defense measures was almost certain to mean their destruction."³⁹ Also General Brereton mentioned the inadequate fighter protection and inadequate air warning system. The amount of anti-aircraft was inadequate. The one anti-aircraft regiment at the airfields was the 200th CA (AA) Regt., a mobile unit of one battalion of 3" and 1 battalion of 37mm guns. This unit was stationed at Clark Field. The remaining anti-aircraft regiment was the 60th CA with units on Bataan and the harbor forts in Manila Bay.⁴⁰ The remaining airdromes were protected by only a few 50 calibre and 30 calibre machine guns. These offered but slight protection.

[14148]

Japanese Strength

Intelligence estimates showed that the Japanese had overwhelming strength, in comparison with the Far East Air Force equipment in the Philippines. In the R. A. A. F. the air order of battle was given as follows:

TABLE II.—*Japanese air strength, Dec. 8th, 1941*

Fleet Air Arm-----	612
Manchuria-----	800
Japan-----	600
N. and Cen. China-----	198
Mandated Is-----	100
Malaya-----	300
Phil Inc. Canton Hainan, Formosa-----	250
Total first line strength-----	2,860

While this estimate is from Australian sources, similar figures had been made available to General Brereton and his staff when they were in Australia on Nov. 21-23 (40a). Royal Air Force figures for this date placed the size of the Japanese Air Force as around 4,500 aircraft of front line strength, which is now generally accepted as correct.⁴¹ The RAAF and RAF figures are cited at this point because no estimates from the War Department, Washington, for the period December 8, 1941, are available here (APO 925).

The estimates shown above indicate that from the Japanese bases in Southern Formosa (430 to 450 miles north of Clark Field) it was possible to throw vastly superior formations against the Philippines. It was also possible for the enemy to increase this superiority by the use of carriers. Finally, the southernmost islands of the Philippines were within range of Japanese air units based on Palau. (Chart VII, App. I).

In the field of Intelligence the Japanese knew the disposition of our units, the location of important stores, the capabilities of our planes. They had excellent maps of the entire area, and objective folders on the important targets. Within the Philippines many of the large Japanese minority were organized as Sakhad-listas, a fifth column under the orders of Japan. In addition to transmitting information, this group even lighted flares at night to designate important targets. In some of the islands in the Far East, the Japanese withdrew their nationals prior to the outbreak of the war. In the Philippines they organized them. Our counter-espionage system was inadequate to cope with this organization; and the security measures around our installations were not great enough to prevent observation of the equipment and installations.⁴²

³⁹ Brereton to Arnold, March 1, 1942. (This was actually written over a week earlier)—(Doc. 9, App. II).

⁴⁰ Lt. Col. Melnik, *AAA in Philippines* (Dec. 24, App. II). It should be noted that a training program for Filipino AAA was in progress at Fort Wint. The organization of the Filipino Units was in progress and a number of regiments were scheduled to be trained by March, 1942. Equipment was being supplied from the U. S. From this equipment, after war was declared two additional regiments were organized; the 200th Provisional CA (AA) which came in part from the parent 200th, was moved to Nichols Field and areas of Manila on the night of December 8th. It was functioning by December 10th and was equipped with 12-3" and 12-37mm AAA guns, as well as some 50 calibre which were placed at Nichols Field and at the port area on the night of December 8th. Also the 51st CA (AA) was organized and used after war began. It does not appear to have operated on air fields.

⁴¹ Central Operational Intelligence Center, *Situation Report* (now under GHQ SWPA), Dec. 12th, 1941.

⁴² Figure from Enemy Appreciation Section, Allied Air Forces, A-2, SWPA (S/L Felthan).

⁴³ Ind. (Bataan) (Mss), p. 246 ff.

[14149] One of the available estimates of the situation of our forces in the Philippines at the end of November, 1941, was contained in a general intelligence summary used by the Tanaka Force. An exact extract of this document (to which are added translations reports the FEAF as consisting of:

Unit	Type
24th Kuchiku Sentai (Pursuit Group)-----	P-35.
3rd Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron)-----	P-36.
17th Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron)-----	P-38.
20th Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron)-----	P-40.
24th Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron) -----	27 planes at Nichols Field above types included.
19th Bakugeki Sentai (Bombardment Group) 1st Chutai of Kuchiku P-38 or P-40-----	27 planes.
14th Bakugeki Chutai B-17-----	12 planes.
28th Bakugaki Chutai B-18-----	13 planes.
36th Bakugeki Chutai (Type of plane unknown).	
2nd Teisatsu Chutai (Reconnaissance Squadron) 0-19, 0-46, 0-47, 0-57.	
19 Teisatsu Chutai unknown.	

The information above is essentially accurate, as comparison with the following table of our dispositions will show. The chief mistake is in listing part of the pursuit as components of the 19th Bombardment Group and not listing two of the squadron numbers in the 19th Bombardment Group. Also aircraft types are listed which were not in the Philippines. About December 1, the summary was shown by the Japanese to include:

Fighters-----	130
Bombers-----	30
Naval Patrol-----	20
Total-----	180

This is also substantially correct, if it is assumed that observation be included under fighters. The fact is that this information is more accurate than that sent to the Australians by their Washington sources following the outbreak of war. The Japanese figure is closer to the number of operational aircraft, whereas those of the Australian Attache included obsolete planes to a greater extent, and also those not in commission.⁴

FEAF Disposition on Dec. 7, 1941

In opposition to the Japanese Army and Navy Air Services, our dispositions on the eve of war were as follows: (See Chart II, App. I.)

TABLE III.—Status and Location of Aircraft ¹

C. O.	Unit	Location	Type	Number operat.
Major O. L. Grover-----	24 Pur Grp-----			
Lt. W. B. Putman-----	Hq. and Hq. Sq-----	Clark-----		
Lt. W. G. Thorne-----	3rd Pur. Sq-----	Iba-----	P-40-E-----	18
1st Lt. Boyd Wagner-----	17th Pur.-----	Nichols-----	P-40-E-----	18
1st Lt. J. B. Moore-----	20th Pur-----	Clark-----	P-40-----	18
1st Lt. Sam Marett-----	21st Pur-----	Del Carmen-----	P-35-----	18
1st Lt. W. E. Dyess-----	34th Pur-----	Nichols-----	P-40-E-----	18
Total pursuit-----				90

¹ This table has been compiled from the History 24 Pur. Grp. (Doc. 1) and *Journal 19 Bomb Gp.* (Doc. 1, App. II). Gen. Marshall in his *Biennial Report* gives the number of P-40s as 107. The discrepancy is due to the fact that Table III above, is of planes operational on Dec. 8th, and excludes planes not erected or out of commission.

There is some question as to who were the commanders of the 21st and 34th Pursuit Squadrons. In G. O. No. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Dec. 18, App. II), 1st Lt. Sam Marett is given as commander of the 34th Sq. rather than the 21st. The *Bataan Roster of the 24th Pursuit Group* (Doc. 27, App. II), also gives this as the status of the command, and gives 1st Lt. Wm. E. Dyess as the commander of the 21st Sq. In this narrative, however, the *History of the 24th Pursuit Group* has been followed.

⁴ Compare the Japanese "No. 3, The Situation of Both Sides Prior to War", ATIS, *Current Translations*, No. 46 with COIC SITREP for the period after December 8, and through December 30, 1941. Further, the Australian Naval Attache in Washington reported to his government on Dec. 12, that the 52 A-24's were operational in the Philippines (Doc. 13, App. II). Actually these aircraft were unloaded at Brisbane on December 22. Twelve of them were eventually ready for the Java campaign.

5326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[14180]

C. O.	Unit	Location	Type	No.
Cpt. J. Y. Parker.....	2nd Obs.....	Clark.....	O-46, 52, 79	10-12
Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank.....	19th Bomb Group.			
Captain MacDonald.....	Hq & Hq Sq.....	Clark.....		12
Major C. E. Combs.....	93rd Sq.....	Del Monte..	B-17-D	
Major E. O. O'Donnell.....	14th Sq.....	Del Monte..	B-17-D	
Major Wm. Fisher.....	28th Sq.....	Clark.....	B-17-D	
Major H. Gibbs.....	30th Sq.....	Clark.....	B-17-D	18

NOTE.—Two planes out of commission at Clark, also three planes of 93rd and 14th Squadron at Clark.

6TH PURSUIT (PHIL. AIR FORCE)

Captain Jesus A. Villamour 6th Sq..... BATANGAS.... P-26 12

MISCELLANEOUS

CLARK }
NICHOLS }.....B-18 10
NEILSON }
CABANTUAN B-10 3
Clark A-27 2
Del Monte B-18 2

Total first line Operational Aircraft Dec. 7th (19th Bomb. 24th Pursuit 2nd. Obsv.)..... 135 or 137
All other operational tactical planes..... 29

Grand Total Operational..... 164 or 166

The total of Far East Air Force personnel in the Philippines on December 8th was about 8,000 of the total of U. S. Army personnel of 19,000.⁴⁴

[14151] Of this air force total, approximately 7,500 was in Luzon. Of the personnel in Luzon, some 1,200 belonged to the 27th Bombardment Group (D) which had no aircraft. Also that part of the ground echelon of the 7th Bombardment Group (H) which had reached the Philippines was awaiting the arrival of the air echelon. The 500 air force personnel outside Luzon were scattered throughout a number of bases with the largest concentration at Del Monte, Mindanao. The Philippine Army Air Force had about 1,200.⁴⁵ Total air force personnel was therefore around 9,200 including the Philippine Army Air Force.

Events Prior to War

Starting on December 2, the Japanese began a series of night and early morning reconnaissance missions over Clark Field. The plane appeared at 0530 each morning, was sighted visually, and also tracked by the radar at Iba. Following the first sighting "instructions were given to force the aircraft to land or destroy it. On the three succeeding nights it was impossible to make the interception, due to inability to see the aircraft in the dark, or the aircraft not getting close enough to be picked up by the seachlights." Accordingly, it was agreed that the AAA would have its turn on the night of December 7th. But on that night no plane came over.⁴⁶

December 8th, 1941

December 8th was the first day of war in the Philippines. Being east of the International Date Line, this was the same as December 7th at Pearl Harbor. Also due to this further distance to the east, it was still dark in the Philippines when the attack on Pearl Harbor came. First news of this attack was flashed to all units upon receipt of the report at 0330.⁴⁷ The official USAFFE warning was sent out at about 0430. Word was also received at 0630 at the bomber base at Del Monte.⁴⁸ War had begun.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff War Department*, p. 10. Gen. Marshall's report gives the figure as 8,000. This is in agreement with the rosters and reports in Documents 5, 8, 14, 15 and 30a (App. II).

⁴⁵ *Strength Report Philippine Air Force*—Jan. 3, 1942. (Doc. 16, App. II.)

⁴⁶ *History Pur. Gp.* Pg. 3 (Doc. 1, App. II).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* This news was by commercial radio and no official action was taken except to order units to stations. The official warning was received by the pursuit units at 0445.

⁴⁸ The message received at Del Monte stated "Hostilities have commenced, govern yourself accordingly." (*Interview with Colonel Fry*) (Doc. 8, App. II.) Message received at 0630 hrs. according to Major Heald, Communications Officer. He remembers the message as: "Hostilities have begun. All airdromes alert." (Doc. 17, App. II.)

⁴⁹ *History 24 Pur. Gp.* (Doc. 1, App. II).

Pursuit Operations⁴⁰

[14152] Prior to receipt of official word that war had begun, the radar at Iba reported a large formation over the China Sea headed in the direction of Corregidor. Accordingly the 3rd Pursuit, stationed at Iba, was ordered to intercept. It proceeded to the heading given in its mission order, and the radar plot showed a successful interception. At this date, however, altitude could not be read from the radar. Actually the P-40's did not see the bombers in the darkness. Therefore they returned to their base for refueling. (Chart III, App. I).

The next development occurred at 0930, with the reporting of a large formation over the Lingayen Gulf headed for Manila. The orders issued from intercept headquarters, where Major Grover and Colonel George were operating, called for the 20th Pursuit Squadron to proceed north from Clark Field and intercept in the vicinity of Rosales. Meanwhile the 17th Pursuit Squadron was sent from Nichols to patrol Clark Field and intercept any planes which might pass the 20th. But the Japs were only feinting. From Lingayen Gulf the Japs did not proceed south. Instead, they swung inland directly past, and hit the army installations at Baguio which was also the summer capital of the Philippines. They also hit airfields at Cabantuan. At the time of the alert at Clark Field, the B-17's were ordered up, so they might not be caught on the ground. They landed again, however, at 1130, their landing being covered by the 20th Pursuit Squadron. (Chart III, App. I).

The last two moves on the part of the Japanese had run two squadrons out of gas and thus limited the number of squadrons which would be available for the main raids. In this they were successful. At 1130 the 20th Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field was being regassed. The B-17's were back at Clark Field; the 17th Pursuit Squadron was being gassed at Nichols. The scene was set for the main strike. (Chart IV, App. I).

There was not long to wait. At 1130 the Iba radar reported a large formation over the China Sea. For the second time during the day the 3rd Pursuit Squadron at Iba was ordered to intercept. It immediately took off, although apparently eight planes were left on the field. Again, in this attempted interception the Japanese were to show one of their tricks. Taking advantage of the limited gasoline supplies of the P-40, the incoming bomber formation feinted and then withdrew. This type of tactics had also been used in China, but for the first time United States air units came in contact with such tactics. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron remained in the air, with its gasoline steadily diminishing.

Believing that interception might not be made by the 3rd Squadron and fearing a direct thrust at Manila and the installations there, the two squadrons on Nichols Field were both sent off, the 17th Squadron to take station over Bataan, while the 34th Squadron was placed on standing patrol over the city of Manila proper. (Chart IV, App. I).

The next report came in at approximately 1145 of an unidentified formation "over Lingayen Gulf, headed south". This raised a new problem and the situation was met by ordering the 21st Pursuit off Del Carmen to cover Clark Field. At the time the 20th, still regassing at Clark Field was ordered up as soon as refueling was completed. But no planes reached Clark Field prior to the attack. Dust on the field at Del Carmen delayed the take off of the P-35s. The first planes of the 21st Squadron which taxied out raised such a cloud that it was necessary to wait for the cloud to settle. The delay was so great that planes of the 21st Squadron did not reach Clark Field until after the Japanese attack was completed. (Chart IV, App. I). At this juncture communications broke down and no further reports were received at Clark Field or Nellson Field concerning the incoming Japanese bomber formation. At 1215 the 20th Pursuit Squadron on Clark Field completed gassing, and the planes started to take off. Four were off the ground and five more were in process of taking off, while five more were on the ground. At either 1217 or 1220 the first Jap planes arrived. There were 54 to 72 bombers in a very shallow V of V's and above 18,000' which bombed with accuracy.⁴¹ These were followed by a number of dive bombers [14153] and fighters which came in to strafe.⁴² The five planes of the 20th Pursuit Squadron which were in process of taking off and the five which were

⁴⁰ This account follows *History 24 Pur. Grp.* (Doc. 1, App. II).

⁴¹ "Sallys" predominated in the early attacks over the Philippines and probably constituted the bulk of this formation.

⁴² These were "Zekes" and possibly "Nates."

still on the ground were all destroyed. The four in the air, led by the squadron commander, Lt. J. H. Moore, went into combat at low altitude and shot down four of the attacking planes.⁵⁵ The bomber formation laid a pattern which destroyed most of the hangars and buildings, as well as most of the B-17s and B-18s on the field. The dive bombers (probably Vals) then came in strafing and set fire to most of the planes which were in the blast pens.⁵⁶ One of the first bombs made a direct hit on the radio station on the field, so that it was impossible to contact the 17th and 34th Pursuit Squadrons, still on patrol over the area of Manila and Bataan. Finally another radio did make contact with the 17th Pursuit Squadron, but it arrived over Clark Field seventy miles to the north of Bataan, after all enemy planes had withdrawn; the 21st also arrived from Del Carmen after the attack was completed. By this time the 17th Pursuit Squadron was running short of gasoline, so it landed at Del Carmen. (Chart IV, App. I).

In the absence of effective interception, the defence of Clark Field was left to the AAA. The field was defended by the 200th CA (AAA). Also a number of air corps crew members heroically went to their planes during the attack and fired the machine guns in the grounded aircraft at the attacking strafers. For outstanding heroism in such action, the Distinguished Service Cross was awarded to the following: Pfc. Joseph G. McElroy, T/Sgt. Anthony Holub and Pfc. Greely B. Williams (posthumously). When the hangar in which his plane was located was set on fire, 1st Lt. Fred T. Crimmins of the 19th Bombardment Group taxied his plane into the open, only to have it destroyed by enemy strafing, he being hit and wounded.⁵⁷

Also, despite the continuous attacks on Clark Field many risked the strafing to help the casualties. Among others, several examples will be mentioned. Private Robert J. Endres secured an abandoned truck and through the midst of the bombing and strafing made seven trips between the field and the station hospital, on each trip carrying a load of wounded.⁵⁸ The 19th Bombardment Group Flight Surgeon, Maj. Luther C. Heidger, stayed in the open during the attack to treat the wounded. The Chaplain, 1st Lt. Joseph F. LaFleur administered religious rites to the wounded and dying throughout the attack, and helped to treat the wounded.⁵⁹ All of these were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

Meanwhile, as the 3rd Pursuit Squadron was running low on gasoline, it turned back toward Iba. There it found the formation which it had been unable to intercept. Fifty-four bombers and an unknown number of strafers were attacking the field. Despite being low on gasoline the P-40's pressed home the attack. They arrived too late to prevent the bombing, but did prevent strafing. Casualties on the field were, however, heavy. All of the installations, including the radar, were destroyed. Five P-40's were shot down in the air, and eight planes on the ground were destroyed. In addition, it being impossible to land on the field, three P-40's ran out of gasoline and crash landed on the beach. The remainder of the formation landed at O'Donnell Field. Gasoline and ammunition was dispatched from stores remaining at Clark Field to supply these planes. (Chart IV, App. I).

[14154]

Employment of Bombardment

Information on the employment of the bombardment planes still on Clark Field is not complete. One B-17 took off at 1030 for reconnaissance of Eastern Luzon.⁶⁰ All that is authoritative concerning the remaining bombardment planes is that at the time of the alert at 0930 "all bombardment was dispatched from Clark Field. The 20th Pursuit Squadron returned to Clark Field and gave the

⁵⁵ G. O. No. 48 USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II). The citation granting Lt. Moore of the 20th Pursuit Squadron the Distinguished Service Cross credits him with leading his formation from the field on December 10, however, the events are those described in the *History 24th Pur. Grp.* and *Journal 19th Bomb. Grp.* (Docs. 1 and 11, App. II) as taking place on the 8th.

⁵⁶ The strafing planes probably included fighters ("Zekes") in addition. Reports varied. Cf. *History 24th Pur. Grp.* and *Journal 19th Bomb. Grp.* (Docs. I and II, App. II.)

⁵⁷ G. O. No. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II) and G. O. No. 2, Hq. Southwest Pacific Command, Lembang Java, Feb. 15, 1942 (Doc. 19, App. II).

⁵⁸ G. O. No. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II).

⁵⁹ G. O. No. 2, SWP. command, Lembang Java, Feb. 15, 1942 (Doc. 19, App. II).

⁶⁰ *Journal 19th Bombardment Grp.* (Doc. 11, App. II).

bombardment cover while they were landing." ⁸⁰ Thus, at 1130, all except the B-17 which was still on reconnaissance over Eastern Luzon, and the twelve aircraft at Del Monte, were on Clark Field.

Of the total of 22 B-17 aircraft on Clark Field at the time of the Japanese attack, fifteen were destroyed. Two or three of those on the field escaped damage and were operational the following day. An additional three or four were repaired and made operational later.

The one B-17 to encounter enemy action in the air on December 8, was a plane which left Del Monte at 0930 for repairs at Clark Field. This plane was piloted by Lt. El E. Tash. ⁸¹ It arrived over Clark Field while the field was under attack, and immediately started back for Del Monte. Three enemy pursuit attacked, and the rear gunner, S/Sgt. Michael Bibin, was severely wounded in both shoulders. The first news of what was taking place to the north reached Del Monte at 1700 when Carpenter called over his radio as he came in to land, "Have been exposed to enemy, have ambulance ready." ⁸² One Zero was believed shot down.

Summary of Raids on Clark Field and IBA

In these two raids the Japanese had effectively destroyed the striking power of the Far East Air Force, had seriously cut down the pursuit strength, had destroyed most of the maintenance facilities for the B-17's, and had inflicted a number of casualties. Our forces had been on the alert. They had not been caught as at Pearl Harbor, with planes not loaded. But the damage inflicted was great.

Before the conclusion of the first twenty-four hours of the war in the Philippines, one more attack was launched by the Japanese—against Nichols Field and its installations. By Midnight telephonic communication was reestablished from Nielson Field to the plotting board at Clark Field and operation of the air warning system was resumed. Shortly after midnight one flight of the 17th Pursuit Squadron was dispatched to intercept an enemy formation. The dust at Del Carmen again hindered the takeoff and one pilot was killed. The remaining four aircraft did not find the enemy formation in the dark, so no interception was accomplished. Some time later, at 0315 a large enemy force appeared over Nichols Field.

The first Japanese aircraft to be shot down during the war is officially credited to 2nd Lt. Randall D. Keator of the 80th Pursuit Squadron, stationed on Clark Field. Taking off while the field was under attack, Lt. Keator's plane was attacked by nine Japanese aircraft. Despite this disadvantage he shot down one of these. Later, during the general combat over Clark Field he shot down another, making his score for the day two. ⁸³

[14155]

Air Situation on December 9th

At the close of the first day's campaign under constant enemy attack, the Far East Air Force was badly mauled. Costly losses in men and equipment had been sustained. Over a third of the pursuit were lost, while more were out of commission. Of B-17s, the operational aircraft had been reduced from 33 to 15 or 16. Moreover, the planes lost were irreplaceable. Wake Island was under attack, which cut the ferry route for B-17s which had been flown in from Hawaii. The destruction of naval forces at Pearl Harbor ended the chance that convoys might bring in pursuit directly. Finally the destruction of hangars, depot facilities, and parts indicated that maintenance constituted a major problem; but the nearest place with even partial facilities was Australia.

Reorganization

During the night the high command of the Far East Air Force reorganized the tactical units. Lt. Wagner's squadron, the 17th, was transferred to Clark Field

⁸⁰ *History 24 Pur. Gp.* (Doc. 1, App. II). There was a staff meeting of FEEAF at the Headquarters at Nielson Field, which was attended by Captain Harold Eads and Captain Allison Ind, and others. General Brereton also went to GHQ. This is stated by Captain Eads. *Statement of Colonel Eads* (Doc. 10, App. II). GHQ, SWPA, records contain no information on the matter. A letter has been written through channels, Hq. AAF, Washington, requesting Gen. Brereton for any information but no reply has been received, cf. Reg. 30503, FEEAF, Registered on 23 April 1944.

⁸¹ *Journal 19 Bomb Gp.* (Doc. 11, App. II).

⁸² *Interview with Colonel Fry* (Doc. 8, App. II).

⁸³ G. O. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II).

and brought to strength by transferring airplanes from the 3rd Pursuit. The rest of the 3rd was absorbed into the 34th at Nichols Field. As already noted, the third had practically been wiped out at Iba. It no longer functioned as a separate squadron from this date. At the same time the ground crews were attempting to repair the pursuit planes³³, and the B-17s at Clark Field which had not burned. The reaction of ground personnel to the bombing had been good on the whole although some had taken to the hills and did not drift in until night. Most were working feverishly to salvage planes and parts. Gun crews had stuck to their posts.

On December 9th the bombardment squadrons at Del Monte were employed as follows: One plane went on reconnaissance of the Davao Area, and then went up to Luzon, landing on the airdrome at San Marcelino. The plane was damaged by fire of our ground forces while landing. At 1430 seven other aircraft took off from Del Monte for San Marcelino, and also were fired on by our ground forces while landing, but no damage resulted. Six aircraft took off on a reconnaissance mission for Catandanes Islands, off Southern Luzon, found no enemy action, and then flew into Clark Field at 1430 to be prepared for a mission the next day. Immediately upon landing they took off because of air raid alarm, and landed after dark. From Clark Field, at 0800, one plane attempted the reconnaissance mission to Formosa, but turned back because of engine trouble, and then stayed up until after dark to avoid enemy attack on the field.³⁴

On the night of December 9/10, reports were received of a large enemy convoy off Vigan and another off Aparri.³⁵ It was accordingly planned to hit them with all the available air power on the following day.

[14156]

SECRET

HISTORY

OF

30TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)

19TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

PERIOD COVERING

DECEMBER 7TH, 1941 TO DECEMBER 31ST, 1942

[14157] On the morning of 8 December 1941 (Philippine Time), word of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was flashed to members of the 30th Bomb Squadron, then stationed at Clark Field, Manila.

Major David R. Gibbs, the 30th's Commanding Officer, immediately ordered all crews to report to the flight line, and upon the disposal of preliminary preparations, the Squadron's B-17s, geared for action, took to the air.

Ground crews likewise were on the alert, for the Japs were expected to attack Clark Field within the next 20 minutes, according to reports received by the 30th, and everything was considered in readiness to repel the enemy when he struck.

For more than 3 hours, the 30th's planes circled Mt. Aryat, flying in and out of cloud banks, soaring over the plains of Luzon, unsuccessfully seeking traces of the enemy. At approximately noon, Major Gibbs ordered the planes to land, and as they did, they were dispersed around Clark Field. Some crews were requested to stand by their ships, with the remainder instructed to obtain a hasty meal and report to Group Headquarters for briefing.

Shortly thereafter—about 12.30 p. m.—came the Japs! A low, whistling noise, resembling wind through the trees, grew louder and louder with devastating crescendo, and a deafening explosion rocked Clark Field, signaling the beginning of the attack. Blast after blast shattered the earth and nearly everything upon it. The initial Jap formation of 54 bombers unloosed tons and tons of high explosives, following with merciless strafing.

The entire attack lasted about 40 minutes, with casualties heavy, the field torn and wrecked, and only one or two of the 30th's B-17s remaining for service. Brilliant, individual deeds of heroism characterized the efforts of officers and enlisted personnel, but they could not stem the Japs in their relentless assault.

³³ *History 24 Pur. Gp.* (Doc. 1, App. II).

³⁴ *Journal 19 Bomb. Gp.* (Doc. 11, App. II).

³⁵ *Colonel Ind's Bataan Mss.*, pp. 260 ff.

Follow-up attacks were naturally expected, and that evening, Major Gibbs moved the 30th from the barracks on Clark Field, establishing headquarters on a small knoll in a cane field about a mile and one-half away. It was shortly thereafter that Major Gibbs, on a mission in a B-18, did not return, and the Squadron lost the first of its several war-time commanding officers.

[14158]

CONFIDENTIAL

E-21

HEADQUARTERS 3RD AIR FORCE
Office of the Commanding General
Tampa, Florida

Lt. Col. LUCIUS P. ORDWAY

A-2 Section Army Air Force, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL:

Inclosed is a summary of operations in the Southwest Pacific Area as I saw them. After reading over the interview which is on file there in Washington, it appeared to be a good idea to clarify and add to the report. The form admittedly is not so good, but in general includes everything that I could remember that might be of interest.

Sincerely,

W. P. FISHER

W. P. Fisher

Major, Air Corps Asst. G-3

[14159]

SECRET

REPORT OF PHILIPPINE AND JAVA OPERATIONS

By W. P. Fisher, Major, Air Corps

I was assigned as a flight commander in a provisional squadron of nine combat and maintenance crews, equipped with 9 B-17D Airplanes, which was formed at Hickam Field, Hawaii, in August of 1941. This was composed of personnel and equipment drawn from the two tactical groups stationed there. Training of this provisional squadron was carried out until the first of September at which time it was designated as the Fourteenth Heavy Bombardment Squadron and the ground component of the Fourteenth added to the combat echelon. The air echelon left Hickam Field on September 5th with orders transferring it to Clark Field in the Philippine Islands. The first stop was made at Midway Island. The flight remained overnight continuing on to Wake Island the following day. The departure from Wake Island to Port Moresby, New Guinea, was made about midnight the following night under conditions of radio silence, arriving at the destination the following afternoon. After a one-day lay over for maintenance, the squadron continued on to Darwin, Australia. Another day's lay over was made there for maintenance and awaiting weather information before the final hop to Clark Field in the Philippines. This was the first squadron of B-17's to arrive in the Philippines. Following arrival at Clark Field, we immediately began intensive unit tactical training in high altitude formation flying, navigation, bombing, and gunnery. Missions at this time were scheduled from 20,000 to 30,000 feet.

About a month after our arrival, the 19th Group stationed at Albuquerque, New Mexico, was transferred to the Philippine Department and, following the same route, arrived about the middle of October with two combat and one Headquarters Squadron and equipped with 25 B-17D Airplanes. Following arrival of the air and ground echelons of the 19th Group, all Philippine Bombardment units were consolidated into the 19th Group. The organization then consisted of the 30th, 93rd, 14th, and 28th combat squadrons and a Headquarters Squadron. All airplanes and equipment were evenly divided among them, giving 8 B-17's to each combat squadron and 3 in the Headquarters Squadron. At this time, I was relieved from assignment to the 14th Squadron and given command of the 28th Squadron which had been stationed at Clark Field prior to our arrival.

By the first of December the international situation was quite grave and reconnaissance patrols were being run by both ourselves and the Japanese between Formosa and Luzon. Visual contact by the aircraft had been made several times. At about this time, the air echelon of the 93rd and 14th squadrons, consisting of the combat crews, some maintenance men, and all airplanes were sent to Del Monte on the Island of Mindanao, our alternate Heavy Bombardment Base; the 28th, 30th and Headquarters squadrons remaining at Clark field. This was the situation that existed on December 7, when the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred. The training of the entire group was at a high state; all personnel was experienced and our equipment in good condition.

The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred about 3:00 o'clock the morning of the 8th, Philippine time. The report of the attack was received first, of course, [14160] by radio news broadcast and all personnel were aware of it by dawn or shortly thereafter. All airplanes at Clark Field had been dispersed and in revetments for some time prior to this and the entire group was prepared to perform missions at any time. While awaiting orders, the first air warning was received around 8:00 o'clock that a formation of enemy bombers was proceeding in the direction of Clark Field. Immediately all flyable airplanes were taken off and flown away from the vicinity of the field to avoid their destruction. Several warnings were received during the morning of enemy formations but no attacks were made on Clark Field. At about 11:00 o'clock, we were all called back in as no further enemy aircraft were reported. After landing, orders were received to attack Air Bases on Southern Formosa at dusk. Preparations for this mission were being made when at about 12:30 a formation of 54 Heavy Japanese Bombers was seen approaching the field. No warning had been received from our radio locator stations of any enemy aircraft in the vicinity, so our entire strength of aircraft was caught on the ground in their dispersed positions with the exception of one B-17 on patrol. It was later found that all communications to Clark Field had been cut by saboteurs and radio communications jammed by radio interference. The formation had been detected by the radio locators, but they were unable to get warning to Clark Field.

Numerous zigzag trenches approximately 2' wide and 5' deep had been constructed by Colonel Maitland, the base Commander, in previous months in the vicinity of the hangars and working area. Also additional trenches had been constructed near the dispersed positions of the airplanes. Upon sighting the approaching formation, warning was given and most of the personnel were able to take cover in these trenches. There was approximately 5 minutes between the time the formation was first seen and the attack on Clark Field. The attack was made diagonally across the quarters and hangar area by two formations of 27 Heavy Bombers. Each 27 plane formation was in the form of a giant Vee. The bombs used in the attack varied from 100 # bombs down to smaller fragmentation bombs and were dropped in train covering the field from the quarters area through the hangar and shop area. I estimate that approximately 300 bombs were dropped in this attack. Following the bombing attack, a formation of 18 fighters came in, individually attacking the dispersed B-17's and other aircraft with machine guns and cannon fire. This attack lasted approximately 40 minutes. Very few airplanes had been destroyed by the bombing attack which was conducted from approximately 23,000' but all air planes were completely destroyed or filled with bullet holes by the fighter attack. During this attack approximately six P-40's of the squadron stationed at Clark Field were able to get off and engage the attacking fighters. The 200th Coast Artillery (an anti-aircraft regiment) was in position to defend Clark Field and also took the fighters under fire with 30 cal., 50 cal., and 37 mm. gun fire. The damage to Clark Field from this attack was great as the hangars, shore, supply buildings, and other installations were struck by bombs and numerous fires started. Personnel casualties were approximately 100 men and officers killed and 200 wounded. Nearly all of the casualties were persons who were taken by surprise and were unable to take cover in the trenches which had been provided. The Japanese intelligence apparently had been complete as they had attacked only the tactical airplanes and installations.

Operations were begun immediately and missions carried out against enemy surface vessels and convoys by the two squadrons stationed at Del Monte. Japanese landings were made at Aparri, Legaspi and Vigan and were successful. These landings were made from a small number of transports accompanied by surface vessels and under the protection of gun fire from the vessels. . . .

[14161]

Headquarters, Far East Air Forces (P)
Historical Record

Chron No. 40-11-1 to A-1132 Hist. No. 42-4-27

Subject Class: History

Title of Document: 24th Pursuit Group in P. I.

Date of Document: 10 October 1942. File 5AF A-1. "Rosters V Bomber Command P. I.—Java File

Type of Document: _____ PAGES _____ IMP. P PUB. S _____

From: _____ TO _____

Typed by T. Leach Checked by _____

Synopsis: True Copy.

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH AIR FORCE,
Brisbane, Q. October 10, 1942.

Subject: Activity of the 24th Pursuit Group in the Philippines.

On or about November 1, 1940, the 4th Composite Group in the Philippine Islands was reinforced by the 17th Pursuit Squadron of the 1st Pursuit Group, commanded by K. J. Gregg, Major, Air Corps, and the 20th Pursuit Squadron of the 35th Pursuit Group, commanded by OL Grover, Captain, Air Corps. At this time, the 4th Composite Group commanded by L. S. Churchill, Colonel, Air Corps, was based at Nichols Field. It consisted of the 28th Bombardment Squadron detached at Clark Field, the 2nd Observation Squadron detached at Clark Field, and the following Squadrons at Nichols Field: Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 3rd Pursuit Squadron, 17th Pursuit Squadron and 20th Pursuit Squadron, all equipped with obsolete P-26 type aircraft. During the month of May, 1941, Colonel Churchill assumed command of Nichols Field, and K. J. Gregg, Major, Air Corps, assumed command of the 4th Composite Group. The 28th Bombardment Squadron and the 2nd Observation Squadron were assigned to Clark Field.

In May, 1941, the Group was re-equipped with P-35 type aircraft destined for Sweden, but diverted to the Philippine Islands. During July, 1941, due to the conditions at Nichols Field, i. e. east-west runway undergoing construction, and north-south runway being unusable due to lack of drainage, the 4th Composite Group (less 17th Pursuit Squadron) was transferred to Clark Field. The 17th Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Iba to undergo gunnery training at that station. During the month of July, 1941, one Squadron was re-equipped with P-40B type aircraft, the other squadrons still being equipped with P-35s. At the same time, one hundred new pilots arrived from the training school in the States, and were assigned to the Group. It became necessary to train these pilots. A training unit was instigated at Clark Field and pursuit training was given. On or about August 1, Major Gregg was transferred to the F. E. A. F., and O. L. Grover, Major, Air Corps, assumed command of the Group. During September the 17th Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Nichols Field and the 3rd Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Iba for gunnery training. This movement was necessary in order to make room for contemplated bombardment reinforcements at Clark Field. Nichols Field's construction was not complete and was not satisfactory for operations. These conditions occasioned a high accident rate for the 17th Squadron.

On October 1, 1941, the 4th Composite Group, less 3rd, 17th and 20th Squadrons was transferred to Clark Field and the 24th Pursuit Group was activated at Clark Field. The 24th Pursuit Group consisted of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 3rd Pursuit Squadron, 17th Pursuit Squadron and 20th Pursuit Squadron. During the month of October, 35 new pilots just graduated from the training schools in the States arrived and were assigned, bringing the Group to full T/O officers' strength. It was necessary to train these pilots for duty in combat units.

During the month of November, 1941, the 21st Pursuit Squadron and the 34th Pursuit Squadron arrived from the United States. They were part of the 35th Pursuit Group. They were attached to the 24th Pursuit Group for duty and administration pending the arrival of the remainder of their Group. On December 1, 1941, the Pursuit units were as follows:

a. Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 24th Pursuit Group, Clark Field, commanded by Lieutenant W. D. Putnam.

[14162] b. 3rd Pursuit Squadron, Iba, commanded by Lieutenant H. G. Thorne, equipped with P-40Es.

c. 17th Pursuit Squadron at Nichols Field, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Boyd D. Wagner, equipped with P-40Es.

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d. 20th Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field, commanded by 1st Lieutenant J. H. Moore, equipped with P-40Bs.

e. 21st Pursuit Squadron at Del Carmen, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Sam Marrett, equipped with P-35s.

f. 34th Pursuit Squadron at Nichols Field, commanded by 1st Lieutenant W. E. Dyess, partially equipped with P-40Es.

Airdromes available to pursuit were: Nichols Field, Nielson Field, Clark Field, Iba, Rosales, Del Carmen; under construction O'Donnel, San Fernando, Ternate. Other commercial fields in the Islands were unsuitable for fully loaded pursuit aircraft.

Communications for aircraft warning: The aircraft warning system consisted of native air watches, who relayed their reports over the telephone to the 5th Interceptor Headquarters at Neilson. The reports were then relayed via teletype to the plotting board at Clark Field. One R. D. F. set was installed at Iba, one set in process of installation 60 miles west of Aparri and the third set was en route to Legaspi for installation. Delay in time for the relaying of messages due to telephone communications was from five to twenty-five minutes.

From November 15, due to the tense international situation, all pursuit aircraft were fully loaded, armed and on constant alert 24 hours each day with pilots available on 30 minutes notice. On December 6, General Brereton held a conference and stated that war was imminent. At this time all units were placed completely on the alert with all combat crews, enlisted men and officers constantly ready for duty.

On the night of December 7, the status report had shown:

The 3rd Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission;

The 17th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission;

The 20th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission;

The 21st Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-35s in commission;

The 34th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission,

giving the Group a total of 54 P-40Es, 18 P-40Bs and 18 P-35s in commission.

The 34th Squadron received their last P-40E from the Depot on the evening of December 7. This squadron was unable to slow time all of the engines, bore-sights or check guns.

During the period November 30 to December 6 all squadrons were undergoing intensive training in interception and gunnery. The squadrons were doing training in conjunction with bombardment in day and night interception in coordination with the anti-aircraft.

Throughout the gunnery camp at Iba an extreme amount of difficulty was experienced in malfunctioning of the guns due to improper adjustment and mal-installation. In order to properly function it was imperative that all gun installations should be modified.

During the period December 2 to December 6, for four consecutive nights an enemy aircraft was sighted over Clark Field at approximately 5:30 a. m. After the first sighting, instructions were given to force the aircraft to land or destroy it. On the three succeeding nights it was impossible to make the interception, due to inability to see the aircraft in the dark or the aircraft not getting close enough to be picked up by the searchlights. On the fifth morning all aircraft were kept on the ground and the anti-aircraft alerted for the interception; however, no aircraft were located. During the same period enemy aircraft were tracked over Iba by the radar set.

[14163] On December 8th approximately 3:30 a. m. the commercial radio station at Clark Field intercepted a message from Pearl Harbor, reference the attack there. Unable to verify this interception no official action was taken other than notifying the Base Commander. However, all units were ordered to constant stations.

At approximately 4 a. m. the radar at Iba reported a formation of unidentified aircraft approximately 75 miles off the coast heading towards Corregidor. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron was dispatched for the interception. No interception was accomplished. However, the tracks on the plotting table showed that the interception was successful and the formation of unidentified aircraft swung off to the west going out of range of the radar. This interception was hampered by darkness and a lack of altitude data from the radar, i. e. it is thought that the pursuit went underneath the formation of unidentified aircraft. At approximately 4:45 official confirmation that a state of war existed was received. The 3rd Pursuit squadron returned to Iba, landed, regassed and went to Stations.

At approximately 9:30, a large force of bombers over Lingayen was reported heading towards Manila. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was immediately dis-

patched for the interception over Rosales. The 17th Pursuit Squadron was immediately dispatched from Nichols Field to cover Clark Field. The interception was not successful. The bombers proceeded on a course until approximately 30 miles north of Rosales then made a turn to the northeast and proceeded to Baguio, bombed Baguio and Tagagarau and departed for the north. At the time the 20th took off all bombardment were dispatched from Clark Field. The 20th returned to Clark Field and gave the bombardment cover while they were landing. Both the 20th and the 17th then landed, regassed and went on the alert.

At approximately 11:30 a large formation of bombers was reported over the China Sea headed for Manila. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron was dispatched for the interception. Uncertainties of time and place factors, due to the delay in communications, making it doubtful whether the 3rd would accomplish the interception, the 17th was dispatched to cover Bataan, and the 34th was placed on standing patrol over Manila. At approximately 11:45 an unidentified report was received of a bombardment formation over Lingayen Gulf, headed south. The 20th not having completed gassing was not able to take off to investigate. At approximately 11:45 the 21st Pursuit Squadron was dispatched to cover Clark Field. At 12:15 the 20th completed gassing and was ordered to cover Clark Field. At 12:20 54 bombers and an undetermined number of dive bombers attacked Clark Field. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was in the process of taking off when the attack came. Four of their aircraft had cleared the ground. Another five were destroyed in the process of taking off by the bombardment. The remaining five were destroyed by strafing after the bombardment attack. The unidentified plot mentioned above proved to be the bombardment formation approaching Clark Field. Communications break down prevented proper identification. At the time of the attack on Clark Field four squadrons of pursuit were in the air and the fifth in the process of taking off. Due to a direct hit on the center of communications at Clark Field, ground-to-air control was destroyed and thus no control could be maintained of the fighters in the air.

The 3rd Pursuit Squadron, which had been dispatched for the interception over the China Sea, failed to make the interception and was notified of another raid approaching Iba, by the ground station at Iba. The radar set at Iba was plotting the approaching raid and relaying to the central plotting room at Neilson airport. However, due to a breakdown in communications these plots were never received at Neilson. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron returned to Iba and as they were circling the field 54 enemy bombers and an unknown number of dive bombers accompanying them approached the field. These were immediately attacked by the 3rd Pursuit Squadron. In the ensuing engagement one bomber and a number of strafers were claimed to have been destroyed. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron lost in the air five P-40s and although not preventing the bombardment of Iba, did prevent the strafing. After the withdrawal of the enemy, three additional aircraft (P-40s) were forced to crash land on the beaches due to their gas supply being exhausted. The remainder of the squadron proceeded to O'Donnell airport and landed; they remained there until ammunition and gas were dispatched from Clark Field to reload and regas this squadron. The installations and aircraft on the ground at Iba were completely destroyed by enemy bombardment. There were approximately eight airplanes on the ground at the time of the attack which were out of condition due to maintenance, engine change etc.

The 17th Pursuit Squadron over Bataan proceeded towards Clark Field but upon arrival there the enemy had withdrawn. The 17th, unable to contact the ground station, proceeded to Del Carmen and landed. The 21st Squadron was greatly delayed in taking off due to the excessive amount of dust on the field, and made no interception. The 34th Squadron patrolled Manila area and landed at Nichols Field at the completion of the mission.

[14164] Chron No. 10-41-6-44 D-1052

Headquarters, Fifth Air Force
Historical Record

Subject Class: Communications.

Title of Document: Record of an interview with Major Heald, Communications Officer, Fifth Air Service Command.

Date of Document: 15 May, 1944.

File No.: Interview.

Type of Document: Statement. Pages ----- Imp. ----- Pub. S.

From ----- To -----

Extract: Typed by C. Lutton. Checked by -----

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RECORD OF AN INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR HEALD, COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER, FIFTH AIR FORCE SERVICE COMMAND

15 May, 1944.

When the Fifth Air Base Group came to the Philippines about 15 November 1941, it was transferred from Manila to Mindinao where it established an airdrome at Del Monte. Lieut. Heald with nine men from the 19th Bombardment Group Hdq. Sq., and a large mobile radio truck, proceeded to Del Monte with the Fifth Air Base Group arriving at that base 1st December 1941. Base communications were set up and radio communications established from Del Monte back to Clark Field and Nielson Field during the week from 1 December to 8 December 1941.

At the time of the attack upon the Philippines, Lieut. Heald received the first message radioed to Del Monte from General Headquarters, which he immediately related to Captain Gee (now Lieut Col) then adjutant of the Fifth Air Base Group. This was signed "MacArthur" and was received at approximately 0630 and it read: "Hostilities have begun. All Airdromes alert". Five minutes later another message arrived from Lieutenant Colonel Eubank with about the same wording.

During the latter part of December 1941 and all of January 1942, Lt. Brownwell made daily reconnaissance flights in a P-40 over Davao harbor which fell to the Japanese the first week of the war.

This information (visual only as he had no photographic equipment) was sent by radio to General MacArthur—Great quantities of supplies and ships of all sorts were visible on the bay and in the harbor. At the time of the naval battle in Macassar Sts., 1 February to 6 February 1942, approximately fifty ships were in Davao Harbor—i. e. destroyers, cruisers, aircraft carriers, and cargo vessels. Several attempts were made by the enemy to follow Lt. Brownwell and locate the strip from which he operated, but he always managed to elude them and land on a strip that could not be found.

There were no radio communications between strips on Mindanao. The only means of communication was over the Philippine Commonwealth telephone lines which were very unsatisfactory.

[14166]

15 JANUARY 1946.

Memorandum for Lt. Colonel Duncombe.

Subject: Organization of the Far East Air Force

1. Inclosed herewith is the material you requested concerning the organization of the air force in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war.

2. Inclosure No. 1 is a copy of a 4 August 1941 order stating that the Air Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East "will operate directly under" the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East. Inclosure No. 2 is a 14 November 1941 order merely changing the name of the Air Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East to "Far East Air Force."

3. Inclosure No. 3 is a chart showing the relationship of the principal air and ground commanders in the Philippines to General MacArthur. Inclosure No. 4 is a chart giving in more detail the organization and location of the various air units in the Philippines. Inclosure No. 5 is a list of air force commanders in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war. The inclosures referred to in this paragraph have been recently prepared on the basis of records on file in the AAF Historical Office, Headquarters Army Air Forces and records in the possession of the Adjutant General.

/s/ JOSEPH B. MITCHELL,
Lt. Colonel GSC.

[14166] 5 Incls

1. Cy of order dtd 4 Aug 41
2. Cy of order dtd 14 Nov 41
3. Chart air & gd comdrs in the Phil
4. Chart Orgn of FEAF
5. List of Air Force cmdrs.

Chron. No. 41-8-4 D-1034

Headquarters, Fifth Air Force
Historical Record

Subject Class: Organization—Units

Title of Document: Redesignation of Air Force

Date of Document: 4 August 1941 File No. USAFFE 300.4

Type of Document: General Order

(Typed by C. Lutton)

True Copy.

HEADQUARTERS,
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST,
Manila, P. I., 4 August 1941.

General Orders. No. 4.

The Philippine Department Air Force as now constituted, Brigadier General Henry B. Clagett (O-2152), United States Army, Commanding, and such other units and installations as may be assigned to it, are hereby constituted as the Air [14167] Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East. It will operate directly under the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, except for routine administration and supply, which will continue through Headquarters Philippine Department.

By Command of Lieutenant General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Official:

/s/ CARL H. SEALS
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Acting Adjutant General.

True Copy

/s/ MANNING J. DAUER
Capt. Air Corps.

Chron No. 41-11-14 D-1051

Headquarters Fifth Air Force
Historical Record

Subject Class—Organizations—Units

Title of Document—General Order

Date of Document—14 November, 1941 File No. USAFFE—G. O.

(Typed by C. Lutton) Extract

Copy

HEADQUARTERS,
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST,
Manila, P. I., 14 November, 1941.

[14168]

General Orders No. 28

1. Pursuant to authority contained in letter, War Department, October 28, 1941, File AG 320.2 (10-20-41) MR-M-AAF, to this headquarters, effective November 16, 1941, the following changes in Air Force Units of the command are announced:

a. The Air Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East is effective this date, redesignated as "Far East Air Force".

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, United States Army Forces in the Far East, effective this date, is redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Far East Air Force.

* * * * *


By command of Lieutenant General MacARTHUR

E. K. SUTHERLAND
Brigadier General, GSC.
Chief of Staff

Official:

CARL H. SEALS,
Colonel, A. G. D.

7 DECEMBER 1941



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[14171] **COMMANDERS OF AIR FORCE UNITS IN THE PHILIPPINES AT THE OUT-BREAK OF THE WAR**

1. Far East Air Force (Nielson Field)—Maj. Gen. L. H. Brereton
2. 5th Interceptor Command (Nielson Field)—Brig. Gen. H. B. Claggett
3. 24th Pursuit Group (Clark Field)—Maj. O. L. Grover
 - 8rd Pursuit Squadron (Iba Field) 1st Lt. H. G. Thorne
 - 17th Pursuit Squadron (Nichols Field)—1st Lt. B. D. Wagner
 - 20th Pursuit Squadron (Clark Field)—1st Lt. J. H. Moore
 - 21st Pursuit Squadron (Del Carmen Field)—1st Lt. W. B. Dyess
 - 34th Pursuit Squadron (Nichols Field)—1st Lt. S. H. Marett
4. 5th Bomber Command (Nielson Field)—Lt. Col. E. L. Eubank
5. 19th Bombardment Group (H) (Clark Field)—Lt. Col. Eubank
 - 14th Bombardment Squadron (Del Monte Field)—Maj. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr.
 - 28th Bombardment Squadron (Clark Field)—Maj. W. P. Fisher
 - 30th Bombardment Squadron (Clark Field)—Maj. D. R. Gibbs
 - 93rd Bombardment Squadron (Del Monte Field)—Maj. C. E. Combs
6. 27th Bombardment Group (L) (Nielson Field)—Maj. J. H. Davies
 - 16th Bombardment Squadron—Capt. W. G. Hipps

[14172] 17th Bombardment Squadron—1st Lt. H. F. Lowery
 91st Bombardment Squadron—1st Lt. W. E. Eubank

7. 2nd Observation Squadron (Nichols Field)—Capt. J. Y. Parker
8. Far East Air Service Command (Nielson Field)—Col. L. S. Churchill
9. Philippine Air Depot (Nielson Field)—Lt. Col. W. N. Amls
10. 5th Air Base Group (Del Monte Field) Maj. R. T. Elsmore
11. 20th Air Base Group (Nichols Field)—Maj. W. H. Maverick
12. 36th Air Base Group (Nielson Field)
 - (It is believed that this was only a small detachment. The bulk of the group and its equipment went to Australia and never reached the Philippines. The detachment commander is believed to have been Capt. Waller.)
13. Clark Field—Maj. M. J. Daly
14. Del Carmen Field—1st Lt. S. H. Marett
 - (Lt. Marett is also listed above as the Commanding Officer of the 34th Pursuit Squadron of the 24th Pursuit Group.)
15. Del Monte Field—Maj. R. T. Elsmore
 - (Maj. Elsmore is also listed above as the Commanding Officer of the 5th Air Base Group)
16. Iba Field—1st Lt. H. G. Thorne
 - (Lt. Thorne is also listed above as the Commanding [14173] Officer of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron of the 24th Pursuit Group)
17. Nichols Field—Maj. W. H. Maverick
 - (Maj. Maverick is also listed above as the Commanding Officer of the 20th Air Force Group)
18. Nielson Field

(This field was not an operational field. It will be noted that only headquarters units, or units which did not have their planes or equipment are listed as being stationed at this field.)

[14174] **Mr. MORGAN.** We have a series of communications from the Federal Communications Commission, dated February 11, 14, and 18, 1946, concerning the matter of monitoring by the Federal Communications Commission at Hawaii for a "winds execute" message. Inasmuch as this question came up during the interrogation with respect to this matter, we would like to have these communications, which are from Mr. G. E. Sterling, Assistant Chief Engineer, together with enclosures, spread on the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They will be spread on the record at this point.

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(The communications referred to follow:)

[14175]

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington 25, D. C., February 11, 1946.

Mr. SETH RICHARDSON,
General Counsel, Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee,
Washington, D. C.
(Attention: Mr. Morgan.)

DEAR SIR: Replies have been received from all officers who were in charge of the Commission's activities in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, in which they all state that they were not requested by any representatives of the military authorities in Hawaii to monitor for the "winds" execute message prior to December 7, 1941.

Copies of their statements are attached to this communication.

Sincerely yours,

(sgd) G. E. Sterling
G. E. STERLING
Assistant Chief Engineer.

Attachments

FEBRUARY 7, 1946.

From: Supervisor H. A. M. A.
[14176] To: Chief, R. I. D.
Subject: "Winds Messages"

My memorandum dated February 4, 1946, contained a blanket denial that any request to monitor for the so-called "Winds Messages" was received from the Army or the Navy prior to December 7, 1941.

This is a repetition of that denial with the added statement that Col. Bicknell did not contact me (or any member of my staff) between November 28 and December 7, 1941, to request that we monitor for the "winds Messages" by making intercepts of Japanese radio transmissions.

/s/ LEE R. DAWSON

RADIO INTELLIGENCE DIVISION,
609 Stangenwald Bldg., Honolulu, T. H., February 4, 1946.

From: Supervisor, H. A. M. A.
To: Chief, R. I. D.
Subject: "Winds Messages"

I, Lee R. Dawson, Supervisor, Radio Intelligence Division, Federal Communications Commission, Hawaiian Monitoring Area, do hereby affirm and state that the following statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief:

(1) That I was actively in charge of the National [14177] Defense Operations Section of the Federal Communications Commission in the Hawaiian Islands from November 1, 1940, to December 7, 1941.

(2) That no request was received by me or by any member of my staff from the Army or the Navy prior to December seventh, 1941, to monitor for the so-called "Winds Messages."

/s/ LEE R. DAWSON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of February, A. D. 1946.

[SEAL]

/s/ ELBERT D. KWASHIGI,
Notary Public, Third Judicial Circuit, Territory of Hawaii.

My commission expires June 30, 1949.

FEB. 5, 1946.

From: Earl A. Nielsen, Kealahou, T. H.
To: Chief, R. I. D.
Subject: "Winds" Messages.

I, Earl A. Nielsen, affirm and state that to the best of my knowledge and belief no request to monitor for "Winds" messages was received by me from the Army or the Navy prior to December 7th, 1941. I was employed as Assistant Monitoring Officer at HA-2, Hawaii National Park from July 1st, 1941 thru December 7th, 1941.

EARL A. NIELSEN.

FEBRUARY 5, 1946.

Mr. GEORGE E. STERLING,
Federal Communications Commission, [14178] Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. STERLING: I am writing to confirm our telephonic conversation of last night regarding matters pertinent to the Pearl Harbor Investigation. As you know, I was Inspector in Charge of the Engineering Department's Field Division office in Honolulu from November 1940 to December 1945. At no time prior to December 7, 1941, was I contacted by G-2 of the Army, or by any other government office, with a request that my department make recordings or monitoring runs of radio broadcasts for the purpose of intercepting the so-called "winds" message from Japan.

As I now recall, I was told by one Frank Santos, who operated a pleasure fishing boat out of Honolulu, that he had aboard a fishing party on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941. Amongst the fishermen were some Army officers who became exasperated when their craft was strafed by the Japs because they thought the planes were our own and they were making their practice runs a bit too realistic. I was personally monitoring the 2638 kc band that morning and heard Santos ask the the Coast Guard station NMO for permission to enter the harbor. It was apparent from the conversation from NMO that personnel at the station did not realize that we were being attacked at the time.

Yours truly,

[14179]

(sgd) JOHN H. HOMSY.

P. S. I trust that you can read this letter which is written at my bedside.

73

JHH

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
RADIO INTELLIGENCE DIVISION,
Honolulu 1, T. H., February 7, 1946.

Secret

Via Clipper Airmail

From: Assistant Supervisor, HA-P, Honolulu, T. H.
To: Chief, Radio Intelligence Division
Subject: February radiogram 072007 BUSY SHIP

In your message of February 7, 1946 it was requested that a written statement be prepared by Mr. Dawson, Mr. Wagner and Mr. Klima concerning a "so called" request to the Honolulu office of the FCC for intercepts of Japanese transmissions containing "winds messages" between November 28, 1941 and December 7, 1941.

I make the following statement: I, Tom B. Wagner, Assistant Supervisor, HA-P, can not recall any request made by Col. Bicknell, G-2, Honolulu, Hawaii, or other military personnel between November 28, 1941 and December 7, 1941 to the FCC for Japanese intercepts [14180] containing "Winds Messages". No written record can be found in the HA-P files for such a request.

Such a request as this would require a clearance from the FCC office in Washington, D. C., before such information could be furnished Col. Bicknell. No record of such a request can be found.

TOM B. WAGNER.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT,
RADIO INTELLIGENCE DIVISION,
February 6, 1946.

To: Chief Radio Intelligence Division
From: Monitoring Officer in Chg. Unit HA-3, Koloa Kaula TH
Subject: Army/Navy monitoring requests re: Japanese winds message prior Dec 7 1941.

Ref: Relative information requested Chief's Radiogram.

This unit was placed in service March nineteenth 1941. The unit was located, temporary set up, at Lihue Kauai. Relocation of the unit to the National Guard Armory Hanapepe Kauai was completed April first 1941.

The only office of military representation on the island of Kauai known by this unit was that of the U S Army.

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[14181] The commanding officer was contacted in person by myself, and information given as to our location, our aim and purpose in monitoring, and service rendered.

As officer in charge of this unit between the dates of March nineteenth 1941 and that of December eighth, 1941, and cognizant of all requests made for service at this unit by either the U. S. Army or Navy during this period, can state, that to the best of my knowledge neither the U. S. Army or Navy made a request for the monitoring of Japanese broadcasts for the interception of "winds message".

This unit's official case record file substantiates the above statement.

/s/ Theodore H. Tate

THEODORE H. TATE

Monitoring Officer.

WAR DEPARTMENT
FOREIGN BROADCAST INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
FIELD DIVISION
February 5, 1946.

From: Waldemar M. Klima, P. O. Box FF, Kekaha, Kauai, T. H.

To: Mr. George E. Sterling, Chief, RID, Washington 25, DC

Subject: Your request re the Winds message.

This afternoon I received the following message by telephone from the HA-3, RID, unit near Koloa, Kauai, T. H.

[14182] "Chief wants airmail statements from you and Klima regarding whether Army and Navy requested you to monitor for winds message from Tokyo prior to December 7th"

The message was apparently a paraphrase by King (Wagner of HA-P) of Busy's message received from Washington.

My statement follows: I am sufficiently certain to state that I personally did not receive a written, telephoned, or verbal request from any representative or any of the military agencies (Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, or Marines) on Oahu to monitor for a "Winds message" or any other specific or general monitoring request in the period of a week prior to December 7, 1941. Neither am I aware of any such request having been received by any one of the other HA-P or HA-1 staff members. No announcement of such a monitoring request was made verbally or in written posted form by the officers in-charge of monitoring activities in the Punchbowl in Honolulu, T. H.

(signed) Waldemar M. Klima
WALDEMAR M. KLIMA

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington 25, D. C., February 14, 1946.

Mr. SETH RICHARDSON,

[14183] General Counsel, Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Morgan

DEAR SIR: I have previously furnished you with statements received from responsible representatives of the Federal Communications Commission, who were on duty in Hawaii prior to December 1941, in which they stated that they had not been contacted by Colonel Bicknell for the purpose of engaging in monitoring Japanese broadcast transmissions for the purpose of intercepting the "WINDS" message.

I now enclose an affidavit made by an employee of the Federal Communications Commission, Mr. A. Prose Walker, in which he states that Colonel Bicknell on two occasions approached him for the purpose of ascertaining if he had any knowledge of Japanese radio stations under surveillance by the FCC, one of the inquiries being directed specifically to the "WINDS" message.

It is very difficult for me to understand why Colonel Bicknell should make affidavit to the effect that he did contact FCC representatives for the purpose of intercepting the "WINDS" message when our own employees in responsible positions indicate they have no knowledge of such a contact.

It is also difficult for me to understand why Colonel [14184] Bicknell endeavored to ascertain information from Mr. Walker on the same subject on two occasions.

I am also enclosing the original sworn statement made by Mr. Lee R. Dawson, a copy of which was furnished you with the other papers. Mr. Dawson was,

prior to December 7, 1941, and continues in charge of our Monitoring Activities in Hawaii.

Very truly yours,

G. E. STERLING
/s/ G. E. Sterling
Assistant Chief Engineer.

Enclosures.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
FEBRUARY 13, 1946.

To: Mr. Sterling
From: Mr. Walker

I recall that on two occasions I was approached by Army personnel relative to any interceptions which the FCC had made of Japanese transmissions prior to or on December 7, 1941. Before the departure of Colonel G. W. Bicknell, Assistant A. C. of S., G2 C. I. D., from the Hawaiian Department, I have a vague recollection that he asked me if I had any knowledge of the Japanese radio stations under surveillance at FCC monitoring stations in Hawaii. My reply was that I had no knowledge of the matter inasmuch as I was [14185] not present in Hawaii at that time, having arrived on March 2, 1942. I probably referred him to Mr. Dawson. I do not recall that any mention was made of the "WINDS" message.

I entered on duty as Chief, Technical Operations Section, RID, on July 7, 1944. Sometime during either July or August of that year, I had lunch with Colonel G. W. Bicknell and he again mentioned the subject of the FCC intercepting any messages on or prior to December 7, 1941. I recall that during this conversation he specifically mentioned the "WINDS" message. Having no knowledge whatever at that time of such a message, my answer to Colonel Bicknell was that I knew nothing about it.

/s/ A. PROSE WALKER.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 13th day of February, 1946.

[SEAL]

/s/ HELEN A. MARSTON
Notary Public

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington 25, D. C., February 18, 1946.

Mr. SETH RICHARDSON

General Counsel, Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, Washington, D. C.
[14186] Attention: Mr. Morgan

DEAR SIR: There is submitted herewith additional information received from the Supervisor of the Hawaiian Monitoring Area of the Radio Intelligence Division, relative to Colonel Bicknell's affidavit relating to the "WINDS" message.

Very truly yours,

/s/ G. E. Sterling
G. E. STERLING
Assistant Chief Engineer.

Enclosure

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
RADIO INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
Honolulu 1, T. H., February 11, 1946.

From: Supervisor, Hawaiian Monitoring Area
To: Chief, Radio Intelligence Division
Subject: Col. Bicknell's Affidavit.

Following my return this date from an exploratory survey trip around the island of Hawaii I have reviewed the correspondence between your office and HA-P during my absence and I believe the following remarks will shed some light on this controversy.

[14187] In the first place, there is absolutely no evidence on hand to bear out Col. Bicknell's statement that he (1) contacted the local FCC intercept station in Hawaii, (2) requested them to monitor for "winds messages" and (3) that intercepts were furnished him but were not what he was looking for. If Col.

Bicknell had contacted HA-P he would normally have talked to either Mr. Wagner or myself. Neither one of us remembers any such call. If a request had been received by any of the HA-P staff to monitor for "winds messages" it would certainly have been brought to the attention of either Mr. Wagner or myself and such an unusual request would certainly have remained in our memories.

Furthermore, if such a request had been received calling for the release of intercepted material, authorization would first have been obtained from your office before such release was made. Attention is called, in this regard, to the fact that the Navy made a request that HA-P participate in a direction finder problem during the latter part of November 1941 and that your office was immediately notified and authority requested before bearings were released to the Navy.

With regard to the third point, I should like to ask what kind of intercepts we are supposed to have furnished him. I believe that we could show quite clearly that no intercepts were furnished Col. Bicknell. I suspect that, [14188] if pressed on this point, he would describe the translations of the JZI intercepts which we furnished the Office of Naval Intelligence from May through December 1941. I refer to the Japanese propaganda broadcasts which we recorded and which were translated by ONI translators. Copies of these intercepts were furnished the FBI and the Office of Military Intelligence. No request for special monitoring with regard to these intercepts, or any other) was received from either the ONI or the MID during the period between November 28 and December 7, 1941.

One other point comes to mind. You will remember that when I arrived in Washington during July 1943 on special detail, I reported verbally to you that Lt. Col. Henry Christian Clausen of the Judge Advocate General's Department, Army of the United States, had contacted me in Honolulu just prior to my departure and had specifically asked if Col. Bicknell had not requested us to do some monitoring just prior to December 7, 1941. Lt. Col. Clausen was very vague as to just what monitoring Col. Bicknell asked us to do and made no claim that the request had been to monitor specifically for the "winds message". Both Mr. Wagner and I answered Lt. Col. Clausen in the negative and said then, as we do now, that we could recollect no such request from Col. Bicknell.

That is all I can add to the story. I believe it was [14189] during July 1943 that I first learned that there was any such thing as a "winds message". I am absolutely certain that no request to monitor for such a message was received at HA-P prior to December 7, 1941.

/s/ LEE R. DAWSON.

[14190] Mr. MORGAN. We have a telegram, dated August 16, 1941, in five sections, from former Ambassador Grew, to the State Department. This telegram includes the substance of telegrams sent to the British Foreign Office by the British Ambassador reporting his conversation on August 11 with the Japanese Foreign Minister. The release of this document has been cleared with the British, and we request that it be spread on the record at this point with the observation that in a note from the State Department liaison officer, dated January 9, 1946, he indicates:

The British Government has agreed to the use of the attached telegram No. 1235 from Tokyo August 16, 1941. It points out an error in section 2, paragraph (A), fourth line from the bottom, where "Germany's policy" should read "Japan's policy."

As indicated, we would like to have this telegram spread on the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be spread on the record at this point. (The telegram referred to follows:)

[14190-A]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TEM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 16, 1941. Rec'd 9:20 p. m. 17th.

SECRETARY OF STATE, *Washington*.

1235, August 16, 3 p. m. (section one).

Following is the (?) telegrams sent to Foreign Office by the British Ambassador reporting his conversation on August 11, with the Japanese Foreign Minister.

"The strong representations to Minister for Foreign Affairs today in regard to spokesman's statement impugning the veracity (?) assurances as to the absence of any British aggressive designs against Thailand. The statement is that such assurances could not be accepted "(?) (?) " was not only calculated to inflame opinion in Japan, but was definitely offensive and I trusted that His Excellency would warn the spokesman of the need of greater (?) in making public statements in the present delicate state of Anglo-Japanese relations. I added that after a public statement of this kind, it was clear from what source the Japanese press received its inspiration for its attacks on my country.

[14190-B] Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to pass on my remarks to Director General of Bureau of Information.

GREW.

WSB

[14190-C]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED COPY

LET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 14, 1941. Rec'd. 11:10 p.m., 17th.

SECRETARY OF STATE, *Washington*.

1235, August 14 3 p.m. (Section Two).

I proceeded to say how regrettable it seemed to me to be that the Japanese Government should continue to place more reliance on reports (probably emanating from interested quarters) in preference not only to my own assurances but also to the public declaration made by yourself in the House of Commons. Assuming that the Japanese Government were sincere in their desire to avoid trouble over Thailand, such rumors appeared to me to be fantastic and I made an earnest appeal to His Excellency to place his cards on the table and give me some idea of the nature and the source of the reports on which they were acting. If His Excellency would deal with the matter thus frankly I was prepared to be equally frank in explaining the point of view and intention of His Majesty's Government.

Two. Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed that if things were to be prevented from going from bad to [14190-D] worse, a frank interchange of views was essential and he then mentioned several examples of the reports which were creating so much concern in Japan and invited my comments:

(A) Concentration of British troops on Thai frontier. Japanese reports were to the effect that large bodies of British troops had been concentrated ready for an immediate incursion onto Thai territory. I replied that this was a gross exaggeration: such British units as were on the Thai frontier were there purely for defensive purposes—as indeed were all our forces in Malaya and Burmah—with Germany's policy steadily pushing southwards, it was an elementary precaution that the British border defences should be adequately manned.

(B) Report that the WARSPITE was in the Gulf of Siam.

GREW

NPL

[14190-E]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 14, 1941. Rec'd. 11:45 p.m., 17th.

SECRETARY OF STATE, *Washington*.

1235, August 14, 3 p.m. (Section Three).

This report, which he believed had originated with British journalists in Thailand, had received wide currency plausible if untrue, it was unfortunate that they allowed the rumor to spread. I replied that the report in the form in which it had appeared in the press was nonsense on the face of it and I thought it much more likely to have originated in Japanese than British journalistic circles in

Thailand (c) Alleged Russo-Japanese clash on Manchukuo front. This report had been spread with particular persistence from Singapore although there was no truth in it whatsoever. No such clash had occurred. I suggested to His Excellency that the report had originated in Manchuria and had received wide currency, so that it was unfair to saddle Singapore with it.

(D) Speeches by Commander in Chief Far East and other high officers in Malaya. The reiterated public assertion of our growing military and air strength in [14190-F] Malaya conveyed an impression of aggressive intentions and had proved most disturbing to the public mind in Japan. Their effect was simply to increase the pressure on the Japanese Government to hasten and augment their own preparations to defend the sphere in which Japan had a vital interest. He made a strong plea for the adoption of a calm and unprovocative attitude on the part of all concerned in handling the present delicate situation, promising to do his best in this direction if the British authorities would do their part. I explained that our authorities in Malaya had to think of the morale of the local population, which might well be affected by Japan's steady advance towards our frontiers were it not for public assurances that all necessary measures had been taken for the defense of British territory. Nevertheless I shared the opinion expressed by His Excellency that in such matters "silence is golden" and promised to impart his representations on this point to you.

GREW.

HSM

[14190-G]

Corrected Copy

TK

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 14, 1941. Rec'd 10:50 a. m., 17th.

SECRETARY OF STATE, *Washington*.

1235, August 14, 3 p. m., (Section Four).

Three. I then reverted to the signs of Japanese pressure on Thailand, quoting reports of concentration of Japanese troops along the Thai border and giving him recent examples of mendacious Japanese press attacks and allegations against us. His Excellency replied that only quite weak Japanese units had proceeded to the Thai frontier and that I would be surprised if I knew how small was the Japanese force which had landed in Indochina. (I abstained from asking for figures for fear of a request referring to our strength along Thai frontier).

Four. A long conversation then ensued on the economic position as regards Thailand, particularly as regards rice, rubber, and other materials which it was now more vital than ever for Japan to secure from that country. His Excellency observed that Netherlands East Indies under British influence had [14190-H] decided to join in the freezing of Japanese assets, with the result that it is now more than ever essential for Japan to satisfy her urgent needs in such markets as were open to her. Japanese-Thai trade had recently showed a natural tendency to increase owing to the difficulties of trade with third powers and the Japanese Government felt that they had a serious grievance against us for our attempts to induce Thailand to stop the export to Japan of even such a vital foodstuff as rice. I was able to show that in this respect His Excellency was laboring under a complete misapprehension, adding, however, that we were equally determined that our own right to purchase reasonable supplies of rice, rubber, et cetera, in Thailand, should not be interfered with by Japanese agencies. On His Excellency's charge that the surest way to ease the economic situation as regards Thailand would be to induce the Netherlands East Indies to lessen the restrictions on exports to Japan, I suggested that he was putting the cart before the horse and that the allaying of British and Netherlands East Indies apprehensions in regard to Japan's intentions in Thai

GREW.

CSB

[14190-I]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 16, 1941. Rec'd. 10 a.m., 18th.

SECRETARY OF STATE, *Washington*.

1235, August 16, 3 p.m. (Section five).

should be the prelude to any overhauling of the economic restrictions imposed in the Netherlands East Indies or elsewhere.

Five. I took the opportunity to say that the main point of our economic restrictions on trade with Japan was, I believed, to bring home to the Japanese Government the fact that in our view Japan's successive southward advances had now reached a point at which words and protests were useless and deeds were necessary to bring it home to the Japanese Government and public how close they were to the danger zone. In denying that Netherlands East Indies action in this matter had been due to British pressure or influence I said that I assumed that the above considerations had also weighed with the Netherlands East Indies Government who must feel themselves threatened equally with us by the Japanese action in Indochina. I did not need to inform His [14190-J] Excellency that the lifeline of our communications with Australia and New Zealand ran through the Netherlands East Indies thus creating a common problem of defense. When he inquired "defense whom" and I replied "against Japan" His Excellency merely smiled and shook his head.

Six. In conclusion we agreed that the main difficulty lay in the suspicions which each power entertained of the intentions of the other, though I did not fail to ridicule the apprehensions of a power which had been steadily advancing southwards until it had reached a point 1500 miles from Tokyo. Minister for Foreign Affairs reasserted that this advance was necessitated solely by Japan's determination to bring her war with China to a successful conclusion and he could only regret our apparent inability to accept his formal assurances that the advance into South Indochina was neither directed against us nor connoted any Japanese intention of attacking Thailand. We also agreed that our conversation might have been useful as tending to dissipate unnecessary misunderstandings and that it would be desirable to have similar frank discussions from time to time.

Seven. While apologizing for the length of this telegram I am anxious to convey to you as correct an [14190-K] impression as I can of the character and views of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs. The conversation lasted for an hour and a half and touched on many subsidiary points which were useful for our mutual understanding though perhaps unnecessary to report by telegram".

Sent Department, via air, mail to Shanghai.
(End of message.)

GEW.

GW.

[14191] Mr. MORGAN. At various places throughout the transcript requests have been made for information with respect to "water-tight integrity of major vessels" located at Pearl Harbor. In order to bring together at one place all communications relating to this matter, we would like to have spread on the record at this time the following communications from the Navy Department:

11 December 1945.

Another one dated 11 December, 1945.

One dated 3 January 1946.

And a final memorandum dated 29 January 1946.

This will enable us to have at one place all of the communications with respect to the condition of "water-tight integrity of major vessels."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They will be spread on the record at this point.

(The communications referred to follow:)

[14192]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY,
Washington, 11 December 1945

Memorandum to: Mr. William D. Mitchell.

1. With further reference to my memorandum to you dated 11 December 1945 the subject of which was "Conditions of water-tight integrity of major vessels",

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there is attached hereto a table¹ showing the scheduled inspection of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941. It will be noted that this table does not contain all of the ships which were at Pearl Harbor on December 7; the explanation for this is, the ships which are not shown were not scheduled for inspection during the period October-December 1941.

/s/ John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

[14193]
R-#16

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
Washington, 11 December 1945

Memorandum:

To: William D. Mitchell.

Subject: Condition of water-tight integrity of major vessels.

1. Pursuant to your request concerning the above matter, the following information has been obtained and is submitted.²

(a) An examination of the logs and records of the major vessels at Pearl Harbor indicates that only one vessel did not have an equivalent of the condition "all water-tight openings below the third deck closed" at the time of the attack. That vessel, the *USS California*, had ten inner and outboard voids open for maintenance work. Its remaining water-tight openings below the third deck were closed.

(b) The logs of the *USS Oklahoma* and *USS Arizona* were destroyed. However information has been obtained through Commander Fuqua, the Damage Control Officer of the *Arizona*, that on his ship all water-tight doors below the third deck were closed. This was also the condition that prevailed in the *USS Oklahoma*, according to information stated by the Commanding Officer of that ship.

[14194] (c) Material conditions of readiness referred to as conditions "Baker" or "X-ray" or "Yoke" are higher than the minimum. The minimum requirements are considered to be those prescribed by Navy Regulations, that is, that all water-tight openings below the third deck be closed from 1600 to 0800.

(d) According to the best available analysis in the Navy Department, the *USS California* is the only ship that might have been saved from sinking by the closing of manhole covers that had been left open for maintenance.

(e) The *USS Pennsylvania* was in dry dock and is not included within the above general statement concerning the conditions of water-tight integrity that prevailed at that time.

2. If more specific and detailed information on these matters is desired, an attempt will be made to locate and have present necessary witnesses.

/s/ John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lt. Comdr. USNR.

[14195]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Washington 3, January 1945²

Memorandum:

To: Mr. William D. Mitchell

1. With reference to your memorandum of 11 December 1945 referring to the memorandum to you of the same date from Lt. Comdr. John F. Baecher entitled "Conditions of Water-tight Integrity of Major Vessels," it is believed that the further memorandum to you from Lt. Comdr. Baecher of the same date (11 December 1945) with enclosure "Compilation of Inspection Schedules Applicable to Vessels Present at Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941," together with the first mentioned memorandum constitutes the desired response to the inquiry concerning the "inspection" charge."

¹ The table referred to appears in Hearings, Part 4, p. 1678.

² See Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2675-2676.

2. There has also been compiled a statement dated 20 December 1945 from the logs of the various ships of inspection that occurred on 5 and 6 December 1941. A copy of this compilation is enclosed herewith since it bears on the same question.

3. With reference to the inquiry concerning the names of persons from the various ships "who could testify about each vessel," it is believed that the best witnesses would be the Senior Surviving Officer from each vessel along [14196] with that ship's Damage Control Officer. In addition to those officers, the names of whom are listed on the "Report of Senior Surviving Officers and Damage Control Officers," also enclosed herewith, Captain Leslie A. Kniskern, attached to the Bureau of Ships, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., who made a study and analyzed the damage to vessels at Pearl Harbor, may have something to contribute in the way of testimony, if the same is desired. Many of these prospective witnesses are located at points far distant from Washington and none of them have as yet been interviewed since the scope of any preliminary interview has not yet been determined.

4. It will be appreciated if you will give advance notice in the event you desire to call any of these individuals as witnesses, or if you desire them to be preliminarily interviewed by the Navy representatives.

/s/ John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHE
Lt. Comdr, USNR.

A. *Arizona*

1. SSO: Ellis H. Geiselman, Capt., USN.
2. DCO: Samuel G. Fuqua, Capt., USN.

B. *California*

1. SSO: Joel W. Bunkley, R. Adm., USN.
2. DCO: Marion N. Little, Capt., USN.

[14197] C. *Maryland*

1. SSO: John M. Haines, Capt., USN.
2. DCO: Wm. S. G. Davis, Capt., USN.

D. *Nevada*

1. SSO: Francis W. Scanland, Commodore, USN.
2. DCO: George C. Miller, Capt., USN.

E. *Oklahoma*

1. SSO: Thomas D. Cullins, Capt., USN.
2. DCO: W. M. Hobby, Lt. Comdr., USN.

F. *Pennsylvania*

1. SSO: C. M. Cooke, Jr., Vice Admiral, USN.
2. DCO: Wm. E. Stock, Comdr., USN.

G. *Tennessee*

1. SSO: Charles E. Reordan, Capt., USN.
- *2 Ass't. DCO: Robert R. Moore, Comdr., USN (Ret.)

H. *West Virginia*

1. SSO: R. H. Hillenkoetter, Capt., USN.
2. DCO: J. S. Harper, Capt., USN.

* DCO deceased.

20 December 1945.

Inspections made on U. S. Battleships which were at Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec. 1941. These inspections occurred on 5 or 6 Dec. 1941 as designated.*

[14198] *USS Arizona*

No log received for Dec. 1941.

USS California

5 Dec. 1941

1149 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

6 Dec. 1941

1020 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

Made monthly inspection of all indices of smokeless powder on board; conditions normal.

*See Hearings, Part 3, p. 2677.

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USS Maryland

5 Dec. 1941

0710 Food inspection.

6 Dec. 1941

0800 Made daily visual examination of all smokeless powder samples, violet paper, and test for local heating of magazines on board ship; conditions normal.

1330 By order of the Commanding Officer, Lt. (jg) Nelson H. Randall, C-V(S) USNR, was suspended from duty for a period of five days from and including this date for improper performance of duty as Communication Watch Officer failing to deliver a despatch to the Commander Battleships Battle Force. The Commanding Officer further ordered that, due to the exigencies of the service [14199] Lt. (jg) Randall is restored to duty for the duration of the Annual Military Inspection and Damage Control Practice of this vessel on December 8, 1941 and December 9, 1941.

USS Nevada

5 Dec 1941

No inspections.

6 Dec 1941

0705 Food inspection.

0900 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

USS Oklahoma

No log received for Dec 1941.

USS Pennsylvania

5 Dec 1941

0800 Food inspection.

1150 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

6 Dec. 1941

0833 Landing force left the ship to be inspected by Commander Battleship Division TWO. 1045 Landing force returned.

USS Pennsylvania

6 Dec 1941

1155 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

[14200] *USS Tennessee*

5 Dec. 1941

1010 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

1445 Secured boiler number 8 after having conducted tests on safety valves.

6 Dec 1941

0745 Commenced embarking Landing Force for Annual Military Inspection.

1130 Landing Force returned aboard. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

USS West Virginia

No log received for Dec 1941.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Washington, 29 January 1946

R #16

Memorandum:

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. In response to the suggestion in the Record of Proceedings page 7236 that the Navy would make a further check in respect of the logs of certain battleships that were at Pearl Harbor concerning water-tight integrity, it is thought advisable to first refer to the several memoranda previously [14201] forwarded counsel on that subject.

Three previous memoranda with enclosures on this subject have been forwarded to counsel, two being dated 11 December 1945 and one 3 January 1946. The enclosures were dated October, November and December 1941 and 20 December 1945.

2. One of the 11 December 1945 memoranda forwarded as an enclosure a table showing the schedules of inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October,

November and December 1941. This memorandum was referred to in the Record of Proceedings at pages 4436-4439 and the enclosure became Exhibit #69 your investigation.

The second memorandum dated 11 December 1945 referred to information which had been obtained regarding water-tight integrity of major vessels, including that only one vessel, the U S S *California*, might have been saved from sinking if certain manhole covers had not been left open for maintenance work. This memorandum was quoted in the Record of Proceedings at pages 7233-7235, and the enclosure at pages 7237-7239.

It is noted that the memorandum of Mr. William D. Mitchell to Admiral Colclough dated 11 December 1945 which is quoted in the Record of Proceedings at page 7235, referred to only one of the two Navy Department memoranda to him of that date, and dealt with the question of the names of prospective [14202] witnesses concerning the "inspection charge". This memorandum of Mr. Mitchell was a response to one of the Navy memoranda of 11 December 1945, quoted in the Record of Proceedings at pages 7234-7235, in which the Navy had previously volunteered to furnish the names of witnesses if such were desired by the committee or counsel, and it did not refer to the other Navy memorandum of 11 December bearing on the "inspection charge".

The Navy memorandum of 3 January 1946 referred to the Navy memoranda of 11 December 1945, and enclosed a statement of mention in the logs of the major vessels at Pearl Harbor of inspections on 5 and 6 December 1941 and also a list as prospective witnesses of the names of Senior Surviving Officers and Damage Control Officers of the several major ships sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor.

A perusal of the Record of Proceedings does not disclose that the Navy memoranda of 11 December 1945 forwarding the schedule of inspections which became your Exhibit #69, or the Navy memoranda of 3 January 1946, or the list of prospective witnesses enclosed therewith in response to the memorandum of Mr. Mitchell printed in the Record of Proceedings at page 7235, have been incorporated in the record. Such incorporation may be appropriate in order to make the record complete.

3.* With respect to the further check to be made by the Navy referred to in the Record of Proceedings at page 7236, [14203] and supplementing the 20 December 1945 enclosure forwarded with the memorandum of 3 January 1946, the logs of the USS *California*, *Maryland*, *Nevada* and *Tennessee* have been examined for any record of any inspections, and for any references concerning water-tight integrity precedent to or in preparation for any inspections on 5, 6, and 7 December 1941, with negative results.

/s/ John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHER
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

[14204] Mr. MORGAN. We have a communication from Commander Baecher dated April 8, 1946, directed to Mr. Richardson, as follows:

Washington, 8 April 1946.

Memorandum:

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. In response to your request for the information, official notification to the Navy Department of the air raid on Pearl Harbor was received by Radio Washington from Radio Honolulu at 1850 GCT (1350 EST), 7 December 1941, by dispatch as follows:

NPM 1516

A0F2 1830 0F3

FROM CINCPAC

ACTION CINCLANT CINCAF OPNAV

AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NOT DRILL

2. At 1930 GCT (1430 EST), 7 December 1941, an ALNAV message was sent by the Secretary of the Navy to all ships and stations reading "Execute WPL-46 against Japan."

/S/ JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR."

*See Hearings, Part 3, p. 2676.

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[14205] Mr. MORGAN. We have a further communication from the War Department with respect to reels of microfilm received from General MacArthur's headquarters, and we ask that this communication, dated 28 February 1946 be spread on the record.

(The communication referred to follows:)

[14206]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ROOM 4D757, THE PENTAGON,
Washington, D. C., 28 February 1946

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

In addition to the 12 reels of microfilm previously received from General MacArthur's headquarters (see Committee transcript pages 7874 and 13,062), there have now been received two more reels containing material from the Japanese file on United States-Japanese negotiations prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. From an examination by qualified Japanese linguists, it appears that of the 80 items in these two reels all were intercepted by the United States at the time of transmission in 1941, except the following:

1. A message from Berlin to Tokyo dated 22 May 1941, giving the substance of an article published in *Pravda*.
2. A message from New York to Tokyo dated 10 July 1941, giving the substance of an article published in *Newsweek*.
3. A message from Rome to Tokyo dated 15 September 1941, giving the substance of two United Press dispatches.
4. A message from London to Tokyo dated 19 May [14207] 1941, giving the substance of an article published in the *Telegraph and Mail*.
5. A memorandum related to the "draft" submitted by Ambassador Nomura to the Secretary of State on 12 May 1941. The draft itself appears at page 420 of Volume 2 of *Foreign Relations*.

Although none of the above items would appear to be helpful to the Committee, the War Department will of course furnish them if the Committee so requests.

/s/ Harmon Duncombe
HARMON DUNCOMBE
Lt. Colonel, GSC

[14208] Mr. MORGAN. Pursuant to a request made by Senator Ferguson at page 522 of the record we have the following pertinent portion from a communication received from the Navy Department dated April 5, 1946:

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Page 522), which is referred to in Item 4 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there is forwarded herewith a copy of the document containing information of the Japanese plans leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor based on information obtain subsequent to 7 December 1941, that was presented to the Secretary of State, the Honorable James F. Byrnes, during the latter part of October.

We request at this point that the entire memorandum be spread on the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so spread on the record.

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

[14209]

RECONSTRUCTION OF JAPANESE PLANS LEADING UP TO THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR.

(BASED UPON INFORMATION OBTAINED SUBSEQUENT TO 7 DECEMBER 1941)

The following summarization has been prepared on the basis of reliable information obtained from various sources subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although this summary does not represent a resume of Japanese Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1, it will be apparent that heavy reliance has nevertheless been placed upon that document, a translation of which is submitted under separate cover.

The Japanese Naval High Command completed preparations during the summer and fall of 1941 to carry out a projected 2-phase plan of conquest and consolidation in the Asiatic-Pacific theatre. The essence of the plan lay in the element of *surprise* in a sudden attack which at one fell swoop would cripple

the major potential opposition—the American Fleet maintained at Pearl Harbor. Following the crippling of this opposition weapon, coincident with the seizure and occupation of land masses desired for the economic, political, and military reasons that together determined the borders of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Phase 1 of the campaign would be completed, and Phase 2—the consolidation of these gains by the seizure or neutralization of outer areas, together with the continued attrition of the enemy forces and his lines of [14210] supply—could be carried out to ensure the permanence of the new Empire.

The Japanese fleet, which had been in training over a period of years for combat fleet operations, was in a state of readiness by the summer of 1941. By late August of 1941, there is evidence based on information believed to be reliable, that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet ordered all fleet commanders and their key staff members to Tokyo for war games* preparatory to a final formulation of operation plans. The final games reportedly got underway on 2 September 1941, with most of the high ranking officers participating on one of the three teams that were organized: the "N" (Nippon) Team, "A" (America) Team, and "E" (England) Team.

During the afternoon of 3 September, 50 copies of an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held were prepared and contained the heart of Operation Order No. 1. These plans must have been under development for several months, as extensive preliminary planning was indicated.

On 5 September, it is known that Pearl Harbor plans were under discussion and the Japs apparently expected to catch all major U. S. Fleet units in the Pacific in Pearl Harbor, as well as units which they believed were recently transferred from the Atlantic. "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on Hawaii and one *Akagi*-class [14211] aircraft carrier and one *Soryu*-class aircraft carrier were estimated as sunk.

On 6 and 7 September, "N" Team debated the best means of assaulting Pearl Harbor. Captain Kurojima (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral Ito (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on Hawaii. Ito was in favor of an early landing but Kurojima won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistic problems.

These early sessions apparently were confined primarily to two general problems: first, the details for a surprise raid on Pearl Harbor; and second, a schedule for occupying, Malaya, Burma, N. E. I., the Philippines, the Solomons, and Central Pacific Islands, including Hawaii. The conferences and games were ended about 13 September. At the end of September, the Main Body of the Jap Fleet moved to Saeki and four revisions of Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 were made while *Nagato* (Flagship) was at Saeki, although no major changes are indicated.

The actual operation plan itself—Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1—has since been recovered and is reproduced in its entirety under separate cover. The objectives of the campaign strategy, the outline and sequence of operations planned, and the organization of the naval forces allotted to each phase of the operations were set forth in the Operation Order, and are analyzed below.

[14212] Objectives:

The general aims of the entire campaign were predicated on the desires for military conquest and security, and enhancement of the Empire by the occupation of areas rich in natural resources:

"1. In the east, the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of operation and supply lines to the Orient will be cut.

"2. In the west, British Malaya will be occupied and British lines of operation and supply lines to the Orient, as well as the Burma Road, will be cut.

"3. Enemy forces in the Orient will be destroyed, bases of operations will be seized, and areas with natural resources will be occupied.

"4. Strategic areas will be seized and developed; defenses will be strengthened in order to establish a durable basis for operations.

"5. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated.

"6. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will to fight."

Outline of operations:

For the accomplishment of the objectives stated above, it was contemplated that operations would be carried out in two phases—the First Phase, comprising

* See Appendix 1.

conquest of the American Fleet and occupation of areas desired, in large part, [14213] for economic reasons (the Philippines, British Malaya, Netherlands East Indies); the Second Phase, comprising consolidation of these gains by mopping-up operations, establishment of advance bases for defense of the occupied territory, and the continued attrition of enemy forces and lines of communication. The conquest or neutralization of areas deemed of strategic importance primarily from the point of view of military security was to occur during the Second Phase, no definite plan being provided initially for the chronology of those operations. Apparently both the precise timing of that portion of the campaign and the determination of which of these strategic areas (listed as Eastern New Guinea, New Britain, Fiji, Samoa; Aleutians and Midway; Andaman Islands, strategic points in the Australia Area) would be seized and which merely neutralized, were problem to be worked out in detail following the completion of the occupation of the areas desired for their economic value as integral portions of the new Co-Prosperity Sphere, and to be solved "as quickly as operational conditions permit."

A. Occupation: "First Phase Operations":

Basically, at this initial stage of the war, the Imperial Navy had four missions to fulfill:

- [14214] (i) The destruction of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian area.
- (ii) The maintenance and extension of control over the Central and South Pacific, to deny these waters to any force which might menace the flank of the forces driving southward.
- (iii) The support of army invasion of the Philippines-N. E. I.-Southeast Asiatic areas and the destruction of Allied naval forces therein.
- (iv) The protection of the North, both against thrusts by the United States from the Aleutians and also against a possible attack by the U. S. S. R.

Aside from the considerably inferior air power and the relatively few scattered surface fleet units possessed by the Allies in the Asiatic-N. E. I. area, the only obstacle of consequence was the American Fleet and air-power based at Hawaii. While Japanese land-based air and surface task groups could suffice to support the amphibious landings in the Philippines-N. E. I.-Asiatic area, a major Japanese task force, built around a carrier striking group, was essential to conduct a surprise attack on the American Fleet. Accordingly, the following general allocation of Japanese forces* was planned for the first Phase operations.

(i) For the Pearl Harbor Attack:

[14215] The Striking Force under the Commander in Chief, 1st Air Fleet, comprising 2 fast battleships, 6 first-line carriers (with a maximum of 400 planes of all types), 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 16 destroyers plus.

The Advance Expeditionary Force under the Commander in Chief, 6th Fleet, comprising 1 training cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 20 fleet submarines, and 5 midget submarines.

(ii) For the Invasion of Wake and Guam (and of Rabaul if conditions warranted):

The South Seas Force under the Commander in Chief, 4th Fleet, comprising 4 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 1 training cruiser, 12 destroyers, 16 submarines.

(iii) For the Invasion of the Philippines-N. E. I.-Malaya:

The Southern Force under the Commander in Chief, 2nd Fleet, comprising 2 battleships, 2 small aircraft carriers, 11 heavy cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 52 destroyers, 16 submarines.

(iv) For the protection of the High North:

The Northern Force, under the Commander in Chief, 5th Fleet, comprising 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 2 destroyers.

(v) In Reserve:

The Main Body under the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, comprising 6 battleships, 2 light cruisers, 8 destroyers.

The operations of these forces during the First Phase were to be divided into three periods:

(a) First Period Operations:

Operations from the outbreak of war until the main body of the invasion army had been landed in the Philippines. To end about X plus 20.

(b) Second Period Operations:

Operations after (a) and until the main body of the invasion army had been landed in British Malaya. To end about X plus 40.

* See Appendix 2 for allocation of Japanese Task Forces.

(c) Third Period Operations:

Operations after (a) and until the completion of the occupation of the Netherlands East Indies.

(1) Central Pacific Operations:

(a) Attack on Pearl Harbor—Assumptions by the High Command:

It is clear from a study of the operation plans that the Japanese High Command made the following assumptions about the American Fleet:

(a) That the main body of the United States Pacific Fleet would be at anchor within Pearl Harbor, or at least in [14217] the Hawaiian area.

(b) That a fast carrier force could be moved from the Empire across the Pacific to the north of Midway, within striking distance of the main islands of the Hawaiian group without undue risk of detection by American defensive reconnaissance.

(c) That should assumption (a) or (b) be in error, a reserve group of heavy units could sortle from the Inland Sea to give support to the carrier striking force in a decisive engagement against the American Fleet. The other task forces of the Japanese Fleet—the Southern Area Force, Northern Area Force, South Seas Force—would also be available. Implicit in the plan is the assumption that in the event of such an engagement, the combined strength of the bulk of the Japanese major fleet units could defeat the American Fleet.

(d) That a powerful carrier air strike directed against the American forces based in Hawaii could, if tactical surprise were effected, achieve the strategic result of crippling the American Fleet, and the tactical result of destroying the American land-based air to permit the Japanese striking force to withdraw without damage. While the latter assumption does not appear explicitly in the copy of the Japanese Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 recovered in the Philippines, it is logically implicit in the plan, and probably was a feature of the specific Operation Order issued by the Striking Force [14218] Commander. The seizure of air superiority is part of the classic Japanese naval doctrine.

The four assumptions outlined above were well grounded. An espionage network in the Hawaiian Islands, together with uninterdicted cable communications between Hawaii and Japan undoubtedly aided the Japanese in establishing their basic hypothesis—namely, that the bulk of the American Pacific Fleet would be waiting at anchor at Pearl Harbor at the time of their surprise attack. The feasibility of a surprise attack prior to a declaration of war was, of course, borne out by events.

(i) Diplomatic Deception:

The operation plan providing for the outbreak of war and the attack on Pearl Harbor was published on 5 November 1941 as Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, and Y day (8 December, Japanese time) was set in Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 2 on 7 November 1941. At the same time, the Japanese envoy Mr. Kurusu was en route to Washington to join the Japanese Ambassador in conducting conversations with the American Government. On 7 November—the date that Y day was set—a “leading Japanese and reliable informant” visited the American Ambassador in Japan reportedly at the request of Foreign Minister Togo and urged repeatedly that, whether or not Japanese concessions were deemed inadequate by the United States, it was “of the highest importance [14219] that the Washington conversations be continued and not permitted to break down.” These conversations were continued throughout November and until the actual launching of the surprise attack. While it is true that Operation Order No. 2, setting Y Day, was not sufficient by itself to effect the launching of the attack on that day, it was sufficient to despatch the various Japanese task forces to their scheduled pre-invasion rendezvous points (Takan Bay in the Kuriles for the Pearl Harbor Striking Force; Mako in the Pescadores for the main body of the Philippines Force, etc.) and have the Fleet complete its basic preparations for an attack on that day. And it seems evident, from a study of such available subsidiary orders as were issued during November 1941 by certain of the task forces involved in the plan, that the supplementary orders that were to cause the task forces to move forward to their attack positions and were to specify precisely the time for the outbreak of war, were to be issued almost as inevitable concomitants of the initial decision embodied in Operation Orders Nos. 1 and 2. While a radical change in the diplomatic situation might have caused the plan to be abandoned, it seems probable that nothing short of complete American acceptance of the Japanese terms in their note of 20 November 1941 would have been regarded as sufficient to cancel the plans already set in motion. In any event, the continuation of diplomatic negotiations by the Japanese after

their task forces were already [14220] en route to their final goals must be deemed nothing short of deception.

(ii) *Radio Silence:*

The Striking Force, as it moved north to the sortie point in the Kuriles, and thence, to the eastern Pacific, was operating under strict injunctions to maintain radio silence to help assure the secrecy of its movement and mission.

(iii) *Radio Deception:*

The 1st Combined Communications Unit was directed to maintain deceptive traffic to simulate the presence of the main strength of the Japanese Fleet in the Inland Sea. At the same time, the early December movements of the Japanese units en route to the south were not conducted under complete radio silence—possibly because the element of surprise for that part of the campaign could not be preserved by silence since Allied visual observations could be made of those movements and possibly because of the belief that the ability of Allied intelligence to trace the southward movements of the Southern Force, and only those movements, would further bolster the effectiveness of the strategic surprise desired for the operations of the Striking Force.

Composition of the Forces Attacking Pearl Harbor:

Striking Force

Commanding Officer: Commander in Chief, 1st Air Fleet—Vice Admiral Chui-chi Nagumo.

Battleship Division #3 (1st section) (*Hiei, Kirishima*), 2 battleships.

Carrier Division #1 (*Kaga, Kagi*).

Carrier Division #2 (*Hiryu, Soryu*)

Carrier Division #5 (*Shokaku, Zuikaku*), 6 aircraft carriers.

Cruiser Division #8 (*Tone, Chikuma*), 2 heavy cruisers.

Destroyer Squadron 1 (*Abukuma*, 4 destroyer divisions) 1 light cruiser; 16 destroyers, plus 11 train vessels.

Advance Expeditionary Fleet

Commanding Officer: Commander in Chief, 6th Fleet—Vice Admiral Mitsumi Shimizu. *Isuzu, Yura*), 2 light cruisers; (*Katori*), 1 training cruiser; I-class submarines (including Submarine Squadrons #1, #2, #3: (I-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22-24, 68, 69, 74), 20 submarines. Midget submarines, 5 midget submarines, plus 6 train vessels.

Execution of the Operation:

The Striking Force assembled at Takan Bay in Etorofu Island (Kuriles) during late November 1941, and sortied for [14222] the attack on or about 27 November, following a course to the eastward and then southward, as indicated on the captured track chart appended (see Appendix 3). Of the 11 train vessels allotted in the Operation Plan, reliable information suggests that only 3 tankers and 1 supply ship actually accompanied the Force. Apparently also, 3 submarines of the Advance Expeditionary Force (submarine fleet) accompanied the Striking Force—the other submarines having proceeded from the Inland Sea independently of the Striking Force. During the fast voyage to their destination 200 miles due north of Oahu, the vessels of the carrier force were kept fueled successfully, albeit with considerable difficulty in many cases. Upon arrival at their destination, about 200 miles due north of Oahu, the carriers launched their aircraft, which rendezvoused further south and then flew in for a coordinated attack. Three waves of these carrier aircraft were employed, commencing at 0747 and ending at 0936, local time; the first attack was on various airfields, followed by attacks on the warships in Pearl Harbor. Following the successful completion of these surprise attacks, the carrier force withdrew to the Empire, taking a circuitous route to Hashirajima and arriving on 23 December. En route, Carrier Division #2 (*Hiryu, Soryu*) and Cruiser Division #8 (*Tone, Chikuma*) were detached as a small reinforcement group for the Wake Island operation. Losses sustained by the Striking Force during the Hawaiian operation reportedly [14223] totalled 29 aircraft.

Until the completion of the surprise attack on Hawaii by the Striking Force, the "Advance Expeditionary Force" of submarines was under the command of the Striking Force Commander. The precise movements of the participating submarines prior to the actual attack are not clear, although some information suggests that the bulk of those units left the Empire in late November. So far as is known, the functions allotted the submarines in Operation Order No. 1 were carried out as planned, viz:

(a) Until X-3, submarines were to reconnoiter important points in the Aleutians, Samoa, Fiji, and Tutulla, and were to observe and report on any powerful American forces discovered.

(b) One element was to patrol along the route of the Striking Force in advance of the movement of that Force—ensure the undetected approach of the carrier group to its destination.

(c) Until X-5, the remaining submarines were to surround Hawaii at extreme range while one element approached and reconnoitered without being observed.

(d) On X day, the function of the submarines would be to "observe and attack the American Fleet in the Hawaii Area; make a surprise attack on the channel leading into Pearl Harbor [14224] and attempt to close it; if the enemy moves out to fight he will be pursued and attacked."

Prior to the attack on X Day, the force of I-class submarines took up scouting positions in several allotted patrol sectors covering the waters in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, while the 5 midget submarines were launched as a Special Attack Force to conduct an offensive attack against American warships within the Harbor and to prevent the escape of the fleet through the Harbor entrances during the scheduled aerial strike. Available data indicates that only one of the five subs penetrated into the Harbor; none of the five inflicted any damage on American units, and none of the five rejoined the Japanese Fleet. American naval units accounted for 3, possibly 4, of the total, and the 5th beached itself at Oahu.

During and after the attack, submarines outside of the Harbor area remained on patrol to oppose any possible sortie of American warships. The following is a translation of an extract from the "Report of the I-69's Operations off Pearl Harbor, 8-10 December 1941" (Tokyo time), written by the Commanding Officer of the I-69 (flagship of Submarine Division 12) and presents a picture of the operation as experienced by one of the Japanese units on patrol:

"During daylight on December 8 (December 7 Honolulu time), the I-69 was cruising submerged, engaged in surveillance in Scouting Sector D (about 17 miles southwest of Pearl [14225] Harbor). Immediately after the attack upon the enemy by the Striking Force and the Special Attack Force, we were able to hear easily, by means of submarine sound detectors, explosions of bombs and torpedoes, and upon hearing the sound of depth charges, I judged that the Special Attack Force was engaged in heavy fighting.

"At 1400 radio orders from the Commander of Submarine Forces were received, assigning the I-69 to a surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area (a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles, with Pearl Harbor as the center). The orders further specified the annihilation of the remaining enemy forces.

"After sunset we surfaced, in an attempt to assist as much as possible, but during the night we sighted five destroyers. While submerging, we received a close-range depth-charge attack----- At 0015 on the 9th (Tokyo time) we surfaced, making certain that no enemy patrol boats were within close range. On a course obliquely to the west, and at battle speed, we hurriedly recharged batteries.

"We sighted 2 patrol vessels on our port quarter and beam respectively, each about 5 kilometers away, and in about 30 minutes we reversed course. Pearl Harbor shone red in the sky, like a thing afire. It was already dawn."

In the post-attack phase, the I-class submarines maintained their patrols for some time, and at least one of the [14226] group—the I-7—launched its aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to ascertain the status of the American fleet and installations. The operation plan had provided, in the event of the virtual destruction of the American Fleet at Pearl, that one Submarine Division or less would be placed between Hawaii and North America to destroy sea traffic and in fact at least one submarine—the I-17—was despatched for the Oregon coast about 14 December.

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[14227]

APPENDIX 1.

Naval general staff	Rank	Official duties
<i>Umpires</i>		
Nagano, Osami.....	Admiral.....	Head of First Section (War Planes and Operations).
Fukutome, Shigeru.....	Rear Admiral.....	
Uozumi, Jisaku.....	Captain.....	Member First Section.
Yamamoto, Chikao.....	Captain.....	Head of Sub-Section, First Section.
Mayuzumi, Harue.....	Commander.....	Member Sub-Section, First Section.
Tamura, Saburo.....	Commander.....	Member Sub-Section, First Section.
Sanagi, Tsuyoshi.....	Commander.....	Member Sub-Section, First Section.
Uozumi, Yorichi.....	Commander.....	Member Sub-Section, First Section.
<i>Navy Ministry</i>		
Takata, Toshitane.....	Captain.....	Member of Military Affairs Bureau.
Shiki, Tsuneo.....	Commander.....	Member of Military Affairs Bureau.
Toibata, Kurie.....	Commander.....	Member of Office of Military Supply.
[14228] Fujii, Shigeru.....	Commander.....	Private Secretary to Navy Minister (Admiral Shimada, Shigetaro).
<i>N-Team—Combined Fleet</i>		
Yamamoto, Isoroku.....	Admiral.....	CinC Combined Fleet.
Ito, Swiichi.....	Rear Admiral.....	Chief of Staff.
Kurojima, Kameto.....	Captain.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
Goto, Shigeru.....	Commander.....	Staff Adjutant.
Isobe, Taro.....	Commander.....	Staff Engineering Officer.
Sugi, Toma.....	Commander.....	Staff Gunner Officer.
Sasaki, Akira.....	Commander.....	Staff Air Officer.
Wada, Yushiro.....	Commander.....	Staff Communication Officer.
Nagata, Shigeru.....	Commander.....	Staff Navigation Officer.
Watanabe, Yasuji.....	Commander.....	Staff Operations and Plans Officer.
Arima, Takayasu.....	Commander.....	Staff Torpedo Officer.
Seimi, Ichiyoshi.....	Commander.....	Staff Supply Officer.
Ota, Kanai.....	Commander.....	Meteorologist Attached to Staff.
<i>1st Combined Communications Unit (Radio Intelligence)</i>		
Kakimoto, Gonichiro.....	Rear Admiral.....	Commander.
Arisawa, Naosada.....	Commander.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
<i>E-Team—Second Fleet</i>		
[14229] Kondo, Nobutake.....	Admiral.....	Commander.
Yanagizawa, Kuranosuke.....	Captain.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
Oishi, Tamotsu.....	Commander.....	Staff Navigation Officer
<i>Fourth Fleet</i>		
Inoue, Semi.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
<i>Fifth Fleet</i>		
Hosogaya, Boshiro.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
<i>Eleventh Air Fleet</i>		
Tsukahara, Nishizo.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
Kusaka, Jinichi.....	Rear Admiral.....	Chief of Staff.
<i>A-TEAM—Third Fleet (Amphibious Forces for Southern Invasions)</i>		
Takahashi, Ibo.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
Ishihara, Majime.....	Captain.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
<i>Sixth Fleet</i>		
Shimizu, Mitsumi.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
Kanoaka, Tomojiro.....	Captain.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
<i>First Air Fleet (Carrier Fleet)</i>		
Nagumo, Chuichi.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
Kusaka, Ryunosuke.....	Rear Admiral.....	Chief of Staff.
Genda, Minoru.....	Commander.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.

[14230]

APPENDIX 2

Japanese Task Forces

Main Body (Commander in Chief Combined Fleet) (Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto) ; (6 Battleships, 2 Light Cruisers, 8 Destroyers) ; Battleship Division #1 (2 Battleships) (*Mutsu, Nagato*) ; Battleship Division #2 (4 Battleships) (*Isc, Hyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro*) ; Cruiser Division #9 (2 Light Cruisers) (*Kitagami, Oi*) ; 8 Destroyers (Names uncertain)

Striking Force (Commander in Chief 1st Air Fleet) (Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo) ; (2 Battleships, 6 Aircraft carriers, 2 Heavy Cruisers, 1 Light Cruiser, 16 Destroyers) ; Battleship Division #3 (1st Section) (2 Battleships) (*Hiei, Kiri-shima*) ; Carrier Division #1 (2 Aircraft carriers) (*Kaga, Akagi*) ; Carrier Division #2 (2 Aircraft carriers) (*Hiryu, Soryu*) ; Carrier Division #5 (2 Aircraft carriers) (*Shokaku, Zuikaku*) ; Cruiser Division #8 (2 Heavy Cruisers) (*Tone, Chikuma*) ; Destroyer Squadron #1 (1 Light Cruiser, 16 Destroyers) (*Abukuma*, Destroyer names uncertain)

Southern Force (Commander in Chief Second Fleet) (Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondo) ; (2 Battleships, 2 Small Aircraft carriers, 12 Heavy Cruisers, 7 Light Cruisers, 52 Destroyers, 16 Submarines) ; Battleship Division #3 (2nd Section) (2 Battleships) (*Kongo, Haruna*) ; Carrier Division #4 (1st Section) (2 Small Aircraft carriers) (Probably *Shoho* and *Ryujo*) ; Cruiser Division #4 (4 Heavy Cruisers) (*Atago, Takao, Maya, Chokai*) ; Cruiser Division #5 (3 Heavy Cruisers) (*Haguro, Myoko, Nachi*) ; Cruiser Division #7 (4 Heavy Cruisers) (*Mogami, Mikuma, Kumano, Suzuya*) ; Cruiser Division #16 (1 Heavy Cruiser, 3 Light Cruisers) (*Ashigara, Kuma, Kinu, Nagara*) ; Destroyer Squadron #2 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (*Jintsu*, Destroyer names uncertain) ; Destroyer Squadron #3 (1 Light Cruiser, 16 Destroyers) (*Sendai*, Destroyer names uncertain) ; Destroyer Squadron #4 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (*Naka*, Destroyer names uncertain) ; Destroyer Squadron #5 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (*Natori*, Destroyer names uncertain) ; About 16 Submarines (Names uncertain)

[14231]

APPENDIX 2

Japanese Task Forces—(continued)

South Seas Force (Commander in Chief 4th Fleet) (Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi Inoue) ; (4 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Light Cruisers, 12 Destroyers, 16 Submarines) *Kashima* (Light Cruiser) ; Cruiser Division #6 (4 Heavy Cruisers) (*Aoba, Furutaka, Kinugasa, Kako*) ; Cruiser Division #18 (2 Light Cruisers) (*Tenryu, Tatsuta*) ; Destroyer Squadron #6 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (*Yubari*, Destroyer names uncertain) ; About 16 Submarines (Names uncertain)

Northern Force (Commander in Chief 5th Fleet) (Vice Adm. Boshiro Hosokaya) ; (2 Light Cruisers, 2 Destroyers) ; Cruiser Division #21 (2 Light Cruisers) (*Tama, Kiso*) ; 2 Destroyers

Advance Expeditionary Force (Commander in Chief 6th Fleet) (Vice Adm. Mitsumi Shimuzu) ; 3 Light Cruisers (*Katori, Isuzu, Yura*) ; About 26 Submarines

Attached Forces (Training) ; Carrier Division #4 (2nd Section) (2 Small Aircraft carriers) (Probably *Hosho* and *Zuiho*) ; Miscellaneous Vessels.

[14232]

APPENDIX 3

Above [opposite] is shown a captured track chart of Jap carriers, covering the period from Pearl Harbor to Midway. During the operations noted, this Jap Carrier Force was commanded by the late Vice-Admiral Nagumo as CinC First Air Fleet. The approximate approach of the Carrier Task Force to Hawaii is indicated. According to another document, recovered from a crashed enemy plane shortly after the raid, Jap aircraft flew off their carriers about 200 miles due north of Oahu, rendezvoused further south, and then flew in for a coordinated attack. From 0755 to 0825 (Honolulu Time), VT and VD attacks were made on U. S. installations. After a 15-minute lull, these were followed by horizontal VB strikes and recurrent VD attacks.

[14233] Mr. MORGAN. Consistent with a request made by Senator Ferguson for information regarding reports of Japanese air reconnaissance over the Philippines, or other U. S. possessions in the Pacific prior to December 7, 1941, we have from the Navy Department a communication dated February 8, 1946, concerning this matter transmitting enclosures. We would request that the letter of transmittal and the enclosures be spread on the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They will be spread on the record at this point.

(The letter of transmittal and enclosures follow:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Washington, 8 February 1946.

1083A

R. #119

Memorandum:

To: Mr Seth W. Richardson

1. In response to Senator Ferguson's request for information regarding reports of Japanese air reconnaissance over the Philippines or other U. S. Possessions in the Pacific prior to December 7, 1941, the following references are given:

a. " * * * 'Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunago, Retired, in [14234] interview published in Hochi States Japanese should face future with calm confidence in ability Army Navy repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about weak ABCD powers encirclement plans x quoted as stating he has flown over Guam total sixteen times this year without sighting single American plane x American air power Far East negligible x prior retirement Matsunaga served twelve years as aviator Commander Ryujo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Director Japan airways.'" (Narrative Statement, page 239; NCI exhibit 12).

b. Dispatch from Marine detachment, Wake Island to ComFOURTEEN, dated 25 November 1941, stating that on 24 November 2115 hours the Pan-American clipper sighted four Japanese sea planes about 1,000 miles east of Guam, flying south at an altitude of 10,000 feet. Narrative statement, page 392; Hewitt exhibit 27, page 127).

c. Dispatch from GovGuam, 240610, dated November 24, 1941. Copy attached.

d. Extract from the interrogation of Captain Takahashi. Copy attached.

2. It is possible that support was given to the belief that Japanese air reconnaissance was being made throughout the Pacific (over all Allied Island possessions) by a report of such reconnaissance over the Gilberts, given in a dispatch originated by the naval attaché at Singapore [14235] on 22 November, paraphrase of which is made in the Hewitt exhibit 27, page 14T. Copy of dispatch #220228 is attached.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

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[14236]

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

From: ALUSNA Singapore
To: OPNAV (Action)
CINCPAC, CINCAF (Info.)

Date: 23 November 1941

220228

Routine

Dependable reports here of reconnaissance flights over Gilbert Islands on November 15 by monoplane with tapered wings, single tailfin, twin engines. Next day repeated by monoplane flying boat silver color number of engines unobserved.

Top secret.

[14237]

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

From: Governor Guam
To: OPNAV (Action)
CINCPAC, CINCAF (Info.)

Date: 24 November 1941

240610

Deferred

At 1217 local time today unidentified two-engined plane sighted, circling southern end of island. Altitude approximately 15,000 feet. At 1226 local time plane passed out of sight to southwest.

Top secret

[14238]

INTERROGATION OF CAPTAIN TAKAHASHI ON 20 OCTOBER 1945

I. Positions held by Captain Takahashi

May 1941–December 1942: On staff of Eleventh Air Fleet in Philippine Islands and Dutch East Indies. This was the duty period on which Captain Takahashi was questioned.

January 1943–June 1945: Senior member of Navy Aeronautical Bureau, Tokyo.

July 1945–August 1945: Senior Staff officer of Fifth Air Fleet and senior staff officer of Third Air Fleet.

20 October 1945–: Chief of Sendai Naval Personnel Bureau.

II. Summary

* * * The primary mission of the Japanese Force in FORMOSA, composed of about 300 fighters and bombers, was the annihilation of the American Air Force in the PHILIPPINES. In this, it was successful partly because complete information relative to the American Air Force [14239] was obtained by Aerial Reconnaissance prior to commencement of hostilities.

III. "Q" What gave the Japanese impression that there were 900 planes in the area and how did you discover that there were 300 instead of 900?"

"A" The Navy received on 20 November 1941, a report from the Foreign Affairs Department that there were about 900 planes in the LUZON area. A photographic reconnaissance plane conducted a search on the 24th or 25th of November over that area and discovered that there were only 300 planes. One reconnaissance plane made flights at that time."

[14240] Mr. MORGAN. We have here a letter from Commander Baecher, dated 7 March 1946, setting forth a request by Mrs. T. S. Wilkinson, the widow of Admiral Wilkinson, that certain information with respect to her husband and his testimony, and also a letter from Admiral Ingersoll to Admiral Wilkinson dated 26 December 1945 be placed in the record.¹ We request that this letter from the Navy Department of March 7, together with the enclosures be spread on the record at this point.

¹ Adm. Wilkinson's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1723–1782, 1798–1858, 1864–1911.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They will be spread on the record at this point.

(The letter and enclosures referred to follow:)

[14241]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 7 March 1946.

Memorandum:

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. It will be recalled that during the course of his interrogation Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson testified concerning the duties of his office which, at least in part, was transcribed at pages 4576-4577 of the Record of Proceedings.

2. It further appears that at the request of Vice Admiral Wilkinson there were read into the Record of Proceedings, at pages 5100-5104, a memorandum of Vice Admiral A. G. Kirk, and two dispatches exchanged between Vice Admiral Wilkinson and Rear Admiral James, pertaining to matters referred to in the testimony of Vice Admiral Wilkinson at said pages 4576-4577 of the Record.

3. In connection with the same matter Vice Admiral [14242] Wilkinson wrote a letter to Admiral R. E. Ingersoll on 20 December 1945, in which he referred to his own and Admiral Turner's testimony, and forwarded as the first enclosure a copy of the memorandum of Vice Admiral Kirk referred to above and as the second enclosure a copy of his own testimony as transcribed at said pages 4576-4577 of the Record of Proceedings before the Joint Committee, and inquired as to Admiral Ingersoll's recollection of the matter. Admiral Ingersoll answered Vice Admiral Wilkinson's letter by letter of 26 December 1945.

4. Mrs. T. S. Wilkinson states that her lately deceased husband, Vice Admiral Wilkinson, refrained at the time from forwarding to the committee the exchange of correspondence with Admiral Ingersoll because he thought the subject matter would be covered when Admiral Ingersoll appeared as a witness. She feels that it now appears that the interrogation of Admiral Ingersoll did not cover the particular question, and has found the letters among Vice Admiral Wilkinson's effects. Accordingly Mrs. Wilkinson, having first obtained the permission of Admiral Ingersoll to such use of his letter, requests in behalf of her husband that the pertinent parts of the exchange of correspondence between Vice Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Ingersoll be read into and made a part of the stenographic record of the committee's proceedings. Accordingly there are attached [14243] hereto, marked Enclosures A and B respectively, copies of the second enclosure to Vice Admiral Wilkinson's letter of 20 December 1945 to Admiral Ingersoll and of Admiral Ingersoll's letter dated 26 December 1945.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lt. Comdr. USNR.

ENCLOSURE A

Admiral WILKINSON. I said that the text of the regulations which you introduced read "Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable."

I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate and spread abroad all types of basic information, what General Miles has termed static information, such as the defenses of the country, its economics, the diplomatic relations, the characters and activities and previous careers of its military and naval men, the location of its fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and everything other than the enemy probable intentions, and such specific information as in itself might give rise or might require action by our fleet, or by our naval forces.

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In the latter case before dissemination I would consult higher authority, either the Assistant Chief, the Chief of Naval Operations, or my Colleague, Chief of War Plans, in order that this information which I sent out would not be in conflict with his understanding of the naval situation, [14244] and the operations for which he was responsible.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, you had the responsibility to disseminate, but where you reached a situation which led you to feel that the information disseminated might approach the area of a directive, or an order to take some specific action to the recipient then you felt you were required to consult War Plans, or the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral WILKINSON. Exactly.

ENCLOSURE B:

STAFF HEADQUARTERS
WESTERN SEA FRONTIER
FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING

San Francisco, California, 26 December, 1945.

MY DEAR WILKINSON: I have your letter of 20 December regarding your testimony before the Committee and also the two enclosures.

My understanding of the instructions given to Naval Intelligence in 1941 is exactly in accord with your testimony as you gave it in the hearings, and as embodied in the second enclosure of your letter.

I remember that discussions took place sometime in '41 although I had forgotten that Kirk took part in the discussions. I remember it more as a discussion with you. I do remember distinctly, however, pointing out that our [14245] organization was not like military intelligence and that the Estimate of the Situation should be prepared by the War Plans Division, although the data for the part "Enemy Intentions" naturally would have to be based on data and information gathered by Naval Intelligence.

With kindest regards and all best wishes for the New Year, I am

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ INGERSOLL

Vice ADMIRAL T. S. WILKINSON, USN.,
3043 "N" Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

[14246] Mr. MORGAN. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There being nothing further, the committee will stand adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 5:40 p. m., the Committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

[14247]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, MAY 23, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a. m., in the committee room of the Committee on the District of Columbia, United States Capitol, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), and Murphy.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[14248] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lane wants to offer, with the permission of the committee, a number of answers to requests which have been made in the record, in order to clean up that part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I might state before you start that the Senate meets at 11 o'clock today and the House also meets at 11 o'clock. We will have to work pretty fast here to get through before the two Houses meet.

I just wanted that to be understood, so that we wouldn't waste any time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I suggested to Senator Ferguson and counsel, while talking informally, that in view of the fact that the Senate is meeting at 11 o'clock today and the House is also meeting at 11 o'clock, that probably the best thing to do would be for us to receive these documents for the record, close the record, and then adjourn subject to call of the Chair, with the idea that as early next week as can be conveniently arranged we could have another meeting of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George cannot be here this morning as he is presiding at a Finance Committee meeting; and Mr. Clark is away, as is also Mr. Gearhart. So it would be my purpose to call an executive committee meeting the first [14249] day of next week that is available.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark will in all probability be back next week.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, it would be my suggestion that we hold this record open to put these things in. I would like to have time to go over them after they are in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to state this, Senator, that the committee voted last week to close the record today, and I wouldn't feel at liberty to hold the record open unless the committee reverses its action taken last week.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I received the answers to questions put to Mr. Hull yesterday. As the Chair knows we have had very important sessions. We had a very important session yesterday and finally voted. It was necessary that I stay on the floor. I haven't had time to properly analyze the material to see whether or not other questions should be submitted. Those I analyzed were very unsatisfactory, so far as I personally was concerned.

I feel that we have failed utterly to get information by the system of using interrogatories. It was difficult enough to get testimony from the witnesses in the hearings. I feel that it has failed and that we should have some time to submit interrogatories.

For instance, I asked many questions of Mr. Stimson. He didn't see fit to answer the first set of questions at all. [14250] Personally I don't feel that he even answered the second questions, but he did at least give us some answers to those.

Now, if we spend months, and we have spent months, on this matter, I feel that we should have a complete record. I certainly want to have a complete record of the Pearl Harbor facts. I feel that by closing this record today, without the right to submit further questions, without the right of getting the Stimson diary, that we are not getting all of the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the committee will have to pass on that.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will go ahead. We don't want to argue that now.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not arguing it.

The CHAIRMAN. No; but we have taken time, which is very short and very precious. I will be perfectly frank to state that unless the committee itself orders it, reverses the action that it took to close the record today, that is what the order was, with only two votes against that motion, made by Mr. Keefe, unless the committee desires otherwise I am going to adhere to the action taken by the committee.

I don't see how I can do otherwise as chairman of this committee. If the committee wants to take a different action when it meets again, that is its business, but so far as the orders of the committee are at present, the hearing of evidence [14251] and the record was to be closed today.

Whether you or I, or the committee, or anybody else, could get any additional information from Mr. Stimson than his reply to interrogatories, I do not know. It is unfortunate that Mr. Stimson's health has been such that he couldn't appear in person. I think that we all have the greatest respect for Mr. Stimson and that the country has the greatest respect for Mr. Stimson. I haven't had a chance to read his replies, but I don't think it is necessary for me to read them in order to determine whether there should be any more hearings or any more questions asked of him. I presume he gave us the best information he could in reply to the questions. If he hasn't, I don't know whether additional questions sent to him would elicit anything further or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, it is only that I think we ought

to be given that opportunity. At least I would like to have made a part of this record the questions that I submitted and a showing that he did not answer.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume that the questions submitted are a part of the record, that they were made a part of the record, as much as the answers. Without seeing the questions and the answers, I assume the questions would be made a part of the record just as if they had been asked in open hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't know. That is the reason I asked.

[14252] The CHAIRMAN. I assume so. Isn't that true, Counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. My idea would be that whatever we got from Mr. Stimson would appear in this record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, and the same with regard to Mr. Hull. Let's go ahead.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire if the Hull answers are here ready to be put in the record today?

Mr. LANE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume all members received them and that they are here ready to be put in the record today. Go ahead.

Mr. LANE. The Committee sent certain interrogatories to former Secretary of State Cordell Hull on April 5, 1946. We have received his answers to the interrogatories, and ask that the interrogatories, the answers thereto, and their letter of transmittal dated May 16, 1946, be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done.

(The answers given by Mr. Hull to interrogatories submitted to him by the Committee follow:)¹

[14253]

MAY 16, 1946.

The Honorable ALBEN W. BARKLEY, *Chairman,*

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MY DEAR MR. BARKLEY, Reference is made to your letter of April 5, 1946, enclosing a set of 169 interrogatories which the committee desired me to consider and make such reply thereto as my recollection of the facts might warrant.

In pursuance of your request I enclose my replies to the interrogatories. I feel that most of the matters covered in my replies have already been set forth in the record of the Department of State or in my prepared statement to the committee. I trust that my replies satisfactorily dispose of the questions concerning which the committee has inquired.

Sincerely yours,

[S] CORDELL HULL.

Enclosure:

Replies to interrogatories.

[14254] **REPLIES TO INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY THE
HONORABLE HOMER FERGUSON, MEMBER OF THE JOINT COMMIT-
TEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK**

1. Question: Is it correct to say, Mr. Secretary, that the first specific point in the 10 points of the American note of November 26, 1941, proposed that Japan enter a seven-power nonaggression compact? (See For. Rel. vol. 2, 769.)

¹ Mr. Hull was sworn by the Chairman at the time of his appearance before the Committee on November 23, 1945. See Hearings, Part 2, p. 403 et seq.

Answer: In this Government's outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan communicated to the Japanese Government on November 26 there were listed in section 2 under 10 headings steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan of which the first heading reads as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States.

2. Question: [14255] Is it correct to say that, in your conversation with the Japanese Ambassadors on November 22, 1941, you broached the matter of proposing to Japan SOMETIME a broad comprehensive plan involving the collaboration of other nations? (For. Rel. vol. 2, 761.)

Answer: On November 22, 1941, I told the Japanese Ambassador that I had in mind taking up with him sometime a general and comprehensive program which we had been engaged in developing and which involved collaboration of other countries. Our broad approach was toward a world objective, not a local, regional, or bilateral objective. While the initial step was bilateral as between the Japanese and ourselves, what we were trying to do was to get Japan to adopt a peaceful program on world-wide lines. Had we been successful Japan would have been able to satisfy all her needs by taking advantage of the principles, for example, of the Nine-Power Agreement and the Good Neighbor policy. We envisaged, of course, the assumption by Japan of obligations along with the acquisition by her of rights.

3. Question: Did the Japanese Ambassadors reply that Japan was interested in a bilateral agreement with the United States? (For. Rel. vol. 2, 762.)

[14256] **Answer:** The Japanese Ambassador said that the Japanese had in mind negotiating a bilateral agreement with us to which other powers could subsequently give their adherence. The Japanese, throughout the conversations, had shown apparently little thought for the rights and interests of countries in the Pacific area other than Japan and the United States. From the outset of the conversations I had endeavored to make it clear to the Japanese that this Government could not join with Japan in disposing of questions affecting the rights and interests of the other concerned powers without consulting them prior to entering into formal negotiations on these matters with the Japanese. There could not have been, however, any doubt in the mind of the Japanese Ambassador that our conversations looked to our entering into a bilateral agreement with Japan as our immediate objective even though we held to the view that other powers should be consulted.

4. Question: Did the Japanese Ambassadors say to you, after reading the note of November 26 and the oral statement of the 26th, that the American proposal was unacceptable and was to be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end? (For. Rel. vol. 2, 766.)

Answer: [14257] After the Japanese Ambassadors had read the documents handed to them on November 26 containing an outline of the proposed basis of an agreement between the United States and Japan and an explanatory oral statement, Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end. Neither Mr. Kurusu nor Ambassador Nomura stated that the American proposal was unacceptable.

5. Question: Is it correct to say that the position of the State Department has been that the American note of the 26th was a necessary restatement of American policy as the only logical and practical means by which peaceful conditions might obtain in the Pacific Ocean? (For. Rel. 767 et. al.)

Answer: In answer to this question, I refer to my statement before the joint committee on November 19, 1945, in which I said:

Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be worked out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either Government was free to offer.

In that same statement I also said:

[14258] The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals.

That confusion prevailed both in Japan and the United States. We knew from Japanese acts and utterances that the Japanese proposal of November 20 was their last word and it was obviously desirable that the record of the American Government's position throughout the conversations be made crystal clear. Therefore, the proposals of November 26 were directed toward making our position utterly clear and toward keeping the door open for further conversations notwithstanding the ultimative character of the Japanese proposal of November 20. The principles set forth in our November 26 proposal were in all important respects essentially the same principles we had been proposing to the Japanese right along. Had the Japanese had the least disposition to pursue a peaceful course, a more desirable program could not have been offered to them. All Japan had to do to take advantage of our offer was to abandon her course of aggression and to adopt the accepted rules of peaceful international conduct. In the explanatory statement which accompanied the proposal there was reviewed [14259] briefly the objective sought in the exploratory conversations, namely, that of arriving at an agreement regarding Pacific questions on a basis of peace, law and order, and fair dealing among nations.

6. Question: It was stated, was it not, by the American Government to Japan in the note of the 26th that the Japanese proposal of November 20 fell short of the objectives desired? (For. Rel. vol. 2, 767.)

Answer: In this Government's communication to the Japanese Government of November 26 it was stated:

The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order, and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

The Japanese asked in their proposal of November 20 that the United States [14260] agree to cease giving aid to China; that the United States desist from augmenting its military forces in the western Pacific; that the United States help Japan obtain products of the Netherlands East Indies; that the United States undertake to resume commercial relations with Japan; that the United States undertake to supply to Japan "a required quantity of oil"; while Japan on her part would be free to continue her military operations in and against China and to keep her troops in Indochina and to attack the Soviet Union, would have her funds unfrozen, would be able to buy with comparative freedom from the United States, would be assured adequate supplies of oil, and would be under no obligation to remove her troops from Indochina until she should have completed her conquest of China or conditions of peace satisfactory to her had been established "in the Pacific area."

Before and after presenting that proposal, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu talked emphatically about the urgency of the situation and intimated vigorously that this was Japan's last word and if an agreement along those lines was not quickly concluded ensuing developments might be most unfortunate.

What Japan asked in that proposal would, had it been agreed to by the United States, have meant condonement by the United States of Japan's past aggressions, assent by [14261] the United States to unlimited courses of conquest by Japan in the future, abandonment by the United States of its whole past position in regard to the most essential principles of its foreign policy in general, betrayal by the United States of China, and acceptance by the United States of a position as a silent partner aiding and abetting Japan in her effort to create a Japanese hegemony in and over the western Pacific and Eastern Asia.

Acceptance by us of the Japanese proposal of November 20 would have placed Japan in a commanding position in her movement to acquire control of the entire western Pacific area; would have destroyed our chances of asserting and maintaining our rights and interests in the Pacific; and in its final analysis would have meant a most serious threat to our national security. She also clung to her vantage point in Indochina which threatened the security of the countries to the

south and menaced vital trade routes. Their conditional offer to withdraw troops from southern Indochina to northern Indochina was meaningless as they could have brought those troops back to southern Indochina within a day or two, and furthermore they placed no limit on the number of troops they might continue to send there.

7. Question: Did our Government reject the Japanese note of [14262] November 20, 1941, which you described as an ultimatum?

Answer: The Japanese proposal of November 20, which I have described in response to question No. 6, was of so preposterous a character that no responsible American official could ever have dreamed of accepting it. Nevertheless, I felt that I should not be violent in my comment to the Japanese in regard to it so as to avoid giving them any pretext to walk out on the conversations.

Therefore, despite the ultimative character of the Japanese proposal, and despite the slim possibility that Japan would elect to continue the conversations, we proposed to keep alive that possibility while restating our fundamental principles. The Army and Navy were asking for more time, as they had for months past, and I had that situation very much at heart. Moreover, we wanted to show our interest in peace up to the last split second and at the same time to expose the bad faith of the Japanese. Everything we said or did was with those considerations in mind. In drawing up a full restatement of our principles, we gave exemplifications of their application to the situation in the Pacific area, and we invited the Japanese to continue the conversations with that statement as a basis.

8. Question: It was stated, was it not that, therefore, the United [14263] States was setting forth to Japan a broad and comprehensive program under which the desired objectives could be attained? (For. Rel. vol. 2, 767.)

Answer: In this Government's oral statement to the Japanese Government of November 26 it was stated:

* * * the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

As I said in my statement before the joint committee of November 19, 1945, in reviewing what I had told press correspondents on the day following the date of delivery to the Japanese of the communication under reference,

I found there had been so much confusion and so many collateral matters brought in along with high Japanese officials in Tokyo proclaiming their old doctrines of force, that I thought it important to bring the situation to a clear perspective. So I had recounted and restated the fundamental principles and undertook to make application of them to a number of specific conditions such as would logically go into a broad basic peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

[14264] There had been every kind of suggestion made as we had gone along in the conversations. I said that I had considered everything in the way of suggestions from the point of view whether it would facilitate, keep alive, and if possible carry forward conversations looking toward a general agreement, all the while naturally

preserving the fullest integrity of every principle for which we stood. I had sought to examine everything possible but always to omit consideration of any proposal that would contemplate the stoppage of the conversations and search for a general agreement for peace.

9. Question: When did you prepare the message which President Roosevelt was to send to the Japanese Emperor the night of December 6, 1941?

Answer: The idea of a message from the President to the Emperor had been under consideration by the President and myself as far back as the middle of October, as is clear from the record before the committee. The message as actually sent was prepared in final form on December 6, and included contributions made in the White House as well as material contained in drafts prepared in the State Department during preceding weeks.

- [14265] 10. Question: For the purpose of a question I shall quote from the President's message to the Emperor: "Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indochina would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area"—end of quotation and I ask: Is it correct to say that the withdrawal of the Japanese from Indochina, under a neutral guarantee of the integrity of Indochina by the interested parties, was the single specific proposal of the message of the Emperor, sent by President Roosevelt on December 6? And fulfillment of it would have assured peace in the southwest Pacific, in the opinion of the President?

Answer: In the President's message to the Japanese Emperor the President stated that "both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat." The President was seeking to make a broad appeal. The withdrawal by Japan of its armed forces from Indochina would have assured the creation of an atmosphere which would have rendered possible resumption of conversations looking to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Conversely, Japan's refusal to accept the President's proposal would expose her real purpose. Indochina was the logical and by far the most feasible jumping-off place for a Japanese movement to the south. The [14266] President by his proposal for the neutralization of Indochina on July 24 had already strongly tested Japan's purposes in her continued movement south by proposing that she get out of Indochina—and the Japanese Government by its clear-cut refusal betrayed its military designs on the South Sea area. This proposal also served to expose Japan's intentions not to consider peaceful arrangements with us unless we were prepared to make all the concessions. The President was now making an additional last-minute appeal. He, of course, knew that the huge Japanese armada had already left the jumping-off place in Indochina, which, from our viewpoint, meant that the danger of attack could not have been more imminent. Nevertheless, the President believed that he should not neglect even the slim chance that an additional last-minute appeal might save the situation. It also served to make clear

to the American people and to the world our interest in maintaining peace up to the very last minute.

11. Question: Was there anything in the December 6 message proposing a Japanese withdrawal from China—a pledge not to interfere should the United States be drawn into war by Germany—or a proposal for Japan's adherence to a seven-power nonaggression pact?

Answer: [14267] Inasmuch as the November 26 proposal of this Government was already before the Japanese, the appeal to the Emperor was made specifically applicable to the critical situation created by the Japanese military movement from and within Indochina which we had very much in our minds. Indochina was the seat of the most acute and imminent danger at that moment. The other subjects at issue with Japan mentioned in your question had been thrashed out over and over again during 6 months of conversations.

Throughout the conversations we had vainly urged on Japan that she abandon conquest, including the conquest of China. We also had asked the Japanese to give up her alliance with Germany and Italy which was directed against us, but they clung to that alliance like they clung to their very life. We had fully demonstrated the utter impossibility of getting Japan to budge on these questions.

Questions 12, 13, and 38 are grouped in a single answer.

12. Question: The intercepted diplomatic messages of the Japanese show that on November 26 Nomura and Kurusu requested permission of Tokyo to request that President Roosevelt wire to a Japanese official, Premier Tojo, I presume, and ask that peace be maintained for the sake of posterity and that Japan replied with a cordial message, were you aware, on November 29, that this document was in the possession [14268] of the American Government as decoded on November 28? (Intercepted messages, exhibit 1, p. 180.)

13. Question: The intercepted Japanese messages show that, on November 28, the Japanese Ambassadors received from Tokyo a message that was secretly intercepted and decoded by the American Government on the same day, and which said: I quote: "I contacted the man you told me to in your No. 1180 and he said that under present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable" end quotation: were you aware of the existence of this document on November 30? (Cf. Intercepted messages, exhibit 1, p. 195, last two sentences of No. 844.)

38. Question: You saw the intercepted Japanese messages, did you not?

Answer: I was at all times intensely interested in the contents of the intercepts. I instructed my secretaries to show me promptly any and all intercepts of material value and importance to the State Department. This, it seemed to me, they did. So far as I was able to judge, all of such intercepts were shown to me. The State Department was on a 24-hour basis and messages received in the Department after office hours in whatever form when important were delivered to

me at my home. At this late [14269] date, in 1946, I cannot be certain whether I received and read at the time all important intercepts or whether it might be possible that some of those I have read since that time or recently are confused in my mind with what I read at the time. I kept no records as to when particular messages reached me.

Questions 14, 82, and 83 are grouped in a single answer.

14. Question: It is proved by the intercepted messages, is it not, that Japan on November 28 had rejected the proposition of an exchange of peace messages between the heads of their respective states? (No. 844, p. 195, exhibit 1.)
82. Question: Will you please look at message No. 844, page 195, exhibit 1, and state as to whether or not that message relates to a message from the President to the Emperor?
83. Question: If your answer to the last question is "yes," then will you explain why the message was sent on the night of the 6th of December 1941, when you and the President had knowledge of the message of exhibit 1, message 844, page 195?

Answer: The intercepted message cited (No. 844, exhibit 1, p. 195) seems to refer to a suggestion by the Japanese [14270] Ambassador for a Japanese initiative in proposing to this Government an exchange of messages between the President and a Japanese official, presumably the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Japanese Foreign Minister, after consulting with the Navy Minister, apparently did not approve of that suggestion. In the situation in which we found ourselves grabbing at straws to save the peace, this Government believed that no possibility should be overlooked even at the last minute to appeal for peace. In any case, there was no reason why the President should not send a message to the Emperor regardless of the attitude of any particular subordinate Japanese official.

15. Question: On November 29, 1941, you rejected, did you not, as useless a suggestion of the Australian Minister that he try to mediate through Kurusu?

Answer: On November 9, 1941, the Australian Minister called on me and brought up the question of his conferring with the Japanese representative, Mr. Kurusu, and suggesting to Kurusu that Australia would be glad to act as a mediator. I offered no objection to his taking such a step, but merely stated my opinion to the Minister that the diplomatic stage was over and that nothing would come of such a move.

16. Question: [14271] On November 30, or around that date, did you recommend to the President that he deliver a message to Congress on the subject of American-Japanese relations?

Answer: On November 29, I sent to the President a draft message to Congress, which Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox had helped to prepare, together with a draft message from the President to the Emperor. In my memorandum to the President I said:

If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable to defer your message to Congress until we see whether the message to the Emperor effects any improvement in the situation. I think we

agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostility, has been reached.

17. Question: What did the President say?

Answer: I have no specific recollection as to what President Roosevelt said regarding a message to Congress. But the record is that he did not send the message to Congress.

18. Question: Why did he not send it to Congress?

Answer: [14272] The President and I had for some time been communicating to various Members of Congress our views on the imminent dangers in the situation in connection with such matters as neutrality legislation and extension of selective service. A message to Congress during the last few days would have contained very little that was new without giving to the Japanese leaders material which would have enabled them to arouse their people against us all the more, a thing we wished to avoid so long as there was even the slightest possibility of keeping the discussions alive.

Furthermore, the powerful isolationist groups in this country would probably have renewed their oft-repeated charges of "war-mongering" and "dragging the nation into foreign wars." The Japanese leaders would then have been in a position to play up the situation as evidencing disunity in the United States in order to gain support in Japan for plunging ahead.

19. Question: Did it occur to you, in making such a recommendation that, either in wording or by precedent, there applied in the situation of November 30, 1941, that clause in the Constitution of the United States which provides that, from time to time, the President shall inform the Congress of the state of the Union?

Answer: [14273] I would say that among the considerations which led to the drafting of the message to Congress was the Constitutional clause you cite, but there was also the consideration whether sending such a message at that particular time would have been helpful or otherwise in the critical situation then existing.

20. Question: Did you tell a press conference on or about December 3, 1941, that the Japanese Government on November 12 had taken the position that these talks were not informal and exploratory, rather that they constituted real negotiations, which were in their final stages and that in the event of their failure a critical and dangerous situation would result? (Cf. For. Rel. p. 75.)

Answer: The question whether the conversations with the Japanese in 1941 constituted real negotiations was not a matter of unilateral determination. This Government had made it clear to the Japanese from the outset that our conversations must remain on an exploratory basis until we could determine whether there existed a basis for negotiations. That point was never reached. Later, the Japanese Government advanced the contention that we were in negotiation, with Ambassador Grew at Tokyo on November 12 and with us

here on November 13. On that day, I made [14274] the position of this Government quite clear to the Japanese representatives, as follows:

The Secretary, after asking the Japanese Minister to make accurate note of what the Secretary was about to say, replied that if we are to work out a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area he could do this only on the basis of carrying on exploratory conversations until we reached a stage when he could go to Great Britain, to China and to the Dutch and say to them that he believes that the attitudes of Japan and the United States are such as to afford a basis for negotiation and that we could call what took place thereafter a negotiation. (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, pp. 731-732.)

Inasmuch as the Japanese Government did not subsequently refer to this point, it was to be assumed that it had accepted this Government's position. There was no occasion for referring to this point in conference with the press. I did, however, make clear to the representatives of the press on November 27 and again on December 3 the seriousness of the situation.

Questions 21 and 22 are grouped in a single answer.

21. Question: From page 43 of your statement, I quote: "On November 30, I was informed by the British Ambassador [14275] that the British Government had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and that this attack would include a seaborne expedition to seize strategic points in the Kra Isthmus" and quotation—I ask if you recall having any information on that day from the First Lord of the British Admiralty indicating a Japanese attack upon the United States?

22. Question: I quote from the New York Times of December 1, a dispatch from London under date of November 30: "A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, said that 'if Japan breaks with and attacks the United States we must go with the United States and I am glad we have been able to send naval reinforcements to the Far East,' end quotation: Did you see any official message to the United States of such a nature?

Answer: I do not recall receiving any information or messages on or about November 30 from the First Lord of the Admiralty or from any other official source indicating a Japanese attack on the United States or pledging support to the United States if attacked; nor has there been found in the Department of State any record of such information having been communicated to the Department of State.

23. Question: [14276] Was it a fact that, on November 30, and thereafter, the predominant opinion in the War Council was that the attack would come against others rather than the United States?

Answer: While it was my judgment that the Japanese were likely to attack in widely separated areas, all observable indications pointed to the likelihood that the attack would occur in the Southwest Pacific area. The most threatening activities known to our Government, so far as I saw or heard, were the Japanese movements near the jumping-off place in Indochina.

Malaya, the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, and Siam were well within range of attack from that jumping-off place. The competent and appropriate military officials, I believe, have spoken for themselves on this subject.

24. Question: When did you first see the cablegram from Ambassador Winant, dated December 6, and received in the State Department December 6, as to the movement of the Japanese fleet toward the Kra Peninsula?

Answer: The telegram in question, No. 5918 from the American Embassy in London, England, was received, according to the records, in the State Department at 10:40 a. m. [14277] December 6. In view of the message's character, of the notation that it was "most urgent," and of the fact that it was headed "Personal and Secret to the Secretary and the President," it must have been shortly after its receipt that I saw it.

25. Question: In your prepared statement to this committee, Mr. Secretary, I find no reference to your conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on August 16, the day preceding the delivery of two notes to Japan by the President; and I ask if it is correct to summarize that conversation of August 16 in these words: to the Ambassador's "pointed" request for a resumption of the conversations you stood by your position of July 23 in which you stated that because of Japan's violation of the basis of the conversations by its seizure of Indochina you saw no basis remaining; and after you had suggested that the Ambassador might see the President, if he desired, Nomura replied that he would be in no position to talk to the President until his Government had wired him concessions which he, as previously stated, believed his Government was willing to make in order to have the conversations resumed? (Cf. Foreign Relations II, pp. 553-554.)

Answer: The conversation of August 16 with the Japanese [14278] Ambassador is correctly summarized in Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, volume II, pages 553-554:

The Ambassador of Japan called at his request. He proceeded to say that he had again read over the documents that he and I had had under discussion, that he had been in communication with his Government, and that he believed there were grounds for progress in the conversations. He said that his Government was very desirous of working out peaceful relations between our two countries and he elaborated further along this line and against the idea of war. He stated that he would favor concessions in order to avoid war and that from what he heard from his Government, it would make concessions in order to avoid war. He said that in fact it would be glad to have a high Japanese official meet a high American official half way between the two countries in order to take up the matter in its final form.

The Ambassador then pointedly inquired of me whether conversations such as he and I had been conducting could be resumed between our two Governments. I proceeded to reiterate and repeat the circumstances leading up to the cessation of our conversations and the reasons which I set forth through Mr. Welles for their discontinuance. I did not pass further on the question which he propounded [14279] but left it as it was. The Ambassador remarked that the

situation was critical and it was very important in his judgment for suitable steps to be taken to avoid serious developments but I still revealed no sign whatever of saying anything favorable about his request for a resumption of conversations. I said that as the matter stands Japan with her Army, Navy, and air forces was establishing many bases in and about French Indochina under her continued policy of conquest by force, that this would mean about the last step prior to a serious invasion of the South Sea area if it should be decided upon by Japan, that such an invasion would be a serious menace to British success in Europe and hence to the safety of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, and that, therefore, this Government could not for a moment remain silent in the face of such a threat, especially if it should be carried forward to any further extent. The Ambassador remarked that the people of Japan did not have enough foodstuffs and went to Indochina to secure such needed commodities as rice. To this I promptly replied that if Japan had been willing to go forward with a peaceful settlement of the Pacific area in line with the principles and policies the Ambassador and I had discussed, Japan would have been able peacefully and without the use or threat of force to have equal access with every other nation to world [14280] markets for rice and all other foodstuffs.

The Ambassador repeatedly said that his country was very desirous of peaceful relations with this country in the future as well as now and that he believed his Government would make some concessions in order to resume conversations to this end. I expressed interest in this and again referred to Japan's continuing policy of conquest by force and of bitter denunciation of this country by the Government controlled press which is loudly supporting such a policy, and again I said that I would not be in a position to say anything relative to his request in addition to what I said some days ago when he first brought up the matter.

I suggested to the Ambassador that the situation was very serious and that if he desired to talk to any others on this subject or to the President it would be perfectly agreeable with me and I would not consider it as in any way going around me, et cetera. The Ambassador said that he would not be in a position to talk to the President until he first telegraphed his country for instructions as to what concessions it might be willing to make in connection with a resumption of conversations.

26. Question: In your memorandum of the conversation in the White House among the President, Ambassador Nomura and [14281] yourself on August 17, you state that the President requested the Ambassador to come to the White House (cf Foreign Relations 11, p. 554): my question is: Had the President been informed that on the previous day, August 16, the Japanese Ambassador had stated that he did not wish to see the President until he had received concessions from the Japanese Government which he, the Ambassador, believed his Government would make?

Answer: I find from the records that I informed the President prior to the White House conference on August 17 of the substance of my conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on the previous day. I refer to President Roosevelt's

telegram to Prime Minister Churchill, of August 18, 1941, which is a committee exhibit.

27. Question: Is it correct to state that the State Department records show no offer of concessions by Japan on August 17, 1941?

Answer: This Government at no time in the course of the conversations of 1941 talked to the representatives of the Japanese Government in terms of "concessions" to be made by Japan as condition for an agreement. It made known to the Japanese Government that its willingness to [14282] enter into an agreement with Japan was contingent upon Japan's adopting consistently peaceful courses. At no time did the Japanese Government give any practical evidence on which this Government could rely or dependable pledges that the Japanese Government intended to pursue policies of peace.

28. Question: When did the war with Japan become inevitable?

Answer: The question of the inevitability of war with Japan involved two factors, the factor of Japanese plans and objectives and the factor of time.

With regard to Japanese objectives, it is clear from the record that following the advent in 1927 of the Cabinet of General Tanaka, who inaugurated the so-called positive policy toward China, Japan had consistently been pursuing only one fixed policy—that of expansion by aggression. In 1931 Japan occupied Manchuria by force; in 1933, Japan seized Jehol, penetrated Chahar and extorted from China a demilitarized zone in north China. The truculent statement of Amau, spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, on April 17, 1934, in which Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed, made crystal clear [14283] Japan's policies of aggression. In 1937 Japan embarked upon military operations in north China which soon developed into an all-out attack on the whole of China. On September 21, 1938, I told the Canadian Minister that I had been proceeding on the theory that Japan definitely contemplated domination, by any and every kind of means, of East Asia and the Western Pacific area. In furtherance of these objectives Japan in September 1940 entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, Japan's program thus being merged into a far-flung drive for world domination of which Japan's share was to be East Asia. On January 15, 1941, in a statement in support of the lend-lease bill before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, I pointed out that Japan was out to establish herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific and that her leaders had openly declared their determination to make themselves masters of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. In the light of Japan's steady course of expansion by force, it was manifest that she would attack in her own good time unless we surrendered our principles.

As I have repeatedly stated, this Government had fully taken into account Japan's record when it entered into the

conversations with the Japanese in 1941. [14284] Nevertheless, the American Government responded favorably to the Japanese request that we enter into conversations looking to a settlement of Pacific questions even though it realized that there was but a slight chance that thereby Japan could be brought around to adopt peaceful courses.

The second factor, that of time, was considered by us in the light of contemporary developments. Through the years that the Japanese Government was standing for policies of aggression, this Government was standing for policies of peace and of law and order with justice, as is clear from the record. These opposing policies were utterly irreconcilable. We knew that would would not surrender at any time our basic principles. As a result of our close-up conversations with the Japanese, we could not escape the conclusion that Japan would not abandon her policy of aggression. Our long-standing appraisal of Japanese policies and purposes of aggression and of attacking us and other countries in the Pacific area in furtherance of those purposes, was supported by Japanese utterances and acts. As regards the element of time, I was satisfied by early October from the evidence of feverish Japanese military activities and movements, the bellicose pronouncements of Japanese spokesmen and of the Japanese press, reports of growing political tension [14285] in Japan, as well as from what was disclosed by the intercepted Japanese messages that the time when they would attack us was rapidly approaching.

In looking back upon the developments in their entirety during the last weeks and months prior to Pearl Harbor it can be clearly seen that our judgments and our methods of dealing with Japan as we did were overwhelmingly vindicated by Japanese acts and utterances as they later unfolded.

At any time prior to Japan's attack it lay within her power to avert a war in the Pacific by abandoning her policy of aggression, just as a bandit might avert a clash with his intended victim by suddenly becoming law-abiding. Up to that time there was always open to her an honorable and reasonable alternative to the courses of aggression which she was pursuing—an alternative which would have given her all she professed to seek in the way of access to raw materials and markets, as well as other rights and opportunities enjoyed by all nations. It lay solely within Japan's disposition to adopt a peaceful alternative and to revoke the decisions reached at the Imperial Conference of July 2, which reaffirmed Japan's purpose of subjugating China and which called for military advance to the south to establish "the great East Asia sphere of co-prosperity", that is to say, to establish Japanese [14286] domination in Southeast Asia and the islands of the Western Pacific area.

Questions 29 to 33 and 45 to 47 are grouped in a single answer.

29. Question: When did you decide that further negotiations were useless and that you were going to turn the matter over to the Army and Navy?

30. Question: When did you advise either the Army or the Navy that you were turning the matter over to the army or navy or both?
31. Question: What had happened that you told Secretary Stimson you were turning the mater over to the Army and Navy?
32. Question: Had you conferred with the President on the matter of turning the matter over to the Army and Navy?
33. Question: Give date and conversation with the President on this.
45. Question: Do you recall having a conversation with the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, about the negotiations with Japan being terminated and that you were turning the matter over to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, or the Army and Navy?
- [14287] 46. Question: Will you state the date and the conversation.
47. Question: If such a conversation took place, did you consider that such conversation turned the matter over to the Army and Navy?

Answer: After this Government had received and studied the Japanese proposal of November 20, which has already been described, together with Kurusu's representation to me on November 21 that Japan had nothing more to offer, it became obvious, especially in the light of Japan's menacing military movements and of the indisputable proof derived from intercepted Japanese messages that the November 20 proposal was their last word, that the chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished. From November 22 on it was my individual view that Japan was through with any serious conversations looking to a peaceful settlement. From that day I and my associates had reach a stage of clutching at straws in our effort to save the situation. We groped about for anything that might offer any possibility for keeping serious conversations going. We gave consideration to possible choices in an effort to determine the wisest and most feasible course.

[14288] From November 22 on I did not conceal my conclusions on these points. It was on November 25 at the meeting of the War Council that I again emphasized the critical nature of the situation and stated more formally that, "the matter is now in the hands of the Army and the Navy." My most accurate recollection of my conversations along this line with the President and the War and Navy officials was contained in my statement of December 30, 1941, to the Roberts committee. I rely upon that statement to refresh my present recollection. The portion of that statement dealing with this point is as follows:

On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of the War Council, at which the highest officers of the Army and the Navy of course were present, I emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan: I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy. At the conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the

Japanese might make [14289] the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

The expression, "the matter is now in the hands of the Army and the Navy," as applied in the situation which then arose, does not imply any idea of a transfer from the Department of State to the Departments of War and of the Navy of any part of the Department of State's functions or responsibilities. Nor do I think that there was any misunderstanding on the part of the President or of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy as to the sense in which this expression was used. It seemed self-evident that the Army and the Navy would be our chief reliance in the light of the critical situation known to all of us. It was, of course, the understanding of each of us that the Department of State would continue to function and coordinate its action with that of the Army and Navy, but I emphasized that we could no longer be expected materially to control the situation.

Questions 34 and 35 are grouped in a single answer.

34. Question: Other than the Winant message, dated December 6, received by the State Department about 10:40 a. m., December 6, 1941, did you have any other information as to the [14290] Japanese Fleet movements as indicated in the Winant message?

35. Question: If so, will you state what the information was and when you received it?

Answer: According to State Department records, similar information was received from the Navy Department (from the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet) and from the War Department (from the United States military observer at Singapore). The Navy report was available in Washington at 10:57 a. m., December 6, and I am informed that the War Department report, so far as the records indicate, came in December 6 followed by a lengthy conference on the morning ment to the committee, the records show several telephone conversations between War and Navy officials and myself on December 6 followed by a lengthy conference on the morning of December 7 between Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox and myself. These conversations on December 6 and 7, according to my best recollection, comprised discussion of the Japanese convoys and other information regarding Japanese military movements which we had previously received.

Questions 36 and 37 are grouped in a single answer.

36. Question: [14291] I show you a memorandum, exhibit 40, and ask you if there was any discussion with you or anyone else to your knowledge on this subject of armed support?

37. Question: Who assured the British of American armed support as mentioned in their instructions to Singapore as shown by the message of our naval observer at Singapore to Admiral Hart?

Answer: There was no discussion with me or with anyone else to my knowledge on the subject of advance assurance to Britain of armed American support which would have served

as a basis for the telegram from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the Navy Department quoted in exhibit No. 40, or for the message from Singapore referred to in question 37. I do not know who, or whether anyone, assured the British of American armed support. However, after witnessing the suicidal experiences of countries like Belgium and Holland which had failed to confer with the Allies before they were invaded, it seemed to me but natural and necessary that the three or four governments deemed in imminent danger of attack by Japan may well have had conversations before the attack, subject, so far as we were concerned in the matter of commitments, to our constitutional limitations.

[14292] 38. See answer to questions 12 and 13.

Questions 39 and 40 are grouped in a single answer.

39. Question: Do you recall the one of November 7—"all arrangements must be completed by the 25th?"

40. Question: Did that message cause you to give the warning to the Cabinet?

Answer: I recall the message of November 5 (exhibit No. 1, p. 100) that, "all arrangements for the signing of this agreement must be completed by the 25th." I do not definitely recall whether the message referred to in question 39 was before me when I warned the Cabinet of the dangers in the situation on November 7. The record shows that the message in question was available on November 5, and presumably I saw it. I would say that my statement to the Cabinet was prompted by conclusions derived from a number of sources.

Questions 41 and 42 are grouped in a single answer.

41. Question: Mr. Secretary, you were familiar with our exhibit 16 and exhibit 17, wherein both Admiral Stark and General Marshall requested time?

42. Question: [14293] Prior to your sending the note of the 26th, were you familiar with the contents of the memorandum to the President, dated November 27, by Admiral Stark and General Marshall?

Answer: I was familiar with the joint memoranda of Admiral Stark and General Marshall of November 5 and November 27. I do not know just when those memoranda were brought to my attention, but I am satisfied that I did not see either memorandum prior to its date. I was, of course, familiar with the views of General Marshall and Admiral Stark in regard to their desire for time, and I myself was animated by a desire to do everything I could to gain time.

Questions 43 and 44 are grouped in a single answer.

43. Question: What did you do to obtain the time as asked for by Marshall and Stark in their memorandums of November 5 and 27?

44. Question: Did you discuss this question with the President and what was said by the President and you in that discussion?

Answer: Generally speaking, our entire 8 months of conversations involved gaining time. There was no conflict between this objective and our intensive efforts to persuade

[14294] the Japanese to pursue policies of peace. After the Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2, 1941, the Japanese in pursuance of the decision to move south, proceeded rapidly with the necessary preparations for a military movement on a large scale.

It was obvious that the time of such attack as Japan would make would be of Japan's own choosing, and would depend upon Japan's own estimate of her readiness and of favoring circumstances. It was not within the power of this Government otherwise than by abject submission to Japan's terms, to halt Japan in her course. However, I endeavored at all times to treat with the Japanese in a spirit of open-mindedness, patience and goodwill. I sought from the outset of the conversations to explore thoroughly every possibility of bringing about a peaceful, fair and stabilizing settlement of the situation in the Pacific, and I spared no effort to keep always open a door to the continuation of the conversations. At the same time I had to be on guard against any manifestation of weakness which might have encouraged the Japanese to be more precipitate than they were in their action. In this way, I believe that we gained months of valuable time. It became clear, however, in October, as I saw it, that the Japanese had decided to strike in their own time unless this Government should be willing to yield abjectly [14295] to Japan's terms. I constantly discussed with the President the question of gaining as much time as possible and we had the subject very much in mind throughout the conversations with the Japanese.

45-47. See answer to questions 29 to 33.

48. Question: Did the Secretary of State's office prepare a final draft, one ready for delivery to the Japanese, of a *modus vivendi*?

Answer: A draft of the *modus vivendi* dated November 25 which was labeled "Final draft," meaning that that was the last draft that was made of that document, has been furnished the committee. It cannot be accurately said that that draft was "ready for delivery to the Japanese," as it is impossible to tell what further revision might have been made if a decision had been made to offer the Japanese a *modus vivendi*.

49. Question: Did you show such a draft to the Ambassadors of Britain, China, and the Netherlands?

Answer: The latest draft of the *modus vivendi* shown to the British, Chinese, and Netherlands diplomatic representatives was the draft of November 24. There were only [14296] minor differences between the November 24 and the November 25 drafts.

50. Question: I call your attention to exhibit 19, page 1, where you used the following words: "My personal view continued as on yesterday, November 28, to be that its sending will be of doubtful efficacy. Except for the purpose of making a record, it might even cause such a complication as Colonel Stimson and I referred to on yesterday." I ask you, Mr. Secretary, to explain what conversations you and Colonel Stimson had with the President and what was said by each of the parties in that conversation?

Answer: I do not recall precisely what conversations Mr. Stimson and I had with the President on or about November 28 in regard to the proposed message to the Emperor other than the points mentioned in my memorandum which you cite. We all realized, of course, that the Emperor at that time was powerless before the military leaders. I recall very clearly that I had in mind that the sending of a message to the Emperor might have prejudiced the situation owing to the probability that such an appeal would be likely to arouse resentment among the real leaders of Japan, because of our having gone over their heads, and moreover might have been interpreted as [14297] weakness, since the Japanese themselves do not normally shift from a bold front attitude to one of pleading until the situation with them is desperate. These points, to the best of my recollection, were all brought out in the discussions I had with the President and Mr. Stimson.

51. Question: What did you mean by the expression "for the purpose of making a record"?

Answer: The expression, "for the purpose of making a record," has reference to the matter of making perfectly clear to both the American and Japanese peoples then and for the future that all the efforts of this Government were directed toward maintaining peace to the very end.

52. Question: When did you first know that the President had sent a message to the Emperor?

Answer: I was in consultation with the President at all stages of the drafting of the message to the Emperor and the message, of course, was sent through the State Department. I, therefore, was aware of the message being sent at the time of its sending, about 9 p. m., December 6, 1941.

Questions 53 to 56 and 84 to 87 are grouped in a single answer.

53. Question: [14298] Was it before or after you learned of the pilot message, being message 901, exhibit 1, page 238?

54. Question: Was it before or after you learned that Japan was replying to your November 26 message?

55. Question: Was it before or after you knew the contents of any part of the 14-part message, a reply to your November 26 message?

56. Question: Had you learned of the receipt of any of the 13 parts of the 14-part message, being message 902, page 239, exhibit 1, before it was decided by the President, or by you, to send a message to the Emperor?

84. Question: When did you first learn that the Japanese were replying to your note of November 26?

85. Question: When did you first see any of the parts of the 14-part message 902, exhibit 1, page 239?

86. Question: When did you first learn that the message was to be delivered in accordance with a time later to be determined?

87. Question: When did you first see the message No. 844, page [14299] 195, exhibit 1, which contained the language: "therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This

is inevitable. However, I do not wish to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off.”?

Answer: I cannot recall definitely the exact time when any of the messages referred to were seen by me.

During the period in which those messages were being received and distributed, my attention was focused on reports of the extremely menacing movement made manifest by the sailing of the large Japanese armada from the jumping-off place in Indochina. Those reports thus were of more serious and urgent import than any threatening phase of intercepted messages relating to Japan's reply to our communication of November 26. As I made clear in my conversations and statements during those last days prior to Pearl Harbor, I felt that war would break out at any time and that the Japanese had given clear indication as to the course they would take. Notification through the intercepts of a forthcoming Japanese communication announcing that the Japanese would not continue the conversations was only confirmatory of the judgment which I had been passing on to my colleagues in the [14300] Government during the previous fortnight.

Even had the intercepted messages clearly indicated immediate war, they could only have referred to attack by the gathering Japanese forces whose movements we had been watching for days.

From the time the Japanese presented their drastic ultimatum on November 20, no intimations were given us that the Japanese would make the slightest concessions in their demands, but, on the contrary, they drove steadily forward to the attack with their armed forces, while, at the same time, misrepresenting the attitude of this Government. The Japanese reply of December 7 was a false and fraudulent statement in the worst of bad faith of Japan's case and a monstrous misrepresentation of our position in what turned out to be a brazen attempt to shift from themselves to us responsibility for their attack upon us.

Questions 57 to 60 are grouped in a single answer.

57. Question: Did you discuss with the President the *modus vivendi* message?

58. Question: If so, what was said about it by the President and what did you say to the President?

59. Question: [14301] Did you ever discuss with the President the fact that you were not going to send the *modus vivendi* but were going to send the note of the 26th?

60. Question: If you had such a conversation or discussion with the President about that date on the *modus vivendi* will you give us the conversations?

Answer: I was in constant touch with the President and consulted him fully at all stages of our consideration of the *modus vivendi* proposal. It is impossible to recall the details of the discussion, but the trend of our thought was indicated in my statement before the committee on November 19, 1945. The President at no time expressed any dissent from views expressed by me. On November 26 I recommended to the President—and he approved—my calling in the Japanese

representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while withholding the *modus vivendi* plan.

Questions 61 and 62 are grouped in a single answer.

61. Question: Was it usual for the President to confer with Ambassadors on Sunday?

62. Question: Can you state why the meeting was held between the [14302] Japanese Ambassador and the President on Sunday, August 17, 1941, the day the President returned from the Atlantic Conference?

Answer: Although, during the conversations with the Japanese in 1941, August 17 was the only Sunday occasion on which the President had received them, I had conversations with them by appointment made at their request on four other Sundays: namely, May 11, June 15, June 22, and December 7. I, therefore, attached no special significance to the President's receiving them on Sunday and I do not know the reason, other than possibly the President's convenience, why the President received them on August 17 rather than an early subsequent weekday. It is true, of course, that the President did attach great importance to the communications which he made to the Japanese Ambassador on that occasion.

63. Question: Would you say that only an extraordinary matter required that the President on a Sunday, and at the hour of his return to Washington from a conference with the head of another Government should deliver to a third Government a note which he said, "he regretted the necessity to deliver but which he felt compelled to deliver"?

Answer: [14303] I would not conclude that otherwise than as indicated in replay to your question No. 62, only an extraordinary matter required the President on a Sunday, and at the hour of his return to Washington, to receive the Japanese Ambassador. The world was then on fire and the aggressor nations, including Japan, were wholly untrustworthy and treacherous, capable of undertaking a desperate stab at any time. Those of us in charge of foreign policy during this critical period were accustomed to spend most Sundays in our respective offices, including Sunday conferences involving both the President and foreign ambassadors.

64. Question: Was the situation between the American and Japanese Governments on August 17, the following: Because of Japan's violation of the basis of the conversations, by the seizure of Indochina, the American Government had broken off informal, exploratory conversations looking to the reestablishment of traditional relations and, because of the aggression against Indochina, the American Government had broken economic relations with Japan?

Answer: An accurate description of the situation between the American and Japanese Governments on August 17 will be found in the two oral statements handed by President [14304] Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941.

I think I should add that it was my strong opinion that the Japanese had convinced themselves that we were inade-

quately prepared and that therefore we would make sacrifices of our principles before undertaking to fight in their defense. It was incumbent on us, in justice to the Japanese as well as to ourselves, to tell them that if they pushed us too far, we would resist. I repeatedly and pointedly made this clear to the Japanese representatives in my conversations with them. President Roosevelt did likewise when he conferred with Ambassador Nomura on August 17 and agreed to resume the conversations. These representations were calculated to sober somewhat the Japanese militarists bent on aggression. But the Japanese did not take them as a threat, as the record of subsequent events shows.

65. Question: In your memorandum of the White House conversation of August 17, you say: "The President thereupon said that this Government should really bring the matters between the two Governments literally up to date and that he would therefore, offer certain observations about the position of this Government; he added that he regretted the necessity of so doing but that he had no other recourse;" (cf. *Foreign Relations*, vol. 2, p. 555). Will you give the [14305] interpretation in the terms of diplomacy of the statement by the head of one nation to another nation, with whom relations are critically strained, that he regrets the necessity of a note which he is about to deliver but that he has no other recourse but to deliver it?

Answer: It seems perfectly clear to me that what the President regretted was that the Japanese should have created a situation which rendered necessary a message of the import of the one which he at that time delivered to the Japanese. The President was endeavoring, in friendly fashion, to impress upon the Japanese Government our attitude as I have described it in answer to question 64.

66. Question: Do you know of any agreement with another power which had fixed the date of delivery of this note, and the second note, to be August 17?

Answer: I do not know of any agreement with any other power which called for delivery on August 17 of the two communications which were made to the Japanese on that date. The official record shows, however, that President Roosevelt told Prime Minister Churchill at their Atlantic meeting that he, the President, planned to see the Japanese Ambassador immediately on his return to Washington.

[14306] Questions 67 and 68 are grouped in a single answer.

67. Question: Do you know on what date that other power took the same action as the President took in line with their agreement for the making of parallel representations to Japan?

68. Question: Have you ever seen the text of the representations which were made by the British Government on August 17, or any subsequent or preceding date, agreed upon to be made parallel with those made by the President on or about August 17?

Answer: The Department has no record of any parallel action taken by the British Government corresponding to the action taken by the President vis-a-vis the Japanese on August 17, and I know of no parallel action taken by the British

other than the radio address of the British Prime Minister on August 24, 1941.

69. Question: The President by his action of August 16 was deciding ipso facto, not to await a bid which you had every reason to believe was coming from Japan. Did you suggest waiting?

Answer: Our judgment as to potentialities of Japanese policy [14307] had to be formed in the light of Japan's actions toward implementation of the decision of the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941, which called inter alia for a military advance south, of Japan's rejection of the President's proposal of July 24 to neutralize Indochina, and of 3 months of searching conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. With these in mind, it was idle to expect that the "concessions" which the Japanese Ambassador suggested might be forthcoming from his Government would be addressed to the fundamentals of the situation, which from our point of view called for Japan's removal of the menace she was creating to the United States and other peaceful nations and for her desisting from her aggressive courses. If Japan had in fact any intention of revising her position and adopting peaceful courses, there was nothing in the President's communication to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17 which would have tended to discourage Japan from adjusting her position; on the contrary, what the President said on that occasion was calculated to help rather than hinder reconsideration by Japan of her policies. There was therefore no advantage whatever in awaiting a further Japanese initiative.

Questions 70, 71, and 72 are grouped in a single answer.

70. Question: I find no reference, Mr. Secretary, in your prepared [14308] statement, to a communication from the Japanese Foreign Minister and an accompanying commentary by Ambassador Grew received by the State Department soon after midnight on August 18, 1941: Do you recall such documents which the State Department published in Foreign Relations 11, pages 560-565?

71. Question: They establish, do they not, that at the time the President was delivering the first and then the second note of August 17, the Japanese Foreign Minister was delivering to Ambassador Grew a lengthy overture for the resumption of the conversations looking to a restoration of traditional relations? (N. B. Tokyo time, 14 hours later.)

72. Question: And in transmitting the Japanese message, Ambassador Grew quote: "With all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without every prayerful consideration . . ." also that the proposal was "unprecedented in Japanese history" and had been made with the approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities of the land; that is correct, is it not?

Answer: [14309] There is no controversy about the contents of the documents referred to in Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, volume II, pages 560-

565, containing an account of the approach made by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Grew in regard to a proposal for a meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister and the President and a statement of Ambassador Grew's reaction. That Japanese proposal is discussed and analyzed at some length in my prepared statement to the committee, which it is unnecessary to repeat here. The President and I, together with our Far Eastern advisers, were looking at the situation with the benefit of all the worldwide information available to us in Washington. We judged that the Japanese Government had no serious expectation of reaching an understanding at the proposed meeting unless the American Government surrendered its basic position while Japan rigidly adhered to and went forward with its policy of aggression and conquest. We had fully tested out the Japanese Government by preliminary inquiries and found it adamant in its position.

Nothing in the record of subsequent developments has contradicted our judgment at that time, but on the contrary, events have vindicated it. For example, the memoirs of Prince Konoye subsequently published in serial form in the *Asahi Shimbun*, a leading Tokyo newspaper [14310] running from December 20 to December 31, 1945, state that the Japanese army leaders agreed, in writing, on August 4, 1941 to Konoye's proposal for a meeting with the President only on condition that Japan adhere firmly to its fundamental policy and that in the event the President did not see eye to eye with the Japanese, Konoye would leave the meeting place determined to make war on the United States. Konoye also disclosed in his memoirs that at an Imperial Conference on September 6, 1941, the Japanese Government decided, in case there was no expectation within the first 10 days of October to gain her demands on the United States by diplomacy, to go to war with the United States, and accordingly to parallel diplomatic efforts with military preparations.

These disclosures by Konoye show conclusively that the Japanese would attack in their own chosen time unless we should surrender abjectly to the drastic Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and that if we had made no reply instead of delivering our communication of November 26, the 10-point proposal, the Japanese would have attacked just the same.

73. Question: On November 7, 1941, you warned the Cabinet they might look for an offensive by Japan at any time. What did you base that warning on?

[14311] Answer: My warning to the Cabinet on November 7 was based upon the acceleration of Japanese military activities and disquieting military disposals, especially in Indochina, the growing agitation in the Japanese press and among Japanese spokesmen for positive action, the pressure tactics employed by the Japanese Government toward forcing acceptance by this Government of the Japanese proposals, as well as the corroborative evidence of the intercepted Japanese messages.

74. Question: When did you draft the 10-point note of November 26?

Answer: Under the modus vivendi proposal the Japanese would have been committed to affirming that their national policies were directed toward lasting peace throughout the Pacific area and that they had no territorial ambitions therein. Its acceptance was also subject to the understanding that during its life (of 3 months subject to a further extension) there would be further conferences looking to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. There was attached to the modus vivendi proposal a plan of a comprehensive settlement as one practical exemplification of what we had in mind. This plan, consisting of two sections, a draft of a mutual [14312] declaration of policy and a statement of the steps to be taken by the two Governments, was common to both the modus vivendi proposal and the communication of November 26. Some of the material in section 1 was drafted months earlier, the remainder, including the material in section 2, in the course of a few days preceding November 26, and the latter part of the accompanying explanatory statement, which was not contained in the modus vivendi draft, on November 26.

Questions 75 and 76 are grouped in a single answer.

75. Question: At any time before it was sent, did you show it to the President or call the contents to his attention?

76. Question: If so, what was your conversation?

Answer: In the light of the foregoing explanation, it is clear that as the President was thoroughly familiar with the entire proposal, all that was called for was to consult with him about dropping the modus vivendi feature of the proposal. This I did by presenting to him a memorandum on November 26, a copy of which is in the hands of the committee, and obtained his prompt approval. I do not recall the details of any conversation on this.

Questions 77 and 78 are grouped in a single answer.

[14313] 7. Question: Did you see the message from General Marshall to General Short on November 27?

78. Question: If you saw such a note, when was its contents called to your attention?

Answer: I have no recollection that I saw before the publication of the Roberts Report the substance of General Marshall's message to General Short of November 27, 1941.

Questions 79 and 80 are grouped in a single answer.

79. Question: Did you the diplomatic relations between Japan and America grow worse after November 27?

80. Question: If they did grow worse how do you account for no other message being given to the commanders in the field?

Answer: Diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States could scarcely grow worse after November 27, except in the sense that the crisis foreseen by us and planned by the Japanese approached closer at hand. There was nothing fundamentally new in the diplomatic situation. That situation as we viewed it, especially from November 21 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, was that Japan [14314]

might strike at any time and that the diplomatic establishment could not be expected to preserve national security.

81. Question: Will you explain in detail if you were consulted in connection with the message to Short which contained the phrase "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act" and also in regard to not arousing the citizens?

Answer: I have no recollection of having been consulted in connection with the considerations which entered into inclusion in General Marshall's message to Short of the phrase, "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act," or in regard to the caveat against arousing the citizens. This was primarily a military question.

- 82, 83. See answer to question 14.

- 84, 85, 86, 87. See answer to questions 53-56.

88. Question: Did not that message 844, exhibit 1, page 195, indicate to you that your note of the 26th was not acceptable and, therefore, that war was imminent?

Answer: I was already satisfied that the Japanese would not agree to anything short of complete yielding by the United [14315] States to Japan's demands. The intercepted Japanese message to which you refer did no more than confirm what we already knew. As I have pointed out repeatedly Japan was bent on attacking us unless we made abject surrender to her demands as an aggressor. We had no serious thought that Japan would accept our proposal of November 26. I said at the time that there was only the barest possibility of her accepting. She would have proceeded to attack us whether we had presented that proposal or any other proposal—unless it had been one of humiliating and abject surrender—or whether we had offered no proposal at all. Furthermore, while a number of us in the State, War and Navy Departments were desirous of grabbing at any straw and therefore hoped for favorable action on the *modus vivendi*, most of us agreed that the chances of its acceptance were very slim. The testimony of Army and Navy officials on this point is in the record.

The November 26 proposal was another test of whether Japan was willing to abandon conquest and to adopt peaceful policies; if she were so willing she would have seized upon our ten-point program as highly desirable.

89. Question: Where were you on the night of December 6, 1941?

Answer: I was most invariably at home at night working on [14316] Departmental matters. While it is possible that I might be mistaken, my best recollection is that I was at home on the night of December 6, 1941.

90. Question: When did you first see or obtain information as to the contents of the following messages in exhibit 1:

#904—page 245.

#907—page 248.

#908—page 248.

#909—page 240.

#910—page 249.

Answer: I do not recall the exact times that I first saw or learned of the contents of the messages you cite.

Questions 91 to 96 are grouped in a single answer.

91. Question: Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese messages with the President?

92. Question: If so, give us the conversations.

93. Question: Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese messages with General Marshall?

94. Question: If so, give us the conversations.

[14317] 95. Question: Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese messages with Admiral Stark?

96. Question: If so, give us the conversations.

Answer: At this late date in 1946 I do not recall whether I discussed any particular messages or the details of the discussion with the President, with General Marshall, or with Admiral Stark. It is true that in many of our conversations, including those with Secretaries Knox and Stimson, and some with the President, some of us would bring up one or another of the intercepted messages. But I have no recollection of discussions of specific messages.

97. Question: Who called the meeting in your office on the morning of December 7?

Answer: As I recall it, the meeting in my office on December 7 was the result of a mutual agreement on the part of Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox, and myself. It might have been suggested in the first instance by any one or two of us three. According to my best recollection, the proposal for a meeting grew out of a desire to continue our dis- [14318] cussion of the situation created by the movement of the huge Japanese armada southward and westward of the southernmost point of Indochina.

98. Question: Tell us with whom you talked personally, by phone, or messenger, about this meeting and what was said.

Answer: I cannot recall material details beyond what I have given in reply to question 97.

99. Question: Please state in detail what was said by the persons attending the meeting in your office on December 7, 1941.

Answer: As I indicated in my prepared statement to the joint committee as well as in my oral testimony, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, and I in our conference of December 7, 1941, discussed the critical situation created by the large-scale Japanese military movement from the jumping-off place in Indochina. I cannot recall details of that discussion. Secretary Stimson has described the discussion in his statement to the Committee and that statement speaks for itself.

Questions 100 to 102 are grouped in a single answer.

100. Question: Our record shows that the President saw the 13 parts [14319] of the 14-part message at about 9:30 p. m., December 6, 1941. Did you see or talk to the President from that time until after the attack at Pearl Harbor?

101. Question: If so, give us your conversations.

102. Question: If you did not see him or talk to him or contact him—were you available?

Answer: I have no record of nor do I recall having seen or having talked with the President between 9:30 p. m. on December 6, 1941, and the moment of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. According to my best recollection, I was available during all of that period.

Questions 103 and 104 are grouped in a single answer.

103. Question: Did anyone from the Army, Navy, or State Departments, or executive offices contact you on Saturday, December 6, and/or Sunday, December 7, up to 2 p. m. Sunday?

104. Question: If so, give the conversations.

Answer: I was in constant contact during Saturday, December 6, and Sunday, December 7, with officers of the State Department and of the Army and Navy. As recorded in annex A [14320] of my statement to the committee, I had on those 2 days conferences, consultations and telephone conversations—as entered in engagement books—with representatives of the Army and the Navy, as follows:

December 6 10:45 a. m.: Telephone call from Secretary Knox.

11:50 a. m.: Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

1:00 p. m.: Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

1:15 p. m.: Telephone call from Admiral Stark.

1:50 p. m.: Captain Schuirmann.

5:15 p. m.: Telephone call to Admiral Stark.

8:45 p. m.: Telephone call to Secretary Knox.

December 7 10:30 a. m.: Telephone call to Admiral Stark.

10:30 a. m.: Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox.

2:10 p. m.: Telephone call from Admiral Stark.

In addition, I had many conferences on those days with officers of the Department of State. It would be [14321] impossible to recall the details of all the conversations which took place, but I might say that the Japanese large-scale military movement from the jumping-off place in Southern Indochina was very much in the minds of all of us who were called upon to consider that situation. We were striving to ascertain the full significance of those military movements, their probable destination, etcetra.

Questions 105 and 106 are grouped in a single answer.

105. Question: Mr. Secretary, will you agree that the official records of American-Japanese relations from August 28, 1941, until December 7, 1941, show that the Secretary of State never considered that the Japanese Government was bluffing in its assertions that, should no agreement be reached with the United States, Japan would strike?

106. Question: In this connection, Mr. Secretary, will you agree that the records established that the Secretary of State accepted at face value the statements in diplomatic exchange wherein

Konoye on August 28, Toyoda on September 27, Togo on November 12, Nomura on November 12, and Kurusu on November 17 and 18, indicated or said that a rupture of the conversations would mean war in the Pacific? (Cf. Foreign Relations 11, pp. 572-3, 642, 719-22, 725, 740, 747.)

[14322] Answer: My view, as set forth in the record of American-Japanese relations over several years, was that Japan was not bluffing but was on a steady and fixed course of conquest which would reach us in Japan's own chosen time. I believed that Japan was playing the role of an international desperado, and it is the principal business of a desperado—whether a nation or an individual—to fight. During that period Japan believed that she was exceedingly well armed for the purpose of achieving her intended conquests in the Pacific area. She likewise knew that at that time we were by no means sufficiently armed in the Pacific to resist successfully a Japanese attack. Therefore, at the time, to which your inquiry related, I was satisfied that Japan was not bluffing but rather was giving us a last chance to yield our basic principles which would enable her to continue her course of aggression and conquest without further serious risk of successful resistance.

When we realize that Japan was carrying on flagrant aggressions and ruthless invasions of peaceful countries, that the United States was pleading with her from the beginning to cease her course of military conquest in close partnership with Hitler, and that all problems in the Pacific would practically settle themselves at once [14323] when Japan adopted a policy of peace, it becomes apparent that she had no more right to make demands on the United States—as though we too were an aggressor, instead of a law-abiding country pleading for peace—than an individual gangster has to assume a like attitude toward his intended victim. It is in the light of these circumstances that we must view all the arguments which the Japanese used in trying to browbeat the United States into yielding, such as those described in the reference cited in your question.

Questions 107 to 109 are grouped in a single answer.

107. Question: In this respect was the Secretary's evaluation of the situation at one with Ambassador Grew's, namely that the Japanese were not bluffing but could be expected to strike suddenly and dramatically?

108. Question: Did the Secretary, with the information from Ambassador Grew that the Tojo cabinet had advised the Emperor as to how far it would go with the United States, and, with the information from an intercepted Japanese message that a deadline had been fixed for November 25, tell the American Cabinet on November 7 that a new and sudden Japanese aggression was to be looked for? (Cf. Foreign Relations 11, pp. 700-1, Intercepts, [14324] ex. 1, p. 100, Peace and War, pp. 135-7.)

109. Question: Did the Cabinet thereupon vote unanimously that Secretary Knox and Under Secretary Welles should deliver

addresses on Armistice Day to the end of informing the nation as to American-Japanese relations? (Cf. Peace and War, pp. 136-7; 776-87.)

Answer: In reply to these questions, I quote the first paragraph of page 29 of my prepared statement to the committee:

On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It [14325] became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.

I also quote a paragraph from Peace and War, pages 136-137:

Four days later, on November 7, Secretary Hull stated at a Cabinet meeting that relations between Japan and the United States were extremely critical and that there was "imminent possibility" that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force. It thereupon became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible be better prepared for such a development. Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we were "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world—on the far side of the Pacific"; that the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense. On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles, [14326] carrying out the cabinet suggestion in an address, stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking high both in the East and in the West," he said, and were threatening, more and more with each passing day, "to engulf our own shores." He warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917; that "at any moment war may be forced upon us."

110. Question: Subsequent to November 7, will the witness agree that the official records and his testimony here show that he advised high military officials of the Government and also the British Ambassador that a sudden attack anywhere in the Pacific by Japan must be anticipated?

Answer: In reply I quote from Peace and War, 2 paragraphs appearing on pages 144-145:

On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of high officials of this Government, Secretary Hull emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan. He stated that there [14327] was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with

a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

On November 29, 1941, Secretary Hull conferred with the British Ambassador. The Secretary said that, "the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy." He said further that it would be "a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the [14328] peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on the theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited conquest now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risk."

Furthermore, I and my associates were in daily consultation with the Army and Navy officials throughout the period after November 7, exchanging information and views as to the critical character of the situation.

111. Question: Is it correct to say that the intercepted dispatch from Tokyo on November 28 (No. 844, p. 195, Ex. 1) giving the reaction to the American notes of November 26, and also the intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin on November 30 (No. 985, p. 204, Ex. 1) informing Hitler of Japan's intentions, confirmed the judgments you had been stating in official councils since November 7?

Answer: During this period all the information we received made clearer Japan's purpose to attack unless the United States yielded to them. In other words, Japan had no intention of yielding any part of her plan of conquest by force, but was giving the United States, by its proposal of November 20, a last opportunity to choose between yielding or fighting. Insofar as the intercepted Japanese messages cited in the question indicated that in consequence of the refusal of the United States to yield to Japan's unreasonable demands the Japanese intended to take forcible measures to gain their ends, those intercepted messages served to confirm my judgments as expressed by me in official councils, especially during those last few weeks.

112. Question: Did not the fact that Japan, without a declaration of war, attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, confirm, in their entirety, the judgments you had been offering in official councils since November 7?

Answer: Japan's attack on a number of points over a sweep of thousands of miles, one of which points was Pearl Harbor, at about the same time confirmed our judgment as to the critically dangerous character of the situation.

113. Question: Do you recall, Mr. Secretary, your meeting with the Japanese Ambassadors in your apartment on the night of November 22 in which they pressed for a reply to the Japanese note of November 20? (Cf. How War Came, p. [14330] 304, also For. Relations 11.)

Answer: I do recall my meeting with the Japanese Ambassadors on November 22 when they pressed for a reply to the Japanese proposals of November 20. During the month of No-

- vember the Japanese representatives were insistently worrying me with their importunities for a quick understanding, intimating that otherwise something awful would happen.
114. Question: I quote in full a secret message from Tokyo to the Ambassadors, under date of November 22, intercepted by the Army at Washington and translated on the same date:

(Secret)
 From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 22, 1941
 (Urgent)
 #812
 To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my No. 736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond [14331] your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next 3 or 4 days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone." (Cf. Intercepts No. 812, p. 165, exhibit 1, our record.)

Did you telephone the President on the night of the 22 concerning this intercepted message? (Cf. How War Came, p. 304.)

Answer: To the best of my recollection I did not telephone to the President on the night of the 22d of November in regard to the intercepted message quoted in the question, and I find no record of having made such a call.

115. Question: Did you on November 26 hand the Japanese Ambassador [14332] an oral statement which rejected the Japanese note of November 20?

Answer: Please refer to my replies to your questions Nos. 6 and 7.

116. Question: Did you, at the same time, hand them a tentative 10-point proposal for a broad settlement of the Pacific situation?

Answer: Please refer to my reply to your question No. 8.

117. Question: Did the Japanese Ambassadors say that their Government would throw up its hands because of these American documents and that their nature was tantamount to meaning the end of the conversations?

Answer: What the Japanese representatives said is covered in the memorandum of my conversation of November 26, 1941, with the Japanese representatives. (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan. 1931-41, vol. II. pp. 764-766).

As I saw the situation at that time, the Japanese had in fact already "thrown up their hands," and, as subsequent disclosures show, their fleets and armed forces [14333] were then moving for an attack on some five points extending over a vast space. The attitude evinced by the Japanese

on the occasion under reference was confirmatory of their fixed purpose of requiring us to surrender our basic policy while they maintained intact their policy of aggression and force.

118. Question: Did the reports of the Japanese Ambassadors to their Government concerning the meeting of November 26, reports known to you by the interception of the messages to Tokyo, coincide in the main with your understanding of what had taken place on November 26?

Answer: The published record of this Government (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, pp. 764-765) contains a full account of the substance of the conversation which I had with the Japanese representatives on November 26. The accounts in the Japanese intercepted messages of that conversation in order to be correctly evaluated must be considered in the light of the background of the situation. It is my understanding that the main object of the Japanese Government in pressing for a reply to their November 20 proposal was to ascertain beyond any doubt whether this Government would yield to the Japanese or whether this [14334] Government was going to stand firm, and if the Japanese had learned that we were standing firm they would continue forward with the attack. Our position of not yielding was as clear as crystal to the Japanese Ambassadors, and all their talk of being "dumb-founded" at the nature of our November 26 proposal was a prelude to an attempt, by outrageously false statements uttered in the utmost of bad faith, to shift to this Government responsibility for what they were planning. As showing this thought was specifically in their minds, I quote from the Japanese message 1190 of November 26, appearing on pages 182 and 183 of exhibit 1, especially that portion which reads as follows:

The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French [14335] Indochina. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counterpropaganda against us.

The foregoing is a virtual admission that the Japanese Ambassador recognized that responsibility for a rupture would be Japan's and of a purpose to attempt to shift that responsibility.

119. Question: There is, in the record, an intercepted message from Tokyo, No. 823, page 173, which advised Nomura and Kurusu that the deadline fixed for November 29 was to be reckoned in Tokyo time: thus when the President left Washington for Warm Springs at 3 p. m. on November 28, the time in Tokyo

was 5 a. m. of November 29; do you know if there were any coincidence in the fact that the President was leaving Washington at the time of the expiration of the deadline set by Tokyo?

Answer: I do not myself recall anything on this point. The fact was that for some days the President and I believed that the chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished.

On the day the President left for Warm Springs, [14336] November 28, he told the press that he was leaving on a vacation that had twice been postponed, and that while he did not know when he would return, he hoped that it need not be before December 2, adding that he might have to return because of existing conditions in the Pacific. Asked how long he expected these conditions to exist, the President referred the inquirer to Tokyo rather than to Washington.

120. Question: In a talk at the Thanksgiving Day dinner at Warm Springs on the night of November 29 the President said, speaking in terms of the Thanksgiving of the following year; "It is always possible that our boys at the military and naval academies may actually be fighting for the defense of these American institutions of ours" (cf. N. Y. Times, November 30): in the circumstances would you say that the limitation to the boys of the military and naval academies was intended to have particular significance to the Japanese or to the American people?

Answer: I, myself, would not be a party to giving the President's statement the narrow construction suggested. The statement, directed toward national defense and made to an American audience, speaks for itself.

Question 121 and 122 are grouped in a single answer.

- [14337] 121. Question: I have found, Mr. Secretary, a discrepancy in the date given by you in your statement to the committee as to an address by Premier Tojo of Japan and your telephoning the President concerning that address and other developments; on pages 43-44 of your statement the date is fixed as of Sunday, November 30; the New York Times of the morning of November 30, fixes both occurrences as of November 29 and gives this authorized statement by the President's secretary, Mr. Early, issued at Warm Springs on the night of November 29: I quote Mr. Early's statement: "As soon as the President returned to the cottage following the dinner this evening he found a call waiting from the Secretary of State, and they held a lengthy conversation. In view of the reported statement—an Associated Press dispatch by the Premier of Japan—the President tonight is of the opinion that he may have to leave Warm Springs tomorrow afternoon, arranging the railroad schedule so as to arrive in Washington Monday before noon": In view of this record would you say that the Tojo speech was delivered on November 29 and that you telephoned the President concerning it on November 29?

122. Question: Will you give the conversation between you and the President?

[14338] Answer: I seem to have telephoned the President on November 29, instead of on November 30 as, by inadvertence, was inaccurately stated in my prepared statement to the Committee. The statement of Premier Tojo was, according to State Department records, delivered in the form of a message to a Japanese meeting held on November 30. (See Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. II, p. 148.) The apparent discrepancy in time may have resulted from the fact that Japanese time is about 14 hours later than Washington time, or perhaps the message may have been available to the press prior to its delivery.

I have no record of exactly what was said in that telephone conversation. As I told the committee in my prepared statement, in that conversation I advised the President to advance the date of his return to Washington.

Questions 123 and 124 are grouped in a single answer.

123. Question: From page 195 of the record of the Intercepts, exhibit 1, I quote:

(Secret)

From Tokyo

To Washington

November 28, 1941

[14339] # 844

Re your file # 1189

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off: Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions, and that, although the opinions of your Government are not clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your No. 1180 and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best [14340] you can.

The record is that this intercepted message had been decoded and translated on November 28; do you recall discussing it with the President before his departure for Warm Springs on the afternoon of the 28th?

124. Question: Did you discuss this intercepted message in your telephonic conversation with the President at Warm Springs on the night of November 29?

Answer: I do not recall discussing with the President the intercepted Japanese message quoted by you.

125. Question: Would you say that it was the Tojo address which alone prompted your call and the President's return?

Answer: The gravity of the situation was evident from many sources. As Tojo's statement reflected the extreme acuteness of the situation, in that sense it may be said that the statement prompted my telephone call and the President's return.

126. Question: Did the intercepted message of the 28th constitute the first official knowledge you had of the Japanese Government's reaction to the notes of the 26th?

[14341] Answer: As I have already stated, I kept no record of when particular messages reached me. I can therefore only presume that the intercepted Japanese message in question was the first knowledge I had of what purported to be the Japanese Government's reaction to this Government's proposal of November 26. This reaction was fully expected in the light of the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum on November 20 and of subsequent developments.

127. Question: The message said definitely, did it not, that the American note was unacceptable, that a rupture was inevitable within a few days, and that Nomura and Kurusu were to make a pretense of carrying on the conversations until the official word came to them of the break?

Answer: The message indicated among other things that the Japanese Government would not accept as a basis for negotiations the American communication of November 26, that the "negotiations" would be de facto ruptured within 2 or 3 days and that the Japanese ambassadors were to avoid giving the impression the "negotiations" were broken off. I have hereinbefore pointed out that I considered serious conversations over after the 20th or 21st barring the very slight possibility that the Japanese might come [14342] back. When the full facts later came out they further confirmed our appraisal of the situation.

128. Question: Did you have in mind, in any way, the secret Tokyo message of the 28th when, on the day following, you told Lord Halifax that the diplomatic phase was over and that the situation was now in the hands of the American Army and Navy? (Peace and War, pp. 816-817.)

Answer: I do not recall whether I had the message in mind when I talked to the British ambassador on November 29. What I told the British ambassador was substantially what I had been saying to the President and to representatives of the Army and Navy for some days previously, based on conclusions derived from various sources.

129. Question: In line with your convictions as to the intentions of Japan did you accept at full value the statements expressed by Tokyo to Nomura and Kurusu on the 28th?

Answer: I considered this message in the light of previous instructions to Nomura and Kurusu to do their utmost to induce the Government of the United States to surrender its basic policies. In the message of November 28 the Japanese Government, realizing that the effort had ended [14343] in failure, was thanking the Japanese representatives for their efforts; secondly the Japanese addressed themselves to framing up a cloak to cover their attack already under way,

which cloak included what was in effect the fantastic and monstrously false charge that this Government was treating the Japanese outrageously by refusing to surrender to them.

130. Question: You have testified that on November 29, you prepared for the President's consideration a draft of a Presidential message to Congress advising that body of the American-Japanese situation?

Answer: Please refer to my reply to your question No. 16.

131. Question: Did you, on the evening of November 29, in your telephonic conversation with the President, discuss such a proposed message to Congress?

Answer: I do not recall whether I discussed the proposed message to Congress in a telephone conversation with the President on November 29.

132. Question: In the preparation on the 29th of a proposed Presidential message to Congress did you have in mind, in any [14344] way, that provision of the Constitution which provides that from time to time the President shall give to Congress information as to the state of the Union and recommend to the Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient? (Cf. art. 11, sec. 3.)

Answer: Please refer to my reply to your question No. 19.

133. Question: If your answer to the previous question is "no" I ask you why such a course was considered even to preparation of a message.

Answer: In the critical situation which then existed it was deemed important to give consideration to any and all lines of action that might in the least be helpful in meeting the situation.

134. Question: You have testified that on Sunday, November 30, Lord Halifax told you that the British Government had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and the Kra Peninsula; did Lord Halifax tell you that the British had obtained this information through interception of a Tokyo message intended for Hitler, personally?

Answer: [14345] I do not recall that the British Ambassador informed me of the source from which the British Government had had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and the Kra Peninsula, and I find nothing in the record indicating that he mentioned the source.

Questions 135 and 137 are grouped in a single answer.

135. Question: A message from the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin to Tokyo, dated November 29 and decoded in Washington on December 1, has the Japanese Ambassador advising his Government that Ribbentrop had informed him that Germany had information that America's stiff front had practically ended the Washington conversations; whereupon the Ambassador had told Ribbentrop that he had no official word from Tokyo as to the conversations or as to Japan's intentions; my question is: Did this intercepted message from Berlin to Tokyo fit in with the evidence of previous intercepts, and of Ambassador Grew's reports, that Japan had

been keeping Hitler in the dark as to the Washington conversations? (Cf. Intercepts, exhibit 1, p. 200.)

137. Question: Is it not clearly indicated, if not established, by the intercept from Berlin of November 29 that on that day neither the Japanese Ambassador nor Hitler had [14346] definite information as to Japan's intentions toward the United States?

Answer: It would seem clear from the message under reference that the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin had not communicated from his Government to the German Government at that time a report on the current situation regarding the Japanese-American conversations. The Germans had more than one way of keeping in touch with Japan. The possibility is not excluded that Hitler and also Ribbentrop had received reports from the German Ambassador at Tokyo of the progress of the conversations. Therefore, I would not wish to undertake to interpret the message.

136. Question: November 29 was the day of the Japanese dead line?

Answer: Tokyo's message to the Japanese Ambassador No. 812 of November 22, 1941, of which a translation appears on page 165, exhibit 1, contains the following passage:

There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next 3 or 4 days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you— [14347] twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the dead line absolutely cannot be changed.

The foregoing bald confession by the Japanese Government of its plan and patent movement to attack unless the United States surrendered to the demands in Japan's ultimatum fits in with all that I said and did following that date.

138. Question: Also intercepted, and decoded in Washington on December 1, was a message from the Japanese Government to its Ambassador at Berlin, dated Tokyo, November 30; Therein the Japanese Ambassador is informed that American-Japanese conversations now "stand ruptured—broken"; the Japanese Government instructs the Ambassador to see Hitler and Ribbentrop immediately and to say "very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms" and to "add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams"; my question is: Did this message and the attendant circumstances of it strengthen your [14348] convictions as to Japan's intentions? (Cf. Intercepts, exhibit 1, p. 204.)

Answer: The message to which you refer was cumulative evidence of the conclusions which I had already reached in regard to Japan's intentions, and which were overwhelmingly supported by the surrounding facts and circumstances.

Questions 139 and 140 are grouped in a single answer.

139. Question: In fixing the deadline for November 29, Tokyo had secretly advised Nomura and Kurusu that after that date things would happen automatically, had it not?

140. Question: Did you consider the message to Hitler on November 30, a portentous automatic happening in the crisis?

Answer: On November 22 the Japanese Government instructed Nomura and Kurusu in regard to the extension from November 25 to November 29 for the deadline for the conclusion of an agreement and stated that: "After that things are automatically going to happen" (exhibit No. 1, p. 165). The message from Tokyo to Berlin of November 30, 1941 (exhibit No. 1, p. 204), was, of course, in harmony with what the Japanese had in mind as revealed through numerous sources.

[14349] 141. Question: Did the President return to Washington on December 1?

Answer: The record shows that the President returned to Washington from Warm Springs on December 1.

Questions 142 to 145 are grouped in a single answer.

142. Question: Did he direct the preparation of a strong note to Japan asking of that Government an explanation for its concentration of forces in the southern part of Indochina?

143. Question: Did the President on December 2, direct the State Department to hand the Japanese a communication in which the President stated that Japanese concentrations in southern Indochina implied the utilization of these forces by Japan for aggression against the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya or Thailand? (Cf. For. Rel. 11, pp. 778-779.)

144. Question: Was such a communication handed to the Japanese?

145. Question: Did that communication state that the Hitleresque nature of the Japanese concentrations and the broad problem of American defense had prompted the President's representations? (Cf. For. Rel. 11, p. 779, last [14350] paragraph of text of note.)

Answer: The President on December 2 simply directed that inquiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the reasons for the continued Japanese troop movements in Indochina. On the same day the Under Secretary of State, in compliance with the President's instruction, informed the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu of the President's inquiry. The record of the matter appears in Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, volume II, pages 778-781.

146. Question: Did the Japanese military concentrations and military movements, known to the American Government in the period November 30-December 6, 1941, constitute threats to American Pacific possessions, to the countries neighboring Japan in the Pacific, and to the American sources of vital materials?

Answer: The Japanese military concentrations and military movements known to the American Government in the period November 30-December 6, 1941, so far as I could judge as

Secretary of State, did constitute serious threats to American Pacific possessions, to the countries neighboring Japan, and to American sources of vital [14351] materials.

Questions 147 and 148 are grouped in a single answer.

147. Question: Did such threats require that the United States immediately take any and all steps to meet them in conformity with the statement of the American Government to Japan on August 17, 1941, to-wit:

* * * this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force OR THREAT OF FORCE of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

(Cf. For. Rel. 11, pp. 556-7.)

148. Question: Did the Japanese military concentrations and movements of November 30-December 6 constitute a challenge to the Government of the United States to implement the position it had taken in its note of August 17 to Japan?

Answer: The purpose of the United States, in making the statement of August 17 under reference, was to tell [14352] Japan in a friendly way that if she kept encroaching upon our rights and interests, we would defend ourselves. This Government at that time was acutely concerned over Japan's refusal to agree to our proposal for the neutralization of Indochina, to abandon her jumping-off place there, and otherwise to desist from the menace she was creating to us and other peace-minded nations. It wholly misrepresents the attitude of the United States in the period after August 17 to allege that this Government was planning any step other than that of pure defense in the event the Japanese should attack. Other aspects of this question, for example, where, when and how we would resist the Japanese, were essentially a military matter.

149. Question: Had the Secretary of State, in September 1940, informed Lord Lothian that American actions towards Japan in the Pacific would be predicated upon a policy of doing everything legitimately possible to help England win the war? (Cf. Peace and War, p. 575.)

Answer: What I said to Lord Lothian on September 30, 1940, in regard to this matter is accurately described in my memorandum of conversation with him appearing on pages 574-575 of Peace and War. My comments to Lord Lothian [14353] had to do with the broad aspects of the situation created by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact but also had special reference to the winning of the war by Great Britain against Germany. At that moment Germany had already overrun much of the Continent of Europe and the British and the entire Allied cause was virtually hanging by a thread. Every rational person realizes what would have happened to this country if Hitler and his allies had succeeded in their

program. It was in these circumstances that I had my conversation with Lord Lothian. I said:

The relations between Germany, Italy, and Japan, each having a common objective of conquering certain areas of the world and each pursuing identical policies of force, devastation and seizure, have been during recent years on a basis of complete understanding and of mutual cooperation for all purposes mutually desirable and reasonably practicable, with the result that the recent announcement was part and parcel of the chain of related events.

I then proceeded to say that this Government has pursued a definite and somewhat progressive line of acts and utterances in resisting Japanese aggression and treaty violations during recent years; that these acts and utterances have comprised repeated aid to China, suc-[14354] cessive moral embargoes, abandonment of the commercial treaty, actual embargoes under law, the sending of our Navy to Hawaii, together with appropriate statements and notes of strong remonstrance against Japanese steps of aggression and constant repetition of the basic principles of world order under law. I added that I did not undertake to predict, much less to make commitments, as to how fast and how far this Government may go in following up the various acts and utterances in which it has been indulging; that, of course, the special desire of this Government is to see Great Britain succeed in the war and that its acts and utterances with respect to the Pacific area would be more or less affected as to time and extent by the question of what course would, on the part of this Government, most effectively and legitimately aid Great Britain in winning the war.

150. Question: Had the Secretary of State in August 1941, informed Lord Halifax that a Japanese movement into the South Pacific would constitute a danger to England second only to a German invasion across the English Channel? (Cf. Peace and War, pp. 710-711.)

Answer: What I said to Lord Halifax on August 9 in regard to this matter is accurately described in my memorandum [14355] of conversation with him appearing on pages 710-711 of Peace and War which reads as follows:

The Ambassador made some inquiry about the amount of aid this Government might give in case Singapore or the Dutch East Indies should be attacked. I replied that I myself visualized the problem and issue in the broader way and that issue is presented by the plan of the Japanese to invade by force the whole of the Indian Ocean and the islands and continents adjacent thereto, isolating China, sailing across probably to the mouth of the Suez Canal, to the Persian Gulf oil area, to the Cape of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a military despotism the trade routes and the supply sources to the British. I added that this broad military occupation would perhaps be more damaging to British defense in Europe than any other step short of the German crossing of the Channel. I said that this Government visualizes these broad conditions and the problem of resistance which they present; that the activities of this Government in the way of discouraging this Japanese movement and of resistance will be more or less affected by the British defensive situation in Europe and hence by the question of the number of American naval vessels and other American aid that may be needed by Great Britain at the same time. I said that in the event of further [14356] Japanese movements south this Government and the British Government should naturally have a conference at once and this Government would then be able to determine more definitely and in detail its situation pertaining to resistance, in the light of the statement I had just made.

151. Question: Had the Congress, on November 13, 1941, at the solicitation of the President and the Secretary of State, committed the nation to keeping open the sea lanes so that Lend-Lease might fulfill its function? (Cf. New York Times, November 14.)

Answer: My view of the significance of the measure passed by the House of Representatives on November 13, 1941, providing for the amendment to the Neutrality Act is contained in a letter I wrote to Speaker Rayburn and Representative McCormack on that same day.

In that letter I stated:

The breadth of our self-defense must at all times equal the breadth of the dangers which threaten us. In the circumstances of today, we must be free to arm our merchant ships for their own protection; and we must be free, in the event of particular and extreme emergency, to use these ships for the carriage of supplies to nations which are resisting the world- [14357] wide movement of conquest headed in our direction. This Government would, of course, use caution in carrying out the power which it could exercise upon the passage of the bill.

I also stated:

The greatest intermediate objective of Hitler's armed forces is to capture Great Britain and to gain control of the high seas. To this end, Hitler has projected his forces far out into the Atlantic with a policy of submarine ruthlessness. By intimidation and terror he would drive our ships from the high seas, and ships of all nations from most of the North Atlantic. Even in the waters of the Western Hemisphere he has attacked and destroyed our ships, as well as ships of other American republics, with resulting loss of American lives.

The action of Congress in amending the Neutrality Act was only one factor in promoting the broad problem of self-defense, the necessity of which at that time was urgent and compelling.

152. Question: In addition to the physical threat to the Philippines as stated in the President's communication to Japan of December 2, did the Japanese military movements constitute a danger to the commitments made by Congress in authorizing [14358] lend-lease and in re-establishing the American policy of freedom of the seas?

Answer: I would say that the Japanese military movements constituted a danger to the defense of free nations resisting the world-wide movement of conquest. The intent of lend-lease was to assist in that defense. The broad question of danger to this and to all peaceful countries was Japan's military partnership with Hitler for conquest. A material factor in the situation was Japan's flagrant violations of American rights and interests and the jeopardizing of American lives in China, which portended the extension of such violations over a much wider area. This Government could not afford to be deluded by Japan's false claims and pretensions which masked her designs of conquest, and to be oblivious to our own serious dangers.

153. Question: You have testified, have you not, that the decision of the Executive, in the period November 29-December 6, was not to advise Congress in a message of the state of American-Japanese relations?

Answer: In my testimony on November 26, 1945, in reply to questions by counsel as to "what the facts and circum- [14359] stances were which led to the decision not to deliver that message to the Congress prior to December 7, "I set forth various considerations which influenced the President and myself against acting prematurely in that matter. I have also discussed this in answer to your questions Nos. 18 and 19. The issue between isolationists and nonisolationists was then at fever heat and its line of cleavage extended through the Congress. The sending of a message to Congress at this critical juncture would have greatly accentuated that issue and would have correspondingly encouraged the Japanese militarists. The fact was that we had been doing our best to acquaint the Congress and the public with the critical dangers in the situation, and at the same time to avoid precipitating the crisis which the military people were anxious to defer as long as possible.

Questions 154 to 156 are grouped in a single answer.

154. Question: As one reason for this decision not to send a message to Congress, you have testified that Congress only a few weeks before November 29, had by only one vote, sustained the Selective Service. Are you aware that the vote in question was in the House on August 13, 1941, 3½ months before November 29, 1941?

155. Question: [14360] Are you aware that the vote had to do with the matter of releasing at the end of a year's service those whose service had been limited to one year in the original bill?

156. Question: Are you aware that the House took this vote in ignorance of the fact that, a day or two before, the President, at the Atlantic Conference, was agreeing with the British Prime Minister on a course of American action with relation to Japan?

Answer: Without discussing the technicalities of the selective service extension bill under consideration in August 1941, it is still my conviction that the close vote in the House on that bill, 203 to 202, indicated the violently divided character of national opinion at the time. Furthermore, had the bill been defeated, the forces of aggression would have been greatly encouraged and the nations resisting aggression correspondingly discouraged.

In his message to Congress on this subject, July 21, 1941, President Roosevelt said:

Today it is imperative that I should officially report to the Congress what the Congress undoubtedly knows: That the international situation is not less grave but is far more grave than it was a year ago. [14361] Occasional individuals, basing their opinions on unsupported evidence or on no evidence at all, may with honest intent assert that the United States need fear no attack on its own territory or on the other nations of this hemisphere by aggressors from without.

Nevertheless, it is the well-nigh unanimous opinion of those who are daily cognizant, as military and naval officers and as Government servants in the field of international relations, that schemes and plans of aggressor nations against American security are so evident that the United States and the rest of the Americas are definitely imperiled in their national interests. * * *

I told the press on August 11, 1941, in response to a question whether failure of the bill would have any effect on Japan, that "the psychological effect alone on many phases of the international situation would be exceedingly bad, to say nothing of the actual results."

With regard to the President's communication to the Japanese Ambassador of August 17, 1941, the President had nothing in mind except a friendly approach to discourage Japan from attacking us. Having participated in that interview, I received no impression from the President's tone or demeanor of any suggestion of a threat. The [14362] President in the same friendly tone agreed that the two Governments should resume amicable conversations looking to a peaceful understanding. Such conversations were then continued in a friendly way for nearly four months. I, therefore, do not see how the attitude of this Government could in any way be construed as offensive or unfriendly or how there can be any warrantable basis for criticism of the President.

Questions 157 and 158 are grouped in a single answer.

157. Question: Were you advised by anyone as to when the Army would be ready for war in the Pacific?

158. Question: Were you advised by anyone as to when the Navy would be ready for war in the Pacific?

Answer: The views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations on the need of more time for preparedness as set forth in their memoranda of November 5 and November 27, 1941, were known to me at the time. Furthermore, the Army and Navy heads for some time had been representing to me their need of more time in which to strengthen the defense of the United States.

Questions 159 and 163 are grouped in a single answer.

159. Question: [14363] Will you advise the Committee as to who saw the final modus vivendi as prepared by the State Department?

163. Question: Will you advise the committee as to who saw your November 26, 1941, message to Japan?

Answer: The November 25 draft of the modus vivendi was of course, seen, as were all previous drafts, by the far-eastern advisers of the Department of State. It contained nothing of material substance that was not contained in the November 24 draft and the revisions it represented were largely refinements in the interests of precision. The November 24 draft was seen by the diplomatic representatives of the British, Netherlands, and Chinese Governments, and to the best of my recollection by the President and the representatives of the War and Navy Departments. I do not know who outside the Department of State saw the November 25 draft, and in any case there would hardly have been time for it to have any wide circulation before the decision was reached on the following day to withhold, in delivering our reply to the Japanese, the modus vivendi feature. On this point I refer to the three successive drafts of the modus vivendi which are a part of the record. With regard to the 10-point proposal,

it is clear [14364] from my reply to your question No. 74 that the contents of the 10-point proposal were seen by all who saw the modus vivendi drafts. However, I cannot say who, other than the far-eastern advisers of the State Department, saw the 10-point proposal in the exact form in which it was set up for delivery to the Japanese. To all of the modus vivendi drafts, the 10-point proposal was attached, as the modus vivendi was intended only to facilitate conversations with the proposals in the 10-point communication as a basis. Japan could not have accepted our modus vivendi draft without being prepared to take as a basis for further conversations a program along the lines of the 10-point proposal, nor could she have avoided declaring at the outset of the conversations that she would pursue a peaceful course, such declaration being set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the modus vivendi in language as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein.

2. They undertake reciprocally not to [14365] make from regions in which they have military establishments any advance by force or threat or force into any areas in southeastern or northeastern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area.

Questions 160, 161, 164, and 165 are grouped in a single answer.

160. Question: Will you advise the committee as to who opposed the sending of this modus vivendi?

161. Question: Will you tell us who favored the sending of this modus vivendi?

164. Question: Will you advise the committee as to who opposed the sending of this message (the November 26 message)?

165. Question: Will you advise us who favored the sending of this message?

Answer: While I, of course, consulted the military and naval authorities of this Government and with the far-eastern advisers of the Department of State on all plans for dealing with the critical situation in relation with Japan, the responsibility for decisions, except in matters which I felt should be referred to the President, rested [14366] with me, and I took no poll of "ayes" and "nays." So far as I am aware, however, among the top officials whose function it was to make decisions, there was no dissent at any stage of our intensive consideration in the days between November 22 and November 26 of the modus vivendi proposal or the 10-point proposal.

The situation with which we were called upon to deal between November 22 and November 26 was briefly as follows: We had the indisputable evidence of the intercepted Japanese message of November 22, referred to in my reply to your question No. 136, that the Japanese Government had instructed its representatives that there must be acceptance of its terms without any possibility of further concessions and within a definite time limit—November 29. I and my associates could not escape the conclusion from a reading of the

Japanese message that the Japanese had decided to attack unless the United States made basic concessions.

In our clutching at straws to see how far we could go toward tiding over the situation we got up the *modus vivendi* plan for possible inclusion as a part of our reply along with a plan for a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area. The *modus vivendi* plan called for the participation of the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands in connec- [14367] tion with the provisions in the plan for the modification of the freezing measures. We consulted those Governments and also the Chinese Government which was vitally concerned. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's reaction to the *modus vivendi* plan as communicated to this Government was that if there was any relaxation of the embargo by this Government, or even a belief on the part of the Chinese people that such action would be taken, Chinese morale would be shattered, Chinese resistance would collapse, and the Japanese would be able to gain their ends. In the light of this serious development and of the chances being overwhelmingly against Japan's acceptance of the *modus vivendi* proposal, especially as we had convincing evidence that Japan was already moving forward with her military forces and had reached the jumping-off place in Indochina, consideration of all the surrounding circumstances relating to the difficulties and the imminent dangers in the situation led to a conclusion not to propose our *modus vivendi* draft to the Japanese.

In any event the *modus vivendi* plan would not have enhanced appreciably the chances of Japan's adopting our counterproposal, for what we would have offered the Japanese in the *modus vivendi* was mere chicken feed compared with what they were asking for, as set forth in their ultimatum of November 20. The view that Japan would not accept our counterproposal, even with the [14368] *modus vivendi* feature, was, to the best of my recollection, shared by all the high officials in the Government who are known to have expressed any views on the subject, as, for example, the following instances: On November 24 Admiral Stark, in a circular message, addressed, among others, to the Commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, pointed out that the chances of a favorable outcome of the negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese in any direction was a probability. On November 25 Admiral Stark followed up that message with a letter to Admiral Kimmel. In the letter he stated that he had held up dispatch of the letter pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull. Admiral Stark stated that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack and that they had confirmed the view expressed in the previous message regarding the gravity of the situation. Secretary Stimson in his diary entry for November 25 stated that at a meeting at the White House the President expressed the view that, "We are likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday."

Some persons, in attempting to reconstruct the situation which then existed, seem to have been misled by Japanese charges misrepresenting the character of the 10-point proposal. They seem to have completely over- [14369] looked the fact, which was subsequently disclosed, that by November 26 when our proposal was delivered to the Japanese, orders had already been given to their fleet to sail preparatory to the attack which was later made according to schedule. It was this movement to attack which prompted the Japanese to start preparing their utterly false and fraudulent misrepresentations, which amounted to the monstrous charge, made in the worst of bad faith, that they had been forced to fight because our statement of policy as contained in our November 26 proposal was harsh and humiliating. Neither the Japanese leaders who falsely pretended to be "dumb-founded" over our proposal of November 26, notwithstanding the fact that it was along lines we had been discussing for months, nor those who supported this Japanese contention had at any time claimed that the Japanese would make the least concession beyond their proposal of November 20, nor have they advanced any suggestion as to what further concessions the United States would have to make, short of complete acceptance of the Japanese proposal of November 20.

There was no reason for the Japanese to have come to us at any stage with their demands, nor was there any need for a new agreement between the United States and Japan. All that was necessary was for Japan to [14370] abandon her course of aggression and adopt one of peace, and the situation in the Pacific area would have adjusted itself almost automatically by the observance on the part of Japan, along with other signatory powers, of the Nine-Power Treaty, of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, and other treaties and commitments, including a commitment to respect the "open door" in China, to which Japan was a party. Nor must also the fact be overlooked that while Japan was repudiating these solemn treaty obligations by taking the aggressive and moving her armed forces toward us and other peaceful countries, we were pleading, as a peaceful and law-abiding nation, with Japan to abandon her course of conquest and likewise become law-abiding and peaceful.

Our position, as summed up in the 10-point program, was really nothing new to the Japanese. We had been discussing with them throughout months of conversations broad-gaged principles, practical applications of which were along the lines of the 10-point proposal. The proposal was not presented to them in the form of demands, but merely as an example of a kind of settlement we would like to see worked out in the Pacific area. We were not bargaining with the Japanese as if we ourselves had been offenders. The only issue or question to be settled was whether we could prevail upon Japan to abandon [14371] her increasingly dangerous movements of conquest and agree to become law-abiding and to adopt a peaceful course. This was the all-

important issue which the Japanese in the end sought to cover up and dodge.

The 10-point program also summed up, so the general public might understand, many of the general and special benefits which might accrue to Japan if she renounced a course of aggression; such as, enhancement of her national security through participation in a multilateral nonaggression pact and through measures calculated to stabilize the situation in the Far East, including the abrogation by the powers of extra territoriality in China and the giving of mutual pledges regarding respect for the integrity of Indochina; and an advantageous economic program: A generous trade agreement with the United States, removal of the freezing regulations, an agreement upon a plan for stabilization of the dollar-yen rate. What Japan was asked to do in return was to give practical application to the professions she had made of her peaceful intent by agreeing to withdraw her armed forces from China and Indochina, to support no regime in China other than the National Government of China, and to agree not to interpret any agreement to which she was a party in such a way as to conflict with the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the [14372] Pacific area. Surely, these latter were reasonable and necessary conditions for the privileges that were offered to Japan. The 10-point proposal would have been highly welcome to Japan if she had had any intention of adopting peaceful courses. It would be a monstrous travesty of the facts and an unspeakable libel on this country if the Japanese war lords in their effort to disclaim responsibility should be permitted to screen and shift their guilt in the face of all the facts to the contrary.

162. Question: Did you agree with Ambassador Grew and others that the placing of the embargo upon Japan would mean war?

Answer: The general proposition regarding the effect of embargoes upon Japan, especially as applicable to the situation from 1938 to 1940, is set forth on page 88 of Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy. The important fact, however, which had to be taken into account in the situation at the time when this Government applied freezing measures to Japan in July, 1941, was the advance of Japan's armed forces so as seriously and immediately to imperil the security of this and other countries. At that stage, Japan was in effect brazenly demanding military supplies with which to attack this and other [14373] countries to the south. The question of our self-defense had by that time become supreme with us and impelled us to refuse to furnish the invader with military supplies.

Questions 166 to 169 are grouped in a single answer.

166. Question: Were you or anyone in the State Department to your knowledge consulted in regard to the military plan being drawn up by America, Britain, the Netherlands, and China, sometimes known as the ABCD block?
167. Question: If you were so consulted will you state who consulted you and what was said at the conference?

168. Question: Did representatives of the State Department participate in any of these conversations?

169. Question: If so, state the name of that representative.

Answer: From time to time I participated from the political angle, in discussions with the President and the leaders of the Army and of the Navy in regard to the subject of the military conversations with the British and the Dutch for joint defensive plans. No representative of the Department of State participated in those [14374] staff conversations, but there was a Department of State representative who participated in the conversations regarding defense which were held with the Canadians. There was no Chinese participation in the foregoing conversations.

In the discussions which I held with the President and the leaders of the Army and of the Navy in regard to those conversations, as made clear above, I did not pass upon the military aspect of questions, but occasionally offered comments and suggestions as a layman. The views that I expressed were along the lines I had expressed publicly as well as in talks with diplomatic representatives. I refer you to what I said in that regard in an address on March 17, 1938 (Peace and War, pp. 412-413), as follows:

Prudence and common sense dictate that, where this and other nations have common interests and common objectives, we should not hesitate to exchange information and to confer with the governments of such other nations and, in dealing with the problems confronting each alike, to proceed along parallel lines—this Government retaining at all times its independence of judgment and freedom of action. For nations which seek peace to assume with respect to each other [14375] attitudes of complete aloofness would serve only to encourage, and virtually invite, on the part of other nations lawlessly inclined, policies and actions most likely to endanger peace.

In the present Far Eastern emergency, we have consistently collaborated with other peace-seeking nations in the manner I have just described. I have said often, and I repeat again, that in this collaboration there is not a trace of alliance or involvement of any sort. We have scrupulously followed and we intend to follow the traditional policy of our country not to enter into entangling alliances or involvements with other countries.

On November 25, 1940, I gave my views to the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, in commenting upon his expressed view that there should be conferences between the naval experts of our two governments with respect to what each would or might do in case of military outbreaks on the part of Japan. I said that, of course, there could be no agreements entered into in this respect, but that there should undoubtedly be collaboration with a view to making known to each other any and all information practicable in regard to what both might have in mind to do, and when and where, in case of a military move- [14376] ment by Japan in the south or in some other direction.

There was no suggestion on the part of any of us in this Government, so far as I knew, that in the military staff conversations our representatives could go beyond, at the very most, making recommendations which, of course, would have been subject to congressional approval.

Mr. LANE. The committee received a sworn statement dated March 1946 from former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. This statement was in response to inquiry by committee counsel for certain portions of a diary kept by Mr. Stimson. We ask that the statement and appendix thereto be spread on the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The statement referred to follows:)

[14377] **STATEMENT BY HENRY L. STIMSON, FORMER SECRETARY OF WAR, TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, S. CON. RES. 27, WITH APPENDIX, MARCH 1946**

[14378—*p. 1*¹] **STATEMENT OF FACTS AS SHOWN BY MY CURRENT NOTES AND MY RECOLLECTION AS REFRESHED THEREBY**

The committee already has before it my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. At that time I undertook to give the board the answers to the questions which were asked me as fully as I was then able, having in mind certain limitations on what I then felt was proper to discuss, including particularly any matters the revelation of which might in any way have jeopardized the safety of our then pending military operations. I am now able, however, to amplify in certain respects the testimony which I gave before the board.

The evidence which I am able to give the committee comes not only from my recollection of the events which transpired preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, but I am able to refresh my recollection from a contemporaneous record which I kept from day to day for my own personal use. As I explained to the Army board, I had a dictograph at my house at which I dictated these memoranda each morning before going to the War Department. I read many excerpts from these to the Army Pearl Harbor Board. This committee last autumn asked me for my notes covering the dates of November 5, 6, 7, 10, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and December 2 and 7, 1941. [*p. 2*] I am attaching to this statement as an appendix copies of my notes covering these dates, of matters [14379] relevant to the Far Eastern situation and the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although these extracts speak largely for themselves, they were made roughly and hastily and were not revised when dictated. They therefore naturally need some addition to tie them in as a connected story and to give the whole picture as I saw it. It is for this reason that I am accompanying them with this statement.

No accurate understanding can be had of the situation which existed in the weeks preceding the Pearl Harbor attack or of the conduct of the various individuals concerned unless they are viewed in the light of the historical events which had been going on for some time and which ultimately led to the crisis that occurred in December and the war of the United States with the Axis powers. From some of the comments which have been made and given wide publicity, one receives the impression that many people have already forgotten the trend of events

¹ Additional numbers in italics enclosed by brackets represent original pages in the statement submitted by Mr. Stimson, which pages were frequently referred to during the examination of certain witnesses.

which were coming to a head in the autumn of 1941 and the threat to our own safety which had unmistakably developed in the actions of the two great aggressor nations, Germany and Japan, who already in the preceding months and years had begun spreading destruction and terror throughout a large portion of the civilized world.

[p. 3] Japan had started on her current path of aggression in the Far East as early as September 1931. She then attacked the Chinese in Manchuria and overran that territory, flouting her [14380] obligations under the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty. There then followed her attacks on the Chinese in Shanghai. She invaded China in 1937, after the conclusion of the Anticomintern Pact with Germany. The brutal and barbarous type of military aggression for which she stood was typified by the outrages committed by her Army in the occupation of Nanking and similar incidents, which by 1941 had become notorious events of history. In September 1940, after Germany had set out on her temporarily triumphal path toward the subjugation of the nations of Europe, Japan concluded a military alliance with Germany and Italy and placed herself formally in the camp of the Axis powers.

By the summer of 1941, the Japanese intentions in the Far East became very clear. After Germany attacked Russia in June of that year, Japan began extensive military preparations—among other things, calling an additional 2,000,000 men to the colors. The utterances of her war lords became increasingly threatening. She extended her military operations into southern French Indochina. That she was headed toward the ultimate occupation of Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, and thence the domination of the [p. 4] entire Southeast Asia, was evident not only from her overt act and announcements but from certain of her intercepted diplomatic messages in which her intentions were expressed in more detail.

All of this presented a great threat to our safety and interests. If Singapore and the Netherlands Indies should be [14381] occupied, Japan would be strengthened by the acquisition of a great fortress and a great source of natural resources in rubber and oil, which would help her greatly to carry on her program of depredation. The Philippines, which lay between Japan and these British and Dutch targets, would inevitably be the next victim, and at her mercy. China might easily be forced to capitulate and taken out of the war. Our military advisers had given the President their formal advice that, if Japan attacked British Malaya or the Dutch East Indies or moved her forces west of a certain line in Indochina, we would have to fight for the sake of our own security.

On the other side of the world, we were faced with a situation which was even more critical. Hitler, having seized Norway, France, Belgium, Denmark, and Holland, had just attacked Russia in June of 1941 and the Russians were fighting a desperate battle to stop the German Army from overrunning a large portion of her territory and her capital. [p. 5] In the meantime, the Germans were maintaining large forces deployed on the north coast of Europe as a continual threat of an invasion of England which, as we know, was ill prepared to meet it. As we now know from the evidence presented at the trial of the German war criminals in Nuremburg, Hitler was planning ultimately to attack the United States and was conspiring

with the Japanese to aid them while they attacked us in the meantime. It was then very apparent to everyone who had carefully followed the course of [14382] events that we would sooner or later have to meet the threat to civilization which these aggressor nations were presenting to the world, and the great danger was that the nations who were then fighting desperately and gallantly to stem this threat would be knocked out of the war one by one before our turn came and that we would ultimately be left to face the onslaught alone.

The American people had been slow to recognize the danger, but by the autumn of 1941 it was beginning to be understood more clearly. Early in 1941, Congress, in the Lend-Lease Act, had authorized the furnishing of munitions to the nations fighting the Axis and the shelter of our ports to their warships. In August 1941 the Congress passed a bill extending the draft. In November 1941, Congress voted to repeal important sections of the neutrality law, thus per- [p. 6] mitting the arming of our ships and their sailing into any combat zone or belligerent port in the world. On November 23, 1941, Representative Gearhart of California, in a broadcast on the "American Forum of the Air," after pointing out Japan's breaches of treaty obligations and her subsequent aggression in China, stated:

Japan's ruthlessness makes her an enemy not only of China but also a common foe of all nations.

From some of the comments quoted in the public press, one would get the impression that the imminent threat of war in October and November 1941 was a deep secret, known only to the authorities in Washington who kept it mysteriously to themselves. [14383] Nothing could be further from the truth. At least one of our destroyers had been attacked by German war vessels. Aside from the war warnings which were sent to our military and naval commanders in the various theaters of danger, the imminence of war with Japan was a matter of public knowledge and the people were being warned time and time again of the danger which was approaching. One need only read the headlines of the newspapers during this period. For example, on October 17 the Navy ordered all American merchant ships in the Pacific to put into safe ports. On October 24 Secretary Knox publicly warned of a "clash" with Japan and the "seriousness [p. 7] of the situation." On November 11, 1941—Armistice Day—the President himself warned the people that the Nation was facing a world war again. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, declared on that day that "our people realized that at any moment war may be forced upon us." During this period, day after day, the headlines warned of the approaching crisis with Japan. On November 26 there appeared on the front page of the "New York Times" the notice that the United States consulate in Tokyo had warned Americans to get out of Japan promptly. On Monday, December 1st, appeared the headline that "Roosevelt Hurries Back in the Crisis." In Honolulu itself the papers were carrying equally sensational headlines. For example, on November 30 appeared the headline "Japanese May Strike Over Weekend."

Meanwhile we had been doing what we could to get ready for [14384] war if and when it came. After the long period necessary to lay the foundations of our ultimate enormous production, the output of war materials in this country was beginning to increase

rapidly; but we were still using large quantities of it under the Lend-Lease Act to satisfy the demands of the nations who were already in the battle and holding off the enemy. We were shipping all we could spare to England and in particular to Russia, which was then in the forefront of the fight.

[p. 8] In the meantime, the War Department was doing what it could to fortify the Pacific. We were giving all the material and effectives that we could spare to Hawaii in particular, which was in fact prior to the time of the Pearl Harbor attack reported to me by the Staff as the best manned and equipped of all our outposts on the Pacific, including the Panama Canal. We were also doing our best to reenforce the Philippines. The effectiveness of the airplane against a navy in narrow seas had been recently demonstrated in the Mediterranean by the German air attacks on British naval forces, as well as by the success of the British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto. We decided that if a sufficient number of our bombing planes, which would be able to proceed to the Philippine Islands under their own power, could be gathered there, this would present a very effective nucleus of a defense against the advances of the Japanese Navy or convoys in South Asiatic waters. Accordingly, in August we started sending out to the Philippines as many four-engined [14385] bombers as we could spare, and by December 7 we had in fact gathered there some 35 of these ships. This was the largest group of such American bombers yet in existence anywhere. We felt at the time that these presented a strong striking force which could be used with great effect in operations against the Japanese Navy. We underestimated, as did everyone else, the effective power of Japanese aviation, which [p. 9] asserted itself at Pearl Harbor and 1 day later in the Philippines by its attack on our installations there, including the destruction of many of the bombers themselves.

In mid-October the Japanese Konoye cabinet fell and a new cabinet under General Tojo came into power, which all expected would be even more aggressive and warlike.

To sum up, the salient features of the situation, as they appeared to me early in November 1941, were as follows:

1. War with Germany and Japan would ultimately be inevitable.
2. It was vitally important that none of the nations who were then desperately fighting Germany—England, Russia, or China—should be knocked out of the war before the time came when we would be required to go in.
3. While we very much wanted more time in which to prepare, nevertheless we felt we had a fair chance to make an effective fight against Japan for the Philippines [14386] even if we had to enter the war at that time, in view of the air power that we were building up in the Philippines.
4. If war did come, it was important, both from the point of view of unified support of our own people as well as for the record of history, that we should not [p. 10] be placed in the position of firing the first shot, if this could be done without sacrificing our safety, but that Japan should appear in her true role as the real aggressor.

During this entire period I kept in constant and close touch with Mr. Hull and Mr. Knox, as well as having frequent meetings with the President. In 1940 Messrs. Hull and Knox and I had inaugurated regular weekly meetings in Mr. Hull's office so that there would be close liaison between the three of us. These meetings were held on Tuesday mornings at 9:30 whenever we were present in Washington and able to go. They were being held during this period, in October and November 1941, as well as meetings between us on other occasions.

Early in November we received word that the Japanese were sending an additional special envoy, Kurusu, to Washington to participate in the conversations that were being held. I had little hope that anything would come of his proposal, in view of all the information which we had been receiving as to the Jap's determination to proceed with their program of aggression.

On November 6, I had an hour's talk alone with the [14387] President with regard to the Far Eastern situation and his approaching conference with Kurusu, who was coming from [p. 11] Japan. The thing uppermost in his mind was how we could gain more time. I quote from my notes:

The President outlined what he thought he might say. He was trying to think of something that would give us further time. He suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement or armament for six months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis.

I personally did not approve of a truce on such a basis and told him so. I felt that it would tie up our hands just at a time when it was so important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of the Philippines and our military advisers then felt that if we could accumulate enough of them there it would place us in a favorable strategic position, and I did not approve of any arrangement that would prevent our continuing this program. Secondly, it was still very important that we keep the Chinese in the war, and I believed that they would feel that such a truce was a desertion of them, and that this would have a very serious effect on Chinese morale.

On Friday, November 7, we had the usual weekly Cabinet meeting. The Far Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our minds. Mr. Hull informed us that relations had become [14388] extremely critical and that we should be on the outlook for an attack by Japan at any time. Our military [p. 12] advisers, while desirous of delay, had urged military action if Japan attacked territory whose security was vital to us and in this connection specified American, British, or Dutch territory. The President at the meeting undertook to take an informal vote of the Cabinet as to whether it was thought the American people would back up if it became necessary to strike at Japan, in case she should attack England in Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies. The Cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the country would support such a move. The Cabinet voted this way even though only Mr. Hull and the President knew of the efforts which we had been making to reenforce the Philippines with the big bombers and which we in the Army felt could be effective support in case any attack should be made on the British or Dutch in southeastern Asia. On November 10 at a staff meeting,

General Marshall, among other things, read us a long letter from General MacArthur in the Philippines, telling us of hopeful progress in the reorganization of the Philippine Army and the construction of airports throughout the islands.

Between November 10 and 21, talks were commenced in Washington between Nomura and Kurusu on the one hand, and the President and Mr. Hull on the other. During this period a very serious crisis developed by reason of the threatened [p. 13] strike of the coal miners; which would have been a most serious obstacle [14389] to our preparations for defense. Not only was the President occupied with this but we in the War Department during this period were obliged to make preparations for taking over and operating the coal mines in case the strike should eventuate. Much of my personal time was occupied during these days with these preparations. Fortunately, the strike was ultimately averted and the matter resolved shortly after November 20. My notes contain no reference to any developments in the Japanese situation during this period. It was during this period, on November 20, that Kurusu presented the Japanese proposals to Mr. Hull which, among other things, demanded that we should withdraw all material and moral support to China and at the same time resume supplying to Japan the oil she required to assist her in carrying on her war with China.

My notes recall to me the fact that on November 24 I had a good talk with General Olmstead, who had recently been promoted to be Chief Signal Officer. This department was of particular interest to me because I had been giving a great deal of personal attention during the past months to the development of radar by the Army. I had for some time become convinced of the importance of radar, both as an antiaircraft protection as well as its uses for [p. 14] installation in planes and ships for combat purposes. We had made every effort to get as much radar equipment to Hawaii as possible, particularly for antiaircraft protection; and, as the committee has undoubtedly heard, [14390] substantial amounts of this equipment of the movable type were in Hawaii and capable of operation.

On Tuesday, November 25, Secretary Knox and I met in Mr. Hull's office for our usual Tuesday morning meeting. Mr. Hull showed us a proposal that he had prepared, which he was considering laying before Nomura and Kurusu for a 3 months' truce.

At 12 o'clock on the same day, we three went to the White House, where we met with the President and also General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The President at once brought up the relations with the Japanese. Mr. Hull said the Japanese were poised for attack—that they might attack at any time. The President said the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning and stated that we might even be attacked, say next Monday, for example.

One problem troubled us very much. If you know that your enemy is going to strike you, it is not usually wise to wait until he gets the jump on you by taking the initiative. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that [p. 15] in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors. We discussed at this meeting the basis on which this

country's position could be most clearly explained to our own people and [14391] to the world, in case we had to go into the fight quickly because of some sudden move on the part of the Japanese. We discussed the possibility of a statement summarizing all the steps of aggression that the Japanese had already taken, the encirclement of our interests in the Philippines which was resulting and the threat to our vital supplies of rubber from Malay. I reminded the President that on August 19 he had warned the Japanese Ambassador that if the steps which the Japanese were then taking continued across the border into Thailand, he would regard it as a matter affecting our safety, and suggested that he might point out that the moves the Japanese were now apparently on the point of making would be in fact a violation of a warning that had already been given.

When I got back to the War Department after this meeting on that same day, I found news from G-2 that was very disturbing. It indicated that the Japanese were embarking a large expeditionary force of 30, 40, or 50 ships at [p. 16] Shanghai and that this expedition was proceeding along the China coast south of Formosa. I at once telephoned Mr. Hull and also sent copies of the report to the President.

The next morning, November 26, Mr. Hull told me over the telephone that he had almost decided not to make the proposition of the three months' truce that he had discussed with Knox and me on November 25. The Chinese, for one thing, had pointed out strong objections to the proposal, particularly the effect on the [14392] morale of their own people. Mr. Hull stated that he felt the best thing to do was simply to tell the Japanese that he had no further action to propose.

I telephoned the President shortly thereafter and asked him whether he had received the news of the new expedition from Shanghai proceeding down the China coast toward Indo-China. He had not received it. He was shocked by it, and at once took it as further evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese, that while they were negotiating with him—negotiations in which we were asking for a withdrawal of their invading troops in China—they should be sending a further expedition down to Indochina.

On Thursday morning, November 27, the news was still coming in of the movement of the large Japanese expeditionary force south from Shanghai and eventually [p. 17] headed toward Indochina, with a possibility that it might be proceeding to the Philippines or to Burma to cut off the Burma Road, or to the Dutch East Indies. It seemed probable, however, that it was a concentration to move over into Thailand, from which they could be in a position to attack Singapore at the proper moment; or, as the President later pointed out, it might develop into an attack on Rangoon and thus effectually stop the Burma Road at its beginning.

Early that morning I had called up Mr. Hull to find out what his final word had been with the Japanese—whether he had [14393] handed them the proposal for 3 months' truce, or whether he had told them he had no other proposition to make. He told me that he had broken the whole matter off. His words were: "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and the Navy." I then called up the President, who gave me a little different view. He said that it was true that the talks had been called off, but that they had ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by

Mr. Hull. I found out afterwards that this was the fact and that the statement contained a reaffirmation of our constant and regular position without the suggestion of a threat of any kind. I personally was relieved that we had not backed down on any of the fundamental principles on which we had stood for [p. 18] so long and which I felt we could not give up without the sacrifice of our national honor and prestige in the world. I submit, however, that no impartial reading of this document can characterize it as being couched in the terms of an ultimatum, although the Japanese were of course only too quick to seize upon it and give it that designation for their own purposes.

Shortly after this General Arnold came in with proposed orders for the movement of two of our biggest planes from San Francisco out across the Mandated Islands to Manila. We were to arrange to have these fly high over the Mandated Islands, beyond the reach of their pursuit planes, and photograph them with the idea of trying to detect any naval concentrations [14394] that might be going on there.

Later Mr. Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow. General Gerow was Chief of the War Plans Division. General Marshall was absent, having left the Department to attend certain Army training maneuvers which were doing on that day. Both Admiral Stark and General Gerow were urging that any crisis be postponed as long as possible, to enable our preparations to proceed. A memorandum had been prepared by General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President on this subject. The opinion of our top military and naval advisers was that [p. 19] delay was very desirable, but that nevertheless we must take military action if Japan attacked American, or British, or Dutch territory or moved her forces in Indochina west of 100° east or south of 10° north. I told them, which was the fact, that I also would be glad to have time but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation of the United States or of backing down on any of our principles which would show a weakness on our part.

We then discussed the messages that might be sent to the commanding officers of the various theaters, including in particular General MacArthur, who was in the Philippines and in the forefront of the threatened area. We had already sent MacArthur a warning but I felt that the time had now come for a more definite warning. In talking with the President on the telephone that morning, I had suggested, and he had approved [14395] the idea, that we should send out a final alert, namely that they should be on the qui vive for any attack, and explaining the exact situation. Ordinarily, of course, there would be no reason for me to participate in the sending of any such message which was the normal function of the military staff. As the President himself, however, had now actually directed the sending of the message, and as I wanted the [p. 20] message clearly to apprise the commanding officers in the various areas as to exactly what the diplomatic situation was, I undertook to participate in the framing of this message myself. In order that it should be strictly accurate, I called up Mr. Hull myself on the telephone and got his exact statement as to the status of the negotiations, which was then incorporated in the first sentence of the message. My papers

also indicate that I inserted in the second sentence the words "BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT."

This same message was sent to commanding office, Hawaiian Department, and to the three other commanding officers of our Pacific theaters or outposts, viz: Panama, the Philippines, and the west coast which included Alaska, except that in the case of the message to General MacArthur in the Philippines there were omitted from the third sentence from the end the following words: "BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT COMMA REPEAT NOT COMMA TO ALARM CIVILIAN POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT." The message as sent to General Short read as follows:

[14396]

COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period If hostilities [p. 21] cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent period Report measures taken period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan period Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

MARSHALL.

This message has been criticized as ambiguous and described as a "do-don't" message. The fact is that it presented with the utmost precision the situation with which we were all confronted and in the light of which all our commanding officers, as well as we ourselves in Washington, had to govern our conduct. The [14397] situation was admittedly delicate and critical. On the one hand, in view of the fact that we wanted more time, we did not want to precipitate war at this moment if it could be avoided. If there was to be war, moreover, we wanted the Japanese to commit the first overt act. On the other hand, the matter of defense against an attack by Japan was the first consideration. In Hawaii, because of the large numbers of Japanese inhabitants, it was felt desirable to issue a special warning so that nothing would be done, unless necessary to the defense, to alarm the civil population and thus possibly to precipitate an incident [p. 22] and give the Japanese an excuse to go to war and the chance to say that we had committed the first overt act.

All these considerations were placed before the commanding officers of their respective areas, and it was because they were thought competent to act in a situation of delicacy requiring judgment and skill that they had been placed in these high posts of command. One of the basic policies of the Army command, which has been adhered to throughout the entire war, and in most instances with complete success, has been to give the local commander his objective and mission but not to interfere with him in the performance of it. When General Short was informed on November 27 that "Japanese action unpredicta-

ble" and that "hostile action possible at any moment," and that the policy directed "should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your [14398] defense," we had a right to assume that he would competently perform this paramount duty entrusted to him. We assumed that when he had been warned that hostile action was possible at any moment, it would not be necessary to repeat that warning over and over again during the ensuing days. The fact was of course that General Short did receive, not [p. 23] only from Washington but from other sources, repeated intelligence of the impending crisis.

You will notice that this message of November 27 specifically mentions that reconnaissance is to be undertaken. This to my mind was a very important part of the message, not only because of its obvious desirability but also because we had provided the Hawaiian Department with what I regarded as a most effective means of reconnaissance against air attack and one to which I had personally devoted a great deal of attention during the preceding months. I refer to the radar equipment with which the Hawaiian Department was then provided. This equipment permitted approaching planes to be seen at distances of approximately 100 miles; and to do so in darkness and storm as well as in clear daylight. In the early part of 1941 I had taken up earnestly the matter of securing such radar equipment for aircraft protection. I knew, although it was not then generally known, that radar had proved of the utmost importance to the British in the Battle of Britain, and I felt in the beginning of 1941 that we were not getting this into production [14399] and to the troops as quickly as we should, and put on all the pressure I could to speed up its acquisition. By the autumn of 1941 we [p. 24] had got some of this equipment out to Hawaii, and only a few days before this I had received a report of the tests which had been made of this equipment in Hawaii on November 19, which indicated very satisfactory results in detecting approaching airplanes. I testified at considerable length with regard to this before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (A. P. H. B., 4064, et seq.). When we specifically directed the commanding officer at Hawaii, who had been warned that war was likely at any moment, to make reconnaissance, I assumed that all means of reconnaissance available to both the Army and Navy would be employed. On the same day a war warning was dispatched to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations. The standing instructions to the theater commanders were that all messages of this character were to be exchanged between the Army and Navy commands.

I repeat that my participation in the drafting of this message of November 27 was unusual, since I do not believe it is advisable for the Secretary of War to meddle with military staff matters. As already stated, I did so on this occasion because I felt I was conveying a message from the President. The President had taken a [p. 25] momentous decision that day, namely to send what I call a final alert. The Chief of [14400] Staff was away for the day, and I wanted to make certain that the President's orders were carried out accurately.

You will note that my notes speak only of the message to General MacArthur. This is evidence of what was the fact—namely that we all felt in Washington that the first and most likely danger was an

attack on the Philippines and that such an attack would be most difficult to meet. Such information as we had been able to gather as to the movements of the Japanese forces indicated a movement toward the south, which might easily be diverted either to Indochina, Malay Peninsula, Dutch East Indies, or the Philippines. We were correct in this inference. Such an attack on the Philippines was being prepared and immediately followed the attack on Pearl Harbor. The movements of the fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor were entirely unknown to us.

When the replies to these messages came in from General MacArthur and General Short, they were checked to me by General Marshall, undoubtedly for the [p. 26] purpose of reassuring me that our messages had been duly received. The original documents bear my initials, indicating that they were noted by me.

The first thing in the morning of the next day—Friday, November 28—I received information from G-2 of such a formidable character with regard to the movements of the Japanese forces along the Asiatic coast that I decided to take it to the President before he got up. I saw him while he was still [14401] in bed, and we discussed the situation. He suggested that there were three alternatives, as my notes show: First, to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum, stating a point beyond which we would fight; or, third, to fight at once. I said that I felt that to do nothing was out of the question and the President agreed with me. As to the other two alternatives, the desirable thing to do from the point of view of our own tactics and safety was to take the initiative and attack without further warning. It is axiomatic that the best defense is offense. It is always dangerous to wait and let the enemy make the first move. I was inclined to feel that the warning given in August by the President against further moves by the Japanese [p. 27] toward Thailand justified an attack without further warning, particularly as their new movement southward indicated that they were about to violate that warning. On the other hand, I realized that the situation could be made more cleancut from the point of view of public opinion if a further warning were given.

I went at 12 o'clock that day to a meeting of the so-called War Cabinet—that is to say, the President, Mr. Hull, Mr. Knox, Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and myself. The President had been studying the latest report of G-2 as to the movements of the Japanese expeditionary force, and we discussed the various possibilities as to what it meant. The various [14402] alternative mentioned were that it might develop into an attack on the Philippines, the landing of further troops in Indochina, an attack on Thailand, on the Dutch Netherlands, or on Singapore, or that it might develop into an attack on Rangoon and thus cut off the Burma Road at the beginning. The possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor was not discussed at the meeting, since our thoughts were all focused on this movement toward southeast Asia, which indicated a crisis in that direction. All agreed that if the expedition were permitted to land in the Gulf of Siam it would place a strong Japanese force in such a strategic position as to [p. 28] be a severe blow at all three of the powers in southeast Asia—the British at Singapore, the Netherlands in the Indies, and ourselves in the Philippines. We all agreed

that it must not be allowed; that, if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight; and, if the British fought, we would have to fight. We realized that if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot.

We decided, therefore, that we could not just sit still and do nothing. On the other hand, we also decided that we could not attack without a further warning to Japan, and we discussed what form that warning should take. The President suggested a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. After some discussion it was decided that he would send such a letter [14403] to the Emperor, which would not be made public, and that at the same time he would deliver a special message to Congress reporting on the danger and reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened. The President left after the meeting to keep his engagement at Warm Springs, where he was going to have Thanksgiving with the children. The rest of the week end was largely taken up with preparing [p. 29] a suggested draft of a message for the President to deliver to Congress, in which Secretary Knox and I cooperated with Mr. Hull and his associates in the State Department.

On Monday morning, December 1, the President returned to Washington. I recollect that in the meantime we had received evidence that the Japanese expedition which we had been watching was landing in Indochina in the neighborhood of Saigon, rather than going on to the Peninsula and up into the Gulf of Siam. This appeared to give us a little respite, since it indicated that perhaps they were not going to invade Thailand at once. The Russians had also made a new counter-attack against the Germans at Rostov, and we thought that possibly this had given the Japanese some pause.

On Tuesday, December 2, Secretary Knox, Sumner Welles, and I met with the President, as Mr. Hull was laid up with a cold. The President went step by step over the situation, and I felt sure that he had made up his mind to go ahead with the message to Congress and possibly the message to the Emperor. [14404] We also learned that he had asked the Japanese through the State Department what they intended by this new occupation of southern Indochina and had demanded a quick reply. We were watching the situation in the Far East very carefully. I was in frequent [p. 30] conference with General Marshall and with General Miles of G-2 and also General Gerow of the War Plans Division of the General Staff. We were particularly concerned with supplies which were on the way to the Philippines and additional big bombers which we were trying to fly over there, some of which were scheduled to start at the end of the week. I gave up another engagement in order to stay in Washington over the week end.

On Sunday, December 7, Mr. Knox and I went to Secretary Hull's office at 10:30 in the morning and talked the whole matter over. This was the day on which we knew the Japanese were going to bring their answer, and Mr. Hull said he was certain that the Japanese were planning some deviltry; and we were all wondering where the blow would strike. The messages we were receiving now indicated that the Japanese force was continuing on in the Gulf of Siam, and again we discussed whether we would not have to fight if Malaya or the

Netherlands were attacked and the British or Dutch fought. We all three thought that we must fight if those nations fought. We realized that if Britain were eliminated it might well result in the destruction or capture of the British Fleet. Such a result would give [14405] the Nazi allies overwhelming power in the Atlantic Ocean and would make the defense of the American Republics enormously difficult if not impossible. [p. 31] All the reasons why it would be necessary for the United States to fight, in case the Japanese attacked either our British or Dutch neighbors in the Pacific, were discussed at length and at my request Mr. Hull and Mr. Knox dictated their views. These views are attached to my notes of that day as submitted herewith.

I returned to lunch at my home. At just about 2 o'clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me on the phone and told me that the Japanese were bombing Hawaii. My notes for the remainder of December 7 speak for themselves and need no comment.

SUMMARY OF MY VIEWS AS TO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMY

My views as to these responsibilities are stated at length in my final official report made under the Joint Resolution of Congress approved June 13, 1944, after the Army Board and the Judge Advocate General had made their investigations and reports to me. Many of the discussions on this subject indicated a failure to grasp the fundamental difference between the duties of an outpost command and those of the commander in chief of an army or nation and his military advisers. The outpost commander is like a [p. 32] sentinel on duty in the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are clear and precise. He must assume that the [14406] enemy will attack at his particular post; and that the enemy will attack at the time and in the way in which it will be most difficult to defeat him. It is not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead of his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to make the best possible fight that can be made against him with the weapons with which he has been supplied.

On the other hand, the Commander in Chief of the Nation (and his advisers), particularly of a nation which has been as habitually neglectful of the possibility of war as our own, has much more difficult and complex duties to fulfill. Unlike the outpost commander, he must constantly watch, study, and estimate where the principal or most dangerous attack is most likely to come, in order that he may most effectively distribute his insufficient forces and munitions to meet it. He knows that his outposts are not all equally supplied or fortified, and that they are not all equally capable of defense. He knows also that from time to time they are of greatly varying importance to the grand strategy of the war.

[p. 33] For all these reasons he is compelled to give constant and close attention to the reports from all his intelligence agencies in order that he may satisfactorily solve the innumerable problems which are constantly arising in the performance of the foregoing duties.

[14407] During those days in November 1941 we at the War Department had been informed and believed that Hawaii had been

more generously equipped from the Nation's inadequate supplies of men and munitions than either of the other three important Pacific outposts, and we believed that with the fleet at hand there it was more capable of defense. We also knew that the Philippines was by far the least capable of defense, although we were working vigorously to get it into a position to put up a hard fight. We also knew that a disaster there would have an incalculably bad moral effect on account of our relations to the Filipinos—well known throughout the Far East—and our pledges given for their protection. Finally, we had received these specific warnings of a Japanese expedition being on its way to a commanding position from which it would attack the Philippine Islands.

From the foregoing I believe that it was inevitable and proper that a far greater number of items of information coming through our Intelligence should be [p. 34] collected and considered and appraised by the General Staff at Washington than those which were transmitted to the commander of an outpost. General Short had been told the two essential facts: (1) A war with Japan is threatening. (2) Hostile action by Japan is possible at any moment. Given those two facts, both of which were stated without equivocation in the message of November 27, the outpost commander should be on the alert to [14408] make his fight.

Even without any such message, the outpost commander should have been on the alert. If he did not know that the relations between Japan and the United States were strained and might be broken at any time, he must have been almost the only man in Hawaii who did not know it, for the radio and the newspapers were blazoning out those facts daily, and he had a chief of staff and an intelligence officer to tell him so. And if he did not know that the Japanese were likely to strike without warning, he could not have read his history of Japan or known the lessons taught in the Army schools in respect to such matters. Under these circumstances which were of general knowledge and which he must have known, to cluster his airplanes in such groups and positions that in an emergency they could not take the air for several hours, and to keep his antiaircraft [p. 35] ammunition so stored that it could not be promptly and immediately available, and to use his best reconnaissance system, the radar, only for a very small fraction of the day and night, in my opinion betrayed a misconception of his real duty which was almost beyond belief.

In the next place, having made these mistakes and disregarded the whole tenor of the warning message to him, he then sent a reply message to Washington which gave no adequate notice of what he had failed to do and which was susceptible of being taken, and was taken, as a general compliance with the [14409] main warning from Washington. My initials show that this message crossed my desk, and in spite of my keen interest in the situation it certainly gave me no intimation that the alert order against an enemy attack was not being carried out. Although it advised me that General Short was alert against sabotage, I had no idea that being "alerted to prevent sabotage" was in any way an express or implied denial of being alert against an attack by Japan's armed forces. The very purpose of a fortress such as Hawaii is to repel such an attack, and Short was the commander of that fortress. Furthermore, Short's statement in his

message that "liaison" was being carried out with the Navy, coupled with the fact that our message of November 27 had specifically directed recon- [p. 36] naissance, naturally gave the impression that the various reconnaissance and other defensive measures in which the cooperation of the Army and the Navy is necessary, were under way and a proper alert was in effect.

With the aid of "hindsight" I believe now that to a staff officer whose specific duty was to make dead sure that the warning order was being intelligently and thoroughly put into effect, the lack of detail in the reply should have suggested the importance of a follow-up inquiry and I have so stated in my final official report of August 1945.

With the further aid of such "hindsight" and in the same official report, I also reached the opinion that the War Plans Division of the General Staff would have placed itself and [14410] the safety of the country in a sounder position if it had transmitted to General Short more information than it did. The novelty of the imminence of war and the fact that our outpost commanders were untried in their positions now indicate that more details and repeated emphasis would have been a safer policy. Also there seems to have been a lack of coordination in the General Staff in respect to the method in which the warnings against sabotage were sent, which would not have occurred later in the war after the staff was fully organized.

[p. 37] Yet none of these things in my opinion alter in any material degree the responsibility of General Short for the complete absence of a real alert, which he had been directed to take in the message of November 27, and for the placing of his defense in a more helpless position than it was before that alert message was sent. After all, he was the man upon whom the country had a right to rely for the defense of Hawaii, and he had been sufficiently warned.

I have tried to review these various responsibilities with fairness to both the outpost commander and the staff officers at home. I am particularly led to do so because of the difficulty of reproducing now after the lapse of more than 4 years the background and atmosphere under which the entire Army was then working. Our general staff officers were working under a terrific pressure in the face of a global war which they felt was probably imminent. Yet they were surrounded, outside of [14411] their offices and almost throughout the country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief in danger which now seems incredible. A single incident gives striking evidence of this. During the very last week before the Pearl Harbor attack there was made a most disloyal and almost unbelievable attack on the chief work of the staff. For months the [p. 38] general staff had been laboring over the construction of a strategic and tactical plan for the fighting of a global war in case it should eventuate. The making of such a plan is the highest and most important duty of a general staff—the chief purpose for which it exists. It is also naturally the most highly secret paper in the possession of the Government. On December 4, 1941, the Chicago Tribune published practically in full a copy of that plan. The impact of such a blow was very severe. It involved implications which stretched far and suspicions (happily not fulfilled) of disloyalty in the Army itself. The officers of the Army were then trying to do their duty in the deadening, if not actually hostile, atmosphere of a nation that was

not awake to its danger. We are now engaged in passing judgment upon their actions in the wholly different atmosphere of a nation which has suffered some of the horrors of the greatest and most malignant war in history. In my opinion, it would be highly unjust to them if this complete difference of atmosphere was not given the weight which it deserves.

(S) HENRY L. STIMSON.

[14412—p. 38-A] STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

Henry L. Stimson, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I have prepared the foregoing statement, and the same is true and correct to the best of my recollection, information, and belief.

(S) HENRY L. STIMSON.

Sworn to before me this 19th day of March 1946.

[SEAL]

(S) THOMAS DEROSA,
Attorney and Counsellor at Law.

Office address: 32 Liberty Street, New York City; Residence: Bronx County.

Bronx County Clerks No. 3, Reg. No. A-33D7; New York County Clerks No. 9, Reg. No. 439D7;

Commission expires March 30, 1947.

[14413—p. 39] MR. STIMSON'S NOTES—APPENDIX TO STATEMENT
OF HENRY L. STIMSON

[14414—p. 40] WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1941.

Matters are crystallizing on both sides of us now and the Navy is meeting with big losses in the Atlantic and Japan is sending somebody to us, who, I think, will bring us a proposal impossible of acceptance. I spent part of the morning reading matters—secret reports—on the latter matter.

[p. 41] THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1941.

Then I left for the White House conference and had about an hour's talk with the President—on the whole a good talk. He was apparently in very good feeling. We talked about the Far Eastern situation and the approaching conference with the messenger who is coming from Japan. The President outlined what he thought he might say. He was trying to think of something which would give us further time. He suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement or armament for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis. I told him I frankly saw two great objections to that: first, that it tied up our hands just at a time when it was vitally important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of the Philippines; and second, that the Chinese would feel that any such arrangement was a desertion of them. I reminded him that it has always been our historic policy since the Washington conference not to leave the Chinese and [14415] Japanese alone together, because the Japanese were always able to overslaugh the Chinese and the Chinese know it. I told him that I thought the Chinese would refuse to go into such an arrangement.

[p. 42]

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1941.

Cabinet meeting this afternoon. The President opened with telling the story of Lincoln and his Cabinet—how he polled the Cabinet and found them all polling “no” and then he said, “the ayes have it.” With that he started to have what he said was the first general poll of his Cabinet and it was on the question of the Far East—whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be.¹ It was a very interesting talk—the best Cabinet meeting I think we have ever had since I have been there. He went around the table—first Hull and then myself, and then around through the whole number and it was unanimous in feeling the country would support us. He said that this time the vote is unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull made a good presentation of the general situation. I told them I rather narrowed it down into a following-up the steps which had been done to show what needed to be done in the future. The thing [14416] would have been much stronger if the Cabinet had known—and they did not know except in the case of Hull and the President—what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready we are to pitch in.

[p. 43]

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1941.

In the second place he (General Marshall at a staff meeting) read us a long letter from General MacArthur in the Philippines, telling us of the progress of the reorganization of the Philippine Army and the construction of airports throughout the Islands. This was very interesting to me.

[p. 44]

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1941.

I talked to the President about the question (danger) of poison gas in the Philippines. We have learned that the Japanese have used it on the Chinese at Ichang, where they killed some 700 Chinamen and disabled about ²—I don't want to be caught without gas in the Philippines. And yet we have been afraid to send it for fear it would leak out and be misconstrued during these negotiations. But I thought the time had come when we ought to not delay any longer and I told the President so quietly and privately after the conference and he [14417] agreed with me. So when I got back I called in General Gerow in the absence of General Marshall and told him to look up all the facts and get ready for the possible shipments with the idea that it should be done so that it would not come out in the press.

[p. 45]

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1941

I had a good talk with General Olmstead, whom I have recently promoted to be the chief signal officer on General Mauborgne's retirement. He is doing very well and outlined to me the work of

¹ NOTE.—See statement, p. 11, as to this Cabinet meeting.

² NOTE: Blank in notes.

reorganization of his office which he has accomplished. It was very good.

NOTE.—This conference was on the subject of the use of radar as a defense against surprise attacks. See statement p. 13.

[p. 46]

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1941.

This was a very full day indeed. At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of Three. Hull showed us the proposal for a 3 months' truce, which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests. I thought as we read it, but I don't think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic. In return for the propositions which they were to do; namely; to at once evacuate and at once to [14418] stop all preparations or threats of action, and to take no aggressive action against any of her neighbors, etc., we were to give them open trade in sufficient quantities only for their civilian population. This restriction was particularly applicable to oil. We had a long talk over the general situation.

Then at 12 o'clock we (viz, General Marshall and I) went to the White House, where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President, instead of bringing up the Victory Parade,³ brought up entirely the relations [p. 47] with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition.⁴ Hull laid out his general broad propositions on which the thing should be rested—the freedom of the seas and the fact that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his policy of world aggression. The others brought out the fact that any such expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps towards an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a viola- [p. 48] tion of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on preparing that. When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that an (a Japanese) expedition had started. Five divisions have come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had embarked on ships—30, 40, or 50 ships—and have been sighted south

³ This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan of national action in case of war in Europe.

⁴ See statement, pp. 11 and 14. Our military and naval advisers had warned us that we could not safely allow the [14419] Japanese to move against British Malaysia or the Dutch East Indies without attempting to prevent it.

of Formosa. I at once called up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the President of the message from G-2.

[p. 49]

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

[14420] Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing over—to tell them that he has no other proposition at all. The Chinese have objected to that proposition—when he showed it to them; that is, to the proposition which he showed to Knox and me, because it involves giving to the Japanese the small modicum of oil for civilian use during the interval of the truce of the 3 months. Chiang Kai-shek had sent a special message to the effect that that would make a terrifically bad impression in China; that it would destroy all their courage and that they (it) would play into the hands of his, Chiang's, enemies and that the Japanese would use it. T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has asked to see me and I called Hull up this morning to tell him so and ask him what he wanted me to do about it. He replied as I have just said above—that he had about made up his mind to give up the whole thing in respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese that he had no further action to propose.

A few minutes later I talked to the President over the telephone and I asked him whether he had received [p. 50] the paper which I had sent him over last night about the Japanese having started a new expedition from Shanghai down toward Indochina. He fairly blew up—jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't seen it and that that changed the whole [14421] situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were negotiating for an entire truce—an entire withdrawal (from China)—they should be sending this expedition down there to Indochina. I told him that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2 and through the Navy Secret Service and I at once got another copy of the paper I had sent last night and sent it over to him by special messenger.

[p. 51]

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

A very tense, long day. News is coming in of a concentration and movement south by the Japanese of a large expeditionary force moving south from Shanghai and evidently headed toward Indochina, with a possibility of going to the Philippines or to Burma, or to the Burma Road or to the Dutch East Indies, but probably a concentration to move over into Thailand and to hold a position from which they can attack Singapore when the moment arrives.

The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his finale had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on 2 or 3 days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday he would, he broke the whole matter off. He told me now that he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and

Knox— [14422] the Army and the Navy.” I then called up the President. The President gave me a little different view. He said they had ended up, but they ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterward that this was not a reopening of the thing but a statement of our constant and regular position.

General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of two of our biggest planes out from San [p. 52] Francisco and across the Mandated Islands to Manila. There is a concentration going on by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands and these planes can fly high over them, beyond the reach of their pursuit planes and take photographs.

Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was glad to have time but I didn't want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United States or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part. The main question has been over the message that we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi alert, or the first signal for an alert, and now, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert; namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack and telling him [14423] how the situation was. So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully; finally got it in shape and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull, I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was.

[p. 53]

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

Pursuant to my instructions G-2 had sent me a summary of the information in regard to the movements of the Japanese in the Far East and it amounted to such a formidable statement of dangerous possibilities that I decided to take it to the President before he got up. I told him there was an important coalition of facts and that I thought he ought to read it before his appointment which he had made for us at 12 o'clock, when the so-called War Cabinet was to meet him—Hull, Knox, myself with Stark and Marshall. He branched into an analysis of the situation himself as he sat there on his bed, saying there were three alternatives and only three that he could see before us. I told him I could see two. His alternatives were—first, to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at once. I told him my only two were the last two, because I did not think anyone would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said of the other two my choice was the latter one.

[14424] When we got back there at 12 o'clock he had read the paper that I had left with him. The main point [p. 54] of the paper was a study of what the expeditionary force, which we know has left Shanghai and is headed south, is going to do. G-2 pointed out that it might develop into an attack on the Philippines or a land-

ing of further troops in Indochina, or an attack on Thailand or an attack on the Dutch Netherlands, or on Singapore. After the President had read these aloud, he pointed out that there was one more. It might, by attacking the Kra Isthmus, develop into an attack on Rangoon, which lies only a short distance beyond the Kra Isthmus and the taking of which by the Japanese would effectually stop the Burma Road at its beginning. This, I think, was a very good suggestion on his part and a very likely one. It was the consensus that the present move—that there was an expeditionary force on the sea of about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing somewhere—completely changed the situation when we last discussed whether or not we could address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops which she already had on land in Indochina. It was now the opinion of everyone that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indochina and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, [p. 55] and ourselves in the Philippines. It was the consensus of [14425] everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear that if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot of going.

It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the Force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the other, which we didn't think we could do—that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good results at the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this did not seem to me to be the right thing now, and I pointed them out to the President. In the first place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be couched in terms which [p. 56] contained an explicit warning. One does not warn an Emperor. In the second place it would not indicate to the people of the United States what the real nature of the danger was. Consequently I said there ought to be a message by the President to the people of the United States, and I thought that the best [14426] form of a message would be an address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this idea of a message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his letter to the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not publicize a letter to an Emperor in such a way; that he had better send his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing, and then make his speech to the Congress as a separate and a more understandable thing to the people of the United States. This was the final decision at that time, and the President asked Hull and Knox and myself to try to draft such papers.

[p. 57]

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1941.

Dr. Alfred Sze and Dr. T. V. Soong came in to see me on their own request. I think Soong was anxious to have someone present as a witness to get me to corroborate what I said to him sometime ago about our intentions to fortify the Philippines. I told him simply that I knew what a difficult situation the Generalissimo was in and it was very presuming for me, sitting here in comfort, to ask him to be patient when he was in the middle of such anxieties and responsibilities there. Nevertheless I told him that that was, I am sure, the course that he should take. I said, I can only say that there is no change in the American policy from what I said to Dr. Soong some- [14427] time ago, and he can report that to the Generalissimo and tell him that I also counsel him to have just a little more patience and then I think all things will be well. Apparently that was all they wanted, for they at once got up and thanked me and went away. I warned them, of course, that they should not in any way make public or leak about what I had said to them. I called in Marshall and told him what had happened and asked him to remember what I said.

I left for the White House conference at 12 o'clock, and there were present there just Knox, Sumner Welles [p. 8] and myself, as Hull is laid up with a cold. The President went step by step over the situation and I think has made up his mind to go ahead. He has asked the Japanese through Sumner Welles what they intend by this new occupation of southern Indochina—just what they are going to do—and has demanded a quick reply. The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that he is quite settled, I think, that he will send a message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country. He said that he was going to take the matters right up when he left us.

[14428—p. 59]

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1941.

Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to Hull, and everything in MAGIC indicated that they had been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole matter over. Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering where the blow will strike. We three stayed together in conference until lunch time, going over the plans for what should be said or done. The main thing is to hold the main people who are interested in the Far East together—the British, ourselves, the Dutch, the Australians, the Chinese. Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture of it, and I made him dictate it to a stenographer and I attach it to the end of this. Knox also had his views as to the importance of showing immediately how these different nations must stand together and I got him to dictate that and that is attached hereto. Hull was to see the Japanese envoys at 1 o'clock but they were delayed in keeping the appointment and did not come until later—as it turned out, till 2

o'clock or after. I returned to Woodley to lunch and just about 2 o'clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me up on the telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me, "Have you heard the news?" I said, [p. 60] "Well, I have heard the telegrams which have been coming in about the Japanese advances [14429] in the Gulf of Siam." He said, "Oh, no. I don't mean that. They have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii." Well, that was an excitement indeed. The messages which we have been getting through Saturday and yesterday and this morning are messages which are brought by the British patrol south of Indochina, showing that large Japanese forces were moving up into the Gulf of Siam. This itself was enough excitement and that was what we were at work on our papers about. The observer thought these forces were going to land probably either on the eastern side of the Gulf of Siam, where it would be still in Indochina, or on the western side, where it would be the Kra Peninsula, or probably Malay. The British were very much excited about it and our efforts this morning in drawing our papers was to see whether or not we should all act together. The British will have to fight if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three all thought that we must fight if the British fought. But now the Japs have solved the whole thing by attacking us directly in Hawaii.

As soon as I could finish my lunch, I returned to the office and began a long conference which lasted until 6 o'clock. The news coming from Hawaii is very bad. [p. 61]. They seem to have sprung a complete surprise upon our fleet and have caught the battleships inside the harbor and bombed them severely with losses. They have also hit our airfields there and have destroyed a great many of our planes, evidently before [14430] they got off the ground. It has been staggering to see our people there, who have been warned long ago and were standing on the alert, should have been so caught by surprise. At 4 o'clock McCloy had the chiefs of the arms of the services in his room and I went in there and made them a little pep-up talk about getting right to work in the emergency but most of the time was spent in conference with Marshall, Grenville Clark, Miles, Patterson, McCloy, and their assistants, Lovett and General Gullion, the Provost Marshal General. The main subject that we were talking about was the form of a declaration of war. Grenville Clark had drawn up a copy based largely on the Woodrow Wilson one. We all thought that it was possible we should declare war on Germany at the same time with Japan, but that, of course, is an open question. There will be no doubt about declaring war on Japan now, I think. The President has set a conference at the White House at 8:30 this evening, in which the Cabinet had a conference and then a conference at 9 to which the leaders of the House were coming.

[p. 62] When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed. For I feel that this country united has practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and divisions stirred up by unpatriotic men have [14431] been hitherto very discouraging.

Our meeting with the President in the evening was in the Oval Room in the White House. He sat behind his desk and we in a semi-circle in front of him. He opened by telling us that this was the most serious meeting of the Cabinet that had taken place since 1861 and then he proceeded to enumerate the blows which had fallen upon us at Hawaii. Before he got to that, Knox who sat next to me told me with a rather white face that we had lost seven of the eight battleships in Hawaii. This, however, proved later to be exaggerated. Steve Early sat near the President and dispatches were brought in every few minutes during the meeting. The President had hastily drawn a draft of a message to Congress which he then read to us slowly. It was a very brief message, presenting the same thoughts which he actually presented the following day in his finished message to the Congress.

[p. 63] After the talk with the Cabinet which lasted for at least three-quarters of an hour, the leaders of Congress who had been waiting below came in. I can remember the following as being present: The Vice President, Senators Barkley, Connally, Austin, Hiram Johnson, perhaps George; Representatives: Speaker Rayburn, Sol Bloom, Eaton of New Jersey, Joe Martin; possibly others. The President began by a very frank story of what had happened, including our losses. The effect on the Congressmen was tremendous. They sat in dead silence [14432] and even after the recital was over they had very few words. The President asked if they would invite him to appear before the Joint Houses tomorrow and they said they would. He said he could not tell them exactly what he was going to say to them because events were changing so rapidly. We didn't finish until after 11 o'clock, when I returned to the office and stayed there until after 12.

On my return to the office from lunch I had started matters going in all directions to warn against sabotage and to get punch into the defense move. Marshall had sent out word of the attack to all of the corps area commanders and all our people throughout the world, particularly in the Philippines. I ordered all the officers thereafter to appear in uniform and I found that others [p. 64] had ordered the armed guards out over the War Department Building and additional guards over my house. We offered a guard to the White House but it was thought better there to have the FBI. This same activity went on during the intervals of my visit to the White House.

[14433—p. 65] PROPOSED STATEMENT FOR PRESIDENT BY HULL—
(SEE RECORD, DECEMBER 7)

The Japanese Government, dominated by the military fireeaters, is deliberately proceeding on an increasingly broad front to carry out its long proclaimed purpose to acquire military control over one-half of the world with nearly one-half its population. This inevitably means Japanese control of islands, continents, and seas from the Indies back near Hawaii, and that all of the conquered peoples would be governed militarily, politically, economically, socially, and morally by the worst possible military despotism with barbaric, inhuman, and semi-

slavery methods such as Japan has notoriously been inflicting on the people in China and Hitler on the peoples of some 15 conquered nations of Europe. This would virtually drive and force all free and peaceful peoples off the high seas.

At this moment of serious, threatened, and imminent danger, it is manifest that control of the South Sea area by Japan is the key to the control of the entire Pacific area, and therefore defense of life and commerce and other invaluable rights and interests in the Pacific area must be commenced within the South Sea area at such times and places as in the judgment of naval and military experts would be within sufficient time and at such strategic points as would [p. 66] make it most effective. In no other way can it be satisfactorily determined that the Pacific area can be successfully defended.

[14434] More than ever is the cohesive, closely related world movement to conquer and destroy, with Hitler moving across one half of the world and the Government of Japan under the military group moving across the other half of the world by closely synchronizing their efforts and collaborating and cooperating whenever to their individual or their mutual advantage.

This at once places at stake everything that is precious and worth while. Self-defense, therefore, is the key point for the preservation of each and all of our civilized institutions.

[14435—p. 67] SUGGESTION BY KNOX—(SEE RECORD, DECEMBER 7)

1. We are tied up inextricably with the British in the present world situation.

2. The fall of Singapore and the loss to England of Malaya will automatically not only wreck her far eastern position but jeopardize her entire effort.

3. If the British lose their position the Dutch are almost certain to lose theirs.

4. If both the British and the Dutch lose their positions we are almost certain to be next, being then practically Japanese surrounded.

5. If the above be accepted, then any serious threat to the British or the Dutch is a serious threat to the United States; or it might be stated any threat to any one of the three of us is a threat to all of us. We should therefore be ready jointly to act together and if such understanding has not already been reached, it should be reached immediately. Otherwise we may fall individually one at a time (or somebody may be left out on a limb).

6. I think the Japanese should be told that any movement in a direction that threatens the United States will be met by force. The President will want to reserve to himself just how to define this. The following are suggestions to shoot at: Any movement into Thailand; or any [p. 68] movement into [14436] Thailand west of 100° east and south of 10° north—this in accordance with the recommendation of the British and Dutch and United States military authorities in the Far East; or any movement against British, Dutch, United States, Free French, or Portuguese territory in the Pacific area.

Mr. LANE. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I ask to have spread on the record those interrogatories submitted to former Secretary Stimson by Senator Ferguson which were not answered as explained in former Secretary Stimson's letter of transmittal covering the interrogatories which he did subsequently answer. The letter of transmittal, the interrogatories and answers thereto will be in our next offer.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The interrogatories [unanswered] referred to follow:)

[14437]

MARCH 6, 1946.

The Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack being advised that the former Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, is unable to appear before the committee because of illness, I submit the following questions to Mr. Stimson to be answered fully, completely, and under oath, and it is to be understood that the questions and answers are to be made part of the official record as if taken in open hearings.

[S] HOMER FERGUSON,
Homer Ferguson,
United States Senate.

1. In your testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board, you stated that you had memoranda and records of what took place at certain meetings relating to Japan and American relations during 1941. Will you please furnish for the committee copies of these memoranda and records so far as they disclose the Far East situation between November 1 and December 8, 1941?

2. Did the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, have knowledge of what was taking place between you and other Cabinet members and the President in relation to the Far Eastern situation?

3. On the 25th of November 1941, you had a conversation [14438] with the President wherein he stated that hostilities with Japan might start perhaps next Monday, and that you had a discussion with him at that time as to what we should do in relation thereto. Will you please give us in detail what was said by you and by the President at that time?

4. Having appointed a board under the statute to investigate the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, how do you account for the fact that after the Board had completed the examination of witnesses you appointed Major Clausen to complete the investigation?

5. Will you give us the details as to those with whom you discussed this matter and the conversations?

6. Did you have Major Clausen investigate our policy in the Far East as far as the Secretary of State's office was concerned?

7. If not, will you tell us why not?

8. Did you have Major Clausen investigate our policy in the Far East as far as the White House was concerned?

9. If not, will you tell us why not?

10. Why did you not have the Board appointed to investigate this matter consider the so-called Clausen affidavits?

11. Were all Magic, that is, intercepted Japanese messages, furnished to you?

If not all Magic, were the messages furnished to War Plans and Chief of Staff delivered to you?

Will you tell us what Japanese messages you did discuss with the President?

[14439] Will you state what discussion you had with the President on the following Japanese messages:

No. 985----- Page 204, Exhibit 1.
 No. 986----- Page 206, Exhibit 1.
 No. 865----- Page 208, Exhibit 1.
 No. 844----- Page 195, Exhibit 1.

12. Did you discuss these Magic messages with the President?

13. I call your attention to the message in exhibit 2 and ask if you saw these messages prior to December 7, 1941.

14. I call your attention to the message on page 12 of exhibit 2 and ask you if you saw that message.

15. I ask you what evaluation you placed on the messages on pages 12, 13, 14, and 15 of exhibit 2.

16. Did you discuss the messages asked about in the previous 3 questions with any person? If so, give us the details of the discussion.

17. Did you ever discuss with Secretary Hull why he decided not to send the modus vivendi?

18. Did he ever tell you why he decided to send the note of November 26, 1941, and not the modus vivendi? If so, will you state what he said?

19. Upon what conversations was it based and what was the reason for it?

20. I show you exhibit 45 and ask you to explain in detail [14440] why this language was used in that memorandum: "be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations."

21. I call your attention to exhibit 45 and ask you whether it was originally intended to send this message discussed in this exhibit to General Short?

22. Isn't it true that a message was only to be sent to General MacArthur and that you had discussed with the President this message only to General MacArthur?

23. Did you ever discuss with Secretary Hull the modus vivendi? Give us the details of your conversation.

24. Did you advise for or against sending that proposal? If so, tell us what was said.

25. Did Secretary Hull ever tell you why he sent the note of November 26 and not the modus vivendi? If so, give us the conversation.

26. Exhibit No. 36 in the present investigation entitled "Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff), subject: Far Eastern Situation," signed by L. T. Gerow, Brigadier General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, contains the following statement: "The Secretary of War directs that the following secret, first priority, message be despatched by cable, radio, or telegraph (whichever method is the most secure from the viewpoint of secrecy) to each of the following:

[14441] Commanding General, Hawaiian Department
 Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command"

There then follows the message sent by the War Department to General Short on November 27, 1941, signed "Marshall" being No. 472, which is set forth on page 7 of exhibit 32.

When you directed that this despatch be sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, did you intend to cause him to alert the Hawaiian Department against hostile Japanese attack in the Hawaiian area?

27. Exhibit No. 46 in this investigation is a copy of General Short's reply to the message from General Marshall referred to in the preceding interrogatory. This reply reads as follows:

Report department alerted to prevent sabotage period. Liaison with Navy re URAD four seven two twenty seventh.

SHORT.

This exhibit containing General Short's reply bears the notation:

Noted H. L. S. (Stimson)

the "H L S" appearing to be your initials placed on the original War Department radiogram in your handwriting.

When you read General Short's reply did you consider that it was an adequate and responsive answer to the War Department's message of November 27th signed: "Marshall," No. 472, [14442] referred to in question 26?

28. If your answer to the preceding question is in the negative, what, if any, action did you take to cause the character of alert in the Hawaiian Department to conform to the type of alert you considered to be required by the message of November 27, 1941, to General Short from the War Department?

29. Did you discuss General Short's reply to the War Department message from General Marshall described in question 26 with any officer in the War Department during the period from November 28, 1941, to and including December 7, 1941.

30. After November 27, 1941, up to and including December 7, 1941, did the President address any inquiry to you as to the condition of alert maintained in the various overseas departments of the Army, and, specifically, as to whether in the Philippines and Hawaii, the Army was prepared to meet any type of Japanese attack?

31. If your answer to question 30 is in the affirmative, what was the nature of the inquiry made to you by the President, and your response thereto?

(Please state in complete detail, as you now recall, what was said by the President and by you in any such conversation.)

32. I am informed that you suggested to the President, and he approved the idea, that a final alert should be sent to General MacArthur. Will you give us the details of your [14443] conversation with the President on this matter?

33. I call to your attention a message sent by General Miles to the Commanding General at Panama dated December 5: "U. S.-Jap relations strained. Stop. Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent.—sgd. Miles," and ask you if you ever knew that that was sent?

34 (a) If you knew of this message referred to in the last question, will you explain when it was drawn up and sent to the Commander in Panama?

(b) Why was it sent?

(c) Why was the same message not sent to General Short at Pearl Harbor?

35. Were you familiar with the reply that the commander in Panama made to the order of the 27th of November?

36. You have spoken in your testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board that the President had made a momentous decision on the 26th or near that date. It appears to be in connection with sending the final alert as indicated in your diary. Will you state what that decision was and all the conversations you had with the President in relation to it?

37. In that message the following language was used: "negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible [14444] at any moment." Is this your language and, if so, did you discuss it with anyone before the message of November 27 was sent?

38 (a) If the language used in the previous message is not your language, will you tell whose it was and what discussions you had in relation to it?

(b) Did you discuss this language with the President? If so, will you give us the details of the conversation?

39. Isn't it true that the Japanese did come back for discussions and that the newspapers carried accounts of further discussions on December 1, 2, and 5?

40. Would not the reports in the newspapers that negotiations had been resumed tend to make General Short feel that the situation was less critical, especially when he had been given no further information by the War Department?

41. You used the following language in the message:

If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

Whose language is this?

41½. You having directed the preparation of the message of November 27 to General Short in General Marshall's absence, if that message was subject to more than one interpretation was it not your responsibility to check up on the reply to it under "report action taken"?

42. Tell us as to the discussions you had concerning [14445] whether it should be put in the message to General Short?

43. Did you ever discuss this first overt act as used in the Marshall message to Short on November 27 with the President? Tell us what was said and when you had the conversation.

44. (a) Did you ever discuss this first over act language with Secretary of State Hull? Tell us what was said and when you had the conversation.

(b) You knew that the message from Marshall to Short required Short to report measures taken?

45. Do you know whether any follow-up was made by the War Department on the report of measures taken made by Short to this message?

46. For the purpose of this question let us assume that General Short misinterpreted the Marshall message. If the answer is "no" to the previous question, is the fault that Short misinterpreted the message or that Washington failed to follow up his reply and see

he misinterpreted your message? Was the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor caused by Short's misinterpretating the Marshall message of November 27 or Washington failing to see that he had misinterpreted your alert and not sending a new alert calling this error to his attention.

47. On the morning of November 28, you went to see the President, as you describe it "before the President got up." You had with you a November 28 G-2 report, or some other report from G-2. Will you tell us the conversation you had with [14446] the President—what was said by each of you.

48. (a) If this was important to discuss with the Commander in Chief, the President, why did you not think it was also important to discuss it with General Short or to give him notice of it?

(b) Did you discuss the same thing with General Marshall or General Gerow?

(c) Did you discuss it with anyone else—if so, give names and conversation.

49. You have described the decision as "momentous." If this is true, should it not have been transmitted to General Short?

50. Where did you expect the Japanese to strike on December 7, 1941?

51. Did the President say or intimate that he did not desire Short or Kimmel to fire the first shot or commit the first overt act?

52. Did you concur without question in that attitude—that the first overt act should not be committed by Admiral Kimmel or General Short?

53. If so, will you give us the reasons for such concurrence?

54. Had not the military movements of the Japanese clearly indicated that Japan was not coming back and not going to offer to continue the conferences?

[14447] 55. Did you ever see the message of November 26, 1941, sent by Secretary Hull to the Japanese?

56. If your answer to the last question is "yes", did you know the contents of that message at the time it was sent or shortly thereafter? Will you explain as to whether or not you believed it broke off relations with Japan?

57. Will you state the full conversation you had with Secretary Hull in relation to the fact that he was through and that it was then up to the Army and Navy?

58. Did Mr. Hull explain why he was sending that message?

59. Are you conversant with an official document of the State Department of the United States wherein it is to be found these two sentences: "He (the Secretary of State) said that our proposed agreement (that is, the agreement proposed by Hull on the same day, the 26th) would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation which, however, were not referred to in the outline for fear that this might give rise to some misunderstanding. He (that is Mr. Hull) also referred to the fact that he had earlier in the conversations acquainted the Ambassador (that is, Nomura) of the ambition that had been his of settling the immigration question but that the situation had so far prevented him from realizing that ambition."

60. Do you understand that these are Secretary Hull's own words, contained in a memorandum, transcribed for him by Assistant Secre-

tary Ballantine who was present at the meeting? [14448] Do you understand that this is what Secretary Hull says he said to the Jap Government in the person of its ambassadors?

61. Do they represent what is known as an unnamed consideration in the event of the American note of the 26th being accepted by the Japanese?

[14449] 62. Were you acquainted, when you reviewed the Army board's definition of the nature of the note of the 26th, with the fact that having read the note and having heard the Secretary's supplementary propositions, Ambassador Kurusu said "that when they reported our answer to their Government it would be likely to throw up its hands." (of Public Relations, vol. 2, p. 765) and that "Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end * * *." (of Foreign Relations, vol. 2, p. 766).

63. Your diary shows that Secretary Hull stated at the meeting on December 7 at the meeting between you, Secretary Knox, and Secretary Hull that the Japanese are planning some deviltry and that he wondered where the blow would strike. Did you discuss Hawaii, or any other American possession at that time?

64. If so, will you state what was said and by whom?

65. (a) Did anyone at that meeting bring up the question of 1 p. m. Washington time being dawn or morning in Pearl Harbor?

(b) Did you three Secretaries on December 7, 1941, discuss the 1 p. m. time of delivery and what was said by each of you?

66. Did anyone suggest or bring up the fact that this might or could mean an attack upon Hawaii or Pearl Harbor?

67. If so, give us the details of that discussion. Give us the detailed conversation that took place in the Secretary of State's office on Sunday a. m., December 7, 1941.

[14450] 68. On December 6, 1941, was an appointment arranged for a meeting between you, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Navy, to be held at the State Department on December 7, 1941, at or about 10 o'clock a. m.?

69. (a) Who arranged the meeting referred to in the preceding question and at what time? What was to be the purpose of the meeting?

(b) Why was not General Marshall and/or Admiral Stark invited or in attendance?

(c) If the meeting was to consider Japan's reply to the Secretary of State's note of November 26, why was the President not also conferred with?

70. What was the occasion for arranging the meeting referred to in question 68?

71. (a) Who attended the meeting at the State Department on December 7, 1941, at or about 10 o'clock a. m.?

(b) What intercepted Japanese messages were before you at that meeting?

72. What discussion or discussions took place at the meeting held at the State Department on the morning of December 7, 1941, which you attended in company with the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox? (Please state in complete detail what was said by you and by the other participants in the discussions at the meeting referred to.)

[14451] 73. What action did you take, or direct to be taken, on the morning of December 7, 1941, (a) when you learned of the existence and tenor of the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26, 1941, which appears on page 245 of exhibit 1; and (b) when you learned that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was directed to present the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 at 2 p. m., Washington time?

74. Was there any discussion between you and any individual on December 7, 1941, prior to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as to the significance of the Japanese message directing the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to present the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26, 1941, at 1 p. m., Washington time?

75. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, what was said by you and any other individual in connection with the subject matter of the significance of the hour fixed for the delivery of the Japanese note to the United States on December 7, 1941?

76. After you learned of the existence of the fourteenth part of the Japanese message and the additional message fixing the time of delivery as 1 o'clock p. m., Washington time, did you discuss either of these messages with the President, with General Marshall, or with Admiral Stark or any officer of the State Department, the Navy Department, the War Department?

[14452] 77. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, what was said by you and what was said by the person or persons with whom you had any discussion or conversation referred to in the preceding question?

78. Did you talk with the President personally or by phone or contact him through a messenger on Saturday, December 6 or 7 from 4 p. m. to the time of the attack?

79. If you did communicate in any way with the President, personally or otherwise, give the details of that conversation.

80. Did you at any time on December 6, 1941, receive the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26, which appears on pages 239, 240, 242, 243, and 244 of exhibit 1 in this investigation?

81. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, at what time and from what individual, did you receive the message referred to?

82. When on December 6, 1941, did you learn that the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 had been intercepted and translated by the Army and Navy?

83. From whom did you receive the information referred to in the preceding question? (Please state in complete detail, as you now recall, what was said by any person or persons informing you of the receipt of the 13-part message, and your [14453] response thereto.)

84. Exhibit 58 of this investigation (item 2) contains a list of "telephone calls made from outside through White House switchboard on December 6, 1941, and December 7, 1941, as compiled from operators' notes available." The following calls appear among others with the following notations as to time on December 6:

1258 p. Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull-----	1wc—OK	1259 p.
830 p. Secy Knox cld Secy Stimson-----	OK	
845 p. Secy Knox cld Secy Hull-----	OK	
847 p. Secy Knox cld Secy Stimson-----	OK	

(a) What was said by you and by Secretary Hull in the course of your telephone conversation at 12:58 p. m. on December 6, 1941?

(b) What was said by you and Secretary Knox in the course of your telephone conversation at 8:30 p. m. on December 6, 1941?

(c) What was said by you and Secretary Knox in the course of your telephone conversation at 8:47 p. m. on December 6, 1941?

85. Did you have any conversation or conversations with Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox on 6 December 1941, other than those referred to in the preceding question?

86. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, what were the time or times of any such conversation [14454] or conversations, and what was said by you and the other party to each such conversation?

87. This question not used.

88. This question not used.

89. This question not used.

90. At any time on December 6, 1941, did you discuss the "pilot message," so-called or the 13-part message referred to in question 80 with any of the following individuals:

- (a) The President.
- (b) Secretary of State Hull.
- (c) Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox.
- (d) Mr. Sumner Welles.
- (e) Gen. George C. Marshall.
- (f) Admiral H. R. Stark.
- (g) General Miles—G-2.
- (h) General Gerow.
- (i) Col. Rufus Bratton.

(Please specify in your answer to this question the name of the individual or individuals referred to, with whom you had such discussion or conversation, and the time or times of such discussions or conversations.)

(See question 94 for description of the pilot message.)

91. What was said by you and by any of the individuals referred to in question 90 in the course of any conversations [14455] or discussions on December 6, 1941, with reference to:

(a) The meaning of the so-called "pilot message" (see question 94.)

(b) Any action to be taken by the War and Navy Departments, or the State Department, in connection with the so-called "pilot message";

(c) The meaning of the 13-part message referred to in question 80;

(d) Any action to be taken by the War and Navy Departments or the State Department with respect to the 13-part message.

92. Where were you on December 6, 1941, from 4 p. m. to 12 midnight?

93. Did you learn of the contents of the thirteenth part of the 14-part message before you saw it? If so, relate the circumstances.

94. Your attention is directed to pages 238 and 239 of exhibit 1 of this investigation, and specifically to the message appearing on such pages from Tokyo to Washington, No. 901, on December 6, 1941. This message has been described in the course of this investigation as the

"pilot message" because it informs the Japanese representatives in Washington that Japan has prepared a memorandum in reply to the American note of November 26 to be sent in 14 parts, and that the time of its presentation was to be specifically fixed [14456] in a later message. Col. Rufus Bratton has testified before this committee (record, p. 12050) that he disseminated this so-called "pilot message" around 3 o'clock of the afternoon of December 6, 1941, to "Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of the War Plans Division, G-2, and my own section."

What action did you take upon receipt of this message?

95. With whom did you discuss the so-called "pilot message" referred to in the preceding question?

96. What was the nature of your discussion of the so-called "pilot message" with any person or persons on the 6th of December 1941? (Please state in complete detail what you said in any such discussion, and what was said by the person or persons with whom you discussed the "pilot message"?)

97. When did you see the pilot message which is No. 901, page 238 of exhibit 1?

Had the contents of the pilot message been called to your attention before you saw it? If so, relate the circumstances.

98. When did you first see or obtain information as to the contents of the following messages in exhibit 1:

No. 904.....	Page 245.
No. 907.....	Page 248.
No. 908.....	Page 248.
[14457] No. 909.....	Page 240.
No. 910.....	Page 249.

99. If you made plans at this meeting on the 7th between the three Secretaries as to what was to be *said* or *done* (the words said and done were used by you in your testimony before the Army board) did you discuss with anyone that this information should be sent to the field, particularly to Short?

Give us the conversations on what was to be said.

Give us the conversations on what was to be done.

100. At what time did you first get the fourteenth part of the 14-part message? Give hour if possible.

101. Did you see General Marshall on December 6? If so, give us detailed conversations between you.

Did you see General Marshall on December 7 prior to the Japanese attack? If so, give us detailed conversation.

Did you see General Gerow on December 6 or 7 up to the Jap attack? If so, give us detailed conversations between you.

102. Did you talk with any Army officer after 4 p. m. on December 6, 1941, up to the time of the attack on the 7th of December? If so, give us the conversations.

103. I quote from exhibit 16 dated November 5, 1941, memorandum from Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff to the President:

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

[14458] a. The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany

remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

b. War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of the 100° East or south 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

[14459] c. If war with Japan cannot be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans, i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the objective of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

d. Considering world strategy, a Japanese Advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

e. All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

f. In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for [14460] intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the need of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

104. Did you discuss the above (question 103) with first the President? If so, give us the details of the conversation; secondly, the Secretary of State? If so, give us details of the conversation; third, with General Marshall? If so, give us details of the conversation.

105. Following is the fourteenth part of the 14-part message:

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

7 December 1941

#902 Part 14 of 14

(NOTE.—In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping [14461] Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

[14462] 106. How do you account for the delay from 5 o'clock a. m., the date of the receipt of the fourteenth part of the 14-part message, until you did receive it?

107. If any of the delay was caused by delay in decoding and translation, it seems clear it was translated by 8 a. m. or 8:15 a. m. on the morning of the 7th of December 1941. How do you account for the delay from 8 a. m. until you did see it?

108. Did you at any time prior to the attack discuss with the President the contents of any part of the 14-part message?

109. If so, what was the discussion?

110. Did you discuss with General Marshall any of the Japanese messages received by our Government on December 6 or 7, 1941, and set forth in our exhibit 1? If so, state the time; give the number of the message and page of exhibit 1, also the details of what was said by each of you.

111. If you discussed with the Secretary of State any of the Japanese messages received by our Government on December 6 or 7, 1941, and set forth in our exhibit 1 at any time other than at the meeting in his office at 10 or 10:30 a. m. on Sunday, December 7. State the times and give the number of the message, page of exhibit 1, and also the details of what was said by you and Mr. Hull.

112. Did you discuss with anyone in the Army and Navy any of the Japanese messages received by our Government on December 6 or 7 and set forth in our exhibit 1? Give the names of [14463] persons, time of discussion or conversations, and conversation by you and the other party or parties.

113. At the meeting of the three Secretaries on Sunday, December 7, 1941, at 10 or 10:30 a. m. You, Mr. Stimson, were familiar with the message sent to General Short on November 27. Did you not consider with the information you had received here in Washington from that date until your meeting time on December 7 that a new alert was necessary to General Short?

114. You had seen on November 28, 1941, the reply from General Short to the message of November 27 which was as follows:

Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD Four Seven Two Twenty Seventh.

having in mind that reply showing his interpretation of the message of November 27 that a new alert was necessary.

Your findings as to General Short indicate you believed he was subject to criticism for his interpretation of the message from General Marshall to him on November 27; is not the same thing true of the failure to properly evaluate his reply to that message.

115. When did you first learn that General Marshall and General Gerow had failed to note what General Short had replied to their note of November 27?

116. Did not the failure of the responsible Army officers in Washington to properly evaluate General Short's reply to General Marshall's message of November 27 contribute to the Pearl Harbor [14464] disaster?

117. Did you know what messages were sent from Washington to General Short between November 27 and the 8th of December 1941?

State the message you knew had been sent between November 27 and December 8, 1941.

Did you believe that General Short was getting all decoded Japanese diplomatic messages?

118. Did you believe that Pearl Harbor had the means to intercept, decipher, and translate Japanese diplomatic messages?

119. Did you know that General MacArthur had access to the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages through the Navy in the Philippines?

120. Did you discuss with the President the 1 o'clock message, exhibit 1, No. 907, page 248?

121. If so, give time and what was said by you and by the President.

122. Why did our Government adopt the policy of leaning over backwards to keep from advising Japan that we were ready for any attack that they might make?

123. If such was the plan, or our policy, who was responsible for its adoption?

124. With whom did you discuss it and give us the contents of the discussion.

125. Do you know why General Marshall did not use the telephone to advise General Short of an anticipated attack or give [14465] him an alert?

How could the fact that we were alerted to air attack (if known by the Japs) been detrimental to the United States?

126. You have made a statement that there was a preliminary alert given prior to the 27th and a full alert given on the 27th. As time went on, and the deadline date of the 29th passed, new developments arose as to the destruction of the codes, and other information came to our Government here in Washington. Did you discuss with anyone the sending of a new message to keep parties alerted and, if not, why not?

127. The fact that General Marshall did send a message at 12:18 on the 7th of December 1941, to General Short would indicate, would it not, that General Marshall did not consider the message of the 27th as sufficient considering the further information that was obtained as to Japan's intentions?

128. This being true, can you tell us why, if a new alert was to be given at all, it was not given earlier than 12:18, December 7?

129. Was your Secretary of War's office alerted to war on the 5th or on the 6th or on the 7th of December 1941?

130. If not, can you explain why not?

131. If it was, will you explain just how it was alerted and who was on duty in the office?

132. When, in your opinion, did war between Japan and America become imminent?

[14466] 133. Did you make any effort to contact General Marshall on the afternoon or night of December 6, or on the morning of December 7, 1941?

134. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, were you successful?

135. If your answer to question 133 is in the affirmative, what was said by you and by General Marshall?

136. Did you during the time, the 6th of December, contact Admiral Stark?

137. If so, give us the conversations and what was discussed.

138. This question was not used.

139. This question not used.

140. Did you contact the Secretary of State, or did he contact you, or were you in communication with him either personally or by message on the 6th?

141. If so, give us the details of the conversation and the time of contact.

142. When did you receive notice or information concerning a message from Ambassador Winant purporting to come from Churchill to the President, received in the State Department at 10:40 on December 6?

143. If you had a conference with the Secretary of the Navy about a meeting the next day, and were familiar with the fact that a 13-part message was in, and 1 part part had not been [14467] received, can you explain why the meeting was held as late as 10 or 10:30?

144. When did you learn that the President was preparing a message to the Emperor?

145. When did you first know or hear that that message was sent?

146. If you had any conversations with the President about that message to the Emperor will you give us the conversations?

147. Did you have a conversation at any time in November or December 1941, with the President about a message to Congress concerning the Far Eastern situation? If so, give us details of that conversation.

148. Were you aware that the President, in informing the press on December 2, that he was asking Japan about the Indochina concentrations, was asked by a reporter if any time limit had been set for a reply and that the President had said that the question was silly, had answered in the negative, and said that those tactics were used in the last century not in this, and had said that the United States was at peace with Japan and that the two nations were perfectly friendly?

149. Were you aware of the Jap Ambassador telling Under Secretary Welles, on delivery of the December 2 note, that it was apparent that both sides were preparing? (See Foreign Relations, p. 780.)

150. Were you aware on December 4 that the Japanese [14468] movements in Indochina alone as represented in the President's note of December 2, constituted actions which the President in his note of August 17 had formally pledged the United States to resist?

151. Do you have any evidence that that commitment on August 17 had been made known to the American people or to the American Congress before December 7, 1941?

152. Will you state your conversation with General Marshall, or any other military authority, in relation to the fact that negotiations were ended so far as the Secretary of State was concerned and that it was up to the Army and Navy?

153. When the President returned from the Atlantic Conference, did you discuss with him his conversations or negotiations with Prime Minister Churchill in relation to the Far East?

154. I refer you to Foreign Relations, volume 2, page 556, at the bottom of the page, the last paragraph, which continues on page 557. Did you know that that message was given by the President to the Japanese and did you discuss with him the message, or the contents thereof, and will you state your discussions, what he said and what you said?

155. Did you know what our Government policy was in giving armed aid or support to Britain or the Dutch if there was an attack made by the Japanese upon the Malay Peninsula or any other British or Dutch possession and no direct attack [14469] against American possessions?

156. Why were you concerned with the movement south of the Japanese to Thailand or the Malay Peninsula if we had no policy as to what we intended to do in case of any attack on the British and/or the Dutch?

157. Did you ever discuss with the President and/or Secretary of State Hull the question of our policy in case of an attack upon the British and/or Dutch and no attack by the Japanese upon America or American possessions?

158. If you had such a discussion, give us the dates and details.

159. At the meeting on December 7, 1941, with Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox, during that meeting or from the time of that meeting up until the attack, did you or anyone to your knowledge present at that meeting, or in that conference, communicate with the President and, if so, what were the contents of the conversation?

160. At the meeting between you and the other Secretaries and Cabinet members, you have stated that you stayed in conference until lunch time going over the plans for what should be said and done. Will you give us the details of that conversation or, if you do not remember the exact words, then the substance of the conference, particularly what you meant by "plans for what should be said" and what is meant by that. Also in regard to "as to what should be done," will you tell us what [14470] was said by each on "as to what should be done."

161. I refer you to a memorandum, exhibit 40, and ask you if there was any discussion with you or anyone else to your knowledge on this subject of armed support.

Who assured the British of American armed support as mentioned in their instructions to Singapore as shown in the message of our naval observer at Singapore to Admiral Hart?

162. As Secretary of War on December 5, 1941, had you prepared or acted in any way to implement the declaration of the President to Japan on August 17 that the United States immediately would resist a Japanese threat or move into the Southwest Pacific?

163. You were certain, if only from the President's note of December 2, were you not, that Japanese concentration in southern Indochina, constituted a threat within the meaning and letter of the declaration of August 17, 1941?

164. As Secretary of War, on December 5, had you anticipated that American resistance to a Jap attack against some other nation would follow the pattern of American resistance to Germany's attacks on Great Britain in the Atlantic Ocean?

165. Was it ever called to your attention that the Secretary of Interior was holding up the installation of the permanent radar sets? If so, what was done to expedite these installations?

166. What evidence was before you when General Short was [14471] relieved of his command?

Whose decision was it to relieve General Short of his command?

167. It is true, is it not, that in late November and early December 1941 you and General Marshall shared with General Short the belief that Japan would not attack Pearl Harbor? (See par. 19, Stimson statement August 29, 1945.)

168. It is true, is it not, that the American General Staff "completely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and particularly the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft"?

169. Do you still think that "It is probably true that the emphasis on sabotage in several War Department warnings and the Department's caution against alarming the civilian population, coupled with the failure to comment on Short's report of November 27, confirmed him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and might disregard all others, as you stated in your official report regarding the Pearl Harbor disaster, released to the press on August 29, 1945?"

170. If there was, in the opinion of the War Department General Staff, any "threat from without," in an overseas command, and the reports from that area showed only an alert against sabotage, who, if anyone, had the duty or authority in the War Department to transmit a message to correct the situation?

[14472] 171. In your public report of August 29 you stated that G-2 "had duties of collecting and analyzing information and transmitting information * * * to the theater commanders"; it is true, is it not, that neither G-2 nor the War Department sent any information to General Short between November 28, 1941, and December 7, 1941?

172. In your opinion, was the War Department on a sufficient alert on December 6, 1941 so that the Chief of Staff could reasonably assume that information such as was received indicating a breach of diplomatic relations would get to him before the next morning, or do you regard the delay in getting this information to General Marshall as an unusual circumstance which he could not have reasonably foreseen?

173. Do you believe that in early December 1941 the War Department had an efficient functioning system to get important intelligence promptly to the Chief of Staff?

174. It is true, is it not, that neither you nor Colonel Clausen, your investigator even asked General Short about his knowledge of the "winds" code, but that, nevertheless, you made a finding in your official report that "this information was available to General Short or his command prior to December 7, 1941?"

175. Were you consulted and did you have anything to do with the appointment of the Roberts Commission?

176. Did you see the Roberts Finding of Facts prior to its [14473] signing and submission to the President?

Mr. LANE. As just previously referred to, subsequently the committee submitted certain additional interrogatories to Mr. Stimson. His reply has been received and we request that the interrogatories, the answers thereto, and the letter of transmittal dated April 23, 1946, be spread on the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

[14474]

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APRIL 23, 1946.

Hon. ALBEN W. BARKLEY,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: I have received your kind letter of April 4th enclosing the two sets of interrogatories which Senator Ferguson has submitted.

I confess to disappointment that my previous effort to give your Committee a fair and full statement of what I could recollect in regard to the Pearl Harbor attack, based upon such effort and investigation as my health would allow, should now be followed by no less than 237 interrogatories submitted by Senator Ferguson. In preparing my statement I went to the very margin of the rules imposed upon me by my physicians.

The interrogatories which you now send me are divided into two lists. The first dated March 6th must have been prepared before my statement sent to the Committee on March 13th could have been received by them. While I have not been able to examine [14475] it carefully, it must have been in large part answered by that statement of mine.

Senator Ferguson's second list by its title is related to my statement and is in substance a cross-examination of that statement. This second list I have now tried to answer to the best of my recollection and belief.

I assume that the committee will be satisfied with my original statement as an answer to the first list and, if there are any questions in that list directed to matters not in the statement, it will assume that my recollection does not extend to that question. I really cannot in my present condition of health undertake the very heavy burden which would inure to another reexamination of all papers, documents, and evidence heretofore submitted. I did the best I could in that respect in my first statement. I hope you will find my answers to Senator Ferguson's supplemental questions satisfactory. I enclose them herewith.

With many thanks for your courtesy and personal good wishes.

I am, very sincerely, yours,

(Signed) HENRY L. STIMSON.

[14476] **ANSWERS OF HENRY L. STIMSON TO SUPPLEMENTAL
QUESTIONS PROPOSED BY SENATOR FERGUSON**

1. Mr. Secretary, you state in your statement to the Pearl Harbor Committee that our military advisers had given the President their formal advice that if Japan moved beyond certain lines we would have to fight for the sake of our own security. Are you referring to the memoranda to the President, dated November 5 and November 27, 1941, and signed by Admiral Stark and General Marshall?

Assuming this statement is addressed to the sentence on page 4 of my statement, my answer is "yes."

2. Was this advice on the request of the President?

I have no recollection as to this.

3. Was that advice accepted and did it become our Government policy prior to the Pearl Harbor attack?

It has always been the fixed and permanent policy of the United States Government to defend itself and its possessions. The Congress itself reaffirmed and endorsed this policy on numerous occasions as the

dangers to this country from the war which was starting across the world became more acute. It reaffirmed it when the regular size of our ordinary military appropriations were enormously increased by the Congress in May and June 1940, at the time of the fall of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. It reaffirmed it in September 1940, when it passed the draft law, and by the joint resolution in August [14477] 1940, which authorized the total mobilization of the National Guard for large scale maneuvers or training. It reaffirmed it by its passage of the lend-lease legislation to assist in arming the nations who were fighting in the front line against aggression by the Axis and in opening our ports for the repairs of their warships. Each of these extraordinary congressional enactments indicated beyond peradventure a policy to prepare the United States against an immediate impending attack by the Axis nations.

It is the President of the United States who is charged with the execution of that policy, both as Chief Executive and as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. It was his duty to make the decisions as to how this policy of defense should be best carried out. The adoption of plans for defense are ultimately for his decision and if the adoption of a particular strategy is to be termed policy at all, it is executive policy the decision of which it entirely a matter for the President. In making this decision, the President receives the advice of numerous advisers, including his military advisers and the members of his Cabinet. Their views and recommendations, however, are purely advisory, and the final policy and strategy is for the decision of the President and it is his alone.

As I have already pointed out in my statement, and as my contemporaneous notes indicate, it was the consensus of [14478] opinion of the President's advisers that if the Japanese in the latter part of November should advance beyond a certain point the security of this country demanded that we would have to fight. It was also the consensus of opinion that a further warning by us to Japan should be given. The President was in fact during the early part of December engaged in preparing an address to the Congress which would incorporate such a warning, and was also considering a special telegram to the Emperor of Japan. Before the address to the Congress was delivered, however, the Japanese struck on December 7. I do not recollect that the President prior to December 7 formally announced any decision on his part to fight if the Japanese passed the point in question, but he was undoubtedly considering such a decision most seriously, because it was the advice of his best qualified advisers.

4. If so, what plans were promulgated to carry out that advice?

See answer to question 3.

5. Did you have information from the President that we would fight for the sake of our security upon the happening of that event mentioned in question 1?

See answer to question 3.

6. If so, did you convey that information to General Marshall?

See answer to question 3.

7. Will you state if the Secretary of the Navy had such advice and if he conveyed it, or caused it to be conveyed, to [14479] Admiral Stark?

I have no information as to this.

8. On page 9 of your mimeographed statement to the committee, you have set forth four salient features of the situation as they appeared to you in November of 1941. Were any or all of these discussed with any other person?

All of these points were discussed many times and with numerous persons. I have already indicated in my statement the discussions that took place with the President, at Cabinet meetings and at meetings with the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Navy and with the chiefs of staff, all of whom shared my views, to the best of my information and belief.

9. If so will you state with whom they were discussed and if anyone else shared your views on these features? Will you give their names?

I have nothing to add beyond what I have already said in my statement of March 1946, and in my last answer.

10. On page 12 of the mimeographed statement you speak of the vote of the Cabinet as to whether or not it was thought that the American people would back you up if it became necessary to strike Japan in case she attacked England in Malay or the Dutch East Indies, does this mean that it became the policy of this Government at that time to take such steps?

See answer to question 3.

[14480] 11. If so, to whom was this policy communicated?

See answer to question 3.

12. Did you advise General Marshall and was he to advise others in the field of this policy?

See answer to question 3.

13. Did you, Mr. Secretary, keep in close touch with the program of installing permanent radar in the Hawaiian Islands?

I took a very active interest in insisting that proper installations of radar, both mobile and permanent, be installed in Hawaii as promptly as possible, but I, of course, left the details as to how and where the permanent apparatus should be installed to the military members of the staff and the local military commander. I have no recollection at this time as to how much detail I knew with regard to the permanent installations at Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941. I do remember distinctly the very favorable report of the test of the mobile apparatus that was made shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack, and that that report indicated that the mobile apparatus was in operation and was capable of detecting the approach of enemy planes at a distance of at least 80 miles.

14. Will you state specifically what was done to expedite the installation of permanent radar in Hawaii?

I have no recollection at the present time.

15. Was it not called to your attention that there were many [14481] delays in the installing of radar equipment in the Hawaiian Islands?

I have no recollection at the present time.

16. On pages 14 and 15, you tell of a conversation between the War Cabinet—the President, Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, and the Secretary of State—on page 15 you state that certain things were discussed at the meeting. Was there any policy formulated by virtue of that discussion?

See answer to question 3.

17. If so, will you state what the policy was and how it was to be carried out? On page 15, you state that you reminded the President of his warning of August 19, I ask you if the correct date of that is not Sunday, August 17, when the President returned from the Atlantic Conference with Mr. Churchill?

See answer to question 3. I believe the correct date of the warning which I described as of August 19 should be August 17, 1941.

18. I also ask you what the President replied to you when you made the statement to him as stated by you on page 15 as to the warning that he had given Japan?

I do not recollect.

19. Will you state what the President said about this warning and your suggestion?

[14482] I do not recollect, except that I do remember that the final view was that an additional warning to Japan should be given.

20. When did you first become familiar with the warning that the President gave to Japan on August 17, 1941, as related in the White Paper (vol. 2, Foreign Relations of the United States, pages 556-557)?

I do not recollect. See answer to question 52 below.

21. Did England ever give a parallel warning? If so, when?

I do not recollect. See answer to question 52 below.

22. Was it not important that you, as Secretary of War, be advised as to our policies in the Far East and that you advise General Marshall of that policy and that he, in turn, advise General Short and other officers in the field?

I think it was important that the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff should be advised as to our policies in the Far East. As to what extent and in what detail the commander of the individual theater should be so advised depends on the circumstances of the particular situation.

23. Was it not important that if our Government had a policy that if England or the Netherlands were attacked that we would consider it as an unfriendly act and an attack upon us, that our military authorities be fully advised as to that?

See answer to questions 3 and 22.

[14483] 24. Was it not important that if Japan was to make an attack upon the British and/or the Dutch and our policy was that we were to treat that as an attack or unfriendly act upon us that the commanding officer at Hawaii be fully informed as to this in order that he might guard against an attack upon our fleet and possessions which were on the flank of the Japanese?

See answer to questions 3 and 22. The commanding officers of the individual Pacific theaters were advised on November 27 that hostile action was possible "at any moment."

25. On page 17 of your statement, you speak of the conversation with Mr. Hull and state that he had washed his hands of it and that it was in the hands of the Army and the Navy, and that you had called the President who gave you a different view, do I understand that the President did not agree with Mr. Hull?

I think my statement and my notes of November 27 adequately cover the answer to this question.

26. Will you give us the entire conversation you had with the President in relation to this?

I have nothing to add to what I have already said in my statement.

27. Did you discuss with the President on or about November 27, 1941, the sending of a message to General MacArthur?

[14484] I did.

28. Will you give us this conversation?

I have nothing to add to what I have already said in my statement, page 19, and to what is contained in my notes of Thursday, November 27, 1941.

29. At that time, or on the 27th, did you discuss with the President the sending of a message to General Short?

I do not recollect. The sequence shows that such a message was sent to Short as well as the two other Pacific outposts; viz, Panama and the Pacific coast including Alaska.

30. Will you give us the conversation with the President about sending General Short a message?

See answer to question 29.

31. When did it first come to your attention that the Japanese were treating our note of November 26, 1941, as an ultimatum?

I do not recollect. I do not know that it ever came to my knowledge until after December 7.

32. Was it not important that we understand the way the Japanese were treating it—as to what their acts would be rather than what our intentions were?

I have nothing to say as to this. See answer to previous question.

33. On pages 24 and 25 of your mimeographed statement you make the statement that the President had made a momentous [14485] decision that day; that is, to send what you called a final alert. I wish you would explain why you refer to this as a momentous decision.

The word "momentous" is perhaps not strictly accurate. It is a fair sample of the rough and hasty character of my daily notes as described in my original statement to your committee. The thought I intended to convey was that the President had himself directed that a final warning should be sent out and that as this decision had emanated from the Commander in Chief it was very important that it should be done.

34. Why was it a momentous decision to advise our armed forces to be on the alert for an attack by the Japs?

See answer to question 33.

35. Did you consider this a declaration of war with Japan and for this reason it was a momentous decision?

I did not consider this a declaration of war with Japan.

36. State what was said between you and the President on this occasion so we may be advised as to why this was a momentous decision.

I have already answered this in my statement of March 1946, at page 26.

37. On page 26 of your mimeographed statement you say that our Government had decided not to attack without a further warning, and that the President suggested a special [14486] telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. Was it decided as a policy of our Government that we would attack after sending of that message if the Japanese continued their aggression further to the south?

See answer to question 3.

38. On the same page you state that a special message would be delivered to Congress. Will you state if you ever knew why that message was not delivered to Congress?

It was not delivered to Congress because the Japanese struck first.

39. Why was Congress allowed to adjourn from December 4 to December 8 at a time when our Government knew of the movement of the Japanese to the south?

I have no recollection as to this.

40. On page 28 of your statement you use the following language:

On the other hand, we also decided that we could not attack without a further warning to Japan, and we discussed what form that warning should take. The President suggested a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. After some discussion it was decided that he would send such a letter to the Emperor, which would not be made public, and that at the same time he would deliver a special message to Congress reporting on the danger and reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened.

Will you please explain as to whether this proposal [14487] involved coming to Congress in advance or whether the proposal was to strike Japan first then report to Congress what had been done?

The proposal was to go to Congress in advance, and through the address to Congress to give the Japanese a final warning.

41. Was it the intention of our Government, through the President, to notify Congress that certain things had happened which caused us to strike Japan, and that the report to Congress was to obtain Congress' ratification and approval?

No. See answer to Question 40.

42. Will you state why no action was actually taken upon this proposal?

See answer to Question 40.

The fact that information coming in around the first of December indicated that the Japanese expedition was landing in Indochina in the neighborhood of Saigon rather than going on into the Peninsula and up into the Gulf of Siam may have prompted the President to think that perhaps the Japanese were not going to invade Thailand at once or attack the Malay Peninsula and may have delayed his address to Congress.

43. On pages 29 and 30 of your message to the committee you go from Tuesday, the 2d of December to Sunday, the 7th, why is there this gap when we consider the crisis that was then pending?

[14488] The gap in my statement occurs primarily because of the fact that my notes of those days do not contain memoranda relevant to this inquiry. I remember that we were very busy on Wednesday, December 3. I participated in a large staff conference in which we discussed at length maneuvers that had recently been held and the lessons to be learned from them. I left in the late afternoon to go to New York to keep a dentist appointment on Thursday morning, December 4. I returned to Washington on Thursday afternoon. When I arrived there I was greeted by the news of the publication by the Chicago Tribune on December 4 of our most secret war plans, which had caused great concern to the members of my staff. On Friday, December 5, my time was largely occupied in discussion of this matter and in determining what action should be taken. On Saturday, December 6, I was in frequent conference with General Marshall, and also with General Miles of G-2 and General Gerow of the War Plans Division, which concerned chiefly the supplies which were on the way to the Philippines and the additional big bombers which we were trying to fly over there.

44. Will you state what took place during these 5 days of the crisis with Japan?

See answer to previous question. .

45. Did you leave Washington on December 5 and go to New York?

No; I was in Washington all that day and until long after December 7.

[14489] 46. If so, had you fully advised General Marshall of the situation, or had you advised your under secretary, so that they could proceed in an emergency?

See answer to previous question.

47. On page 30 of your mimeographed statement you use the words "and we were all wondering where the blow would strike," will you explain to the committee who you include in "we"?

By "we" I referred to Mr. Hull, Mr. Knox, and myself.

48. On page 35 of your mimeographed statement, will you state as to whether or not you made inquiry from any military personnel as to what was meant by an alert against sabotage, or being alerted to prevent sabotage?

I made no such inquiry.

49. Were you at any time acquainted with various alerts of the Army?

I was not acquainted with the various alerts, the details of the strategic and tactical plans for the defense of the various theaters, nor was it my duty to be familiar with them.

50. If not, was it not your responsibility, you having sent the message of November 27, under General Marshall's name, to acquaint yourself with the meaning of the reply?

There is nothing to add to what I have already fully covered in my original statement to your committee. See pages [14490] 35 and 36.

51. Did the Marshall message of the 27th of November not call for General Short to reply to the measures taken?

It did.

52. On page 47 you use the language "I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first step toward an ultimatum," are you there referring to the message of August 17, 1941, delivered to the Japanese Sunday morning, August 17, 1941, and was not that message an ultimatum if the United States desired to use it as such?

I believe I am referring to the message of August 17, 1941. I have not before me the text of that message, nor have I any recollection of having ever seen that text. I had heard such a warning discussed, but I do not even recollect with whom such discussion or discussions took place. They were nearly 5 years ago.

53. Is it not true that that message having been delivered that the Japanese had violated it in their movements south?

See answer to previous question.

54. Is it not true that the Japanese had violated the terms of the President's message of August 17, 1941, on Saturday, December 6, 1941, Washington time?

See answers to the previous two questions.

55. On page 56 of your memorandum to the committee, under date of November 28, you state that the final decision at that [14491] time was to send a speech to Congress and that the President asked Mr. Hull, Secretary Knox, and you to try to draft such papers. Did

you aid him in the drafting of these papers, and, if so, will you tell us where we might get copies, or can you furnish us with copies?

I worked on the drafting of some paragraphs, but I have no copies in my possession, nor do I know whether any such copies still exist. Such drafts as I made were not used.

56. With the situation gradually growing worse from November 28 to and including the 6th, what happened that the message was not given to Congress and the message to the Emperor of Japan was not sent until after we had received the 13 parts of the 14-part message indicating a rejection by the Japanese of our proposals of the 26th of November?

See answer to questions 38 and 42.

57. Referring to page 60 of your memorandum, you state the British were very much excited about it—will you state as to whether or not you had any contacts with the British on the 6th or 7th of December 1941?

I do not recollect that I personally had contacts with the British on either the 6th or the 7th of December 1941.

58. If so, state what information you received, or what information you gave to the British.

See answer to question 57.

59. On page 67 of your memorandum, being part 5 of Secretary [14492] Knox's suggestion, I call your attention to the statement "we should therefore be ready jointly to act together and if such understanding has not already been reached, it should be reached immediately." Do you know whether or not any understanding had been reached?

I know of no such understanding. The fact that Mr. Knox in his paper proposed the making of such an understanding confirms me in the belief that none existed.

60. State whether such an understanding was attempted and, if so, what was done toward arriving at such an understanding.

See answer to question 59.

61. Was such an understanding ever reached and, if so, when?

To answer such a question would require an examination of the minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff throughout the war. It was not my duty to follow such minutes and I have with me no other basis for refreshing my recollection. The long and harmonious co-operation throughout the war by our staff and the British staff would indicate that such an understanding was reached soon after we entered the war.

[14493] STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

Henry L. Stimson, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I have prepared the foregoing answers to interrogatories. The same are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

(Signed) HENRY L. STIMSON.

Sworn to before me this 23d day of April 1946.

[SEAL]

(Signed) Thomas de Rosa,
THOMAS DE ROSA,
Attorney and Counsellor at Law.

Office address: 32 Liberty St., N. Y. C. Residing in Bronx County. Bronx Co. Clks. No. 3, Reg. No. A183D7. N. Y. Co. Clks. No. 9, Reg. No. 439D7. Commission expires March 30, 1947

[14494] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether or not all we are going to do this morning is to put these things in the record? If so, there will be no necessity of my staying, and I have another committee meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. That is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. I have another hearing.

I do want the record to show how I feel, that the record should not be closed until we have had time to fill in the gaps, so as to make a complete record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Your statements on that subject will be a part of the record.

Go ahead, Mr. Lane.

Mr. LANE. Mr. Chairman, we have a draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in a memorandum by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in Exhibit No. 161.

We ask that this draft be marked "Exhibit No. 161-A" and spread in the exhibits of the committee record.

The CHAIRMAN. So received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 161-A.")

Mr. LANE. The log of the watch officer, Officer of Chief of Naval Operations, on the night of December 6, 1941, as shown in Exhibit No. 162, contains references by serial numbers to certain naval communications. Copies of these [14495] messages have been obtained from the Navy Department and we ask that they be received and marked "Exhibit No. 162-A."

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 162-A.")

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt again, because of my inability to be two places at once, I will ask to be excused.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you intimate that you prefer the other place to this one? (Laughter.)

Senator FERGUSON. No, Mr. Chairman. I have done all I can do on this committee but I still have a great interest in it. It is only because the hearing is for the purpose of putting in records that I ask to be excused.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I did write a letter on May 20, after our last meeting, in relation to certain facts that I thought we should get from the official records in the War Department. I wrote the letter to Mr. Richardson on May 20. He has the letter now and if we might consider that letter at the present time I would appreciate it.

(The text of the letter referred to by Senator Ferguson follows:)

UNITED STATES SENATE,

May 20, 1946.

Mr. SETH W. RICHARDSON,

*General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack, Senate Office Building.*

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: I have gone over the book *The Case Against the Admirals*, and it appears to me that we should have, for the record, the report on the bombing of the *Utah* in the fall of 1937. We should also have the program which was prepared by General Andrews and Colonel Knerr. The book states they prepared a program to submit to the War Department

calling for 108 B-17's for enlarging the Pacific Fleet so it would operate in the Pacific and also provided for training of men to cost \$21,000,000.

We should also have a copy of the budget of the Air Corps providing for this. We should also have the evidence showing why the War Department refused to submit the \$21,000,000 item to Congress.

I believe we should also secure copies of the letters from Colonel Knerr to the Senate on the B-17 program.

On page 64 of the book is this quotation:

"The War Department cannot approve the program for developing the the B-17's. Instead of the B-17 you are ordered to build a light, responsive, less-expensive type of bombardment plane with a range not to exceed 300 miles."

We should put this evidence from the War Department into the records.

Sincerely,

(S) HOMER FERGUSON.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it you want Mr. Richardson to produce?

Mr. RICHARDSON. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, at our last meeting a question arose with reference to the possible [14496] interrogation of General Knerr with reference to matters alleged to have taken place subsequent to 1937 in connection with the preparation of long distance bombers known as B-17's. This letter is the communication we received the 21st, I think, the day following the day it was written, requesting that this information be secured and put in the record.

The facts that are involved in the question are:

(1) A request for the report on the bombing of the *Utah*.

(2) The program referred to which was prepared by General Andrews and General Knerr.

(3) Copy of the Budget which asked for 21 million dollars for training.

(4) The evidence why the War Department refused to submit the item covering these long distance bombers to Congress.

(5) The Knerr letters to the Senate recommending the B-17 program and

(6) The War Department statement disapproving the B-17 program.

I am inclined to think that five of these six requests are documentary and probably could be furnished by a request appropriately submitted to the War Department. The fourth one, evidence of why the War Department refused to submit the item to Congress, would be directly controversial, of course, and would require the calling of witnesses.

[14497] Senator FERGUSON. I didn't mean to call witnesses on that; if there was anything in the files.

Mr. MURPHY. Wasn't the *Utah* incident in 1938?

Senator FERGUSON. 1937.

Mr. RICHARDSON. 1937 is the recital here.

Mr. MURPHY. Where was it bombed in 1937, in Pearl Harbor?

Senator FERGUSON. It was a test bombing on this whole B-17 idea.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The point of this request is, as stated before, the question of how far the committee wants to go into the question of why the military services were short of B-17 bombers, and it would be expected that this evidence, if it was developed and put in the record, would disclose that, who was responsible for opposing the building of those bombers, and thereby would have the responsibility for failure to have them in our air force during 1941 when the situation with Japan grew more tense.

That is the question involved in this picture.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I think that, in all fairness, if that were to go into the record that it would be necessary to go into a study of the defense strategy of the United States from 1937 on. We have a statement from General Marshall as to how much we actually had in the way of large bombers in the Service at December 7, 1941.

This letter purports to be based upon a book which was [14498] written by William Bradford Huie. Mr. Huie makes certain statements in this book that are open to challenge. I noticed a number of them that I think could be very easily refuted.

But at any rate, questions arise out of a reading of this particular book, which is one placed on the market in 1946.

He says, at page 162:

I suppose an objective discussion of the Marines is about as difficult to achieve as is an objective discussion of religion or Roosevelt.

That is the kind of a book it is.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the name of it?

Mr. MURPHY. The Case Against the Admirals.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee discussed this book at its last meeting in executive session in connection with the suggestion that certain people mentioned in the book be called as witnesses which, the committee felt, I think, in view of its action, would involve the committee going into a controversy that was raging in 1937 as to whether these B-17's should be ordered and an appropriation made for them.

The action of the committee in ordering the record and the hearings closed today seems to preclude the calling of these witnesses and, obviously, if the theory in this book is to be exploited, or explored, everybody mentioned in the book would have to be called here as a witness, or at least [14499] a certain number of them. Those against whom the book is written, being The Case Against the Admirals, would certainly have a right to be heard in defense of their own theory, and it is my feeling, and I think it was the feeling of the committee, by their action, that that not be gone into.

I don't think the committee can take any action based upon what is in that book.

I stated at the time that the writer of the book was not under oath, as was everybody else who testified here, and if any statements or any things mentioned in it, are to be brought in as evidence, certainly those making the statements would have to be sworn, like everybody else, and that would make impossible, and be utterly inconsistent with the order of the committee that the record should be closed today. That is what I am going by.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, it wasn't my desire to make this book a part of the record. I never even suggested that it be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no; I appreciate that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I did read the book and I found some facts in it, which I checked with officials in the War Department, and I found one particular fact, that the War Department could not approve the program for developing the B-17's, and instead of B-17's, were ordered to build a light, responsive, less expensive type of bombardment plane, [14500] with a range not to exceed 300 miles.

Now, it is my contention that on this record as it now stands that when our fleet was moved to Pearl Harbor, someone, somewhere, should have developed a defense for that fleet. If it had been properly developed and if it had been properly taken care of, then Pearl Harbor could not have happened. I take that as being one of the things that we were to look into.

Now, I did find in this book certain information which I thought should be brought to the attention of the committee to fill in certain gaps. We had a lot of testimony, it is no new subject, about taking the fleet to Pearl Harbor, and whether or not it was defended at Pearl Harbor. There was a lot in the record about who was to fly bombers out—whether they were to be flown out. The record shows that the reconnaissance was to be had. There is some doubt in the record as to who was to carry on that reconnaissance. Was it the fault of the Navy, was it the fault of the Army, or who in the Navy or who in the Army, or who somewhere else.

I merely want to get information for the record officially. I am not taking Huie's language. I don't want to put his language in. I want official files in the record so that the committee when it gets up its report may give to the American people all of the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it you are asking to be done now?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking that the War Department [14501] furnish these particular things which Mr. Richardson read. I understand that the committee has ruled against me, that they are closing the record, but I did write this before the hearing came on, so that we could get these official records and put them in the record. That is all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Masten just suggested to me, it would be possible, if the committee approves, to get whatever official records are involved in these inquiries presented to us, put them in shape, and that could be introduced in the record before the record was finally closed, without the necessity of additional testimony, or taking any particular time, except that at some time the committee would have to go in session, and do what they are doing this morning with reference to the exhibits. That could be done and it would only involve official records, apparently, from this request.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, couldn't you close the record today with permission to insert those at a later date?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Whatever the chairman thinks advisable.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee ordered the record closed today. I have to be governed by that action. If the record can be closed as of today I personally have no objection to these official documents being put in, as a part of today's record; but if they are to be brought in before another session of the committee and then be the basis for further [14502] requests, that is something else. We couldn't close the record on that basis.

The definite action of the committee last Thursday or Wednesday, whenever it was that we met, was that today would close the record and it would come to an end.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would like to ask the chairman whether he and the members of the committee would think it would be proper to close the record today as including these documents with the right to physically present the documents and put them in the record at some future date?

Senator FERGUSON. That would solve the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Not some future date; that they be put in the record as of today.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Because if we ever get to the point where we can meet to consider a report we have got to have the record completed. And we have got to ask for another extension of time, up to July 1, I am not going to ask it beyond that, to make this report.

But that would not, I suppose, violate the order of the committee. Any objection to it?¹

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether or not counsel is going to offer in evidence the letters of Colonel Stimson and the letters of Mr. Roosevelt in regard to the bomber program and the planes at Hawaii?

[14503] The CHAIRMAN. I don't know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no anticipation of offering them.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask that they be introduced, Mr. Chairman. We have had them for 6 months.

Mr. MASTEN. Senator Ferguson has requested that all the papers in the President's file that have not heretofore been put in the record, be included.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection that will be ordered.

Senator FERGUSON. The letters would be part of that.²

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. LANE. Exhibit No. 21 contains two dispatches dated December 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to the State Department. The dispatch dated at 3:05 p. m. that day refers to State Department Dispatch No. 5682, dated December 5, 1941, to the American Embassy, London. Copy of dispatch No. 5682 has been obtained from the State Department and we ask that it be received and marked "Exhibit No. 166."

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 166.")

Mr. LANE. The State Department file copy of the document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941; statement to the press on that date, by the State Department, relating to delivery of the [14504] document; the State Department press release No. 585, dated December 7, 1941, concerning delivery and text of the document; and a memorandum dated December 2, 1941, concerning the President's remarks as his press conference on that date, relating to delivery of the document, have been compiled, and we ask they be marked and received as Exhibit No. 167.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 167.")

Mr. LANE. A compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed *modus vivendi*, which documents supplement those introduced as Exhibit No. 18, has been prepared. We ask that these documents be received and marked "Exhibit No. 168."

¹ The information requested was subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 183."

² See "Exhibit No. 179," subsequently introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 168.")

Mr. LANE. A compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between August 6 and December 8, 1941, has been prepared, and we ask that they be received and marked "Exhibit No. 169."

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 169.")

[14505] Mr. LANE. Exhibit No. 140 contains certain documents introduced in connection with testimony relating to the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short. At the request of the committee at page 8594 of the transcript, a comprehensive review of the War Department file has been made and a compilation of documents concerning the retirement of General Short, and related matters, has been made, and we ask that this material be received and marked "Exhibit No. 170."

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 170.")

Mr. LANE. Pursuant to committee request at page 8649 of the transcript, the Navy Department has furnished a compilation of documents from departmental records concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. We ask that this compilation be received and marked "Exhibit No. 171."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So received.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 171.")

Mr. LANE. At page 12991 of the transcript, reference was made to material handled under lend-lease to foreign countries. Additional compilations have been made by the War and Navy Departments on request of counsel, concerning planes and guns produced and their distribution from February 1 to [14506] November 30, 1941. We ask that this compilation be received and marked "Exhibit No. 172."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So received.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 172.")

Mr. LANE. The War Department has furnished a translation of the memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan. These documents are reported to have been turned over to a representative of the United States Army in Japan by Prince Konoye, subsequent to the Japanese surrender. We ask that this translation be received and marked "Exhibit No. 173".

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 173.")

Mr. LANE. From numerous documents submitted by the State Department and examined by some members of the committee, a number of miscellaneous documents were requested for inclusion in the record. A compilation of these documents has been made, they are somewhat voluminous, and we ask that the compilation be received and marked "Exhibit No. 174".

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So received.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 174.")

Mr. LANE. The Secretary of Navy by memorandum dated December 5, 1941, and the Secretary of War by letter dated [14507]

December 6, 1941, submitted estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State, for delivery to the President. We ask that this compilation be received and marked "Exhibit No. 175."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So received.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 175.")

Mr. LANE. At pages 13953 and 13956 of the transcript request was made for the compilation of data reported to have been requested of the Navy Department by the Secretary of War to be delivered to the Secretary of War on the morning of December 7, 1941. This data reportedly concerned the location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific and the Far East. The War Department Liaison Office has obtained a copy of such a compilation dated as of December 7, 1941, which is apparently the document in question.

We ask that this document be received and marked "Exhibit No. 176."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 176.")

Mr. LANE. Senator Ferguson has requested that documents obtained from the State Department, dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding, be made a [14508] part of the record. This compilation has been made and we ask that it be received and marked "Exhibit No. 177."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 177.")

Mr. LANE. A compilation of documents from Ambassador Grew to the State Department and the President, and attached memoranda has been made, and we ask that it be received and marked "Exhibit No. 178."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit 178.")

Mr. LANE. A selection of documents from the files of the late President Roosevelt, which were forwarded to the committee by Miss Grace Tully last November, in response to committee request for all material in the late President's files relating to Japan and the Far East, in 1941, has been obtained.

At the request of Senator Ferguson, we ask that these documents be received and marked "Exhibit No. 179." It should be noted that in addition to these documents there are some 500 pages of other documents from the President's files already in the record. With the introduction of this material, everything furnished by Miss Tully will be in the committee record. We ask that this material be marked "Exhibit No. 179."

[14509] The VICE CHAIRMAN. So received.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 179.")

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record show that the committee is aware of the fact that about three-fifths of this material has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor but is only being introduced because it was a part of the sum total of material furnished by Miss Tully. It has to do with elections in the Philippines, about differences with the Commissioner and Mr. Quezon, and about some

matters in connection with General MacArthur, and about who is going to be named Governor in Hawaii, none of which data has any pertinence to this inquiry, and the only reason I do not object is that they are part of the files furnished by the White House.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel may proceed.

Mr. LANE. The Army and the Navy have presented to the committee organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington and Hawaii. They are large charts, and we ask that they be received and marked "Exhibit No. 180."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So received.

(The charts were marked "Exhibit No. 180.")

Mr. LANE. With reference to Exhibits Nos. 117 and 117-A, which have been introduced, we wish that a letter dated February 4, 1941, from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, [14510] to various officers under his command, be spread upon the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Be so ordered.

(The letter referred to follows:)

[14511] A4-1/VZ
A4-3/VZ/(0195)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., Feb. 4, 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Battle Force.

Commander Scouting Force.

Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

Commander Aircraft Battle Force.

Commander Patrol Wing TWO

Subject: Aircraft in Hawaiian Area, maximum readiness of.

1. Many matters of Fleet material readiness are susceptible of improvement. I heartily endorse all effort, past and future, to obtain approval of and accomplish expeditious action on these things. Meanwhile, the Fleet must be prepared at any given time to employ, with maximum effectiveness, all components as they actually exist.

2. There is a definite line of demarkation between this objective and longer range planning. The latter has its proper sphere and must be continued as an essential basis for determining and stressing improved readiness requirements. This planning will naturally include the more effective schemes of employment that improved readiness, when attained, will permit.

3. Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on any recommendation for, or expectation of, improved conditions [14512] or facilities. Such plans must be based only on hard fact. They must be so developed as to provide for immediate action, based on facilities and materials that are now available.

4. A subject emphatically calling for attention in line with the foregoing is maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor defense, of all all available aviation components. As is well known, much remains to be done for adequate future effectiveness in this respect. Much, however, can now be done with means now available, to make arrangements for local employment of aviation more effective than they now are.

5. I propose, as a first step in direct action on this subject, to call a conference at an early date with the addressees of this letter. I desire that appropriate preliminary studies be initiated at once; discussion may be had with Army authorities subject to the understanding that preliminary agreements must be confirmed by the senior officers of the respective services in this area. As a guide in such studies, intended in no way to exclude consideration of any other proposals that may occur to those concerned, a brief outline is appended. I consider these features to be the most obvious steps toward making the best use of everything that is now available for the purpose:

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(a) *Joint Air Exercises.* Desirability of intensified attention to this subject. Frequency and [14513] scope. Degree of coordination. Improvement along practical lines.

(b) *Communications.* Fully satisfactory communications between all Army and Navy air activities, both in the air and on the ground. Direct and instantaneous communications, in particular, between all Army and Navy air fields. Continuation of and renewed stress upon joint communication exercises.

(c) *Air Command.* Determination of responsibility and degree under various conditions. Arrangements between the two services for such direct exercise of air control as may be necessary.

(d) *Landing Fields, Mutual Use.* "Scattering" plans, including dispersion of patrol planes. Familiarization of Navy and Army aircraft personnel with one another's landing fields and facilities, including actual practice in mutual use and servicing.

(e) *Aircraft Recognition and Familiarization.* Recognition signals between air and ground. Familiarization of all personnel—air, ground and ship—with all local Navy and Army types.

(f) *Alert Watches.* Determination of suitable alert watch conditions. Requirements for all naval aircraft types. Size and composition of watches. Watches with and without ship-based planes present. Conservation of [14514] personnel and material.

(g) *Armament and Re-armament.* Plans for adequate accomplishment with means now available. Ready storage. Speed. Replenishment.

(h) *Alarm and Detection.* Effective and instantaneous air alarm arrangements. Detection by RADAR (and otherwise) and tracking of enemy planes. Possible restriction of own planes to specific operating areas for this purpose. Similarly, control of air traffic approaches.

H. E. KIMMEL.

P. C. CROSLY, *Flag Secretary.*

Mr. LANE. We have four documents from the files of the State Department which we desire to add to the record. They consist of: A memorandum of conversation dated December 5, 1941 between Secretary of State and the British Ambassador concerning cooperation with the Dutch East Indies against the Japanese;

A dispatch dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Grew to the State Department;

A dispatch dated December 6, 1941 from the State Department to the American Ambassador to Chungking; and

A dispatch dated December 7, 1941 from the State Department to Ambassador Grew.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So received.

[14515] (The matter referred to follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Date: DECEMBER 5, 1941

Subject: Cooperation with Dutch East Indies against Japan.

Participants: Secretary of State Hull and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax.
Copies to:

The British Ambassador called at my apartment by his request.

He said he had a message from Eden, head of the British Foreign Office, setting forth the British view that the time has now come for immediate cooperation with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding. This of course relates to the matter of defense against Japan.

I expressed my appreciation.

C. H.

S CH: MA

[Copy]

MA

Tokyo

Dated December 8, 1941

Rec'd. 6:58 a. m., 10th

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before [14516] being communicated to anyone. (br)

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

Triple priority.

1906, December 8, 1 a. m.

Confidential.

Department's 818, December 6, 9 p. m., was received and decoded late this evening and I was able to see the Foreign Minister immediately thereafter at 12:15 a. m., when I requested an audience with the Emperor at the earliest possible moment in order to communicate the President's message directly. The Minister said that he would present my request to the throne and would communicate with me thereafter. I read to him and left with him a copy of the message.

GREW.

HTM

[Telegram sent]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, December 6, 1941. 9 p. m.

AM. EMBASSY,

Chungking (China).

[14517] 286

Triple priority.

Confidential.

Please communicate, in person if feasible, at the earliest possible moment to Chiang Kai-shek for his confidential information a copy of a message which the President is sending to the Emperor of Japan, reading as follows:

QUOTE (Telegraph Section: Insert here the text of the attached message from the President to the Emperor of Japan beginning with the words SUBQUOTE Almost a century ago END SUBQUOTE to the end of page five including the President's name) UNQUOTE.

In communicating copy of this message to Chiang Kai-shek, please state orally as from the President that the quoted message has already been sent by the President to the Emperor; that this message, as the situation now stands, would seem to represent very nearly the last diplomatic move that this Government can make toward causing Japan to desist from its present course; that if the slender chance of acceptance by Japan should materialize, a very effective measure would have been taken toward safeguarding the Burma Road; and that it is very much hoped that Chiang Kai-shek will not make or allow to be spread in Chinese Government circles adverse comment.

/s/ Hull.
SKH

FE:MMH:REK FE PA/H

[Telegram sent]

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, December 7, 1941, Midnite.

AM. EMBASSY,

Tokyo (Japan).

Triple priority. 823

The Department has been informed by the War Department that at 8:00 a. m. today (Honolulu time) fifty or more Japanese dive-bombing planes, presumably from an aircraft carrier, dropped bombs in and around Honolulu. According

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to unconfirmed radio reports, the Japanese Government has declared war against the United States and Great Britain.

At 1:00 p. m. on December 7 the Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment with the Secretary of State. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu were received at 2:20 p. m. The Ambassador opened the conversation by saying that he was sorry that he had been delayed as his instructions were to deliver the paper which he then handed the Secretary at 1:00 p. m., but that owing to inability to decode the message he had been delayed. After reading two or three pages of the paper the Secretary asked the Ambassador whether it was presented under instructions of the Japanese Government. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative. The Secretary thereupon read the remainder of the paper after [14519] which he made to the Ambassador a brief statement emphatically critical of the contents of the document.

The Japanese representatives then took their leave without comment.

/s/ Hull.
SKH

FE:MWS/RLS:HES FE

Mr. LANE. In the testimony of Captain Zacharias at page 8734, a question arose as to certain purported orders to Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey. The Navy has responded to our request by a memorandum dated May 3, 1946, and we ask that the Navy reply be spread upon the record, together with the request.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14520] 1083A; R #145

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Washington, 3 May 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson, referred to and forwarded in your memorandum of 31 January 1946, that there be obtained a copy of the orders purporting to delay the return to Pearl Harbor in December 1941 of Task Force Eight under Admiral Halsey, as mentioned in the testimony of Captain Zacharias (Record of Proceedings Page 8734), careful and thorough searches for the period 28 November to 7 December 1941 have been made of the files of the Navy Department and of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Task Force Eight was required by order to be off Wake on 3 December 1941, but there were no orders to it to reduce speed nor any other directive to it to delay its return to Pearl Harbor.

(S) JOHN FORD BAECHER,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.

JANUARY 31, 1946.

Memorandum to Admiral Colclough

In the course of his testimony at page 8734 of the Committee transcript, Captain Zacharias refers to the fact that [14521] Halsey's Task Force was originally scheduled to arrive back in Pearl Harbor on the fifth of December, 1941, but was delayed by fueling and weather and "now I know because of certain orders which did not speed us up."

At the request of Senator Ferguson, it would be very much appreciated if you would secure the orders to which Captain Zacharias refers to above.

S. W. RICHARDSON, Counsel.

SWR:MBB

Mr. LANE. In response to a request of counsel of the Navy Department concerning a memorandum prepared regarding the dissemination of Magic material and the submission of the raw material to the

President, the Navy Department under memorandum dated May 23, 1946, has replied to counsel's request and we ask that the reply be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

[14522] 1070/JFB:ms; R. #185

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Washington, 23 May 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of the first and second paragraph of your memorandum of 17 May 1946, a search has been made of the pertinent official files of the Navy without success to find the memorandum dated 12 November 1941, prepared by Captain A. D. Kramer, U. S. N., entitled "Dissemination to White House," which you state was referred to by Captain L. S. Safford in his testimony or digest in the so-called Clarke Investigation conducted by the Army of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. A copy of the paper obtained from Captain Safford is forwarded herewith, though because of the failure to find the original, it has not been possible to check its accuracy.

The memorandum in question was a rough handwritten paper by Captain Kramer for his possible future reference and not an official document of the Navy of or concerning the events or conclusions referred to therein.

(S) JOHN FORD BAECHER,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.

[14523] Confidential

DISSEMINATION TO WHITE HOUSE

7 Nov. '41 Gen. Sherman Miles (G2) at 1600 called Capt. Wilkinson (DNI). I was called in on the subject question. In reply to Miles' inquiry I explained as follows:

G-2	ONI
JAN	FEB
MAR	APR
MAY	JUNE
JULY	AUG
SEPT	OCT
NOV	

A. Through spring of '41 (G-2) (Bratton) and ONI had followed the signed agreement of Jan. '41.

B. A combination of the following factors led to G-2 not sending anything to the White House after May '41:

1. Loss of Memo #9 by State in March.
2. German report to Japs of leakage in April and the resulting clampdown on security.

3. G-2 lack of confidence in Gen. Watson's ideas of security, particularly due to the absolute necessity thereof after 1 and 2 above, and because of the fact that earlier in the spring one Memo to the White House was found by Col. Bratton in Gen. Watson's wastebasket.

4. The feeling of G-2 that almost with- [14524] out exception the subject of the Memos and traffic was State business anyway, and the matters should therefore be properly taken up with the White House by State, rather than being sent directly.

C. During June, when the new Naval Aide to the President (Beardall) came, he had taken the O. N. I. memos over as per agreement. In July I continued to show things to him in original form to keep him informed and also because he specifically requested this, since the President at times was asking him about points appearing in this material.

D. Toward the end of September (G-2 having sent nothing to the White House) Beardall stated the President wanted to see the material I was showing him (Beardall). I informed DNI, explaining that G-2 permission must be

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obtained in accordance with the agreement. With DNI's permission I contacted Col. Bratton and got his O. K.

E. During October (ONI dissemination duty), only the "memos" went.

F. Several times between 1 Nov. and 7 Nov. (today) Capt. Beardall was shown original material. On Friday noon, 7 Nov., he asked to have a number of them to take. I reminded him that November was Army's month for dissemination. He acknowledged this and stated he had so informed Mr. Roosevelt, but Roosevelt had directed him to bring it anyway. I told him I would get DNI and G-2 permission.

General Miles then said G-2 was beginning again to disseminate to the White House. I indicated that my concern was to comply with the agreement, and particularly to avoid duplicating via the Naval Aide anything which G-2 might send. This could be done by keeping in daily touch with Col. Bratton on what he was sending to the White House. In fact, the Naval Aides could be entirely eliminated during G-2's months and adhere strictly to the agreement, by having ONI request G-2 to send anything Capt. Beardall felt should go. Gen. Miles agreed and stated that he [14526] would confer with Gen. Watson on the matter.

7 Nov. 1630 I saw Capt. Beardall, to show him today's material, and explain what had developed in the above talk. He elucidated further by saying that when he had informed the President, in reply to a request for material, that it was Army's month for dissemination, the President said he understood that, and was in fact either seeing or being told about the material through Hull. However, he desired to see the material via Beardall anyway. Beardall expressed the opinion to me that President grasps things more rapidly visually than orally, and therefore, wanted to see the material in addition to getting it from Hull.

7 Nov. 1700 I informed Capt. Wilkinson of the above. He indicated he was going to pass it on to Miles.

10 Nov. 1230 I saw Beardall with today's material. He informed me that a conference between him, Miles, Watson (and another?) had agreed to Beardall alone handling [14527] dissemination to the White House.

10 Nov. 1630 Saw DNI with today's material. He had already been informed of the above and directed that I comply therewith.

12 Nov. 1615 Started routine of giving Beardall the day's material for transmission to the President, in compliance with the above outlined modification to the signed agreement of Jan. '41 between G-2 and ONI.

A. D. KRAMER.

12 Nov. 1941.

Mr. LANE. By memorandum dated May 23, 1946, the Navy Department has furnished a reply to the inquiry appearing at pages 271-273 of the transcript and at page 6144 of the transcript regarding orders issued to Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson as noted in the October 10, 1942, issue of the Saturday Evening Post. We ask that that reply be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Washington, 23 May 1946.

[14528] 1070/JFB:ms; R. #102

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Congressman Gearhart (Record of Proceedings, pages 271-273, and 6144), referred to in item 2 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, in respect of statements made by Lieutenant Clarence E. Dickinson in the 16 October 1942 issue of The Saturday Evening Post, concerning orders under which he flew an airplane from the U. S. S. *Enterprise* while it was engaged in the mission of Task Force 8 from Pearl Harbor to Wake Island and return, 28 November-7 December 1941, it has been ascertained that on 28 November 1941,

the date the Task Force departed Pearl Harbor, then Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander, Task Force 8, sent to his command the following signal:

"Current operations involve necessity readiness for instant action."

This signal was received by the U. S. S. *Enterprise*, which was the flagship of Task Force 8. It would be usual Navy practice, and may be assumed, that the substance of the signal [14529] was communicated to all of the pilots who flew planes from the *Enterprise* during the mission.

[s] O. S. COLCLOUGH
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

Mr. LANE. Under date of May 22, 1946, the Navy Department has furnished a reply in response to the request of Senator Ferguson at pages 12792 and 12793 of the transcript concerning the so-called History written in 1942 of the activity of the Communications Unit of the Navy, which was testified about by Admiral Hart in connection with conversations between Captain Safford and himself.

We ask that this reply be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14530]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 22 May 1946.

1070/JFB:ms

R. #179

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Pages 12792-12793, 12862 and 12875), referred to in Item 18 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there is enclosed a copy of all of the references to and of all messages quoted concerning the Winds Code in the compilation or so-called "history" written in 1942 of the activity of the Communications Unit, which Admiral Hart testified was seen by him in connection with the incidents involving or conversation between Captain Safford and himself in respect of the Winds Code or any execute thereof.

The references in the commentary or explanatory paragraphs in the enclosure to Japanese messages are to only those intercepts which are also quoted therein, viz: JD-1: 6875, JD-1: 6850, JD-1: 6985 and JD-1: 7148.

The statement in the last commentary or explanatory paragraph, which is that preceding the quotation of JD-1: 7148, that there were "other reference to the United States in [14,531] texts not available now," is an obvious confusion of the Winds Code and the Hidden Word Code. It was made in connection with the "Hidden Word" Japanese message of 7 December 1941 (Tokyo Circular No. 2494) JD-1: 7148, in the first translation of which there was omitted the reference to the United States conveyed by the Japanese code word "Minami." A thorough search of the files of the cognizant activity of the Navy has failed to reveal any other message received prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor containing any reference to the United States in the Winds Code or the Hidden Word Code.

All of the messages referred to and quoted in the enclosure appear in Exhibit 1 of the Congressional Investigation, at pages as follows:

Tokyo Circular #2353 (JD-1: 6875) Page 154.
Tokyo Circular #2354 (JD-1: 6850) Page 155.
Tokyo Circular #2409 (JD-1: 6985) Pages 186-188.
Tokyo Circular #2494 (JD-1: 7148) Page 251.

(S) JOHN FORD BAECHER,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.

Encl (1).

[14,532]

* * * * *

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* * * "Instructions for secret broadcast signals to indicate critical relations with the United States, Russia, and Britain, were sent out from Tokyo."

* * * "A plain Japanese weather broadcast on December 7 indicated that Japanese relations with England and the United States would be broken off."

* * * "Secret codes for emergency messages in the regular short wave broadcasts from Tokyo were now issued by the Japanese. All of them dealt with the rupture of relations between Japan and other countries."

From: Tokyo Circular #2353, Nov. 19, 1941.
To: Washington, J19.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In the case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger—HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East wind rain).

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI— [14533] (North wind cloudy.)

(3) Japan-British relations: HISHI NO KAZE HARE—(West wind clear.)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and last sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

JD-1: 6875 Navy Translation
11-28-41

From: Tokyo Circular #2354, Nov. 19, 1941.
To: Washington, J19.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI."

(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA."

(3) Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI)—"NISHI."

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

JD-1: 6850 Navy Translation
11-28-41

* * * "An interesting dispatch, which contained much valuable [14534] information for the decryption purposes of U. S. Navy Radio Intelligence was the subsequent one. Note the tone of finality in all the special messages."

From: Tokyo Circular #2409, Nov. 27, 1941.

To: Washington, J19 (in 4 parts—complete).

(Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324).

(Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message.)

(Part I)

Handle as Chief of Office Routing.

With international relations becoming more strained, the following Ingo Denpo (hidden words, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

Example. A message meaning:

"Japan and USSR military have clashed", will read "HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, Clerks, have been both ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) STOP (end spell.)"

[14535] In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word STOP will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARI" (end) will not be used.)

(Part 2)

Code word and meaning:

ARIMURA: Code communications prohibited.

ASAI: Communications will be by radio broadcasts.

ASAKURA: Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.

ASIKAGA: Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.

ASUMA: Pressure on Japan increasing continually.

EDOGUTY: Prepare for evacuation.

HANABUSA: Preparations for evacuation have been completed.

HANAZONO (?): Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (or Consul) there.

HATAKEYAMA: Relations between Japan and ----- have been severed.

[14536] HATTORI: Relations between Japan and ----- are not in accordance with expectations.

(Part 3)

HIZIKATA: Japan's and -----'s military forces have clashed.

HOZINO: Japan and ----- are entering a full fledged general war.

IBARAGI: Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations between Japan and the country to which you are accredited.

INAGAKI: Have you ----- the ----- matter?

ISHIKAWA: I have ----- the ----- matter.

KASHIWAGI: We are commencing *military action*? against -----.

KOBAYAKAWA: Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan, to persons of ----- nationality.

KODAMA: Japan.

KOMIYAMA: China.

KOYANAGI: England.

KUBOTA: U. S. S. R.

KURIBARA: France?

KUSONOKI: Germany.

[14537] MATUTANI: Italy.

MIWATA: Canada.

MINAMI: U. S. A.

MIYAZAKI: Mexico.

MOROKOSI: Brazil.

MOTIZUKI: Panama.

NAGAMINE: Argentina.

MAKAZATO: Thailand.

NANGO: French Indochina.

NEGI (?): Netherlands East Indies.

OGAWA: Burma.

OKAMOTO: Malaya.

OKUMURA: Australia.

ONIZOKA: Union of *South Africa* (?).

ONODERA: Enemy country.

OTANI: ? (Possibly: friendly or allied country?).

ONISI: Year.

SIMANAKA: Day (?).

SAKAKIBARA: (Tsuki) Month.

SIGENO I: (Ke) Paragraph.

SANZYO: (Toki) time.

ITIRO: 1.

NISAKU: 2.

SANTARO: 3.

YORI: 4

[14538] Goro: 5.

Masaroku: 6.

Simetaro: 7.

Yasokiti: 8.

Hisamatu: 9.

Atumi: 0.

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* * * "The first one (Dispatch on 7 December) was in plain Japanese, but used the weather code, which signified the breaking off of diplomatic relations. Though this refers to England, other references were made to the United States in texts not available now.

From: Tokyo Circular #2494, Dec. 7, 1941.

To: (Circular telegram.)

(Plain Japanese language using code names.)

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

JD-1: 7148 Navy Translation

12-7-41"

[14539] Mr. LANE. By memorandum dated May 16, 1946, the Navy Department in compliance with the request of Congressman Cooper at page 10738 of the Record of Proceedings has furnished a smooth copy of a study made by Captain Kramer of certain translations of Japanese intercepts.

We ask that this be spread on the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14540]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 16 May 1946.

1083A(HLB)

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In compliance with the request of Vice Chairman Cooper at page 10738 of the Record of Proceedings, referred to in item 14 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, Captain Kramer has prepared, and there is forwarded herewith, a smooth copy of the study made by him of the times of delivery to the White House of certain translations of Japanese intercepts.

/s/ John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

[14641]

JD #	Origin	Date	Tran.	Page in Ex. 1 or Transcript	Subject & Army Number	Delivered by Navy
7137	B-T #1421	12/ 5	12/6 N	11215	Gave Germans dope on U. S. negotiation. Think we should tell them re Konoye note.	First message of block delivered about noon 6 December.
7138	B-T #1408	12/ 3	12/6 N	11217	(Re 7132) Re-Rostov and Rommel.	} Eve 6 December.
39	W-T #1261	12/ 5	12/6 N	235	Hull-Kurusu-Nom talk on 5th.	
40	T-W #896	12/ 5	12/6 N	234	(Re 7051) Have Terasaki etc. leave in next few days. **My footnote re Terasaki.	
41	W-T #1262	12/ 5	12/6 N	11225	(Re 7140) Want to keep Terasaki for present.	
42	T-W #897	12/ 6	12/6 A	237	Re code machines, keep one I meant (25835)	
43	T-W #902 (Parts 1-13)	12/ 6	12/6 N	239	Jap Note parts 1-13 (25843)	
43	T-W #902 (Part 14)	12/ 7	12/7 N	245	Jap Note part 14 (25843)	0815-1000 7 December.
44	T-W #904	12/ 6	12/6 A	245	Re Typist (25844)	} 1030-1100 7 December.
45	T-W #907	12/ 7	12/7 A	248	1 P. M. msg (25850)	
46	T-W #908	12/ 7	12/7 A	248	Thanks to 2 Ambassadors (25853)	
47	T-W #910	12/ 7	12/7 A	249	Destroy all codes and papers (25854)	
7148	T-Circ #2494	12/ 7	12/7 N	251	Rel. Bet. Jap & Eng. (Hidden Word Code)	
49	T-W #901	12/ 6	12/6 A	238	Pilot Msg (25838)	} PM 7 December.
50	T-W #905	12/ 6	12/7 A	10745	AP-UP reports re FDR msg to Emperor (25857)	
51	T-W #909	12/ 7	12/7 A	248	Thanks to Emb staff (25858)	
7152	Rio-T #460	11/15	12/7 N	-----	Re planes to Africa	

**No footnote in original.

5482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[14542] Mr. LANE. The request of Senator Ferguson at page 13966 and Congressman Keefe at page 13996 concerning data appearing on the log dated December 6, 1941, kept by the Navy Department operations watch officer, now Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover, USN, has been replied to by the Navy Department, and we ask that the information contained therein be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Be so ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14543] 1083 A
R. #168

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington 26 April 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to the requests of Senator Ferguson and Congressman Keefe (Record of Proceedings), Pages 13966 and 13996, respectively) inquiry was made of Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover, U. S. Navy, by dispatch #152019 of April 1946 to ascertain his recollection in respect of the item (read into the Record of Proceedings at Pages 13946-13947) written by him in the log of the Operations Watch Officer on the night of 6 December 1941 at 2000, and his reply by dispatch #160636 of April 1946 has been received. Photographic copies of each of these dispatches are forwarded herewith.

Rear Admiral Glover is not the holder of any records in respect of the incident noted in the log. It will be noted that while he remembers contacting Admiral H. R. Stark at the latter's home between 000 and 0200 concerning the southern movement of the Japanese convoy that ultimately landed near Kota Baru yet he states he is unable to recall the 2000 of 6 December 1941 incident noted in the log, but that he suggests a possible additional source of information in the form of a "log kept by the Ship Movement Division." [14544] A search has been instituted to identify and locate any such "log," and also to obtain the other information in respect of the incident noted in the log which would be responsive to the further requests of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Pages 13953 and 13956), referred to in Items #2 and #3 of your memorandum of 19 April 1946. As of the present time these searches have not been successful but they are not yet completed. You will be advised by subsequent memorandum of such event and of the ultimate results.

JOHN FORD BAECHE,
Commander, USNR.

NAVAL COMMUNICATION

From: SECNAV (JAG)
To: COMAIRPAC
Date: 15 APR 1946
152019
Restricted

For Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover USN X in congressional investigation of Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor question has arisen as to whereabouts of Admiral H. R. Stark on night 6 December 1941 and Admiral Stark cannot recollect that detail X Log of OPNAV duty officer for 6 dash 7 December 1941 indicates you stood watch from 1900 to 0200 X This log contains over your signature the following entry quote at 2000 [14545] Major F. L. Harrison comma aide to the Secretary of War comma telephoned that the Secretary of War desired the following information by 0900 Sunday 7 December colon compilation of men of war in Far East comma British comma American comma Japanese comma Dutch comma Russian comma also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific fleet comma with locations comma and a list of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without locations X Admirals Ingersoll comma Stark and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000 Sunday 7 December unquote X This entry does not recall to Admiral Stark any recollection as to his whereabouts X He accepts the item but think it may possibly be inaccurate because he cannot see why it would have been necessary to have consulted all three paren Ingersoll himself and Knox paren in the matter referred to X

Advise by dispatch as soon as possible whether you recollect consulting Admiral Stark as indicated comma as well as the manner in which and the approximate time you contacted him and where he was located when reached by you X

From: COMAIRPAO 160636
To: SEC
P (JAG) WASHN D C
Restricted X

[14546] I regret that I am unable to recall the incident referred to in your 152019 X Information of the nature requested by the Secretary of War was normally compiled by the so-called quote War Room unquote which was then a new section of the Ship Movements Division of OPNAV X This section was headed by Captain Frank Leighton now deceased X Events of importance originating from the War Room were entered in the log kept by the Ship Movement Division X It is possible that Capt Leighton was the consultant X I do remember very definitely having telephoned Admiral Stark during the night concerning the movements of a Japanese convoy which was west of the Philippines headed south X This was the convoy that made the initial landing on the Malay Peninsula near Kota Bharu X I am certain that this call was made after midnight as it was toward the end of the watch and that Admiral Stark was then at his home X From Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover X

1083 A
R. # 173

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 7 May 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to the requests of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Pages 13,953 and 13,956) referred to [14547] in Items #2 and #3 of your memorandum of 11 April 1946, a thorough search, as heretofore indicated in the memorandum to you from the undersigned dated 26 April 1946 (1083A R #168), has been made of the pertinent files of the Navy Department to locate the data or document in respect of the compilation of ship locations requested by the Secretary of War on 6 December 1941 as noted in the ~~2000~~ entry in the log of the watch officer of Naval Operations and for the records used to give that information to the Secretary of War. The search has now been completed but with negative results.

There was found, however, a copy of a statement of locations of U. S. Naval forces and foreign naval forces as of 7 December 1941, which on comparison is found to be in part the same as or a copy of and in other parts to contain information substantially identical with that stated in the similar document found in the files of the War Department on the outside sheet of which there appears the notation "Secnav (2) 1000."¹ A study of the two documents indicates that the one found in the files of the Army is most probably a copy of that which was prepared in pursuance of the request noted in the watch officer's log, and which probably was delivered in duplicate to Secretary of the Navy Knox and by him a copy to Secretary Stimson at their conference at 1000 on 7 December 1941, while that now found in the files of the Navy was either a subsequently typed document of the same date or more probably [14548] the rough draft on which was based the final draft of the document delivered to the Secretary of the Navy. A copy of the document which has been found in the files of the Navy is forwarded herewith.

Information of the nature reflected in ship location summaries such as those referred to above is based on dispatches and other internal Navy intelligence as to the locations and movements of United States ships, and on Intelligence Reports and Estimates such as are in the Record of the Congressional Investigation as to foreign ships.

(Sgd) John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHEER,
Commander, USNR.

¹ See exhibit No. 176 for document from War Department files.

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Mr. LANE. Congressman Murphy, at page 7496 of the transcript, requested copies of any report that, after a trial, a plan for readiness of aircraft at Hawaii was abandoned due to wear on planes and crews. Under date of May 8, 1946, the Navy Department has replied to this request and we request that the reply be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14549] 1070/JFB:ms R. #182

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 8 May 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In compliance with the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings, Page 7496), referred to in Item #7 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, a thorough search has been made of the pertinent files of the Navy Department for a report submitted by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, to the effect that because of the wear and tear on airplane crews and planes there was abandoned after a few days trial at some indefinite time prior to 7 December 1941, a plan whereby all Army and Navy planes, including pursuit planes but excepting search planes, should be warmed up, manned, and ready to take off before sunrise to ~~0800~~, and for one hour before and after sunset. No such report could be found.

(Sgd.) John Ford Beacher,
JOHN FORD BEACHER,
Commander, USNR.

[14550] Mr. LANE. Senator Ferguson at page 13527-13529 of the record requested copies of any message sent by Capt. John Creighton, Naval Observer at Singapore, to Admiral T. C. Hart, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 4, 5, or 6 December 1941, concerning the sighting of a Japanese convoy south of Siam.

Under date of May 10, 1946, the Navy Department has replied to this request and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14551] 1070/JFB:ms R. #180

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 10 May 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Pages 13527-13529), referred to in Item #20 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, a thorough search has been made of the files of the cognizant activity of the Navy Department for the message which Captain John Creighton testified was sent by him on 4, 5, or 6 December 1941 from Singapore to Admiral T. C. Hart in respect of information received from the pilot of a British reconnaissance plane that a Japanese convoy had been sighted south of the south point of Siam, headed west, and that Japanese fighter planes had taken off from a Japanese carrier in the escort to prevent the British plane from approaching the convoy. No message containing such information could be found in the files of the Navy Department.

(Sgd.) John Ford Beacher,
JOHN FORD BEACHER,
Commander, USNR.

[14552] Mr. LANE. A request of Senator Lucas, at page 152 of the transcript, concerns long distance reconnaissance from Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, 1941. The Navy Department, under date of May 2, 1946, has replied to that request, and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Be so ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

[14553] 1083A, R #101, R #122.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington 2 May 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to the request of Senator Lucas (Record of Proceedings, Page 152), the regular air search including the dawn patrol of the fleet operating areas from Oahu was first prescribed on 15 February 1941, by Paragraph 3 (B) (1) of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 of that date, and was put into effect on 25 February 1941, by Paragraph 2 of Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1CM-41, of that date.

There are enclosed photographic copies of (1) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, dated 15 February 1941, and (2) Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1CM-41, dated 25 February 1941.

(s) John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

[14554] Cinepac File No. A211/FF1/A4-3/QL/(0271).

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., February 15, 1941.

Confidential

Destroyed Cy #5

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Fleet.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference: (a) U. S. Fleet Conf. Letter No. 8CL-40.

(b) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).

(c) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 9L-40.

(d) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.

(e) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.

(f) Section 4, Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian Area may reasonably be based on two assumptions:

(A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

(1) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor.

[14555] (2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(B) That a declaration of war might be preceded by;

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.

(3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part or in their entirety as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

(A) *Maintain continuous patrols:*

(1) Channel Entrance plus a ready duty destroyer moored near coal dock.

(2) Boom.

(3) Harbor.

(B) *Intermittent patrols:*

(1) *Patrol Wing TWO* shall search assigned operating areas and vicinity prior to entry therein by operating forces and in early morning on subsequent days.

(2) *An off-shore destroyer patrol* of three destroyers beginning twelve hours prior to the sortie and/or entry of heavy ships to search that part of the circle of a [14556] radius of ten miles from the entrance buoys not patrolled by the Channel Entrance Patrol. This patrol shall be furnished by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, on request of Task Force Commander.

(3) *An air patrol* shall be established at least two hours prior to the sortie of the first heavy ship to search that part of the circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is South of latitude 21°-20' N. This air patrol shall be furnished: for sortie, from ship or carrier-based aircraft by the Senior Office Present Afloat of unit remaining in the Harbor on the request of the Sortie Task Force Commander; for entry, by the Task Force Commander entering; when a sortie and entry occur in succession, by the Task Force Commander entering.

(4) *Daily sweep.* Sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

(C) *Operating areas:*

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (e).

(2) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and patrol aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port [14557] and shall provide for the following:

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available in the priority:

Priority 1—BBs.

Priority 2—CVs.

Priority 3—CAs.

Priority 4—CLs.

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier 'if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wing TWO and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(D) *Sortie and Entrance:*

(1) Comply with instructions in U.S.F. 10.

(2) Patrols outlined in (B) (2) and (B) (3) above, shall be established and commanded by the Sortie Commander except when forces are entering only, in which case they shall be established and commanded by the officer commanding the Task Force entering. When forces sortie and enter consecutively the command of the patrols will be turned over to the entry Task Force Commander on completion of the sortie by the Sortie Task Force Commander. These patrols shall continue until released [14558] by the Task Force Commander of the sortie in case of sortie only, or by the Task Force Commander entering in case of entry or successive sortie and entry.

(3) Degaussing coils, if calibrated, shall be energized in water of less than sixty fathoms. Unless the Entrance Channel has been swept for magnetic mines, Commander Base Force shall furnish a tug, minesweeper, or small ship without protection to precede the first heavy ship in which the degaussing gear is inoperative. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(E) *Conditions of ships at sea:*

(1) Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor in unprotected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului may be considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(2) Task Force, or Task Group Commanders, if directed by the former, shall maintain inner air patrol for disposition or formations, when in assigned operating areas.

(3) Maintain inner anti-submarine screens insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(4) Maintain condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness [14559] in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

(5) Maintain material condition XRAY, or equivalent, in all ships.

(6) Steam darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(7) Restrict use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(8) Maintain horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(9) Submarine shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.

(10) Submarine operations, except (9) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarines squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian Area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they will maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

(11) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes all operations of submarines other than those covered [14560] in sub-paragraphs (9) and (10) above, shall be on the surface.

(12) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.

(13) Commanders of surface task forces, when they have been designated, shall be furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. Commanders of surface task forces shall ensure that all air patrols are properly notified thereof.

(F) Condition of ships in port:

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures, outlined in references (b), (c) and (d).

(G) Defense against air attack:

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

[14561] (3) As a basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire, berths in the harbor are assigned to air defense sectors as follows:

Sector I—Berths F2-F8, K2, C1 to C5. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 045° to 190° true from assigned berths).

Sector II—Berths F1, F9, B1-3, Dry Docks, DG Calibrating Buoys, T1-4, WL-2-3, D2-7, X22, X23. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 190° to 270° true from assigned berths).

Sector III—Berths D1, D9, F10-13, X2, X15, X18. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 270° to 000° true from assigned berths).

Sector IV—Berths X3, X4, X5, X6 to X14, X17, C6. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 000° to 045° true from assigned berths).

Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships moored at that sector's berths. But ships at other sector berths may be used to augment fire outside their sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. [14562] He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and will be responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N.B.D.O.). As such he will—

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

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(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for co-ordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Co-ordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by—

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander [14563] at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notify all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships will not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure will be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

[14564] (2) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(3) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(4) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea advised.

(b) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit.

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require.

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines of action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks, or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit will execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

[14565] (4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) *Action to be taken if submarine attacks in operating area:*

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed;

(a) *Ship Attacked.* Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F. T. P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details and addressed to all ships present in Hawaiian Waters. To insure rapid delivery this despatch should be transmitted by the attacked ship to the Task Force Commander, to all ships present in Pearl Harbor on the harbor circuit in effect, and to Radio Honolulu (NPM) on 355 kcs. for Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, and relay on schedule. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

Ships other than one attacked.

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, [14566] except all aircraft will be placed in Condition ONE, armed. Aircraft for initial inner patrol may be launched unarmed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available). Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) *Cruisers.* Same as for battleships, except that one-half available aircraft (armed) will be used for own inner air patrol. The second half will be sent to scene of attack, armed, to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers.* Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on orders of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) *Submarines.* Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zig-zagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minecraft.* Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base Force.* If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas slip tows and join her at best speed, prepared to tow. Report in code positions of rafts [14567] abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol Wing Two.* Assume readiness for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft.* Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instruction issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval District.* Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) *S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor.* Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task Force Commander at sea.* Coordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the [14568] Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines awaiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (List II, Case 1): O; X; AA1; AAA1; EN1; EN3; NA12; ND11AC; ND11-12-13-14.

P. C. CROSBY,

Flag Secretary.

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[14569] CinC File No.
A2-11/FF1/
A4-3/QL/0312

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 25 February 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1CM-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Fleet.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas—Measures to be effective.

Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, directs that the following security measures of reference (a) be effective as of the date of this letter.

2. Paragraph numbers herein correspond with those in reference (a).

(A) (1).

Channel Entrance and ready duty destroyer—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

(A) (2).

Boom—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(A) (3).

[14570] Harbor—administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished by Commander Battle Force, from all ships present.

(B) (1) (2) (3).

(B) (4).

Administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with own services. Commander Base Force will augment if so requested by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

(C) (1).

(C) (2) (a) (b) (c) (d).

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

(D) (1) (2) (3).

(E) (1) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13).

(F).

The provisions of reference (b).

(G).

Entire article, except subparagraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General Hawaiian Department.

(H).

Entire article.

3. Force Commanders and Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will issue the necessary orders to make these [14571] measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL.

DISTRIBUTION: (List II, Case 1).

O; X; AAA1; EN1; EN3; NA12; ND11AC; ND11-12-13-14.

(s) P. C. Crosley,
P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

Mr. LANE. On the last page of Exhibit No. 160, reference is made to a statement by the late President Roosevelt concerning a report

from a Captain Smith. The Navy Department was asked to identify this Captain Smith, upon request of Senator Ferguson, and under date of May 9, 1946, the Navy Department has advised that this officer was then Lt. Comdr. (now Commander) C. D. Smith, U. S. N. R., Commanding Officer, U. S. S. *Wake*, and we ask that the full reply of the Navy Department be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14572] 1070/JFB:ms
R#174

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 9 May 1946.

(Memorandum)

To Mr. SETH W. RICHARDSON.

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson of 16 April 1946, forwarded by your memorandum of 19 April 1946, the Captain Smith referred to on the last page of the 13 December 1941 memorandum of the remarks made by the President on 7 December 1941, on the occasion of the meeting of the Cabinet was then Lieutenant Commander (now Commander) C. D. Smith, U. S. N. R., Commanding Officer, U. S. S. *Wake* (River Gunboat). The U. S. S. *Wake* was captured by the Japanese at Shanghai, China, and Captain Smith was taken prisoner. He escaped from a Japanese prison camp in China and returned to naval jurisdiction in November 1944.

The phone call from the Japanese received by Captain Smith, which President Roosevelt mentioned, was reported to the State Department in a message filed by Consul General Stanton with Radio Shanghai at 2210 (10:10 p. m.) 7 December 1941 (Greenwich Civil Time), which was 1710 (5:10 p. m.), 7 December 1941, Washington local time and 6:10 a. m., 8 December 1941, Shanghai local time. The message was received in Washington at 1913 (7:13 p. m.) 7 December 1941, Washington local time. A photostatic copy of the message is enclosed herewith.

[14573] The following is a chronological summarization of the events surrounding the phone call and receipt of knowledge of it in Washington.

[14574] *Local time and date*

Event	In Greenwich	In Washington	In Hawaii	In Shanghai
Attack on Pearl Harbor started.....	071820 6:20 p. m. 7th	071320 1:20 p. m. 7th	070750 7:50 a. m. 7th	080220 2:20 a. m. 8th
Elapsed time between attack and phone call: 1 hour, 55 minutes				
Call received by Captain Smith.....	072015 8:15 p. m. 7th	071515 3:15 p. m. 7th	070945 9:45 a. m. 7th	080415 4:15 a. m. 8th
Elapsed time between call and filing message: 1 hour, 55 minutes				
Message filed in Shanghai.....	072210 10:10 p. m. 7th	071710 8:10 p. m. 7th	071140 11:40 a. m. 7th	080610 6:10 a. m. 8th
Elapsed time between filing message and receipt in Washington: 2 hours, 3 minutes				
Message received in Washington.....	080013 12:13 a. m. 8th	071913 7:13 p. m. 7th	071343 1:43 p. m. 7th	080813 8:13 a. m. 8th
Elapsed time between receipt in Washington and mention by President: 2 hours, 17 minutes				
Phone call mentioned by President.....	080230 2:30 a. m. 8th	072130 9:30 p. m. 7th	071600 4:00 p. m. 7th	081030 10:30 a. m. 8th

(S.) JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, U. S. N. R.

5492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[14575] NPB 1535 RDO SHANGHAI CK XX GOVT STATE PRIORITY SEVENTH 2210

Govt State SecState Washn Info AmEmbassies Chungking Peiping Nanking Amconsuls Hankow Hongkong Swatow Amoy Canton Chefoo Tsingtao Captain C D Smith Commanding U.S.S. *Wake* received telephone call at four fifteen this morning period A Japanese naval officer stated quote A state of war exists between my country and yours and I am taking control of *Wake* unquote period All communications with *Wake* cut off and no further information is available regarding her period HMS *Peterel* small British gunboat blew up at about the same time period Japanese in control of waterfront but have not taken over settlement or French concession city quiet para all confidential codes and papers destroyed including those aboard *Wake* except ditof

STANTON.

[14576] Mr. LANE. The request of Senator Ferguson at page 11220 of the transcript, concerns time of interception and translation of a message from Berlin to Tokyo, serial 1405, mentioned in a series of dispatches by Captain Kramer in his testimony before the committee. The War Department under date of May 1, 1946, and the Navy Department under date of April 15, 1946, have replied to this request, and we ask that their replies be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14577]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 1 May 1946.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARDSON:

With reference to the question raised by Senator Ferguson on page 11220 of the transcript as to whether Message No. 1405 from Berlin to Tokyo was received prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, a search of the files of the Signal Intelligence Service discloses that the message was dated 2 December 1941, was received by the Signal Intelligence Service on 5 December 1941, but was not decoded and translated until 10 December 1941.

(S) Robert M. Diggs,
ROBERT M. DIGGS,
Capt., AUS.

1083A(JFB)
R#148

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 15 April 1946.

(MEMORANDUM)

To MR. SETH W. RICHARDSON.

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings p. 11220), referred to in item 16 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, it has been ascertained that the Berlin to Tokyo message # 1405 was intercepted and translated by [14578] the Army, and therefore the files of the Navy do not indicate whether it was received before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

(S) John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR

Mr. LANE. At page 9671 of the transcript Congressman Murphy requested monthly reports from the Interceptor Station at Winter Harbor, Maine, and Cheltenham, Md., for November and December 1941. Under date of May 3, 1946, the Navy Department replied to this request and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14579] 1083A
R #183

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 3 May 1946.

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings Page 9671), referred to in Item #13 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, the November and December 1941 Monthly Reports of the Navy Intercept Stations at Winter Harbor, Maine and at Cheltenham, Maryland were taken on several occasions by the undersigned to the regular daily hearings of the Joint Congressional Committee.

At one such time it was explained to Congressman Murphy that in addition to the material referred to in the testimony of Captain Safford (Record of Proceedings Page 9672) those reports contained considerable technical and operational data which were pertinent to the Pearl Harbor inquiry and which the Navy desired not to be disclosed for important reasons of security. On receiving that information Congressman Murphy quickly acceded to the request of the Navy and stated that he was desirous of cooperating to the fullest extent to preserve the security of the data referred to and that he would be satisfied to obtain for the Record a statement that the Monthly Reports were physically present in the Navy Department and available to authorized persons at that [14580] time and had been since 1941. The desired statements in the affirmative were made by the undersigned in behalf of the Navy Department in answer to questions put by Congressman Murphy on 16 February 1946 (Record of Proceedings Pages 12,640-12,641), and, to the extent it may be deemed necessary, those statements are confirmed.

In view of the above it is believed the request of Congressman Murphy has been complied with to his satisfaction. If this assumption is not true please advise and any further desired information will be supplied.

(S) John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHEER,
Commander, USNR.

Mr. LANE. Requests of Senator Ferguson and Congressman Murphy, appear at page 13856 of the transcript, for copies of correspondence between Admiral Kimmel and President Truman concerning the examination of certain Navy Department files. Under date of April 26, 1946, the Navy has furnished the information requested and we ask that the material be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14581]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 26 April 1946.

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. In response to the requests of Senator Ferguson and Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings, Pages 13,856 and 13,857), referred to in Item #1 of your memorandum of 19 April 1946 for copies of the exchange of correspondence between Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Retired) and President Truman there are enclosed copies of the following:

- (1) Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to the President dated 13 November 1945.
- (2) Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of the Navy dated 29 November 1945.
- (3) Letter from the President to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 29 November 1945.

(S) JOHN FORD BAECHEER,
Commander, USNR.

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[14582]

ROOM 1N90 NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington 25, D. C., 13 November 1945.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been informed that there are in the files of the Director of Naval Communications of the Navy Department copies of despatches forwarded by the White House to London and other cities, in 1941.

I submitted a request to the Chief of Naval Operations under date of 8 November 1945 that I be given access to these files for examination, with the view to selecting individual despatches in those files that relate to Pearl Harbor and to the events leading thereto, and this for the purpose of obtaining photostat copies thereof for use in the hearings of the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee.

I have been orally informed today that this request to you is necessary for your approval before I may be given access to these files. I am, therefore, submitting this request to you through the Secretary of the Navy.

Very respectfully,

HUSBAND E. KIMMEL,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.).

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

[14583]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, 29 November 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Replying to your memorandum dated 23 November 1945, forwarding a request from Rear Admiral Kimmel for access to confidential files of the Navy Department for use in hearings of the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee, access to files that are material to the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack is made available to the Congressional Committee by my memorandum of October 23, 1945, to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I have found it necessary to lay down a policy that confidential files of the Department may not be available for examination by individuals.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have sent to Admiral Kimmel.

(S) HARRY TRUMAN.

[14584]

29 NOVEMBER 1945.

DEAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL: Replying to your letter dated 13 November 1945, requesting access to certain confidential files of the Navy Department for your use in hearings of the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee, you are informed that access to files in the Navy Department that are material to the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack is permitted to the Congressional Committee by my memorandum of 23 October 1945 to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.

I have found it necessary to lay down the policy that confidential files in the Navy Department may not be made available for examination by individuals.

I am sure that if you made application to the Congressional Committee, it would obtain for you the information which you are seeking.

Very sincerely

(S) HARRY S. TRUMAN.

Rear Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN (Ret.)
Room 1N90 Navy Department,
Washington 25, D. C.

[14585] Mr. LANE. On request of Senator Brewster, page 8208, for any report made by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy on the report of the Roberts Commission, the Navy Department has replied under date of April 26, 1946, to this request and we ask that the reply of the Navy Department be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14586] 1083A
R#109

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 26 April 1946.

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

Response to the request of Senator Brewster (Record of Proceedings, Pages 8208-8211), referred to in Item #10 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, was made by prior memorandum to Counsel for the Committee dated 21 January 1946 (File 1083A R#109), which advised that no record had been found in the Navy Department of any report made by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy on the report of the Roberts Commission. Further search has not disclosed any such Report.

However, there was prepared by an officer on the working level in the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy a rough draft from which were typed smooth copies constituting what that officer conceived as a statement of possible charges and specifications in respect of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Retired), but as to which no record has been found indicating it was ever approved or passed on by either the Judge Advocate General of the Navy or the Secretary of the Navy and which, therefore, never became a part of the official records nor a document of the Navy. In the event this paper may be considered at all responsive to the [14587] request of Senator Brewster, or in case either you or the Committee may have any interest in it, a carbon copy is forwarded herewith.

(S) JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

NAV JAG-63-B
OO-Kimmel, Husband E./A17-20

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

To: Judge Advocate, General Court-Martial.

Subject: Charges and specifications in case of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

1. The above-named officer will be tried before the general court-martial of which you are judge advocate, upon the following charges and specifications. You will notify the president of the court accordingly, inform the accused of the date set for his trial, and summon all witnesses, both for the prosecution and the defense.

CHARGE I. CULPABLE INEFFICIENCY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

SPECIFICATION

In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S. [14588] Navy, and it being the duty of the said Kimmel while so serving as the said commander in chief to take all practicable steps to keep the ships of his command ready for battle, did, in Hawaiian waters, from about 1 February 1941 to 7 December 1941, while so serving as aforesaid, fail to issue and see effected such timely orders as were necessary to keep the ships of his, the said Kimmel's, command ready for battle, as it was his duty to do, by reason of which inefficiency an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in a number of the said ships being damaged and destroyed.

CHARGE II. NEGLIGENCE IN OBEYING ORDERS

SPECIFICATION

In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S. Navy, having, in Hawaiian waters, on or about 27 November 1941, been lawfully ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations to execute a defensive

deployment of forces under his command in preparation for carrying out war tasks, did, during the period from about 27 November 1941 to about 7 December 1941, at the place aforesaid, neglect and fail to make appropriate, adequate, and timely defensive deployment of naval forces under his command preparatory for carrying out war tasks [14589] as required by the imminence of hostilities and in obedience to the aforesaid orders, and as a result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in Navy installations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.

CHARGE III. NEGLECT OF DUTY

SPECIFICATION 1

In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S. Navy, and it being the duty of the said Kimmel, while so serving as said commander in chief, to protect the territory within the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier against hostile expeditions, and he, the said Kimmel, well knowing of the possibility of an attack by Japan on the United States, did, in Hawaiian waters, during the period from about 16 October 1941 to about 7 December 1941, neglect and fail to protect the territory within the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier against hostile expeditions, as it was his duty to do, by neglecting and failing to provide and cause to be provided a proper and sufficient distant reconnaissance although means were available for such reconnaissance, as a result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in Navy installations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed. [14590]

SPECIFICATION 2

In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S. Navy, and while so serving, being jointly responsible with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier and well knowing of the possibility of a surprise attack by Japan on the United States, did, in Hawaiian waters, during the period from about 27 November 1941 to about 7 December 1941, neglect and fail to consult, confer and cooperate with the aforesaid commanding general with respect to measures to be taken under the then existing plans for joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier and the adaptation of the said plans in whole or in part as required by the imminence of hostilities, as it was the duty of the said Kimmel to do, and as a result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in Navy installations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.

SPECIFICATION 3

In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, United States Navy, Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in [14591] Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, United States Navy, and while so serving, being jointly responsible with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, having been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch on or about 24 November 1941 that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility, and on or about 27 November 1941, that negotiations with Japan had ended and Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within a few days, and on or about 29 November 1941 that Japanese action was unpredictable and hostilities on their part were momentarily possible, did in Hawaiian neglect and fail to consult and confer with the said commanding general with respect to the meaning and intent of the warnings issued by the said despatches and the appropriate measures of defense required by the indicated imminence of hostilities, as it was the duty of the said Kimmel to do, and as a result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces of 7 December 1941, resulted in Navy installations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.

SPECIFICATION 4

In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in [14592] Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S. Navy, and while so serving, being jointly responsible with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, having on or about 27 November 1941 been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch that negotiations with Japan had ended and that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within a few days and that said despatch was to be considered a war warning, did, in Hawaiian waters, between said date and 7 December 1941 neglect and fail to put into effect within his command a state of alert and of readiness such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the said despatch, as it was the duty of the said Kimmel to do, in that a distant reconnaissance was not inaugurated and maintained and shore batteries of the Navy and antiaircraft artillery on board vessels of the fleet were not manned and supplied with ammunition, and as a result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in Navy installations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.

[14593] Mr. LANE. In response to the request of Congressman Keefe, page 11033 of the record, the Navy Department has replied, concerning the location of certain cards in respect to the winds code, and we ask that the Navy Department reply be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14594]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 23 April 1946.

1083A (HLB)

R#165

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Congressman Keefe (Record of Proceedings, page 11033), referred to in item 15 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, a thorough search of the pertinent files of the cognizant activity of the Navy Department has been made to find the cards in respect of the winds code which were prepared at the direction of Read Admiral Noyes, and no information or material of the type described has been found.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

[14594-A] Mr. LANE. In respect to the request of Senator Ferguson for information as to the number of airplanes sent to Hawaii and the Philippines during the period February 1, 1941, to December 7, 1941, in the transcript at page 12997, by reply dated April 22, 1946, the Navy Department has furnished this information and it has been included in Exhibit No. 172 of the committee.

Mr. MURPHY. In connection with that I would like for the record to show that there are letters in the President's file that are pertinent to that very question, letters from Secretary Stimson to the President and from the President to the Secretary, in regard to the planes to be sent to Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. LANE. In response to Senator Ferguson's request at page 13995, for the various messages noted in the operations watch officer log, the Navy Department, under date of April 22, supplied this material, and it has been made Exhibit 162-A.

At page 14064 of the transcript, a memorandum from the Navy Department concerning the notes and drafts of Admiral Inglis' statement before this committee was spread on the record. A correction of

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the Navy Department memorandum has been received under date of April 18, 1946. We ask that the correction be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14595] 1083A(JFB)

R101

123

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 18 April 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In respect of the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, pages 200-201) concerning the drafts and notes assembled in connection with the preparation of the statement of Admiral Inglis, my previous memorandum (dated 25 January 1946, R #101, 123) (Record of Proceedings, page 14085) erroneously advised as to the date when the final draft was completed and the work material destroyed. The date of the occurrence of those events was 14 November 1945 and not 24 November 1945.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHE,
Commander, USNR.

Mr. LANE. We request that a memorandum from the War Department liaison officer dated December 13, 1945 to committee counsel concerning production and distribution of B-17 bombers as of September 1, 1941 be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., December 13, 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.

With reference to your letter of December 10, 1945, forwarding a copy of Senator Brewster's request dated December 5, 1945:

1. As of September 1, 1941, 133 B-17's had been produced.
2. Of the 133 B-17's produced as of September 1, 1941, 113 had been delivered to the Army Air Forces and 20 to Great Britain.
3. On September 1, 1941, the United States possessed 109 B-17's, disposed as follows:

Hawaii.....	21
Panama.....	7
Continental United States.....	81

(S) HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff Corps.

Mr. LANE. Senator Ferguson requested whether or not the OpNav dispatch 061743, December 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, was a priority message. The Navy Department has replied to this request and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14596]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 16 April 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of proceedings, page 7812) referred to in Item 8 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, Dispatch 601743 of December 1941 from OpNav to CinCPac for action to CinCAF for information, was sent with deferred precedence.

This message, as indicated in part in my memorandum (1083A (HLB) R#105 dated 29 January 1946) to you, was transmitted from Washington to radio Honolulu on 6 December 1941 at 2254 Greenwich Time, which was 1754 Washington Local Time and 1224 Hawaiian Time (10:54 p. m. Greenwich Time, 5:54 p. m. Washington Local Time and 12:24 p. m. Hawaiian Time) all of 6 December. Since this message was transmitted by radio, it was received in Honolulu at the moment of transmission. No record has yet been found at Pearl Harbor indicating the exact time of delivery of the message to Admiral Kimmel.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER
Commander, USNR.

[14597] Mr. LANE. Senator Ferguson's request, at page 207 of the transcript, for records relating to the phrase "provide necessary escort" in the dispatch marked "Exhibit No. 3" of this committee, has been answered by a reply of the Navy Department dated the 17th of April 1946. We ask that this reply be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14598] R #124
(JFB-efb)
(1070)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 17 April 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Page 207), referred to in item 1 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, the direction in dispatch 252203 of November 1941 from OpNav to Com12 for action and to CincPac, CinCaf, Com14 and Com16 for information (Cong. Inv. Exhibit 3), reading 'CinCPac and CinCaf provide necessary escort', which follows the instruction for the routing of all trans-Pacific shipping through the Torrest Straits, is usual Navy phraseology whereby it was indicated to the Fleet Commanders that they should detail as a protective escort such ships as in their discretion they considered necessary to accomplish the purpose of guarding the trans-Pacific shipping in question from any unfriendly action or aggressive attack.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

[14599] Mr. LANE. In reference to page 14127 and page 14129 of the transcript, information was recorded as received from the Navy Department concerning the time of Japanese attacks in various Pacific locations at the outbreak of war. This additional information has been received from the Navy Department and we ask that it be added to the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14600] 1083A (HLB)
R #112

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 17 April 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

Subject: Time Table of Japanese Attacks—source of material.

Reference is made to my memorandum file 1083A R#112 dated 4 April 1946 (Record of Proceedings, pages 14127-14129), in which the times of the Japanese attacks at Clark Field, P. I., and Nichols Field, Manila (Record of Proceedings, page 14129) were reported to be 9:27 am (December 8th, local time) and 3:00 am (December 9th, local time).

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Further and later information received from the War Department now places the times of the attacks at these places as follows:

Place	Local time	Greenwich time	Washington time
Clark Field, P. I....	Between 12:17 and 12:20 p. m. December 8th.	Between 4:17 and 4:20 a. m. December 8th.	Between 11:17 and 11:20 p. m. December 7th.
Nichols Field, Manila.	3:15 a. m., December 9th...	7:15 p. m., December 8th...	2:15 p. m., December 8th.

/s/ John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

[14601] Mr. LANE. Congressman Murphy requested at page 12635 of the transcript and the Navy has supplied four intercepted dispatches, mentioned in the statement before the committee of Capt. L. F. Stafford. Opanav dispatch No. 282301, also requested at that time, has been included as a part of Exhibit No. 142 of this committee. We ask that the four intercepted dispatches be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14602]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington 15 April 1946.

1083A (JFB)

R #172

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings, page 12635), referred to in Item 17 in your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there are enclosed herewith copies of the following documents:

- (a) No. 843, Tokyo to Washington, 27 November 1941.
- (b) Serial 1197, Washington to Tokyo, 27 November 1941, (JD-1 No. 6908).
- (c) Serial 482, Rio to Tokyo, 30 November 1941, (JD-1 No. 6982).
- (d) Serial 768, Rome to Tokyo, 29 November 1941, (JD- No. 6981).

/s/ John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

Encls. (4)

[14603] From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

27 November 1941

(Purple)

#843

Broadcast schedule as follows:

6	p. m.	To Pacific Coast.....	JVJ	12275.
6:30	p. m.	To Western Hemisphere.....	{ JUO	9430 and
			{ JVJ	12275.
7:00	p. m.	To the Coast.....	JVJ	12275.
8:00	p. m.	To the Coast.....	JHL	5160.
9:00	p. m.	To the Coast.....	JHL	5160.
10:00	p. m.	To the Coast.....	JHP	11980.
10:30	p. m.	To Europe.....	JHL	5160.

JD-1: 6899 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT) Encl (A)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

27 November 1941.

(Purple) #1197.

Re your #798* and #843**.

Due to reception of JUO and JVJ (general intelligence [14604] information—Morse code—broadcast) being weak, we desire that you change these to JAV (27,327.5 kilocycles) and JUP (13,065 kilocycles), the change to be made immediately.

Reception is also very weak on JHL (Domei news broadcast) so arrange to use above wave length for this, too.

Due to static, the JAP (European broadcast) cannot be heard at all.

*JD-1: 6658—Instructions concerning talks on withdrawing troops from Southern Indochina.

*JD-1: 6899—Tokyo broadcast schedule.

JD-1: Secret Navy Trans. 11-29-41 (X) Encl (B)

From: Rio (Ishii).

To: Tokyo.

November 30, 1941.

Purple. #482.

I am making a general test of the reception of dispatches, and find that at present we cannot receive the 10:30 P. M. (Japanese time) transmission at all. At present the only one we can hear is the 6:30 P. M. (Japanese time) transmission from JVJ to the United States, so please bear this in mind. Argentina [14065] reports the same.

As I would like to find out whether conditions are favorable here for reception between 4:00 and 6:00 A. M. (Japanese time), it seems best to send to South America at that time over a wavelength of from 10 to 15 megacycles.

25571 Army 6982 Secret Trans. 12-2-41 (7) Encl (D)

From: Rome.

To: Tokyo.

29 November 1941.

(Purple) # 768.

Re my #762*.

In regard to the Japanese language radio broadcasts to Europe recently, JLT cannot be heard at all and while JVW can be heard fairly well still there is interference from other wave lengths during the news broadcasts and static, etc. Added to this is the fact that the announcer apparently speaks in a low tone, very rapidly and swallows the ends of his words, and the occasions when we do not get good reception are numerous. There is great danger that we may miss some important announcement such as was referred to in your telegram. Please take up the following points that I am going to mention and [14606] please arrange to do something about it, temporarily at least.

1. Select an announcer who can speak slightly louder than the present one and who can enunciate clearly, one who does not intone and who can pronounce even the last syllables of his words correctly and clearly.

2. In selecting the news please continue to place the most important news first followed by items of lesser importance. However, as some time is usually consumed in adjusting the machine, sometimes the important news is missed so please repeat this again at the end of the broadcast even if this requires cutting down on the entertainment features.

3. Before the Japanese news broadcast please be sure to always play several minutes of Japanese patriotic music by way of introduction.

Relayed to Berlin.

*Not available.

JD-1 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (G-TT) Encl (C)

Mr. LANE. Senator Ferguson requested at page 6374 a memorandum attached to a letter dated 4 April 1941 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel. The Navy Department replied under date of May 1, 1946, and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

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(The matter referred to follows:)

[14607] 1083A R#131

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
WASHINGTON, 1 May 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Page 6374), referred to in Item # 6 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, a careful search has been made of the files of the Navy Department for the memorandum mentioned in the letter dated 4 April 1941 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel. Neither the memorandum nor a copy can be found.

(S) John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHEER,
Commander, USNR.

Mr. LANE. Congressman Gearhart requested, at page 299 of the transcript, orders transferring ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic and vice versa from May to December 1941.

Under date of May 1, 1946 the Navy Department replied and we ask that their reply be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14608] 1083A R#47B

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
WASHINGTON, 1 May 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. In response to the request of Congressman Gearhart, (Record of Proceedings, Page 299), referred to in Item #3 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, for copies of orders transferring ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic and vice versa from May to December 1941, reference is made to the following documents:

(a) CNO Secret letter, Serial 06538, dated 7 April 1941 which lists battleship Division THREE; either the *Lexington* or the *Enterprise*; Cruiser Division EIGHT; Destroyer Squadron EIGHT (DesDiv 3 and 15), and Destroyer Squadron NINE (DesDiv 17 and 18) as the units which are to be transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic "because of the existing and prospective strategic situation in the Atlantic Ocean."

(b) CNO Serial 152153 dated 15 April 1941 (Narrative Statement, Page 156; Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document [14609] 122) which modified item (a). This dispatch orders that transfers indicated in item (a) are to be held in abeyance until the international situation clears; that the *Enterprise* or the *Yorktown* are to be substituted for the transfer of the *Enterprise* or the *Lexington*; that when the carrier is ready she is to proceed accompanied by the *McDougal* and DesDiv 18.

(c) CinCPac Serial 162346 dated 16 April 1941 (Narrative Statement, Page 167; Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document 123) which reports the *Yorktown* and the destroyers specified in item (b) ready to depart approximately 21 April.

(d) CNO Serial 132019 dated 13 May 1941 (Narrative Statement, Page 167; Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document 125) which modifies item (a) and orders that three groups, each consisting of one battleship, one light cruiser and three destroyers from the units specified in item (a), be organized, as well as a fourth group consisting of one light cruiser and DesDiv 3. This dispatch specifies the intervals between departures for these groups.

(e) OPNav Serial 242155 dated 24 May 1941 (Narrative Statement, Page 168; Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document 127) which orders two destroyers of the Cimarón [14610] class to the Atlantic Fleet.

(f) CNO Confidential letter Serial 023638 of 22 May 1941 (forwarded with memorandum of the undersigned R#47B dated 8 February 1946) which outlines the reorganization of DesRon's 2, 8, 9, 11 and 13 by individual ship name. All of the ships named in this letter with the exception of the *Livermore*, *Eberle*,

Kearney, Erickson, Guin, Meredith, and Grayson were at the time of the writing of the letter in the Pacific.

(g) CNO Confidential letter Serial 021988 dated 16 May 1941 (forwarded with memorandum of the undersigned R#47B dated 8 February 1946) reporting the intention to transfer the USS *Bridge* and the USS *Antares* to the Pacific Fleet.

2. With the exception of CNO Secret letter Serial 06538 dated 7 April 1941 (item (a) above) all of the above references have previously been forwarded to the Committee, and, therefore, a copy of only that letter is forwarded herewith.

(S) JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

[14611] Op-38-MG 4/5

APR. 7, 1941.

Serial 06538

SECRET.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Transfer of Units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet.

Reference: (a) CinCus Secret letter A16/0140 of 28 January 1941.

1. Two battleships of the Atlantic Fleet are now under Navy Yard overhaul, one a routine overhaul and the other of an emergency character. Both these battleships will be absent from the Fleet until about the middle of May; thereafter, a certain period of time will be required for training before they would be ready to undertake their assigned duties if the United States were then in the war. The *Ranger* is scheduled for Navy Yard overhaul from July 1st to September 1st for essential alteration of arresting gear and for routine work. The Chief of Naval Operations considers that this overhaul cannot be indefinitely postponed.

2. Because of the preceding circumstances and the existing and prospective strategic situation in the Atlantic Ocean, it has now become apparent that the Atlantic Fleet must have a greater initial strength in order to perform effectively the tasks that will be assigned it in war. It has therefore been decided to transfer certain units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet.

3. The following is a list of the units which will be ordered to the Atlantic:
Battleship Division 3.

Either the U. S. S. *Lexington* or the U. S. S. *Enterprise*, as may be later directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

[14612] Cruiser Division 8.

Destroyer Squadrons 8 (Desdivs 3 and 15) and 9 (Desdivs 17 and 18) as now constituted.

Vessels under overhaul are to be dispatched as soon as ready.

4. The movement of these units to the Atlantic must be accomplished with the utmost possible secrecy. In order to promote secrecy, it has been decided not to transfer all vessels at once but to make the transfer in several groups, with about two weeks elapsing between departures of groups. The Chief of Naval Operations will instruct you by secret dispatch as to the final dates for departure of each group from the Hawaiian area.

5. The groups and tentative dates of departure will be as follows:

Group 1. Tentative date of departure from Hawaii April 15, 1941.

1 battleship of Battleship Division 3.

2 cruisers of Cruiser Division 8.

All available 1850 ton vessels of Destroyer Squadron 9.

Group 2. Tentative date of departure from Hawaii May 1, 1941.

1 battleship of Battleship Division 3.

2 cruisers of Cruiser Division 8.

Destroyer Division 17.

Group 3. Tentative date of departure from Hawaii May 15, 1941.

1 battleship of Battleship Division 3.

Lexington or *Enterprise*, as may later be directed.

Flagship of Destroyer Squadron 8 and Destroyer Division 15.

[14613] 6. After passage of the Canal, all groups will proceed to Hampton Roads, unless otherwise directed.

7. You will direct that all vessels of the Atlantic detachments maintain radio silence, except in emergency, from the time of departure from Hawaii until

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arrival in Hampton Roads. During transit of the Canal, the commander of each group will report by dispatch, through the shore communication organization, to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, for duty.

8. With regard to item (19) of paragraph one of reference (a), in which you recommend that Destroyer Division 12 remain with the Pacific Fleet instead of being assigned to the Southeast Pacific Force, you are informed that in a forthcoming revision of WPL-44, Table USF-2 will be changed to require one destroyer division, of the long range type, having five guns and two torpedo tubes. After the transfers directed by this letter, two such divisions will remain in the Pacific Fleet, viz., Destroyer Divisions 1 and 2.

9. Acknowledge receipt by dispatch, referring to the serial number of this letter.

(S) H. R. STARK.

Copy to:

CinClant 147/89.

[14614] Mr. LANE. Congressman Murphy requested at page 9525 of the transcript, information concerning identity of a ship located to the north of Hawaii on a chart dated 6 December 1941, which chart is a part of Exhibit No. 109. Under date of April 30, 1946, the Navy Department has replied to this request identifying the ship.

We ask that the reply be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14615] R#144

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 30 April 1946.

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings, Page 9525), referred to in Item #12 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, the ship indicated on the chart labeled "Secret, 5 Dec. '41" (one of the documents of Exhibit 109 of the Congressional Investigation) as located northward of the island of Oahu at 27° North Latitude and 153° West Longitude is the Royal Canadian naval vessel *Prince Robert* (XCL-38).

The chart in question, and the others of similar nature that are parts of Exhibit 109 of the Congressional Investigation, are copies of photographs of a wall chart which was maintained in the Navy Department for the purpose of plotting the approximate locations of naval vessels of the United States and of friendly foreign powers. The position of the *Prince Robert* stated above as shown on the chart is only approximate, and it has been ascertained that at noon G.C.T. 5 December 1941 this ship was located at the position 25° 30 minutes North Latitude and 152° 30 minutes West [14616] Longitude. There is attached hereto a further chart on which are indicated the two locations which have been mentioned, that is (1) 27° North Latitude—153° West Longitude, and (2) 25° 30 minutes North Latitude—152° 30 minutes West Longitude.

The *Prince Robert* departed from Pearl Harbor at 2030 Greenwich Civil Time on 4 December 1941 for Esquimalt, Vancouver, B. C., where it arrived 11 December 1941.

(S) JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

Mr. LANE. Congressman Gearhart requested, pages 780-782 of the transcript, a list showing ships transferred from the Pacific to Atlantic or vice versa between May 1, 1940, and February 1, 1941. The Navy Department replied to this request under date of April 29, 1946, and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14617] 1083A
#47A

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 29 April 1946.

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Congressman Gearhart (Record of Proceedings, Pages 780-782), referred to in Item #5 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there are forwarded herewith two tables showing (1) Ship transfers from the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleets and from the Atlantic to the Pacific Fleets between 1 May 1940 and 7 December 1941, and (2) Ships, new or re-commissioned, that were sent (otherwise than by transfers from Fleet to Fleet) to the Pacific to augment the forces of the Pacific Fleet between 8 October 1940 and 7 December 1941.

(S) JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

Enclosure: (a) Twelve (12) copies of tables (1) and (2).

[14618] TABLE 1.—*Transfers of ships from the Pacific and Asiatic fleets to the Atlantic fleet and vice versa*

	From 1 May 1941 to 1 Feb. 1941		From 1 Feb. 1941 to 7 Dec. 1941	
	Pacific to Atlantic	Atlantic to Pacific	Pacific to Atlantic	Atlantic to Pacific
Battle-ships.	None.....	None.....	BatDiv THREE: <i>Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico, Yorktown</i>	None.
Aircraft carriers.	None.....	None.....		None.
Cruisers.	<i>Louisville, Chester, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Omaha, Memphis.</i> NOTE.—Also the <i>Augusta</i> from Asiatic to Atlantic.	<i>Louisville, Chester, Trenton.</i>	1. CruDiv EIGHT: <i>Philadelphia, Brooklyn, Savannah, Nashville.</i>	None.
Destroyers.	<i>Sampson, Moffett, Anderson, Hammann, Hughes, Sims, Mustin, Russell, Mayrant, Rhind, Trippe.</i>	<i>Crane, Crosby, Kilty, Kenison, Anderson, Hammann, Hughes, Sims, Mustin, Russell, O'Brien, Walke, Buck.</i>	DesRon EIGHT: <i>Anderson, Mustin, Hammann, Rowan, Lang, Stack, Sterett, Wilson.</i> DesRon NINE: <i>McDougall, Morris, Roe, Wainwright, Buck, Davis, Jouett, Warrington, Somers.</i>	None.
[14619] Submarines.	None.....	None.....		None.
Auxiliary vessels.	None.....	None.....	<i>Cimmaron, Sangamon, Santee, Relief, Wm. P. Biddle, Fuller, Heywood, Little, Manley, Stringham, McKean, Brant, Partridge, Algoma, Kalnia.</i>	None.

NOTE.—All transfers were between the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet except as expressly noted

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[14620] TABLE 2.—*Augmentations in ship strength of Pacific fleet other than by transfers from other fleets during the period 8 October 1940–7 December 1941*

	New ships sent to the Pacific Fleet	Older ships sent to the Pacific Fleet
Battleships.....	None.....	None.
Aircraft carriers.....	None.....	None.
Cruisers.....	<i>Helena</i>	<i>St. Louis</i> .
Destroyers ¹	None.....	<i>Allen, Chew, MacFarland, Schley.</i>
Submarines.....	<i>Car, Cudgion, Tambor, Tautog, Thresher, Triton, Trout, Tuna.</i>	None.
Auxiliary vessels.....	<i>Aldebaran, Casco, Curtiss, Fulton, Harris, Kuala, Pallas, Procyon, Sabine, Solace, Tangier, Zeilen.</i>	<i>Arceel, Ballard, Breeze, Gillis, Hulbert, Regulus, Sacramento, Seminole, Thornton.</i>

¹ All classified as ODD (old destroyer, recommissioned) on Dec. 7, 1941.

[14621] Mr. LANE. Senator Ferguson requested, page 14069 of the transcript, all duty officer logs kept for the Office of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff between 1 November and 7 December 1941.

The reply of the War Department has been received to this request, and we ask that the reply, dated April 23, 1946, be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14622]

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Room 4D761, The Pentagon, 23 April 1946

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

At page 14,069 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked for all duty officer logs kept for the offices of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff between 1 November and 7 December 1941. Inclosed herewith is a letter from Major General John R. Deane, who was an Assistant Secretary of the General Staff during the period mentioned, describing the duty officer system of the office of the Secretary of the General Staff in the months preceding Pearl Harbor and stating that no logs were maintained by the duty officers of that office. The foregoing duty officer arrangement served both the office of the Chief of Staff and the office of the Secretary of War.

(S) CARL R. NELSON,
Captain, AUS

[Incl.]

[14623]

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
Washington, 19 April 1946.

CAPT. CARL R. NELSON

Rm 4D761 The Pentagon, Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR CAPTAIN NELSON: In reply to your telephone request this date the following represents to the best of my recollection, knowledge and belief the system that was employed concerning duty officers in the Office of the Chief of Staff just prior to Pearl Harbor.

There were 6 or 8 officers designated as Assistant Secretaries of the General Staff, all of whom were on a roster as night and weekend duty officers. When acting as duty officers they were required to remain within reach of a designated telephone so that they might be called by the Adjutant General's Office in case anything unusual occurred outside of the regular hours.

I was Assistant Secretary of the General Staff during the few months preceding Pearl Harbor and was one of the officers on the roster referred to above. I do not recall ever having been called by the Adjutant General's Office because some unusual situation had arisen. There was no log kept of the activities of the duty officers. If anything arose that called for immediate action [14624] such action would be taken at once; otherwise the circumstances would be re-

ported to the Secretary of the General Staff upon his arrival at the office on the following day.

(S) JOHN R. DEANE,
Major General, USA.

Mr. LANE. In response to the request for information concerning Japanese estimates of the United States air strength in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the War Department by memorandum dated May 21, 1946, has furnished information obtained from the Chairman, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, and we ask that this information be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14625]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Room 4D761, The Pentagon, 21 May 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

In response to your request for information concerning Japanese estimates of United States air strength in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, there is inclosed herewith a memorandum dated 21 May from the Office of the Chairman, United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

(S) ROBERT M. DIGGS,
Captain, AUS.

[14625]

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY,
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN,
21 May 1946.

CAPTAIN ROBERT M. DIGGS, A. U. S.,
Room 4D 757, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CAPTAIN DIGGS: In reply to your question concerning Japanese estimates of United States air strength in the Hawaiian area prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the Survey can offer the following.

Last November in Tokyo Admiral Yonai, the last Japanese Navy Minister, gave the Survey a document, the translated title of which is "Estimation of Japanese Strength at the Outbreak of the Greater East Asia War (December 1941)." This paper which was used by the Japanese Cabinet for planning purposes during the late fall of 1941 has the following estimated disposition of United States air strength in the Pacific:

	Hawaii area	Wake-Midway	Philippines area	Aleutian area	Available for transfer to Far East
Fighter planes.....	About 200...	Wake, about 12.	About 10....		About 1,000.
[14,627]					
Large planes (4 engines).....	About 40....		About 40....		About 60.
Medium planes (2 engines).....	About 100....				About 200.
Small attack planes.....	About 150....				
Reconnaissance and patrol planes.....	About 35....		About 20....		
Reconnaissance seaplanes.....			About 10....		
Flying boats.....	About 110....	Wake, about 6; Midway, about 9.	About 35....	About 12....	About 250.

Yours very truly,

(S) WALTER WILDS,
Commander U. S. N. R.

Mr. LANE. We have received answers to inquiry at page 13760 of the transcript for further information regarding the proposed British warning to Japan sent to President Roosevelt on December 6, 1941, which involved the reply of the Australian Government.

We ask that this material now be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

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(The matter referred to follows:)

[14628]

APRIL 9, 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Marks:

With reference to your undated letter advising that clearance has been obtained from the British Government for documents numbered 6 and 8 referred to in Mr. Masten's memorandum of February 23, 1946, the Joint Committee desires the following further information regarding document No. 8 (which is the memorandum dated December 7, 1941, apparently from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, enclosing a draft of a proposed declaration by the British Government to the Japanese Government):

1. The basis for the assertions made in the message from the Australian Minister at Washington, mentioned in the telegram from the then Australian Minister for External Affairs enclosed with your letter, regarding the procedure to be followed by the President. It is requested that, if necessary, appropriate inquiry be made of the then Australian Minister at Washington as to the basis for these assertions.
2. All information in the State Department files concerning (a) the above-mentioned document No. 8, and (b) the above mentioned telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs.
3. The date and hour of dispatch of (a) the above- [14629] mentioned telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs, and (b) the above-mentioned message from the then Australian Minister at Washington.

These matters were discussed at the Committee's hearing this morning, and a prompt reply will be greatly appreciated.

(s) S. W. RICHARDSON,
General Counsel.

APRIL 17, 1946.

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: I refer to your memorandum to Mr. Marks dated April 9, requesting information concerning a British memorandum of December 7, 1941 to President Roosevelt and an Australian telegram regarding that memorandum, a paraphrase of which the Department recently furnished to you.

In regard to point 2 of your memorandum, the files of the State Department have again been searched, but no material has been found relevant to these papers.

In regard to points 1 and 3, your request has been communicated to the Australian Government. While, under ordinary circumstances, the Department of State does not feel it should request other governments for documents in their files, an exception has been made in this case because [14630] of the fact that the Australian telegram in question was placed in the record at the request of the Australian Government.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE,
Special Assistant to the Secretary.

The Honorable SETH W. RICHARDSON,
*General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.*

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, May 23, 1946.

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: In further reference to your letter of April 9, there are enclosed two copies of a letter received from Mr. L. R. McIntyre of the Australian Legation which contains information requested by you.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Joseph W. Ballantine (per ONC)
JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

Enclosure

Mr. SETH W. RICHARDSON,
*General Counsel, [14631] Joint Committee for the Investigation of
the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.*

[Copy]

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
Washington 8, D. C., 22nd May, 1946.

DEAR MR. RICHARDS: I refer to Mr. Acheson's letter of April 16th, 1946, to Mr. Oldham, transmitting a request from the Joint Committee for the Investigation of the Pearl Harbour Attack for further information regarding the telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the United Kingdom which has been inserted in the record of the Joint Committee's hearings.

The telegram contains the substance of a message which the Minister for External Affairs had received from the Australian Minister at Washington. This message was despatched from Washington at 9:30 P. M. on December 6th, 1941. The information contained therein regarding the procedure to be followed by the President had come orally from the President late in the afternoon of December 6th.

There is no record of the exact time of despatch from Canberra of the telegram to the Secretary of State for [14632] Dominion Affairs beyond the fact that it was despatched in the evening of December 7th, Canberra time.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ L. R. McINTYRE.

Mr. ARTHUR L. RICHARDS,
Room 377, State Building,
United States Department of State, Washington, D. C.

APRIL 10, 1946.

DEAR MISS TULLY: There are enclosed with this letter mimeographed copies of two documents which you furnished the Committee from the files of the late President Roosevelt. The first document is dated December 7, 1941 and appears to be a memorandum from Prime Minister Churchill to the President, and the second document is the draft declaration attached to the first. There is also enclosed a mimeographed copy of a paraphrase of a telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in the United Kingdom. Permission to use the first two documents was granted the Committee by the British Government only upon the condition that the third document be released at the same time.

At the public hearing last Tuesday, the Committee asked that a further check of the records and files of President [14633] Roosevelt be made to ascertain whether any further information or documents are available concerning the enclosures. You will note the description of the "President's subsequent procedure" in the third document and the assertion that "he will issue his warning" on Tuesday afternoon or evening. The Committee desires to know whether the records and files of President Roosevelt contain any memoranda relating in any way to the three documents mentioned above, and to the basis for the assertion made by the then Australian Minister at Washington in the third document regarding the intentions of President Roosevelt. In particular, the Committee would like to know whether President Roosevelt's records and files contain any memoranda of conversations between the President and the then Australian Minister at Washington, Mr. Casey, or copies of memoranda or messages from the President to Mr. Casey which might have served as the basis for the Australian Minister's assertions.

We will greatly appreciate your usual prompt attention to the Committee's request.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ S. W. RICHARDSON,
General Counsel.

Miss GRACE TULLY,
3000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C.

5510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[14634]

3000 CONNECTICUT AVENUE,
Washington, D. C., April 17, 1946.

Hon. S. W. RICHARDSON,
*General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States,
201 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of April tenth, but I have just returned to Washington from New York.

I have made a further search of the files but I am unable to find any additional documents or memoranda regarding the enclosures.

My feeling about the message from the Australian Minister at Washington, Mr. Casey, is that he and the late President discussed the subject but, of course, no record was ever made of such conversations.

I regret that I cannot be more helpful.

Very sincerely yours,

(S) Grace G. Tully
GRACE G. TULLY.

[14635] Mr. LANE. At page 34 of the committee transcript Senator Brewster requested that the final draft of a memorandum from the committee for the President, which the committee proposed the President send to the various executive departments and agencies, be spread on the record. It was ordered by the committee Chairman. We request that a copy of the letter dated November 2, 1945, from the committee Chairman to Hon. Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to the President, which letter quoted the committee's proposed memorandum, be spread on the record, together with a copy of the reply dated November 7, 1945, from Mr. Connelly to the committee Chairman, which enclosed a copy of the memorandum the President sent to the executive departments and agencies that day. This latter memorandum appears in the full in the committee transcript at page 30. However, the letter of transmittal does not appear at that point. We ask that this material be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14636]

[Copy]

NOVEMBER 2, 1945.

Honorable MATTHEW J. CONNELLY,
SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CONNELLY: The Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack respectfully asks that the President approve the following memorandum:

Memorandum for: The Chief Executives of all executive departments, agencies, commissions and bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to assist the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack in its desire to make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events leading up to or following the attack, and to supplement previous directives and arrangements for full disclosure to and co-operation with the Joint Committee, and to add to the protections given in that provision in Section 3 of the Concurrent Resolution creating the Joint Committee, which reads as follows:

SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be [14637] used against him in any court proceeding or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

You are directed to authorize every person in your respective departments or agencies whether in the armed services or in a civilian status, and whether or not called to testify before the Joint Committee, if interrogated by the Committee or any of its members or counsel, to volunteer any information of which they may have knowledge bearing on the subject of the Committee's investigation, and whether or not so interrogated, to come forward voluntarily and dis-

close to the Committee, or to any of its members or its counsel, any information such persons may have on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think may not already have been disclosed to the Committee.

Respectfully,

CHAIRMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 7, 1945.

MY DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: This is to acknowledge your letter of November second, written on behalf of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

I am enclosing a copy of the memorandum the President [14638] is today sending to the Chief Executives of all Executive Departments, Agencies, Commissions and Bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) MATTHEW J. CONNELLY,
MATTHEW J. CONNELLY,
Secretary of the President.

HONORABLE ALBEN W. BARKLEY,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

[Enclosure.]

Mr. LANE. The committee has received, under date of April 23, 1946, certain corrections requested by Captain Zacharias to be made in the transcript of his testimony. We ask that his request be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14639]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 23 April 1946.

1083A (HLB)
MEMORANDUM.

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. Captain Zacharias has reviewed the transcript of his testimony before the Committee and has requested that the following typographical errors be corrected:

Page 8717, line 13, change "Jacinto" to "Isidro".

Page 8718, line 15, change "come" to "came".

Page 8720, line 5, delete "then".

Page 8723, line 19, delete "for".

Page 8724, lines 12 and 13, at end of line 12 change period to comma, and at beginning of line 13 change capital "T" to small "t".

Page 8738, line 2, change "made" to "make".

Page 8743, line 23, change "nand" to "and".

Page 8755, line 3, change this line to read: "Why, here I am a Reserve Intelligence Officer in G-2 and".

Page 8755, line 6, delete "I said,"

Page 8760, line 6, change "that in" to "that in".

Page 8763, line 24, delete "Vice".

Page 8763, line 25, change "of" to "on".

[14640] Page 8995, line 19, insert "not" between "by" and "having".

Page 8986, line 23, change "sai" to "said".

Page 8998, line 3, change "1924" to "1926".

Page 9007, line 22, change "from" to "into".

Page 9014, line 4, change "defer." to "refer to."

Page 9014, line 7, change "If you knew" to "In view of".

Page 9023, line 2, change "it" to "these".

Page 9024, line 4, change "Tmayer" to "T. Mayer".

Page 9024, line 21, before "Juno" insert "It says".

Page 9039, line 12, change "ability" to "a billet".

(S) JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

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Mr. LANE. Under date of April 25, 1946, we have received a list of corrections suggested in the testimony of Admiral H. R. Stark, by the admiral. We ask that his request be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14641]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 25 April 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. There is forwarded herewith as enclosure (A) a memorandum from Admiral H. R. Stark requesting that certain typographical and grammatical errors be corrected in the transcript of his testimony before the Joint Committee. These items are listed by page and line number.

(S) John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

Enclosure: (A) Memo from Admiral H. R. Stark to Commander J. F. Baecher dtd 19 Apr 46.

19 APRIL 1946.

Memorandum

To: Commander John Ford Baecher.

1. Referring to the recent hearings, I have read them over and I see no corrections for us in Volume 68. However, on Page 13712 in the question by Mr. Richardson in the paragraph at the top of the page next to the last line, the word "Price" should be "Prince".

[14642] 2. In Volume 69, page 13897 in the paragraph near the bottom of the page starting "I remember her remark", change "her" to "the" so that it would read "I remember the remark".

3. On page 13927, paragraph 1 at top of page, "May" should be "December". If I said "May" it certainly was a mistake. I had meant and thought I had said "I think it was December," etc.

4. Page 13948, line 19-20, insert "based" at the end of line 9 so that the answer would read "they were based in".

(a) Page 13912, line 2, change the last two words "any explanation" to "an exclamation".

5. Going back to my former testimony, I note the following and which Dave may have corrected but I think it might be well to check up:

Volume 35:

(a) Page 6395, line 6 after the word "out" insert "except through" and eliminate the word "of". It would then read "they couldn't get out except through Intelligence".

(b) Page 6397, line 13 insert "the" between the words "when" and "King". It would then read "when the King went back", etc.

(c) Page 6433, line 13 insert the word "not" between the words "did and "have.". It would then read "so we did [14643] not have." This is obviously a clerical error.

(d) Page 6463, line 6 change "200" to "0200".

(e) Page 6502, line 20 change the word "transport" to "task force."

(f) Page 6505, line 11 change the word "report" to "support."

(g) Page 6524, line 20 change the word "we" to the word "he."

H. R. Stark,
Admiral, U. S. Navy.
(S) H. R. STARK,

Enclosure (A)

Mr. LANE. Under date of May 20, 1946, we received a request from Admiral Beardall of certain corrections he would like to have made in his testimony. We ask that his request be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14644] 1070/HLB:ms

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 20 May, 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

Admiral Beardall has checked the transcript of his testimony before the Joint Committee and requests that the typographical errors listed on the enclosure be corrected in the transcript.

/S/ JOHN FORD BAECHE,
Commander, USNR.

Italics indicates error or omission.

Volume 69, of 11 April 1946

Page	Line	Change
14014	24	Should read: "Harbor attack when I joined him."
14020	2	Should read: "No, not necessarily so. At that".
14025	12	Change "American" to "Japanese".
14025	13	Omit "of Japan".
14036	1	Should read: "When do you think it will happen?".
[14645]		
14038	6	Should read: " <i>the</i> conclusion that it was immediately."
14039	15	Read "No, he never discussed it with".
14054	4	Should read: "or some sort of a mail <i>center</i> , or something."

Mr. LANE. We have received suggested corrections from Henry C. Clausen to be made in his testimony before the committee, and we ask that his request be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

MAY 23, 1946.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

GENTLEMEN: Since my appearance on February 12, 13, and 14, 1946, as a witness before your committee, I have reviewed a transcript of my testimony.

Please make the following corrections:

Page	Line	Corrections
11475	15	Change "1944" to "1942".
11486	7	Change "Conserto" to "Caserta".
11486	14	Change "Biddlesmith" to "Beddle Smith".
11491	12	Change "Naureln" to "Nauheim".
11492	14	Change "had given to G-2" to "had been given by G-2".
11493	15	Change "Jansen" to "Clausen".
11493	17	Change "November" to "December".
11495	11	Change "Colonel" to "Harvey".
11496	8	Change "it" to "a slanted investigation".
11503	16	Change "that I assume as you assume" to "what I assume you assume".
11504	15	Change "given" to "begin".
11507	11	Change "Colonel" to "Lieutenant".
11531	3	Change "From my understanding" to "For my definition of understanding".
11545	18	Change "November" to "December".
11659	14	Change "a manual" to "Emanuel".
11943	7	Change "Mr. Gearhart" to "Colonel Clausen".

Please inform me of the action taken.

Respectfully yours,

(S) HENRY C. CLAUSEN.

[14646] Mr. LANE. Mr. Chairman, interrogatories were sent by the committee upon the request of Senator Ferguson, to Vice Admiral William A. Glassford, U. S. N., in Germany, and to Brig. Gen. Francis

G. Brink, U. S. A., in Shanghai, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not they have information concerning matters under review by the committee. Inquiry was made by the Navy Department of Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover, U. S. N., Honolulu, and his reply was furnished to committee counsel, as were the replies to interrogations by Admiral Glassford and General Brink. Brig. Gen. E. L. Harrison was interviewed by counsel for a similar reason. The results of all of these inquiries were presented in writing to each member of the committee. It is the view of counsel that none of these officers has information material to this inquiry, and unless the committee desires otherwise, counsel does not contemplate them as witnesses.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you offering, however, the interrogatories?

The CHAIRMAN. You want that statement made a part of the record?

Mr. LANE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I think, in view of the fact that there are statements made in the record which would intimate that those gentlemen have vital information, and in view of the fact that the interrogatories do not so indicate, I think that those interrogatories ought to be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

[14647] Mr. LANE. Mr. Chairman, we would like to have permission to furnish those to the reporter because we don't have them with us.

The CHAIRMAN. You will do it today?

Mr. LANE. Yes, sir

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14648] **INTERROGATORIES AND REPLIES OF BRIGADIER
GENERAL FRANCIS G. BRINK**

Request is made by Joint Committee investigating Pearl Harbor attack that Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink answer the following questions:

1. Did you know Brooke Popham, British Air Marshal, head of the Royal Air Force in Malaya?

Answer: Yes.

2. Did you ever talk to him concerning what our policy would be should the Japanese attack the British or Dutch?

Answer: No.

3. A. At 3:26 p. m. on 6 December 1941, Singapore time, Capt. John Creighton sent the following message in code to Admiral Hart at Manila:

On Saturday Brooke Popham received from War Department London:

American armed support has now been assured us in following cases:

a. We have to execute our plans to prevent landing Isthmus of Kra by Japs or counteract Jap invasion elsewhere in Siam.

b. Attack is made on Dutch Indies and we proceed to their defense.

c. Japs attack US the British. Accordingly, put plan in action without reference to London if you have good

information that Jap expedition is advancing apparently with [14649] intention of landing in Kra, or if any part of Thailand is violated by the Japs.

Should NEI be attacked, put the plans agreed upon between Dutch and British into operation.

B. Were the contents of this message discussed by you with Brooke Popham?

Answer: No.

C. Was any or all of the information contained in the message conveyed by you to Captain Creighton?

Answer: No.

D. Were the contents of the above message known to you before it was sent?

Answer: No.

E. If not, when did you first learn of the contents?

Answer: In above cable received 15 April.

F. To your knowledge were the contents of that message given to you or anyone by Brooke Popham before it was dispatched?

Answer: No.

4. At what time did you first have knowledge that the Japs would attack the Kra Peninsula?

Answer: Unable to say accurately from memory without consulting my reports between 3 and 8 December 1941 to the War Department. Two convoys were reported off Cochin China, traveling south, [14650] at least one day before the Kra Peninsula landing; they turned west, then in darkness turned south. The RAF observed the convoys and attacked them at the time the landings in Malaya and South Thailand were made. Possible landings on Kra and North Malaya were a definite Japanese capability on the previous day when the convoys were reported in the Gulf of Siam. To the best of my recollection the time of the actual landing was on or about the 8th of December.

5. When did you first learn that they were going to attack any territory of the British?

Answer: Answer to question 4 applies. I learned of landings at Kota Bahru in Malaya at 0100, 8 December, Singapore time.

6a. Was anyone connected with the armed services of the American Government advised by you of an expected attack?

Answer: Yes. I furnished the data given in reply to question 4.

b. If so, who was so advised and when?

Answer: I notified the War Department and the Philippine Department of the Japanese movements toward the Kra Peninsula noted [14651] in the answer to question 4. The precise time would have to be obtained by reference to the War Department message file.

7. What did you know from the British or the United States about our policy should the Japanese attack the British and/or the Dutch?

Answer: Concerning the United States policy covering this matter, I have no knowledge.

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8. Do you know of any policy that the United States had as to our action in case the Japanese attacked the British and/or the Dutch but not the Americans?

Answer: Same answer as in No. 7.

APRIL 25, 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Reference is made to the reply of Brigadier General Francis G. Brink to cabled questions from the Joint Committee concerning his knowledge of the general situation in the Far East just prior to December 7, 1941.

In reply to Question No. 4 and Questions 6A and 6B, it is noted that General Brink refers to a dispatch he sent to the War Department concerning Japanese movements toward the Kra Peninsula.

It is noted that at page 5507 of the Joint Committee transcript there appears a paraphrase of a message sent by General Brink from Singapore on December 5, 1941, reporting [14652-4] this incident, and the War Department liaison office has advised that this message is the only report received by the War Department between December 3 and December 8, 1941, from General Brink.

A copy of the paraphrased message sent by Brink, as it appears in the transcript, is attached.

In answer to Question No. 5, Gen. Brink says he learned of the landings at Kota Bharu at 0100, 8 December, Singapore time. That is equivalent to 7:30 AM December 7, Honolulu time, and 1:00 PM December 7, Washington time.

(S) LOGAN J. LANE,
Counsel.

PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET MESSAGE RECEIVED AT WAR DEPARTMENT AT 4:20 P. M.
DECEMBER 6, 1941

From Singapore: Filed 5:18 P. M., December 5, 1941
Received in I. B.: 1:35 A. M., December 7, 1941 No. 96

Brink advises that at one o'clock in the afternoon, following a course due west, were seen a battleship, five cruisers, seven destroyers and twenty-five merchant ships; these were seen at 106°8' E., 8° N.; this was the first report.

The second report was that ten merchant ships, two cruisers and ten destroyers were seen following the same course at 106°20' E., 7°35' N.

Both of the above reports came from patrols of the Royal Air Force.

[14655]

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington 6, 1946.

The Hon. ALBEN W. BARKLEY,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, U. S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: Reference is made to your letter dated 3 April 1946, which forwarded interrogatories to be submitted to Vice Admiral William A. Glassford, U. S. Navy, which was acknowledged by letter dated 10 April 1946 from the Acting Secretary of the Navy.

The written replies of Vice Admiral Glassford to the interrogatories have now been received, and I am enclosing for you the original signed by him.

Sincerely,

(S) JAMES FORRESTAL

[14656]

UNITED STATES FLEET,
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, GERMANY,
% Fleet Post Office, New York, N. Y., 20 April 1946.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO LETTER OF VICE ADM. WILLIAM GLASSFORD,
U. S. NAVY

WRITTEN REPLIES TO QUESTIONNAIRE OF SENATOR BARKLEY¹

Question 1. Admiral Glassford, were you commanding U. S. Naval Forces in Chinese waters in October 1941 and was your su-

¹ Questions by Senator Ferguson for submission by Senator Barkley as Chairman of the Committee.

perior officer Admiral Thomas A. Hart who had headquarters at Manila?

Answer: Yes.

Question 2. Did your flag lieutenant, at that time Lieutenant Chenault on the U. S. Gunboat *Luzon*, advise you that Karl H. von Wiegand had important information and that you were to call him in regard to it?

Answer: I have no recollection. However, I saw Mr. von Wiegand often by prearrangement.

Question 3. Did you on or about the 17th of October 1941 go to the office of Karl H. von Wiegand in Shanghai and did he tell you the following:

I have information through what hitherto have been reliable channels, that the general staffs of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, together with the Japanese Government, have set December 6, 1941, as the "deadline" for the negotiations in Washington. If no settlement has been reached by that date, between the Japanese and [14657] American Governments, war may start any hour after midnight December 6.

Answer: I saw Mr. von Wiegand frequently over a period of time. I cannot therefore state whether or not I saw him on or about the 17th of October 1941; but neither the statement quoted nor its substance was communicated to me by Mr. von Wiegand at any time.

Question 3 (continued). If you do not answer that question in the affirmative, did he give you the substance of what was stated in the previous question? Or what do you now say that you recall that he stated to you in regard to the above conversation?

Answer: At no time did I have a conversation with Mr. von Wiegand in which such information or its substance was given to me.

Question 4. Did Karl H. von Wiegand tell you that he could not reveal to you the source of his information since a leak might involve the lives of several persons, but that he had reasons to believe that it came from a very high source in Tokyo?

Answer: See my reply to question 3.

Question 4 (continued). Did you not know at the time that Karl H. von Wiegand was careful in making statement to you?

Answer: That was always my impression.

Question 5. Is it not true that Karl H. von Wiegand had given you other information and that you had remarked that it had proven better and more correct than information from Naval [14658] Intelligence in Shanghai?

Answer: Over a period of time Mr. von Wiegand gave me much valuable information. I do not recall making the particular remark mentioned.

Question 6. Did you, Admiral, state on or about October 17, 1941, that you would immediately make a report on the information that he had given to you about: "If no settlement has been reached by that date between the Japanese and the American Governments, war may start any hour after midnight, December 6, 1941 (")", or any conversation similar or containing that statement?

Answer: No; since I did not receive the information.

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Question 7. To whom did you report the conversation you had with Karl H. von Wiegand on or about the 17th of October 1941?

Answer: To no one, since I had no conversation with Mr. von Wiegand of the nature referred to in questions 3, 6, and 8.

Question 8. To whom did you communicate the information that you received from Karl H. von Wiegand relative to:

I have information through what hitherto have been reliable channels that the general staffs of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy together with the Japanese Government have set December 6, 1941, as the deadline for the negotiations in Washington. If no settlement has been reached by that date, between the Japanese and [14659] American Governments, war may start any hour after midnight December 6.

Answer: No one, since I did not receive such information.

Question 8 (continued). Did you report this conversation or the substance of it or any part of it to Admiral Hart in Manila?

Answer: No; since the conversation did not take place.

Question 9. Did you send a report of this information (quotation in question 8) or the substance of it or any part of it to any official in Washington?

Answer: No; since I did not receive such information.

Question 10. If your answer to the previous question is "yes," to whom did you report in Washington and give us the substance of that report.

Answer: My answer to the previous question is "no."

Question 11. Did you ever advise anyone the substance of the quotation contained in question 8 or any part of it?

Answer: No; since I did not receive such information.

Question 12. On or about December 7, 1941, Philippine time, did you dine with Karl H. von Wiegand and another or others at which time you discussed information that he had given you about December 6 and that it might not come true and that you had made the cryptic remark: "We may take the initiative"?

Answer: I did dine with Mr. von Wiegand, To the best of my knowledge I did not make the remark attributed to me.

[14660] Question 12 (continued). Admiral, will you please explain in detail what was meant by the remark, "We may take the initiative," and where did you obtain that information?

Answer: I cannot explain a remark which, to the best of my knowledge, I did not make.

Question 13. Do you recall a telephone conversation on Monday morning Philippine time, with Karl H. von Wiegand and that you stated to him: "The war is on. Your information was correct."? Also that you related to him the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor and that you were waiting to see Admiral Hart and would be off to your flagship by seaplane?

Answer: I did telephone to Mr. von Wiegand. I did tell him that Pearl Harbor had been attacked by the Japanese. However I could not have referred to information which I had not received.

(S) William Glassford,
WILLIAM GLASSFORD.

[14661]

NAVAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

Drafted by COMDR JOHN FORD BAECHER, Room No. 1070, Ext Nr. 2920.

Date, 15 APR 1946.

From: SECNAV(JAG) 152019

PRECEDENCE

To: COMAIRPAC (date/time group)
(GCT)

x Routine
x RESTRICTED x

Text: *RESTRICTED*

For Rear Admiral Cato D Glover USN X In congressional investigation of Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor Question has arisen as to whereabouts of Admiral H R Stark on night of 6 December 1941 and Admiral Stark cannot recollect that detail X Log of OPNAV duty officer for 6 dash 7 December 1941 indicates you stood watch from 1900 to 0200 X This log contains over your signature the following entry quote At 2000 Major F L Harrison comma Aide to the Secretary of War comma telephoned that the Secretary of War desired the following information by 0900 Sunday 7 December colon compilation of men of war in Far East comma British comma American comma Japanese comma Dutch comma Russian comma also compilation [14662] of American men of war in Pacific Fleet comma with locations comma and a list of American men of war in the Atlantic without locations X Admirals Ingersoll comma Stark and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000 Sunday 7 December unquote X This entry does not recall to Admiral Stark any recollection as to his whereabouts X He accepts the item but things it may possibly be inaccurate because he cannot see why it would have been necessary to have consulted all three paren Ingersoll himself and Knox paren in the matter referred to X Advise by dispatch as soon as possible whether you recollect consulting Admiral Stark as indicated comma as well as the manner in which the approximate time you contacted him and where he was located when reached by you X

FN COMAIRPAC 160636

To SEC

P (JAG) WASHN DO

RESTRICTED X

I regret that I am unable to recall the incident referred to in your 152019 X Information of the nature requested by the Secretary of War was normally compiled by the so called quote [14663] war room unquote which was then a new section of the Ship Movements Division of OPNAV X This section was headed by Captain Frank Leighton now deceased X Events of importance originating from the war room were entered in the log kept by the Ship Movement Division X It is possible that Capt Leighton was the consultant X I do remember very definitely having telephoned Admiral Stark during the night concerning the movements of a Japanese convoy which was west of the Philippines headed south X This was the convoy that made the initial landing on the Malay Peninsula near Kota Bharu X I am certain that this call was made after midnight as it was toward the end of the watch and that Admiral Stark was then at his home X From Rear Admiral Cato D Glover X 0717/16 Apr. CH 160636Z 152019

[14664] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I make one other request?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy

Mr. MURPHY. During the course of the hearings, on countless occasions each member of the committee referred to the United States News, to quote from the different reports. In view of the great use that was made of that volume I ask that it be made an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. United States News?

Mr. MURPHY. United States News.¹

¹ The United States News, extra number, September 1, 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. It was referred to time and time again. We ought to have the source in the record.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. You want it made a part of the record?

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have it made an exhibit, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LANE. I ask that it be given Exhibit No. 181, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 181.")

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Counsel.

Mr. LANE. By letter dated May 6, 1946, Senator Ferguson asked that Gen. Hugh Knerr be called as a witness before the committee. This request was reported to the committee on May 14, 1946. We have not been advised by the committee [14665] that General Knerr should be presented as a witness. We would like to have that statement appear in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be noted in the record.

Senator BREWSTER. Was there any action by the committee?

The CHAIRMAN. We had that up last week. The matter was discussed and the committee in effect denied the request by ordering the hearings and the record closed today. There was no understanding, as I recall, of the committee that he would be called as a witness. It would involve the calling of other witnesses.

Mr. LANE. By letter dated November 15, 1945, Senator Ferguson requested copies of all intercepted messages between January 1 and July 1, 1941. Messages printed in Exhibit No. 1 were selected from those sent during the period July 2, 1941, to December 8, 1941. Present counsel have not pursued this request and, therefore, has not available such intercepts.

Senator BREWSTER. What is the reason you didn't pursue it?

Mr. RICHARDSON. As a matter of fact, Senator, it was a request which was made of Mr. Mitchell early in the hearings and he turned it over to Mr. Hannaford and it came to light when we started preparing to close this record, and we just paid no further attention to it.

Senator BREWSTER. I think we did get some of the messages during that period, which had a very illuminating bearing on this matter of the knowledge of the Japanese, as [14666] to their knowledge of the intercepted communications, warning the Japanese Embassy to look out because they thought we were breaking the code.

You recall those episodes. Those communications were not furnished to us earlier, which, we thought, was unfortunate. It wasn't until we went into their earlier period. How those were selected and what was the basis of this earlier period, January to June, I don't know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We are subject, of course, to whatever the committee wants to do. It came up from the bottom of the basket.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you know what the volume is?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I don't know.

Senator BREWSTER. Unless they are very extensive I think it would be a good idea to have them in. We had these few in May and June, as I recall it, which showed these communications between Tokyo, Berlin, and Washington, and they revealed very valuable information.

Now, how many intercepts there were during the 6 months' period I don't know. Unless they are very extensive I think it would be a good idea to have them.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, it is my impression that the volume is enormous.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought the intercepts which we had secured, and made Exhibit 2, I believe it was, contained all [14667] the pertinent intercepts.

Senator BREWSTER. No one has ever looked at these.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any idea, Mr. Masten, as to how extensive the intercepts are that would be responsive to this request?

Mr. MASTEN. The only information I have on that, Mr. Richardson, is that Mr. Hannaford spent about 3 weeks over there, but what he went through I don't know. I believe there is a memorandum in the file which discusses what he did in examining the intercepts. I, myself, know actually nothing other than that about it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It would be possible, still closing your record to-day, to include all of these intercepts by reference. It would be physically possible to ask to have the intercepts put into a document and introduced in the record if you feel it is necessary, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BREWSTER. I think it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Just to grab up all the intercepts between January and July might mean producing a lot of highly immaterial stuff.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The request covers that, just that, all of the intercepts in that 6 months' period.

The CHAIRMAN. This printing bill is going to be something enormous as it is, as everybody knows. I do not use that as an argument against putting anything of value into the record, [14668] but if they are very voluminous it is obvious that they might contain a lot of items that have nothing to do with the inquiry.

Senator BREWSTER. Would it be possible to have counsel find out about that and get a decision this afternoon?

The CHAIRMAN. If the committee is willing to say that as of today counsel shall examine these intercepts and include in the record what counsel regards as pertinent, I would have no objection to that.

Senator BREWSTER. Could we leave it this way, that if it is found they are not extensive, that they may go in. That would be easier—to put them in.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a rather vague way of doing it.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, as I just said to Mr. Richardson, Mr. Hannaford spent, I believe, 3 weeks over there, and the material that was included in Exhibit No. 1 was what he regarded as relevant to the inquiry. Now, whether or not he went behind July 1, my impression is that he did, although I do not actually know, as I never discussed it with him.

Senator BREWSTER. Is there a memorandum?

Mr. MASTEN. There is a memorandum in the files describing the procedure followed. I think the thing to do is to put the memorandum in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not put the memorandum in the record. Would that be agreeable?

[14669] Senator BREWSTER. Subject to further check as to whether he went into this period before July 1. In the first instance he did not because that was what occasioned our later desire when we got word that there were these earlier communications in May and June.

The CHAIRMAN. After all the time we have spent on the intercepts, it seems a little haphazard to come in on the last day and ask to go back over another period, although I have no objection if it is pertinent.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Masten tells me that it will be an enormous task and will take a month. I don't know what the source of that information is. I know nothing about this. The request came up and rather than do anything about it I thought I would present it, as we did.

The CHAIRMAN. We examined everybody who appeared for days and days and days. I don't intimate that anybody was guilty of laches in not bringing up these prior ones, but it is unfortunate that on the last day we are requested to go back over those intercepts for 6 months.

Mr. MASTEN. There is this memorandum in the file, Mr. Chairman, showing the basis on which the selection was made. I haven't looked at it recently. I think that would be the thing to put in.

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest that the memorandum be printed as a part of the hearing today. Can you get it for the record?

[14670] Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I will withdraw the other suggestion.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14671]

DECEMBER 21, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES RE EXHIBITS 1 AND 2

Exhibits 1 and 2, containing intercepted Japanese messages, were prepared by counsel from War Department records. Counsel examined the War Department's file of Japanese intercepted messages from July 1 to December 31, 1941. No examination was made of the Navy Department file of intercepts because counsel was assured by both the Army and the Navy that the Navy's file is a duplicate of the Army's. With respect to intercepts prior to July 1, 1941, the War Department's files have not been examined completely, although earlier messages on particular subjects have been examined after they had been dug out by the War Department pursuant to request of counsel.

Exhibit 1 is intended to include the most complete picture of the Japanese-United States negotiations from the Jap point of view that could be prepared without producing an exhibit that was too bulky. In preparing the exhibit, the following types of messages were eliminated:

1. Messages relating purely to administrative matters, such as salaries of embassy clerks, etc.

2. Messages transmitting the text of United States or Japanese notes which are printed in full in the State Department document entitled "Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941."

[14672] 3. Certain messages relating to the negotiations which were exchanged during the months of July, August, and September. In these early months selections were made to highlight the course of the negotiations, but as the negotiations approached the critical stage—i. e., in the months of October, November and December—practically all messages were included.

4. Messages from the Japanese Ambassador in Washington dealing with political activities in the United States.

Exhibit 2 includes all intercepts that could be found which were transmitted after August 1, 1941, and which dealt with ship movements, etc., except that messages of particular interest transmitted prior to that date are included in Section 7 and that all messages relating to Hawaii that were decoded in 1941 are included in Section 1.

In both of the exhibits all reference to the type of code—i. e., purple—were eliminated because at the time the exhibits were prepared it was contemplated these matters would not be referred to in the hearings. These were the only deletions from the War Department copies of the messages except that three

paragraphs giving detailed instructions for the destruction of code machines were deleted from circular No. 2330 which appears on page 137 of Exhibit 1.

[14673] Senator Ferguson's letter of November 15th, a copy of which is attached, asked for all intercepted Japanese messages between January 1 and July 1, 1941. Intercepted Japanese messages between those dates relating to Japanese espionage activities have been included in Exhibit 2 and those showing that the Japanese suspected we were breaking their codes, have been inserted in the record. Due to the press of other work, no steps have been taken as yet to answer the request completely.

NOVEMBER 15, 1945.

HONORABLE WILLIAM D. MITCHELL,
Room 201, Senate Office Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MITCHELL: I have received the printed copies of the intercepted messages sent by the Japanese Government between July 1 and December 8, 1941.

I would greatly appreciate it if you would send me another copy of this material, as well as a copy of all such intercepted messages between January 1 and July 1, 1941.

With all good wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HOMER FERGUSON.

[14674] Mr. LANE. With reference to a letter dated November 3, 1945, from Senator Brewster requesting that all State Department reports and inquiries between Washington and London on the Tyler Kent affair be produced, by memorandum dated November 8, 1945, the then general counsel, Mr. Mitchell, advised Senator Brewster that the request had been forwarded to the State Department.

On November 20, 1945, by letter, Under Secretary Dean Acheson stated:

Mr. Tyler G. Kent, formerly a clerk in the Foreign Service employed as a code clerk in the American Embassy in London, was arrested in London in May 1940 and convicted by a British Court in October 1940 for violation of the British Official Secrets Act. He was convicted of obtaining and communicating documents which might be useful to the enemy for a purpose prejudicial to the interests and the safety of Great Britain and of stealing one of those documents.

The letter concluded:

This Department does not understand how the facts concerning the arrest and conviction of Kent, or correspondence between the Department and the American Embassy in London in regard to the matter, could be considered material to the committee's investigation within the meaning of the President's order of October 23, 1945. Therefore, the Department is unable to comply with the request of Senator Brewster.

In subsequent conversations, according to [14675] the files of counsel's office, between Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Marks, assistant to Mr. Acheson, it was understood that counsel might examine documents in the Tyler Kent file for relevancy after the committee specified what aspect of the case was considered pertinent.

The file has not been examined as the committee has not advised counsel what aspect of the case was considered pertinent.

Senator BREWSTER. This is the first I ever heard of that. I never heard of the Acheson letter and I never heard of this point that they wanted to know what was pertinent. We repeatedly discussed it in the committee and stated the pertinency when the matter came up.

The CHAIRMAN. I had a letter from Mr. Tyler Kent stating that he had no information that he regarded as of value to the committee in regard to Pearl Harbor. If I can find that letter I think it might be well to put it in the record.

(The letter referred to follows:)

[14676]

DECEMBER 17, 1945.

HON. ALBEN W. BARKLEY,
Chairman, Pearl Harbor Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

SIR: Various recent newspaper references, and within the last few days some expressions attributed to Members of Congress, seem to imply that I am expected to testify before the Pearl Harbor Committee of which you are the chairman.

To clarify my position, may I respectfully state that since my arrival in America from England on December 3 last, I have remained ready at all times to present any information that I have to your committee or to any other official body.

I can think of nothing within my own knowledge that would throw light on events directly connected with our country's disaster at Pearl Harbor. But I shall gladly submit upon request, for whatever significance you may attach to them, any of the facts with which I happened to become familiar in Europe, and because of which, to prevent my imparting them to the American Congress in 1940, I was secretly, and I think very unjustly and illegally, tried and imprisoned in England.

Respectfully,

(S) TYLER KENT,
2112 Wyoming Avenue, N. W.
Washington 8, D. C.

[14677-78] Senator BREWSTER. I have never asked for Tyler Kent. I am not interested in Tyler Kent. I am interested in matters of our State Department which, in my judgment, may have a relevancy. And I am still disturbed and concerned at the handling of this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask that this communication be made a part of the record?

Mr. LANE. I didn't ask, but we have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let it go in as part of the hearings today.

(The document referred to follows:)

[14679]

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
November 3, 1945.

HON. WILLIAM D. MITCHELL,
Room 201, Senate Office Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MITCHELL: Would you kindly secure for me copies of all State Department reports and inquiries between Washington and London on the Tyler Kent affair?

Thanking you for this courtesy, I am

Sincerely yours,

(S) OWEN BREWSTER
Owen Brewster, U. S. N.

[OB:rg]

NOVEMBER 8, 1945.

Memo to Senator Brewster:

Your request of November 3 for logs of ships has been [14680] presented to the Navy Department.

Respecting your request of November 3 as to summaries of "off the record" testimony before the Army board, we instituted inquiry about that some time ago, with the hope that someone made some notes about it, but so far we have not found that anyone did so.

As to the Admiral Hewitt testimony, our only copy was loaned to Senator Ferguson and has not been returned.

Your request for State Department reports and inquiries between Washington and London on the Tyler Kent affair has been presented to the State Department.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL

NOVEMBER 20, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. MITCHELL: I refer to your letter of November 9, 1945, referring to this Department a letter dated November 3, 1945, to you from Senator Brewster, in which Senator Brewster requested that you secure for him copies of all State Department reports and inquiries between Washington and London on the Tyler Kent affair.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 27, establishing the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, provides that the committee "shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon [14681] Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, * * *." The President's order of October 23, 1945, addressed to this and other departments instructs the Secretary of State to make available to the joint committee, for such use as the committee may determine, any information in his possession "material to the investigation." In pursuance of this order, this Department has made available to the committee counsel all information in its possession which is material to the investigation.

Mr. Tyler G. Kent, formerly a clerk in the foreign service employed as a code clerk in the American Embassy in London, was arrested in London in May 1940 and convicted by a British court in October 1940 for violation of the British Official Secrets Act. He was convicted of obtaining and communicating documents which might be useful to the enemy for a purpose prejudicial to the interests and safety of Great Britain and of stealing one of those documents. There is enclosed herewith for your further information, a copy of a release to the press dated September 2, 1944, concerning the Kent case.

This Department does not understand how the facts concerning the arrest and conviction of Kent, or correspondence between the Department and the American Embassy in London in regard to the matter, could be considered material to the committee's investigation within the meaning of the President's [14682] order of October 23, 1945. Therefore, the Department is unable to comply with the request of Senator Brewster.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) DEAN ACHESON,
Under Secretary.

(Enclosure: Press release No. 405, September 2, 1944.)

The Honorable WILLIAM D. MITCHELL,

*General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor,
Attack, Congress of the United States.*

(Handwritten note on letter:) In subsequent conversations with Mr. Marks, it was understood that counsel might examine documents in the TK file for relevancy after the committee specified what aspect of the case was considered pertinent.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

For the press.
No. 405

SEPTEMBER 2, 1944.

The Department of State has taken note of recent inquiries and newspaper reports regarding the case of Tyler Kent, former employee of the American Embassy at London, and the Office of Foreign Service Administration has been instructed to review the matter thoroughly and prepare a comprehensive report. The following is the text of the report:

[14683] Tyler Kent, American citizen, an employee of the American Foreign Service assigned to London, was tried and convicted under the Official Secrets Act (1911) of Great Britain before the Central Criminal Court at the Old Bailey, London, in October 1940. The charges against him were the obtaining and delivering to an agent of a foreign country (Germany) copies or abstracts of documents which might have been directly or indirectly useful to the enemy, and which were, at the same time, prejudicial to the safety or interests of Great Britain. Incidental to the proceedings against him, it was brought out that he had violated the Larceny Act of 1916 of Great Britain by the theft of documents which were the property of the Government of the United States in the custody of the American Ambassador, London. The above-mentioned were found proven by a jury on the basis of evidence presented during the trial. Kent had worked through a confederate who was allegedly anti-Jewish and pro-Nazi.

The background of the case and the circumstances leading up to Kent's arrest and trial were as follows: Kent, at the age of 22, had entered the foreign service as a clerk, his first assignment having been to the American Embassy at Moscow.

He was later transferred to the American Embassy, London, arriving there in October 1939. He was assigned to the code room as a code clerk, where his duties were to encode and decode telegrams. Before entering the service he had attended Princeton University, the Sorbonne (Paris), the [14684] University of Madrid, and George Washington University. He had acquired several foreign languages, including Russian, French, German, and Italian.

On May 18, 1940, a representative of the London Police headquarters at Scotland Yard called at the Embassy to report that Kent had become the object of attention by Scotland Yard through his association with a group of persons suspected of conducting pro-German activities under the cloak of anti-Jewish propaganda. Prominent in this group was Anna Wolkoff, a naturalized British subject of Russian origin, the daughter of a former admiral of the Imperial Russian Navy. Miss Wolkoff had resided in Great Britain since emigrating, with her father, from Russia following the Bolshevik revolution, had been hospitably received and had made a considerable circle of friends among Londoners of standing, some of whom had assisted in setting up the Wolkoff family in a small business. After the outbreak of the present war, the British police had become interested in Miss Wolkoff's activities, believing that she was in sympathy with certain of Germany's objectives, that she and some of her associates were hostile to Britain's war effort, that she was involved in pro-German propaganda, that she had a channel of communication with Germany and that she was making use of that channel of communication.

Kent had been observed by Scotland Yard as having been [14685] in frequent contact with Anna Wolkoff and in touch with others of a group known to her. Among other things, it had been noted that Kent and Miss Wolkoff were sharing an automobile and that Miss Wolkoff frequently drove this car using gasoline allegedly supplied by Kent. Scotland Yard was now convinced that Anna Wolkoff was receiving confidential information from Kent and stated that she would be arrested on May 20. The police added that on the same day they considered it highly desirable to search the rooms occupied by Kent. In reply to an inquiry made by British authorities, Ambassador Kennedy with the approval of the Department, informed such authorities of the waiver by this Government of the privilege of diplomatic immunity. Scotland Yard thereupon indicated that a search warrant would be issued and that Kent's rooms would be searched on May 20, 1940.

The possibility that an employee of the Embassy having access to the confidential codes, was making improper use of the material entrusted to him in the course of his work was of the utmost concern to Ambassador Kennedy and to the Government of the United States. Preservation of the secrecy of this Government's means of communication with its establishments abroad is a matter of fundamental importance to the conduct of our foreign relations. In the circumstances described, it was imperative that Ambassador Kennedy ascertain, and ascertain immediately, whether Kent was guilty of a violation [14686] of trust. There was every reason, in the interest of the American Government, for the waiving of diplomatic immunity and for allowing the British authorities (who alone had the means of obtaining the evidence) to proceed in an effort to prove or disprove their suspicions. In this connection it may be noted that it is well established in international law that the so-called immunity of an employee of a diplomatic mission from criminal or civil processes may be renounced or waived by the sending state at any time.

The search of Kent's room was conducted according to plan, an officer of the Embassy being present throughout. It revealed that Kent had in his possession copies of Embassy material totaling more than 1,500 individual papers. He also had two newly-made duplicate keys to the index bureau and the code room of the Embassy, these being unauthorized and in addition to the keys furnished him officially for his use as a code clerk. He explained that he had had these keys made so that in the event he should ever be transferred from code work to another section of the Embassy he would still have access to the code room. Also found in his possession were two photographic plates of Embassy documents believed to have been made by confederates for the purpose of endeavoring to transmit prints thereof to Germany, and certain printed propaganda material which was prejudicial to the British conduct of the war. The police also established [14687] that some of the papers found had been transmitted to an agent of a foreign power.

An examination of the documents found in his room indicated that Kent had begun classifying the material by subject, but this work was far from completed. They covered practically every subject on which the Embassy was carrying on

correspondence with the Department of State. As may be supposed, they included copies of telegrams embodying information collected by the Embassy which otherwise would not have been permitted to leave Great Britain without censorship. As may be likewise supposed, they contained information which would have been useful to Germany and which Great Britain would not have permitted to reach Germany. It is of interest to note, in this connection that Kent had, during his service in London written to the chargé d'affaires of the American Embassy in Berlin asking his assistance in arranging for his (Kent's) transfer to Berlin. When questioned as to what he would have done with the documents in his possession had he been transferred to Germany, Kent replied that he could not state what he would have done with them; he regarded the question as a hypothetical one.

Regardless of the purpose for which Kent had taken this material from the Embassy, he had done so without authorization, in violation of the most elementary principles governing the rules for the preservation of the secrecy of the Government's [14688] correspondence. By his own showing he had, while occupying a very special position of confidence, within the Embassy, displayed a shocking disregard for every principle of decency and honor so far as his obligations toward the United States were concerned. The removal of so large a number of documents from the Embassy premises compromised the whole confidential communications system of the United States, bringing into question the security of the secret ciphers. It was obviously impossible to continue his services, and Kent was dismissed from the Government service as of May 20, 1940. Thereafter the question of diplomatic immunity naturally did not arise.

So far as the British police were concerned, the evidence found in Kent's room was such as to convince them of the necessity of detaining him at Brixton Prison pending investigation of the use he had made of the documents in his possession and the true implications of his connection with Anna Wolkoff. Ambassador Kennedy, with the consent of the Department of State, agreed to Kent's detention.

On May 28 a representative of Scotland Yard informed the Embassy that investigations were proceeding, that the case became progressively more complex, and that it could not be cleared up quickly. It was believed, however, that there would be a case for prosecution against Kent and Anna Wolkoff under the Official Secrets Act of the United Kingdom.

[14689] Kent's trial eventually commenced August 8, 1940, and was attended by the American Consul General. It was held in camera because of the harmful effects to British counter-espionage efforts which were to be anticipated if certain of the evidence became public. Prior to the trial the American Consul General in London had called upon Kent (July 31, 1940) at Brixton Prison. The Consul General informed him that he would be taken to court the following day and formally charged with offense under the Official Secrets Act of the United Kingdom, i. e., obtaining documents for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom which might be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy. The Consul General inquired whether Kent had a lawyer to represent him, to which Kent replied that he had not, and that he had not given the matter any thought. The Consul General advised him that he should be represented by a lawyer and agreed to assist in getting in touch with a suitable solicitor. Kent was subsequently placed in touch with a lawyer, whom he engaged to represent him during the trial.

On October 28, 1940, the jury found Kent guilty of violating the Official Secrets Act. The sentence was postponed until completion of the trial of Anna Wolkoff. On November 7, 1940, Kent was sentenced to 7 years' penal servitude and Anna Wolkoff was sentenced to 10 years. Kent's attorneys [14690] applied for permission to appeal. On February 5, 1941, this application was rejected by a panel of judges which included the Lord Chief Justice.

In reviewing the Kent case it is important to bear in mind the circumstances surrounding it. At the time of Kent's arrest and trial Great Britain was at war and the United States was not. The case involved a group of people suspected of subversive activities. The evidence relating to individuals of the group was inextricably mixed, and the activities of no single suspect could be separated from the activities of the others. The interest of Great Britain in such a case, at a time when it was fighting for its existence, was therefore preeminent. Deep as was the concern of the Government of the United States over a betrayal of trust by one of its employees, it is hardly conceivable that it would have been justified in asking the Government of Great Britain to waive jurisdiction over an American citizen in the circumstances described. Kent was within the jurisdiction of

the British courts, and all the evidence, witnesses, et cetera, were available to the British courts. Moreover, it was, as has been mentioned, in the interest of the United States to have determined immediately on the spot, where the evidence was available, whether or not one of its employees in a position of trust was violating such trust. The question whether the United States will prefer additional charges against [14691] Kent will be decided after his release, from imprisonment in Great Britain and he again comes under the jurisdiction of our courts.

[14692] Senator BREWSTER. What is the disposal of the matter?

Mr. RICHARDSON. It leaves the Tyler Kent business like Mohamet's coffin, halfway between heaven and earth. A request is made of the State Department and they reply that they don't think it relevant. It was discussed three or four times in the committee in detail that that was the position of the State Department. We have never received any committee direction as to what it wanted to do with respect to the position taken by the State Department and it stands there now and we offer it so that the record will show that it, at least, was not overlooked.

The CHAIRMAN. As counsel says this matter was brought up time and time again and no action was taken in the committee. As I recall, nobody ever made a motion to take action. It was left that way.

Senator BREWSTER. If the chairman will permit, each time I brought it up the chairman requested me to defer it and said that the matter would be taken up subsequently.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't recall that.

Senator BREWSTER. Several times you asked me to defer, not to press it.

The CHAIRMAN. I haven't talked to the Senator from Maine about it or in his presence for at least 3 months. The conversations were always in the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. That is right.

[14663] The CHAIRMAN. Not as individuals.

Senator BREWSTER. They were always in the committee. Every time the matter was taken up I stated why I felt it was important for us to have access to this information. And the last time was when we were trying to complete the record, I think some time in February, and we had two or three other matters, the Hull and Stimson matters up, and the chairman suggested that we defer further consideration, that we would take it up subsequently, and I deferred it.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't recall that. But if there is a record of it the record will show it.

Senator BREWSTER. It was an executive session; I don't think we had a record.

The CHAIRMAN. The Kent matter was brought up in open session several times, as I recall. Whatever the record shows I stand by.

Senator BREWSTER. Am I to understand that this matter is now to be ignored? I certainly do not accept the State Department's judgment as to what is relevant after the revelations we had from them on various matters, and I think the record is left in an awkward position, when they are willing for counsel to look at the record and that has not been done, as a result of the committee not taking action.

I now move that counsel be requested to look at the record and report to us whether or not there is anything of [14964] relevancy.

The CHAIRMAN. If that will involve any further hearings and involves an extension of this hearing, so that we cannot complete this record today, as far as I am concerned, as an individual member, I vote against the motion.

Senator BREWSTER. I make that motion.

The CHAIRMAN. In favor of the motion?

Senator BREWSTER. Aye.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Senator BREWSTER. That makes the record very clear. One more count in the indictment.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not indicting you.

Mr. LANE. Mr. Chairman, with respect—

Senator BREWSTER. I would like to have a roll call on that.

I move that the counsel shall comply with the suggestion of the State Department that the counsel may examine the Kent records in the State Department and report to us whether or not it would appear that they are relevant.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement on that, as I wasn't here before.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to state that Congressman Keefe and Congressman Gearhart, members of this committee, spent [14695] several hours with Tyler Kent, discussed the matter thoroughly, and reported to the committee in executive session that Tyler Kent himself, as well as each of the said members who discussed the matter with Tyler Kent, stated that he knew nothing about Pearl Harbor and couldn't contribute anything.

Senator BREWSTER. I would like to make a little statement.

I do not think that the gentleman from Pennsylvania, or the other members of the committee, saw any evidence as to make us think that statement completes what the situation is.

It was thoroughly understood in executive committee discussions, and I think in the record as well, that there were some twelve to fifteen hundred messages between a certain naval person, otherwise known as Winston Churchill, and Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, which were items about which a great deal of the preliminaries to this world war evolved, and it is a fair presumption that in connection with this affair and the alleged theft of certain of these documents that the State Department records will disclose these communications which never have been made available to this committee.

Whether or not they have a relevancy to the preliminaries to our becoming involved in the war could only be determined by investigation. That has been clearly and repeatedly stated as the reason why I felt this record should be looked over.

I have never been interested in Mr. Tyler Kent or in his evidence. I have been offered an opportunity to talk with [14696] Mr. Tyler Kent and I have not been interested. But I am interested in what the record of the State Department shows as to these communications. And I think that this committee is making very clear their desire to leave certain dark recesses unexplored in their continued refusal to even permit counsel to examine this record and the other records of the State Department in this connection.

Mr. MURPHY. Senator Barkley?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Senator Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. Aye.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Affirmative one; negative three.

The CHAIRMAN. The motion is lost.

Go ahead.

Mr. LANE. With reference to the requests which have been made on the record by members of the committee throughout the hearings and with reference to the requests they have made in writing, counsel is in a position to state that except for those brought to our attention just prior to this time, in this meeting, all of the requests have been answered by the various departments, one way or another. Those in writing from the various members were in general answered in [14697] writing by the counsel to the various committee members, transmitting the replies of the Department. Those that were on the record we tried to answer by putting the material either in the record itself or advising the member who asked the question and asking whether he desired that the information be placed in the record.

Senator BREWSTER. I understand your statement on the Kent affair was in the record, was it; your statement of the discussions and the letter was put in?

Mr. LANE. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, in continuation of making the record complete, I should like to call the committee's attention to a letter from the War Department under date of April 29, 1946, with reference to a request of Senator Brewster of April 16; a letter of April 30, 1946, to me from Grace G. Tully, which is self-explanatory; together with a letter of May 3, 1946, to me from the Secretary of State, signed by Herbert S. Marks, which is self-explanatory; letter of May 13, 1946, from Commander Baecher of the Navy Department in response to my request of April 25, 1946, which is self-explanatory.

May they be extended on the record?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[14698]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON,

Room 4D761, The Pentagon, 29 April, 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

With reference to your memorandum of April 25 forwarding Senator Brewster's request of April 16 for all communications between the British Government in London and our Government in Washington on November 25, 26 and 27, 1941, a search of the War Department files discloses no such communications.

/s/ ROBERT M. DIGGS,
Captain, AUS.

13 MAY 1946.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to your request dated April 25, 1946, for "copies of communications concerning Japan and/or the Far East which were transmitted between the British Government in London and our Government in Washington on November

25, 26 and 27, 1941, and which now appear in the Navy Department files", [14699] you are advised that a search of the pertinent files of the Navy Department reveals no dispatches of this nature.

There are, however, in Navy files, messages between the Navy Department and the British Admiralty for 25, 26 and 27 November 1941, copies of which were furnished prior counsel on 14 November 1945, as follows:

November 251005Z	Admiralty to OpNav
November 251114Z	Admiralty to OpNav
November 251205Z	Admiralty to CNO
November 251733	OpNav to Admiralty
November 252229	Admiralty to Spenavo
November 261722A	Admiralty to OpNav
November 262251	OpNav to Spenavo for Admiralty
November 270015Z	Admiralty to OpNav
November 271250Z	Admiralty to OpNav

You will probably recall from our conversations and the correspondence of the undersigned with prior counsel, that in view of the understanding between the Navy Department and the British Admiralty, none of the messages referred to above, nor any others between the Navy and the Admiralty, should be made public until first there has been obtained the consent of the British Admiralty. The obtaining of such consent may possibly require a considerable period of time. Since it is not known whether you desire that there be obtained the consent of the [14700] British Admiralty to the publication of the above mentioned messages, no proceedings will be initiated by the Navy toward that end unless and until further advice is received from you.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 3, 1946.

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: I refer to your letter of April 25, 1946 requesting "copies of communications concerning Japan and/or the Far East which were transmitted between the British Government in London and our Government in Washington on November 25, 26, and 27, 1941".

Enclosed are photostatic copies of four documents which are being furnished in accordance with your request. After a careful search of the Department of State files, these documents, other than those already furnished to the Joint Committee, appear to be the only communications between the United States and the British Governments relating to Japan and/or the Far East covering the three days specified. The documents which have already been furnished are the following:

- (1) Conversation between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador, which attached memorandum [14701] from the British Embassy, November 25, 1941 (Exhibit 18);
- (2) Message "For the President from the Former Naval Person", November 26, 1941 (Exhibit 23); and
- (3) Conversation between Under Secretary of State and the British Ambassador, November 27 1941 (Exhibit 18).

Sincerely yours,

/s/ HERBERT S. MARKS,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

The Honorable SETH W. RICHARDSON,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States

5532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(The documents referred to follow :)

[14701-A]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

Subject:

1. British parallel action desired re our export policy to French Indo-China.
2. Desire of French ship in Philippines for bunkers.

Participants:

Mr. Thorold—British Embassy
Mr. Hallett Johnson—Department of State

Copies:

DE Mr. Bunn
A-A Mr. Reinstein

I referred to Mr. Thorold's letter to Mr. Reinstein of November 19, 1941, and said that Mr. Reinstein was studying all possible means to prevent the shipment of cotton to French Indo-China and that a communication would soon be prepared in this regard.

I then informed Thorold that our authorities in the Philippines have been informed that we do not desire that any commodities other than foodstuffs be licensed for export to French Indo-China and said that we would be glad if the British can see fit to take parallel action.

Thorold gave the following background with regards to British exports to Indo-China:

Before the Japanese went into Indo-China, the British made what is known as the Decoux Agreement. Under this agreement Indo-China agreed to export its commodities through normal trade channels and to normal destinations. In return, England agreed, apart from certain strategic commodities to maintain normal trade with Indo-China. The purpose of this agreement was to prevent the diversion of Indo-China exports from Hong Kong, Singapore, and France, to Japan and to make possible a continuance of rubber shipments to this country. The chief value of the agreement to the British was that through it rice was secured for British possessions. The agreement has not, however, been adequately carried out since the export of rubber has been diverted from the U. S. A. to Japan or to North Africa. The British have now cut off the export of oil to Indo-China and have gradually whittled down other exports.

Thorold will convey our suggestion regarding parallel action to London and let us know upon receipt of reply. He believes that the reply will be favorable except that the British will probably desire to continue to export to Indo-China sufficient jute sacks for the rice still being exported from Indo-China to Hong Kong and Singapore for the Straits Settlements and the Dutch East Indies.

In conclusion Thorold brought up another question. A french ship has applied in the Philippines for sufficient bunkers for the voyage to Shanghai and back to Indo-China. This ship is carrying coal from Indo-China to Shanghai for the use of a public utilities corporation, the Shanghai Power Company. Thorold said he understood the State Department was interested in the British viewpoint as to the propriety of the ship being bunkered in the Philippines and added that the British have no objection but wondered whether the question had been studied in the Department from the point of view of the desirability of facilitating the export of coal from Indo-China.

DE: HJ: FBS

/s/ HJ HALLETT JOHNSON.

[14701-B]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

NOVEMBER 25, 1941.

Subject: Aid Needed by Thailand

PARTICIPANTS:

British Ambassador, the Viscount Halifax;
Under Secretary, Mr. Welles.

Copies to: S, AA-, PA/D, Eu, PA/H, FE

The British Ambassador called to see me this evening at his request.

The Ambassador said he wished to discuss with me an urgent instruction he had received from his Government concerning Thailand. A message received by the

British Foreign Office from Sir Josiah Crosby, the British Minister in Bangkok, gave as the opinion of the latter that the Thai Government was again becoming very shaky and that unless some practical action were taken by Great Britain and the United States, the Japanese influence would again become preponderant.

The Ambassador said that the aviation gasoline and the artillery given to the Thai Government by the British had been regarded by the former as completely insufficient and had had no appreciably beneficial effect. He stated that the Thai Government was urgently desirous of obtaining airplanes. I replied that it was the case it would seem to me that the British might use some of the planes allocated by the United States to Great Britain which are now in Singapore and make these available to the Thai Government without publicity by flying them in at night. The Ambassador said that the trouble was that the British Government urgently needed all the airplanes they could get from us for use in Singapore. I said that that was the situation with respect to the United States since, as the Ambassador knew, we were building up as rapidly as possible our air strength in the Philippines, and I had been informed by both General Marshall and Admiral Stark that the planes we had in the Philippines are infinitely more valuable to us there than they would be in Thailand.

The Ambassador then suggested on behalf of his Government that the situation might be ameliorated by a credit of \$10,000,000 to Thailand by the United States. I said that this matter would be given immediate consideration.

/s/ SW.

U: SW: GES

[14701-C]

[Telegram received]

ALH This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

London

Dated November 27, 1941.

Rec'd 8:30 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington,

5727, November 27, 12 p. m.

Department's telegram 4222, October 3; Embassy's despatch 2127, November 19.

Ministry Economic Warfare is now making a special study of Japan's war potential and as a part of a much larger work on Japan's economic and industrial position has completed a preliminary survey, copies of which are being forwarded with Embassy's despatch No. 2195, November 27. Ministry feels that this preliminary survey fails to answer the main question of how far Japanese industry is in a position to maintain military forces under blockade conditions and would greatly appreciate Department's cooperations in assembling any information already available in Washington on the following points:

- (1) Iron and steel production Japan, Korea, Manchukuo and North China.
- (2) Iron ore production particular in Manchukuo and Korea. Present annual production and future planned production from the Tungpientsao deposits in South-east Manchuria and the Mosan deposits in Korea.
- (3) Details of blast furnaces, steel furnaces, rolling mills and coke ovens. (a) installed during recent years, (b) under construction.
- (4) Position of coke supply for iron and steel industry. Are deposits of reputedly good coking coal at Tungpientsao being exploited and what is the production and planned production? When is this coal shipped to (*)?
- (5) What quantities of iron ore are being obtained from China—Tayeh mines in Central China and from North China?
- (6) Synthetic oil production. (a) present and estimated future output, (b) difficulties in obtaining the necessary coal, (c) any interference with development through stoppage of German machinery supplies.
- (7) Is there any shortage of mining labor? Are there difficulties in securing Northern Chinese and Korean labor for coal and iron mines in Manchukuo and Korea?
- (8) To what extent has morale been affected by (a) shortages of goods for civilian consumption and of the increasing restrictions thereon, (b) the rationing of rice and enforced mixing with other cereals, (c) any shortages of oil affecting the fishing industry?
- (9) Transport. (a) Is the railway system being overworked and is the equipment showing any signs of deterioration, (b) is the transport of essential goods being unduly delayed?

(10) Japanese mining activities in Indochina or Thailand particularly as regards exploitation of manganese deposits and phosphates in Tonkkin (urgently required).

(11) Stock position. (a) What stocks of war materials especially nonferrous metals have been accumulated, (b) what is the public warehousing position. Are there difficulties in finding storage space?, (c) have large stocks of scrap iron been accumulated in recent years? If so where is it stored and what area cover?

(12) Production of explosives. British officials believe better information is available in United States on the phenol position and suggest that the Monsanto Chemical Company might be helpful as regards synthetic phenol.

(13) Automobile industry. (a) estimated production, (b) extent of assistance in production of tanks and aircraft.

These questions have also been discussed with Military Attache who is advising G-2 War Department.

WINANT.

[Copy]

[14701-D]

NOVEMBER 25, 1941.

Mr. R. J. STOPFORD,

Financial Counselor, British Embassy.

MY DEAR MR. STOPFORD: I refer to Mr. Hall's letter of October 2 regarding exports of cotton to Japan.

No licenses for the exportation of raw cotton to Japan were issued by the Treasury Department in October. As has been previously indicated to the Embassy, no such licenses were issued in September.

Official figures for exports of cotton to China are not available as yet. Preliminary figures obtained from the Treasury Department indicate shipments to all of China during September of 155,120 pounds, values at \$27,037. No division of this figure between occupied and unoccupied areas is available. Shipments of cotton to occupied China during October are tentatively estimated at 300,537 pounds, valued at \$50,045.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON.

3000 CONNECTICUT AVENUE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., April 30, 1946.

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: After receiving your letter of April 25th, I again went through the files of the late President Roosevelt and I find the only communications between our government and the British Government on the dates you mention were sent to your Committee. They are as follows:

[14702] Message from the Former Naval Person to the President, dated November 26, 1941, and signed by Ambassador Winant. I quote the beginning of the message—"Your message about Japan received today. Also full accounts from Lord Hallifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some comments."

Copy of a "Memorandum of Conversation", dated November 25, 1941—Subject "Suggested changes in Modus Vivendi" which Secretary Hull had with the British Ambassador, and attached to it a memorandum given to Secretary Hull by the British Ambassador.

Also, I find a message from the President to the Former Naval Person, dated November 24, 1941, which starts as follows: "On November 20th the Japanese Ambassador communicated to us his proposals for a Modus Vivendi".

I hope the above information will be of some help to you.

Very sincerely yours,

(S) GRACE G. TULLY.

Honorable SETH W. RICHARDSON,

General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,

201 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

P. S. I am sorry but I have no record of any telephone communications which might have taken place on any of these dates.

[14703]

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
May 20, 1946.

Senator OWEN BREWSTER

Room 248, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: Reference is made to your letter of April 16, 1946, in which you suggested that the Committee should have available all communications between the British Government in London and our Government in Washington on November 25th, 26th and 27th of 1941, including any trans-Atlantic telephone communications during those days. Reference is also made to my memorandum to you dated April 17, 1946, concerning your request. There are enclosed herewith the following replies to your request:¹

1. Reply of Miss Grace G. Tully concerning the files of the late President Roosevelt.
2. Reply of the Department of State, with attached photostats of documents.
3. Reply of the War Department.
4. Reply of the Navy Department.

Unless you desire that some of this material should become a part of the committee record, I do not contemplate offering it in evidence. I shall depend upon you to advise me as to your wishes in the matter.

Yours very truly,

(S) SETH W. RICHARDSON,
General Counsel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. A request was made of me to ascertain from the War Department whether any copy of the Stimson diary, so-called, was in the possession of the War Department, and on May 22, 1946, I contacted the War Department and I have here the written statement of Capt. Robert N. Diggs, representing the War Department, as follows:

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

With reference to your oral request today for a copy of Secretary Stimson's diary, I am advised by the Office of the Secretary of War that the diary was not regarded as an official War Department record, and that the War Department has no copy of it.

That, I think, completes all of the record that we have. That would complete all requests and all other sources which are identified in the record except as we had the discussion [14705] this morning.

I have this to say to the committee, that we have received from the Printing Office two copies of the page proofs of the exhibits. They are the only two copies we have to date in our office. These two copies of all exhibits to date have been placed in folders, and are plainly marked for the purpose of facilitating examination of them. They are available for any member of the committee who wants to use them. That, of course, is preliminary to the final copies of all.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all counsel has to submit by way of evidence?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. When will the printed copies, do you think, be available; what is the latest estimate?

Mr. LANE. We have the entire transcript up to today's hearing in page-proof form. It has to be footnoted to take care of the requests and the answers, to tie them together. That has been done but it hasn't been revised by the Printing Office. We have in page-proof form all of the exhibits up to those introduced today and it is anticipated that as soon as the Printing Office can handle the material introduced today they will be in shape to furnish a final print.

¹ Printed immediately preceding this document.

The CHAIRMAN. How many bound volumes will the testimony and the exhibits all make up when finally printed?

Mr. LANE. We estimate 39 volumes, Senator.¹

[14706] The CHAIRMAN. I hope we can adjourn Congress sometime during July so I can spend the rest of the year reading them.

Senator BREWSTER. I still am not clear as to when you think those might be available.

Mr. LANE. It probably won't be before 3 weeks from today.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean all of them?

Mr. LANE. All.

The CHAIRMAN. There will be some available?

Mr. LANE. The prior proceedings have been set in type and page-proofed. There is a copy in the office of each member of the committee and the entire transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee doesn't have to wait until they are bound up in printed form to have them available.

Mr. LANE. No, sir. However the committee doesn't have all copies of the exhibits. We have these two copies that are complete.

Senator BREWSTER. There was some question about the military intelligence reports. Do you know about those that were requested? I have a copy of it here. I don't know whether this has been put in the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I don't know about that.

Mr. LANE. I don't believe that is in the record. I have never seen it before.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no objection to putting these [14707] in the record as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they?

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is entitled "Military Intelligence Estimate, January 1 to July 1, 1941," prepared by G-2 of the War Department.

Senator BREWSTER. We have the last 6 months in. I thought this should be in. Those are not complete. On what basis they were selected I do not know. I don't know whether those relate to the Far East. Do you know what the basis was?

Mr. MASTEN. I have never seen them before, Senator. I understood they had been gotten through a request of yours.

Senator BREWSTER. They skip around.

The CHAIRMAN. How long has this been available?

Mr. MASTEN. Either Mr. Hannaford or Mr. Gesell had them and sent them to Senator Brewster, about 3 or 4 months ago.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Apparently Mr. Greaves² presented it here. Where did he get it?

Mr. RICHARDSON. From Senator Brewster's office, undoubtedly.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought where a Senator made a request through the committee that the document came back to the committee, not just to the member who made the request.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, it has happened that where [14708] a committee member made a request for some documentary evidence, the moment it came in, for facility, it was transmitted to that member. Now, this has undoubtedly come in under the earlier regime and I have never seen it or had my attention called to it. Since this is all official I see no reason for not putting it in the record.

¹ The complete record of this Committee comprises 39 parts.

² Percy Greaves, an assistant to Senator Brewster.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection to it being put in. I was curious as to why a document like that would come in months ago and show up on the last day.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I can't help you on that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Without objection let it be printed.

Mr. LANE. We ask that be given Exhibit No. 182.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 182.")

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all counsel has to offer?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think that completes the record.

Just one moment. Let me be clear on this matter of Senator Brewster's request.

If those documents that are asked for in his letter to me are included in the record as of this date——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you mean Senator Brewster or Senator Ferguson?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Senator Ferguson.

[14709] If they are to be included in the record we will then endeavor to get the documents and see that they go in physically.

The CHAIRMAN. They are, as I understood it, to be included in the record as of today.¹

Of course, there is this disadvantage about that, and it applies to everything else that goes in, that we haven't had a chance to see it, none of the committee knows what the documents contain, or what statements are made. We are rather blind on that subject. But in order that nobody can be prejudiced by it, it was understood that that would go in as of today and be a part of today's record.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to whether or not all of the interrogatories, some 238 of Senator Ferguson to Secretary Stimson, are now a part of the record?

Mr. MASTEN. You mean those not answered?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. LANE. They are all in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All asked, whether answered or not, all are made a part of the record.

Mr. LANE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That also holds true of Secretary Hull?

The CHAIRMAN. The same applies.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I want to make a speech.

The CHAIRMAN. Here?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

[14710] The CHAIRMAN. This is not the proper time. [Laughter.]

You have something you want to say?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. I will not tax the time of the committee unduly.

I think the unusual if not irregular character of the situation is illustrated by the comment of the chairman when he spoke about having this material go into the record which none of the committee members have seen. We have sat here and seen a vast stack go in, which, so far as I know, no member has seen, or had opportunity to

¹ Exhibit No. 183.

see. I think that officially illustrates the somewhat unjudicial character of the termination of this. I would not call it a legislative divergence of the minority, but it certainly departs very considerably from the original program of the committee and from the scope of the investigation, which has covered a lot of ground, had a lot of latitude, and brought to light a lot of things.

On the other hand there have been certain twilight zones and brown-outs into which the committee has not been permitted to penetrate under the policy pursued by those who control the action.

Before the record closes I want to make it clear that I do not feel that we have covered the ground we should have. We have gotten 75 or 80 percent of what we went after and it has been a matter of great interest and value to the American people and has carried out to that extent the very lofty purpose [14711] which the chairman outlined when he presented his original resolution some time ago.

On the other hand we have faced these problems, and I want to just enumerate three or four of the items which it seems to me leave us still not in a sufficiently good position to pass finally on the matters which we were authorized and directed to carry out.

One is the matter of the Philippine situation, which was clearly within the scope of the committee as stipulated by the chairman and the Senator from Illinois in colloquy at the time the resolution was introduced; and outside of the discussion with Admiral Hart when he appeared in connection with certain other matters that has not been at all explored.

In my judgment it has a vitally important bearing on the circumstances surrounding Pearl Harbor.

The refusal to have the Grew diary and the Stimson diary available for examination of the committee I feel is a further unfortunate aspect of the matter as it seems to me clear from what excerpts we have been permitted to see, that they had a vitally important bearing, and I do not believe that this committee can fulfill its functions by permitting any other individuals, either inside or outside of Government, to determine what is and what is not relevant. I believe that is a matter for the determination of the committee.

The unfortunate aspect of Mr. Hull's illness is something [14712] which is clear and we have done the best we could to meet that.

The telephone communications between London and Washington during the period before Pearl Harbor is something which we have not been able, apparently, to run down. Miss Tully advises she has no record. It seems to me incredible that communications of that importance between the heads of state were not made a matter of record. If they were not made a matter of record it seems to me there was serious dereliction. If they were made a matter of record I believe that this committee should have knowledge regarding them.

I think that covers some of the items. There are many other unexplored fields in the higher echelons which it seems to me most unfortunate that the committee has not been able to explore and expose.

I want to conclude by saying that I do not feel this investigation should be terminated at this time or at this point and I have so voted consistently in the committee. I wanted this to be a matter of public record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to state in connection with what the Senator from Maine has stated that he thinks that this committee has made as exhaustive, meticulous, careful, an investigation of the pertinent or related facts connected with the Pearl Harbor attack as any committee ever made of anything in connection with an episode, incident, or the [14713] official conduct of men in any branch of our Government.

At the time this resolution was introduced by me I was interrogated by Senator Lucas as to whether it was broad enough to include an inquiry into the Philippine situation, which involved an attack the following day after Pearl Harbor, and I stated that it was, and I still maintain that the resolution was broad enough to do that.

The committee has never taken any action to follow up that. Nobody on the committee ever made a motion that we go to the Philippines or that we investigate the Philippine end of it.

Evidently the committee felt that after going into the immediate related facts pertaining to Pearl Harbor that it was not essential or necessary that we go into the Philippine end of it, which may or may not have involved somebody who happened to be in charge in the Philippines at the time.

So far as these records of telephone conversations are concerned, I think this committee, and counsel, have felt, and the President of the United States, who issued orders with reference to the examination of documents in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and other departments, and in the White House, realized that Miss Tully, who had been in charge of those documents, was a reputable, responsible woman of long experience and high character, I think the committee felt that she had brought to the attention of counsel everything [14714] in the President's papers that had any relationship to this investigation.

So far as the diaries of Mr. Grew and Secretary Stimson are concerned, when Mr. Grew was on the stand he was asked by the committee with respect to his diaries kept in Japan consisting of some 13 volumes, many of which contained private comments and private entries that had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor, and the question was raised, although the committee never took a vote on it, whether the diary should be requested, as I recall now, but the Chair would say, speaking for himself, that he would not have voted, and would not now vote, to require Mr. Grew to give his diary, his private diary, kept over a long period of years, in his capacity as a diplomat, to make it public and exhibit it before this committee.

The same applies to Mr. Stimson. If he had been able to appear as a witness members of the committee might have examined him about entries in his diary or about statements that he was able to refresh his mind on from reading his diary. But my attitude about compelling him to make public his private diary, from which he has taken anything that has a pertinency or relationship to this investigation, I certainly would not have voted, as a member, to require him to make that diary public.

I am perfectly willing to take full responsibility as an individual member for that attitude. That is my attitude. I [14715] think that we have made a thorough, complete, broad investigation of this whole matter. I have no doubt that we have, as part of the evidence

in this record, voluminous as it is, many things that really have no bearing upon the attack on Pearl Harbor, because they have gone in because members requested them. If they had any relationship to it, well and good, and if they didn't, why, no harm was done.

I feel that this committee has devoted itself assiduously, in the midst of great work in other fields of legislation, to the task set for it by the Congress of the United States, and personally I feel that it has fulfilled its duty to the fullest extent expected or required by the country.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to state that Ambassador Grew, former Ambassador Grew, stated that if his complete diary were to be placed in the record that it would seriously impair the work of every American diplomat and Ambassador or representative in the foreign field, and that it would seriously interfere with the protection of American security in future years, and for that reason I would have voted, had it come to a vote, against insisting upon the presentation of the diary.

Senator BREWSTER. I would not want anything I have said to infer a lack of appreciation of the amount of time which [14716] the chairman and the other very busy members and very responsible members of both bodies have given.

In my experience I have never witnessed more time and diligence given to a specific matter than in this case and I think that should continue to be a matter of record.

On the other hand, I do feel, as I stated, about this unexplored field. I am a little disturbed at the chairman making a point of the fact that this has not been made an issue or a matter of a motion, so in order to correct the record I would like to complete the record and to make the three motions which, apparently, are essential in order to leave no doubt as to the position of the members.

So I move that the committee should further explore the occurrences at Manila and Clark Field and the Philippines on December 7 and December 8, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose from a technical standpoint, in view of the action the committee has taken about closing the hearings today, I could declare that motion out of order, but I will not do so.

Senator BREWSTER. The hearing and the record has not been closed.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing and the record has been closed. We will vote on it. Do you want a roll call?

Senator BREWSTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. As many in favor of the motion say "aye"; [14717] opposed, "no"; the motion is lost.

Senator BREWSTER. I move that the committee request that the Grew diary be made available for examination of the committee and counsel to determine the relevant portions which can be made a part of the record without detriment to the public interest.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I state that means asking Mr. Grew to produce 10 volumes.

The CHAIRMAN. As many in favor of that motion say "aye"; opposed "no." Motion lost.

Senator BREWSTER. I move the same request be made for the Stimson diary, under the same circumstances and conditions.

[14718] I point out I do not contemplate the publicity which the other gentleman has mentioned, but it shall be a matter for the committee to determine as to the relevancy and importance.

The CHAIRMAN. As many in favor of the motion say "aye"; opposed "no." Motion lost.

I should have said a while ago when I was responding to the suggestions of the Senator from Maine, that the committee feels very grateful to counsel, who have, in all cases, abandoned their legal pursuits, their law practice, and the peace and quietude which they would have otherwise enjoyed, to assist this committee; first, in the case of Mr. Mitchell and his assistants, Mr. Hannaford, Mr. Masten, and Mr. Gesell who, I think, in the gathering of evidence and in going through the records and the comprehensive preparation of this investigation, did as magnificent a piece of work as was ever done by any counsel for any committee in the Congress of the United States.

Unfortunately, Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell were compelled to retire from the investigation because of their private interests, and the probability, as has turned out to be the fact, that the hearing would drag on beyond the time which they could devote to it; and in January, I think it was, we secured the services of Mr. Seth Richardson, and Mr. Kaufman, of New York, and others, to take up where Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell and others left off, to pursue this investigation to its ultimate conclusion. It was a difficult task which they assumed in [14719] stepping into the investigation, in the midst of it, and grabbing up the loose threads and the continuity of the testimony, in order to move on with it, and they did that in a manner which I feel sure is eminently satisfactory to the committee, with a devotion to duty that has never been excelled to my knowledge; and, as a matter of fact, notwithstanding the change of counsel we lost very little time by reason of that. So that the testimony went on continuously and has now been completed.

I want to thank the counsel, all of them, from the top to the bottom, both sets and all sets, and all their assistants, the girls that worked with them and for them. I want to thank the Federal Bureau of Investigation who were assigned to us by Mr. Hoover for the very efficient and outstanding work they have done.

I wish also to take advantage of this opportunity to thank the press who have been diligent in their attendance upon the hearings, who have been fair in reporting the hearings. Obviously, in a long-drawn-out hearing like this, over months, it is impossible for the newspapers to carry the testimony in full so that the people who read can get a full account of the testimony and what really happened. That is perfectly obvious and it is inherent in the newspaper field. It isn't possible that they could print every day all that everybody said. But the press has been diligent, it has been fair, it has been, I think, constructive, and I want to, on behalf of the committee, thank the press and the reporters who have set with us here since last September [14720] in undertaking to make the public aware of what we were doing and let the public make up its own mind about this episode out in the Pacific Ocean, which they may have done by now or will do when the final conclusion is reached.

I think one of the valuable things, whatever else may happen, or whatever else may be said about the investigation, whatever the report may contain, one of the valuable things and maybe the most

valuable of all is the fact that all these people involved in this unfortunate affair have had an opportunity to tell their story in public and to have it reported so that the people could read it, hear it, and make up their own minds with respect to it.

That has been a real service for which I am sure the committee in its entirety is grateful.

I was about to include another group. The liaison representatives from the War, Navy, and State Departments who have from the beginning worked with counsel and with the committee in finding and sorting the official testimony and records which we have called for. They have been very efficient and always at the beck and call of the committee and its counsel. We are very grateful to them.

I also wish to include in what I said about the press the radio. That is a new field of intelligence and information. It is so important that we have set apart the radio press, and they are recognized as a part of the informational set-up in [17421] the United States.

All, radio, press, liaison, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and everybody who has assisted the committee, have our everlasting gratitude; and if I have left out anybody, consider yourself included.

Senator BREWSTER. As a representative of the minority, and since we have had some matters on which we haven't agreed, I wish to associate myself with the expressions of appreciation of our distinguished chairman and particularly wish to thank the press who I think have done an extraordinary job and have given the American public a fair analysis.

I also wish to thank our distinguished counsel and his associates who have labored in season and out of season in what was sometimes seemingly an impossible situation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now that we are all in accord, it would be a good time to close.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The Chair will announce that today officially closes the record of this hearing, and the committee will now stand adjourned, subject to call by the Chair, and I hope we will be able to call you early next week.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p. m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

[14722]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, MAY 31, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., in room 312, Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, and Lucas and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; John E. Masten, Logan J. Lane, and Edward P. Morgan of counsel, for the joint committee.

[14723] The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, will you come around?
Admiral Stark.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I want to explain for the record why I called this meeting. It was called rather suddenly. I regret that it had to be that way because some of the members are away on account of Memorial Day and haven't returned.

Senator Ferguson and Senator Brewster are both away. Congressman Murphy, Congressman Clark. Congressman Gearhart is out in California. Congressman Keefe is here. He told me to go ahead, that he would come over as soon as he could, but not to wait for him.

The reason I called this meeting is that 2 or 3 days ago Admiral Stark called over to the Capitol and gave me a letter, which I will read for the record:

26 MAY 1946.

Hon. ALBEN W. BARKLEY,

*Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack (S. Con. Res. 27), Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: I have testified before the committee that the President did not call me on the night of 6 December (preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December). I also [14724] stated that it was of course possible that I might be mistaken on this after over 4 years lapse of time, but that I recalled no such call.

I am now informed that I did talk to the President over the telephone on 6 December, and hasten to put this before the committee in order to set the record straight.

The circumstances are as follows: Last night (Saturday 25 May) Capt. H. D. Krick, USN, now on duty in the Bureau of Ordnance (Captain Krick had been my flag lieutenant in my last sea command) and his wife made a social call on Mrs. Stark and me. During the course of the evening Captain Krick asked me if I recalled the evening of 6 December—when I replied "No" he recalled

that he and his wife had dinner with Mrs. Stark and me at my quarters, and that we had then—the four of us—gone to see The Student Prince.

Captain Krick also recalled that on returning to my quarters after the theater to pick up his car they, the Kricks, had come into the house for a while and that I was told by one of the servants that the White House had called me; that I then went upstairs to talk to the President (the White House phone was in my house on the second floor). Krick further stated that when I came downstairs after the phone call I said to him in substance that the situation with Japan was very serious.

I felt I should put this matter before the committee [14725] immediately. I have again searched my memory for this phone call and I can only repeat that I do not recall it.

Very truly yours,

[S] H. R. STARK.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Richardson, you may proceed.

I might state before you start that Admiral Stark advises me that he is leaving this afternoon for a long delayed important engagement in London and that he will be gone 3 or 4 weeks; therefore it seemed desirable that we get this in the record before he leaves, in order to accommodate him as well as the committee.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, your arrangements for this trip abroad long antedated the discovery of the knowledge of Lieutenant Krick of this episode of Saturday evening, December 6, did it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes; months ago.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So that your trip away has no reference whatever to any of the transactions in connection with Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. Not the slightest. I had been asked for this trip last October and I refused, not being able to leave at that time, and the date was then set the latter part of June which I accepted months ago.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Does this episode which the lieutenant refers to in your letter refresh your recollection at all today, Admiral?

[14726] Admiral STARK. No, sir; it does not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You still have no recollection whatever of any events of that evening?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you have no recollection of going upstairs and using the White House phone in response to any report made to you by any of your servants?

Admiral STARK. No; I do not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The evidence, as you know, indicates here that at an earlier time on that evening, when the President was made familiar with the first 13 parts of this now celebrated 14-part message, he characterized the message and then sought to get in touch with you, received a report that you were at the theater, and said he would contact you later.

From that if we assume that he wished to talk to you about this 13-part message, it would be reasonable that any message to you from the White House that night would have communicated to you the existence of that message, wouldn't you think so?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You will recall the last time you were on the stand you suggested that your visit to your office on Sunday morning was in accordance with your practice to go to your office on Sunday morning, while you were uncertain as to the precise time, being of

the opinion yourself that it might have been a little later because it was Sunday morning—

[14727] Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON (continuing). That you didn't go to your office for the purpose of seeing a 13-part message because you had no recollection of having known there was such?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the first time you saw the message, or the fact that it existed came to your attention, is when you found it in your office when you went there that morning?

Admiral STARK. That was my recollection.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This discussion, with your letter, the detailed report he gives you, doesn't refresh your recollection with reference to any of those particulars?

Admiral STARK. It does not.

I might say in that connection that I talked very frequently with the President. I think you will all be surprised to know how much, how minutely he was following every detail, and how fully I kept him acquainted with anything going on that was of any interest that came to my attention in connection with naval matters and international matters at that time. I frequently called the President along about a quarter after 6 in the evening, which I knew was about the time he was likely to be finished signing his mail, and I frequently called him, and I mean frequently, not only at that time but after the war was on, in the late evening, perhaps around half past 11, after I had gone over the contents of [14728] my brief case, because at that time the President was likely to be free. I would call and ask if he were free and talk to him over any items of interest.

That went on continuously. So there was nothing unusual in my talking to the President that time of night, not the slightest. I can only assume that when the President called me that he mentioned this note that we had received from the Japanese, that he did not, certainly did not, impress me that it was anything that required action; I took none. I am certain that he gave me no directive or I would have carried it out. It would have been the simplest matter in the world for me to have called up the Department and said to send out that message if it had been anything that I should have seen. The President, of course, knew that I was going to the office the next morning; I was always there; he called me up Sunday mornings, and I called him up. And in connection with that also it is my recollection that every witness who testified as to the material which the President had before him that evening, the 13 points, has stated that it was nothing but a rehash and nothing which required any action.

I think that was the testimony of both Army and Navy. I remember Ingersoll's particularly, and in talking to him about it later, that there was nothing to it that required any action. I am certain that nothing was indicated to me. [14729] I also testified that when I did see that message, that had I seen it the night before I would have taken no action on it. That was in response to a question by one of the members of the committee. Not only the 13 points but even the fourteenth point, which was different from the rest, and which struck me in particular because it was almost a paraphrase of what I had

included in our message of the 27th and confirmation of what I had sent.

The President was familiar with every move we had made. I kept him fully informed. We were all intensely aware of the seriousness of the situation, watching it just as closely as we could. Even on the 6th we had sent a message authorizing destruction of certain codes to the commanders in the Pacific, stating "Hold on to some", in winding up the message, "until the last minute." Everything we had seen, in our opinion had indicated the tenseness of the situation, that anything might break at any time. In fact, we said so specifically.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, you remember when you were last on the stand the question was asked you whether if you had received any intimation from the President that he thought the 13-part message meant war, that would have been a very important statement to you and one that would have stirred you into action, based on the President's statement?¹

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; if he had said anything to me [14730] about the imminence or anything new, or indicated any action, it would have stirred me into immediate action.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, the testimony indicates that when the President read this message he said, "This means war", or used equivalent language. Would you, from your knowledge of the President and the detail, as you say, with which he followed the events which were transpiring, would it be your presumption now that the President made no such statement to you if he talked to you on the night of December 6?

Admiral STARK. It would be, decidedly. We had, of course, and I think my letter of the 25th indicated that, both the President and Mr. Hull had stated in my presence that they would not be surprised if the Japanese attacked at any time, and I think if the President had made any such statement to me on the night of the 6th that I would have recalled it.

I also remember Beardall's testimony when the fourteenth point was presented the next morning and in which, I believe, he testified to the best of his recollection that the President merely said, well, it looked like a rupture of negotiations. That fourteenth point, of course, was in much stronger, more definite language than the preceding 13.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, the subject of this message and any discussion with reference to it would be within the limitations of magic, would it not?

[14731] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So that any discussion between you and the White House, if Captain Krick is correct, having been about magic, there would be no possibility of discussing with Captain Krick any of the details of your conversation?

Admiral STARK. Oh, no; no, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So that when he told you that you stated that our affairs with Japan were in a very critical condition, or something of that sort, that would be as much comment as you could make, from such a conversation?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think it would. I had made that statement to others.

¹ See p. 5157, *supra*.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, the fact that you didn't say anything to Captain Krick as to the details of your conversation would be entirely in accord with the way you would have to handle any information that had anything to do with magic?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was Captain Krick one of those who would have any knowledge of magic or transactions that were passing, magic interceptions?

Admiral STARK. I think not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, it turned out, did it not, Admiral, that this 14-part message was a very significant and important message?

[14732] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And there were significances with respect to it which if fully appreciated made it of startling importance?

Admiral STARK. Well, we had come to the conclusion previously that we considered Japan likely to attack at any time in any direction. I wouldn't say that it changed any of our previous conceptions. It was a confirmation, if anything.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you include in that estimate any of the significances of the use of the 1 p. m. date?

Admiral STARK. The 1 p. m. date, and again in the light of hindsight—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes; I realize that.

Admiral STARK (continuing). Was different. It set a time and, as you will recall, I was discussing the matter when General Marshall called me, and my first reaction was that we had sent so much, and we had assumed that what we had sent out there was, I previously testified, enough to have everybody fully alerted, it was questionable whether to send anything more, including the message, you remember, which I recalled we sent on the 6th; then, after only a little further reflection I told Marshall to go ahead and send it and to be sure that our people were notified.

I put that in a different category because I think there was nothing in the 14-point message which in one way or another [14733] we had not previously covered.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, it would be your conclusion as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral, that the fact that the President made no mention to you that in his opinion this message meant war, deducing that—he couldn't have, because of the fact you have no such recollection in your memory—

Admiral STARK. That is the assumption, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Plus the fact that when Admiral Wilkinson saw the message, General Miles saw the message, and Beardall saw the message—

Admiral STARK. Admiral Ingersoll.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Beardall saw the message the night before, I mean.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And Secretary Knox saw the message the night before. The fact that nothing immediately was done with reference to that message is because you feel that the message itself was simply a rehash of information which had come before and of which you were already aware?

Admiral STARK. I feel that very definitely; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that if any of those high officers had any different view there would have been a different attitude toward this message?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I think we all felt the same [14734] about it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, the first expression of anything unusual about this message in point of action came with the suggestion of General Marshall with reference to a message that he proposed to send?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have any, when you were examining the message, when you went to your office—I have forgotten your testimony, I am sure you testified on it—were you informed as to any of the possible significance of this 1 o'clock date, from either Kramer's report or the report of any of your aides?

Admiral STARK. No, I was not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And as soon as Captain Krick told of this incident, of his knowledge of this situation, you immediately prepared this letter to the chairman of this committee in order to inform him of this much light, at least, on what happened on Saturday night?

Admiral STARK. I did; yes, sir. When Captain Krick first mentioned this to me, about our having been to the theater that night together, and about my having gone upstairs and talked to the President, which was the natural way for it to have followed through, that the White House had called, my first thought was, well, I can't add anything to this testi- [14735] mony, it doesn't bring up anything which I haven't covered so far as I can, goodness knows I have racked my brains on that evening—why report it—and the more I thought about it the more I realized that this indicated that my testimony was incorrect, the impression of it, and it was quite definite that I had not talked to the President that night; the more I thought of it the more disturbed I became that the committee should have this, the record should have it straight, and I got up around 2 or 3 in the morning, thinking this thing over, and wrote this letter in longhand and had it typed the following day, I sent it for typing on Sunday, got it Monday, and brought it up to Senator Barkley, Monday.

Of course, I am extremely glad it came up. If it had come up after everything was over I never would have felt comfortable about it, I wouldn't have known how to get it before the committee, and I would have felt I couldn't rest until I squared this away.

You may recall—I think you were not here on my first hearing—when I stated that if anything whatsoever came up with regard to Pearl Harbor, that I thought of anything of interest to this committee, that I would report it immediately. That was on the conclusion of my hearings. And this is the only thing that has come up which I have thought any different from what I have previously testified to.

[14736] Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, if the President had told you in his talk with you that night, assuming that you talked to him, and had told you that it was his opinion that this thirteenth-part message meant war, thereby impressed you with his very serious estimate of it, what would have been, in accordance with your custom, the action for you to have then taken, with that information?

Admiral STARK. I don't know, sir, that I would have, that we would have sent anything more. I think that I should have gotten in touch with Ingersoll and with Turner. We had had a conference a few days previously, going over the seriousness of the situation, if there was anything more we could have sent, and, as I say, we practically repeated this fourteenth point, repeated, some days earlier we had sent the same thing. We thought, and the President knew every move that we had made, that we had sent everything possible, on that premise, that war was in the immediate offing.

I don't know that I would have done anything. I couldn't say.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would there have been any customary acceleration of getting the completed message? The evidence indicates that the message was completed around 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning; it then lay without attention until Kramer came down about 7:30, and it passed out of Kramer's hands along about [14737] 9 or 9:30, somewhere in there.

Admiral STARK. At 10:30—Well, the 1 o'clock part.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What I am wondering is whether if you had been apprised it would have been proper and usual to have taken steps to see to it that someone was waiting and ready to receive the full message for the purpose of effectuating such action as might be necessary.

Admiral STARK. Well, I think it might have, sir, if I had had any feeling as you have just represented, I think I should myself.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, let me ask you another odd question. Are you able to state from your recollection of Saturday the 6th that there was not at the White House an extensive conference between the heads of the Army and the heads of the Navy in discussion of matters and things which in part had to do with this fourteenth-part message?

[14738] Admiral STARK. I never had heard of such a conference, I know of nothing now regarding such a conference, I was not present at it, I had never even heard anyone suggest such a thing until it was mentioned here in previous hearings.

My honest opinion is that nothing of the sort took place. It was a complete surprise to Marshall that even the question came up. It was to me. I am certain that I didn't leave the house after the Kricks left. I just can't think of any such thing as happening. Certainly I was not present, and Colonel Knox never mentioned any such thing to me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And despite your inability to recollect detail, such a conference at the White House, under those circumstances, would be so extraordinarily unusual, that don't you think that would at least stand out in your memory, even though you don't remember the details of this evening?

Admiral STARK. I think so, unquestionably.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all the questions I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, had Captain Krick ever said anything to you about this matter that he mentioned last Saturday night, until last Saturday night, when his wife and he were guests of Mrs. Stark and you?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; never. It was out of a clear sky to me.

The CHAIRMAN. You realize that it might seem strange that [14739] a thing like that would escape your memory altogether.

What is your explanation or interpretation of the reason why, if all this happened as he said, that it still doesn't register in your mind?

Admiral STARK. Well, lapse of time, I would say, was certainly an important factor. The immediately following events, which stand out crystal clear, as to some other events; and an awfully busy time since then probably has simply wiped it out.

And I might say there was nothing unusual about the Kricks being with us for any entertainment or otherwise. One's flag lieutenant gets very close to one, and we had been together afloat just previous to my coming ashore for a couple of years, attending many, many functions together, and coming ashore about the same time, and they were often with us.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the fact that you had, as you have testified, frequent White House talks over your direct line with the President, maybe night after night for a period, or as often as several times a week, would that have anything to do with your ability to identify this particular night as against any other night when you had a conversation with the President over the telephone?

Admiral STARK. I think so, because it wasn't something unusual which might stand out. I mean, my talking to the White [14740] House. I would pick up the phone and talk just as freely to the President as I would, almost, pick it up and call my own home.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt at this point. As I told you on the phone when I called I had just then received notice that this meeting was to be held, just a few minutes before 10 o'clock, and I hurried to get here.

The CHAIRMAN. I explained the reason for the sudden call was that Admiral Stark is leaving tonight for London to fulfill a long-delayed engagement, and upon the receipt of this letter I felt that whatever pertained to it ought to go in the record and not simply have the letter filed with the committee.

Mr. KEEFE. I raised the question because I had understood that the hearings had, by action of the committee, been closed, and that the testimony had been closed, and I want to keep the record clear, in the absence of my colleagues, none of whom are present here this morning.

I assume that the chairman felt that it was due propriety that the action heretofore taken by the committee in closing the testimony in this matter should be vacated and set aside in order to permit this testimony to go in, but I wonder if we have established a precedent now that may plague us in the future, because I understood very definitely that the [14741] testimony in this case was closed, definitely closed by vote and action of the committee.

Now, if it is to be reopened for this purpose, it may be perfectly proper to reopen it for some other purpose, and this committee will go on and on.

I want the record to show that I have raised this question. I do not know, I haven't had any notice of action by the committee vacating the previous action closing the testimony, but it seems to me that we ought to keep our record clear, Mr. Chairman.

I don't know whether this testimony amounts to anything or not. I didn't hear the first part of it. I don't know what it is, except what

I heard since I came in, and that doesn't seem to cast very much light on the testimony as it heretofore appears.

Unless Admiral Stark knows when he talked to the President and what the President told him, what they talked about, I don't know that it makes much difference to now confirm the fact that he attended The Student Prince that night.

The CHAIRMAN. All you say is true now, Congressman, that the hearings were closed.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not criticizing the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. This situation was brought suddenly to my attention. The admiral was on the verge of leaving the country [14742] for 3 or 4 weeks, and I felt that in view of what Captain Krick had said to him about it, and will say here in a few minutes when he is called, that it was the part of wisdom to get the committee together, even though all of them couldn't be here, and make this matter of record by public testimony, instead of simply filing Admiral Stark's letter with the committee.

I don't think it sheds any light on it, but Admiral Stark felt, having been told this by Captain Krick, as late as last Saturday night, that he ought to bring it to the attention of the committee, and he having brought it to my attention, I felt whatever was done about it ought to be done publicly and not just hand the letter in to the committee and simply file it.

Mr. KEEFE. I take it, Mr. Chairman, that if the testimony means anything, it means that Admiral Stark now says his memory has or has not been refreshed by reason of his conversations with Captain Krick.

Now, if his memory has not been refreshed by reason of his talks with Captain Krick, his whole testimony, it seems to me, is utterly inconsequential and immaterial.

I am not interested in the fact that Captain Krick comes in and now says that he was at the dinner with Admiral Stark and that they went to the theater and saw The Student Prince, and then went home and had a lunch and Admiral Stark went to [14743] the telephone and talked to someone, and then he left. I don't see that that is of any particular probative value unless those facts related to him will recall to Admiral Stark's mind those facts and the fact that the President did talk to him and what the President said and what was the discussion.

I understand that it doesn't click with him, he doesn't remember any such situation. So under those circumstances, I feel compelled to object to any further repetitious testimony going into this record on a matter that is not of any probative force or value, in view of the fact that the committee has definitely voted to close the testimony, and it would establish a precedent which would clearly offer the opportunity for my colleague, Mr. Brewster, or Senator Ferguson, or somebody else, to plague the committee with offers of testimony that will continue this thing on and on and on.

I have made my statement. That is the way I feel.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair appreciates your statement and cannot controvert it. I mean, all you have said about the matter is undoubtedly accurate.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I want to subscribe to the statements made by the Congressman from Wisconsin. He has said exactly what I was about to say. As he has said, if we are going to continue hearings on this matter, there is no question but what somebody will continue to bring [14744] something forward, and cause delays.

I know that the chairman has been tremendously busy with legislation on the Senate floor, and I think, perhaps—I am not criticizing him—but I think if we had discussed this in executive session we might have accomplished something without this testimony.

I didn't know that we were going to have hearings this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I will state this, that I conferred with counsel of the committee in respect to the proceedings that ought to be had in view of the admiral's letter to me. If we had had all the time that might be available we might have had an executive session and decided it wasn't worth while to even put the letter in the record.

The admiral felt compelled to address the letter to me, in order not to be in a position of holding back something that somebody had told him, and I called the hearing this morning because the admiral is leaving the city and might not be back until we have made our report, or were on the verge of doing so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Might I make this suggestion, Mr. Chairman. Suppose we take the Captain's testimony, which will be very brief, and then if the committee later decides not to use any of this testimony, all right; on the other hand, if they allow it to go in, we have it.

[14745] I would like to state for the record that one of the issues that I think is involved in the record is the fact that about 9:30 on Saturday evening the President sought to get in touch with Admiral Stark. He was unable to do so. There, up to this morning—

The CHAIRMAN. If you will permit, it was about 10:30 when Commander Schulz delivered the message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Whenever that time was.

It, therefore, would stand upon the record as though the President paid no more attention to contacting Admiral Stark, because Admiral Stark remembered nothing of any message from the White House that evening. Apparently, from Captain Krick's testimony, it now becomes definite that there was a communication after Admiral Stark came home from the theater, between Admiral Stark and the President on that evening; so that, so far as the President is concerned, his statement that he would later contact Admiral Stark was accomplished.

I advised the chairman that I thought that that fact should be in the record.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it just shows one thing, that the President was more alert than anybody else.

Mr. KEEFE. Does Admiral Stark recall what the conversation was?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

[14746] Senator LUCAS. He doesn't recall a thing.

Mr. KEEFE. He doesn't recall that they even had a conversation, or that he was called, or anything else?

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor that he went to see The Student Prince.

Senator LUCAS. I don't see how Admiral Stark can go to London this afternoon, in view of the fact that this has been reopened, and in view of the fact that Senator Brewster and Senator Ferguson are not

here; they are the individuals who voted not to close the hearings, and they are the two individuals who are going to have much to say if when they return they don't have a chance to examine Admiral Stark, notwithstanding the fact that he doesn't know anything about the conversation.

I have observed Mr. Brewster, and I say this not because he is absent, but from beginning to end, trying to make—well——

The CHAIRMAN. I might say that I asked Senator Ferguson after the vote in the Senate Wednesday at 5 o'clock if he would be here this morning. He was rushing to catch a plane. And he said he would be here. I learned from his office that he wouldn't be here until this afternoon. And Senator Brewster may be here this afternoon.

The committee can do what it wants to do. I did what I [14747] thought was my duty in calling the meeting, under the circumstances. If the committee wants to postpone the meeting in order to get all the members present, to let them examine into this matter as much as they please, it suits me. I did what seemed to me to be the best thing to do. I didn't feel that, with Admiral Stark on the verge of leaving for London for 3 or 4 weeks, the matter should be withheld from the committee.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I have not talked to Captain Krick, I don't know what he is going to say, but from what has been stated, and what appears in Admiral Stark's letter, there must have been conversation between Admiral Stark and Captain Krick which would inform Captain Krick that the President had called and that the telephone conversation was between Admiral Stark and the President.

Admiral STARK. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, Admiral Stark doesn't remember a thing. He can recall nothing. Therefore the statement of Captain Krick hasn't prodded his recollection at all. I don't see how any great help is being given to the record to have Captain Krick testify that he was out at Admiral Stark's house and that Admiral Stark went to answer the telephone and came back and said "I talked with the President," or something of that kind.

[14748] Admiral STARK. Mr. Chairman, I may state that my feeling is that I couldn't add anything to the record, except to show, as counsel has suggested, that I did talk to the President that night. The record as left showed that, too.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you assume you talked to him from what Captain Krick said?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you don't remember anything about it you are no better off than you would be if Captain Krick didn't say that.

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are assuming that you talked to the President inasmuch as he, Captain Krick, did say that to you?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. And I thought that that fact should be in the record, along the line of thought which counsel has suggested. I don't know of another thing that I could give the committee.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I shall have to insist upon my point, because it seems to me perfectly obvious that it is so unfair to the other members of this committee, in view of the action heretofore taken by the committee, to now reopen this case, without the other

members of the committee being present and given an opportunity to ask any questions [14749] that they see fit to ask.

The chairman will recall, as will the other members, that it has been my purpose to close these hearings and to get on with the report and finish our obligation, and I don't think that this little bit of second-hand testimony would be, on the part of Captain Krick, very important.

The CHAIRMAN. Assuming that, and I don't dispute it, I am sure that you will agree, all members will agree, that having received this letter from Admiral Stark, if I had stuck it in my pocket and suppressed it and not brought it to the attention of the committee, I would have been pilloried not only by certain members of the committee but by others for withholding something that the committee was entitled to.

I have presented the letter. The committee may take such action as they see fit. If it wants to have another meeting, maybe this afternoon, when the other members can be here—I can't assure that.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, I think the suggestion made by counsel is not an unwise one, that we might have Captain Krick now make a statement and subsequently, in executive session, decide whether any of it would go into the record, beyond the bare letter of the admiral, if he wishes it to go into the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I agree with that statement, Mr. [14750] Chairman. I think that probably would be the best course, to hear what Captain Krick has to say, and just suspend the question until a full attendance of the committee can be had.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain Krick is here in the Department in Washington. He can be obtained if the committee wants him at any time.

Is that agreeable?

Admiral, we thank you for your appearance.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask the Admiral one question before he leaves?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, do I understand now from your conversation with Captain Krick that it appears you had dinner together that night?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Then following the dinner you went to the show?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Then from there you went home?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. Captain Krick drove his car to my quarters, we went to the show in my car, and he came back to my quarters to get his car.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember any of that or are you saying what he told you?

[14751] Admiral STARK. I am saying what he told me. That would be the normal course.

Senator LUCAS. You don't remember any thing of that kind?

Admiral STARK. I do not remember that evening and I have stated so. My original impression was that I was home, which I know to be incorrect, but I do not recall it. I stated that I recalled having seen a revival of The Student Prince but I did not connect it with the night of December 6. I still do not.

Senator GEORGE. You have no independent recollection except what you have given the committee?

Admiral STARK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you have no independent recollection?

Admiral STARK. I have not. I don't have any independent recollection. My sole purpose was the fact that a conversation took place that should be in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral.

Well, if it is agreeable we will let Captain Krick make his statement and then the committee can decide what course it wishes to take.

Admiral STARK. May I ask whether or not I shall be free to go on?

Senator LUCAS. What time do you leave, Admiral?

[14752] Admiral STARK. I am sailing tomorrow morning. Have to be aboard ship between 8:30 and 10:30.

Senator LUCAS. You will leave here tonight for New York?

Admiral STARK. I was leaving this afternoon. I could leave on a midnight train and make it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral, it is rather difficult for me to say. If the other members wish to be called into session I would be glad to call a session this afternoon and let them decide.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I can't see any conceivable possible statement that Admiral Stark can give the committee that he hasn't already given them and he could go to London to perform his service and perhaps be performing a greater service than sitting around here and telling us that he doesn't remember anything.

Admiral STARK. I quite agree.

Mr. KEEFE. That is, in substance, the picture as I see it.

Admiral STARK. I thought of that when I wrote the letter, that I couldn't add anything, but I couldn't leave without giving you this letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it the feeling of the committee, in view of the situation and suggestion, that Admiral Stark need not delay his trip?

Mr. KEEFE. That is my opinion.

[14753] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I agree.

Senator GEORGE. That is my opinion.

Senator LUCAS. I will agree but you will hear plenty about it afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we can't help that.

Thank you, Admiral.

Admiral STARK. I am grateful to you, sir, for permitting me to say what I have.

Senator LUCAS. Don't find any more friends, please. When friends come in say nothing about Pearl Harbor. [Laughter.]

(Admiral Stark was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Come up, Captain Krick.

[14754] **TESTIMONY OF CAPT. HAROLD D. KRICK,
UNITED STATES NAVY**

(Having been first duly sworn by the chairman:)

Mr. RICHARDSON. State your full name, Captain.

Captain KRICK. Harold D. Krick, United States Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy, Captain?

Captain KRICK. I will be in the Navy 28 years on the 7th of June 1946.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you known Admiral Stark?

Captain KRICK. I have known Admiral Stark since 1933 when he commanded the U. S. S. *West Virginia*, to which ship I was attached.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was your last assignment with him?

Captain KRICK. My last assignment with Admiral Stark was as his flag lieutenant when he was commander of the cruisers of the battle force.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you come to Washington to live?

Captain KRICK. I came to Washington to live in July 1939.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Since your coming to Washington, has there been a continuation of social relations between your family and Admiral Stark's family?

Captain KRICK. Yes, sir; there has been a very close relation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Socially?

[14755] Captain KRICK. Socially.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Frequently at his house?

Captain KRICK. Yes, sir; frequently at his house.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you familiar, from your acquaintance with his house, whether Admiral Stark had a White House phone in his house?

Captain KRICK. Yes, sir; Admiral Stark did have a White House phone in his house.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What floor was it on?

Captain KRICK. It was on the second floor, in his study.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall your whereabouts on Saturday night, December 6?

Captain KRICK. On Saturday night, December 6, 1941?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Captain KRICK. I was with Admiral Stark and Mrs. Stark.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was with you?

Captain KRICK. My wife.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just the four of you?

Captain KRICK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you meet that evening, first?

Captain KRICK. We assembled at Admiral Stark's house about 6:30 or 7 o'clock in the evening.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have dinner?

Captain KRICK. We had dinner at the Stark residence.

[14756] Mr. RICHARDSON. Were there any other guests?

Captain KRICK. No other guests.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where did you go after dinner?

Captain KRICK. After dinner we attended a performance, I believe it to be the *The Student Prince*, at the National Theater in Washington, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you stay for the entire performance?

Captain KRICK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were did you go after the performance?

Captain KRICK. Subsequent to the performance we returned to the Stark residence in order to pick up my transportation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Whose car did you go to the theater in, and from?

Captain KRICK. In the admiral's car.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you left your car at the Stark house?

Captain KRICK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you returned for it after the theater?

Captain KRICK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you go in the Stark residence upon your return?

Captain KRICK. Yes, sir; we did go into the Stark residence, as was the custom, for a few moments, before returning to our home.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To get something to eat and drink?

[14757] Captain KRICK. There were usually refreshments; that was the usual custom.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall the occasion of going into the house on that evening?

Captain KRICK. Yes, sir; I do recall that evening.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What occurred when you went in the house?

Captain KRICK. One of the admiral's servants advised the admiral that—

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did he say?

Captain KRICK. That there had been a White House call during the evening, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What happened then?

Captain KRICK. The admiral excused himself and retired to his study on the second floor and returned.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long was he there?

Captain KRICK. I would say approximately between 5 and 10 minutes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did he come downstairs again?

Captain KRICK. Yes, sir; he did come downstairs.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did he say anything to you?

Captain KRICK. Only to the extent that the conditions in the Pacific were serious; that was the substance of it, that conditions with Japan were in a critical state, something of that sort, sir.

[14758] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did he say anything to you, as near as you can recall, that he had had a telephone message, on the second floor?

Captain KRICK. That is my inference. There is absolutely no doubt in my mind about it, sir. But I do not recall the exact statement. I do not recall that he stated "I have talked with the President of the United States". But I heard, of course the statement of the servant that there had been a White House call, and the admiral retired immediately, and he may have stated that he was going to call the White House; but I have the distinct impression that the conversation was with the White House.

[14759] Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you have any impression that upon his return from upstairs Admiral Stark made any statement then that his talk had been with the White House?

Captain KRICK. My impression very definitely was that; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was the end of the conversation?

Captain KRICK. That was the end of the conversation. The admiral never talked over any of his affairs in that connection with me, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long did you stay after that statement?

Captain KRICK. Approximately not more than 15 minutes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, you and your wife went home?

Captain KRICK. Yes sir; I would say that it would be not later than 11:30 on the night of the 6th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you first relate to anyone the details of what you have just told us?

Captain KRICK. That was the night, I believe, of the 25th of May 1946, at the admiral's home; this conversation came up very casually.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was there?

Captain KRICK. The admiral and Mrs. Stark and my wife.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And yourself?

Captain KRICK. That is correct.

[14760] Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the conversation then?

Captain KRICK. The substance of the conversation was referring back to the night before Pearl Harbor on the 6th of December 1941, that I had noticed a headline to the effect that the admiral hadn't known where he was, I had not followed this case closely, and I then informed the admiral that we were his guests that night, and I informed him what I have just said, to the effect that as usual he had left with his boy the number of the National Theater, so that he could be called in the event any calls came in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Wait just a moment. Was there any such conversation in your presence that evening before you went to the theater between Admiral Stark and any of his servants?

Captain KRICK. I am quite sure that there was; sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And what was the admonition which he gave to his servants?

Captain KRICK. The custom was, sir, to give to the boy a slip of paper with the number of the telephone where the admiral could be contacted.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you of the opinion that occurred that evening?

Captain KRICK. Yes, sir; I am quite sure of it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you reached the theater what was done with respect to advising the theater officials?

[14761] Captain KRICK. As I recall it, either the admiral or I notified the head usher in that respect, where the admiral was sitting, where we would be during the entire evening, and no call came for the admiral during that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What statement did the admiral make when you told him what had happened on the night of December 6?

Captain KRICK. The admiral was very disturbed. He said, in effect, "You realize that I have testified to the contrary," and I told him that I hadn't followed his testimony in the newspapers, and that I, therefore, didn't realize what he had done, and he implied that it should be laid before the committee, which has now been done, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you tell this incident to anyone else before you recalled it to Admiral Stark?

Captain KRICK. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When this hearing was going on and the newspapers were referring to Admiral Stark's knowledge, had you made any statement to anybody that you had any knowledge with reference to where Admiral Stark was on the 6th?

Captain KRICK. Possibly only conversation in the family, sir. Certainly, to no one about the 6th.

[14762] I just didn't give this thing very much importance in my own mind, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was no attempt on your part to conceal it?

Captain KRICK. Definitely not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Or not to advance the testimony?

Captain KRICK. Definitely not. I just had not followed the testimony.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You never, between that night, the 6th of December 1941, and last Saturday night, the 25th of May this year, you never attempted to remind Admiral Stark of the events of that night, which you have detailed here and which you detailed to him last Saturday?

Captain KRICK. Never, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. KEEFE. No questions.

Senator LUCAS. One question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. What was the exact time, Captain, that you saw Admiral Stark first on the evening of the 6th?

Captain KRICK. That I saw him first on the evening of the 6th?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

[14763] Captain KRICK. I would say in the neighborhood of 7 or 7:15, sir, at dinner. He came in from the office, as I recall, about that time, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have any conversation with him as to where he might have been previous to the time you saw him?

Captain KRICK. No, sir; I did not, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did he say anything to you at that time about having any conference of any kind or character with the President and Cabinet officers before that dinner took place?

Captain KRICK. No, sir. As I previously testified, the admiral never made any mention of his business at the office in my presence, sir.

Senator LUCAS. So you were with him from about 7 o'clock, then, until about 11 that night?

Captain KRICK. 11 or 11:30; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That night?

Captain KRICK. Yes sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, when he came away from the telephone after having this purported conversation with the President, was there anything unusual about his appearance or demeanor, as a result of that conference?

Captain KRICK. Absolutely not, sir, he was very much as he always is, apparently not disturbed, there was nothing [14764] unusual.

Senator LUCAS. Did he make any further telephone calls while you were there, to anyone?

Captain KRICK. No, sir; but I would not be in a position to know. I was not in a position to know that, because his telephones were in his study.

Senator LUCAS. I mean after he came down?

Captain KRICK. After he came down, no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And he stayed with you until you left?

Captain KRICK. Yes. Not to my remembrance did he make any additional calls.

Senator LUCAS. How do you remember this so well, Captain?

Captain KRICK. Because I was a very small fish, and great things were transpiring, and you don't forget that sort of thing. It is not like looking down, when you look up at something.

Senator LUCAS. You were looking up, and the Pearl Harbor disaster struck the following day, and the entire evening was definitely impressed upon you?

Captain KRICK. Yes, sir; and it will be there for a long time to come.

Senator LUCAS. Always will be.

Captain KRICK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I am glad we found out where Admiral Stark [14765] was.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought until now I was the only man in the United States who knew where he was on Saturday night, the 6th of December, but I find that I am not. I know where I was and why I was there.

Senator LUCAS. Even though Admiral Stark doesn't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Senator GEORGE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you stated, Captain, that having served with Admiral Stark as his flag officer, that you were friends, and you and your wife were frequent visitors at their house?

Captain KRICK. That is correct, sir, particularly was that true from 1939 until the admiral left for London in 1942, the spring of 1942, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think there is anything further. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will adjourn, subject to call.

(Whereupon, at 11:15 a. m., the committee adjourned subject to call of the Chair.)

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK**

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(79th Congress)

**A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO**

PART 12

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 1 THROUGH 6

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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

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13	7 and 8.
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17	111 through 128.
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19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
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39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

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Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
1-----	23 11-15-45	1	Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941.
2-----	24 11-15-45	254	Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc.
3-----	87 11-16-45	317	Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.
4-----	142 11-16-45	318	Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector Station.
5-----	153 11-16-45	318	Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielen as illustrating his narrative statement.
6-----	153 11-16-45	337	Navy compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Admiral Inglis as illustrating his narrative statement.
7-----	172 11-17-45	391	Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked "Exhibit 3-B in evidence" in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board.
8-----	233 11-19-45	391	Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
8-A-----	1792 12-18-45	413	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-B-----	1792 12-18-45	415	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-C-----	1792 12-18-45	424	Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
8-D	2480 1-5-46	425	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
9	256 11-19-45	923	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10	279 11-20-45	1000	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.
11	319 11-21-45	1006	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12	363 11-21-45	1013	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.
13	387 11-21-45	1019	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14	397 11-21-45	1040	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).
15	401 11-23-45	1042	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.

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16	401 11-23-45	1061	(a) Memorandum Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation, dated Nov. 6, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941; (c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.
16-A	3839 2-6-46	1077	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
16-B	4341 2-13-46	1081	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.
17	402 11-23-45	1083	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
18	402 11-23-45	1084	Documents relating to proposed " <i>Modus Vivendi</i> ," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
19	402 11-23-45	1201	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
20	402 11-23-45	1226	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
21	402 11-23-45	1246	Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.
22	458 11-23-45	1252	(a) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government; (b) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 160115; (c) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister.
22-A	1694 12-15-45 2065 12-31-45	1262	Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((c) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
22-B	1783 12-18-45	1269	Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.
22-C	1783 12-18-45	1275	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation".
22-D	1783 12-18-45	1292	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Wells and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.
23	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
24	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
25	574 11-26-45	1301	Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.
26	634 11-27-45	1303	Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch).
27	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942), Department of State Publication 1853.
28	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943), Department of State Publication 1883.
29	670 11-27-45	1315	"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941", vols. I and II (1943), Department of State Publication 2008.
30	670 11-27-45	1315	"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

31	737 11-28-45	1316	Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese representatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.
32	778 11-29-45	1326	Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33	778 11-29-45	1334	Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33-A	2092 12-31-45	1385	Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.
34	825 11-30-45	1389	Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.
35	828 11-30-45	1390	Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures.
36	830 11-30-45	1393	Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.)
37	839 11-30-45	1395	Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
38	841 11-30-45	1409	Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents.
39	928 12-4-45	1409	Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretary, General Staff.
40	954 12-4-45	1412	Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (979645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions.
41	988 12-5-45	1413	Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code destruction message).

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
42-----	990 12-5-45	1416	Copy of Army Regulation No. 10-15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties".
43-----	997 12-5-45	1422	Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.
44-----	1001 12-5-45	1423	Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
45-----	1019 12-5-45	1471	Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders.
46-----	1027 12-5-45	1472	Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.
47-----	1041 12-5-45	1476	Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 300850"; dispatch 300850 from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.
48-----	1044 12-5-45	1481	Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii.
48-A-----	2093 12-31-45	1484	Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command.
49-----	1053 12-6-45	1485	Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC-1).
50-----	1053 12-6-45	1551	Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).

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51	1053 12-6-45	1585	Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC-22).
52	1053 12-6-45	1593	Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
53	1063 12-6-45	1600	Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
54	1067 12-6-45	1627	"Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).
55	1067 12-6-45	1628	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.
56	1076 12-6-45	1630	Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
57	1077 12-6-45	1631	Minutes of "Conferences in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.
58	1088 12-6-45	1632	List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
59	1092 12-6-45	1635	General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".
60	1094 12-6-45	1636	General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".
61	1112 12-7-45	1640	Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
62	1284 12-10-45	1641	Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed.
63	1345 12-11-45	1644	Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
64-----	1544 12-13-45	1645	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
65-----	1541 12-13-45	1677	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66-----	1642 12-15-45	1680	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (961255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67-----	1642 12-15-45	1682	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").
68-----	1675 12-15-45	1689	Log of U. S. S. <i>Boise</i> for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.
69-----	1677 12-15-45	1715	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.
70-----	1695 12-15-45	1716	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71-----	1696 12-15-45	1719	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.
72-----	1696 12-15-45	1721	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.
73-----	1700 12-15-45	1727	Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoye cabinet in Japan).

74-----	1703 12-15-45	1735	Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.
74-A-----	2768 1-19-46	1741	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.
75-----	1705 12-15-45	1744	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
76-----	1709 11-15-45	1754	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoaka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
77-----	1712 12-15-45	1757	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.
78-----	1724 12-17-45	1768	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
79-----	1724 12-17-45	1770	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
80-----	1724 12-17-45	1774	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.
81-----	1724 12-17-45	1837	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.
82-----	1728 12-17-45	1864	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP-16).
83-----	1754 12-17-45	1866	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (#31850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
84-----	1775 12-17-45	1867	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85	1799 12-18-45	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
86	1825 12-18-45	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87	1889 12-19-45	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88	1912 12-19-45	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP-12)".
89	1938 12-20-45	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90	2066 12-31-45	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91	2067 12-31-45	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92	2068 12-31-45	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93	2075 12-31-45	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G-2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94	2078 12-31-45	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95	2091 12-31-45	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

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96	1989	2091 12-31-45	Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.
97	2007	2091 12-31-45	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.
98	2014	2093 12-31-45	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Indo-China".
99	2015	2094 12-31-45	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
100	2016	2095 12-31-45	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".
101	2023	2095 12-31-45	Log of U. S. S. <i>Enterprise</i> from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.
102	2107	2095 12-31-45	Log of U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
103	2118	2095 12-31-45	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander, <i>Enterprise</i> Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.
104	2122	2095 12-31-45	"U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.
105	2140	2096 12-31-45	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.
106	2144	2096 12-31-45	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.
107	2258	2349 1-4-46	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107-A	2479 1-5-46	2393	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108	2364 1-4-46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109	2476 1-5-46	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110	2477 1-5-46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111	2495 1-15-46	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112	2496 1-15-46	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113	2558 1-16-46	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113-A	2807 1-19-46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113-B	2807 1-19-46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces—Organization and Missions".
113-C	3449 1-31-46	2538	(a) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, together with documents which approve same; (b) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

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114	2558 1-16-46	2568	WPPac-46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow 5);
115	2558 1-16-46	2601	Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (a) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (b) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (c) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
115-A	3449 1-31-46	2672	Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".
115-B	3450 1-31-46	2677	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
116	2558 1-16-46	2700	Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.
117	2559 1-16-46	2707	Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
117-A	5015 2-20-46	2713	Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
118	2559 1-16-46	2714	Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".
119	2559 1-16-46	2716	Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
120	2559 1-16-46	2721	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (b) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (c) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.
121	2561 1-16-46	2727	Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
122	2588 1-16-46	2735	Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
123-----	2588 1-16-46	2736	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.
123-A	5015 2-20-46	2743	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124-----	2674 1-17-46	2749	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.
125-----	2678 1-17-46	2801	Log of the <i>U. S. S. Wright</i> from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126-----	2767 1-19-46	2832	(a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127-----	2768 1-19-46	2867	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)
128-----	2768 1-19-46	2870	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129-----	2842 1-19-46	2875	Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.
130-----	2879 1-21-46	2941	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Taiwan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.
131-----	2892 1-21-46	2943	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.

132	2017 1-21-46	2943	Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874-7877, Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."
132-A	5137 2-20-46	2946	Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662-13665 Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (b) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (c) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (d) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.
133	2965 1-23-46	2953	Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.
134	2965 1-23-46	3124	Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.
135	2965 1-23-46	3171	Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27-28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.
136	2966 1-23-46	3187	Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
137	2966 1-23-46	3187	Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.
138	2976 1-23-46	3195	Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)

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139	3006 1-23-46	3196	Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.
140	3188 1-26-46	3203	Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.
141	3311 1-28-46	3254	File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".
142	3324 1-29-46	3302	Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
142-A	3324 1-29-46	3318	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (b) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142-B	3674 2-4-46	3321	Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142-C	3741 2-5-46	3322	Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142-D	3780 2-5-46	3323	Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.
143	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)
144	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)
145	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

146	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)
147	3929 2-7-47	3332	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
148	3929 2-7-46	3332	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
149	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
150	4083 2-8-46	3333	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.
151	4421 2-13-46	3335	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
152	4794 2-18-46	3351	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
153	5009 2-19-46	3353	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
154	5013 2-20-46	3430	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. I. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
155	5068 2-20-46	3435	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
156	5122 2-20-46	3436	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".
157	5201 4-11-46	3441	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158-----	5201 4-11-46	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
159-----	5201 4-11-46	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160-----	5240 4-11-46	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161-----	5241 4-11-46	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161-A-----	5464 5-23-46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162-----	5269 4-11-46	3534	Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162-A-----	5464 5-23-46	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163-----	5292 4-11-46	3557	Log of the U. S. S. <i>Helena</i> from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164-----	5292 4-11-46	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165-----	5292 4-11-46	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166-----	5468 5-23-46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

167	5468 5-23-46	3652	(a) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (b) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (a); (c) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (a); and (d) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (a) and general Far East matters.
168	5468 5-23-46	3666	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed <i>modus vivendi</i> , which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
169	5469 5-23-46	3696	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
170	5469 5-23-46	3789	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
171	5469 5-23-46	3942	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
172	5469 5-23-46	3978	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
173	5469 5-23-46	3985	Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
174	5469 5-23-46	4030	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
175	5470 5-23-46	4115	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.
176	5470 5-23-46	4121	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
177	5470 5-23-46	4132	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date intro- duced	Exhibits page No.	Description
178 - - - - -	5470 5-23-46	4209	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179 - - - - -	5470 5-23-46	4241	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.
180 - - - - -	5471 5-23-46	4551	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
181 - - - - -	5520 5-23-46	4565	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182 - - - - -	5537 5-23-46	4702	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.
183 - - - - -	5468 5-23-46	4766	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the <i>Utah</i> by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940-45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers.

EXHIBIT NO. 1**INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY
THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY 1 AND
DECEMBER 8, 1941**

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
July 2, 1941
Purple (CA) (K9)
Circular #1390 (Part 1 of 2.)

(National Secret.)

At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd "The Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation" were decided. This Policy consists of the following two parts. The first part "The Policy" and the second part "The Principal Points" (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter.) Inasmuch as this has to do with national defense secrets, keep the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to both the Naval and Military Attaches, together with this precaution.

The Policy.

1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change.

2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection.

Army 20701

Secret Trans. 8/8/41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
To: Washington
July 2, 1941
Purple (CA) (K9)
Circular #1390 (Part 2 of 2.)

The Principal Points.

For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Regime to submission, increasing pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in the south. Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be reenforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand

shall be executed. As regards the Russo-German war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining the war, if need be, Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed.

Addresses to which this message is sent: U. S., Germany and Soviet Russia. From Germany transmit to Italy.

Army 20702

Trans. 8/8/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Canton

To: Tokyo

July 14, 1941.

Purple

#255.

To be kept secret within the Department.

Re my #253^a.

Subsequent information from the military officials to the Attaches is as follows:

1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis but, if necessary, alone. Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them, have been dispensed with. That is because we did not wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the Japanese populace and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude.

2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush it by force, occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part. As for the Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only one division and in seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two. In the main, through the activities of our air arm (in your city, the Spratley Islands, Parao, Thaiese Singora, Portuguese Timor and French Indo-China) and our submarine fleet (in the South Seas mandate islands, Hainan Island, and French Indo-China) we will once and for all crush Anglo-American military power and their ability to assist in any schemes against us.

3. The troops soon to occupy French Indo-China will be reorganized as the 25th Army Corps (one Army Corps consists of four divisions) and also the 30th Army Corps, consisting of the South China forces, which will be assigned to special duty with airplanes, tanks,

and howitzers. General IIDA (the IIDA Army mentioned in preceding telegrams has been changed to the Nishimura detachment) will be placed in command and general military headquarters will be set up in Saigon. All preparations have been made. The ship fees have been paid and the expedition will soon proceed from here.

Army 19731

Trans. 7-19-41 (5)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.

To: Berlin.

19 July 1941

(Purple)

#669

(Abstract)

The Cabinet shake up was necessary to expedite matters in connection with National affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the principles of the Tripartite Pact.

Relayed to Rome, Nanking.

19842

JD-1: 3838

(A) Navy Trans. 7-21-41 (C-NR)

[Secret]

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

21 July 1941

(Purple—CA)

#545

At the request of Acting Secretary of State Welles, Wakasugi called on him on the 21st. (The Ambassador is expected back in Washington tomorrow morning.) Welles said that he has been giving careful study to recent world conditions. He had asked Wakasugi to come to his office, he said, so that he could express the opinions reached by Secretary Hull and himself, in the light of recent world developments, regarding the unofficial discussions which have been taking place for the past several months between the Ambassador and Secretary Hull.

After thus prefacing his remarks, the Undersecretary said that the real objectives, set up by the Ambassador, Wakasugi, et al., of the Japanese-U. S. conversations, were identical to those towards which the Secretary was striving.

According to information received from various sources in various areas, he continued, there are definite indications that Japan is planning to take some steps very shortly which would upset the peaceful status of certain areas. If these reports are based on fact, he said, there would be a conflict between Japanese acts and the gist of the Ambassador's intentions expressed during the conversations.

Recently when the Ambassador met with him, Welles said, Japan's position was discussed. In the course of those conversations, the Ambassador claimed that Britain, the United States and other nations were applying the pressure on Japan, and described this as an "encirclement" of Japan. This expression is identical to that employed earlier by Germany, he pointed out.

As a matter of fact, the Undersecretary continued, the above was clearly a misunderstanding on the part of Japan, because the United

States has no such intentions as those Japan apparently feels. It is because the United States wishes to maintain peace between the two countries that she has been continuing the talks.

He went on by saying that the advices received were to the effect that Japan would take the southern portion of French Indo-China by force within the next few days. Such an act would definitely be in violation with the spirit of the Japanese-U. S. conversations which are being conducted in behalf of maintaining peace on the Pacific.

That is the American viewpoint, he said, but would appreciate being advised of the Japanese viewpoint.

Wakasugi, therefore, replied that he was well aware of the fact that the Ambassador and the Secretary were conducting negotiations aimed at improving U. S.-Japanese relations, and that he, himself, prays that they will succeed. By "a reliable source of information", Wakasugi asked, did the Undersecretary mean the U. S. Embassy in Japan? To this, avoiding a clear answer, Welles merely replied that the report was an accurate one.

Wakasugi then said that he would relay the information contained in the report referred to to the Ambassador. In the meantime, he said, he would like to make an inquiry, as one emanating purely from himself and one which in no way should be considered an official one. Assuming, Wakasugi said, that Japan is planning to make a move in the manner described by the Undersecretary in some direction, what effect would that have on the U. S.-Japanese discussions which were being conducted?

Welles replied that such an act on the part of Japan would be in direct conflict with the spirit of the discussions. So saying, he implied that further discussion would be in vain. On the other hand, he continued, he had been lead to understand that the new Foreign Minister of Japan was a close friend of Ambassador Nomura. Moreover, in view of the fact that very little time has elapsed since the new Cabinet was installed, probably it had not decided upon any definite policy as yet. In view of this fact the United States would patiently await developments before taking any steps to halt the discussions.

Wakasugi told Welles that he would report this conversation to the Ambassador in detail, and withdrew.

20026

JD-1:3937

(D) Navy Trans. 7-25-41 (X)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
23 July 1941
(Purple—CA)
#397

Regarding your message #545*.

1. You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined upon a definite policy because of the fact that I have not been in office very long.

As was pointed out in my message #368**, our occupation of French Indo-China was unavoidable. This step had been decided upon by the Cabinet even before I assumed office. It is to be carried out peacefully for the purpose of jointly defending French Indo-China.

It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-U. S.

Should the U. S., however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as closing of ----- for all practical purposes and the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the United States of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation.

2. Please carefully reread messages Nos. 368 ** and 396 ***, and make an effort to improve the situation.

3. With regard to your message #536**** ----- (last 13 groups garbled).

*JD-1: 3937. Wakasugi reports conversation with Undersecretary Welles.

**JD-1: 3680 (S. I. S. #19501). Tokyo informs Washington of the contemplated negotiations with France or establishment of Jap naval and air bases in French Indo-China.

***JD-1: 3953 (S. I. S. #20029).

****JD-1: 3974 (S. I. S. #20067).

20091

JD-1: 3986

(D) Navy Trans. 7-25-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

23 July 1941

(Purple—CA)

#555 (In 2 parts, complete).

Since Wakasugi had called on the Acting Secretary of State, as reported in my message #545*, I called on Welles myself this afternoon. I explained to him that our southern occupation was absolutely essential from the standpoint of national security and economic safety. I further pointed out the impossibility of Japan to pursue a "do nothing" policy in the face of the embargoes being clamped down against her by various countries, for such a policy would lead to national suicide.

After carefully explaining the above situation, I said that according to press report the French Indo-China affair was apparently being carried out peacefully with the full approval of the Vichy government. I added that in view of those circumstances, it was my hope that the government of the United States would restrain itself from jumping to hasty conclusions, and instead would watch the trend of further developments for a little while yet.

I told him that I feared considerable repercussions among the general public, if measures such as an export embargo on oil is put into effect at a time such as this.

The new Cabinet in Japan, I advise the Undersecretary, is as anxious to bring the U. S.-Japanese "Understanding Pact" to a successful conclusion, as was the previous cabinet.

To the above, the Undersecretary replied that he would not reiterate his statements to Wakasugi. He would not, he said, reconcile the Japanese policy with regard to French Indo-China with the basic principles of the plans being discussed by Secretary Hull and myself. Neither Great Britain nor the United States had any intention of attacking French Indo-China, he said. The concensus here is, he said, that Vichy's submission came as a result of pressure from Hitler and that Japan intends to use French Indo-China as a base from which to make further southward moves.

The U. S. Government, he continued, has not for the past many years made any hasty conclusions. Her actions are governed by Japan's policies.

Although he did not mention what steps the United States is planning to take in the future, he did say, as I was about to depart, that Secretary Hull was expected back at his desk very shortly and that he would no doubt welcome an opportunity to discuss matters with me.

In reply to my inquiry, the Undersecretary said that traffic through the Canal has been indefinitely suspended while it is undergoing repairs. He asserted that no particular nation was suffering discriminatory action.

(Time at present: 2130).

*JD-1: 3937 (S. I. S. 20026). Acting Secretary Welles, in a requested interview with Jap Minister Wakasugi, states that the reported aggressive move by Japan toward F.I.-C. would violate the basis of proposed understanding with Japan. Requests Japanese statement of intentions. Wakasugi asks for source of Welles information and is told that "it is accurate".

20186

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 7-29-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
July 24, 1941
Purple (CA)
#406

Secret outside the Department.

Re my #397*.

That the leaders of the United States Government will at this time display a high degree of statemanship is what I am secretly hoping for the sake of maintaining peace in the Pacific. The Japanese Government would do likewise and would like to reciprocate. However, according to information received by us lately, especially according to newspaper reports, there is the possibility of the United States freezing Japanese funds or of instituting a general embargo on petroleum, thus strongly stimulating public opinion in Japan. Should this plan of freezing Japanese funds be put into effect, it would have an adverse effect on many aspects of our domestic life and might compel us to resort to diverse retaliatory measures. This would lead to a breakdown of Japanese-American economic relations and we cannot be certain that it would not in turn hasten the development of the worst situation. Will you please get in touch with Finance Official NISHIYAMA and, in accordance with the contents of the caption telegram, request the United States Government to favorably treat this question.

Army 20034

Trans. 7/25/41 (5)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Net

July 26, 1941

Red

Circular #1616

Depending upon how Japanese relations with England and the United States turn out, we may have to consider divesting England and the United States of all their interests in China. If and when things come to the worst, I want all areas concerned to cooperate in either destroying or seizing the considerable mining and other industrial equipment and ships of these countries. Be particularly sure to let nothing be taken away. I want you all to be ready at any moment to take this precautionary step of transferring the property of these two nations to our control.

Army 20144

Trans. 7-28-41 (5)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

27 July 1941

(Purple)

Circular #1622)

In retaliation for the steps taken by the British and United States by which our assets were frozen, the rules restricting foreign business transactions in Japan which are included in the rules governing foreign exchange, shall be put into effect on the 28th by order of the Finance Ministry. Manchukuo will also take similar steps while in China proclamations by the Consulates will be made subsequently. As an emergency measure, the above regulations will be announced by the Consulates as a bulletin and will be made effective for all practical purposes. (All transactions involving Britain and America will be placed on a license basis). At the same time, the Chinese will receive instructions to put similar measures in effect.

With regard to the Customs, all exports to countries which have frozen our assets, shall have to receive licenses in accordance with orders issued by the Financial Bureau. Guidance will be given to settle all complications which accompany the materialization of these regulations.

Ample study has been made so as to make these measures counter whatever measures the opposition should choose to actually take.

This message addressed to London and Washington.

20267

JD-1:4111

(D) Navy Trans. 7-29-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

July 30, 1941

Purple

#609 Re my #608^a.

Today I knew from the hard looks on their faces that they meant business and I could see that if we do not answer to suit them that they are going to take some drastic steps.

During my first conversation with Roosevelt after I took office the President, referring to the Panay incident, said that at the time he cooperated with the Secretary of State and succeeded in restraining popular opinion but that in case such a thing happened a second time, it would probably be quite impossible to again calm the storm. The latest incident brought all this back to me and I can see just how gravely they are regarding it. Think of it! Popular demand for the freezing of Japanese funds was subsiding and now this had to happen. I must tell you it certainly occurred at an inopportune moment.

Things being as they are, need I point out to you gentlemen that in my opinion it is necessary to take without one moment's hesitation some appeasement measures. Please wire me back at the earliest possible moment.

^a See S. I. S. #20331 (J. D.-1: 4149): Welles summons Nomura and demands explanation of Tutuila bombing immediately.

Army 20423

Trans. 8/2/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

July 31, 1941

Purple (CA) K9

#433 (Part 1 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with the military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly.

1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular #1390^a. Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of that policy.

2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government's general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.

^a Not available.

Army 20461

Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

July 31, 1941

Purple (CA)

#433 (Part 2 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German Embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.

3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.

That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

Army 20462

Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

July 31, 1941

Purple (CA)

#433 (Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easily understood. If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action.

5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany.

It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not

Germany start a war with Russia because of her own military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient.

Army 20463

Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

July 31, 1941

Purple (CA)

#433 (Part 4 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our actions.

6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.

Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington.

Army 20464

Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

5 August 1941.

(Purple) (CA)

#447 (In 2 parts, complete).

1. The Imperial Government is trying to give its attention to the all important matter of Japanese-U. S. relations. This is not an easy task, for there are numerous obstacles involving domestic politics.

According to the various reports you have submitted on the subject, the President and the Secretary of State are displaying considerable understanding in their attitudes towards Japan. You imply that they view the situation cool headedly, regardless of the trend of general public opinion.

On our side, however, there are quite a few persons who vigorously insist that the U. S. economic pressure on Japan is being daily increased in intensity. For example, the newspaper Yomiuri carried a dispatch from ——— on the 2nd, in which it was reported that the President of the United States had either ordered the complete suspension of, or curtail to the extreme, all exports of petroleum products. As a result of this order, the dispatch continued, even those

exports for which permits had already been issued, had to be cancelled.

Regardless of whether there was any truth in the report or not and regardless of the extent of the alleged curtailment, such reports give the antagonists a strong talking point. This is a situation which causes us no end of anxiety.

2. If it is believed by any that our people and country can be threatened into submission by the so-called strengthened encirclement policy or by the application of economic pressure, it is a mistaken notion. As a matter of fact it is erroneous to the extreme as should be obvious to any who understands our national characteristics.

If such a policy as the above is adopted, we cannot guarantee that the trend will not be in directly the opposite direction from our goal of an improved U. S.-Japanese relationship. One should be able to see this clearly from the example set forth above.

3. We are convinced that we have reached the most important, and at the same time the most critical, moment of Japanese-U. S. relations. It was at a time like this that the Imperial Government voluntarily agreed to temporarily cease the bombing of Chungking and its suburban area. This should clearly indicate Japan's sincerity, considerateness, and restraint toward the United States.

If an improvement in the relations between the United States and Japan, as two equal powers on the Pacific, is sincerely desired, the points which will most effectively bring about such improvements must be given unbiased and cool consideration.

For the purpose of preventing the possibility of letting anyone, either within or out of the country, be under the impression that the negotiations were conducted under the threat of economic pressure, all measures which may be construed as being economic pressure should be abandoned at once. That we shall reciprocate in kind was made clear in the recent statement issued by the Minister of Finance.

4. Based on the general plan outlined by the last Cabinet, the Imperial Government proposes a plan, set forth in my separate message #448*, to improve Japanese-U. S. relations. This last plan was drawn up as a reply to the plan suggested by the President on the 24th, and is being submitted only after the respective positions of the United States and Japan as they affect the other, were given thorough consideration.

Will Your Excellency make an effort to clearly impress this point on the President and the Secretary of State and at the same time draw their attention to the graveness of this matter.

5. In form, the proposal which is being forwarded herewith, is a reply to the President's plan of the 24th. Our real motive, however, is to incorporate its provisions into the final agreement. With this instrument, we hope to resume the Japanese-U. S. negotiations which were suspended because of the delay in the delivery of our revised proposals of 14 July and because of our occupation of French Indo-China which took place in the meantime. Since that is our intention, please relay the matter contained in my separate message #448* without delay.

*JD-1: 4326.

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 7 August, 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #452

Through my previous messages on the subject, you are perfectly well aware of the fact that the Konoye Cabinets have been sincerely interested in the betterment of Japanese-U. S. relations. Through misunderstandings and manipulations by third countries, and in spite of our above described desires, Japanese-U. S. relations are, today, critically tense. We feel that a policy of laissez faire should no longer be pursued.

We are firm in our conviction that the only means by which the situation can be relieved is to have responsible persons representing each country gather together and hold direct conferences. They shall lay their cards on the table, express their true feelings, and attempt to determine a way out of the present situation.

2. In the first proposal made by the United States mention was made of just such a step. If, therefore, the United States is still agreeable to this plan, Prime Minister Konoye himself will be willing to meet and converse in a friendly manner with President Roosevelt.

Will you please make clear to them that we propose this step because we sincerely desire maintaining peace on the Pacific. Please sound out their attitude on this proposal.

3. If, however, they show any signs of hesitation (from the contents of your message #649* this possibility cannot be discounted entirely) on the grounds of our occupation of French Indo-China and the reports that we have increased our military strength in the north, put up the following arguments:

(a) That we recognize the exceedingly criticalness of the situation and for that reason, the Prime Minister made up his mind to break all precedent to represent his country himself.

(b) That unless every possible effort is made to maintain peace on the Pacific, we would be failing to fulfill our duties to our people.

4. If they are agreeable to holding such a conference, make inquiries as to the time which would best meet the President's convenience. In view of the times and conditions, we are of the opinion that the sooner that such a meeting took place, the better.

The subjects which will be discussed, undoubtedly will depend greatly on the time it is held. In general, however, the discussion will be conducted along the lines of the negotiations which were being conducted in an attempt to bring about better relations between Japan and the United States. In view of the fact that both the Prime Minister and the President have many uses for their time, arrangements should be made so that the discussions between them will last no longer than a few days. With a view to practicalness it is our hope that the delegations representing Japan and the United States will consist of the minimum number of persons.

5. In view of the extremely important nature of this subject, it is essential that strict secrecy be observed until the holding of the discussions are definitely agreed upon. Therefore, Your Excellency will convey this proposal in person to the President or to the Secretary of State. As soon as you come to an agreement and if the President

has no objections, it shall be publicly announced. Therefore, will you confer as to the opportune time, etc. and come to an agreement on those points as well.

For the purpose of security, we are not advising the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this subject for the time being. This is for your information.

*JD-1: 4345 S. I. S. #20649. Amb. Nomura discusses various angles of Jap-U. S. relations with a U. S. cabinet member (identity not given); suggests conclusion of an agreement upholding the integrity of territories adjacent to F. I. C. to facilitate supplies of materials.

20699

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-8-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

7 August 1941

(Purple—CA)

#663 (In 2 parts, complete).

U. S.-Japanese relations have now reached an extremely critical stage. However, this does not come unexpectedly; undoubtedly it was unavoidable and is the by-product of our government's pursuing other essential policies.

I now wish to describe the recent general outlook in the United States. I realize, of course, that I may be too presumptuous, but I do so only because I believe it might be of some interest to one whose time in office has been as short as yours.

1. Fundamentally speaking, the United States is under the impression that the ties between the Axis partners are closer than appear on paper. It is convinced that the East is working in close cooperation with the West, and vice versa. It assumes that the aims of Germany and Italy in the West and Japan in the East are to conquer the world. Talking with ones who harbor such policies, the United States says, is out of the question.

We, therefore, carefully explained that Japan is guided solely by the principles of HAKKO ITIU (brotherhood of mankind) and that the Axis Pact, like the earlier Anglo-Japanese Pact, is merely an agreement within limitations. This explanation lead eventually to beginning the unofficial discussions.

Then, while the Secretary of State was on leave due to illness, the occupation of French Indo-China took place. The United States, refusing to accept our explanation that that was a peaceful occupation, discontinued the unofficial discussions then and there. Moreover, the United States returned to its original opinion with regard to Japan. Acting Secretary of State Welles made this clear in his statement and it was later confirmed by Secretary Hull himself. Last night, the Secretary expressed his deep disappointment to me. According to the Postmaster General, this disappointment on the part of the Secretary was all the deeper because he had been so very interested in bettering the relations between Japan and the United States. I have already reported that Secretary Hull and his very good friend Walker were put in an exceedingly embarrassing spot in their relations with their Cabinet colleagues.

2. The United States policy toward Japan cannot be termed as one of definite unfriendliness to Japan herself, they explain. The United States has to take some measures, they say, to counteract certain steps taken by Japan. The United States is only taking measures which will counter Japanese southward or northward expansion attempts.

When Japan occupied French Indo-China, the United States retaliated with the "freezing" order and the export embargo; a joint warning by Hull and Eden was issued with regard to any ambitions in the direction of Thailand. There is no doubt whatsoever that the United States is prepared to take drastic action depending on the way Japan moves, and thus closing the door on any possibility of settling the situation.

With regard to a northward move by us, it must be remembered that the United States has suddenly established very close relations with the Soviet Union. In view of this fact, it is highly doubtful that the United States would merely watch from the sidelines if we should make any moves to the north.

It is reported that the President accompanied by high army and navy officials is meeting with Churchill. This indicates that careful preparations are being made to counter our every move without falling back a single time.

3. It must be noted that the government of Germany is exercising the utmost precaution and perseverance in dealing with the United States. It has even gone so far as to issue peace terms in an attempt to ease U. S. public opinion. Therefore, the Pacific, of late, has become the center of public attention and there is a good possibility that, depending on developments in Europe, this trend will be considerably invigorated in the near future.

I have submitted my humble opinions before and they are unchanged today. Our country is at present standing at a most critical crossroads. My only desire is that we choose the right road, for the sake of the future of our country.

21045

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-15-41 (X)

[Secret]

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

9 August 1941

(Purple)

#674 (In 2 parts, complete).

Re your #465*

Upon the President's return to Washington (when this will be unknown) I shall make arrangements to call on him and explain to him the subject contained in your message referred to above. I shall do everything in my power to make a favorable impression on the President on that occasion.

As I have pointed out in my various reports on this subject, I am convinced that as long as we proceed along the lines of our present policy, the United States, too, will undoubtedly undeviatingly follow the course whose trend has already been established. The United States assumes that our occupation of South French Indo-China

indicates that Japan has definitely set her course. On this point the President and the Secretary of State are in complete agreement and it would be a mistake to try to differentiate between their attitudes. I was made acutely aware of the firm attitude of the United States during my conversations of the 6th and the 8th.

In view of this situation, I greatly fear that even the offer of the Prime Minister to personally come here, would not move the United States to any perceptible degree. For this reason, I regret to have to say that I do not expect too much from the interview I plan to have with the President.

Unless we can draw up some plan by which we can persuade the United States to change its policy toward Japan, I can only feel pessimism for any attempts to break up the present critical situation.

Though I regret that I can report only dark clouds over the world from my distant vantage point, I submit these humble opinions to you for whatever value they may be.

*JD-1: 4429. Immediately upon Roosevelt's return to Washington call upon him and do your utmost to bring about a materialization of these conversations (re Jap-American understanding).

20868

JD-1: 4465

(D) Navy Trans. 8-12-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.

To: Berlin.

15 August 1941

(Purple)

#739 (Separate message)

At the time of my conversation with Ambassador Smetanin the other day, I mentioned our desires in regard to the full realization of our rights and interests in Northern Saghalien and also the removal of danger zones in the waters of the Far East. Since then, we have been asked by the Soviet as to the attitude of Japan toward the German-Russian war; to which we have replied that there has been no change in our intentions of continuing friendly relations between Japan and Russia, that thus far we have maintained an attitude of observing the neutrality pact, and that it is still our desire to continue this in the future, but, that whether or not we can continue thus is a question that depends on the way in which the Soviet Union responds to this. For instance if (a) any of the Soviet Union's territory in East Asia should be ceded, sold, or leased to a third power, or offered as military bases, (b) the Soviet Union should take any steps that would cause the sphere of any third power's military movements to be extended into East Asia, or should conclude with a third power an alliance that might have the Empire as its object, we certainly could not overlook the threat that this would be to our nation.

To this the Soviet Ambassador replied, that the Soviet government is rigidly observing the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact, and that as far as the above mentioned two points are concerned he could give assurance that there has been nothing of the kind and that there will be none in the future.

I furthermore took this opportunity to call the attention of the Soviet to the fact that of late it is persistently rumored that the United States will be shipping munitions to the Soviet via Vladivostok, and

that if this should be true, Japan would have to take a serious view of it, as it would involve the three power pact relations.

In regard to the Japanese Government's attitude to the German-Russian war, I reiterated that there has been no change in our foreign policy, which has as its keynote the spirit and the objectives of the three power pact, even as Foreign Minister Matsuoka had communicated to the Soviet Government 2 July, and that this point is well understood by the Soviet.

21175

JD-1: 4637

(F) Navy Trans. 8-19-41 (C-NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
15 August 1941
(Purple)
#740

On the 15th I told the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, confidentially, of my recent conversations with the Soviet Ambassador along the lines of my separate message #739*. Ambassador Ott expressing a desire to understand the basic problem, said that according to the notice sent to the German Government on 2 July, he understood that the possibility of Japan's participating in the German-Russian war was not precluded, but asked if, now since the Soviets have given assurances regarding the two points which Japan considers vital, to the effect that there has been nothing of the kind and will not be in the future, the Soviets do not have the impression that Japan will not take part in the German-Soviet war. To this I replied that, in view of the military expansion the Empire is at present effecting, I think under present existing conditions the above-mentioned arrangement with the Soviet is the very best means of taking the first steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the Soviet, which will be undertaken together with the German Government, that this is entirely in harmony with the spirit and objectives of the Tripartite Treaty, and that I hoped that the German Government would fully understand this point. Ambassador Ott thereupon asked if it is proper to understand that this present arrangement is the first step toward future measures that are to be taken against Russia, that this is merely a temporary arrangement, in other words that it partakes of the nature of a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations can be completed. To this I replied in the affirmative.

Please relay to Rome together with the separate message.

*JD-1: 4637 S. I. S. #21175. Report of conversation between Japanese Foreign Minister and the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo, in which both insist the Neutrality Pact is being strictly observed; Japan warns against third power's acquiring Russian territory in East Asia; extension of third power's military movements to East Asia, and shipment of U. S. munitions to Vladivostok.

21219

JD-1: 4656

(F) Navy Trans. 8-20-41 (C-NR)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 1 of 4)

Re your #480*.

(1) As I have successively reported to you, Japanese-American relations have today reached a stage in which anything might happen at any moment, and they are likely to grow worse suddenly as soon as Japan makes her next move. That this sudden change will take place with Japan's occupation of Thailand is a view upon which both Japanese and Americans agree. As I have already informed you, the United States has not yet attained sufficient unity of mind with regard to participation in the European war, and the President himself is hesitant. However, the people are unanimous with regard to taking a strong hand in the Far East. According to those well versed in political affairs, this is what Great Britain approves of and both China and Germany desire.

* Not available.

Army 21150

Trans. 8/19/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 2 of 4)

I hardly think the President will go to the extreme, inasmuch as he and the naval leaders realize what a tremendous undertaking a Pacific war would be. I understand that the British believe that if they could only have a Japanese-American war started at the back door, there would be a good prospect of getting the United States to participate in the European war. The people here believe that though Germany might eventually defeat Soviet Russia, the war has already passed the stage of being a short, decisive one and has entered the stage of being one of attrition; that inasmuch as the submarine war in the Atlantic is turning in favor of Britain and the United States, these countries will be able in time to attain their original objective; and that the situation resembles closely that which existed in 1917. I understand that confidence in ultimate victory is gaining.

Army 21151

Trans. 8/19/41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 3 of 4)

(2) Since such is the state of affairs in this country, I could not have helped but refer to the State Department the proposal for a conference which you made in your telegram, but as you already know, the Secretary of State gave a negative reply to the proposal.

I, therefore, subsequently tried to interest a member of the cabinet who was intimately associated with the Secretary of State, but he also showed little interest in the subject. Besides, it is customary for the Secretary to be present at such conversations. I understand the President at one time had thought of arranging for a conference between the leaders of the two countries, but since Japan's occupation of French Indo-China, he has come to believe that Japan does not want a fundamental readjustment of Japanese-American relations but that she is carrying on an appeasement policy toward the United States. I hear that they are beginning to think that I have been fooled by my country and that his having conferred with me was an exceptional thing.

Army 21152

Trans. 8/19/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 August 16, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #703 (Part 4 of 4)

In the meantime, Japanese newspapers have printed scorching criticism of the statement issued by the American Government. Thus the atmosphere is getting worse. Unless something is done now to eliminate this misunderstanding, I shall not be able to accomplish our object. Furthermore, viewing the problem from the political standpoint, so long as the head of the country remains unfavorable to the proposal, we cannot expect him to do anything about it. I believe the United States is wishing that we would give, at least, some sort of a pledge regarding those three critical points taken up during the past conversations; namely, the question of self-defense, withdrawal of troops from China, and nondiscrimination in trade. Today, when the Secretary of State has already rejected our proposal, I cannot help but feel keenly the necessity of careful consideration and a great deal of smoothing out if we are to bring about what you have instructed me in your telegram. I am told that the President will be returning in a few days, so will you please consider the points I have given above, and if you have any further instructions, wire them at once.

Army 21153

Trans. 8/19/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 August 20, 1941
 Purple CA
 #487 (Part 1 of 2)

Re the last part of your #705*.

We cannot, of course, predict what the outcome of the Russo-German war will be, but this does not preclude our anticipating the fact that in case Soviet Russia loses and as a result the Stalin Regime disintegrates, Far Eastern Russia will be thrown into political confusion. It is a self-evident fact that Japan is pressed with the necessity of taking precautionary measures for the sake of maintaining peace in the Far East as well as for the sake of Japan's national defense

and security, in view of the actuality that that part of Soviet Russia is adjacent to Japan and Manchuokuo. Furthermore, since, due to the Russo-German war, there is a possibility of the influence of a third power being implanted in Far Eastern Soviet Russia, as for instance of Soviet Russia resorting to such unfriendly act as to allow the establishment of ————— and military bases in the Maritime province of Siberia or in Kamchataka, and consequently of the security of both Japan and Manchuokuo being threatened, we need to prevent such a thing from happening.

The Japanese Government has decided to increase the Japanese forces in Manchuokuo to the minimum number necessary to cope with such a possibility. On the other hand negotiations are being carried on in Tokyo with Soviet officials in order to arrive at a friendly solution of various matters having to do with this area. I understand that the Soviet officials have been instructed by the party leaders to be cautious in their attitude toward the forces stationed in Manchuokuo. This is solely for your information.

Army 21234

Trans. 8/19/41 (S)

• S. I. S. #21165. NOMURA asks to be informed for his own information what the Japanese government intends to do with regard to her northern policy.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 20, 1941
Purple (CA)
#487 (Part 2 of 2)

If ----- the United States Government asks you questions concerning the increase of Japanese troops in the North, will you explain to them suitably as your own view of the matter what I have pointed out above. Impress upon their minds that the movement of the troops has for its objective purely preventive precautions against unforeseen emergency and that by it we will be able to forestall any possibility of peace in the Far East being disturbed.

Recently when the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo inquired about this matter, I replied that so long as the Russian Government lives up to the treaty Japan also will be faithful to it. The Ambassador was very much pleased to hear this, saying that my statement had clarified the matter. This is solely for your information.

If it becomes definitely known that the United States is shipping iron, airplanes and other materials by way of Japanese coastal waters to assist Soviet Russia, this fact would unnecessarily provoke the feelings of the Japanese people, and it cannot be said that it will not have an unfavorable effect on the question of readjusting Japanese-American relations—a question which is at the present stage a very delicate one. We would like, therefore, to see the United States refrain from such action. Will you take a good opportunity and tactfully call the attention of the United States authorities to this fact. Today I personally called the attention of the American Ambassador to it.

Army 21235

Trans. 8/20/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
23 August 1941
(Purple)
#497

From Financial Attache Nishiyama (#70).

1. American inspection of Japanese firms and banks comes closer to being a search for "subversive acts" rather than an inspection connected with the freezing order. There was a marked difference in the Japanese inspection of American banks. Influential persons in the Specie Bank are much concerned and desire an investigation to ascertain just what the real purpose of the American officials is. Furthermore the National City Bank is arranging for the Kobe and Yokohama branches to unite with the Tokyo office and is closing out the Dairen office. According to Curtis's explanation the above move is dictated by economic policy as was the case in the Osaka amalgamation and that there is no other reason for the move. Two or three young Americans will be left in the Tokyo office and the others will be returned home.

2. A proposal has been received from the British-Dutch Bank to exchange commodities for commodities in order to liquidate the bank's accounts and this matter is being pressed by the head of the London branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank. However officials in the foreign office do not look with favor upon pushing negotiations to the solution of this one problem when there are so many other questions pending between Japan and Britain. Also the immediate conclusion of such an agreement would exert an unfortunate influence upon the leadership of public opinion hence orders have been issued not to ratify such an agreement.

(This item is for your information only).

21644
JD-1: 4860

(H) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 26, 1941
Purple CA (Very Urgent)
#504

Re my #503.

That message contains the maximum concessions that we can make to the proposal of the President of the United States; however, whether or not you can convince the Americans of this is naturally another matter. Now the international situation as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hopes on an interview between the Premier and the President.

Please try to convince ROOSEVELT and HULL to this effect and please bear in mind that I do not consider that the interview need necessarily be bound strictly by what is set forth in my caption message.

Army 21481

Trans. 8/26/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 26, 1941
Purple
#505

Notwithstanding representations made by us on successive occasions the United States is treading a course which seems to be bent on exciting public opinion within our country. Beginning the first day of September they are exercising stringent limitations on gasoline shipments essential to our civilian population. At this time they are planning to pass through waters adjacent to our shores with cargoes of petroleum products which should be coming to us. The fact that they are transporting these petroleum products to Vladivostok has dealt a severe blow to the sensibilities of our government and people. At the same time that this brings about grave effects upon Japan and American relations, a terrific blow is being dealt by those in Washington to the whole country far more than you can realize.

This being the case, we are forced to cry out our disapproval of the realization of such measures and the Ministry of Interior as well as the War Ministry are very apprehensive. Therefore, because such measures are not in keeping with the neutrality treaty between Japan and Soviet Russia nor in accord with the interpretation of international law, I would like to have you make representations again to the Secretary of State in order that he may reconsider an immediate cessation of these measures from the general view point of the current Japan-American diplomatic relations. Wire me back as soon as you have filed these representations.

In the event the United States assumes the position that it is impossible to cut off shipments of petroleum products to the Soviet, then as it seems advisable to your Excellency make suggestions that they change the transportation route. However, should they not comply with this request, either, I think it would be wise to try to persuade the American authorities that they revive shipments of petroleum products to Japan immediately.

Furthermore, additional representations have been filed with the Soviet too, as of the 26th.

Army 21482

Trans. 8/26/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
29 August 1941
(Purple—CA)
#756 (4 part message, complete except for Part 4)

Regarding my #732 (?)*

The following is the gist of my discussion with Hull, last evening. (28th), regarding the proposed conference, etc.

(A) As the result might be quite unfortunate should either one of the conferring heads of the two governments assume an uncompromising attitude on certain points, it is the expressed desire of Hull to

hold preliminary conversations for the purpose of effecting a general agreement prior to the meeting of the two heads, and also to make the decisions of the two principals as final. (Hull used the expression "certification"). (Regarding this point please refer to my #703 (?)**).

(B) While it is necessary to bring up to date the various points of past conversations, the United States maintains that the adjustment of Japanese-American relations can be achieved without considering the question of China, which is vital to her.

(C) Despite Japan's insistence that she cannot alter her policy towards China, the United States government is unwilling to seek adjustments in Japanese-American relations at the expense of existing American-Chinese relations. Neither is the United States Government willing to give cause to "explosion" in China by its action. Furthermore, the task of placating China by the United States Government for accepting the basis of Chinese-Japanese negotiations will involve the tremendous effort of winning the approval of Britain and the U. S. S. R. and for this reason it is deemed unfeasible.

(D) Regarding the question of withdrawal of our troops from China and the right of protection, I informed the Secretary that I had nothing to state except what has already been stated on previous occasions. However, when I explained that so long as Prince Konoe remains in the saddle, I am confident that he will make every effort to settle these questions satisfactorily, Hull replied that he hoped that the Imperial Government will see fit to take definite steps towards this end.

Please check over my #540*** regarding these questions and let me know the government's opinion regarding them. Also please obtain details regarding same from Colonel Iwakuro upon his return.

(E) I wish to make the following suggestions in the event that it has been decided to hold the "Leaders' Conference".

(1) While it is the desire of the Japanese Government to designate Hawaii as the meeting place, we should consent to accept Juneau, if for reasons of constitutional requirements or personal safety, Hawaii is unsatisfactory to the President.

(2) The conference date should be from September 21st (?) to——.

(3) Five persons each from the Foreign Office, the Ministries of Navy and War, the Embassy and Consulate, that is a total of 20 persons or less, should be present at the conference.

(Part 4 not yet available).

**#732 available, not translated. Dated 23 August. Corrects the word "insisted" in a previous message to "instituted".

***JD-1: 4642 (S. I. S. #21150 to 53). Amb. Nomura brings up to date the seriousness of Japanese-American relations; reports that since Secy. Hull has already rejected Japan's proposal (for continued negotiations) and the President is returning shortly, Tokyo should consider giving the U. S. some sort of pledge regarding the three critical points: self-defense, withdrawal of troops, and nondiscrimination in trade.

***JD-1: 3842 (S. I. S. #19911). Amb. Nomura expresses the opinion that, based on the thought and discussions given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries, and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each.

[Secret]

From: Batavia (Isizawa)
To: Tokyo
September 2, 1941
Purple
#902

Re the first part of Circular #261* from Ambassador HONDA.

1. Conditioned by our military invasion of French Indo-China, it is a fact that the government of these islands has drastically stepped up their anti-Japanese tendencies and very evidently assumed an attitude of aid to China. This is evidenced by the unconvincing control exercised by the authorities here over the anti-Japanese editorials of the Chinese press, the solicitation of funds for the construction of military airplanes for Chungking among Chinese resident here, and their demand for suspension of publication of the Japanese-operated *East India Daily News* Chinese character edition, as well as the Malayan language magazine *Sinarusuratan*. However, on the other hand, in order that we may give a sufficiently clear picture of the situation, there is a small group of Chinese resident here whose anti-Japanese tendencies have slightly improved as a result of the activities of the government here. However, no sooner than they got the impression that these Chinese were coming slightly closer to us in feeling, it could be seen that they began to exercise their old tendencies on a still greater scale. Japanese who had good contacts with Chinese here were unmercifully exiled, and these Chinese friends were hauled unceremoniously to the police stations for questioning or possibly taken before the person in charge of Chinese affairs here. It has been anonymously reported that a statement has been made that they are in danger of their lives. Thus they have begun to hinder our schemes with regard to the Chinese with more and more determination.

2. Therefore, when an excellent opportunity presented itself, I deliberately took the occasion to exchange arguments on the Sino-Japanese incident with the Chief of the Far Eastern Section, RO^b, who is chiefly in charge, within the government circles, of the handling of the Chinese question. At that time, the fundamental points of his argument relating to the Chinese question here, I am giving below for your information.

(a) "I have lived in China many, many years. In addition, since my return to the Netherlands East Indies ten years ago, I have gradually come into repute in my handling of the Chinese question. I think I am pretty well aware of matters having to do with the Chinese, but the fact that Japan has set up the Nanking regime and is very anxious to overthrow the regime of CHIANG KAI-SHEK is, I think, extremely foolhardy and has slight chance of success. I personally cannot condone Japan's effort to beguile the Chinese masses from CHIANG KAI-SHEK through the establishment of the Nanking Government made up of second-rate or worse individuals. There is no more logical course for Japan to follow in the settlement of the China incident than to reach a compromise with CHIANG KAI-SHEK. This is my firm belief.

(b) "Though it is said that there are practically no Chinese living here in the Netherlands East Indies who support the Nanking Government, this is actually no exaggeration. All Chinese here give their support to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Furthermore, the Dutch Government recognizes the CHIANG regime, and because she does not

recognize the Nanking regime, it can be clearly seen that the Netherlands Government entertains the same convictions.

(c) "WANG CHING-WEI, who heads the Nanking Government, is sold on the Asia doctrine. He advocates Sino-Japanese peace. His fundamental policy is the expulsion of the white man from East Asia. It is but natural that the Netherlands East Indies Government should oppose this theory. Therefore, the consequent reaction here is the decision to follow a course of seeing to it that the Chinese on these islands are not swept off their feet.

(d) "At the present time, martial law has been put into effect on these islands, and everything is on a wartime footing. The people are united, and in order that the Netherlands home government might be restored, they are ready to fight. The 1,500,000 Chinese resident here on these islands are an important and integral part of the society of the Netherlands Indies. Their well-being greatly affects the peace, order, and economic livelihood of all living on these islands. Therefore, the Netherlands Indies authorities have definitely decided to follow a policy of unequivocally crushing out political schemes from abroad directed toward the Chinese resident here."

3. Having said all this, I endeavored to refute him with all the strength that I could command. RO, however, would not be convinced and adamantly stuck to his statements. Not only is the situation like this, but recently the fact that the police strength on these islands has been greatly augmented has made it extremely difficult for us to carry on our schemes toward the Chinese residents here. As a consequence, the situation practically means that we can do nothing directly. Therefore, I would like to have our organs here for the manipulation of public opinion as well as those who work in the development of our schemes remain passive for a little while. For the time being, we are concentrating our efforts in the collection of intelligences having to do with the activities of Chinese here as well as other things.

4. Therefore, in the meantime, until we have securely brought French Indo-China and Thai within our sphere of influence, I think that it would be most propitious for us to strengthen our schemes with regard to the Chinese here. For this purpose I would like to have sent to these islands influential persons in whom the Nanking Government has much confidence, who can command large numbers of followers among the Chinese here, who will have for their main objective the preaching of the doctrine that the Chinese and the Japanese are one, as well as set up organizations to influence Chinese opinion. These men would have absolutely no relations with either this office or with Japanese persons but would meet in large and small groups and talk with influential Chinese as well as substantial individuals of that group here.

Please transmit this message to Ambassador HONDA in China and to other competent diplomatic officials to whom this information, in your good judgment, might be usable.

Army 21816

Trans. 9/4/41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
3 September 1941
(Purple—CA)
#524

Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner.

In the midst of this confusion at home Fleisher's story in the Herald-Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between the Premier and the President broke, which was unfortunate, to say the least, as you can well imagine.

The government is not afraid of the above mentioned confusion; nor does it feel that that condition will destroy the fruits of the said conference. It is only that the government wished to keep the matter a secret until the arrangements had been completed. I am sure that you are aware that such a policy is not limited to just this case.

Because of the circumstances being what they are, we would like to make all arrangements for the meeting around the middle of September, with all possible speed, and issue a very simple statement to that effect as soon as possible. (If the middle of September is not convenient, any early date would meet with our approval).

Will you please convey this wish of the government to Hull and wire us the results. If an immediate reply is not forthcoming, we plan to issue a public statement describing our position in this matter. We feel that this should be done from the viewpoint of our domestic situation. Please advise the United States of this plan.

21792

JD-1: 4923

(D) Navy Trans. 9-5-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
September 4, 1941
Purple (CA)
#528 (Part 1 of 2.)

Re your #556^a.

1. What the United States Government proposed as a preliminary to the meeting of the leaders of the two countries were the questions of self-defense, occupation of China by the Japanese Army and equal treatment in trade, discussed during the informal negotiations in the past. The fact is that the recent situation in Japan, especially since the leakage of Premier KONOYE's message, has made it urgent to hold the conference as soon as possible and thereby adjust Japanese-American relations. However, if we continue to argue merely the legal angle of the aforementioned three pending questions as we have been doing, we believe that it would be impossible to be ready, as you have suggested, by the latter part of September. Furthermore, regarding what was communicated to us by the United States Government on July 24th and (August ?) 17th, we have already expressed our views, in addition to our sending the Premier's message. Since

we have nothing more to say on the subject, we have decided to express first of all our viewpoint given in #529^b, and, after finding out on what points the leaders of the two countries preliminarily and principally can agree, to hold a conference for the discussion of those points and then issue a joint statement at the end (I will wire you our text as soon as it is ready,) and thus help create a more wholesome atmosphere between the two countries.

Army 21790

Trans. 9/4/41 (S)

^a Not available.

^b See S. I. S. #21786, #21787 and 21788.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
September 4, 1941
Purple (CA)
#528 (Part 2 of 2.)

And so at 4:30 P. M. on the 4th I asked Ambassador GREW to come to see me and, upon his arrival, I communicated to him what is in the separate telegram. Bearing this in mind, will you also communicate the same to the Secretary of State.

2. The points in the separate telegram which require special explanation are as follows: (This was promised by the leaders of the two countries today during their conference. Whether it should take the form of a secret agreement or an ordinary agreement will be left to the discretion of the conferees.)

(1) We expect each of the matters upon which Japan has made her pledge, especially Japan's stand with regard to the Three-Power Alliance, will win the approval of the United States Government.

(2) As to the withdrawal of the orders for freezing of assets by both countries, you should avoid giving the impression that this freezing measure taken by the United States had proven to be damaging to Japan.

(a) Explain the fact that if the—of this measure is technical and complicated and, furthermore, a halfway step, it will not be understood by the people at large.

(b) Explain the fact that this step which the United States has taken has given the impression to the Japanese people that it was meant to be a punishment for Japan's occupation of French Indo-China.

(c) Consider its spectacular aspect as secondary and emphatically propose that in view of the importance of the pledges made at this time by Japan, the United States must reciprocate Japan's decision even by overcoming a possible strong opposition within the American Government. By the word "immediately" with reference to the time when these orders are to be withdrawn, the time when an agreement regarding the matter included in the aforementioned (1) has been reached by the leading conferees, is meant.

(3) By ceasing to take military measures we mean, for example, to cease dispatching more submarines and airplanes to the Philippines and cease acquiring military bases in the southwestern Pacific area, in China and in Far Eastern Russia.

Army 21791

Trans. 9/4/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

15 September 1941

(Purple)

#819 (In 3 parts, complete).

Re your 561 to 563*.

Points that have occurred to us here:

(1) Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be passed on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems that the matter of preliminary conversations has been entrusted by the President to Secretary Hull, in fact he told me that if a matter could not be settled by me and Secretary Hull it would not be settled whoever conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that during the past eight years he and the President had not differed on foreign policies once, and that they are as "two in one".

(2) The expression "Communistic and other subversive activity" would arouse their caution, and the words "common defense in China" would give rise to questions, while "agreement" would still leave a doubt as to just what it does mean in concrete terms.

(3) The United States has intimated that it wants to be advised of the peace terms between Japan and China and has further indicated that she would refuse to act as intermediary in the peace negotiations unless the terms were fair and just. Under such circumstances, I feel certain that the United States will not agree to promoting the peace conference if we now avoid outlining our terms.

(4) In view of the national characteristics of the United States and of the President's position, it will be next to impossible to leave the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact up to the "leaders" at the conference, for them to settle from a political viewpoint. In other words, if opinions of both sides do not coincide at the preliminary conferences, there will be no "leaders' conference".

(5) The United States has absolutely no objections to making these talks a Japanese-U. S. affair. Moreover, she has never even suggested the addition of a third power to it. The only thing they want to do is to arrange matters with Britain, China, Netherlands, etc. in advance, so that they will not get the impression that the United States is trading them off. However, I shall, of course convey the gist of your instructions to Hull.

(6) I have been doing everything in my power, however insignificant my efforts may seem, to carry out your various instructions and suggestions concerning the proposed negotiations. I fear, however, that if I were to go ahead and make some disposition of the various points you are discussing in Tokyo, I may find myself going off at a tangent. I should like, therefore, to leave these points alone for the time being and watch developments.

22427

JD-1:

(FD) Navy Trans. 9-18-41 (1)

*561-JD-1: 5159. (S. I. S. #22247)

#562-JD-1: 5160. (S. I. S. #22248)

#563-JD-1: 5161. (S. I. S. #22249)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

17 September, 1941

(Purple—CA)

#823 (Parts 1 and 2 of 3)*

(1) On 6 August, I said at the White House that of the three main points, both parties were in agreement in principle on two. As for the matter pertaining to our evacuating our troops, I expressed my opinion that it was only because he was confident that an agreement could be reached that the Premier is prepared to attend the meeting. At that time, the Secretary of State said that there were two or three other points that had to be clarified and "brought up to date." When he said that, he was referring to our proposal of 24 June.

Although we are aware of your instructions contained in your message #397 of 24 July,* since the negotiations broke down at about that time, we could do nothing about your instructions of 15 July. The break-down continued, and the talks were resumed only after the recent message was sent.

(2) The "understanding" which was put into words and submitted as a proposal on 24 June, was the culmination of over a dozen conferences between the Secretary of State and myself, in accordance with your instructions of 11 May. The Secretary and I conferred almost up to the moment he departed on his trip in behalf of his health. It is natural that the Secretary feels considerable attached to the proposal, since he had worked on it so hard for so many months.

It is my opinion that the U. S. will be more likely to come to terms at the preliminary negotiations if the general lines contained in that proposal were followed.

Hull (insists ?) that the negotiations be held here.

*JD-1: 3986 (S. I. S. #20091)—(You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined on a definite policy because of the fact that I have not as yet been in office very long. It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-U. S. Should the U. S., however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the U. S. of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation.

* For Part 3; see S. I. S. #22477.

22506

JD-1: 5301

Navy trans. 9-19-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

17 September, 1941

(Purple—CA)

#823 (Part 3 of 3)*

In view of the above facts, I believe that it is doubtful whether the preliminary negotiations can be arranged in accordance with only our proposal of 4 September. In any event, our first task is to find terms which are acceptable to both sides concerned, regarding the three points—particularly regarding the matter of garrisoning troops.

According to information from that usual source, the atmosphere of the Cabinet meeting held here last Friday showed considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U. S. conference. There is no mistaking the fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting if the preliminary arrangements can be made.

Nishiyama (Financial Attaché) says that a very good friend of his told him that Hull said to him (the friend) that the President "went too far" during the talks with this Ambassador.

• Parts 1 & 2 not available.

22477

JD-1: 5301

Navy Trans. 9-19-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

September 22, 1941

J-19

#839 (Part 1 of 4)

Currently the feeling here is, as ever, to aid the various countries on the side of the United States in carrying out the ultimate destruction of Germany. Though the Soviet, far more than was expected, has been able to put up a remarkable fight, there are many who sense an early defeat. England and the United States render such assistance as is possible in order to make impossible a separate peace or surrender. They are hopeful of being able to maintain her fighting strength in the spring, provided she can weather the winter. Opinion has developed to this point. The United States is putting up an estimated \$-0,000,000 worth of assistance. As a result of this, they plan to encourage the Britons' will to fight.

With regard to submarines, their utter annihilation is recognized to be virtually impossible. But then the American Navy could move directly into the Atlantic in order to protect Atlantic shipping. Furthermore, after the anticipated 6,000,000 "dead-weight" tons of increased construction have been completed by the United States alone during the twelve months of next year, a crisis will arise in the Atlantic. No one is unduly alarmed about submarines.

Army 23011

Trans. 10/3/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

September 22, 1941

J-19

#839 (Part 2 of 4)

With regard to the question of the policy toward....., the people, as a general rule, are extremely happy-go-lucky. Should a war develop between Japan and the United States, "why worry, it's inevitable," is their attitude. There is still a great deal of talk on the comparative merits of the navies of both countries, the gist of which can be summed up as follows: A war between Japan and the United States will be one within the scope of the navy alone; Japan's economic strength cannot stand a long war; the United States excels greatly in its ability to replace warships lost in battle; saying these things, they boast of their ability to win out in a short while. There are only a few who are at all conscious of the danger of a war with Japan. In the field of international diplomacy, they still maintain their age-old policy

toward There are many who argue that to reach a compromise with Japan at the expense of China is fundamentally wrong. For example, according to the Hyde Park correspondent writing in the *New York Times*, Sunday edition, at the present time attempts to ameliorate the situation existing between Japan and the United States are deadlocked. Because Japan's demands for the continued occupation of territory held by them in China is not in agreement with HULL's categorical denial of the possibility of such continued occupation, Premier KONOYE has requested a direct conference with the President.

Army 23012

Trans. 10/3/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

September 22, 1941

J-19

#839 (Part 3 of 4)

Nevertheless, notwithstanding all that, since the German people's will to fight is stronger than ever before, there are a greater number of people who feel that such a non-aggressive policy as outlined above cannot bring about a successful conclusion.

Many feel that as a result of the discontent of people in occupied lands, Italy will withdraw herself from the line of battle. In addition, many feel that the unrest of people in occupied areas will continue to increase. There are others, too, who pin unfounded hopes that the power of endurance of the German people will crumble within a short space of time.

If the war is to be a short one, one or two years will be required. If it is a long one, it will be protracted from five to ten years. The people generally here are maintaining an extremely happy-go-lucky frame of mind. There are practically none at all who think that as a result of this war the United States will be destroyed. With regard to their will to enter into the war, they feel that naval participation is sufficient. And, aside from the preparations being undertaken by military authorities, there are practically none who anticipate the dispatch of expeditionary forces on a large scale.

However, most recently there has been a sharp decline in the isolationist opinion expressed in the houses of Congress. One group is already going over to the majority group who back up the Government's foreign policy.

Army 23013

Trans. 10/3/41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

September 22, 1941

J-19

#839 (Part 4 of 4)

Nevertheless, the President is a person who unceasingly confers with HULL. Today the greater portion of the American Navy is being kept in the Pacific. Japan, in the event of the Russian downfall, might move either to the south or to the north. In such a case

there is some fear that a frontal clash might occur at the same time in the Atlantic and the Pacific as well. The President is giving the utmost consideration to this matter.

As for Japan's peace terms, rumors are being circulated that in addition to Japan demanding the treaty ports and the four southern provinces in China, she might go so far as to demand other points of military importance.

Finally, though the United States Government does not wish to compromise with Japan at the expense of China, should Japan give up forceful aggressions, Japanese-American trade relations could be restored, and the United States would even go so far as to render economic assistance to Japan.

The above are the critical observations concerning the trend of opinion in the United States made by KURATUKUHOON,* and I think he hit the nail on the head.

* Kana spelling.

Army 23014

Trans. 10/3/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

23 September, 1941

(Purple—CA)

#842 (3 Parts—complete)

On the morning of the 23rd. I called on Hull and handed to him the English texts of your messages #562* and #564**, and our terms of peace between Japan and China as contained in your message #590***.

I took this opportunity to point out the following points: That with these notes, together with the various other statements made by us, we have said all that we can say; that we have nothing further to say to Ambassador Grew, either; that we shall leave all matters pertaining to the Tripartite Pact, other than the points which have already been brought up and explained, to be decided upon at the meeting of the leaders of the two countries; that the proposals which we now make are not intended to show down the original proposals made by the U. S., but rather are intended to enlarge their scope.

I continued by describing the situation and conditions in Japan in accordance with the contents of your message #589****. I added that our government was sincerely interested in having the "Leaders' Conference" materialize at the earliest possible opportunity.

Part 2.

In reply to this, Hull said that he was spending much time in promoting the materialization of the "Leaders' Conference". He then said that he had previously expressed his hope that we would guide public opinion to a more favorable one, and inquired if we had been successful in this.

I replied that as I had pointed out on several previous occasions, the government has faced this problem with sincerity, and that it is gradually being improved.

Hull then asked for my own personal opinions on the matter, so I replied that it is the government's opinion that the Tripartite Pact

and the improvement of U. S.-Japanese relations can be made to parallel each other. I also said that I was firmly convinced that the meeting between the two leaders would immeasurably strengthen the peace of the Pacific.

Part 3.

Hull then advised me that he has received Grew's report of the Minister Toyoda-Grew meeting of the 22nd, and that he is giving it his careful study at the present time. He said that he is anxious to reply to it at the earliest possible moment. I then tried to have him commit himself to be in favor of the materialization of the "Leaders' Conference", even if in principle only, but I was unable to make him say anything definite.

Hull then went on to say that in view of world conditions, it is not too early even now, for the U. S. and Japan to consider the reconstruction of a peaceful world. He, himself, thinks that Japan and the U. S. are ideally situated right now to lend leadership to the world. At the same time, however, he is not sure whether the caliber of the statesmanship of the two countries is capable of coping with such an undertaking.

I, therefore, said that even from this standpoint, it was essential that the "Leaders' Conference" takes place.

With this, our meeting was brought to an end.

*JD-1: 5160 (S. I. S. #22348)—Detailed reply of Foreign Minister to Grew's request for interpretation of various phrases and paragraphs in Japan's notes and statements of intentions in the current U. S. negotiations.

**JD-1: 5162 (S. I. S. #22350)—"Equitable basis" is not to be judged solely by Japan. (Refers to open door & commerce in China.)

***JD-1: 5360 (S. I. S. #22550-51)—Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China.

****JD-1: 5359 (S. I. S. #22547-49)—Grew-Toyoda talk in which Japs again emphasize that all U. S. questions have now been answered and they therefore expect a U. S. reply on the leaders' conference question. The situation during past month has steadily become more critical and will become more so, due to pro-Axis elements in Japan, if a decision is not reached prior to the 1st anniversary of the Tripartite Pact the 26th of this month. Tell the Secretary this and wire his reactions.

22749

JD-1:

Navy trans. 9-26-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
September 26, 1941
Purple (CA)
#597

In solving so difficult a problem as Japanese-American relations, your Honor's troubles and anxieties have always been deeply appreciated by me. I can easily see that, concerning the negotiations, Your Honor's views are not infrequently at variance with mine; but, as I told you in my #554*, this is a very serious matter and I am proceeding cautiously and deliberately. Therefore, I wish to caution you again not to add or detract a jot or tittle on your own without first getting in contact with me. In this connection, please wire me back concerning the following points:

1. Have you communicated to them the contents of my #590*?

1. In your conversation with the President, did he not mention a promise on our part that we would avoid and cease any further increase in our troops stationed in French Indo-China for the sake of success in the Japanese-American negotiations? When the President stated with smiling cynicism that he expected we might occupy Thailand

while the Premier and he were talking, just as we did French Indo-China while you and the Secretary of State were conferring (see your #752^e), did he not also refer to such a promise? I think he probably did. In view of the seriousness of matters as they stand, although I know the hour is all ready late, because of the necessity of keeping records, I want you please to go and question them again. Now when Germany (?) is becoming so aroused, we have no intention of rehashing things which have been gone over in the past. Please, also, (tell this to them?). Needless to say, there will be no changes in my #595^d of today, so will you please communicate it to them.

* See S. I. S. #22191 in which Tokyo tells Ambassador NOMURA that the texts of certain notes are decided upon after very careful study by all of the various ministries involved. If, however, he notes any points in such messages, he should make inquiries and suggestions by cable before delivering them to the addressees.

• See S. I. S. #22550-51 in which Tokyo sends Washington the text of the basic terms of peace between Japan and China.

• See S. I. S. #21651 and #21615 in which Ambassador NOMURA wires Tokyo of his conference with the President with regard to the meeting between Prince KONOYE and the President.

• See S. I. S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

Army 22753

Trans. 9/26/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
27 September 1941
(Purple—CA)
#604

On this the 27th, at 1630, after completing the ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, I requested Ambassador Grew to call on me. Off the record, I talked to him along the lines contained in my separate message #605*. I urged him to strongly recommend to his home government to have the "leaders' meeting" materialize immediately. Will you too, therefore, carefully read the contents of my separate wire and secretly do everything in your power to prevail upon the President to have this meeting materialize.

The above is not to be construed as being the absolutely final proposal on our part, nor is it absolutely essential that a time limit be put in force. However, in view of internal and external circumstances of our country, we cannot keep postponing matters forever. Please, therefore, put primary emphasis on the importance of holding the meeting immediately. (I mentioned this point to the U. S. Ambassador, too.)

*JD-1: 5503.

22863

JD-1: 5502

(D) Navy Trans. 9-30-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
27 September 1941
(Purple—CA)
#605 (In 4 parts, complete)

(Translator's note. This is the gist of the off-the-record statement made by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew—see Tokyo to Washington #604*—and is written in the first person, Toyoda speaking.)

(Part 1)

1. Europe has now fallen into a chaotic condition. The flames of war have spread to the Atlantic and they are enveloping the various powers of the world. Fortunately, however, no war has, as yet, broken out in the Pacific. The United States and Japan, alone, hold the key to continued peace or war in the Pacific.

Should the United States and Japan come to blows, the Pacific, too, would be immediately thrown into the chaos that is war. World civilization would then come crashing down. No greater misfortune could befall mankind.

In recent times, there have been numerous and various incidents between Japan and the United States. Relations are at an exceedingly sensitive point, and even the slightest thing must be treated with the utmost precaution.

If, at this time, Japanese-U. S. relations were to be adjusted so as to promote friendship between them, the effects would be felt not only by the United States and Japan, but would indeed contribute greatly to a world peace. The Imperial Government desires the adjustment of Japanese-U. S. relations not only for the sake of Japan and the United States, but hopes that at the same time, such a step would become the opening wedge to bringing about peace throughout the world.

2. Since assuming my post two months ago, I have been working on the matter of readjusting Japanese-U. S. relations even to the extent of almost forgetting to eat and sleep. It is with the same objective that Premier Konoye has expressed his willingness to act as a leader in a conference with President Roosevelt.

(Part 2)

3. Japan is connected to Germany and Italy by an alliance. The fact that the Premier of Japan had volunteered to meet the President, in itself has given rise to much misunderstanding regarding her relations with Germany and Italy. Thus, there is proof that Japan is making a supreme sacrifice. Moreover, the history of Japan has no precedence of an instance where the Premier himself has gone abroad in behalf of diplomacy. This fact in itself should clearly show the sincerity of the government of Japan in its expressed desire of adjusting the relationship between Japan and the United States, and through that, of maintaining peace on the Pacific, and, indeed, for the world.

4. Maintenance of peace is Japan's sole motivating power. Should there be those who believe that Japan was forced to her knees by U. S. pressure, it would indeed be a sad misconception on their part. Japan desires peace; she is not succumbing to outside pressure. Moreover, Japan is not one to yearn for peace at any price.

The Japanese people have a peculiar characteristic of repelling all outside pressures. We have pointed this fact out previously but in view of the general tone of U. S. newspapers in the past, (it is admitted that this has been considerably toned down of late), I feel that it is necessary to repeat this.

(Part 3)

5. Japanese-U. S. relations are exceedingly complicated. Hence, it is quite possible that the entire matter cannot be settled in a day and a night. It is quite possible that not all of the difficult problems can be ironed out by a single meeting between the leaders of the two countries. However, the political aspect of such a meeting would have exceedingly far reaching effects. Moreover, those items which have as yet remained unsettled (we do not believe that any of these exist any longer, but assuming that some do) after all of the goings and comings of cables, they could undoubtedly be settled at the conference. It should be unnecessary to point out the turn for the better in U. S.-Japanese relations that this would have.

We are under the impression that in theory, your side is not opposed to the holding of the "leaders' conference". Should, however, in spite of this, the meeting does not materialize for some reason, we doubt if another opportunity such as the present would appear for some time to come. Moreover, it is quite possible that there may be some fearsome reactions from such a failure.

6. Japan has already announced the proposals she will make at the meeting. We have moreover already submitted for your convenience a complete resume in accordance with the lines contained in the United States' proposal of 21 June. I feel certain, therefore, that the United States is fully aware of the Japanese viewpoint by this time

7. We have, of course, already decided upon the vessel which will transport the Premier and his party; the personnel of his party, including the generals and admirals, have also been decided upon. We are in a position to start at any moment now.

(Part 4)

8. Since the situation is as described above, the Imperial Government awaits with expectations the United States' reply at the earliest possible moment. Any further delays would place the government in an exceedingly difficult position from the viewpoint of the Tripartite Pact. Your Excellency is certainly fully aware that there is every possibility of commemorating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, to strengthen the ties of the three powers.

From the viewpoint of the weather there is considerable danger that it will become unfavorable in the North Pacific and in the Alaska area.

9. From both domestic and external circumstances, time is of paramount importance, as I have pointed out previously. It is essential that the meeting be decided upon at all possible speed and it is with this thought uppermost in my mind that I so strongly insist upon this matter at this time. I would consider it to be of greatest fortune if we were to receive a definite reply at the earliest moment.

From our standpoint if the meeting were scheduled from 10 to 15 October, it would meet with our best convenience.

In conclusion, I would like to say that in a negotiation of this type, it is of the utmost importance that each respect the other's reliability

and sincerity. Your Excellency is fully cognizant of Premier Konoye's character and his political position. I hardly feel that I can add anything in this respect at this time. However, as I said before, I doubt if another opportunity to adjust Japanese-U. S. relations will present itself because, at present, the Premier and the entire Cabinet are behind the move. At the same time, it is essential, even under present circumstances, that the leaders meet and confer directly, and at the earliest possible time. I repeat this last point over and over again.

JD-1: 5602.

JD-1:
22864

(D) Navy Trans. 9-30-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
27 September 1941
(Purple—CA)
#865 (In 10 parts, complete)

(Part 1)

On this, the 27th, I had Matudaira call on Ballantine and had him relay the contents of your message and at the same time deliver the English texts contained in your messages 591* and 595**. He requested that they be delivered to Hull.

I am taking this opportunity to express my humble opinion on various points which happen to draw my attention in regard to your message #595**. I pass them on to you for whatever value they may have.

1. As I have pointed out on several previous occasions while reporting on matters pertaining to this issue, the United States insists that it would be inappropriate to hold the "leaders' conference" until the two nations have come to a complete agreement on all the points involved. At present the United States is allegedly investigating our attitude with regard to said various points. Since, as you said, we have already said all that is to be said, we are now committed to await expression of intentions by the United States.

(Part 2)

If we submit further papers to them in advance of receiving some reply from them, there is a danger that matters would become further complicated and less clear. I am of the opinion that this would tend to hamper the progress of the negotiations.

If, by some chance, some apparent inconsistencies appear in our various papers, it may lead to their becoming suspicious of our sincerity.

(Part 3)

Fundamentally speaking, the United States wishes to proceed along the lines she express in the U. S. proposals of 21 June. Judging from developments to date we do not feel that the premises outlined in those proposals are too far afield. Moreover, from the viewpoint of

practicability we feel that they are the most concrete. I, therefore, hope that you will accept the reasonings embodied therein.

2. The deletion of the item reading "no northward advance shall be made without justification" will no doubt be the point which will invite the most suspicion.

(Part 4)

3. The respective attitudes of the two nations to the war in Europe: As I have pointed out in messages pertaining to this phase, (see particularly my message #540***), it would be exceedingly difficult from the United States' viewpoint to retain paragraph 1 proposing joint mediation. Recent developments (particularly in view of the President's statement subsequent to the sinking of the U. S. vessel) have further stiffened the U. S. attitude. Therefore, it is my opinion that considerable difficulty will be encountered in securing U. S. agreement to this point.

(Part 5)

Concerning the matter of self defense as contained in paragraph two: Again, as I have previously reported, all U. S. moves pertaining to the European war are allegedly being made from the basic national policy of self defense as the starting point. Even if the United States does become actively involved in the war, she will do so in behalf of self defense and will not, supposedly, be in any sense an aggressive attack, even though she may have had ample provocation to make it so. In this way, they intend to obviate the necessity of our invoking the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Thus, the United States is very anxious to have the term "right to self defense" as elastic as possible. (Read Secretary Hull's speech, contained in my message #381****). For this reason, they may not be tempted to accept the wording of our proposal on this point. The fact that we outline our needs for self defense may unduly arouse their suspicion.

(Part 6)

Regarding the matter pertaining to the settlement of the Chinese Incident: As I pointed out in my message #540***, the United States has, fundamentally speaking, insisted that we outline the peace terms we shall propose to China. She maintains that she will enter into the real negotiations only after a complete agreement as to the contents of the "annex." Therefore, we shall undoubtedly be confronted with the difficult task of coming to an agreement on the matters of garrisoning troops and non-discriminatory treatment. I am of the opinion that in the final analysis, we shall have to agree to the terms offered by the United States in so far as they do not conflict with the terms of the Nanking Agreement. We should word our explanations and counter proposals with this in mind.

(Part 7)

Before we are able to have the United States yield, we shall undoubtedly have to conduct several negotiations even after this. The danger of the negotiations breaking down completely as a result of the matter of our stationing troops, is constantly on the increase.

The "non-discrimination" phase is not quite as tickling a problem as the former. In our proposal we state that non-discrimination will apply to the conducting of business between China and Japan only. We add that as long as any third nation conducts her economic enterprises on a fair and even basis, she will in no way be discriminated against. I am not at all sure that the United States will be satisfied with these conditions.

(Part 8)

Furthermore, we will probably encounter considerable difficulty in making the United States swallow, from the standpoint of policy, the new "principle of especially close relations".

Aside from these points, paragraph one is so worded as to imply that the United States and Japan were jointly responsible to settle the China Incident. I am not at all confident that we shall be able to succeed in this because it may not give a favorable impression at the time this "understanding" is published. (As I have reported in previous messages, the United States is not in favor of keeping this "understanding" a secret).

-----with regard to the contents of paragraph two referring to having the United States use her good offices ----- and the point making the demands, shall necessitate the making of new demands if we are to pursue the lines laid down heretofore, as well as those contained in your instruction of 11 April.

(Part 9)

I also believe that considerable difficulty will be encountered in having them agree to the new matter. In that part referring to peace terms, the following words appear: "Konoye statement and those agreements between Japan and China". I feel that here, too, we shall encounter difficulty in getting their approval. Since President Roosevelt is very interested in taking the mediation actions himself it might be well to insert the word "President" in the sentence.

(Part 10)

5. We have your instructions of 15 July with regard to the matter of trade between the two countries. We would appreciate your basing your proposal on the U. S. proposal of 21 June.

6. With regard to the matter pertaining to the political stabilization of the Pacific, it is said that that part of the U. S. proposal of 21 June referring to it was written by Secretary Hull himself. Since the United States looks upon this phase with the most importance, we would appreciate your allowing that part of their proposal to stand as is. We would particularly appreciate your deleting from the new proposals that part which states that we agree to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China only at the termination of the China Incident. We feel that it would be more acceptable to the United States if we were to retain only that part which refers to the condition of a large scale peace on the Pacific.

In other words, we hope to wind up all arrangements of the preliminary conference.

*JD-1: 5415 (S. I. S. #22700). Japan presents a long explanation of the necessity for her maintaining troops in certain parts of China even after peace with Japan is restored.

**JD-1: 5438 (S. I. S. #22748). Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U. S. to agree to a "leaders' conference".

***JD-1: 3842 (S. I. S. #19911). Amb. Nomura expresses the opinion that based on the thought and discussions given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries, and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each.

****Not available.

22961

JD-1: 5534

(D) Navy Trans. 10-1-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

September 28, 1941

Purple (CA)

#606 (Part 1 of 2)

In connection with my off-the-record communication to the American Ambassador in Tokyo last night, in case you have an interview with the President, the following is for your information:

1. As the last paragraph of that communication makes clear, we do not mean at all that all questions and answers are now useless. However, I wished again to emphasize that the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance is the turning point and that this occasion is all the more grave. If they have any questions, of course, we will be glad cordially to respond (but as a matter of fact, they have not asked us a single thing since the 10th, and I find this very mysterious).

2. The meaning of the statement that yesterday was the turning point and that the occasion is an important factor is that for the last few days a movement to strengthen the Axis has been afoot, and the popular psychology is being adverted toward this trend. Consequently, the tendency to oppose an adjustment with the United States is naturally increasing. Hence, now is the time, if ever, to concentrate on this accord. This does not mean at all that the power of the present government has dwindled or that the advocates of anti-Americanism have strengthened their position.

Army 22819

Trans. 9/29/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

September 28, 1941

Purple (CA)

#606 (Part 2 of 2)

It is true, we shall have to get quicker and better results than ever before from our endeavors for an understanding. It may even be necessary for us to publish them. Nevertheless, once the negotiations are decided upon or once the date of an interview is set, the government of this country is sure that the people will stand united and that the opposition's voice will be quickly drowned in a chorus of approval. Of this we have always been sure, nor has our conviction waned for a moment lately. Notwithstanding, the Premier sent his message more than a month ago. Nothing has happened; it

seems as though it were pigeon-holed. The government is very much worried over this, needless to say.

3. It is true that one influential admiral and one general were included in the Premier's entourage. This made the United States suspect that a hostile military was holding the whip hand over us. I took this action, therefore, to dispel any such fear on their part (I seem to recall that HULL asked Your Honor something about this once).

4. I talked with the British Ambassador the other day and he said, "To speak frankly, the trouble is that the United States is uneasy and lacks confidence concerning the attitude of the government of Japan." Well, the integrity of Premier KONOYE and of the present government ought to be a hundred per cent reliable, and the American Ambassador must have sufficiently advised his government on the trustworthiness of Prince KONOYE.

Army 22820

Trans. 9/29/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

29 September 1941

(Purple) (CA)

#867

During the morning of this, the 29th, (Monday), I called on the Secretary of State, and, in accordance with the instructions contained in your messages from 604 to 606*, I asked that I be granted a secret interview with the President. The Secretary said that because of death in his family, the President had been in Hyde Park since Thursday. Upon his return to Washington, however, he would see the President, he said and would hand me a memo of the U. S. Government within the next couple of days. He added that he read Ambassador Grew's report yesterday and thus gave evidence of being thoroughly familiar with the situation.

Hull gave indications that he too felt that immediate action was essential. At the same time, however, he seemed to think that it was of primary importance to get public opinion in Japan thoroughly unified in favor of it.

I, therefore, pointed out that though the government, the army, and the navy, were in full accord with the proposals being discussed, considerable time would have to elapse before the entire public could be made to understand them. There are those, for example, who cannot understand why the United States should meddle so deeply in Asiatic affairs when she herself constantly refers to the Monroe Doctrine and who, in actual practice, has seized the leadership of the American continents. Japanese public opinion cannot be made to conform with the every whim of the United States. To await its doing so would be like watchfully waiting for the century plant to bloom, I said.

23033

JD-1: 5592

(D) Navy Trans. 10-3-41 (7)

*604-JD-1: 5502 (S. I. S. #22863). Toyoda-Grew talk held 1630 Sept. 27. Japs again strongly urge early action on the "leaders' conference", and directs Nomura to do everything possible to avoid further postponement.

*605-JD-1: 5503 (S. I. S. #22864). Gist of remarks made by Toyoda to Grew.

*606-JD-1: 5504 (S. I. S. #22819-20). Toyoda elucidates for Nomura's information various points of his talk with Grew.

[Secret]

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

29 September 1941

(Purple)

#870 (In 4 parts, complete)

(Part 1)

To Chief of Bureau Terasaki from Iguti.

I realize, of course, that I am being presumptuous, but the following are my opinions of the negotiations to adjust U. S.-Japanese relations:

(1) In view of such incidents as were described in our message #866*, we believe that it would be well if we did not deliver those papers here which have already been delivered in Tokyo to Ambassador Grew. Duplications in this manner are apt to create misunderstandings through transmission errors and through differences in translations. This is particularly true of some vague passage which cannot be made clear without lengthy explanations. (Please see our message #865**, and others for points which are in doubt). Under these circumstances, we are unable to make explanations when we are requested to do so by the United States. The Ambassador himself is placed in an exceedingly awkward position. We, therefore, would prefer to put most of our efforts in trying to sound the U. S. attitude.

(Part 2)

(2) We have already said that we have said all that is to be said. To keep submitting notes after notes, thereafter, which do not always run in sequence with the previous note, is not good, for it causes confusion and further delays.

As a matter of fact DESUBANIN *** told us in confidence that the United States is of the opinion that the scene of the negotiations was shifted to Tokyo by us so as to bring about delays. They think that we are watching developments of the German-Soviet war, and that we shall launch a northward move if indications seem to favor it.

(Part 3)

(3) Father Dught advises us that a friend of his in Tokyo (probably Walsh) reports that Japanese governmental circles feel that there is absolutely no reason why the United States should not accept the most recent proposals. The fact that she has not done so, must be due to interference from some Washington source, Walsh cables.

For the past six months, we have been holding talks here during which the attitude and stand of the United States has been set down clearly. We feel confident that you are aware, through our various reports on the subject, that it is exceedingly unlikely that the United States has any intention of backing down from those established stands.

We feel that there must be a tendency in Tokyo to view the United States statements too optimistically. It is imaginable to us that there are those who approach the Premier with a little too much "wishful thinking".

(Part 4)

(4) It is admittedly true that impatience in this matter must be avoided. We realize, of course, that circumstances have made it unavoidable to a certain extent, but even so, it seems to us that we have been urging the United States to reply quite frequently of late. This apparently is giving the impression to the United States that we are overly anxious.

On the other hand, the United States applied the "freezing" order on us, effecting our entire economic structure. Since then, they have been sitting tight, awaiting and watching subsequent developments. The United States does not suffer greatly from that measure; hence they are in no rush.

Under such circumstances, we do not feel that it is to our advantage to show signs of over-anxiety all by ourselves.

23110

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 10-4-41 (1)

*JD-1: 5560 (S. I. S. #22977). Grew's report of our terms of peace with China differs from what you sent me. Please check.

**JD-1: 5534 (S. I. S. #22961). Long report from Nomura giving his views of current state of U. S.-Jap negotiations.

***R. E. Desvernine, President American Crucible Steel Co.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 September 30, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #614 (Part 1 of 3.)
 Re your #865^a.

1. As you say, so long as they do not send us any reply we should avoid presenting them with various written suggestions. I am entirely in agreement with you.

2. I, too, in the beginning was in a hurry to draw up a plan and hurry along the negotiations, that is why on the 14th of July I sent you some instructions, but since you never presented the American officials with them, and in the light of subsequent events, in order to finally evolve a comprehensive settlement, on September 4 I brought forth a proposal. I incorporated this proposal in my #595^b and did my best to harmonize it with the American proposal. There are no changes to be made in the substance of it and if the Americans so desire I think we might negotiate on the basis thereof.

3. My views on certain points which you mention in your message are as follows. In case they question you please answer accordingly:

1. The reason why I left out the expression, "As there is no real objection we will make no northward invasion", in part 2 of your message is that if we were to insert this into the body of the text it might only give them the suspicion that we have direct designs against the Soviet. This whole matter, after all, concerns the China incident and the South Seas question. There is no particular problem in the north. In the preface to the clause concerning the stability of the Pacific area, this matter is fully included so I am willing to leave it up to the leaders on both sides and if necessary to clarify this in the

minutes. In my proposal of the 4th I made it plain that there was no objection to this statement.

Army 22870

Trans. 9/30/41 (S)

* Not available.
* See S. I. S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
September 30, 1941
Purple (CA)
#614 (Part 2 of 3)

2. The first clause relating to the attitude of both Governments toward the European war is all right as it stands so far as I am concerned. Since we say "when the proper time comes" I am sure that this will cover their misgivings.

3. Concerning the second clause of the same article, as you say, they may have something more to say. We will merely wait for them to broach the subject and if necessary not be loathe to consider it again.

4. The part concerning the adjustment of the China incident.

a. We do not mean by the first clause that this is the joint responsibility of the Japanese and the American Governments. All along the United States has insisted that a settlement of the China trouble has a great bearing on the stability of the Pacific. That is why we went so far as to say that both Governments "will endeavor to bring about etc." We do not mean to discuss this in detail but if they oppose it as it stands we are ready to change it or leave it out.

b. We have been looking forward with expectancy from the beginning to American mediation and so we are not making any new requests such as you mentioned.

c. The insertion of the phrase "a treaty between Japan and China" is merely in accordance with the three principles laid down by KONOYE and there is no special meaning to it. Please explain this to them.

d. There is no objection to requesting that President ROOSEVELT mediate.

Army 22871

Trans. 9/30/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
September 30, 1941
Purple (CA)
#614 (Part 3 of 3.)

e. When we come to the question of non-discrimination in economic activities in China, I want you to make it clear to them so that they will not entertain any misgivings that this principle should not apply merely between Japan and China but also to third countries. Advise them, furthermore, that the principle that neighbors naturally have intimate relations is practiced throughout the whole world and is by no means a new theory.

5. The clause concerning commerce between the two countries in my #595^a coincides in meaning with the American proposal. Only in the meantime the freezing order has taken place and subsequent developments have modified the situation. We only hope that conditions will soon be ameliorated. Once they eliminate this order we will have no objection to their proposal on this subject.

6. *a.* Concerning the stipulations about the political stability of the Pacific, the stipulations in the American proposal are pet principles of Secretary HULL and the United States sets great store by them. They are merely general stipulations, therefore, we will not be loathe to reconsider them.

b. I transferred the matters concerning the military evacuation of French Indo-China and the settlement of the Chinese incident to the clause concerning the establishment of peace in the Pacific. This will make the clause more harmonious and expand its significance. That is all I meant by this action. If they don't like it, however, we will put it back like it was.

If the Americans present you with an aide memoire today, without any delay, wire it on to me. I am ready and eager to make a translation of it. If possible, before you send it, send me a brief summary.

Army 22872

Trans. 9/30/41 (S)

^a See S. I. S. #23748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

[Secret]

From: Rome
To: Tokyo
September 30, 1941
Purple
#627

Our recent negotiations with the United States have put a bad taste in the mouths of the people of this country. Our attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance appears to them to be faithless. Recently the newspapers have been growing more critical in tone where we Japanese are concerned. Official comment, too, has been none too complimentary. As for Italy's attitude toward the recent celebration of the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite Alliance, its coolness reflects the attitude of the whole Italian people. I mean to say:

1. The Propaganda Department told the press to confine itself to a mere mention of the present anniversary and to turn its attention mainly to other things, refraining from discussion of the bearing of this alliance upon the present international situation.

2. The ceremonies attendant upon this anniversary were carried out half-heartedly or even less by the Italians. It would even seem that this was done to spite Japan and Germany. At Villa Madama there was a reception held for CIANO, but certainly no festivities worth mentioning took place. At a reception held for the press, at first the German and Italian flags only were hanging in the hall. A Japanese reporter mentioned this, and then they pulled them all down.

3. When asked about felicitations and ceremonies, the Propaganda Department always replied that this was not a good time to be ostentatious.

Furthermore, the other day PRUNAS told ANDŌ that word had been received from Ambassador INDELLI that when he inquired of the Japanese Foreign Office officials concerning the negotiations between Japan and the United States, they were very reserved and uncommunicative, showing that their erstwhile fervor for the Axis was not as glowing as in days gone by.

All this shows how dissatisfied the Italian people are. All I can say is that the exercises held in Tokyo on the ——— and the Minister's speech, together with the messages from the Premier and Minister, saved the situation perhaps to some extent.

Army 22946

Trans. 10/2/41 (G)

—————
[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

September 30, 1941

Purple (CA)

#881 Part 1 of 2*

Last Monday after a long time I went to call on Admiral STARK. In the middle of our conversation Rear Admiral TURNER joined us. The Admiral said that after all the question of troops stationed in China would do most damage to the negotiations and that unless the China Incident is settled an understanding between Tokyo and Washington will be impossible. TURNER said that he doubted if we would agree to evacuate China, but if no agreement were reached in the preparatory talks any conversations between the leaders of the two countries might be dangerous.

While we were talking about the Tripartite Alliance, the Admiral stated that the United States does not intend to go ahead and strike at Japan, adding that if the United States fights a two ocean war after all she will have to defend herself in the Pacific.

Army 22987

Trans. 10/2/41 (2)

* Part 2 not available.

—————
[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

1 October 1941

(Purple—CA)

#618 (In 5 parts, complete)

(Part 1)

To Counselor Iguti from Terasaki.

Re your #870*

1. Please refer to our message #613** with regard to the matter contained in your #866***.

2. I feel that you are justified to a certain extent when you complain that after we have stated that we have put all of our cards on the table, we continue to send you note after note, etc. Our note of 4 September was so designed to contain our views of the three subjects

which have been discussed hitherto in a very broad light. It was not drawn up with any intention of "slowing down" the procedure in the sense voiced by Hull. We were of the opinion that there were some points of the preliminary talks which needed clearing up. Thinking that it would facilitate matters if we drew up our proposals in the form that the U. S. proposal of 21 June was put in (my message #595****). We further sent you message #590****, dealing with Japanese-Chinese peace terms and my message #591***** pertaining to the garrisoning of troops, in the hope that they would supplement and explain our note of 4 September. They were forwarded to your office by the Foreign Minister, as reference material to be used by the Ambassador in explaining our position to the United States. They were sent at the request of the Premier and the military.

(Part 2)

Putting it bluntly, we were quite unaware of the fact that the Ambassador in the United States had allegedly submitted, for the purpose of further consideration by this office, certain changes in our note of 4 September, (the 1st, 4th—including the supplements—, 6th and 7th paragraphs were unchanged; paragraph 2 was unchanged with the exception of that part referring to the exchanging of official notes; paragraph 3 was identical to the Japanese note of 15 June; and to paragraph 5 was added the words: "For the production and procurement of national resources" to the U. S. proposal of 21 June), until we were questioned about it by the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo. This allegation came as a great surprise and the Foreign Minister replied that the note of 14 July must have been the one implied. The Minister added that if the Embassy in Tokyo was in immediate need of the English text of that message, he could no doubt obtain it from the State Department, and that we could supply him with the Japanese text immediately.

It was then that that part which appears in parentheses in the preceding paragraph came to light. At the same time, the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had said that the "draft was not official" to the State Department was also brought to light.

(Part 3)

These conditions have further complicated the already exceedingly complicated negotiations and for that reason, it is indeed very regrettable.

3. It is regrettable that in spite of the fact the Ambassador in Washington and yourself are putting forth your best efforts and in spite of the fact that we are facing the problems with the utmost sincerity, the United States does not reciprocate our statesmanship. However, there are none here who are underrating the United States or who are looking upon the developments with undue optimism.

4. We fear that possibly you are not completely familiar with the exceedingly critical situation at home. It is only through the clear thinking of the military and the superhuman work on the part of all those officials concerned with domestic matters that we have been able to avert the breaking out of any unfortunate incident subsequent to the 27th*****. The utmost caution shall have to be exercised

in the future to preserve this condition. Will you please obtain from Minister Wakasugi at first hand a description of the situation in Japan. This is, of course, for your and the Ambassador's information only.

Your explanation to the United States should be made along the following lines: "Apparently there are those in the United States who misunderstand the political situation in Japan. These persons seem to be of the opinion that the Konoye cabinet's position is not strong. Therefore, any agreement entered into with that government is in danger of being disregarded by the military or some other strong organization. This is not a correct analysis of the situation in Japan. It is true that there are those who express opposition to the present cabinet but these elements can be easily overruled.

(Part 4)

"Of course there have been public utterances such as Colonel Mabuchi's broadcast and Nakano's speech, who expressed, judging from the reports, opinions opposed to those contained in the Premier's message. Anyone, however, who knows the characteristics of the Japanese and who are familiar with conditions in Japan, should be able to understand the true meaning of those speeches. Mabuchi placed the most emphasis on encouraging the people while Nakano, pursuing his usual line, need not be looked upon with any importance.

"Unfortunately, however, foreign newsmen stationed in Japan, attached much importance to these speeches. British and American newspapers which place the most importance on 'journalistic interest' played up minor points in an exaggerated manner.

"These, of course, are causing misunderstandings. We are confident, however, that the people who have spent any time at all in Japan can see the true picture, etc."

We believe that if the situation were explained to them in that manner, they will more readily understand matters. Moreover, it is the truth.

Not only the Foreign Minister but all concerned are as one in this matter, and are willing to meet any without fear. You can readily see, in view of domestic circumstances and in view of external relations, that we are all eager to have the "leaders' conference" take place. This is but a natural development, and if they insist on construing it to be impatience on our part, I guess it can't be helped.

(Part 5)

That we intend Washington to be the central locale of these negotiations is as you stated in your recent message and should have been further clarified by the telephone communication between the Foreign Office and the Embassy. Because of some peculiar circumstances, the occasion may arise where some talks are conducted in Tokyo first. That would be done only under unavoidable circumstances. Any who believe that any idea of stalling was behind such a move, thoroughly misunderstands the Foreign Minister's motives.

Time is now the utmost important element. Whether this matter materializes or not has a direct and important bearing on peace on the Pacific and even of the world. The seriousness of the situation

must be thoroughly recognized. Please exercise every bit of power available to bring about a favorable conclusion of this matter.

Paragraph 2 of my message #614***** was meant to point out that we have no objections to using the contents of my message #595**** as a basis of negotiations if so desired by the United States.

Although there is that matter contained in my message #617***** , we make the above statement anew.

23078

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 10-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 5614. Available, being translated.

**Available, not translated; dated 30 September.

***JD-1: 5560 (S. I. S. #22977). Grew's report of our terms of peace with China differs from what you sent me. Please check.

****JD-1: 5438 (S. I. S. #22748). Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U. S. to agree to a "leaders' conference".

*****JD-1: 5360 (S. I. S. #22550-51). Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China.

*****JD-1: 5415 (S. I. S. #22709). Japan presents a long explanation of the necessity for her maintaining troops in certain parts of China, even after peace with Japan is restored.

*****First anniversary of the Tripartite Pact.

*****JD-1: 5510 (S. I. S. #22870-71-72). I agree that we should avoid any more written suggestions to the U. S. until they give us some reply.

*****JD-1: (Available, being translated.)

[Secret]

From: Berlin

To: Tokyo

1 October 1941

(Purple)

#1198

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters especially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity I, and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these experiences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany in this report to you.

1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Ambassador Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to the Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to understand Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude.

2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of affairs. Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessimistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper correspondents and others concerned with the outside that Germany is cognizant of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany.

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider

it in a certain sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged. However we receive the impression that the greater number feel that Japan is avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident and is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war.

4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these machinations of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the pretence that there is no change in her feelings toward Japan, the fact that the feeling of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is getting bad is one that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan takes a wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations without consulting Germany there is no telling what steps Germany may take without consulting Japan.

Please convey this to the army and navy.

Relayed to Rome.

23673

JD-1:

(H) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (4)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
October 2, 1941
(Purple—CA)
#625

Special intelligence #330 from New York states that an A. P. dispatch declares that the Japanese-American negotiations warrant a pessimistic outlook and that the KONOYE Cabinet will face a crisis in about two weeks, whereupon it will be inevitable that the Cabinet undergo a revision. It seems that this rumor is going around in Washington, but in any case, it is absolutely false and untrue. The situation here in Japan as described in my #618* should be known to you and, whenever necessary, will you please enlighten the Americans. Too, Secretary HULL appears to be gravely concerned over public opinion here in Japan. I think that he has questioned you twice on this subject. Well, let me tell you that public opinion is very calm here and we intend to take advantage of the situation. We are merely awaiting their memorandum, and the Government entertains the view that we had better issue a statement on these Japanese-American negotiations at the earliest opportunity. This opinion is growing.

Naturally the substance of this statement will be confined to our side. We can merely refer briefly to matters on the American side. In any case, we will discuss all this with the Americans.

It seems that there have been a number of rumors concerning a statement by the Government, lately. Among them there are many mistaken ones.

Army 22988

Trans. 10/2/41 (S)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 2, 1941
(Purple—CA)
#889

At Secretary HULL's invitation, I called on him at nine o'clock this morning. He handed me the reply of the United States Government which I have given in the separate telegram #890* and said that it is the opinion of the United States Government that a conference of the leaders of the two governments would be a precarious affair unless a (complete ?) understanding could be arrived at thereby and that if peace is to be maintained all over the Pacific, a "patch-up" understanding would not do, but a "clear-cut" understanding would have to be made. I remarked that the Japanese Government will, no doubt, be very much disappointed in such a reply but that in any case I would transmit it.

Army 23001

Trans. 10/3/41 (7)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
3 October 1941
(Purple—CA)
#627

I described the various problems involving the United States and Japan to British Ambassador Craigie who was scheduled to have gone on a vacation trip to the United States on 28 September. (He had planned to leave from Nagasaki and make connections with the President Coolidge at Shanghai on 4 October. However, in view of illness on the part of the Counselor who was to have acted as Charge d'Affaire in the Ambassador's absence, his trip has been apparently postponed for about three weeks).

At the same time, we asked Ambassador Grew to also speak to Ambassador Craigie and we understand that they also discussed matters on the same day.

Subsequently, according to absolutely unimpeachable sources, Ambassador Craigie cabled Foreign Secretary Eden and Ambassador Halifax, explaining the importance of having the United States and Japan come to an immediate agreement to hold a conference. The gist of Craigie's opinions contained in those messages is being forwarded to you as my supplementary message #628*.

In view of the source, will Your Excellency keep the information contained strictly to yourself only.

23079

JD-1: 5623

(D) Navy Trans. 10-4-41 (W-TT)

*JD-1: 5624.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
3 October 1941
(Purple—CA)
#628

1. With the resignation of former Foreign Minister Matuoka the chances of turning away from the Axis policy and toward the Democracies, has been considerably enhanced.

2. Among the difficult points in the materialization of a Japanese-United States conference, is that with Japan speed is required. Moreover, she can enter into nothing more, at the present time, than a temporary understanding. On the other hand, by pursuing a policy of stalling, the United States is arguing about every word and every phrase on the grounds that it is an essential preliminary to any kind of an agreement. It seems apparent that the United States does not comprehend the fact that by the nature of the Japanese and also on account of the domestic conditions in Japan, no delays can be countenanced. It would be very regrettable indeed if the best opportunity for the settlement of the Far Eastern problems since I assumed my post here, were to be lost in such a manner.

3. Prince Konoye is sincerely desirous of avoiding the dangers which Japan may face through her connections in the Tripartite Pact and in the Axis for which the Prince, himself, feels responsibility. Opposition within the country to the Prince's reversal of policy is fairly strong. Therefore, unless the Japanese-U. S. conversations are held in the very near future, the opportunity will probably be lost. Moreover, if by some chance, meetings fail to materialize, or if they are unduly delayed, the Konoye cabinet will be placed in a precarious position.

4. We realize, of course, that there are numerous very complicated matters involved in the proposed negotiations. However, both the U. S. Ambassador in Japan and I are firmly of the opinion that it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude.

In conclusion, it must be added that until Japan's reversal of policy is concretely proven—in other words, until the Konoye principles actually materialize—there should be no let up in the retaliatory economic measures by us.

(NOTE.—The above message expresses the views of British Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo, as explained in JD-1: 5623).

23080

JD-1: 5624

(D) Navy Trans. 10-4-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo.
3 October 1941
(Purple—CA)
#894 (In 4 parts, complete)

Although there is a feeling that the Japanese-U. S. talks have finally reached a deadlock, we do not believe that it should be considered as an absolutely hopeless situation. We are of the impression

that the United States worded their memorandum in such a way as to permit a ray of hope to penetrate through.

The general public has been becoming more and more favorable to the President's foreign policy, until today it is being supported overwhelmingly. The program of war time industrial production has been making satisfactory progress, and it may be said that the general public is taking a more optimistic view of the European war. This last is due to the surprisingly good showing the Soviet Union has been making in her war efforts. The United States is well satisfied with that.

At the same time, however, both the United States and Great Britain are fearful lest the Soviet Union enter into an independent peace. The United States and Britain are giving determined aid to the Soviet Union in order to prevent such a peace from materializing, and, if possible, to enable the Russians to hold out over the winter and resume fighting next spring. The Atlantic war has shown a definite turn in favor of Britain; submarine losses have increased and hence, loss to shipping has dropped radically. Due to the vastly strengthened air arm of the British and because of her power on the seas, England herself is practically safe from invasion.

(Part 2)

That all is not perfect for Germany in the war on her eastern front may be seen from the fact that the various Balkan countries show some hesitancy. At the same time unrest is on the increase in the various occupied areas and Italy's war strength is constantly on the decrease. Apparently it is only through German intervention and pressure that Italy is prevented from entering into a separate peace. The effectiveness of the blockade will increase as the war is prolonged, and the same situation as existed in the last war will probably be brought about.

Such are the optimistic predictions being made here with regard to the final outcome of the war.

Should Germany succeed in bringing about an independent peace with the Soviet Union at this time, Germany would be able to amply reinforce her forces directed toward England. This would place England in a critical position once again and this is probably the one thing the United States does not want. (Translator's note: From this point to end of Part 2 badly garbled; guess work contained in translation). For such a development will probably involve the United States very deeply in the Atlantic war and it is possible that the United States would lose ships because of it. If such a situation materializes, the United States would for the first time realize the imminence of the war to herself and may then—but not until then—take a slightly more conciliatory attitude toward Japan.

From the Japanese point of view, it would be most favorable if the Soviet Union does sue for an independent peace and if, as a result, the Germans launch a new phase of the war on the Atlantic, such developments would undoubtedly have the most favorable effects on U. S.-Japanese relations.

(Part 3)

It is true that the Konoye message relieved to a certain extent the very critical situation between the United States and Japan for it had a tendency to squelch those few in the United States who advocate going to war against Japan first. This sentiment has been kept smothered since then and at the same time the message did, indirectly, tend to get the United States to become further involved in the Atlantic.

On the other hand, however, the United States has not decreased her economic pressure against Japan one iota. It should be carefully noted that the United States is proceeding along a policy of making this her threatening power. Should the United States continue along her present economic policy, without resorting to the force of arms, she shall gain her objectives of a war against Japan without once resorting to a battle. Moreover, I am of the opinion that unless there is a radical change in the world situation or unless Japan changes her foreign policy, the United States will not alter this policy of hers against Japan.

(Part 4)

Of the three major topics involved in our negotiations, two have been agreed upon for all practical purposes. (Hull is an advocate of free trade and believes that "bloc" economics is the cause of wars. He is trying to force the British Empire to accept this philosophy at the present time). Thus the only remaining problem is that concerning the evacuating of our troops. In view, however, of the conditions you referred to in your message #622*, and upon taking into consideration the undoubted confusion in the future of the world, it will become apparent that a complete evacuation would be an impossibility. We do not believe that it will be an impossible task for us to come to some acceptable understanding with the United States at a later date.

In view of the fact that the "understanding" between the United States and Japan hinges on this one point, I would appreciate your giving this phase your further consideration.

Incidentally, in the course of a friendly discussion with a Cabinet official, he advised me that both the President and the Secretary of State are sincere in their desire to bring about an "understanding" between Japan and the United States and that the matter of the removal of the troops is the only thing that blocks the attainment of this goal.

In the opinion that the matter involved is of much importance, I submit my humble opinions concerning it to you.

23166

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 10-7-41 (2)

*JD-1: 5634 (S. I. S. #23073-75). Long 3 part summary of military-political-economic conditions with "free China".

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
 To: Washington
 October 4, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #637

Re your #890*.

Please (make sure ?) immediately and suitably the following points:

1. Since the United States Government wishes to get our explanations regarding the fundamentals before entering upon the Japanese-American negotiations, theoretically speaking, as soon as we have satisfied it with our explanation we should be reaching the stage of actually opening the negotiations. As to the details of these fundamentals, we have already exchanged our views and so they should be clear. Now that only those points which the United States Government has pointed out remain difficult of agreement (namely, economic activity in the Pacific; withdrawal as well as stationing of troops, and the question of the Three-Power agreement), would it be all right for us to assume that the United States Government has a clear comprehension of the other points?

2. Now, as to the approval the Premier has given to the four basic principles, he has merely approved of them in principle. In other words, although in principle he considers them good, there may be differences of opinions when it comes to actually applying these four principles. The Premier stated that he would like to consider these differences at the time of the negotiations. In fact, it is on the presumption of doing so that we have been managing affairs domestically. Since this matter is of a delicate nature in its bearing upon the internal situation, I would like to have you see to it that the United States Government has no misunderstanding of it.

Army 23118

Trans. 10/6/41 (X)

* See S. I. S. #23101-#23109 inclusive and #23115-23116, inclusive. Text of American Government's statement to the Japanese Government.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 7 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #643 (In 3 parts, complete)

I requested the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo to call on me on the 7th, and he complied. The following is the gist of our conversation, and I forward it to you for your information only.

"I am in receipt of the U. S. memorandum of the 2nd, and I (the Foreign Minister) assume that you (the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo) have also received notification thereof from your home government. I would consider myself exceedingly fortunate if I were permitted to hear your opinions thereon", I said.

To this the Ambassador replied that he had received a resume of that memo from Washington, but that was all and for that reason he said he had no way of expressing his opinion. I, therefore, said that since the resume undoubtedly limited itself to the listing of all of the more important points, it should facilitate the forming of an opinion. I added that I was striving to reach an understanding through coop-

eration, in the same manner as is the Ambassador, not so much as a diplomat, but rather as a human being. From that viewpoint, what are the views of the U. S. Ambassador, I asked of him, and also asked him if he had not had some communication from his home government which would tend to explain or express opinions on the above mentioned resume.

The Ambassador said he had been cabled the resume only, and nothing more. Without seeing the entire memo, he said, he could not ascertain the tone thereof. He would be very happy if he could be permitted to read the full text, he said. Should, however, he be forced to express an opinion with his inadequate knowledge of the circumstances, he would be inclined to believe that the United States is trying to secure an agreement on the preliminary conditions.

I, therefore, replied that putting things bluntly, from the viewpoint of the sincere efforts we were making in this matter, we were not completely satisfied with the U. S. note referred to at present.

(Part 2)

By the above I do not imply that we do not trust the sincerity of the United States, I explained, but say so after taking into consideration the domestic and external circumstances of Japan.

The Ambassador then advised me that even as recently as on the 5th, he wrote up a fourteen page, 3000 word report of the various conditions in Japan based on what he had actually seen and heard himself during his many years of service in Japan. In it, he said that he fully described the real efforts that were being made by us in this matter. However, he did not dwell on this phase of the matter.

2. According to the U. S. memorandum of the 2nd, I continued, the Prime Minister of Japan allegedly stated that he "fully subscribed" to the Four Principles referred to during his conversations with the U. S. Ambassador on the 6th of last month. The record of the meeting, however, shows that the Premier stated that he was in accord with them only in principle. To this the Ambassador replied that being fully aware of the importance of every word of that interview, he had reported it absolutely accurately to his home government. I, therefore, said that it was because I agreed with him as to the importance of the matter that I wished to make this point clear. Our notes of the meeting clearly records that we agreed in principle only. The copies of the U. S. memorandum which were sent to various persons concerned for their perusal and study were corrected from "fully" to "in principle" so as to coincide with the original. We have already requested the Ambassador in the United States, I continued, to notify the United States of this correction. I am reporting this matter to His Excellency, I said, because I felt that he was concerned. The only reason we mentioned this matter to Ambassador Nomura was because this memorandum had been handed to him for delivery. There was absolutely no other motive in doing so, I said.

The U. S. Ambassador seemed to be thoroughly satisfied with my explanation and expressed his thanks for reporting it to him.

(Part 3)

Continuing, I said that though I had no intention of being too argumentative, there was one item I would like to question the Ambassador about. I pointed out that in doing so, I did not want the friendly relations between himself and myself to be altered in any manner.

After thus prefacing my remarks, I said that fundamentally speaking the Prime Minister's message was a private message addressed to a private party. How, then, I lightly pressed, was it that passages therefrom could be quoted in the memorandum which is an official note?

The Ambassador replied that he could see our point clearly and added that it must have been due to faulty handling of the various papers in the State Department. He said that that was entirely an on-the-spot assumption on his part. He went on to say that he would now be able to definitely state that the Prime Minister was in accord "in principle".

3. Returning to the matter concerning the "fully subscribed" quotation, the Ambassador started to say that he seemed to recall that when that matter was first brought up, Ambassador Nomura had accepted the "Four Principles" unconditionally. I, therefore, said that if there is some misunderstanding on the part of the United States through erroneous handling of some papers by our representative, it may become necessary to correct it at some future date. To attempt to do so now, though, I said, involves the danger of needlessly confusing the issue. (I referred to "Ambassador Nomura's draft" incident of 4 September as an example) and for this reason, I said that I thought it would be better if nothing were done about it at present.

23349

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 10-11-41 (1)

 [Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

October 8, 1941

Purple (CA)

Message to Berlin #873. Part 1 of 4.

Re my #708 *.

1. The Japanese American negotiations began under the conditions described in my aforementioned message during the Administration of the 2nd Konoye Cabinet. There was, however, a rupture caused by the occupation of French Indo-China. We hope by the penetration of French Indo-China to hasten the end of the China trouble; to break the Anglo-American encirclement by joint defense; and to procure raw materials. It is a measure taken in self defense. But England and the United States brought to bear against us measures equivalent to an economic blockade. Japanese-American relations deteriorated extremely and our internal situation was perilously affected. In the meantime, the European War took the trend of a protracted struggle. The fight between the Reich and the Soviet

Union contrary to the calculations of Berlin reached a deadlock. Now the Soviet is going over to the Anglo Saxon camp and we must make ready to cope with this situation. Moreover commerce is disrupted between Europe and Asia and liaison between our country and Germany and Italy is for the time being severed.

Army 23221

Trans. 10/8/41 (S)

* See S. I. S. #20461-42 inclusive, giving the statement of the policy and views of the Imperial Government.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

October 8, 1941

Purple (CA)

Message to Berlin #873 Part 2 of 4

All the while England and the United States were strengthening their net about us and we could see no means of concluding the Sino-Japanese affair. It was under these conditions that the Imperial Government suddenly decided upon diplomatic negotiations to terminate their struggle with the Chinese; to establish an area of co-prosperity in East Asia; and to conserve our national resources in preparation for the future. We feel that it is necessary to open the way for a compromise in our relations with the United States.

2. When we concluded the Three Power Pact, we hoped while maintaining amicable relations with America, and to tell the truth through this very means, to conclude the China trouble; to win the Soviet over to the Japanese-German-Italian camp; to have Germany use her good offices between Tokyo and Moscow (STAHMER said that Germany would be an honest go-between and would be sure to bring about the solution of our troubles with the Kremlin and OTT sent us a letter to the effect that he himself was going to work for an understanding between Japan and the Soviet); to guarantee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy who, in turn, were to give us mechanical and technical assistance. But since then times have changed and unexpected events have taken place. All that remains unchanged is Japanese-American relations and that is about the only thing that could be patched up.

Army 23222

Trans. 10/8/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

October 8, 1941

Purple (CA)

Message to Berlin #873 Part 3 of 4

At the time Germany stated that she would not spare any effort to prevent a clash between Japan and the United States and that she would even do all she could to improve relations between the two countries (this was during the MATSUOKA-STAHMER talks.) Then Japan and Germany felt the need of preventing the United States from entering the war.

3. The objective of the Japanese-German-Italian Three Power Pact was to prevent the expansion of the European war, to restrain the

United States from participating, and to establish universal peace. Statements exchanged at the time make this perfectly clear but now the war covers the face of Europe. The only placid expanse of water on earth is the Pacific. Under these circumstances, it is felt that it is up to both nations to probe into the causes of the trouble between their respective governments and to assure the harmony of the Pacific. It is further felt that this coincides with the spirit of the Three Power Pact.

Army 23223

Trans. 10/8/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

October 8, 1941

Purple (CA)

Message to Berlin #873. Part 4 of 4

4. It was with this view that the former cabinet began negotiations with Washington and still today we feel the necessity of continuing them. On the very occasion when Tokyo and Washington were arguing over our occupation of French Indo-China, Prince KONOYE was moved to reopen negotiations and messages were exchanged between him and President ROOSEVELT and ever since the respective Governments have been endeavoring to lay the groundwork for the opening of parleys through an exchange of opinions. We got our latest answer from Washington on the 4th of October and we are studying it now. It is not that we are divergent from our relations with the signatories of the Tri-Partite Pact but we are continuing our negotiations hoping to end the China affair. (The three principles of KONOYE envision a conclusion of hostilities with China through a basic treaty and the use of the United States to coerce the CHIANG regime, to establish an area of co-prosperity in greater East Asia, to procure materials, to prevent the expansion of the European war, to seal peace in the Pacific area and to prevent the United States from entering the war. Of course, however, we expect our ups and downs.) This is for your private information.

Relayed to Washington.

Army 23224

Trans. 10/8/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 8, 1941

Purple

#907 (Part 1 of 4)^a

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)

Re your #637.^b

I will tell you more about this after I interview the Secretary of State a little later on. However, my views at present are as follows:

(1) According to the American memorandum of the 1st, the Americans realize that there is unanimity on the various principles and fundamentals which they have stuck to. However, they are dissatisfied because you did not express a desire to go into a detailed discussion. The Americans believe in the four principles as the basis on

which relations between the two countries must be adjusted. The Americans consider that it is necessary to achieve unanimity on the various questions which have been fundamentally explored by both nations in the unofficial talks held so far in order to settle the Pacific question. They have always felt that if conversations between the leaders of the two countries are to be realized immediately, it must be definitely understood that these principles are to be applied to the concrete problems in the Pacific, and they desire a further clarification of our views.

Army 23319

Trans. 10/10/41 (1)

* For Part 3 of 4, see S. I. S. #23293.

† S. I. S. #23118 in which the Foreign Minister, TOYODA, asks Ambassador NOMURA to immediately clarify with the U. S. Government two points.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 8, 1941

Purple

#907 (Part 2 of 4)

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)

Thus, they hope that we will make ourselves clearer on these points. In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did we limit them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal conversations thus far, but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees we offered concerning the aforementioned principles. We equivocated concerning guarantees that we would not engage in armed aggression. We limited the area to which the principle of non-discriminatory treatment would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that China was geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On the question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China (including French Indo-China), the Americans are making some demands which we in principle have objections to. Moreover, they figure that they must be much surer of our attitude toward the three-power pact. These points you probably already know.

Army 23320

Trans. 10/10/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 8, 1941

Purple

#907 (Part 3 of 4) *

(To be handled in government code.)

Judging by the impression I got from the above mentioned facts and my contacts with them so far, they figure on first bringing about unanimity on the fundamental questions on which our two countries have so far failed to see eye to eye, and then gradually to turn to the other matters. They evidently feel that so long as there is disagreement on the aforementioned points it would be vain and futile to discuss the various other problems, therefore, up to now the United States has done no more than express her opinions on the other matters

in the proposal of June 11. (As I have wired you, some changes were made in the last clause.)

In their proposal of June 21, they made it evident that they were going to stick to this as the basis for negotiations. The latest reply of theirs shows, I am sure, that they are entirely disregarding our own proposal of the 25th. This shows that they are going to stick to their ideas as they stand; however, it will still be necessary for us to talk through certain matters concerning, A. The matter mentioned in the annex of the clause concerning the China incident. B. Discontinuing activities designed to help CHIANG. C. The stipulation concerning Nanking Treaty in the clause concerning the China incident (an agreement between Japan and China); joint mediation and the right of self-protection mentioned in the clause concerning our attitude toward the European war; the question of eliminating the annex to the clause concerning commerce between the two nations.)

Army 23293

Trans. 10/10/41 (7)

* Parts 1 and 2 not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 8, 1941
Purple
#907 (Part 4 of 4)

Concerning the four principles mentioned in (2) during the conversation mentioned in your #634^a, the American Ambassador talked like I had already reached an understanding with Secretary HULL on this. As I have told you in various messages, they shelved the question in both letter and spirit, but on April 16 when Secretary HULL presented me with these four points (see my #277^b), I certainly was in no position to accept such a proposal before getting instructions from my home government, nor would I give the impression that we would accept them. Please note that. Nevertheless, these are very abstract principles, and I figured that there would be some elasticity in their application. This country applies them with prudence to other foreign nations; for example, in peace conferences, discussions of principles are extremely circumlocutionary, so I do not think you need to be troubled over this.

Army 23321

Trans. 10/10/41 (2)

^a The number is apparently wrong, as the subject matter of the message mentioned is unrelated.

^b S. I. S. #17168 in which NOMURA gives his views on the attitude for policies of the United States Government, and the four basic points which the United States advocates.

[Secret]

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

9 October 1941

(Purple—CA)

#915

Re your #637*

This morning, the 9th, I called on Hull and relayed the matter contained in your instructions, and at the same time brought up the points discussed at the White House on 3 September. The Secretary, in reply, merely repeated that non-discriminatory treatment should extend over the entire Pacific area. He added that geographical proximity, etc., could be interpreted in many ways. He said that he would have Ballantine and others make a detailed reply to me later after the papers I submitted were carefully perused and studied. (Hamilton and Ballantine are supposed to call on me this afternoon.)

Referring to the matter of evacuating or stationing of troops in China, I carefully and in detail described the political situation in China from the Japanese viewpoint and pointed out that stationing of our troops in certain parts of China was absolutely essential. I requested that this point be given a reconsideration in this light.

I also stated that the Prime Minister had stated that he was in accord with the "Four Principles" in principle only, but Hull indicated that he was already aware of this fact.

*JD-1: 5665 (S. I. S. #23118). Re the U. S. note of 2 October it is assumed there is agreement with the U. S. on all points of the negotiations for an "Understanding Agreement", except evacuation from China, and the Tripartite Pact. Is that true? Konoye approves in principle the Four Principles laid down by the U. S. and expected to iron out their application in conference.

23437

JD-1: 5805

(D) Navy Trans. 10-13-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

9 October 1941

(Purple)

#917 (In 2 parts, complete)

For official code handling.

Secret outside of department.

Re my #915*.

On the 9th, Hamilton (accompanied by Ballantine and Schmidt) called on me on instructions of the Secretary of State, and I tried, on the basis of your #637** and along the general lines of your telephone conversation, to ascertain their intentions. They went into minute explanations pointing out that the U. S. Government's attitude is made plain in the memorandum of October 2nd, namely that this government is seeking to promote peace in the Pacific on the basis of the so-called Four Principles, and that the views of the United States in regard to such problems as Japan's forced advances northward and southward, indiscriminatory treatment in the Pacific, withdrawal of troops in China, and the Tripartite Treaty, have their origin in a fundamental concern with regard to the future. They stated that these principles apply to the entire Pacific area, and that there

is no reason for applying different principles in the various areas of the Pacific. In reply to my question as to whether or not the United States is satisfied with our explanation in regard to all other points aside from those pointed out in the memorandum of the 2nd, they replied that they would like to have this ascertained from the basic attitude of the U. S. Government which is indicated in the memorandum of the 2nd, that this memorandum was given careful study by the U. S. Government and that this represents all that the U. S. Government has to say and that therefore there is nothing more for them to add. They emphasized the fact that they think that the U. S. Government does not now desire to enter upon any more discussions in regard to details, and that if there is a "meeting of minds" between the two nations in regard to the interpretation of the four basic principles, the other questions will find a natural understanding; but they avoided giving much in the way of definite replies to my questions.

Of course, they did state that there might be points in the proposal of June 21st which would need revision because of subsequent changes in the situation, but that in its larger aspects there has been no change and added further that after having studied these four basic principles, if Japan should reconsider the September 6th proposal and submit a second proposal, the United States stands ready to give it careful consideration.

With the situation as thus stated, I think we might as well proceed on the assumptions mentioned in my #907***.

23438

JD-1:

(F) Navy Trans. 10-14-41 (2)

*JD-1: 5805 (S. I. S. #23437).

**JD-1: 5665 (S. I. S. #23118). Re the U. S. note of 2 October, it is assumed there is agreement with the U. S. on all points of the negotiations for an "Understanding Agreement", except evacuation from China, and the Tripartite Pact. Is that true? Konoye approves in principle the Four Principles laid down by the U. S. and expected to iron out their application in conference.

***JD-1: 5740 (S. I. S. #23319). In reply to Tokyo query whether the U. S. agrees to all points except "evacuation from China", Nomura explains in detail his ideas of the U. S. position and reasons for refusing the leader's meeting. Japan has equivocated and limited her agreement to the Four Principles the U. S. insist must be the basis of an understanding.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)

To: Washington

October 10, 1941.

Purple (CA)

#650

Re your #915*.

1. Slowly but surely the question of these negotiations has reached the decisive stage. I am doing my utmost to bring about a decision on them and the situation does not permit of this senseless procrastination. The difficult points must be clarified now. My #637^b and related messages were sent you for that reason. What I wish of you now is to find out as soon as possible the opinions of the United States concerning the matters mentioned in those messages. (Otherwise, as I have told you two or three times, it will be impossible for me to decide upon our policy.) Yes, I know you have told me your opinions quite sufficiently in a number of messages, but what I want is the opinions of the American officials and none other.

2. In your caption message you do not tell me whether or not we have a chance to proceed with these parleys. You do not tell me how HULL answers. You do not tell me anything else I need to know for my future consideration. You must wire me in detail and immediately the minutes of these conversations, what they say and the prospect for negotiations. Hereafter, when you interview HULL or the President of the United States, please take WAKASUGI or IGUCHI with you and please send me without any delay the complete minutes of what transpires.

Army 23384

Trans. 10-13-41 (X)

* Not available.

* S. I. S. #23118 in which the Foreign Minister, TOYODA, asks Ambassador NOMURA to clarify immediately with the U. S. Government two points.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 10, 1941

Purple (CA)

#923

I have read your #650*.

What they want is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific and they claim that our policy is semi-pacific and semi-aggressive. They say that our proposal of September 6 diverged greatly from preceding statements, and that it will be out of the question to agree on any preparatory talks on the basis of such a proposal. In addition to the three matters mentioned in your message, it seems that there are many other objections. I have repeatedly asked them to clarify what I do not understand, but they won't answer. At any rate, however, I feel safe at least in saying that they are demanding that we compromise in accordance with the lines laid down in their memorandum of October 2. I am sure that there is not the slightest chance on earth of them featuring a conference of leaders so long as we do not make that compromise.

In other words, they are not budging an inch from the attitude they have always taken; however, they act as if they were ready to consider at any time any plan of ours which would meet the specifications of their answer of the 2nd.

I think that you fully realize the situation I described in my #917* yesterday. However, I am sending you this for your information.

Army 23355

Trans. 10/11/41 (7)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)

To: Washington

October 12, 1941

Purple (CA)

54

On the afternoon of the 10th I asked Minister GREW to call on me. For your private information I spoke to him as follows, and as I have asked you before, I want you to continue your efforts to lead the United States officials to present us with a clear-cut proposal:

1. "On the 3rd we received the American memorandum of the 2nd and have given it our most cordial consideration. It is a little difficult

for us to grasp the important points of it, but as best we can make out, they are (1) garrisoning and evacuating soldiers; (2) the English, Japanese, American attitude toward the European war; and (3) non-discrimination in commerce in China.

2. "Now we wish to put all our cards on the table and to proceed with negotiations. If the United States has any misgivings on those three points, or on any others, I am sure it will be possible for us to straighten them out. I would like to present to the treaty officials a proposal having some possibilities of adoption. Concerning those three points, there is also a question of time. There is no use in exchanging official letters, notes and other documents as we now are. If we would only start out with a conference of leaders, such difficulties as exist may fade away automatically."

3. The American Ambassador said "The United States is a free country and we have to carefully consider public opinion." I retorted "Well, it is none the less so with us. It is true that we are under the thumb of public opinion, but if we can agree with the United States on a conference, public opinion will, of itself, calm down and no such unrest as now exists will continue. If we go on this way, it will be hard to say what the extremists may do."

4. I passed on to the Army Your Honor's communication concerning French Indo-China, but so far I have received no reply. I expect it soon.

Army 23517

Trans. 10/15/41 (X)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
13 October 1941
(Purple) (CA)
#658

Re my #657*

I presume that your talks with Welles will cover the U. S.-Japanese negotiations in toto. We are particularly anxious to be advised as soon as possible, as I have mentioned in previous messages referring to this subject, on the points listed below. (The situation at home is fast approaching a crisis and it is becoming absolutely essential that the two leaders meet if any adjustment of Japanese-U. S. relations is to be accomplished. I cannot go into details now, but please bear this fact in mind).

1. May we assume that the United States has no particular disagreements other than the three points which are under consideration at the present time?

2. Submitting by the United States a counter proposal to our proposal of -- September. (As you are well aware, our proposal of -- September embodied our claims in the form submitted by the United States as their proposal on 21 June. Should the United States be reluctant to submit a clearcut counter proposal to ours referred to above, we should request that they submit a basically new proposal immediately).

Of point 1 set forth above, we are particularly interested in being advised of what the United States exactly desires concerning the matter of evacuation or garrisoning of troops.

23421

JD-1: 5779

(D) Navy Trans. 10-13-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 5778 (S. I. S. #23420). "We shall cable our instructions with regard to the talks referred to, subsequently. Please be so advised."

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
13 October 1941
(Purple—CA)
#662

We have made the necessary arrangements for a telephone connection between Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, Terasaki, and Minister Wakasugi, for noon (Japan time) on the 14th. On this occasion, the following passwords and codes will be used.

U. S. attitude
Is reasonable

MARIKO
OTAKU NI ASOBI NI KU-
RUYA

(Is Mariko coming to pay you a social call?)

U. S. attitude
Is unreasonable

MARIKO
ASOBI NI KO NU

(Mariko is not coming to pay a social call.)

General outlook of the negotiations

SONO GO NO KŌSI NO
KENKŌ

(The health of the Minister since then.)

The Four Principles

SITIFUKUJIN NO KAKE
MONO

(Japanese scroll of the Seven Luck Gods.)

Will they stick to it?

KI NI IRIMASITA KA

(Did it meet with your approval?)

Is there some way through it?

KI NI IRIMASEN KA

(Did it not meet with your approval?)

23514

JD-1: 5840

(D) Navy Trans. 10-14-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 13 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #663

Re my #658*

I pointed out in my message referred to in the heading that circumstances do not permit even an instant's delay. Please, therefore, submit a report on the rough outline and the general tone of the conference between Wakasugi and Welles immediately, and dispatch a cable giving the details, subsequently.

23443

JD-1: 5815

(D) Navy Trans. 10-14-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 5779 (S. I. S. #23421).

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 13 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #939 (In 3 parts, complete)

The details of the Wakasugi-Welles conversations will be reported in a subsequent cable*, but in the meantime, I shall submit this which concerns the two points on which you requested information in your message #658**. In view of the fact that the talks lasted for over two hours, will you please await the subsequent message for the details of the tone, etc. of the talks.

In general, the tone of the talks were friendly and frank. Welles said that there is no change in the President's expressed desire of meeting with the Premier if the three points can be agreed upon. He added that Secretary Hull is in full agreement on this point, too.

(1) As far as he knew, Welles said, there were no obstacles to the materialization of the leaders' conference, other than the three points. Wakasugi said that he got the impression that Secretary Hull was of the opinion that there would be one or two more points which would have to be cleared up when the preliminary arrangements were brought up to date, and asked Welles about that. Welles replied that he had not been advised by Hull of those points but that he would ascertain them and then advise us.

(Part 2)

With regard to the matter of withdrawing or stationing troops in China, Wakasugi said that the U. S. attitude had been made clear in her proposal of 21 June and again in her oral statement of 2 October. We have no intention of arguing about that point any further, Wakasugi continued, but that he would like to ask one question about it. This question was his own personal one as an individual and was not instigated by or put with the knowledge of either the Government or the Ambassador.

So saying, Wakasugi said that when a nation had been sending fighting forces to another over a long period of years, it was exceedingly difficult, from a practical standpoint, to suddenly evacuate them.

Even if such a program were to be carried out, years and months would be required before its completion, Wakasugi said, adding that Welles, who has had long years of experience as a diplomat should well understand that.

Moreover, Wakasugi continued, the matter of whether troops were to be removed or not was a matter involving Japan and China. Should, therefore, the United States be assured the withdrawal of troops by Japan, would the United States be willing to leave the details up to Japan and China to decide?

(Part 3)

Welles replied that that would depend entirely upon Japan's sincerity. If Japan is truly sincere in her assurance of troop evacuation there no doubt would be ways of coming to a successful agreement as to ways and means of carrying it out.

1. The United States has no intention of making any counter proposals other than those she has already submitted to Japan on 21 June and the Oral Statement of 2 October. The above two proposals were the result of careful and thorough consideration. However, it is in the realm of possibility that if the objectives contained in those proposals are kept intact the wording may, under certain circumstances, be altered. The United States' objections to the Japanese proposals of — September and 25 September are based on the fact that they considerably restrict the terms contained in the two U. S. proposals—which incidentally, contained the terms of the earlier Japanese proposals—referred to above.

23704

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 10-20-41 (1)

*Available, dated 13 October. (A 6 part message, only Part 4 available at present.)

**JD-1: 5779 S. I. S. #23421. Since the situation at home is fast approaching a crisis, in your talks with Welles cover the entire subject of the U. S.-Jap negotiations, and in particular, just what the U. S. wants re evacuation or garrisoning of troops in China.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

13 October 1941

(Purple)

#941 (In 6 parts, Part 4 only available).

5. Of the three points, please be advised of the matter pertaining to withdrawing or stationing of our troops in China, by my previous report.

6. Wakasugi, therefore, said that in the final analysis, the stumbling block lies in the fact that whereas the United States is interested in agreeing upon basic principles first, Japan is insisting that the matter of primary importance is the clearing up of the outstanding differences first and then to discuss the generalities such as basic principles, etc. The truth of the matter is, Wakasugi continued, it is indeed rarely that a basic principle can be carried as such to any satisfactory degree. Moreover, he pointed out, without agreements or concrete factors, an agreement on principle is without meaning.

To this, the Undersecretary said that the basic principle should first be agreed upon, after which the actual problems can be fitted to it

for individual agreements * * * (2 lines missed) * * *
 (Wakasugi pointed out that) our proposal of 6 September expressed a willingness to sacrifice a practically unanimous desire of the people of Japan for a northward and/or southward military move, for the sake of an adjusted relationship with the United States. This was indeed a bold stroke and probably one which a subsequent cabinet, regardless of its nature, would not dare to duplicate.

In view of this daring step, wouldn't the United States be willing to display some boldness in behalf of great statesmanship?, Wakasugi asked.

The Undersecretary said that he fully appreciated our moves and that the United States felt considerable encouragement therefrom. However, the United States has experienced disappointing reverses he said, pointing to the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China, even after matters had progressed to the point of the United States submitting the 21 June proposal.

Wakasugi, therefore, pointed out that the occupation of French Indo-China had a direct bearing on the China incident. He explained that, with a view to our security, we took this step with the agreement of the Government of France.

23817

JD-1: 5967

(D) Navy Trans. 10-21-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 14, 1941

(Purple)

#943 (Part 1 of 2)* (To be handled in Government Code)

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

Army 23570

Trans. 10/16/41 (2)

* For part 2 see S. I. S. #23516.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 14, 1941

(Purple)

#943 (Part 2 of 2)*

He said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should Germany offer Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German peace and England would not now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important position and I take it that this is the view of the Navy. On the other hand, HOOVER and his following consider that should Moscow make a separate peace with Berlin and should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms, this whole fray would end with unimaginable quickness. CASTLE^b told me that HUGH GIBSON feels the same way and that Japan, too, should be on the alert for this possibility. This, however, I take to be a minority view entertained by the Isolationists. MOORE^c reports that Secretary HULL told Senator THOMAS that he is proceeding patiently with the Japanese-American negotiations, but he hopes that Japan will not mistake this for a sign of weakness on America's part, and that no answer had arrived to the memo of October 2nd. KIPLINGER^d reports that there is a very good basis for rumors of a cessation of hostilities between Russia and Germany and that the chances for war between Japan and the United States are fifty-fifty.

Army 23516

Trans. 10-15-41 (7)

* Part 1 of 2 not available.

^b Former U. S. Ambassador to Japan.^c American legal advisor to Japanese Embassy in Washington.^d A Washington newspaper correspondent.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

15 October 1941

(Purple—CA)

#667

Regarding your #939* and #941**.

Your message has clarified many points regarding the situation and the matter can be charged up to Welles' state of agitation. However as I feel that further conversations with Wakasugi might be continued, please maintain contact and also bear the following points in mind:

(1) If we quibble over the argument set forth in paragraph 6 of your message #941**, it may give them an opening to insist on having the Four Principles included in the text proper of the agreement.

However, since not only have the so-called basic American stipulations been omitted from the preamble of the American proposal of June 21st, but the reference is made in the final clause to the effect that the principles (stipulations) contained in the proposal of June 21st are also included in the document of October 2nd. We wish to hold to this and should take advantage of the American desire to use the proposal of June 21st as the basis of negotiations and continue our conversations on the basis of the same proposal, without taking up the Four Principles independently.

(2) Our proposal is nothing more than our proposal of September 16th incorporated into the American proposal of June 21st. However, there is no need for us to make any further move until the other side decides that it is impossible to clarify the concrete proposal any further. Therefore please discuss the points of variance between our proposal and that of June 21st and ascertain the United States intentions regarding the various points involved in the concrete proposal, and reply results.

(3) Due to the nature of this negotiation we wish to have it handled between Wakasugi and Welles, for the time being, and should progress warrant, to transfer the whole negotiation to be handled between you and the Secretary of State.

23706

JD-1: 5933

(A) Navy Trans. 10-20-41 (2)

*JD-1: 5929 (S. I. S. #23704).

**Available, dated 13 October. (A 6 part message, only Part 4 available at present.)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

15 October 1941

(Purple)

#950

Chief of Office routing.

Regarding Your #667*.

Tomorrow afternoon (16th) Wakasugi is expected to confer with Welles. Yesterday (14th) "O" is said to have conferred with the President and also with the heads of the Far Eastern Affairs. (For your information).

The Military Attache here has been instructed by the headquarters in Tokyo to advise us not to yield an inch in our stand regarding the question of the evacuation of troops. They are apprehensive that we have not emphasized enough our stand regarding it and urge us to lay special stress on this point.

It goes without saying that we fully understand our country's stand regarding this question and both Colonel Iwasa and I have repeatedly informed the other side of this.

However, when Wakasugi conferred with Welles on the 13th, he purposely did not go deeply into the subject of the evacuation of troops because it happens to be one of the three major questions which have been gone over many times before and the purpose of the above conference was to clarify certain points in the United States proposal in order to ascertain their intentions. You may be assured that we do not intend to minimize the importance of this question nor to effect any compromise.

At tomorrow's conference we intend to bring up this question for discussion once again.

Should you have any inquiry from the Military regarding this matter please explain the above in order to avoid any misunderstanding. I have already explained the situation as stated above to our Military Attache.

23708

JD-1: 5935

(A) Navy Trans. 10-20-41 (7)

*JD-1: 5933 (S. I. S. #23706).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Washington
October 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#671

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival ?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it necessary to do something in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power Alliance she had concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making a success of the Japanese-American negotiations. Under the circumstances, we can do no other than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment in such words as are given in my separate telegram #672 * and as would not affect the Japanese-American negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me and you.

Army 23631

Trans. 10/17/41 (7)

* See S. I. S. #23571—English text of a message from the Imperial Japanese Government to the American Government.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
October 16, 1941
Purple (English Text)
#672

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further deterioration

but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.

Army 23571

Trans. 10/16/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 16, 1941

Purple

#959 (Part 1 of 2)

On the evening of the 15th TERASAKI was invited to the home of Admiral TURNER, who, as you know, is a most trusted friend of Admiral STARK. In the course of their conversation TURNER said:

(a) "If HITLER gains control over Europe, it will constitute a direct threat to Central and South America, and America must certainly fight this. Therefore, it is the present policy of the United States to prevent the enfeeblement of Great Britain's national resources (including the Far East) by assisting her in stopping Germany."

(b) "It is said that the present Japanese cabinet is a strong one; however, it is doubtful whether it has the support of the Army, and if the Military finds itself at variance with the opinions of the cabinet, the cabinet might be overthrown at any time. Therefore, the United States cannot help feeling a little trepidation in broaching any negotiations with the Japanese Government under these circumstances."

(c) "It is urgent that a formula be drawn up on the basis of a fifty-fifty compromise between Tokyo and Washington." (TURNER does not think that we are compromising.)

Army 23715

Trans. 10-20-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 16, 1941

Purple

#959 (Part 2 of 2)

RETRANSLATION

TERASAKI explained that some Americans had already questioned him about the permanence of the present cabinet but that this was beside the point because to broach the Japanese-American negotiations while doubting the permanence of the cabinet was putting the cart before the horse. He said that at present, when mutual doubts were rife, particularly in the United States, the United States ought certainly to exercise statesmanship, and continued, "The United States is exceedingly idealistic concerning the Far East. Aiding China might be called a question of principle, but if I may say so, this talk of principles is a sort of hobby among the rich. If it's not a question of principle, all I can conclude is that you all are determined to make us fight with China until we are exhausted. On the other hand, you have followed a very, very realistic policy in Central America. Forgetting the history of Panama for a moment, we can find plenty of present examples proving what I say. Well, China is not an over-simplified question of principle with us Japanese. It is a

question of our life. We have already fought there for four years. You went to Japan on the *Astoria*. I am sure you know something of the temperament of the Japanese. Once a Japanese is in a corner, he will forget all interest in life and death and fight back with fury. I know that we are much poorer than you Americans in material things. I don't know what the result of Japanese-American war might be, but even though we lost, I can tell you we would put up an awful fight. If we do not achieve what we are trying to do, it may come to that. Now if you Americans would only extend your hand of friendship to us a little, you could have our lasting amity; otherwise we may turn out to be permanent enemies.

my 23716

Trans. 10/22/41 (2)

[Secret]

om: Washington (Nomura)

: Tokyo

October 16, 1941

urple

62. (Part 1 of 5) (Extremely Urgent)

By previous arrangement WAKASUGI, HULL and WELLES had a conference lasting two hours beginning at 5:00 p. m., on the 16th. The substance of their talk was as follows: (Probably because he had received news of our Cabinet's general resignation, WELLES said that he would like to talk with WAKASUGI in the presence of Secretary HULL. He led WAKASUGI to HULL's room and they talked together.)

1. HULL asked the circumstances of the Cabinet's general resignation and wished to know what the outlook for the new Cabinet was. WAKASUGI said that all we had received was a public announcement of the general resignation and as yet no detailed news had reached us. WAKASUGI continued, "No matter what sort of Cabinet it is, however, it is impossible to leave Japanese-American relations in their present state. The world being in its present condition, particularly affected by the China problem, our people cannot continue undecided as they now are in the face of American opposition. They demanded of our Government that would take a definite stand either to the right or to the left. There is no mistake about that. If no unanimity can be discovered between our two nations, it would be hard to say in which direction the wind will blow. I wanted to talk with the Under-Secretary today and see if we could not find some points of agreement between your proposal of June 21st and our proposal of September 14th. That is why I came."

my 23711

Trans. 10-20-41 (2)

[Secret]

om: Washington (Nomura)

: Tokyo

October 16, 1941

urple

62. (Part 2 of 5) (Extremely Urgent)

HULL spent half an hour recounting the substance of his conversations so far and then went on to say, "The United States is certainly not playing along with a policy of procrastination. I earnestly wish to see peaceful and normal political relations reestablished."

lished between Japan and the United States. In Europe HITLER is trying to set up a new order by force of arms. Now, if you Japanese also are attempting to set up a new regime in the Far East by force of arms, this world is becoming cramped indeed. We cannot stand by and approve this course of events with equanimity. We stand for non-discrimination in trade and for freedom of the seas and are opposed to all of these militaristic policies. One of the hardest things to reconcile in Japanese-American relations is the fact that, while proclaiming the maintenance of peace, Japan actually carries on a military invasion. There are so many military expansionists now among the Japanese people and among influential people there that I doubt if it would be possible for Japan to cooperate on a new peaceful policy." WAKASUGI then said, "It is true that there are those who advocate expansion northward or southward; however, ever since we have been a naval power foreign nations have lined up our neighbors as colonies of theirs to oppose us. Recent events show how this economic pressure has again brought us to grief. All we have done is to follow the trend necessary for the national security and existence of our people. As a measure for self preservation we had to get necessary materials. Do not think that we deliberately embarked on a military campaign with any joy.

Army 23712

Trans. 10-20-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 October 16, 1941
 Purple (Extremely Urgent)
 #962 (Part 3 of 5)

"The United States seems to have an idea that in order to establish an understanding with Japan on these important questions, she must stop military moves northward and southward, but unless the United States ceases measuring everything by her own yardstick and understands Japan's peculiar position, and unless she shows a friendly attitude in lifting the limitations on the settlement of the China question which faces Japan, as well as commercial limitations, the situation will inevitably continue to grow worse."

3. WELLES urged HULL himself to continue an explanation of the three points he had made, and HULL repeated that the present object of the United States is to defeat Hitlerism; in short, (a) to abolish all militarism, and (b) to bring about equality of treatment and opportunity throughout the whole Pacific area, including China. He showed quite a bit of understanding of Japan's position with respect to the Tripartite Alliance. He seemed, however, loathe to go too deeply into the question of peace between Japan and China because he has always been an advocate of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other powers. He asked if there was not some Chinese with whom he (WAKASUGI) could discuss these matters directly. WAKASUGI, however, said that although he knew both AMBASSADOR HU SHIH and SOONG TSE-WEN, he was not able to discuss the relations of the two countries with them. HULL seemed to understand this and said that in any case this would have to be worked out between Japan and China.

Army 23713

Trans. 10/20/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 16, 1941

Purple (Extremely Urgent)

962 (Part 4 of 5)*

WAKASUGI then went on to say that it would be very difficult for us to evacuate China. He told them it was very necessary to keep troops there. He went on to explain the activities of the Communist forces in the north as described in your messages and by the Naval Attache. He told them that the Communists were like a cancerous growth on the development of China. He explained that we had to keep forces and to protect the lives, property, and commercial interests of both Japanese and foreigners. HULL then asked, "Well, if you did not take your troops away and left them there for a long time, how would the Chinese take it?" WAKASUGI said, "What the Chinese are most interested in is the safety of their lives and a guaranteed livelihood." He went on to say, "So far as the maintenance of peace is concerned, the Chinese do not care in the hands of what people it is. It is apparently being reported to the President that the Communist Party is engaged merely in educational activities. However, this is a tragic error. What the Communists are trying to do is to destroy Chinese society and industry at the very roots. All the Chinese fear this exceedingly." HULL, however, countered by saying, "In the past we, too, stationed some soldiers in Central America and left them there as long as ten years, but the results were bad, and we brought them out. Since then we have found it more profitable to practice the "Good Neighbor Policy." He did not appear to wish to discuss this matter any further and seemed to think that this should be thrashed out between ourselves and the Chinese. WELLES then asked, "Well, have you any other questions besides those three which you wish to discuss?" and HULL answered, "None in particular."

4. WELLES told HULL the desire of WAKASUGI to look into the differences and points of agreement in the Japanese-American proposals. HULL immediately agreed. He was all in favor of having the officials concerned in this business convene and work out the details immediately, but WAKASUGI said that when the officials concerned on both sides had met before, all they had done was waste their time in arguments without any results. He said that the time would not permit of such procrastination and that he would, for the time being, like to confine his discussions to important questions only and to discuss them with the Under Secretary alone.

Army 23714

Trans. 10/20/41 (2)

* Part 5 not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 17 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #682

The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body. At this time I wish to thank Your Excellency and your entire staff for all the efforts you have made.

The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However, regardless of the make-up of the new Cabinet, negotiation with the United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated. There shall be no changes in this respect.

Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before.

23677

JD-1:5923

(D) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 17 October 1941
 (Purple)
 #966 (In 6 parts, complete)

Wakasugi met and talked with Hull and Welles for about an hour and a half, from 4:30 p. m. on the 17th. The following is the gist of their talk:

1. Wakasugi stated that he would like to further discuss the three points involved in the U. S.-Japanese negotiations with the understanding that neither side commit itself to what is said here in view of the fact that we were not in receipt of instructions from the new cabinet as yet. Hull expressed his agreement to this proposal and then inquired what the outstanding points were in the respective proposals.

In reply, Wakasugi read those paragraphs pertaining to the right of self-defense under the terms of the Tripartite Pact as contained in our proposal of 25 September, and the U. S. proposal of 21 June. He went on to explain the features in accordance with the various instructions from Tokyo, pointing out that we had made the right of self-defense on which the U. S. placed much emphasis, a mutual right. Did that not satisfy the U. S. demands?, Wakasugi asked.

Hull replied that during the tenure of the former Foreign Minister it was loudly broadcast that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was to prevent the United States from entering the war. Since the United States may be forced to enter the war for self-defense purposes, the United States could not help but have doubts as to Japan's true motives. The United States has no intention of taking military aggression against any nation; her only intention is to consider ways and means of defending herself, he explained repeatedly.

Wakasugi, therefore, pointed out that fundamentally the thing called "right of self-defense" was put in motion in the direction it is intended to be used by the state which invokes its use. Therefore,

It is natural that depending on the intentions of another, we should restrain ourselves from fulfilling our duties under the terms of an agreement.

That is why we definitely established the fact in our proposal that our intentions are strictly self-preservation and that application of any phases thereof, would be absolutely on behalf of self-preservation. Self-preservation, as we have used the term, implies that Japan and Japan alone shall determine the means of carrying it out without depending on any foreign country whether it be Britain the United States or Germany, or any other. There are no other implications or interpretations to the phrases from our viewpoint.

Fundamentally, Wakasugi continued, wasn't it a self-evident fact that political agreements such as the Tripartite Pact cannot limit the signatories to any political commitments against a third country?

In the light of the Imperial Rescript published at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, the spirit and the aims of said Pact should be evident. In the final analysis, that Pact's real mission is the contribution to world peace and does not support any intent of aggression and aggrandizement.

Hull listened carefully to Wakasugi's detailed explanations. Apparently the Secretary suspects that, basically, the nature of the Pact could be twisted at will to suit the needs of either a Japanese cabinet favoring military aggression or a cabinet favoring peace. Wakasugi, therefore, asked whether it was not true that unless suspicions were allayed, it would be impossible to come to agreements with any country. Was it not true, he continued, that when viewed through eyes of suspicion there would be much that could be questioned, even in the so-called defense measures of the United States?

In any event, it was agreed that both of the proposals in question shall be given careful study after which a reply would be submitted.

2. Hull places the most emphasis on matters pertaining to non-discrimination in trade. He urged that we listen carefully to Welles' explanation of how Japan would actually profit by such a system. Hull then went on to point out that materialization of the non-discrimination in trade matters has been his main objective since his assumption of post many years ago and described the progress he has made in various quarters. As an example, of the success of his program, he pointed to the recently signed trade agreement with Argentina. He seemed particularly proud of this accomplishment and added that even the self-interested British appeasement policy had been prevented in Central and South America. (What was meant exactly by this was not made clear).

Hull went on to say that if this policy were limited merely to the Southwest Pacific area, it would not be of much value. Unless this principle is applied to the entire Pacific area (including China) the contribution it would make toward peace would be negligible. There is more probability that world peace, under present world conditions, can be attained through adjustments in trade relations than through adjustments of political relations between nations, he claimed.

It cannot be doubted for a moment, he continued, that if Japan adopts this basic policy and applies it in the Far East, that she will have the advantage over all countries in her area because of her geographical position, her race, and because of her business acumen. He urged repeatedly that the concrete and positive advantages be pointed out to our government.

Will you please therefore, be thoroughly advised of this phase and let us know your opinions thereof.

Wakasugi then said that he would admit that the various principles set forth by the United States were indeed fine and as guiding principles no one could possibly find fault with them. The cold facts are, however, that different means have to be used by each individual nation in order to survive. In spite of this fact it is the United States custom to measure the others needs by a ruler which measures the needs of her own country, which is the most blessed from the standpoint of nature, of any nation in the world. The fact that the position and circumstances of other countries differ from those of the United States apparently is not taken into consideration by the United States, Wakasugi said.

Japan occupies only a small corner of what is known as the Far East; moreover, she has been occupied for over four years with the China incident. She has, therefore, a number of circumstances which are peculiar to herself. So though she may want to comply with all of what the United States suggests, it is impossible for her to immediately do so. For example, for obvious and unavoidable reasons, Japan has established various organs and put into effect various systems in China to cope with temporary conditions and circumstances. Even if we tried to comply with the basic principles advanced by the United States, we could not do so overnight where these are concerned. It would be an absolute impossibility from a practical and actual standpoint.

If the United States' principles are to be applied to the world at the end of the war, it is indeed a worthy undertaking and merits serious consideration. However, it is not in the realm of practicality to attempt to apply these principles at a time when the whole world is in a chaotic condition. It is asking too much of Japan to expect her to accept these principles under such world conditions, and to expect her, in turn, to apply them immediately to the Far East area which has been undergoing particularly unfavorable conditions.

Therefore, Wakasugi continued, the immediate need is to discuss matters which Japan is capable at the present time of carrying out. These actual problems should be worked out to the maximum point of possibility under present circumstances and in this manner, the first opening to the road of joint and cooperative action should be found.

Hull replied that he well understood Japan's position and the circumstances in which she was involved. However, he continued, the United States also has to cope with domestic problems. For example, there are complaints from U. S. business men in China who have been squeezed out or whose activities have been curtailed because of the monopolistic attitude Japan has assumed in the China trade. When these complaints are voiced, because of the make-up of the United States, they cannot be left unnoticed.

Returning again to fundamentals, it is an unalterable fact, the Secretary continued, that the United States' basic principle is advantageous to Japan. For this reason he desired acceptance of it by Japan, the Secretary repeated.

He agreed to compare the two proposals on this point, too, and to submit a reply after so doing.

In conclusion Hull asked what the conditions were in Japan. Wakasugi replied that the general public were very strained. The government is being forced to take an immediate and decisive turn to either the right or the left. The people are apparently ready to jump at a chance for an understanding with the United States and because of the sensitiveness of the Japanese people, the tension will no doubt be immediately relieved if there is the slightest gesture on the part of the United States to warrant it.

Although it may be true that more time will be required before an agreement can be reached on the weighty items, however, there would be made favorable reactions if even minor matters, such as the following, were cleared up: releasing of the Itukusima Maru and the Syoyo Maru which have been tied up in San Francisco for over a month because the money with which to pay for their fuel has been frozen; releasing of funds with which to pay for fuel for those ships which are coming over here at present. (There is some interference from the Treasury Department in this instance).

As Wakasugi mentioned these items, Welles took down the names of the vessels and other pertinent facts and promised to take the matter up with bureaus concerned.

23818

JD-1: 5968

(D) Navy Trans. 10-21-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 18, 1941

CA

Accept my congratulations on your appointment. Although I was instructed to carry out the policy of the former cabinet and endeavored to do my best, I was not able to do anything useful and naturally I have been keenly conscious of the responsibility. Since my appointment to this post, things have developed contrary to my wishes and, for this reason, I am deeply concerned. It should be fairly clear that I, with my limited ability, shall not be able to accomplish much in the future; I am afraid I shall be leading not only a useless existence but even a harmful one. Grateful for the kind encouragement which the former minister gave me, I would like to think over carefully what I should do; I would like also to return to Japan in the near future so that I may personally report the situation here to you and incidentally receive your instructions in all matters. Will you, therefore, give your approval at once. Inasmuch as both WAKASUGI and GUCHI are men of ability and efficiency, there should be no objections to leaving matters in their hands after I have left.

Army 23803

Trans. 10/22/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 20, 1941
Purple (CA)

(RETRANSLATION BASED ON COMPLETE INTERCEPT COPY)

Will Your Excellency please read this for your own information and then please transmit it to the Minister of the Navy.

My dear Mr. Minister:

Congratulations on your new appointment! When this humble Ambassador was appointed to his present post he asked for the fervent support of the whole Navy Department, but since I came to Washington I am sorry to say that there has been no cooperation between us. Furthermore, the Navy has not cooperated with the Foreign Office. The times do not permit of such incoordination. On the one hand the United States is faced by the European war and on the other hand by the Pacific problem, but still she has made no military move. I believe that there is a weak point here. Therefore, I had expected the United States to take a more or less conciliatory attitude toward us as soon as the situation was favorable, but, contrary to my surmises, so far all America has done is to stick to her own national policy, and I am beginning to doubt if she can be reformed very much. I think that probably in the last analysis this is due to the fact that the United States has too many interests in China. My own desire has been to leave the China question out of the picture and work out some *modus vivendi* between our two countries. In my conversations with the Secretary of State I have shown this by my way of talking. However, the Secretary says that the China question is inseparably bound up with the stability of the Pacific. Some days ago I talked for an hour or more with HALIFAX. He said that the British Empire has a great interest in the Pacific problem and he would like to see some *modus vivendi* worked out between Japan and the United States to avoid a crisis. He said that he would like to talk with Secretary HULL about this. Since then, however, I have had no chance to talk with him. Well, before I came here I had talked with all the cabinet officials of that time and thought I thoroughly understood the position of the Government; however, since then there have been two administrative changes and now I am left floundering. I cannot tell you how much in the dark I am. I have talked along my own lines with the Secretary of State so often that, if we now explored the situation from a new angle, all my presence would do would be to confuse the situation and cause an unfavorable reaction. There is no doubt about this. That is why I wired you the other day that I would like to come home. If you have anything which you want the Foreign Office to transmit to me, please be sure to let them know.

Army #23774

Trans. 10-22-41 (1)

[Secret]

from: Tokyo
to: Washington
1 October 1941
Purple—CA)
898

Re your #966*

What you say is well justified. We should, of course, send you instructions immediately, but in view of the fact that the new cabinet has only just formed, they have been unavoidably delayed.

The new cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere desire to adjust Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis. Our country has said practically all she can say in the way of expressing of opinions and setting forth our stands. We feel that we have now reached a point where no further positive action can be taken by us except to urge the United States to reconsider her views.

We urge, therefore, that, choosing an opportune moment, either you or Wakasugi let it be known to the United States by indirection that our country is not in a position to spend much more time discussing this matter. Please continue the talks, emphasizing our desire for a formal United States counter-proposal to our proposal of 5(?) September.

8968

D-1: 6015

(D) Navy Trans. 10-23-41 (S-TT)

JD-1: 5968. (Long 6 part report). Wakasugi-Welles-Hull talk on 17 Oct. in which there is an extensive rehash of arguments and counter arguments that have been repeatedly discussed before. Wakasugi continues to emphasize the impracticability of evacuating China, while Hull emphasizes non-discrimination trade (i. e. the Open Door up-to-date).

[Secret]

from: Washington (Nomura)
to: Tokyo
October 22, 1941
Purple (CA)

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded fools. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

Army #23859

D 6017

Trans. 10-23-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 23 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 Unnumbered

From your message(s) I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making. As you are well aware, the outcome of those negotiations have a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As such, it is an exceedingly important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your Excellency's reports for our information on this matter.

For the above reason, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post

23860

JD-1: 6016

(D) Navy Trans. 10-23-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 October 24, 1941
 Purple
 #995 (Part 1 of 4)

Re your #698^a.

On the 24th from 2:30 p. m., WAKASUGI conferred with WELLES for an hour, and following the purport of your telegram, explained that our new cabinet was as anxious as the former cabinet for a just readjustment of our relations; that our desires have already been clearly stated; and that since, from what WAKASUGI himself could judge on the basis of what he saw and heard during his recent visit in Japan, circumstances there do not permit prolonging these conversations any longer, he—though not yet in receipt of detailed instructions—would like to see, without a day of further delay, some sort of conclusion reached. He then requested that the United States submit a counter-proposal to our proposal of September 25th. WELLES first expressed his pleasure of learning that the new cabinet intends to continue the discussion of this question and proceeded to say that recently men in responsible positions in Japan—for example, the Naval spokesman—had made such a war-like statement as “the Japanese Navy is ‘itching for action’”, and that the ferocious attacks which the Japanese newspapers have been making on the United States had greatly provoked the American people both in and out of the government and are injurious to the continuation of discussions

Army #24002 Trans. 10-27-41 (1)

^a S. I. S. #23968 which points out the fact that the new cabinet is anxious as the former one to adjust Japanese-U. S. relations and that Japan has made her stand perfectly clear and can do no more. It further more directs WAKASUGI to inform the U. S. that Japan is not in a position to prolong the discussion and would like to be informed of the United States' counter-proposal to that of Japan's dated September 25th

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 24, 1941

Purple

995 (Part 2 of 4)

WAKASUGI replied that there were not a few influential politicians in the United States as, for example, Senator PEPPER, who have severely criticized Japan; that especially the speech made today by Secretary of Navy KNOX to the effect that Japanese-American war is inevitable and the clash of the two countries is only a few days ahead and other warlike statements are quite provocative to the Japanese government as well as the people; and that in this respect the two countries are very much alike. To this, WELLES came back with the argument that the Naval Secretary's speech was not such a provocative one but the newspapers had played up certain parts of it; that as a man responsible for the United States Navy, which is the most powerful influence in the country, he occasionally indulges in strong words with the intention of encouraging the Navy; and that he would like WAKASUGI to realize that these speeches are nothing other than those made for such purposes. WELLES proceeded, saying, "As to the counter-proposal which you request of the United States, as I have repeated at the time of the previous conversation, the principles as well as the proposal of the American Government are clearly given in the proposal made on June 21. To be sure, one way of approaching a solution would be to adjust the wordings of that proposal to those of the proposal made by Japan."

Army 24003

Trans. 10/27/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 24, 1941

Purple

995 (Part 3 of 4)

"However, in the light of the experience of the informal discussions held during the past several months, to do no more than to consider each paragraph of the past formula would result in repetition of the same old arguments and, therefore, would not be conducive to progress. As I have pointed out during the previous conversation at which Secretary HULL was present, it might be well to try to reach an agreement on such general matters as the three important points which are comparatively easy of settlement; such a new formula may be a short-cut. However, if this is to be done, we had better take up at the beginning the question of equal treatment in commerce, a question which is comparatively easy of agreement by both countries. In reference to this point, WELLES asked if we had transmitted to our government what HULL had so strongly advocated during the previous conversation, and so WAKASUGI replied that he had communicated the matter in detail; and secondly, we should debate the question of Japan's duties to the Three-Power Alliance." He spoke as if there was a possibility of some adjustment also on the part of the United States with regard to this question. WELLES then suggested taking up the China question next. Thus, he made an entirely new proposal.

Army 24004

Trans. 10/27/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 24, 1941

Purple

#995 (Part 4 of 4)

WAKASUGI replied, saying, "Since I have not yet received detailed instructions from my government, I haven't the liberty to add anything today to the proposal of September 25, but I would like to have the United States authorities draw up a definite proposal with reference to the new approach you just suggested and submit it before we will have our next conversation. We, too, shall make a study of this point."

Speaking on the request that frozen funds be released for the dispatching of the two tankers referred to during our previous conversation and the two ships of the NYK line at this time, WELLES said, "We at that time made immediate arrangements, and all procedures have been completed by the Treasury Department with regard to the three NYK ships; but in the matter of tankers, since the United States banking laws require strict investigations for the purpose of protecting bank depositors, once money has been transferred to an account with the Yokohama Specie Bank, it is impossible to release it, regardless of the fact that the money is in the form of cash or of a draft for transference of money to that bank. However, the State Department will offer as much assistance as possible if you wish to have drafts made so that they could be transferred through some American bank."

Army 24005

Trans. 10/27/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

25 October 1941

(Purple—CA)

#709

Re your #989*.

We are particularly anxious to get an idea of the extent to which the United States will agree with our final proposal. We are putting much expectation that this point will be clarified during the Wakasugi-Welles talks on the 25th.

With regard to the military general staff office's message, we obtained an explanation from it after we received your message. It seems that that message was an expression of the General Staff's hopes and the government in the meantime is going ahead with its studies to establish a basic national policy, embodying the results of the Japanese-United States negotiations.

My personal intentions are as I outlined in my message #698** (those on which the army and navy concurred). Bearing these facts in mind, will you please urge the United States to voice its intentions. At the same time will you continue to make an effort to definitely ascertain the U. S. attitude with regard to our proposal. I am exceedingly anxious to receive your findings on these points.

24069

JD-1: #6117

(D) Navy Trans. 10-25-41 (S-TT)

* S. I. S. #23006.

**JD-1: 0016 (S. I. S. #23006). New cabinet sends first instructions on U. S.-Jap negotiations. The situation is at an impasse unless the U. S. will change its views.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
27 October 1941
(Purple)
#1004

Chief of Office Routing.

On the 25th, I met and talked with Admiral Pratt. The Admiral is one who recognizes the fact that in the final analysis, the aims of economic warfare and actual armed conflict are one and the same. He is of the opinion that as long as Japan stays within the scope of the China Incident, there will be no shooting war between Japan and the United States. He said, however, that if Japan moved either northward or southward, he feared the consequences. He added that the final decision rested in the Emperor and the President.

Knox's speech, he went on, was exceedingly unfortunate. When he (the Admiral) writes for magazines or speaks on the radio, he always takes Japan into his calculations very carefully. After all, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as far as the President is concerned, is of course, Stark. The opinions of the two completely coincide. Unfortunately, however, Stark cannot be said to be a "strong" individual, Admiral Pratt said. Hart, on the other hand, although he has enemies within the Department, is a strong character.

He further reported that he had heard from other sources that the President is sincerely desirous of having a peaceful and stabilized Pacific. However, because he is advised by various people to pursue various courses of action, the Admiral could not guarantee that there would be no trouble on those waters.

Admiral Pratt went on to say that Harriman, who was sent to the Soviet Union, is a very capable person in whom every confidence could be placed. This man states that Stalin is not in a position to discuss peace and that without a doubt, Hitler is winning that battle.

Concerning the project to attempt to have Italy enter into a separate peace, Pratt is of the opinion that such a peace would put Italy in the same disastrous position that France now occupies and for this reason he is inclined to doubt that Italy will consider it.

In the final analysis, the Admiral is of the opinion that the war will be a long drawn out affair, and that sooner or later, one side will become more fatigued than the other.

Thus, he expressed what probably is the most optimistic view to come from any authoritative American.

He went on to express his opinion that the Atlantic would be saved for Great Britain.

Japan should do everything to avoid impairing her might on the seas, so that she can take it with her to the eventual peace conference. It will be only with a strong navy to fall back on that Japan will have much say in those peace terms, he said.

24192

JD-1: 6175

(D) Navy Trans. 10-30-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

29 October 1941

(Purple)

#1008 (In 3 parts, complete)

From Minister Wakasugi

U. S.-Japanese relations are now fast approaching a critical cross-road. In view of the fact that the times are indeed grave, I am waiving formality and, though it may seem very presumptuous of me, am reporting to you my views on the general attitude of the United States after coming in contact with its representatives on several occasions.

As you no doubt are well aware through the many other reports pertaining to this matter, the basic U. S. policy is the crushing of the so-called "Hitlerism", (establishment of a new order through the force of arms). Working from this principle, the United States is gradually strengthening its war-time structure. Britain and China have been set up as the first line of national defense. In this way, the United States has succeeded in steamrolling over the isolationist opposition and is forcing the government and the public alike to follow this policy.

The government has determined to gamble on a long term program. It is on these grounds that Hull has said on several occasions that though he yearns for the preservation of peace on the Pacific, on the other hand it will have to be based on agreements covering the entire Pacific area and not upon a patchwork of hit-or-miss local agreements. During my talks with him on the 24th, Welles said that the United States was not in agreement with the British practice in the past of establishing special relations with her colonial holdings. The United States is a firm advocate of an absolute non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all in the entire Pacific area, (including Japan, United States, Britain, China, Australia, Netherlands East Indies, etc.) Every nation will be offered opportunities equal to those existing between the home government and its colonies. For this reason, Welles pointed out on that occasion, this policy should be advantageous to Japan as well.

Judging from these factors, we assume that the United States based their demands for equal opportunities of access to the natural resources of French Indo-China and Thailand, as well as a guarantee that they will remain strictly neutral, upon their principle of non-discrimination. Apparently, they presume that we intend to develop this area under the principle of our military's co-prosperity sphere, in a monopolistic manner, and through the force of arms.

Thus, there has arisen a clash of ideologies.

The United States wants to tackle the China problem as merely one phase of the aforementioned "peace on the Pacific" issue. On the other hand, it should be recalled that Hull once said to the late Ambassador Saito that it was exceedingly doubtful that there should be war between Japan and the United States over merely the China problem. There are indications that the United States is still not anxious to fight Japan over only the China problem. However, it must be borne in mind that China is now relying solely on the United

States. (It is said that T. V. Soong and others in the United States are working on the Treasury Department in particular) and the United States is doing everything in its power to prevent the bringing about of a truce between Japan and the United States. Since China is entirely dependent on the United States, the United States cannot turn a cold shoulder to her pleas. It is impossible for the United States to cruelly impose terms on China which would be almost impossible for the United States herself to endure.

Welles used the above described excuse during our talks on the 24th. He went on to say, however, that the United States would not be unreasonable; she would not demand of Japan to carry out that which is immediately impossible. What his implications were when he said that is not clear, but possibly he may have been referring to some such tough problem as that of evacuating our forces, (indications are that in spite of our repeated explanations concerning the garrisoning of troops in China, the above ambiguous statement may have been his camouflaged way of pointing out a means of carrying out a program of withdrawal of troops). I got the impression that he wanted to convey to me that the United States would not demand that it be carried out immediately.

In any event, it has become apparent that U. S.-Japanese relations have now become an integral phase of the national policy of the United States. There is every indication that the United States is anxious to adjust the relationship between the two nations as it has much bearing on her national policy. However, she is willing to come to terms only if the conditions suit her. She has set forth her stand in her proposals of 21 June and of 2 October. I am very doubtful that she will make any concessions therefrom.

Her preparations in the event of the worst have been completed. Therefore, I cannot believe that she is stalling for time. On the other hand, I am of the opinion that she is not so anxious to enter into the agreement that she will sacrifice any of her terms. Therefore, I do not believe that we should expect any further counter proposals from them. They have decided on a course of economic pressure plus watchful waiting.

Therefore, if we choose to good naturedly continue these talks, I am of the opinion that all is not hopeless. I feel that such a move will almost automatically open up ways of breaking down differences if we make the best use of world developments. However, if we depend on immediate settlement by settling local differences by insisting upon our freedom of action, we must have our minds made up that not only will these negotiations be terminated, but that our national relations will be severed.

The United States has expressed its interest in continuing with the talks after she has been advised of the attitude and policy of the newly formed Cabinet of Japan. I urge, therefore, that the new Cabinet establish its basic policy as speedily as possible, so that we may lay our cards on the table for them to see. I sincerely believe that that would be to our best interests.

24250

FD-1: 6207

(D) Navy Trans. 11-1-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

29 October 1941

(Purple)

#1010 (In 2 parts, complete)

Chief of Office routing.

I report the following points to you merely as reference material in connection with the adjusting of national relations.

1. Admiral Standley, Retired, told Member of Parliament Kasai that the more influential Congressmen from the Middle West (where there are many Americans of German descent) state that the majority of the Middle Westerners are opposed to a war against Germany, but that at the same time, a great number of them favor a U. S.-Japanese war. This is due, in part, he said, to Germany's superior propaganda work. I have heard O'Laughlin, who is familiar with that area, express similar opinions.

2. Secretary Hull has told Congress that the U. S. Government looks upon the Tripartite Pact as an instrument to be used to intimidate the United States. Its aim is to make impossible the aiding of Great Britain by the United States and thus gradually to force the United States to give up the control of the seas and bring back the first line of U. S. defense to the U. S. shore line. The United States desires peace; however, it is a well established fact that there is a better chance to have peace if strength can be shown. If I (Hull) were to make too many concessions to the Axis powers, there is danger that they would be interpreted as weaknesses on my part and no doubt their demands would be increased. (This is particularly true in Tokyo). There are indications, Hull continued, that the degree of enthusiasm in Tokyo to proceed on selfish courses, is determined to a considerable extent on how the German-Soviet war is going.

It is said that he went on to say that the situation was "very delicate and very changeable". (Reported in the New York Times 28th).

To me, Secretary Hull once said that the people of both Japan and the United States were proud peoples. For this reason, neither would easily succumb to bluffs of the other.

3. It is said that Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long told a certain Japanese who called on him and set forth the many advantages of speedily entering into an understanding with Japan along the lines published in a newspaper as a Tokyo dispatch, that it would be impossible for the United States to get everything in order before 15 November.

4. On two different occasions recently, I met and talked with Lord Halifax. I tried to sound him out as to British attitude with regard to a Japanese-U. S. understanding. I gather from these that, in accordance with the Churchill speech, Britain would string along with the United States. Lord Halifax said that British did not want trouble on the Pacific; that is true of the United States, too, he said adding that he hoped that Japan would give the matter her thorough study from all angles and exercise the utmost of patience before doing anything.

He refused to enlarge upon the U. S. and British embargo policy in effect at present.

24376

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans, 11-5-41 (5)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Nanking
31 October 1941
(Purple)
#464

The agreement is to go into effect November 25th, and it is generally agreed between Japan, Germany, and Italy that it shall be continued for a period of five years. Negotiations should be begun between the three countries regarding the proposal for a new protocol. This is strictly secret and for your information.

24290

JD-1: 6225

(H) Navy Trans. 11-3-41 (5-AR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
1 November 1941
(Purple)
#721

Please advise this office what actual relationship exists at present between the original contents of the U. S. proposal of 21 June and the following points:

The matter pertaining to the exchanging of the official texts which was put into the 21 June proposal as a footnote to Section 2 thereof, (that part concerning the attitude of the respective nations to the European war); and, the three questions which were submitted concerning the United States' proposal of non-discrimination in trade, a subject which was put in as a supplement to Section 3, (concerning peace between China and Japan), of the 21 June proposal.

According to your message #424*, you told Secretary Hull on 22 June that you could not deliver the official note to the home government. Moreover, there seems to be indications that the U. S. Government is beginning to understand our viewpoint with regard to the matter of the right of self-defense.

In view of these facts, may we assume that the matter of exchanging of official notes has been dropped by the United States? We must have this information to discuss this whole matter in a business like manner, so please advise us immediately, although it may seem like bringing up old issues.

24531

JD-1: 6323

(D) Navy Trans. 11-7-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 3271 (SIS #18717, and 18735) dated 24 June. Amb. Nomura wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secy. Hull, Hull made the statement that there seems to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U. S. so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that such concession as the U. S. has so far offered are not worthy of consideration.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington
November 2, 1941
Purple (CA)
#722

The Government has for a number of days since the forming of the new Cabinet been holding meetings with the Imperial headquarters. We have carefully considered a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final decision in a meeting on the morning of the 5th and will let you know the result at once. This will be our Government's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. The situation is very grave. When we resume negotiations, the situation makes it urgent that we reach a decision at once. This is at present only for your information. When we take up these negotiations once more, we trust you will handle everything with the greatest of care.

Army 24292

Trans. 11-3-41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 2, 1941
Purple (CA)
#723 (Part 1 of 2)

Day before yesterday when I met the diplomatic corps, during the conversation I had with the American Ambassador, I said, "I am very sorry that Japanese-American relations have lately been growing worse and worse. If this continues, I fear that unfortunate results will ensue. For six months, negotiations have been dragging along, and our people are growing impatient. Therefore, I hope that a speedy settlement will be reached. In this connection, I would like to ask your friendly cooperation." I added, "It is necessary for the United States, in order to arrive at a frank understanding, to relinquish its theoretical procedure and view the Oriental situation realistically. For example, when we come to the question of evacuation, there are other countries besides Japan who actually have occupation forces in China. Furthermore, although Outer Mongolia is considered a part of Chinese territory, the Soviet has a considerable force stationed there. The United States must realize these facts and understand our position." The Ambassador nodded to this and promised cooperation. He said that he would like for the parleys between the United States and Japan to proceed amicably.

Army 24293

Trans. 11/3/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 2, 1941
Purple (CA)
#723 (Part 2 of 2)

On the 26th the British Ambassador came to see me on other business, and I said to him, "The attitude of the United States is entirely too theoretical, and if this continues there will be scant chance of a settlement. At the present time I am very much concerned over this. If the negotiations turn out to be a failure, cannot tell but what a lamentable situation will occur. Now you English, who have such important interests in the Far East, would not like this. I think that England ought to endeavor to improve Japanese-English-American relations in order to reestablish and maintain the peace of the world." The Ambassador replied that he would transmit what I said immediately to London. I saw him again (yesterday?) and endeavored to impart to him the impression that the situation is waxing more and more acute and will not permit of procrastination.

Sent also to London.

Army 24294

Trans. 11/3/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
3 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#1021

I plan to see Hull in two or three days. If possible I would like to be advised of the Cabinet's definite policy before then. If this is impossible will you please advise me of the points I should bear in mind while talking to the Secretary.

24424

JD-1: 6277

(D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 3 November 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #1025

Re your #721*

1. As you mentioned in your message, it is true that I refused to relay the text of the exchanged notes. They have stuck firmly to their original stand and consequently the two proposals have remained at odds with each other.

2. The questions regarding the three items were made with reference to the 21 June proposal. They are still, as before, awaiting our definite reply.

24476

JD-1: 6316

(D) Navy Trans. 11-7-41 (2)

*Available, being decoded; will be translated. Dated 1 November.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 4, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #725 (Part 1 of 3)

Concerning my #722*.

1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy, the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter-proposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the Government and the military high command (ensuing Nos. 726^b and 727^b). This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.

2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure

of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.

Army 24330
JD 6248

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

* S. I. S. #24292 which states that meetings are being held with the Imperial Headquarters to consider a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America and that a final decision is to be made on the morning of the 5th.

^b Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#725 (Part 2 of 3)

When the Japanese-American meetings began, who would have ever dreamt that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some understanding, we have already gone far out of our way and yielded and yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick and thin sticks to the self-same propositions she made to start with. Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, our Government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this—to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who think we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our long-suffering. Nay, when it comes to a question of our existence and our honor, when the time comes we will defend them without recking the cost. If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this position of ours, there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. This time we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time we are making our last possible bargain, and I hope that we can thus settle all our troubles with the United States peaceably.

Army 24331

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 4, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #725 (Part 3 of 3)

3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward to what may come at the end—at the last day of Japanese-American negotiations—the Government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be for the whole world situation.

4. Your Honor will see from the considerations above how important is your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind to continue to do your best. I hope you will. Now just as soon as the conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to tell them how determined we are and try to get them to foster a speedy understanding.

5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there, so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in Tokyo, and as soon as you have got the concensus of the American officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go awry, I want you to follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to know there will be no room for personal interpretation.

Army 24332

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

 [Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 4, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #726 (Part 1 of 4.)

Proposal "A".

1. This proposal is our revised ultimatum made as a result of our attempts to meet, insofar as possible, the wishes of the Americans, clarified as a result of negotiations based on our proposals of September 25. We have toned down our insistences as follows:

(1) The question of non-discrimination in trade.

Should they appear not to accede to our proposal of September 25 in this respect, insert the following statement, "The Japanese Government is prepared to carry out this principle in the entire Pacific area; that is to say, China as well, providing the principles of non-discrimination are applied to the entire world."

(2) The question of our understanding and application of the Tripartite Alliance.

At the same time that you clarify to them that we intend no expansion of our sphere of self-defense, make clear, as has been repeatedly

explained in the past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of Europe's war into the Pacific.

Army 24334

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#726 (Part 2 of 4.)

(3) The question concerning the evacuation of troops.

We are toning down our stipulations in this connection as follows:

(A) The stationing and evacuation of troops in China since the outbreak of the China Incident.

Japanese troops which have been sent to China will be stationed in North China, on the Mongolian border regions, and on the Island of Hainan after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, and will not be evacuated until the elapse of a suitable interval. The evacuation of other troops will be carried out by Japan and China at the same time that peace is established. In order to maintain peace and order, this will be carried out within a period of two years. (Note: Should the American authorities question you in regard to "the suitable period", answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years.)

(B) The stationing and evacuation of troops in French Indo-China.

The Japanese Government respects the territorial integrity of the French possession, Indo-China. In the event that a just peace is established, or that the China Incident is brought to a successful conclusion, Japanese troops which have been dispatched to French Indo-China and are there now shall be evacuated.

(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and the United States (whether it is called an understanding proposal or some other sort of a statement.)

Army 24335

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#726 (Part 3 of 4)

2. Explanation.

(1) Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity when we come to consider non-discrimination in commerce. However, we have revised our demands along this line hitherto and put the question of non-discrimination on a world-wide basis. In a memorandum of the American Government, they state in effect, however, that it might be feasible for either country within a certain specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a complementary policy. Judging from this

statement, I do not believe they will oppose this term. I think that we can easily reach an understanding on this matter.

(2) As for the question of the Three-Power Pact, your various messages lead me to believe that the United States is, in general, satisfied with our proposals, so if we make our position even more clear by saying that we will not randomly enlarge upon our interpretation of the right of self-defense, I feel sure that we will soon be mutually agreed on this point.

Army 24336

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#726 (Part 4 of 4)

(3) I think that in all probability the question of evacuation will be the hardest. However, in view of the fact that the United States is so much opposed to our stationing soldiers in undefined areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of occupation and our officials, thus attempting to dispel their suspicions. We will call it evacuation; but although it would please the United States for us to make occupation the exception rather than the rule, in the last analysis this would be out of the question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation. Summing this up, Proposal A accepts completely America's demands on two of the three proposals mentioned in the other proposal, but when it comes to the last point concerning the stationing and evacuation of forces, we have already made our last possible concession. How hard, indeed, have we fought in China for four years! What tremendous sacrifices have we made! They must know this, so their demands in this connection must have been only "wishful thinking." In any case, our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further compromise in this connection. As best you may, please endeavor to have the United States understand this, and I earnestly hope and pray that you can quickly bring about an understanding.

Army 24337

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#727

1. Proposal "B".

This proposal is based upon proposal "A". If there appears to be a remarkable difference between the Japanese and American views, since the situation does not permit of delays, it will be necessary to

put forward some substitute plan. Therefore, our second formula is advanced with the idea of making a last effort to prevent something happening. The substance is as follows:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States agree that neither will militarily invade any area in Southeast Asia and the South Seas with the exception of French Indo-China.

(2) The Governments of Japan and the United States will cooperate mutually in guaranteeing the obtention of the materials they need in Netherlands India.

(3) The Governments of Japan and the United States will mutually return to the situation prior to the freezing of their respective assets and the Government of the United States will agree to furnish Japan with the petroleum she needs.

(4) The Government of the United States will engage in no activity which might put an obstacle in the way of Japan in her efforts to make peace with China.

Addendum:

(1) If necessary, upon the establishment of this understanding, as soon as peace is established between Japan and China, or as soon as a just peace is made in the Pacific area, Japan has no objection to promising to evacuate her troops.

(2) If necessary, we will insert an additional stipulation concerning the interpretation and carrying out of the Three-Power Pact and the question of non-discrimination in commerce which were referred to in proposal "A" in my #726*.

Army 24338

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

* See S. I. S. #24334 to 24337.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA)
#730

Re my #725*.

In view of the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your request on instructions from me, Ambassador KURUSU is leaving—on the 7th by clipper to assist you. He will be your right-hand man in these parleys. He is carrying with him no additional instructions, so in order to prepare him for the talks, will you please tell him all, and I hope that you can, by all means, arrange for an interview between him and President ROOSEVELT.

By the way, will you please be sure to keep Ambassador KURUSU's activities strictly secret.

Army 24339

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

* S. I. S. Nos. 24330, 31, 32.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 4, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #731

Re my #725.*

In these negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested party and has vast interests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to carry out this proposal (both Proposal A and Proposal B), it would certainly behoove Great Britain and, for that matter, the Netherlands also as interested parties, to put into effect the terms of the understanding in question. If we should proceed without any definite assurances on this point and reached an accord with Washington alone, it might very well be that it would never work.

Consequently, I want you please to impress upon the American officials the importance of this essential measure and have them agree to make Great Britain and the Netherlands both simultaneously sign those terms in which they are concerned. Please wire me the results.

Army 24333

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

* See S. I. S. #24330, 31, 32.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 5 November 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #732

Re my #725*

If and when an agreement is reached on the basis of our latest proposal we would prefer that it not be written up in the form of a treaty. Ratification of the Senate is required for a treaty, and we fear that too much time would be consumed obtaining this. From the viewpoint of speed and certainty, we would like to avoid having to follow this course. From the gist of the U. S. proposals, we feel that the U. S. Government is also desirous of not having to await Senate ratification.

We have been lead to believe that it is the U. S. Government's intention to use this instrument as a basis for some future treaty, and that it would be classified as one type of an "Executive Agreement" as the President is authorized to do. We have been proceeding in the past on this assumption. (Please refer to page (3 ?) 1, Volume 2, of Hyde's International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States). Will you please ascertain the U. S. attitude on this point.

In any event, it is of utmost importance that an agreement be entered into along the lines given in the message referred to in the heading at the earliest possible moment. Under present conditions, speed is an absolutely essential factor.

24372

JD-1: 6253

(D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6248. S. I. S. #24330.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
5 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#735

1. Our counter proposal in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations referred to in my message #725* was taken up at the Imperial Conference on this, the 5th, and was given approval. Therefore, will you please begin the talks along the lines given in my instructions.

2. We assume that it would meet with the U. S. approval, in view of past developments, if, for the time being, the 21 June proposal—25 September's from our point of view—was used as a basis of these new talks. Subsequently, we feel that from the standpoint of the likelihood of reaching an early agreement, our Proposal A (contained in my message #726**) should be submitted for discussion. (As a matter of fact, there are a number of points in the form and in the expressions used in the U. S. proposal which do not meet with our complete approval. However, we feel that for convenience and speed's sake, Proposal A should be submitted first.) Please, therefore, explain these points to the United States and at the same time have them clearly understand the circumstances contained in my message #725*. Thereupon, do your utmost to have them accept that proposal in the shortest possible time.

3. If the United States expresses too many points of disapproval to Proposal A and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot be reached, we intend to submit our absolutely final proposal, Proposal B (contained in my message #727***). Please, therefore, ascertain the U. S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as possible, and advise this office. Be sure to advise this office before Proposal B is submitted to the United States.

4. As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted. Please bear this in mind and do your best. I wish to stress this point over and over.

5. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal.

(Although a "1" was placed at the beginning of the body of my message #727***, there was no need for it, so please delete it.

24387

JD-1: 6276

(D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6248 (S. I. S. #24330-33).

**JD-1: 6249 (S. I. S. #24334-37).

***JD-1: 6250 (S. I. S. #24338).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 5 November 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #736

(Of utmost secrecy).

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

24373
 JD-1: 6254

(D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 5 November 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #1037

I have received all of your messages of instructions, and after giving the matter my very careful consideration, I have decided to continue to put forth my best efforts, however feeble they may be. I, therefore, made arrangements immediately on this, the 5th, to meet with President Roosevelt through Hull. (I shall advise you the date and time of this interview as soon as it is made definite). I am of the opinion that it would be to our advantage to keep this meeting as secret as possible. I would appreciate being advised of the Foreign Office's view on this point as soon as possible. If you believe that it would be better if this were made an official interview, please advise me as to the manner in which it should be announced to the public.

24573
 JD-1: 6364

(D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 5 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #1040

Re your #735, paragraph 5*.

On the 5th, reports from Tokyo were played up by the newspapers here to the effect that Domei, the mouthpiece of the Japanese Government and the Times-Advertiser, the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office, were declaring that the 15th had been set as the "deadline" for the

negotiations and were giving a list of the Japanese demands, (seven was given as the number).

While I recognize that the above may be considered as well intentioned efforts on our part to lead to a favorable reception of the negotiations still the above reports are directly opposed to the interest of your caption telegram. As you are well aware in view of the present delicate situation such reports will have the effect of alienating American public opinion or causing it to become actively opposed to Japan.

There is danger that America will see through our condition. If we have really made up our minds to a final course of action it would be the part of wisdom to keep still about it. I realize that the internal situation is causing you no end of worry, however I feel that in view of the present grave situation still further guidance should be given to the newspapers.

24479

JD-1: 6320

(H) Navy Trans. 11-7-41 (7)

*JD-1: 6276 (H-24387).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 6, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#739

Re my #730.*

The reason why we are sending Ambassador KURUSU to you so quickly is, in addition to what I have already wired you, to show our Empire's sincerity in the negotiations soon to follow. As I wired you before, he brings with him no new instructions in addition to the ones I have already sent you. I wish him, however, to communicate to you at first hand as best he may, the exact situation here in Japan, and now that we are on the last lap of these negotiations, I do hope that he can help you in unravelling this bewildering maze and through cooperation lead to a solution, and that right soon. To make it sound good, we are telling the public that he is coming to help you quickly compose the unhappy relations between the two nations. We have explained all this fully to the British and American Ambassadors here in Tokyo, and Ambassador KURUSU himself had a heart-to-heart talk with the American Ambassador here before he left, and both Ambassadors fully understand why he is making the trip.

The officials of both the Army and the Navy are pleased with the special dispatch of the Ambassador and are very grateful for the trouble he is taking. After you read this, please go and tell the American officials concerned and wire me back their reply.

Army 24439

Trans. 11/6/41 (S)

* S. I. S. #24330 which states that Ambassador KURUSU is being sent to Washington on the 7th by clipper to assist in the Japanese-American parleys.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 6, 1941
Purple (CA)
#740

Re your #1025.*

Through Your Honor's continuous efforts, gradually both the Japanese and American insistences centering around the question of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Treaty have become clear. Now we might say that there exists almost no division between our respective views. At any rate, we have been taking it for granted that this is the case for some time. Our proposal of September 25, which is a counter-proposal to the American proposal of June 21, makes no reference to any exchange of notes, which means that we are refusing to consider such an exchange. We are taking it for granted that the United States, too, is eliminating this as a matter of course from the negotiations, and we are continuing the negotiations on the assumption that there will be no such exchange of notes. If, by any misadventure, the United States should say that they will not leave out the proposal for exchange of notes, it will be utterly and absolutely impossible for us to agree, so when you negotiate, please be fully aware of this.

Army 24442

Trans. 11/6/41 (S)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 6, 1941
Purple (CA)
#741

Re your #1037.*

The matter of Your Honor's interviewing the President is delicate in the extreme, and if the newspapers speculate on the import of it, the effect would doubtless be most regrettable. Therefore, if possible, I think we should avoid letting the press get wind of the substance of the interview or even the fact of the interview. If the American officials will agree with this, naturally we, too, will observe the same secrecy.

Carrying this idea still further, in all your subsequent contacts with American officials I would like for you to do your utmost to maintain the same secrecy and avoidance of publicity.

Army 24440

Trans. 11/6/41 (S)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 6, 1941
Purple
#1051

In the present delicate state of Japan-American relations the local press is becoming more and more excited over the dispatch of KURUSU, etc. From now on all kinds of articles and editorials based on conjecture will continually be appearing. Although I have been very careful in my contacts with the local and foreign press, on account of the rivalry between the different newspapers, spontaneous conjectures and reports are published.

Moreover these articles in English-language newspapers may be sent just as they are to Japan where I fear they would have an unforeseen influence on our already tense population. Considering the seriousness of the situation please prevent the publication of such writings for the time being in the interest of better Japan-American relations, and, keeping a strict control, follow the most prudent policy.

Army 24552

Trans. 11/10/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
7 November 1941
(Purple)
#1053

Re my #1040*.

We are of the opinion that it is absolutely essential that, at this time, to either through direct means or through suitable indirect channels, strike home Japan's determinations to the U. S. Government. Under this assumption we are making every effort to carry this out.

As I pointed out in the message referred to in the heading, there is everything to lose and nothing to gain to resort to a press campaign at a time like this, for such a campaign is aimed at the general public. The Times Advertiser is referred to here as the official government organ. We urge you to make that paper refrain from too bluntly commenting on the negotiations. As a matter of fact, we would be in favor of their remaining completely silent. We are convinced that an ominous silence would have the best effect, so will you make arrangements towards this end immediately.

24645

JD-1: 6401

(D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (1)

*JD-1: 6320 (S. I. S. #24479).

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

7 November 1941

(Purple)

#1054

Re my #10—

I met and talked with Secretary Hull at 0930 on the 7th, and I explained our new proposal to him in accordance with your instructions. I requested that it be given consideration by the United States and at the same time I expressed my desire to meet with the President at the earliest possible moment. Hull promised to give them his consideration.

With regard to the matter of nondiscrimination in trade, Hull showed indications of being satisfied. He did not indicate either approval or disapproval of the matters pertaining to rights of self-defense and of withdrawal of our troops.

The interview lasted approximately one hour.

This message dispatched at 1330.

24576

JD-1: 6372

(D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

7 November 1941

(Purple)

#1055 (Part 1 of 3) (Part 2 not available)

At 0900 on this, the 7th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull at his home. (Ballantine was also present.)

I said that I had been instructed by my home government to explain to the President and to the Secretary of State, Japan's attitude and position in the hope of bringing about immediate settlement of the various problems involved in the relationship between Japan and the United States.

In way of replying to this, Hull said that at present there were two political factions in this world which were at odds with each other and which were, consequently, embroiled in an armed conflict. Neither faction is able to decide the outcome speedily and hence there is a danger that they will be gradually thrown into the chaos of anarchism.

If, at a time like this, the United States and Japan simultaneously hit upon a method of maintaining peace on the Pacific, it is quite possible that the world may be saved from the apparently imminent chaos.

I, therefore, said, in accordance with your your various instructions, that:

1. Of the three outstanding problems, agreements have been practically been reached on two. With regard to the matter of garrisoning or withdrawing troops, Japan is prepared to make the maximum concessions which can be permitted by the domestic political conditions of Japan. ———(9 groups missed here———) I urged that the United States cooperate in bringing about a speedy settlement on that assumption.

24577

JD-1: 6372 (b)

(D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (7)

MEMORANDUM

In JD-1: 6372 (b), the last paragraph on the first page of this message should be changed to read as follows:

1. Of the three outstanding problems, agreements have been practically reached on two. With regard to the matter of garrisoning or withdrawing troops, Japan is prepared to make the maximum concessions which can be permitted by the domestic political conditions of Japan.

2. From the viewpoint of U. S.-Japanese friendship in its broad sense, the U. S. Government should take a philosophic attitude concerning present conditions, I said, and I urged that the United States cooperate in bringing about a speedy settlement on that assumption.

S. I. S. #24577.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

7 November 1941

(Purple)

#1055 (Part 2 of 3)*

(I pointed out that):

3. I have been instructed by my home government to fully explain Japan's determination and Japan's position to the President and the Secretary of State, and through such understandings to reach settlements as soon as possible.

4. After six months of negotiations, the people of Japan are getting a little impatient and that hence the situation there is becoming exceedingly critical. For this reason, we are very anxious that these negotiations be brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

5. In view of the very critical situation parallel negotiations in Tokyo are to be conducted.

Explaining that Japan is now displaying the maximum amount of good will and the utmost of sincerity, I submitted the counter proposal which you sent us, to them. I requested that the United States give it her consideration from the broad aspect, and urged them to accept the terms contained therein.

Hull carefully read this document. He nodded approval of the section concerning the principle of non-discrimination, and commented that that way would prove to be to Japan's interest. With regard to the section of garrisoning troops, he simply asked what would be the proportion of those remaining to those being withdrawn. I replied that much the greater part would be withdrawn and only a small portion would be kept in China. I went on to explain our position with regard to the "right of self-defense" issue, in accordance with your instruction which I received today.

It was decided that an answer to all of the points would be submitted after this note had been carefully studied by them. They will submit their reply after my interview with the President, at which time I shall endeavor to make more detailed explanation.

24646

JD-1: 6372 (b)

(D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (1)

* Parts 1 and 3—S. I. S. #24577.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

7 November 1941

(Purple)

#1055 (Part 3 of 3) (Part 2 not available)

Hull went on to say that as he had said on previous occasions, Britain, China, the Netherlands and other countries had to be consulted regarding Japanese-U. S. talks of maintaining peace on the Pacific. He let it leak out in this connection that China was being consulted with regard to matters pertaining to the China problems.

Hull then said that he had happened to wonder what Japan's attitude would be if there were the following developments: Supposing an influential and reliable representative of China were to join in these talks. Supposing, further, that this representative states that China is desirous of resuming friendly relations with Japan, giving his pledge of true friendship and sincerity. What would Japan's reaction be?

Wakasugi asked whether he could assume first, that China's attitude had been ascertained. Hull replied that the matter hadn't been taken up with China as yet, and that it was just something that he as an individual had happened to think of. If such a thing could be done, however, he continued, peace on the Pacific would be maintained, and no doubt it would set an example for the world and thus have a very favorable effect on it.

We got the impression that he may have already discussed this matter with the Chinese and that his plan was a consequence thereof. In either event, Hull requested that this plan be struck upon, be relayed to the government of Japan and its attitude on it be ascertained. I said that I would give it my consideration.

24577

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

9 November 1941

(Purple—CA)

#751

Re the last part of your message #1055*.

We interpret Secretary Hull's plan to have a Chinese person of the highest integrity give his pledge regarding the China problem, to mean that the Secretary wishes to leave the China problem which has been a stumbling block in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, up to direct negotiations between Japan and China for settlement. This would lead to having Chiang Kai-shek propose to us that peace negotiations be begun.

We recognize this to be a great contribution toward bringing about friendly relations between Japan and China and for this reason we highly welcome it. We will, of course, follow this message up with another giving this government's opinions. In the meantime please ascertain and advise us what relation this proposal has upon the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. Please make suitable inquiries on this

phase to obtain as much information as possible, on whatever concrete plans the United States may have.

24579

JD-1: #6374

(D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6372 (b) (S. I. S. #24577).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
9 November 1941
(Purple)
#752

Re your #1040* and #1053**.

1. This office is in complete agreement with the contents of your messages referred to above. The government is doing everything in its power to giving enlightenment to correctly guide public opinion. The censor bureau has evolved a plan whereby there will be no comments on the U. S.-Japanese negotiations. It goes without saying, of course, that the contents of the negotiations will not be published, but furthermore, all utterances which may tend to excite the United States will be censored. (It has been unofficially decided to even suppress information as to the dates on which the representatives of the two nations confer). We shall prevent the publication of anything that may interfere with the progress. We have issued a particularly vigorous warning to the Times of dire consequences if there are any infractions.

2. We see reports from correspondents in the U. S. area, (for example from the Domei office in your city), which are not in accord with our established policy of maintenance of calm and patience regarding the Japanese-U. S. talks. The situation here is a critical one, so please give correct guidance to all of the correspondents there.

24580

JD-1: 6375

(D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6320 (S. I. S. #24479).

**Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 10, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#755. Part 1 of 2.

Re my #754*.

In adjusting Japanese-American relations, the Government of Japan has attached a great deal of importance on speedy solution of the China Incident. At the same time the United States Government also has maintained the attitude that if peace is to be established in the Pacific, the China question cannot be overlooked. Now, if it is the intention of the United States Government to mediate between Japan and China along the lines proposed by Secretary HULL and also to leave the matter of peace terms to the Japanese and Chinese Governments, this plan harmonizes with what the Japanese Govern-

ment has been looking forward to since the beginning of ———. It would mean that the question of withdrawing troops from China would according to HULL's suggestion be left out for the time being from the negotiations. This would make it possible for us to hasten the settlement by means of negotiations conducted between Japan and China alone and it would also have the advantage of bringing about peace between Japan and China without American interference.

Should we take advantage of this proposal, it goes without saying that it would be necessary to secure a promise or a definite statement that the settlement of the negotiations between Japan and the United States would not make the establishment of peace between Japan and China its condition and that the United States would not interfere with the peace to be established between Japan and China. (This promise includes cessation of activities for aiding CHIANG.) Furthermore, it is necessary to make it clear that the agreement between Japan and the United States would be immediately signed and put into effect.

Army 24581

Trans. 11/10/41 (S)

• Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 10, 1941
Purple (CA)
#755. Part 2 of 2.

As regards the China question, this would mean that the paragraph concerning the China Incident in Proposal "A" of my #726^a (paragraph 3 of the Agreement) should be eliminated from the agenda of the negotiations and paragraph 4 of Proposal "B" given in my #727^b (namely that the United States will refrain from any action detrimental to the efforts made for the purpose of establishing peace between Japan and China) be substituted in its place.

Furthermore, I believe that the United States wishes to see a speedy establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United States and so, for this reason, HULL's proposal is a sincere one and from this standpoint the United States Government proposes to mediate between Japan and China. If the United States is of the intention of postponing the settlement of questions other than the China question until peace is established between Japan and China or of continuing aid to CHIANG, we shall not be able to accept the proposal for it would prevent the establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United States and, furthermore, would be apt to put the blame for the failure of the Japanese-American negotiations upon us. I need hardly point this out to you but I would like to have you take care so that this would not happen.

Army 24582

Trans. 11/10/41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #24334-37.

^b S. I. S. #24338.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 10, 1941
Purple

#757 (Part 1 of 3) (To be handled in government code)

On the 10th I went to talk to the American Ambassador, and DOOMAN sat with us. I opened the conversation with a resume of my #725 * and reiterated my earnest hope that a decision could be reached in the negotiations on a basis just to our Empire. I explained that I would bend every effort toward the solution of this difficult situation. Then I continued, "Having examined the results of the negotiations thus far, what I feel is that the United States does not have full knowledge of the true situation. I feel that the United States does not have enough understanding and knowledge. Secretary HULL says that he recognizes Japan's stabilizing influence, yet unless he realizes sufficiently present conditions in East Asia and that we Japanese have been occupied over a period of four and a half years with the China incident, even though he calls us a stabilizing influence, he contradicts himself. Our population is ever increasing. Already we have about 100,000,000 people. In order to maintain their existence, we absolutely must obtain the necessary materials. On the other hand, six months have passed since Japanese-American negotiations began, and during that time, although we have given in as much as we could, the United States sticks to her first proposals and will not bend an inch. This is a most regrettable circumstance. It would seem that there are not a few Japanese who doubt the sincerity of the American Government. Consequently, a further delay would do great damage to our popular spirit. Moreover, the cabinet will soon convene, and the situation is becoming exceedingly tense. Without the loss of a day, we should establish these negotiations. I hope that the American Government, too, will fully consider all these points and take the large view, settling the whole thing at once. I do not honestly believe that there is any other way to settle this perplexing situation.

Army 24583

Trans. 11/10/41 (s)

* S. I. S. #24330-32 states that as a result of a conference between the Foreign Office and the Military High Command, two new proposals, containing the final concessions Japan is willing to make, have been devised.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 10, 1941
Purple (Urgent)

#757 (Part 2 of 3) (To be handled in government code)

Next I presented him with the English text of Proposal A contained in my #726 * and said, "As a result of deep thought, this was arrived at by the Government and represents the maximum compromise that we can endure to make. There is absolutely no possibility of our yielding any further.

"1. The attitude of both nations toward the European war is recorded in our proposal of September 25. Therefore, I take it for granted that we are in agreement on this score.

"2. I feel that this proposal fully covers America's desires concerning non-discriminatory treatment in commerce.

"3. Concerning the ever-knotty problem of evacuating troops, the present proposal, in view of the difficulties we face here in Japan, ventures our maximum compromise. I am sure that the United States officials can readily comprehend this. Let me tell you how strongly I hope that we can reach a quick settlement. Now included in this documents are many matters in which Great Britain's interests are deeply concerned, so it is necessary that, simultaneously with the establishment of Japanese-American negotiations, Japan and England make preparations to sign." I added, "I hope that the Government of the United States will undertake this."

The American Ambassador answered, "I have had no instructions from my home government, so I would like to reserve my opinion. Only as a hint, let me say that I have wired to Washington the true situation in detail, so the American Government understands the Oriental situation fully. Concerning influence for stability, there are many ways of interpreting that. Concerning the question of the obtention of materials, the present negotiations aim at that very thing, and I think that there will probably be some way for you Japanese to obtain what you need in a peaceful manner."

Army 24584

Trans. 11/10/41 (S)

* See S. I. S. #24334, #24335, #24336, and #24337.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 10, 1941
Purple

#757 (Part 3 of 3) (To be handled in government code)

I answered, "Though I have all along fully appreciated the efforts of Your Excellency, I do not feel that the Government of the United States has as yet fully appreciated the situation. The feeling in favor of stability and peace is, as a matter of course, the feeling of the majority of the people. Then too, insofar as the question of resources is concerned, if we take the example of the recent situation wherein the supplying of raw materials to Japan was suspended as a result of America's actions in the freezing of assets, such strong-arm measures of economic pressure, in addition to being a threat indicate the probability of even more severe measures in the future. The people of Japan, though they may feel deeply within themselves that extreme steps for self-defense must be brought to bear, cannot bring themselves to the point of carrying this out.

"On this question there is a definite need for the United States to give the most careful consideration. Furthermore, insofar as the China question is concerned, would you have us ignore the successes gained as a result of sacrifices that we have made over four and a half years? Submission to terms such as these would be suicidal to Japan. For the Government, as well as for the people, I believe that such a course is impossible."

At this point, Counselor DOOMAN interposed the following: "We cannot accept the results of aggression." I refuted him by saying, "The Imperial Government does not consider that it has carried on a war of aggression. Therefore, the question of the results of aggression cannot be raised. We should, therefore, make an exception even in a non-aggression pact insofar as military action in the interests of self-defense is concerned. The fact is, insofar as the interpretation of the right of self-defense is concerned, judging by the examples of recent arguments, I believe that it is the United States which has been exhibiting a tendency to wrongfully magnify this. Therefore, it seems indicated that it is for Japan to call for the exercise of self-control by the Government of the United States. But at any rate, insofar as today is concerned, it behooves us not to become too involved in such arguments as these."

Army 24585

Trans. 11/10/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 10, 1941

Purple (CA)

(Urgent)

#1066. Part 1 of 2

1. I sent MOORE * to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action."

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all quibbling, began by saying to me:

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation."

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.

He replied, however:

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary of State."

Army 24655

Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

* Frederick Moore—Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 10, 1941

Purple (CA)

(Urgent)

#1066 (Part 2 of 2)

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United States saving its face.

3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him on the bases of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best.

Army 24656

Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 10, 1941

Purple CA

(Extremely Urgent)

#1069

Today, the 10th, at 11:30, accompanied by WAKASUGI, I had an hour's conversation with President ROOSEVELT in the presence of Secretary HULL. I told them what you said in your instructions and explained in detail our proposal for the settlement of the three problems. In response the President said that in the present world crisis the American Government has as its objective to contribute to the establishment of peace and order in the Pacific in the spirit of fair play and that he hoped the Japanese-American conversations would be effective.

He continued, "In accordance with the desire of the Japanese Government we will endeavor immediately to continue the parleys and I hope that Japan too will make it evident that she intends to take a friendly attitude. What the United States most desires is (1) to prevent the expansion of the war, and (2) to bring about a lasting peace."

He concluded with the promise that he would carefully study, with Secretary HULL, our proposals as explained by me and after thinking them over make a reply.

I will wire you the details later, however, I am in a hurry to send you this résumé.

Army 24652

Trans. 11/12/41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 10, 1941

Purple (Extremely Urgent)

#1070 (Part 1 of 4)

(To be handled in Government Code. Secret outside the department)

My interview with the President, referred to in my #1069,^a was held in a private room in the White House in order to avoid publicity. It was as follows:

Prefacing my remarks with the fact that I was speaking on instructions, I said, "I have had no talks with the Secretary of State for about three weeks: ever since the resignation of the KONOYE cabinet; and since the present situation between Japan and the United States is such that it could not be left as it is, I am very pleased to have this opportunity of speaking with you. The conversations on this question have lasted for more than six months. From their inception, Japan has been wishing to arrive at a quick settlement. The people of Japan also looked forward to these conversations with much hope; however, the conversations have dragged on and in the meantime the relation between the two countries has grown worse. It has become increasingly difficult for the people of my country to be patient. Now, the Government of Japan has in the meantime made many concessions, but the Government of the United States has held to its arguments and has shown no willingness to respond to our compromises. As a result, some people in Japan have begun to doubt if the United States is really sincere in this matter. The Japanese people regard the freezing of funds as a kind of economic blockade, and there seem to be some who say that modern warfare is not limited to shooting alone. No country can exist without the supply of materials indispensable to its industry. From what reports I have received from Japan, the situation seems to be serious and threatening and, therefore, the only way to keep peace is for Japan and the United States to come, without further delay, to some kind of a friendly and satisfactory agreement. It is for no other purpose than that of keeping peace in the Pacific that the Japanese Government is endeavoring so hard to arrive at a satisfactory agreement by continuing our conversations.

Army #24714

Trans. 11/13/41 (1)

^a S. I. S. #24662 which states that President ROOSEVELT will endeavor to continue the parleys and that what the United States most desires is (1) to prevent the expansion of the war, and (2) to bring about a lasting peace.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 10, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)
#1070 (Part 2 of 4)

"As a major effort in attaining this objective, our Government has made the recent proposal. I wish that your Government would make its views clear to us as soon as possible by responding to the views and desires expressed by the Japanese Government."

I incidentally told him that the Japanese Government, realizing the seriousness of the situation, is dispatching Ambassador KURUSU to assist me. Then I continued and said, by way of an explanation of our proposal, that taking together the views expressed on October 2 by the Secretary of State relative to our proposal of September 25, and what both the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary had said subsequent to that date, the whole question could be boiled down to consist of the following three difficult points. I went on to say:

1. "As to the principle of non-discrimination, we have decided to recognize the fact that if this principle is, as your Government wishes, to be applied to the whole world, it is to be applied in the entire Pacific area including China. Since this is something which the Secretary of State has often spoken to me about as being a long-cherished desire of his, I hope that this guarantee which our Government is offering would prove to be satisfactory to you.

2. "Now as to the attitude of the two governments toward the European war, we proposed in our proposal of September 25 that the action on the part of the two governments should be based upon consideration of 'protection and self-defense.'" (The English text used our expression as it stood.)

Regarding this point, I asked whether the United States Government would guarantee that it will not give an unnecessarily broad interpretation to the words "protection" and "self-defense", and I said, "If the Japanese Government could get such a guarantee from the United States Government, the Japanese Government is also willing to give a similar guarantee." I continued, "As to the words 'in case the United States enters the war, etc.,' since our conversations had for their object the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, we are not in a position, under the present circumstances, to make any definite statement outside of what has been given in our proposal of September 25. Unless we have confidence in each other, as you well realize, no guarantee would be a satisfactory one even if backed by a hundred promises and a hundred documents."

Army 24715

Trans. 11/13/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 10, 1941

Purple (Very Urgent)

#1070 (Part 3 of 4)

3. I submitted the new proposal, as it stood, regarding the question of stationing and withdrawing of troops and proceeded to say, "With regard to this question, the Japanese Government has gone a step beyond her past proposals and has, by definitely fixing not only the localities in China where our troops would be stationed but also the period of their occupation, made it clear that the occupation is not a permanent and definite one. No doubt you would like to see the troops withdrawn at once, but I am sure you well understand that it is impossible under the present circumstances to do so. I earnestly wish that you would give favorable consideration to this question from the standpoint of the general situation."

Next, I said, "The Japanese Government is making the following proposal with regard to the Japanese troops in French Indo-China," and so saying, I submitted the proposal contained in your instructions.

In reply to this, the President, remarking that he had already thought on the question before our explanation was given him, spoke as follows from a note which he had been holding in his hand, "As a result of a confusion created by the forces of aggression, the whole world has fallen into a critical state. What seems to me to be common sense is for us to wish earnestly that the world will return to peaceful normalcy and for the United States Government to do its utmost in the spirit of fair play for the establishment of peace, stability, and order in the Pacific. If this object is to be realized, actual results must be effected for the sake of human welfare. It is my earnest wish that the preliminary talks relative to this question would have good results which would serve as a basis of future negotiations. I will; just as the Japanese Government hopes, do my best in order to help carry on these negotiations successfully. I wish that the Japanese Government would clearly set forth its intention of following a peaceful course in its policy and not an opposite course. This is the way to attain the results toward which both you and we are working."

What the United States desires, according to the President, are: (1) to prevent the war from spreading; and (2) to establish a permanent peace.

Army 24716

Trans. 11/13/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 10, 1941

Purple (Very Urgent)

#1070 (Part 4 of 4)

The President elaborated on the point that with regard to the question of non-discrimination, he had agreed with CHURCHILL when he had conferred with that statesman to abolish the economic

limitations throughout the world; that he had opposed Germany because Germany followed a policy contrary to this idea; and that he wished that the principle of non-discrimination would be applied generally throughout the world. The President then said by way of an incidental remark that in the days of President TAFT when disturbance arose in Cuba, the United States had failed by resorting to a policy of force; however, today under his administration, because the government had adopted a friendly policy, the relations with the Latin-American countries had improved. He then explained how necessary it is to follow a new policy in accordance with new situations. Secretary HULL inserted the remark that the South American countries, who had in the past been fearful of the United States, have come to take an attitude of welcoming the United States. Speaking on the remark I had made to the effect that economic pressure had aroused the ill feelings of the Japanese people and had made them impatient, the President said, "It is necessary to find a *modus vivendi* if the people are to live," and proceeded to explain that this expression should be translated as "method of living." Although it is not clear to me what it really means, I intend to ascertain whether he refers to, possibly, a provisional agreement.

The President then asked if Ambassador KURUSU was bringing with him a proposal other than that referred to above. I replied that he was not bringing any proposal, but in response to my wishes he was coming to assist me. Then the President said that he is leaving on the 15th and will be away for one week, as he must attend, as is his custom, a children's party at Warm Springs during the Thanksgiving week (the 20th), and that he wondered whether he would have the opportunity of meeting Ambassador KURUSU before he leaves.

Army 24717

Trans. 11/13/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
11 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#762

Re your #1069*

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736** is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on (the following day ?)) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.

I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. At the same time

do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.

We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not they will accept our final proposal A.

24653

JD-1: 6415

(D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (S-TT)

*S. I. S. #24652.

**JD-1: 6254 (S. I. S. #24373).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
11 November 1941
(Purple)
#763

Re my #671*

With regard to our representations to the United States in this matter, we have received two representations from the Germans since then. On 6 November, I advised the German Ambassador in Tokyo that in view of the present general relationship between the United States and Japan, it was essential that this matter be given very careful study. I explained that there is a good chance that it would be more effective under the present circumstances, for us to present a determined attitude rather than to merely make representations to the United States. It is exceedingly doubtful, I pointed out, whether a mere representation would bear any fruit.

24654

JD-1: 6416

(D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 5901 (S. I. S. #23631). Tokyo wires Nomura secretly that the Axis countries are demanding that Japan send a message to the U. S. stating that if the Roosevelt administration does not cease attacks on the Axis, it would provide reasons for convocation of the Three Power Pact and lead to war with Japan. Toyoda has to date held up such a note as well as information on talks with the U. S. in order to further those negotiations, but a warning note must now be presented by Japan in order to fulfill her obligations under the Tripartite Pact. (Mag. dated 16 October 1941)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
11 November 1941
(Purple)
#764 (In 3 parts, complete)

1. On the 11th, the British Ambassador, while calling on me on some other business, brought up the subject of the conversations. He advised me that he reported my talks of the other day (see contents of 2 of my message #723*) to his home government, to which his government replied along the following lines, he said:

"The British Government is not aware of the details of the conversations being conducted in Washington. Since its success would be of interest to Britain and Japan, it is fervently hoping for the success thereof. However, unless the basis of discussion is first settled upon, it would be useless to go ahead and enter into negotiations of the details. The British Government feels that discussions as to the basic principles could safely be left up to the U. S. Government. However, as soon as the real negotiations begin, the United States is

to confer with Great Britain according to arrangement. Therefore, when that time arrives, negotiations will be carried on jointly with the United States and Japan."

2. I replied that in the matters being discussed between Japan and the United States there were some phases which greatly affected Great Britain. In the event of an agreement between Japan and the United States, Japan will simultaneously seek Britain's agreement. I wish to arrange matters so that the two agreements may be signed at exactly the same time. In view of the fact that to do the above is necessary, we have already requested the United States to give their approval to the terms, I said to the British Ambassador.

The British Ambassador said that he was not aware as to how much progress had been made between the United States and Japan, but he assumed that they were still in the preliminary stages.

I, therefore, replied that his assumption may have fitted in the past, but that at present they had already entered into the realm of the actual negotiations. Moreover, the Imperial Government has already submitted its final proposal, thus bringing the negotiations to the final phase. We have made this fact absolutely clear to the United States, I added.

I went on to say that I hear that the British Prime Minister made a speech at a luncheon given by the Mayor of London in which he stated that though he did not know the developments in the U. S.-Japanese negotiations, he would issue a warning to Japan. Would it not be more to the point, I challenged, if, instead of making threats without knowing of what he spoke, he were to try to more clearly understand the issues and to cooperate in an effort to clear them up? However, I said, with the U. S.-Japanese talks in the phase they are today, and in view of the fact that I realized that there were certain relationships between the United States and Great Britain, I have no intention of urging or opposing British participation in these talks at this time.

The Imperial Government has made the maximum concessions she can in drawing up its final proposal, I explained. We are of the opinion that the United States will find no objectionable points in it. I believe that it will be possible to sign the agreement within a week to ten days, I said. If, unfortunately, the United States refuses to accept those terms, it would be useless to continue the negotiations. Our domestic political situation will permit no further delays in reaching a decision.

I am making superhuman efforts at this time, I pointed out, in the attempt to ride out the crisis in the U. S.-Japanese and the British-Japanese relations. There are factions in the country which insist that there is no need for negotiating and point out the uselessness of doing so. The negotiations are being continued only after these factions were checked.

For these reasons, it is absolutely impossible that there be any further delays.

A speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the attitude of Britain and the United States, I said, and suggested that his country give serious consideration to this, and cooperate in bringing about an early agreement.

In the above manner, I pointed out the criticalness of the situation. The Ambassador listened to what I said very attentively, giving

indications that he was realizing for the first time how critical the situation was. He advised me that he would send his government a report of the above conversation and that he himself would do his best to bring about a speedy settlement.

3. Thus, there are indications that the United States Government is still under the impression that the negotiations are in the preliminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging opinions. This is further supported by the words of President Roosevelt reported by you in your message #1070** (that part in which he says that he hopes that these preliminary discussions will lead to the basis of the real negotiations. etc.)

That the United States takes this lazy and easy going attitude in spite of the fact that as far as we are concerned, this is the final phase, is exceedingly unfortunate. Therefore, it is my fervent hope that Your Excellency will do everything in your power to make them realize this fact and bring about an agreement at the earliest possible moment.

24824

JD-1: 6417

(D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6228 (S. I. S. #24203-04).

**Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

11 November 1941

(Purple—CA)

#1074

Re your #762*

After my conversation with the President, I told Hull that as the situation is urgent, I would like to meet him the same evening or this morning, and go on with concrete discussion. He replied that they understand fully our need of haste, that, as a matter of fact both yesterday after our conversation and today, although it is the 11th and the Armistice holiday, he would gather those concerned and give study to our proposal, and that it would facilitate the negotiations to have our discussion tomorrow the 12th after hearing their opinions.

As for a conjecture regarding the success or failure of the negotiations, I will . . . after getting their opinions in tomorrow's interview.

24711

JD-1: 6453

(F) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (7)

*JD-1: 6415 (S. I. S. #24653).

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 12, 1941

Purple

#1087 (Part 1 of 4)

(Departmental secret. To be handled in Government code.)

On the 12th at 3 p. m. WAKASUGI went with me to talk with Secretary HULL. BALLANTINE sat in and we conversed for about

an hour. I asked if they had any answer to our proposal and HULL gave me the oral statements contained in my #1083^a and #1084^b. He said that he wanted me to ascertain if the new cabinet would also approve of oral statement A and stated that oral statement B was presented in the sense of a suggestion concerning peace between Japan and China referred to in our last conversation in accordance with our request. He went on to say that if the same principle were applied to the China question as was applied to all the other problems, a settlement should be possible; that also, such things as the question of non-discrimination in commerce had to be connected with this; and that by day after tomorrow he could let us have a definite proposal. I said that judging from this suggestion and our conversation it looked as though it was implied that unless Japan and China could get together on the question of the stationing of troops there would be no chance for any success at all in the Japanese-American negotiations. I said that if this was what was meant it would be leaving the key to Japanese-American relations in the hands of someone else, which looked rather inappropriate, and I asked him if he meant that Japanese-Chinese relations could be left to Japan and China and that the United States and Japan could agree on the other questions. HULL, however, replied vaguely that if the general principles were applied to China too, an understanding would be possible.

He then continued, "We have not yet privately informed China about these talks, but we are letting England and the Netherlands, who are concerned, know something of their general lines. In case some basis for negotiations is worked out, I believe it possible that they may sign along with the United States. However," he added, "I cannot guarantee this."

Army 24794

Trans. 11/14/41 (2)

^a See S. I. S. #24785-24788, inclusive.

^b See S. I. S. #24789 for part 1 of 4. Other parts not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 12, 1941

Purple (Extremely Urgent)

#1087. Part 2 of 4.^a

To be handled in government code.

Then BALLANTINE inserted the remark that it is stipulated in the American proposal of June 21st that the United States will not be a party to applying to other countries any condition conflicting with the principles which the United States has been consistently upholding.

WAKASUGI said:

"While we heartily welcome the suggestion offered, I would like to know more definitely how China is to be made to pledge to follow the suggestion. Is it the intention of Secretary HULL to leave this matter up to direct negotiations to be conducted between Japan and China; or is it his intention to have the United States secure the pledge from China and transmit it to Japan; or it is to be accomplished with Japan, the United States, and China meeting in a conference?"

It seems that Secretary HULL had no definite plan in mind regarding this matter, but he spoke as if he was confident that if the Japanese-American negotiations are carried out in accordance with the principle of peace that a stage would in due time be reached at which this suggestion could be carried out.

Whereupon WAKASUGI asked:

"Is it your intention to have China make this pledge when that stage has been reached in the course of the negotiations?"

HULL avoided making a definite reply and instead he brought out an example, stating that when two parties in a dispute wish to come to an agreement they could do so by the mediation of a third party and, so saying, HULL hinted his having the intention of mediating between Japan and China depending, of course, on conditions.

Army 24837

Trans. 11/15/41 (2)

* For Part 1 see S. I. S. #24794.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 12, 1941

Purple

#1087 (Part 3 of 4)* (Departmental Secret) (To be handled in government code)

Concerning the stationing of troops, I explained to him that in the new proposal we made it clear that we do not mean to keep them there indefinitely. HULL replied that to interfere in the private affairs of other nations contravenes any general peace program and that permanent occupation is impossible. However, he seemed quite satisfied with my explanation.

In connection with a general peace policy, HULL said, "In one breath you say that the three-power pact has a peaceful objective and in the other you confess that Japan is bound by the agreement and is tied up with Germany. Now the officials of our country and our public are at a loss to understand any explanation like this. HITLER has a hard task and to carry it out, he is making the people of the various small nations suffer. Now he cannot hold out forever in such a difficult undertaking, and sooner or later we are going to have to take charge of things after the war. In this we are going to need every resource. Leaders of both Japan and the United States ought to cooperate in a peaceful program. Thus, if some sort of plan can be worked out between Japan and the United States comprising the nations concerned—for example, England and the Netherlands—to bring about complete harmony over the Pacific, Japan would no longer need to worry about the three-power pact, and the three-power pact would die a natural death." I refuted this argument, saying, "The Japanese-British alliance was in effect at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, but afterwards at the time of the Washington conference it was nullified, so you see the situation changes with the times. The existence of the three-power pact presents no obstacle to any peace plan.

Army 24838

Trans. 11/15/41 (2)

* Part 4 of 4 not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 12, 1941

Purple

#1087 (Part 4 of 4)*

Departmental secret. (To be handled in government code.)

Continuing, he said, "Japan does not like to exercise force—not by any means. If we could get petroleum and other raw materials from the United States and the Netherlands Indies, we would not have to use force, would we? Then, when we come to the question of non-discrimination in commerce, I don't think that the United States will have any objection to our proposal."

HULL answered, "The United States also recognizes that the situation is tense and is considering your proposals concerning the three problems. We are doing this just as fast as we can but questions pending over a period of ten years cannot be settled over night. By day after tomorrow, I will be ready to reply."

WAKASUGI reiterated, "As I told you, the Diet assembles on the 25th and the situation is drawing more and more grave. I want to get a definite reply to our proposal at any time now so by day after tomorrow I will expect a clear concise reply on these various problems."

In a word, during that conversation they sought our recognition of the statement of August 28, number B, and made explanations of their recent suggestions for a Japanese-Chinese peace. They only wished to tell us that the United States is going deeper into the three problems and our proposal of September 25 and that they are making ready for a quick reply. I am not satisfied with their attitude toward taking up negotiations so tomorrow morning I am going to have WAKASUGI again tell HULL please to hurry up with a decision.

Army 25428

Trans. 11/26/41 (X)

* For Part 1 of 4 see S. I. S. #24794. For parts 2 and 3 see S. I. S. #24837 & #24838. A report of the conference between Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary HULL with WAKASUGI and BALLANTINE present.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Vichy

November 12, 1941

Purple

#528

In the face of the ever-straining international situation, the army is endeavoring to perfect as quickly as possible military facilities in French Indo-China. As a result, they now face a great need of making certain preparations in North Indo-China which would be in violation of the NISIHARA-MARUTAN agreement, especially the clause which forbids occupation by the army of the area south of the river Aju*. The French Indo-China authorities, I understand, claiming that they could not permit the Japanese Army to make such preparations because they consider the restrictions stipulated in the agreement still valid, refuse absolutely to recognize the demands of the Japanese Army. However, at the time the treaty for the joint defense was concluded, in anticipation of just such a case as this, we saw to it that a clause was inserted to the effect that the treaty includes

cancellation of the restrictions stipulated in the NISIHARA-MARU-TAN agreement. Therefore, urge them to issue at once definite instructions to the French Indo-China authorities to withdraw their claim and then wire me the results.

Army 24915

Trans. 11/18/41 (NR)

* Kana spelling.

[Secret]

From: Toyko
To: Washington
13 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#766

Re your 1055*

1. Through the U. S. Ambassador's courtesy, I was, in confidence, shown the record of your conversations with Secretary Hull of the 7th. According to this record, the Secretary asked you, point blank, in connection with the so-called self-defense rights, for a "concrete statement of Japan's relations with the Axis powers".

You made no mention of this in your message. Will you please give us a detailed report of this.

2. Judging from the tone of these talks, the United States is apparently still assuming that they are of a preliminary nature. We pleaded with the U. S. Ambassador again on the 12th to try and see the seriousness of the situation. Will you, too, do everything in your power to make them realize this in accordance with the lines contained in my various instructions on this subject.

3. Since the record of your conversations with Hull were shown to me only through the personal courtesy of the Ambassador, please maintain strict secrecy regarding it.

24712

JD-1: 6455

(D) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6372(b) (S. I. S. #34577 & 24646).

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
13 November 1941
(Purple)
#1089

Re my #1087*

On this, the 13th, Wakasugi called on Ballantine.

(1) Wakasugi said:

"Yesterday's conversations led to no settlement and moreover, the outcome of it fell far short of Japanese anticipations. The times have become exceedingly critical and the Japanese people have become impatient with regard to the Japanese-U. S. conversations. They are becoming desperate as far as Japanese-U. S. relations are concerned. This being the general condition in Japan, and being confronted with the fact that it is the eve of the convening of the session of the Diet, the government of Japan is anxious to have these U. S.-Japanese talks reach some conclusion without a moment's unnecessary delay.

"The above is as was explained forcefully in yesterday's conversations. In the next conversations, any discussions of general attitudes and comments on the possible outlook should be unnecessary.

"We request that Hull be asked to give a clear reply at our next meeting on the following points: Does the United States intend to accept our proposal of 25 September, including the proposals submitted by us on 7th and 10th of this month? If not, will the United States submit a counter proposal to the above, clearly indicating the revision desired? Or, on the other hand, is the United States of the attitude that she will stick to her proposal of 21 June and make that instrument her final proposal?

"Many in Japan are of the opinion that the United States is purposely stalling the procedure", Wakasugi said.

Ballantine:

"The United States is also aware of the fact that matters have reached an exceedingly critical stage. In spite of the fact that the 11th was a holiday, it was disregarded and this matter was discussed. There is no truth in the charge that the United States is pursuing a "stalling" policy.

"However, in spite of the fact that we do not wish to appear to be quibbling about details, there are several points which will have to be explained by Japan before the United States can make definite replies.

(Part 2)

"For example, Japan has expressed her acceptance of non-discrimination of commerce on the Pacific but on condition that said non-discriminatory treatment be applied to the entire world. Does this sweeping proposal include those nations which are at present embroiled in the war? We cannot help but have some misgivings as to when such an agreement would become effective over the entire Pacific area, if its effectivity there depends on its applicability on the nations at war."

Wakasugi:

"Fundamentally speaking, the basic aims of this is to bring about a U. S.-Japanese agreement. The supporters would be Japan and the United States, hence the terms are not intended to be made applicable to every country in the world. It is our intention that the United States and Japan agree upon the basic principle of non-discriminatory treatment throughout the world."

(2) Concerning the matter contained in your messages #758** and #764***, it is true that the United States is still assuming that, as it was in the beginning, these talks are as yet in the exploratory stages through which the basis of agreements may be discovered. We, on the other hand, are going on the assumption that these are the actual negotiations. There exists, therefore, a fundamental discordant note.

Wakasugi pointed out this fact, to which Ballantine replied:

"The United States is proceeding along the lines set forth heretofore. Even as late as yesterday, Hull said that if these conversations can be carried to the point of their being made the basis of a negotiation, we could no doubt get Britain and The Netherlands to participate."

(Part 3)

Wakasugi:

"Leaving aside the U. S. viewpoint on this particular matter for the time being, if talks between the duly recognized Ambassador of one country and the President and Secretary of State of another, concerning adjustments of relations between the two countries they represent—regardless of the form in which said talks are conducted—are not negotiations, we are indeed hard put to it to figure out what, indeed, does constitute a diplomatic negotiation.

"I request that Hull be clearly advised that we are treating the present proceedings as part of the negotiations."

(3) Regarding your message 766****:

The main objective of that day's interview was to submit our new proposal and to arrange for a meeting with the President together with Secretary Hull and to advise them that we would make a more detailed explanation at that time. For that reason, as I reported in my message, the only reference I made to the Tripartite Pact was to express my hopes that they would not insist upon enlarging the scope of the right of self-defense. Besides that, we discussed nothing pertaining to the Tripartite Pact. Hull never requested that we made a "concrete statement" concerning our relations with the Axis Powers. Had he done so, I would have been compelled to make some reply.

For the sake of reassuring myself, I had Wakasugi make indirect reference to this matter to Ballantine who was present on the occasion in question. Wakasugi asked Ballantine if he could remember any other points that might have been discussed, stating that he wanted this information for the sake of the records. Ballantine replied that he could recall nothing further.

If any mention was made of the topic you state was in the records of the meeting, it would not be likely that Ballantine, who was the only other person there, knows nothing about it. No doubt there is some mistake there. You are aware, of course, that the United States is trying to get us to assure them on our stand with regard to our duties under the terms of the Pact. You can see that by the contents of their proposal.

(Please insert "766-(2)" following that part reading "764" in (2) of this message.)

24882

JD-1: 6559

(D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6521 (S. I. S. #24794, 24837-38).

**JD-1: 6413 (S. I. S. #24650).

***JD-1: 6417 (S. I. S. #24834). (Note: In connection with this ref. see last sentence above.)

****JD-1: 6455 (S. I. S. #24712).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

November 14, 1941

Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#772

The time of presentation of Proposal B will be according to my instructions of today. We have drawn up this proposal in a formal

measure including the addendum. (I mean to say the proposal you are to present to the American officials upon instructions from me.) I am sending to you the English text thereof in ensuing message #773.^a
 Army 24791 Trans. 11/14/41 (S)

^a See S. I. S. #24792.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 14, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)

Points 1, 2, 3, and 4 are given in my #727 ^a.

5. The Japanese Government agrees to withdraw her army, which is at present stationed in French Indo-China, whenever peace shall have been established between Japan and China or a just peace firmly established in the Pacific area.

6. The Japanese Government (agrees ?) that if the principle of non-discriminatory treatment in trade is to be applied throughout the world the same principle should also be applied to the entire Pacific area, in other words, in China as well.

7. The two governments shall make world peace their common objective and shall cooperate at a suitable time for speedy realization of world peace. However, in dealing with developments prior to the establishment of world peace, the two governments shall act in accordance with the viewpoint of protection and self defense. Furthermore, in the event of the United States' participation in the European war, Japan shall automatically carry out what she understands to be the obligations which befall her as a party to the Three Power Agreement existing between Japan, Germany and Italy. (Point 7 is identical with what is given in paragraph 2 of our proposal of _____ of this month and does not contain the purport given in the first part of (2) of our Proposal "A". This is for your information.)

Army 24792 Trans. 11/14/41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #24338. Text of proposal "B".

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Hongkong
 November 14, 1941
 Purple

Cir. #2319 (To be handled in Government Code)
 (Strictly secret outside the Department)

Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan-American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:

- a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.
- b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.

c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it become necessary.

In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. Therefore, in consideration of the desirability to lighten our personal and material load, we will encourage the activities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout the entire Far East. At the same time, we place great importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas). In order to do this, all in the cabinet have concurred, in view of the necessity, in a reasonable relaxation of the various restrictions now in force (after you have duly realized the critical situation which has brought the above decisions into being you will, of course, wait for instructions from home before carrying them out).

In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing legislation. We are wiring you this particularly for your information alone. Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.

This message is directed to Nansō,* Hokudai,* Shanghai, Tientsin, Hsinkow, Hankow, Canton, and Hongkong. Hokudai* will transmit to Kalgan and Taiyuan. Tsingtao will transmit to Tsinan. Canton will transmit to Amoy.

Army 25322

JD 6801

Trans. 11/26/41 (NR)

* Kana spelling.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 14, 1941

Purple

#1090 (Part 1 of 3)* (Departmental Secret)

(To be handled in Government Code)

I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only.

I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations, and I will fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite patience and then leave the outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must tell you the following:

1. As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare.

2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind of preparation to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust

southward; they are conspiring most actively with the nations concerned and rather than yield on this fundamental political policy of theirs in which they believe so firmly, they would not hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a thing as the Munich conference which took place several years ago and which turned out to be such a failure. Already I think the apex of German victories has been passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility of a separate peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more in evidence.

3. The United States is sealing ever-friendlier relations with China, and insofar as possible she is assisting CHIANG. For the sake of peace in the Pacific, the United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of China. Therefore, the China problem might become the stumbling block to the pacification of the Pacific and as a result the possibility of the United States and Japan ever making up might vanish.

Army 24877

Trans. 11/17/41 (2)

* For Part 2, see S. I. S. #24857; Part 3 of 3 not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 14, 1941

Purple (Urgent)

#1090 (Part 2 of 3)* (Departmental Secret) (To be handled in Government Code)

4. There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese Government are tying up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are regarded as having a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any case, to stab the United States right in the back. Lately the newspapers are writing in a manner to show how gradually we are tying up closer and closer with the Axis.

5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence and our lives, it naturally follows that we will have to fight England and the United States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will participate. Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Central America are already the puppets of the United States, and as for those of South America, whether they like it or not, they are dependent for their economic existence on the United States and must maintain a neutrality partial thereto.

6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory or that little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do not amount to much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out till the end will be the victor.

7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and deeper in the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, and as things now stand she might at any moment transfer her main strength to the Pacific.

Army 24857

JD 6553

Trans. 11/17/41 (7)

* Parts 1&3 not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 14, 1941

Purple

#1090 (Part 3 of 3)* (Secret outside the Department)

Great Britain, too, in the light of the present condition of the German and Italian navies, has, without a doubt, moved considerable strength into the area of the Indian Ocean. I had expected in the past that should the United States start warlike activities in the Atlantic, there would be considerable feeling for a compromise in the Pacific, but there has been no evidence of such an inclination as yet. There are even now many arguments against war with Germany as opposed to internal questions, but there is not the slightest opposition to war in the Pacific. It is being thought more than ever that participation will be carried out through the Pacific area.

8. Though I cannot be a hundred per cent sure of the present situation in Japan, having read your successive wires I realize that the condition must be very critical. In spite of the fact that it is my understanding that the people and officials, too, are tightening their belts, I am going to pass on to you my opinion, even though I know that I will be harshly criticized for it. I feel that should the situation in Japan permit, I would like to caution patience for one or two months in order to get a clear view of the world situation. This, I believe, would be the best plan.

Furthermore, I would like to call your attention again to my wires Nos. 894^a and 901^b sent to you on the 3rd and 4th of November, respectively.

Army 25139

Trans. 11/22/41 (NR)

* S. I. S. #23166 in which NOMURA gives his views on the present world situation.
b S. I. S. #23114 in which Ambassador NOMURA apologizes for expressing himself carelessly on the spur of the moment on October 3 and ventures the opinion that Japan will have to drastically reorganize her economy before she is able to become self-sufficient as a result of the establishment of the sphere of co-prosperity. He suggests a profitable foothold from a southward movement within several years.

* For Parts 1 and 2, see S. I. S. Nos. 24877 and 24887.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

15 November 1941

(Purple—CA)

#774

Re your #1087*

During the conversations with Hull, Wakasugi asked, with regard to the form in which the "B" suggestion should materialize, "or is it your intention to have it conducted by the consular representatives of Japan, the United States, and China?" As you are aware, the Imperial Government is opposed to its taking that course.

Please be aware of the fact that the "B" suggestion was taken up because we thought it might be a short cut to settlement. In other words, we decided to take it up because we thought it would speed up the procedure. We do not wish to give it even a chance to further complicate and prolong matters.

Bearing this in mind, do everything in your power to not only prevent further complications but to simplify matters as much as possible.

24833

JD-1: 6530

(D) Navy Trans. 11-15-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6521 (S. I. S. #24787).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
15 November 1941
(Purple)
#775

Through my various messages on the subject, you are fully aware of the fact that these talks have gone beyond the preliminary stage and that they are now well within the realm of the "real thing". It is true that at the time the Konoye statement was dispatched, the negotiations were more or less conducted as preliminary to a meeting of "the leaders". However, for all practical purposes, the talks had gone beyond the point where they could be termed as being of a "preliminary" nature. By that time, we had centered all of our efforts toward bringing about a speedy termination of the talks. That has been made perfectly clear. I feel sure that the United States too, regardless of what they may have said, recognized this fact from a realistic point of view.

It is true that the United States may try to say that since we made no particular mention of the changed status of the talks, they were under the impression that they were still of a preliminary nature.

Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736* is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.

24834

JD-1: 6531

(D) Navy Trans. 11-15-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6264 (S. I. S. #24373).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
15 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#781

To Ambassador Kurusu.

I wish to express my sympathy on the presumption that you must be experiencing considerable fatigue as a consequence of your long trip by air. Not alone this Minister, but everyone in government circles, feels deep gratitude that you have agreed to tackle the exceedingly difficult problems which confront us. As I said, I realize that your task is a difficult one, but at the same time it is an important one; success or failure will have a great bearing on the rise or decline of our nation.

Please explain to Ambassador Nomura the conditions which exist here, and at the same time describe our determinations in detail to

him. After you have perfect understanding of each other, cooperate with him in an unsparing effort to guide the negotiations to any early settlement. That is my fervent prayer which I hope may be granted.

Even after the presentation of the final proposal by us, the U. S. Government apparently continues to show laxness. There are even those who suspect that the United States is intentionally stalling for time. In view of the fact that the crisis is fast approaching, no subsidiary complications can be countenanced even when considering the time element alone. Such an eventuality would make impossible the surmounting of the crisis.

Please familiarize yourself with my various instructions to Ambassador Nomura on this subject, after which do everything in your power to make the United States come to the realization that it is indeed a critical situation. I beg of you to make every effort to have them cooperate with us in assuring peace on the Pacific.

Because of your expressed desires prior to your departure from here, we have not as yet presented our "B" proposal to the United States. We are of the opinion, however, that we had better submit it to them at an early opportunity.

24873

JD-1: #6556

(D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

15 November 1941

(Purple)

#1095 (In 2 parts, complete)

On this, the 15th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull, (Ballantine was also present), for an interview which lasted about one hour and a half. I shall report in detail subsequently, but in the meantime, I am sending you a resume of the meeting as follows:

The United States handed us an explanation of their stand on the "non-discriminatory treatment in commerce" matter, which I am forwarding to you as separate wire "A", numbered my message #1096*; separate wire "B", numbered my message #1097**, contains the text of their proposal involving this matter. (The latter is a proposed joint statement on economic policy and is composed of (1) general policy; (2) Japanese-U. S. relations; and, (3) policies involving the Pacific area).

We stated that we would give these notes our careful study and after requesting our government's advice, would make a reply. We went on to say that we insist that these talks have now progressed to the negotiations stage.

To this Hull replied that before any settlements can be reached, it is necessary that other countries involved, such as Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, be consulted. This procedure is desired by Japan too, he pointed out. There are reasons, he said, that make it inconvenient for the United States to state that negotiations are being conducted with Japan alone, before they have had a chance to participate therein. He went on to repeat that for those reasons, these talks shall continue to be of an exploratory nature. At the

same time, the continuation of these conversations shall not be hampered, he promised.

We then requested that he reply with regard to other matters to which Hull said:

"Japan on the one hand is attempting to enter into a peaceful agreement with the United States, while simultaneously, on the other hand, she is insisting that her military alliance with Germany be maintained. I, personally, can understand Japan's explanations, however, I feel that it would be exceedingly difficult to make the general U. S. public and even of the world, see through the seeming paradox.

(Part 2)

"For this reason, it is essential that we have the definite word of the new Japanese Cabinet on the peaceful policy. In other words, it is essential that this new Cabinet give definite recognition and approval of the statement submitted by the previous government concerning this matter. On 21 June, we made certain proposals which concerned political stabilization of the entire Pacific area. Even if Japan were to favor limiting this area to only the southwestern Pacific area, the United States would continue to desire that it be made applicable to the entire Pacific area.

"Therefore, we shall submit our reply on the other two points only after we have received a reply to the proposal we are submitting to you today."

We therefore stated that our government's attitude has already been expressed by the contents of our proposal through which it may be seen that there has been no changes therein. However, for the sake of reassurance, we would ascertain this point, we said.

Hull expressed several doubts concerning our relations to the Tripartite Pact. He pointed out that in spite of the Japanese-U. S. S. R. neutrality pact, it was apparently essential that great armed forces of both countries had to constantly face each other across the Japanese-U. S. S. R. border. The United States wants no peace of that nature. He went on to say that the United States desires that simultaneously with a peace agreement between Japan and the United States, the Tripartite Pact shall become a mere scrap of paper.

We, therefore, repeated that part of our proposal which involved that alliance and again pointed out that there need be no clash between U. S.-Japanese peace and the continued existence of that treaty. We went on to say that our government would no doubt be very disappointed at the results of today's conversations. We then decided to meet again after I had received my government's further instructions.

Will you, therefore, please rush your instructions concerning the matters contained herein.

24930

JD-1: 6584

(D) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6585 S. I. S. No. 24931.

**JD-1: 6586 S. I. S. No. 24932.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

5 November 1941

Purple)

#1098 (In 2 parts, complete)

Let us suppose that the Japanese-U. S. negotiations for the adjustment of relations between the two countries which are being conducted at present, unfortunately break down, and that, as a consequence, we pursue an unrestricted course. The following is my guess as to what would be the relationship between the United States and Japan under such circumstances.

Much, of course, would depend on what move we make and how we make it, but

(a) It is most probable that diplomatic relations between the two countries would be broken off immediately;

(b) Even if they are not, the same situation as now exists between Germany and the United States—that is, the closing of the consulates and recalling of the Ambassador—will probably be effected. Through the application of the order freezing the assets, economic relations have already been broken off for all practical purposes). Under such circumstances, only a small staff will remain at the Embassy here. (Please see my separate wire #1099* for my suggestion as to the personnel of such a reduced staff).

I presume that the government has given careful consideration as to the disposition of the various offices and our nationals residing here. I would appreciate being advised in confidence of your decision in these matters.

In the event of (b), I presume that the same procedure as was followed in the case of U. S.-Germany will be followed. That is, personnel of the consulates of the respective countries will no doubt be evacuated by mutual consent. We can see that it could be possible for the officials and business men who remained here at that time (they would total about 300 or 400), to be evacuated on another vessel. However, we fear that the number of persons desiring passage will undoubtedly skyrocket. The Consuls will, of course, urge our nationals to remain here even if the worst eventuality should materialize, but we feel that there will be many who, because of various circumstances, will find it impossible to do so.

It will be practically impossible to make a distinction between them and officials and business men. Will you, therefore, give your consideration to sending enough ships to evacuate these people.

(Part 2)

In the event of (a)—

(1) No doubt some agreement between the United States and Japan will be entered into to guarantee the safe passage of Embassy and Consulate staff members, (agreements will no doubt be entered into with regard to the course of the vessel, markers, and communication methods). (One plan may be to have these officials sent to some half-way point, for example Hawaii, some port in the Aleutian Islands, or, if unavoidable to French Tahiti, on ships belonging to the nation to which they are accredited, and at such prearranged place, have the respective ships exchange passengers). To the representative of

what nation do we plan to entrust our national property and to protect the rights of our nationals remaining here? Is it correct to assume that negotiations with the country which has been selected will be completed in Tokyo with the diplomatic representative of that country and in that country by our ambassador or minister?

(2) Japanese residents here who are of military age, will undoubtedly be held here. Therefore, a plan to exchange our nationals residing here for Americans residing in Japan is conceivable, but in view of the difference in numbers, it is indeed a very slim hope. Dependence on ships of neutral register, too, would be an exceedingly precarious undertaking should war actually be declared. We would appreciate being advised of the government's attitude on these points.

25032

JD-1: 6631

(D) Navy Trans. 11-19-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6654 (S. I. S. #25083)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

15 November 1941

(Purple)

#1106 (In 6 parts, complete.)

Chief of Office routing.

The following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 15th, the gist of which I reported to you in my message #1095*:

Hull said that the United States is making sincere efforts too, and through such efforts, he said, he is now able to present a proposal concerning the commerce problem. So saying, he related to me Note "A", which was reported to you as my message #1096**.

Hull: "The United States has entered into trade agreements with 22 nations, all of which are based on the status of a "most-favored nation". Through them trade barriers throughout the world are being removed. There actually are between 1000 and 1200 articles on which tariffs have been substantially reduced. I strongly advocated this policy at the Economic Conference which was held in London some time ago, but because opposition to it was voiced by some, it was not adopted at that time." (He added that Germany was one of the countries which was opposed to it.)

"In this way, the United States desires to apply the non-discriminatory policy over a wide scope. Japan wants that part of the proposal which advocates the application of these terms to the entire Pacific area to be revised so that it will be applicable to the entire world. The United States is unable to guarantee any conditions which are outside of the United States' sphere of influence. Therefore, I hope that Japan will agree to delete her condition, in which she insists that she will agree to applying the non-discriminatory treatment to the Pacific area only if it is applied to the world."

(Part 2)

So saying, he submitted Note "B" which contains the U. S. proposal and which was sent to you as my message #1097***. Wakasugi asked Hull if this was a counter proposal to that part of our proposal

which we submitted the other day concerning the three major problems, pertaining to non-discrimination. Hull replied that in its application it covers a wider range, (meaning, apparently, that its contents covers a wider range). I, therefore, advised Hull that we would give it our study and that we would seek our government's opinion thereon after which I would submit our reply.

I said: "Since official proposals have been submitted by me to the President and the Secretary of State, we feel that these talks should be looked upon as negotiations."

Hull: "Your government may consider those talks as being negotiations today. As I said at our previous meeting, however, the subjects being discussed must be taken up with Britain, Netherlands, and others. Moreover, the Foreign Minister himself told Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that it was essential that those countries participate in the negotiations. For these reasons, we feel that it is necessary to hold these preliminary exploratory conversations between Japan and the United States first. It would be inappropriate if we were to consider these talks formal negotiations, because then it would seem as if we were trying to force whatever settlements we reached upon those other nations.

"I feel that we should first find the basic principles on which a suitable agreement could be reached, after which, the United States would reveal its attitude to those other countries, and ask them to participate in the final settlement. Thus until we work things out to a point which would seem to be satisfactory to all parties concerned, I shall consider these talks to be exploratory in nature.

(Part 3)

"From a more practical viewpoint, too, if there were negotiations, the free exchange of opinions between the United States and Japan would be considerably hindered. In Tokyo the Foreign Minister requested to Ambassador Grew that . . . (several lines missing).

"In the United States proposal of 21 June, the United States advocates that that part pertaining to the political stabilization be made applicable to the entire Pacific area. Japan wants to limit it to the southwestern Pacific area only. In view of the fact that my talks with Your Excellency concerns the establishment of peace in the entire Pacific area, I find it difficult to understand Japan's desires to so limit the area. I would like to have this point explained."

He went on to repeat what he has said from time to time before, regarding Japan's peace policies and her connections in the Tripartite Pact.

(Part 4)

Hull, as he did on the previous occasion, requested that the present government of Japan give its definite approval of the spirit of peace contained in our statement of 28 August.

I therefore replied: "The spirit of that statement was contained in our latest proposal and therefore I am convinced that there has been no change in our government's attitude. We are doing everything in our power to bring about a settlement so that peace may be guaranteed on the Pacific. It is true that the words "southwestern Pacific" appear in the main text of our proposal, but in the preface thereto we

made it clear that our aims are to establish and maintain peace on the entire Pacific area."

Hull: "The preface is not a part of the main text and therefore its contents had no binding powers. The only parts which have any binding powers are the contents of the main text."

So saying, he again repeated his doubts as to Japan's expressed peaceful intentions.

He went on to say that Japan is apparently wanting to enter into a peaceful agreement with the United States on the one hand while maintaining a military alliance with Germany on the other.

Hull: "I, myself, can understand Japan's viewpoint and explanations on this matter. The general public, however, are aware only that Japan is allied to Germany and to it—the general public—this has a very militaristic connotation. Should the United States, disregarding what seems to be a paradox, enter into a peace agreement with Japan, the general public and the world in general would probably howl with laughter. We would be in a very difficult position to try to make any explanations.

"If Japan succeeds in coming to an agreement with the United States, she would not find it necessary to hold on to the Tripartite Agreement, would it?

(Part 5)

"While on the one hand Japan is asking that Britain and the Netherlands, which are at war with Germany, to participate in a peaceful agreement which is to be established between Japan and the United States, while on the other she negotiates a military alliance with Germany which is the enemy of Britain and the Netherlands. That is incongruous."

I: "We have already explained our position in the Tripartite Pact in our proposal. As I said before, an alliance and a peace agreement need not necessarily be at odds with each other as may be seen by the example of the Japanese-British alliance. Fundamentally speaking, this alliance in question has peace as its main objective. Germany, too, understands that the alliance would not conflict with peace between Japan and the United States."

Hull: "If Japan insists on adhering to the alliance with Germany even after an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States, we could not explain the apparent paradox to other countries. The United States does not desire a situation such as exists between Japan and the U. S. S. R., which in spite of the fact that a Neutrality Pact exists, vast armed forces of each nation must constantly be facing each other across the national boundary. We desire that simultaneously with the establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United States, the Tripartite Pact shall disappear." (He called it a "dead letter").

Wakasugi: "In other words, do you mean that a U. S.-Japanese agreement is an impossibility as long as Japan does not withdraw from the Triple Alliance?"

Hull: "A peace agreement and a military alliance must be at odds with each other. Therefore, if and when an understanding is reached between Japan and the United States, I desire that the alliance become a dead letter".

Wakasugi: "May we consider that as your reply to our proposal pertaining to the matter of right of self-defense which is a part of the other two subjects?"

(Part 6)

Hull: "Our reply to the other two problems will be issued after we receive: Definite assurance that your present government approves the peace policy expressed in a statement issued by the previous government; clarification of the meaning of changing "the entire Pacific area" in the U. S. proposal, to Japan's proposal's "southwestern Pacific area"; Japan's reply to today's U. S. proposal regarding a joint statement on the economic policy."

I said: "In view of the very critical situation, I am afraid that my government will be very disappointed over your replies."

We agreed to meet again after I had received further instructions from my home government.

Today's talks can be boiled down to the fact that the United States did clarify their attitude on the trade question. On the other two problems, although we agree in principle, we differ on interpretations. They harbor deep doubts as to the sincerity of our peaceful intentions and apparently they view the China situation through those eyes of suspicion.

Since the above seems to have been fairly clearly established, will you please speedily express your definite approval of the government's statement involved, so that we may make a reply to their proposal.

25085

JD-1: 6627

(D) Navy Trans. 11-21-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6584 (S. I. S. #24030).

**JD-1: 6585 (S. I. S. #24031 & 25006).

***JD-1: 6586 (S. I. S. 24032 & 25007).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
15 November 1941
(Purple—J 19)
Circular #2330

The following is the order and method of destroying the code machines in the event of an emergency.

Note: Three paragraphs giving detailed instructions for the destruction of code machines have not been printed.

Washington relay to Mexico, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.
Berne relay to NSW and NLH (Rome and Ankara (?)). Bangkok (?) relay to Hanoi.

25235

JD-1: 6752

(D) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 16, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#

For your Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090*, and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.^b Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,^c and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

Army 24878

Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

^a For Part 1, see S. I. S. #24877. For Part 2, see S. I. S. #24857 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.

^b S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.

^c S. I. S. #24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 26th of this month.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

November 16, 1941

Purple

#782 (To be handled in government code.)

Re your #1083.^a

1. Please give the following reply to them regarding the question of recognition:

----- the various points in the statement made by the Japanese Government on August 28, which is included in the American oral statement, (quote only the points given in the said oral statement) were also included in our proposals of September 6 and 25, and the present cabinet also has no objection to recognizing them as they stand. However, these points have been given on the assumption that the Japanese-American negotiations would reach an agreement. Naturally, therefore, should the negotiations end in a failure, these points would not be binding on Japan alone. We wish to have this clearly understood.

2. Regarding the general question of use of force, the expression "without provocation" was used in the reply of the Japanese Government made on August 28. In the same reply, relative to the Soviet question, we used the words "as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty" and then in our proposal of September 6, we used the words "without any justifiable reason." Now all these expressions mean fundamentally the same thing. The reason for our having gone somewhat into detail concerning the Soviet Union is that we found it necessary to do so in view of the connection between the existence of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty and the Russo-German war.

In short, we had stipulated the "qualification" which we as an independent country should necessarily and naturally state. It goes without saying that this qualification by no means either limits nor minimizes our peaceful intentions.

Army 24879

Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

^a See S. I. S. #24785-88, inclusive. The text of an oral statement given to Ambassador NOMURA by Secretary Hull at the conference on the 12th.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 16, 1941

(Purple)

#1107 (Departmental Secret) (Strictly Secret)

1. I sent ARMSTRONG to the State Department on the 15th to have him feel out the atmosphere (see my #1029*). ARMSTRONG then informed TERASAKI that during the last two days something happened, apparently, to make the President strongly desire the maintenance of peace between Japan and the United States. (I dare say, however, that the attitude of the United States toward us is just about the same as always and that this is just a ripple on the sea. Nevertheless, as we have heard the same thing from other quarters, I send it to you for what it may be worth.)

2. ARMSTRONG, furthermore, said that the advent of Ambassador KURUSU is having a very good effect. (The newspapers, too, in general, have been showing considerable good feeling. Two or three days before Ambassador KURUSU arrived at his post, not only did news articles become quite friendly toward him, but the press interviews in every place drew, in general, the most favorable comments. Will you also, therefore, direct public opinion along these lines.)

Army #24978

Trans. 11/19/41 (2)

* S. I. S. #24475 which describes the organization of a committee for the promotion of friendly relations between Japan and America in which TERASAKI is liaison agent and through ARMSTRONG keeps in contact with the State Department.

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo

17 November 1941

(Purple)

#1113

At 10:30 a. m. on the 17th I called on Secretary of State Hull accompanied by Kurusu, following which we both had an interview with the President at 11:00 which lasted for about an hour and 15 minutes. Today's conference was largely concerned with formalities and we did not get down to business. However, I stated that the intentions of the Japanese Government were peaceful, however as we see it the situation is very acute. To this the President replied that America also desired to preserve the peace of the Pacific. (In regard to maintaining peace in the Pacific I could see that he was outlining some formula in his mind). I will wire the details in a subsequent telegram.

25028

JD-1: 6648

(H) Navy Trans. 11-19-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

17 November 1941

(Purple)

#1114

Schmitt's report:

On the evening of the 16th, we had Schmitt try to feel out the State Department's attitude. He reports that he talked with his good

friend Williamson (secretary to Assistant Secretary of State Hurley). According to him, Williamson, the stumbling points in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations are the Tripartite Pact and the matters pertaining to the China incident. A solution in so far as it involves the actual points is apparently quite possible from both the United States and Japanese viewpoints. The difficulty seems to be a more spiritual one—that is, the suspicion that the United States harbors of Japan. The United States bases its suspicion on the fear that the German and Japanese military cliques will apply pressure and prevail upon the Japanese Government. In other words, the United States believes that there is a possibility that immediately subsequent to the establishing of a U. S.-Japanese accord, the Japanese Government may be forced by Germany or by the Japanese military to pursue a course entirely different from that charted by the accord.

Compared to the above obstacles, the solution of the economic problems, of which the petroleum question is one phase, is indeed a very simple matter.

25133

JD-1: 6693

(D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2)

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 16, 1941

(Purple)

#1118 (Part 1 of 5.^a) (To be handled in government code)

On the morning of the 17th at half-past ten, I, accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, called on Secretary HULL. First HULL said, "After the last war there were no able statesmen; therefore, a situation like the present one came about. What we have to think about now is saving the world from this sort of extremity." KURUSU replied, "I am in entire agreement with what you say. Fortunately, the United States and Japan, who have not yet participated in this war, have a grave responsibility on their shoulders for working in this direction. However, before we can talk about that, there are some things which have to be settled between Japan and the United States. Still, if we do not engage in concrete negotiations, we cannot get anywhere." (Then he went on briefly to tell how he had come to the United States at the behest of the Premier and Your Excellency.) Then he continued: "The Premier earnestly hopes for a settlement between Japan and the United States. As a matter of fact, he seems to be rather hopeful beyond expectation. There are at present three problems causing a deadlock between Japan and the United States: They are: Equality in commerce, the Tri-partite Agreement, and evacuation. The Premier seems to be very hopeful of a settlement concerning the first two. However, when it comes to the third question—that of evacuation—he seems to entertain great concern.

Army 25091

Trans. 11/21/41 (1)

* Part 2, S. I. S. #24940; Part 3 not available; Parts 4 and 5, S. I. S. No. 25084.

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
November 16, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#1118 (Part 2 of 5)^a

Since the time had come to meet the President and since HULL had expressed his wish to continue the conversation in the presence of the President, we all left our seats. Together with Secretary HULL, I went to see the President at 11:00 a. m.

KURUSU began his conversation by saying, "As I had already told Secretary HULL, the present Cabinet is very much interested in the Japanese-American negotiations. You, Mr. President, as a statesman, no doubt well understand in what frame of mind the Japanese people are after four years of experience in the China incident. While on my way to this country I noticed—though I am not by any means an expert in making such observations—that the situation is militarily strained in Hongkong, Manila and in other islands. The situation is so tense that we cannot tell when an explosion would occur and, even if it occurred, of what benefit would such a situation be to the United States and Japan? (The President showed that he felt the same way.) To be sure Japan wishes that the Japanese-American negotiations would prove to be a success. However, the time element must be taken into consideration. Delaying the solution avails Japan nothing since in the meantime conditions, both militarily and economically, would become less favorable to her if she is to defend herself. The Premier also seems to be quite hopeful that all of the three questions, namely, that of the Three Power Alliance and Pact and the question of withdrawing troops would be settled.^b However, he is very much worried over the question of withdrawing troops."

Army 24940

Trans. 11/18/41 (M)

^a Part 1, 2, 4 and 5 not available.

^b Translator's note: Apparently the writer neglected to include in the three questions that of non-discrimination in trade.

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
17 November 1941
(Purple)
#1118 (Part 3 of 5)

The President: "A long time ago, Secretary of State Bryan once said, 'There is no last word between friends'.

"There have been many so-called 'non-aggression pacts' in the past, but all of them are now out of date. I believe, however, that by the establishing of some general understanding between the United States and Japan, the situation may be saved."

Kurusu: "That would seem to be very acceptable from my point of view. From my way of looking at it, apparently the main difficulties in the U. S.-Japanese negotiations to date, have been over the problem of what to do about Japan's connections with the Tripartite Pact, and what to do about the various claims that the United States has made with regard to the method in which the China Incident

should be settled. In the final analysis, it would seem as if adjusting these two points is the main problem at hand at the present time.

"With regard to the Tripartite problem, Japan is bound by certain duties under the terms of that instrument. Moreover, she must consider her dignity and honor as a great power. Because of these considerations, it is impossible for her to violate the terms of an alliance. Since the United States has been strongly insisting right along that international agreements must be adhered to, I cannot believe that the United States is urging us to do so now. I feel doubly sure of this where the Tripartite Pact is concerned since the basic objectives of that pact are the prevention of the war's spreading and the maintenance of peace.

"Under these circumstances, it seems as though it should be possible to coordinate and adjust the two problems so as to bring about a settlement. Please understand, however, that no proposal, regardless of how good it may sound, can be accepted by Japan if the terms contained therein cannot be put into effect."

The President: "With regard to the China problem, I have been advised that Japan finds the withdrawal of troops from China a very difficult undertaking. The United States is not trying to intervene or mediate in the problems of Japan and China. I don't know whether there is such a word in the parlance of diplomats or not, but the United States' only intention is to become an 'introducer'."

25129

JD-1: 6643

(D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

17 November 1941

(Purple)

#1118 (Parts 4 and 5 of 5) (Parts 1, and 3, not available). (For Part 2 see JD-1: 6643) (S. I. S. 24940).

(Part 4)

Kurusu: "Concerning Japan's duties to go to war under the terms of the Tripartite Pact, Japan has stated that Japan alone will determine this. The United States apparently interprets this to mean that Japan will wait until the United States is deeply involved in the battle on the Atlantic and then stab the United States in the back. This is not the case. There have been indications in the past that there are those in the United States who have been laboring under the erroneous belief that Japan would move at Germany's demands; that Japan was merely Germany's tool. Japan issued the statement that she would act in accordance with Japan's decisions alone, for the purpose of correcting this misapprehension.

"In any event, if at this time a great understanding between the United States and Japan with regard to the Pacific can be reached as described by the President, such an understanding would far outshine the Tripartite Pact. Under such circumstances, I feel confident that all doubts you may harbor regarding the application of the Tripartite Pact would automatically and completely melt away".

At this point, Hull broke in, and after describing Germany's policy of conquest, said: "Suppose that Germany succeeds in conquering England and then establishes various subservient governments in South America. Suppose after that that Germany attacks the United States with the British fleet. If the United States waits till then, it would be too late regardless of what she tries to do. That is why the United States must prepare her defenses now and this is what the United States calls her rights under defense. There is no reason why Japan cannot see this."

Thus did Hull go over his theory again.

The President: "The map I referred to in my speech the other day, which described German policy in Central and South America, was an authentic map. Its source was the German Government circles."

Kurusu: Mr. President, a while ago you made reference to the general relationship between Japan and the United States. As long as we are speaking of peace on the Pacific, and since at least one side of the western hemisphere is on the Pacific, the various countries in Central and South America must be covered when we speak of the Pacific area. It would be impossible for Japan to be a partner in any project aimed at disturbing the peace of the western hemisphere.

"You say that people would give voice to their disapproval should these negotiations lead to a successful settlement between us on the grounds that Japan would be promising the United States peace while on the other hand she would be carrying the spear for Germany. From the beginning, however, the Japanese Government has been saying that should a just peace be established on the Pacific, she would withdraw her troops from French Indo-China. If, therefore, matters progress to that point, this withdrawal should satisfy the general public of the United States as actual proof of Japan's peaceful intentions.

"In any event, I am convinced that the immediate objective is to successfully and speedily come to an agreement on the various problems now being discussed at present between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull."

Hull: "I favor the continuation of these talks. Heretofore, I and Ambassador Nomura have met and talked on numerous occasions but we always seem to come to a certain point and then start going around and around the same circle. I would welcome your—Kurusu's—attacking this point from a different angle."

The President expressed his approval of this, and said: "I am planning to remain in Washington until this Saturday (the 24th). I shall be glad to discuss matters with you and Secretary Hull at any time before then.

25084

JD-1: 6654

(D) Navy Trans. 11-21-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 17 November 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #783

Re your #1110*

We have no objections to have it apply to the entire Pacific area. Therefore, we shall not object to your deleting the word "south-western" from Article 6 of our proposal of 25 September.

24881
 JD-1: 6560

(D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (S-TT)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 17 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #784

Re your #1096*

By "in the event that the principle of non-discriminatory treatment is applied to the entire world", we mean that the Imperial Government desires that said principle would be applied uniformly throughout the world. Upon the realization of this hope, we anticipate that the principle will be applied on China as well.

We do not imply that the United States shall be held responsible for any violations of this principle outside of the United States' sphere of influence.

Even before the outbreak of this European war, the trend was away from the above mentioned basic principle. Since the outbreak of this war, practically all traces of the principle have been obliterated. Under these circumstances it would be only one with a very unrealistic view of the situation who could expect any fruit from an attempt to apply the principle to China alone.

Japan is not refusing to apply the principle on China on the grounds that a few nations in the world refuse to comply. Japan desires to apply it to China when world conditions are such that a majority of the nations therein are in favor of the principle.

(Through an error, the serial number 781 was applied on two messages**. Will you please give the number 781-B to that message dated the 16th which contained information for Your Excellency only).

24880
 JD-1: 6561

(D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (S-TT)

*Not yet available.

**One available thus far. Dated 15 November; JD-1: 6556 (S. I. S. #24873).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
17 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#785

Re your #1097*

1. The contents of 3 of paragraph 2 pertaining to Japanese-U. S. relations, seems to be about the same as the terms contained in the supplementary provision of the United States' 21 June proposal. In view of the fact that "materials necessary for one's own country's safety and for self-defense" shall be an exception, there is a danger that even after the agreement is entered into, they will put some restrictions on the exporting of petroleum. We cannot accept that phraseology, therefore, unless they agree not to restrict exports on articles needed by us which will be clearly listed.

2. Regarding sub-sections 1 and 2 of paragraph 3 of that message which concerns the policy on the Pacific area: Under paragraph 5 of the basic terms of Japanese-Chinese peace which was appended to our 25 September proposal**, regarding economic cooperation, there is no objection to a third country's engaging in economic activities in China as long as it is conducted on a fair basis. Our proposal is aimed at our having the right to develop and have access to natural resources vital to national defense. In view of the great sacrifices made by Japan in the past four and a half years, this is but a natural demand.

If, therefore, the United States recognizes the basic forms of our peace with China, and if the contents of your message #1096*** and sub-sections 1 and 2 of the paragraph referred to, are meant to be the basis from which a permanent policy is to be established subsequent to the establishment of peace under the terms set forth by us, we shall give it our favorable consideration.

If, on the other hand, the contents of your message #1096*** and sub-sections 1 and 2 of the referred to message (1097*) are aimed at making us alter the basic peace terms, the Imperial Government finds them absolutely unacceptable.

(Part 2)

3. Re the same paragraph 3:

It is feared that the terms included in this paragraph will lead to joint supervision of finances and credit in China. Since this conflicts with the fundamental principles of the New Order policy of the Empire, (please point out that these terms conflict with the basic principles that the United States has been proclaiming of late, too), for that reason, it is impossible for us to give our approval thereto.

4. After all is said and done, the various paragraphs noted above are apparently parts of a proposal which is attempting to completely disregard our sacrifices during four and a half years of war. Settlement based on this proposal is absolutely out of the question. Since the United States herself has stated that this was an unofficial and exploratory proposal which has no binding powers, please lead the

United States to completely abandoning it and to proceed, using our proposal of 25 September as the basis on which to do so.

24937

JD-1: 6589

(D) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6586 (S. I. S. #24932).

**JD-1: 5360 (S. I. S. #22550-51).

***JD-1: 6585 (S. I. S. #24931).

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo.

17 November 1941

(Purple)

#1127

The most emphasis in the talks between Hull, I, and Ambassador Kurusu on the 18th, (lasting about three hours), was placed on matters pertaining to the Triple Alliance. Hull, in his customary manner, denounced the Hitlerian policy of expansion through armed force. He pointed out that as long as Japan is tied up with such a policy through the Tripartite Pact, it would be difficult to adjust Japanese-U. S. relations.

Kurusu then said that it would be impossible to comply if he was demanding of Japan that she abrogate the Tripartite Pact. He also pointed out that the alliance was not aimed at expansion through the force of arms.

Hull said that he was in no position to tell Japan to abrogate the Pact but that as long as there is no substantiating proofs of the real aims of the pact, it serves absolutely no purpose.

Then I and Kurusu explained that it was an impossibility to settle such a basic point in any specified time limit. However, to ease the exceedingly critical situation, the first step would be to mutually return to the situation which existed prior to the date on which the freezing of assets order was put into effect, (in other words, Japan would withdraw from south French Indo-China and the United States would rescind her order to freeze the assets): Talks should then be continued in a more congenial atmosphere, we suggested.

He did not seem particularly receptive to this suggestion. He said that if the government of Japan could make it clear that it wants to pursue a course of peace, then the United States would confer with the British on the subject of returning to the conditions which existed prior to the time that the freezing order went into effect. It is essential, however, that under those conditions, Japan continue to pursue a peaceful policy with ever increasing vigor.

There were indications that Hull, because of his usual cautious nature, was somewhat influenced by the exaggerated reports carried in the press regarding the Premier's speech in the Diet in which he expressed the three basic principles of international relations and intention of increasing the troops in French Indo China.

Details will be sent in a subsequent message.

25170

JD-1: 6722

(D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
18 November 1941 (Probable date of drafting)
19 November 1941 (Intercepted)
(Purple)
#1129

Re your #784* and my #1106**.

During my talks with Hull on the 18th it became evident that he is thinking about readjusting the economic situation of the world after the conclusion of this war and that he has only a passing interest in the various problems of China. Furthermore, there are indications that the matter prognosticated by Ambassador Kurusu in the separate message, is also being given consideration by Hull.

As a matter of routine, of the three points contained in our Proposal "A", they are apparently desirous of first disposing the matter pertaining to non-discriminatory treatment. In view of this attitude on this subject, unless we delete from our Formula "A" that part which follows after "on the understanding", (as you are aware, Konoye's message contained no such qualification), and give them a more definite agreement, I fear that the progress of our talks may be impeded. This is, of course, not in accordance with our policy of a speedy settlement. Since our formula concerning non-discrimination is also contained in our "B" proposal, unless we reach an agreement on this point now, I fear that our Proposal "B" will not help matters any.

I realize thoroughly that there are domestic issues which make it very difficult. Please give your consideration to the deletion of that part which follows "on the understanding", etc.

25241

JD-1: 6758

(D) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (1)

*JD-1: 6561 (S. I. S. #24890). Explanation of phrase: "in the event that the principle of non-discriminatory treatment is applied to the entire world." We mean that it shall apply uniformly throughout the world. China included. Japan desires to apply it to China when world conditions are such that a majority of the nations are in favor of the principle.

**JD-1: 6627 (S. I. S. #25085). "The following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 16th, the gist of which I reported to you previously".

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
18 November 1941*
(Purple)
#1131 (Part 1 & 2 of 5)
(Foreign Office Secret)
(Chief of Office routing)

On the 18th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull at 10:30 in the morning and we conversed for two hours and forty-five minutes.

Hull (in his customary tone): "I am one who worried about Hitler's activities right from the beginning. However, at that time, no one paid any attention. He is a man who does not know how to stop once he starts. The United States will no doubt become his objective in the near future." (So saying, he repeated his theory which he expounded on the 17th). "In the event that Hitler continues to be victorious, Japan should be thinking of his coming on to the East

* Translator's note: Date is evidently the 18th, though the first two parts were encoded with key for 17th.

Asiatic stage. If Japan doesn't see this for herself, I can't feel sorry for her." (He continued in his usual vein, bringing up again a description of the 'confused era (?)' and the turn about in Germany's attitude toward the Soviet Union).

"The basis of the national policy of the United States is and will be the maintenance of peace. Therefore, it is impossible for the United States to ever condone the policies of Hitler which depends on expansion through the force of arms.

"As long as Japan is tied to Hitler by means of the Tripartite Pact, there shall be great difficulties in adjusting Japanese-U. S. relations".

Placing emphasis on Japan's part in the Tripartite Pact the Secretary went on to describe his point of view.

Hull: "Even if an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States at this time, it would be impossible at this time to shake the general U. S. public's conviction that, as Germany is pursuing a policy of expansion by force of arms, Japan is doing likewise in the Far East.

"Of the extremists in the United States, there are those who even say that the United States has become Hitler's partner in his policy of aggression, through her relationship with Japan.

(Part 2)

"Even if some agreement is reached between Japan and the United States under present circumstances, it could mean no more than the existing agreement between Japan and the U. S. S. R., under which, the agreement notwithstanding, enormous forces, which are constantly being increased, have to be facing each other at all times.

"Unless the fundamental trouble is removed, it will be impossible to expect any progress in our talks."

Kurusu: "If something is impossible to do, it simply can't be done, regardless of what fancy words may be used to dress it up.

"Even if you tell us to abrogate, or at least to make ineffective, the Tripartite Pact at this time, that is something that is impossible for us to do."

Hull: "The United States is not in a position to demand that you nullify the effect of the Tripartite Pact. The only thing I say is that although I can comprehend the circumstances making it possible for Japan to maintain the status quo of her relationship to the Tripartite Pact and at the same time seek an agreement with the United States, in view of the nature of the United States, it is impossible to completely disregard the effects of public opinion."

Kurusu: "The alliance in question does not advocate, or even condone, expansion through the force of arms."

Hull: "If that is the case, it is a useless instrument unless some definite proof as to its purposes are presented."

Nomura: "It would be difficult to do so within any limited time. The situation in the southwestern Pacific area is at present very critical. To counter Japan's sending of troops to French Indo-China, Britain is increasing her armed forces in Singapore while the United States is doing likewise in the Philippine Islands.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 18, 1941

Purple

#1131 (Part 3 of 5)* (To be handled in government code.)

"If we both undertake to increase our military strength at any time, something which we would regret might occur. Therefore, since even though we keep fighting each other with broad, idealistic arguments there would be no end to them, let us first relax this tension for the time being. To do this we should return to the situation prior to the exercise of the freezing order. I mean Japan should evacuate southern French Indo-China, and in return the United States should rescind the freezing order. If the atmosphere is calm in this manner, there will be no need of sending warships to Singapore or strengthening military facilities in the Philippines. Then we would like to continue these talks." HULL said, "While we are not yet agreed on fundamental questions, it would be futile to do what you say as a temporary stop-gap measure. We hope that as first of the East Asiatic nations, Japan will take the leadership for a policy of peace. However, if a policy of armed conquest is to dominate Japan, we will consider it a danger to world peace, and we will not, by any means, yield. (To this both I an Ambassador KURUSU had something to say). If the leaders of the Japanese Government will show that they will exert a peaceful policy in any event, why then in turn, I will not object to getting in touch with Great Britain, the Netherlands, etc., and consider returning to the status prior to the exercise of the freezing order. However, this is so that Japanese politics will turn more and more toward a peaceful trend."

Army 25086

Trans. 11/21/41 (1)

* Parts 1 and 2 not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 18, 1941

Purple

#1131 (Part 4 of 5) (To be handled in government code)

Concerning the China question, HULL asked a question about the stationing of troops. I explained what you said in Proposal A of your #726 * (of course, I didn't mention the twenty-five years you spoke of), and HULL let it go at that. Referring again to the China question, he said that England, the Netherlands and China had all contacted him, and KURUSU wanted to know on what points they were concerned. HULL said that he assumed that Great Britain was mainly interested in the principle of equality of treatment in commerce; that it was the same in the case of the Netherlands; and as for China, she merely spoke in generalities without going into definite matters. Now concerning the principle of equality of treatment, the following conversation took place: HULL: "Have you received any reply from Tokyo on our proposal of the 15th?" (See my #1095.^b) KURUSU: "Well, we have a general answer, but further study is necessary. I haven't enough to tell you yet. You seem to mean that the United States can't bear the responsibility of other countries.

Well, aren't we pretty much in the same position? Until peace is established between Japan and China, we could say the same thing about the China question, I think. You see, Japan and the United States are in different economic positions. You Americans are in an advantageous position relative to the various nations when it comes to commercial negotiations. We do not have the advantageous bargaining position that you have.

Army 25087

Trans. 11/21/41 (1)

^a S. I. S. Nos. 24334, 5, 6, 7.

^b S. I. S. #24930 which gives an explanation of the U. S.'s stand on the "non-discriminatory treatment in commerce" matter.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 18, 1941

Purple (Urgent)

#1131 (Part 5 of 5) (To be handled in government code)

"There is a remarkable difference between the extent to which the economy of the United States depends on foreign trade and that to which ours does. You cannot measure them by the same rule. When the economic set-up is suddenly disrupted, great turbulence ensues. Take, for example, the question of controlled exchange in North China. If that were abolished now, the economy of a hundred million Chinese would be thrown into chaos. Now out of consideration of the welfare of the Chinese people alone, we could not do such a thing as that." HULL: "I well understand that. When I was insisting on the principle of equality of treatment in commerce, I had the post-war situation in mind. I rather think that in post-war economic reconstruction, probably the principle of non-discrimination will be an all-encompassing one. What I would like to see is Japan and the United States working together for the principle of non-discrimination. Now all along I've fought against the preferential system of the British Empire resulting from the Ottawa Conference, and now we are talking it over with England. I don't want you to tell anybody about this, but don't you know, only lately Great Britain is coming around to my point of view." (In this connection, see the newspaper article quoted in separate wire #1132.^a

Army 25088

Trans. 11/21/41 (1)

^a Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

(18 November—probable date of drafting)

(19 November—intercepted)

#1133 (In 2 parts, complete)

From Kurusu.

(1) According to Ambassador Nomura's and my own observations, the President is maintaining a very self-composed attitude outwardly, but he seems also to be very much in earnest in regard to effecting an understanding between Japan and the United States. Therefore,

we must exercise great care just now against forming a hasty conclusion that they are merely deferring in order not to seem to swallow our proposals at a gulp, and also against taking any steps that might prove irretrievable.

(2) As a result of the revision of the neutrality act, the attention of the United States has turned more than ever toward the Atlantic of late, and a determination is being strengthened to be ready even for a war with Japan if necessary. However, there seems to be a desire to be reassured as to their rear by negotiations with our country. Herein seems to be the chief reason why both in the conference with the President on the 17th and in the one with Secretary Hull on the 18th the point of emphasis was on the Three Power Pact, and there was more insistence than heretofore on this. In other words, the United States, in order to give the American people the impression that an estrangement is taking place between Japan and Germany, would make use either of a joint declaration by Japan and the United States regarding non-discrimination in trade, or of having Japan become party to a treaty on problems similar to those on which negotiations are now in progress between Britain and the United States, or again, of a message from our country giving a declaration of peace policies, as was suggested by Secretary Hull in conference on the 18th.

(3) Of course, any sudden change in the present status of Japanese-German relations would be out of the question, but in view of the above mentioned situation I feel that it is most essential that we do everything we can to fully reassure the United States and let them become more and more involved in the Atlantic areas, and thus place us in a favorable position, not only for effecting a settlement of the China incident, but also, in regard to the international situation following the war.

(Part 2)

In regard to the question as to whether after the war Britain and America will not turn their weapons toward oppressing us, in our conference on the 17th, I explained about the bitter experience that came to us after the former world war, and frankly told them how some of our nation have felt in regard to Britain and the United States. To this the President replied that the treaty now under consideration would "cover all" such points.

(4) In view of the internal situation in our country, although I think there will be difficulties to be met in trying to reach a settlement in harmony with the wishes of the Americans, I feel that as a stop-gap for the present, we should ask them to consider our strong desires for a "time limit" in connection with the conclusion of such a Japanese-American agreement and for the purpose of breaking the present deadlock, as them for the removal at once of the freezing act and also for assurances regarding imports of a specified amount of oil.

In the conference of the 18th both Ambassador Nomura and I suggested the resumption of the status quo prior to 24 July, but in view of the progress of negotiations thus far, the Americans will likely not consent to this merely for our agreeing to not forcefully invade any territory aside from French Indo-China as per Proposal

"B" or for our promise in vague terms of evacuation of troops from French Indo-China ----- Please have your mind made up to this. I desire instructions re "time limit" and ----- as we desire to press for a speedy settlement, please give consideration to the above and advise at once.

25242

JD-1: 6759

(F) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 18, 1941

Purple

#1134 (Part 1 of 2)^a

Re my #1131^b.

In our conversations of today, as a practical means of alleviating the ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful situation, as well as, to bring about a return to the situation existing before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested the evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China.

HULL, showing considerable reluctance replied, "After Japan has clearly demonstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with Britain, the Netherlands and other interested powers."

In the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the American authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in China. Recently, however, the United States, what with her internal situation and, especially insofar as it concerns the revision of the Neutrality Agreement, her increasing involvement in the war in the Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change. She is now, rather, exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan's peace plans insofar as they pertain to the Tri-Partite Alliance. With regard to other questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to bring about a compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions. In view of these circumstances, as a result of our deliberations of successive days it would seem that should we present Proposal "B" immediately, an understanding would be more difficult to realize than if we went on with our discussions of Proposal "A". Therefore, looking at it from a practical point of view, we are of the opinion that prior to presenting of Proposal "B" it would be more advisable to reach a practical settlement, principally on the questions of the acquisition of goods and the cancellation of the freezing legislation mentioned in Proposal "B" and then to try to proceed with the solution of other questions on this basis. Unless we follow this course we are convinced that an immediate solution will be extremely difficult.

Army 25090

Trans. 11/21/41 (2)

^a Part 2, in S. I. S. #25243.

^b See S. I. S. #25086.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

(18 November—Probable date of drafting)

(19 November—Intercepted)

#1134 (Pt 2 of 2) (This message should probably be #1128).

It is true that the Konoye government reiterated its approval of the government's statement referred to here. However, that statement carried several supplementary notes, some of which apparently aroused the suspicion of the United States. These supplementary notes were of such character that even if they are not written down in black and white, they would naturally become applicable under the rights of self-defense in the event that to do so becomes necessary.

Please therefore issue a statement as that of the new government's, in which there are no provisional notes, and which express our peaceful policies.

The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not interested in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises in effect. It is necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to withdraw our troops as soon as the freezing order is rescinded and materials are made available to us.

Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message #1133*. (Hull told me that he would be glad to see me at any time. However, the day after tomorrow, the 20th, is a major holiday here, so if you could make it possible for me to make a reply tomorrow, it would be very convenient for me.)

25243

JD-1: 6760

(D) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6760 (S. I. S. #25242).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

November 18, 1941

Purple

#788 (Strictly Secret)

Re your #1098.*

1. It is hard to prophesy the future course of events, but in the case of "B" if we carry out the first sailing proposal in my #786* for: (a) the remaining officials; (b) such persons as must absolutely not be held back; (c) company employees; and (d) all residents who were unable to board the three ships previously dispatched, the matter can be satisfactorily handled. We will at this sailing have the families of our various diplomatic officials as well as members of their staffs who must return to Japan, without an exception, board the ship. However, we do not intend to warn any save those of our residents who must of a certainty return to sail. The number of those who actually embarked at the first sailing was much smaller than the original number of applicants. The reason was, doubtless, nostalgia and a reluctance to part with their property.

2. Will you secretly, therefore, suitably advise the several consuls to take the following steps: (a) to help our citizens who remain behind to work together for the common good; (b) to destroy immediately such secret documents and so forth as are in the possession of Japanese companies and chambers of commerce.

3. We are now studying ways and means of cooperation between our diplomatic officials and our consulates, as well as responsibility for the interests of our high offices in case of "B". We will negotiate concerning the latter here in Tokyo.

4. I am wiring you next a plan for reducing the members of staffs.
 Army 24976 Trans. 11/19/41 (S)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 November 18, 1941
 Purple CA
 #1135 (Departmental Secret)

On the evening of the 17th, both of us went to call on a certain cabinet member and this is what he told us:

"The President is very desirous of an understanding between Japan and the United States. In his latest speech he showed that he entertained no ill will towards Japan. I would call that to your attention. Now the great majority of the cabinet members, with two exceptions, in principle approve of a Japanese American understanding. If Japan would now do something real, such as evacuating French Indo-China, showing her peaceful intentions, the way would be open for us to furnish you with oil and it would probably lead to the reestablishment of normal trade relations. The Secretary of State cannot bring public opinion in line so long as you do not take some real and definite steps to reassure the Americans."

Army 25089 Trans. 11/21/41 (2)

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 19 November 1941
 (J 19)
 Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
 In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

25432
 JD-1: 6875

(Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

*East wind rain.
 **North wind cloudy.
 ***West wind clear.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J 19)
Circular #2354

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- (1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".
- (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
- (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.); "NISHI".

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.

25392

JD-1: 6850

(Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#798

Re my #797*

The condition outlined by them namely "After the peaceful policies of Japan have been made more definite", we imagine would naturally have reference to the question of the three-power treaty. It does not mean merely that Japan will withdraw her troops from Southern Indo-China, and that then the U. S. will go back to conditions prior to the freezing act. It leaves the way open for the U. S. to bring up rather complicated terms.

On the other hand, the internal situation in our country is such that it would be difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored. It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that would come up to the B** proposal. With the situation as urgent as it is now, it is of utmost importance that you play your hand for the amelioration of the situation, to the extent of the proposal in your message, then to push on for an understanding.

The Ambassador did not arrange this with us beforehand, but made the proposal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting the tense situation existing within the nation, but this can only result in delay and failure in the negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore, having received our revised instructions, (after reading our #797*, #800,*** and #801****) will please present our B** proposal of the Imperial Government, and no further concessions can be made.

If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best efforts.

We note what you say in your #1133***** and #1134***** , but in these negotiations consent can be given only within the scope of the instructions of this office. We would emphasize this.

S. I. S. #25040

JD-1: 6658

(F) Navy trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6657.

**JD-1: 6250, with additional paragraphs 5, 6, 7 in JD-1: 6528.

***JD-1: 6660.

****JD-1: 6661.

*****Not yet available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

19 November 1941

(Purple—CA)

#799 (In 2 parts, complete)

In the proposal for a joint declaration by Japan and the United States, given in your #1096*, there are many points to which it would be difficult for the Imperial Government to give consent, as I have already cabled you. Secretary Hull's advocacy of a reciprocal trade agreement stated in the same dispatch, we can consent to as something he has advocated for many years, but we imagine it would have as many as possible of the opinions of the State Department's China specialists woven into it. Therefore, if we were to go into a discussion of each of these particulars, we would have to give up hopes of the possibility of reaching a settlement in a short time, (see my #736**). Now that matters have progressed this far, we think the only way to reach a full solution is to conclude an agreement now on a few absolutely essential items in order to prevent matters from going from bad to worse by long-view political adjustments, thus first of all avoiding the danger of an outbreak of war.

(Part 2)

Therefore you will please delete from my #780***, paragraph 6 (nondiscrimination in trade) and paragraph 7 (the Tripartite Agreement) and add my #801**** as item 2 of paragraph 5, and hand this to Secretary Hull. This will "drop" the question of non-discrimination in international trade which has heretofore been an important pending problem between the two countries, and in view of the United States attitude regarding troops stationed in China, this will be made the subject of conversations between Japan and China, in an effort to ease up the present tension. ----- item 2: the transfer of troops from southern French Indo-China to the northern part, is an important concession we would venture to make for the sake of speeding the agreement, ----- in order to save the situation and with President Roosevelt's immediate (this should mean within one week) approval, have it ready for signatures of both countries.

Furthermore if they insist, it will be all right to agree to the ----- of 6 and 7 (non-discrimination in trade and ----- Tripartite Treaty)

of my #780***, but because of the reasons stated in your #1129****, in regard to our attitude to these two questions, we cannot change my #784****. (As Hull at present does not seem to be taking so much account of matters in China, I think he (or we) will not insist on deleting from "on the understanding" on.

In regard to paragraph 7 (the Tripartite Treaty) see the latter part of my #800*****.

25035

JD-1: 6659

(F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6585 (S. I. S. #24931 and 25006).

**JD-1: 6254 (S. I. S. #24373).

***JD-1: 6555 (S. I. S. #24872).

****JD-1: 6661 (S. I. S. #25037).

*****Not available.

*****JD-1: 6561 (S. I. S. #24890).

*****JD-1: 6660 (S. I. S. #25036).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

19 November 1941

(Purple—CA)

#800

Re my #799*

Re paragraph 1 of my #781**.

Southeast Asia and the South Pacific includes the Netherlands East Indies and Thai, but does not include China. Re item 2 of paragraph 3. All the main items shall be considered and settled by the two governments before signatures are affixed to this agreement. Please bear in mind that paragraph 4 means the cessation of all help to Chiang Kai-shek by the United States.

Re paragraph 5. Article 2 (my #801***) is an important concession we venture to make for the sake of speeding the conclusion of the agreement.

Re paragraph 6. We could not agree to the principle of no discrimination in trade being applied only to China, as I have stated in my #784****.

Re paragraph 7, item 2, the explanation of our attitude (- - - self-defense- - -) in the event of the United States entering the European war. - - - in such a case the Empire would- - - as to whether or not there had been an attack- - - the interpretation of the provision of the Tripartite Treaty. You may make it clear that there are no secret agreements in the Three Power Treaty. (However, you will please withhold your explanation of this item until you see prospects of this agreement materializing).

25036

JD-1: 6660

(F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: (S. I. S. #25035).

**JD-1: 6556 (S. I. S. #24873).

***JD-1: 6661 (S. I. S. #25037).

****JD-1: 6561 (S. I. S. #24890).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 19 November 1941
 (Purple) (Eng.)
 #801

The government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

25037
 JD-1 6661

(M) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 19 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #1136

I know that it is beyond our powers to imagine the anxiety felt by the Cabinet leaders who bear the heavy responsibility of saving the nation and succoring the people at this time when relations between Japan and the United States have now at last reached the point of cruciality. There are now three ways which the Empire might take—

- (1) Maintain the status quo.
- (2) Break the present deadlock by an advance under force of arms.
- (3) Devise some means for bringing about a mutual non-aggression arrangement.

No. 1 would mean that both sides would continue to increase war preparations and send out larger fleets of war vessels bringing about a state where only a contact would be needed to start a conflagration. In other words this would finally result in an armed clash and it differs from No. 2 only in the matter of the longer or shorter time involved.

No. 3 would mean finding some provisional arrangement by which the present deadlock might be broken, and at the same time attaining our objectives under the peace for which we have been striving. My #1134* of yesterday was sent with this purpose in mind. The displeasure felt by the government is beyond my power of comprehension, but as I view it, the present, after exhausting our strength by four years of the China incident following right upon the Manchuria incident, is hardly an opportune time for venturing upon another long drawn out warfare on a large scale. I think that it would be better to fix up a temporary "truce" now in the spirit of "give and take" and make this the prelude to greater achievements to come later.

I am thus frankly setting before you my humble opinion as supplementary to my message of yesterday.**

25248
 JD-1: 6769

(F) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6665.

**Wash-Tok #1138 (JD-1: 6771) says: "At the end of my message #1136 (S. I. S. #25250) please add 'please convey the above to the (Prime ?) Minister'".

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
19 November 1941
(Purple)
#1140

Re your #791*

(1) We assume that the date, 25 November, mentioned in your message #736**, is an absolutely unalterable one. We are making all our arrangements with that as the basis.

We are also in receipt of your instructions concerning your conversations with the British Ambassador (your message #763***).

In view of those, we have been hinting to the United States that it is of much importance that we receive some definite reply within ten days and that it is impossible for us to continue with the negotiations if there is any further delay.

At a time when we are thus pressing them for an early reply, I feel that it would do us great harm were we to announce that we are having ships, with all the accompanying dark implications, leave on or about the 25th or 26th. We feel that such a statement by us would lead to their having doubts of the determined front we have been putting up. We feel that such a step would not be in accordance with your repeated instructions to bring about an early settlement.

In view of these facts, I beg of you to reconsider the matter.

If it is impossible to do so, please let us postpone our making that announcement for at least four or five days to permit us to see how the talks are progressing.

After you have given these points your consideration, please advise us.

(2) The number of persons connected with business firms who still remain here and who wish to return to Japan does not warrant the sending of a ship at this time. If it is for the purpose of taking our nationals home from Panama, we feel that a ship sent to South America could be rerouted for them.

(3) If the final decision is reached to have the ship sent here, there will be no difficulty in arranging matters for the evacuating of government officials and their wives. However, there will no doubt be much complication if it is your intention to have all men connected with business firms depart. We feel that it would be necessary that the home offices of these people should be notified, and that the said home offices should in turn send notifications and instructions to their personnel on the scene.

Please give these points your consideration.

25142

JD-1: 6708

(D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2)

*Not available.

**JD-1: 6254.

***JD-1: 6416.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 20 November, 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #806

It seems that your #1136* passed my #798** enroute, but under the circumstances here, we regret that the plan suggested by you, as we have stated in our message would not suffice for saving the present situation.

We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock except for you to push negotiations immediately along the lines of the latter part of our #798. Please understand this. The Premier also is absolutely in accord with this opinion.

S. I. S. #25038
 JD-1: 6663

(F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)

*Not yet available.
 **JD-1: 6668.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
 To: Ankara
 November 20, 1941
 J-16
 Circular #2364 (Strictly secret)

1. Since the formation of the Cabinet, the Government has been in conference for successive days with the Imperial General Headquarters. They have given due consideration to the development of a fundamental national policy which will correspond to the urgent exigencies of the situation. Insofar as this is concerned, in the conference which took place on the morning of the 5th, decisions were reached covering fundamental policies having to do with the adjustment of diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States.

2. Insofar as Japanese-American negotiations are concerned, in proceeding upon these negotiations for the adjustment of diplomatic relations on a just basis, conferences have been in progress since the 7th. However, there is great disparity between their opinions and our own. In the light of the trend of past negotiations there is considerable doubt as to whether a settlement of the negotiations will be reached. Insofar as we are concerned we have lent our maximum efforts in order to bring about a settlement of the negotiations. However, the situation not permitting any further conciliation by us, an optimistic view for the future is not permitted. In the event that negotiations are broken off, we expect that the situation in which Japan will find herself will be extremely critical. The above is for your information alone.

This message is addressed to Switzerland, Turkey and Moscow. Switzerland will transmit to France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and South Africa. Turkey will transmit to Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary.

Army: 25427

Trans. 11/28/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 20, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#1144

At noon on the 20th I, accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, called on Secretary HULL at the State Department and we talked for an hour and a half. Today we went into a somewhat lengthy explanation of the various subjects taken up in the instructions in your message #798^a. On everything else HULL expressed no noteworthy differences of opinion, however, when we came to the part about the United States doing nothing to obstruct our efforts for a comprehensive peace with China, he showed that he was terribly aroused. He said, "So long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning toward a peaceful policy it will be impossible to stop aiding CHIANG just like it will also be impossible to cut off assistance from Great Britain," or words to that effect. He said that in any case, after particular study, he would have some views to express.

Army 25137

Trans. 11/22/41 (2)

^a See S. I. S. #25040. Tokyo says that no further concessions can be made other than the "B" Proposal and if the United States' consent to this cannot be secured negotiations will have to be broken off.

[Secret]

To: Tokyo
From: Washington
November 20, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)
#1147. Departmental secret

To be handled in Government Code.
(Part 1 of 2)

Our conversation with HULL on the 20th may be summarized as follows: (That day is America's biggest holiday. They call it "Thanksgiving." In spite of that, however, Mr. HULL not only agreed to talk with, but seemed glad to see both me and Ambassador KURUSU when we went to call on him.)

First, we explained the various items mentioned in the instructions in your #798^a. HULL had only one or two questions about the other parts and expressed hardly any opinions but, when we came to the part where we state that we do not want the United States to do anything to hinder us in bringing about a complete peace over China, he seemed extremely reluctant to consider it. He went on to reiterate what he has always said about the Tri-Partite Alliance. He said that so long as fears emanating from that treaty existed in the heads of the Americans, the United States would find it well-nigh impossible to cease aiding CHIANG KAI-SHEK and that, as we knew, the United States is now opposing the German policy of military expansion which knows no bounds; that on the one hand she is helping Great Britain and on the other hand CHIANG KAI-SHEK; that therefore until we Japanese made it perfectly clear that our policy is to be one of peace, it will be impossible to cease aiding China, just like it will be

impossible to stop aiding England. He continued that, leading up to the state of affairs we find today, American interests in Japan, including Manchukuo, had undergone terrible embarrassment.

Army 25179

Trans. 11-24-41 (S)

* S. I. S. #25040 which tells Ambassador NOMURA to present Proposal "B" to the U. S. Government and says that no further concessions will be made.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 20, 1941

Purple

#1147 (Part 2 of 2) (Departmental Secret)

(To be handled in Government Code.)

KURUSU said, "When I had an interview with the President the other day, he talked as if he would like to act as an introducer. Now if he wants to take the trouble to do this introducing in order to bring about peace, I cannot reconcile it with continued assistance to CHIANG KAI-SHEK, which actually hinders peace. In other words, it seems quite reasonable to us to ask the President to stop aiding CHIANG if he is going to act as an introducer." HULL replied, "Well, what the President meant when he said that was that he was presupposing that you Japanese would first make it apparent that your fundamental policy was peaceful. Heretofore, influential Japanese statesmen have expressed opinions favorable to HITLER's military expansion policy, and the American people find it very difficult to believe that Japan is turning peaceful." I said, "Well, the plan which I proposed today makes no progress whatever on two or three points. However, since the situation is so tense, if the tension between Japan and the United States can be relaxed, be it ever so little, particularly in the southwestern Pacific, and quickly clear the atmosphere, then I think we could go on and settle everything else." HULL said, "Yes, I understand what you mean thoroughly, but that would be very hard to do. In any case, you and I have on our shoulders a heavy responsibility toward both the Japanese and American people. I might say toward the whole human race." Mr. HULL's face assumed a sadly compassionate expression, and he said, "I want to think over this proposal you have brought me fully and sympathetically, and then I want to talk to you again.

Army 25180

Trans. 11/22/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 20, 1941

Purple

#1148. (To be handled in government code)

Secretary of State HULL, in the conversations I detailed in my #1144 *, expressed his satisfaction that in the last two or three days Japanese newspaper editorial comment on the United States had become calm. This, doubtless, is due to your great efforts.

Since newspaper editorial comment in this country has become extremely circumspect in conjunction with our conversations, no

doubt as a reflection of State Department opinion, I would like to have you continue your efforts in guiding newspaper opinion.

Army 25174

Trans. 11/24/41 (2)

* S. I. S. #25137 in which HULL says that so long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning toward a peaceful policy, it will be impossible to stop aiding China.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

21 November 1941

(Purple)

#810 (Part 1 of 2) (Separate wire)
(Chief of Office routing)

Formal note

"I have the honor of addressing this note to you to inform you that my home government has instructed me to forward you a copy of an agreement drawn up between the government of Japan and the government of the United States of America on the . . . (blank) . . . of this month. At the same time I have the honor to transmit to you the following information:

"For the purpose of assuring the maintenance of peace on the Pacific and through that to contribute to the recovery and promotion of peace throughout the world, this agreement was drawn up between Japan and the United States.

"The Imperial Government is firmly convinced that the government of your country, like the governments of Japan and of the United States, is vitally interested in the purposes indicated above. We, therefore, beg permission to draw your government's attention to the contents of this agreement, and particularly to Article One, Article Two, Article Three, Article Four, and Article Six, (Article Six, only if it is included), thereof.

"The various articles enumerated above concern, respectively, the political stabilization in the Pacific area; access to materials produced in the Netherlands Indies; the trade relations between Japan and the United States; the China Incident; and, the non-discriminatory treatment in international commerce, (this last, only if it is included in the agreement).

"The two governments have made a joint declaration including the above points. We feel that your government and mine could utilize the understandings in the same manner as between Japan and the United States.

"Therefore, in the hopes that the aims thus drawn up in this agreement may more fully be realized, the Imperial Government herewith wishes me to advise you that it is prepared to take suitable steps to come to a formal understanding between your government and mine on the specific points enumerated above. We expectantly await your government's advice that it would be similarly disposed.

"Accept, Sir, these renewed assurances of my highest consideration."

—formal close—

/s/

(Part 2 follows)

25126

(JD-1: 6687)

(D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 21 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #810 (Part 2 of 2)

Formal reply

"I have the honor of addressing you in order that I may respectfully acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the Agreement on a Joint Understanding which has been drawn up between your government* and the government of the United States dated the (blank date)---- of this month and your accompanying explanatory note.

"Your explanation was to the effect that

"I have the honor to inform you that I am receipt of a reply from my government to the effect that the government of Great Britain (or the Netherlands Government) understands the objectives drawn up in this draft agreement, and in the hope that they may be more fully realized, is disposed to take suitable steps to come to a formal understanding between your country and mine on the points specifically enumerated above.

"Accept, Sir, renewed assurances of my highest consideration."

(Leave some space, and then way down at the bottom place:)**

—formal close—

/s/ **

25126 JD-1: 6687

(D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (S-TT)

*Japan.

**This is Japanese language epistolary style.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 21 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #811

In case you use Proposal "B"* for an agreement, as an introductory paragraph please tentatively incorporate the following draft:

"The Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the United States of America, impelled by their strong desire of preserving peace in the Pacific, and recognizing the vital importance of a frank expression on the part of both countries of a sincere determination to embrace peaceful methods, declare it as their mutual understanding that:"

25130

JD-1: 6688

(M) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6250 (S. I. S. #24338).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
21 November 1941
(Purple)
#969

At present, the possibility of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union seems remote. However, it may be that Germany would prefer to avoid being faced with a long term resistance by the U. S. S. R., so that she—Germany—may transfer her entire fighting forces to some other part. On the Soviet side, it seems possible that sentiment for peace may develop when she views the situation from the standpoint of reconstruction.

Our relations with the United States may have considerable effect on our southward program, depending, of course, on what turns those relations take. In other words, our relationship with Great Britain and the United States has a great bearing on the future of our national greatness.

For this reason, we would like to avoid the rise of any violence at this time. At the same time, we would like to break up the policy of British-U. S.-U. S. S. R. joint action. We would, therefore, welcome, if anything, peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. For the purpose of enhancing our position, we would not be opposed to mediating in a peace, if such a course is possible.

Will you, therefore, bearing the above in mind, keep an eye on developments----- (message unfinished).

25171
JD-1: 6731

(D) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (C-NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 22, 1941
Purple CA (Urgent)
#812

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736*. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to your fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

Army 25138

Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

* See S. I. S. #24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 22, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #815

The Anti-Comintern Agreement runs out on the 24th, and for some time we have been conferring with the signatories. It has been decided that this agreement shall be in effect for five more years and that on the 25th in Berlin, Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchukuo, Hungary, and Spain will all six sign the protocol.

Germany, fighting Russia as she is, seems to be thinking about the propagandistic effect of this signing. However, we, for several considerations, intend to handle the matter circumspectly. You know we have Japanese-American relations to think about. This is for your information.

Army 25140

Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 22, 1941.
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #816.

So it seems that the United States is reluctant to definitely promise to do nothing to prevent the establishment of peace between Japan and China in accordance with Clause 4 of Proposal "B". Well, if they will accept our proposal "B", we will have no objection to letting President ROOSEVELT be our introducer. Through his mediation, on the basis of the American proposal (B) of the 12th, China would be made to express her friendly intentions toward Japan, and, as a result, peace negotiations would ensue. Then as soon as an armistice agreement were established between Tokyo and Chungking, there would be no basis in fact for continuance of American assistance to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Thus, as a result of the mediation which President ROOSEVELT would exercise, CHIANG KAI-SHEK would by the American Government be caused to propose a cessation of hostilities. The American Government accordingly, hoping for the establishment of amicable relations between the Japanese and Chinese, should do her best to support our efforts in this direction and they should make it clear that they will refrain from any act that would hinder us in achieving this objective. Therefore, will you please endeavor to have the Americans accept our "B" proposal and, in case an understanding is reached, please endeavor by the date set in my #812 * to have the President prevail upon CHIANG KAI-SHEK to send us a peace proposal (a very brief one will be all right).

Army 25175

Trans. 11-24-41 (2)

* S. I. S. #28138 in which the deadline is extended from the 25th to the 29th

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 22, 1941.
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#817

Re your #1144.*

I take it that the "B" plan which you proposed on the 20th included the second clause of (5) relative to moving troops from southern to northern French Indo-China, and left out (6) concerning non-discrimination in commerce and (7) the Tri-Partite Treaty. Am I right? Wire me back just as soon as you get this whether or not the Americans took any particular note of the fact that you left out (6) and (7).

Army #25212

Trans. 11-25-41 (S)

* S. I. S. #25137—Ambassador NOMURA says Secretary HULL has expressed no noteworthy differences of opinion except with regard to China. He said that so long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning toward a peaceful policy, it will be impossible to stop aiding CHIANG.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 22, 1941
Purple
#1158 (Government Code) (Secret outside the Department)

Re your # 817.*

As you are aware, I have advised them concerning the first part. Insofar as the latter part of that message is concerned, on the occasion of the interview outlined in my #1147,^b no reference was made to this matter. However, after they have studied the matter, they will doubtless present some opinions concerning it.

Furthermore, Ambassador KURUSU and myself, at their request, are scheduled to have an interview, as already announced, with Secretary of State HULL at 8:00 P. M. today, the 22nd.

Army 25181

Trans. 11/24/41 (2)

* Available, being worked on.
^b See S. I. S. #25179-80.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
23 November 1941
(Purple)
#1159 (In 4 parts, complete)

On the 22nd, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the Secretary of State, Hull. (Ballentine was also present). The resume of our conversation follows:

Hull: "I conferred with the Ambassador and Ministers of Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands on the 22nd." (The press reports that this conference lasted for about two and a half hours.) "I sought their opinion on the Japanese proposals. They all said that if Japan's intentions are assuredly pacific, then they would wholeheartedly favor them. They said that it would be the source of much joy to them to

cooperate in the matter of resuming trade relations with Japan under those circumstances.

"However, they said, we are not sure of Japan's real intentions as yet, for while on the one hand she apparently indicates her desire for peace by dispatching a special envoy, the tone of the politicians and press of Japan seems to be in direct opposition.

"The diplomats who called on me also pointed out that just prior to the application of the freezing order, Japanese imports of petroleum took a very sudden upward swing, disproving any contention that it was to be used solely for peaceful undertakings, but that it was being stored away by the navy.

"They further expressed the opinion that the embargo should be lifted only in slow degrees.

"These diplomats, however, said that they would seek their home governments' instructions regarding the Japanese proposals and would submit their replies by the coming Monday. Upon receiving these advices, I shall make a reply to you."

(Part 2)*

Thus the Secretary seemed to feel considerable concern over the recent trend of Japan's public opinion. He pointed out that a clear statement by the Japanese Government of its desire for peace would have a most important reaction on the public opinion of the United States. (Ballantine said that a clear statement of attitude from the government of Japan to the Japanese people, which would of course be cabled abroad, would bear more fruit than propagandistic reports sent through press channels for foreign consumption only) and in turn would have a most favorable bearing on the chances of a settlement. He even went on to say that was it not the duty of every politician to strive for peace up to the day before war is found to be unavoidable? The President and the Secretary of State, he said * * * (two or three lines too badly garbled).

I then said: "Leaving British, Australian and Dutch opinions aside for the time being, what is the attitude of the United States itself regarding our proposal?"

His subsequent reply, which he made by taking up the proposal paragraph by paragraph, was a complete evasion. However, there were indications that what the United States, Britain, Australia, etc. actually desire is to dissolve the crisis in the south Pacific, so that the fighting powers they have to maintain in this area to keep things under control, may be transferred for action in other parts.

(Part 3)

He pointed out that since that is their main objective, the assurances given by Japan in her proposals were insufficient.

I said: "Our troop concentrations in the northern part of French Indo-China are aimed at cutting Chungking's life line. Therefore, they are, for the most part, directed towards Yunnan. As such, they do not and are not intended to form a threat to the south Pacific area."

After I pointed out this fact, Kurusu said that the acceptance of our proposal would naturally lead to the conditions desired not only by

the United States, but by the other nations he referred to. To this, Hull replied that what these countries desired was a quick turn-about in the situation.

Hull: "With regard to resumption of trade, a rapid change in the situation can be wrought here, too, once Japan's Pacific intentions have been ascertained. This change for the better can be brought about in a mere matter of days."

Regarding aid to China, Hull said:

"We must take into consideration the possibility of a U. S. mediation when considering the possibility of cutting off aid to Chiang. If we promise Japan that we shall cease aiding China, the United States could no longer be considered a fair and neutral party to propose peace between China and Japan.

(Part 4)

"Moreover, if it is terminated immediately upon the beginning of the negotiations, the promise would be utterly without value. In any event, the so-called 'aid to Chiang Kai-shek' is not as great as is commonly publicized.

"It is Japan's desire to improve the situation which has reached a critical stage by first settling the outstanding factors involved. Since that is the desire expressed by your proposals, we cannot at this time concur in Japan's demands with regard to stopping aid to Chiang."

He went on to say that he did not believe that the time was as yet ripe for the President to suggest peace to China.

I said "I feel that on Monday the United States will submit some sort of a counter proposal to us. I further feel that this proposal will contain a suggestion that Japan join in some plan to maintain peace on the Pacific and in some kind of a trade agreement. No doubt it will be necessary for the United States and Japan to come to some preliminary agreement, after which it would be submitted to the other countries for their approval."

Kurusu: "If it is intended that a sort of a group be formed by those nations and that if they expect to make it appear as if we were 'voted down' by the majority of the voters, we wish to state now that we shall be absolutely unable to accept such a proposal."

25347

JD-1: 6839

(D) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (2)

*Part 2 badly garbled; considerable reconstruction work contained.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

23 November 1941

(Purple)

#1160 (In 2 parts, complete)

Re my #1159*

From Kurusu:

Secretary Hull and I conferred for about a half an hour on the 21st to arrange our talks for the 22nd. At that time Hull said that he thought my idea of attaching so much importance to the agreement that it would outshine the Tripartite Pact, as expressed by me during our talks on the 18th, was wholeheartedly in favor of peace on the

Pacific through joint action of the United States and Japan, and through this accomplishment, to contribute to the peace of the world.

He went on to say that he still remembers with pleasure that at the Economic Conference in London, he fought for free commerce shoulder to shoulder with Viscount Isii and (Eigo Fukai ?). Hull said that he has looked upon Japan's leadership in the Far East as only a natural phenomenon. It is true that Japan's actions and statements regarding the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere have been slightly on the unpolished and abrupt side but he is able to be sympathetic with the spirit of it.

(Part 2) (Garbled)

As long as Japan strives for this goal without resorting to the force of arms, the United States has nothing against the program and has no intention of interfering with its realization.

"I would like to see the U. S.-Japanese relationship which existed shortly subsequent to the Russo-Japanese war reestablished. At that time Japan and the United States exercised their influence over the Far East and the Western Hemisphere respectively, but at the same time maintained very friendly relations and close cooperation in all matters with each other.

"I hope that we can revive the spirit of those times and reach an agreement to maintain peace on the Pacific. At the same time, I wish that Japan would make it clear that the Tripartite Pact is not an obstacle to attaining that goal".

Under the present critical conditions, the United States acceptance or rejection of our Proposal "B" may have a vital bearing on whether or not the negotiations will break down. However, because of the circumstances outlined in my message referred to in the heading, we may receive some proposal from Hull with regard to an agreement covering the Pacific area on Monday.

In the meantime, if you have any suggestions which may lead to a settlement, please advise us immediately.

25397

JD-1: 6857

(D) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6839 (S. I. S. #25347).

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

23 November 1941

(Purple)

#1161 (In 2 parts, complete)

Regarding my #1160*

General outline of conversation on the night of 22nd is as follows:

Trade between Japan and the United States could gradually be resumed if Japan were willing to take a peaceful attitude, representatives of foreign powers that are friendly with the United States met in conference yesterday. They were all advised of this and are to meet again on Monday, after they have reported to their own government and received their answers.

Hull continued that there was a limit to his powers, and although he understood the reason for Tokyo's demand of urgency regarding the matter, he does not seem to see the reason why Tokyo can not wait a few days.

The Chinese Ambassador KOTEKI came to the conference yesterday, getting up from bed (due to illness) and arriving at the end of the conference.

According to Hull he does not intend to act as a mediator in the Japan-China incident right now, or to give up aid to China, (however the aid to China today is not to a very great extent). It seems as though he wishes to handle (discuss) the China incident later.

According to reliable information it seems that to station troops for duration of necessity can be considered as stationing of troops indefinitely, but if it was stated that troops were to be stationed for a certain period of four or five years, at the end of which period conditions were to govern restationing of troops, there might not be so much opposition. But with just an indefinite stationing of troops for an indefinite period, it would be against the U. S. policy which is against annexation and interfering with self-government. (The fact that during the preparatory conference last July, the Japanese troops went into French Indo-China, causing the conference of that time to be broken off)—the above was mentioned again today and thus hinting that it was hoped a similar occurrence would not develop this time.

He continued that to merely move troops which were in southern French Indo-China to the north would not relieve the tension in the south Pacific or relieve the anxiousness of the countries of the south Pacific, etc. so that it was explained that to an experienced military observer this was great information and should add much to the peace of that part. Hull explained that the contents of the conference would be strictly restricted to himself alone, (then later said he would mention it to a few), so that gave the appearance of his not understanding much about military aspects.

I presented the prelude of our B Proposal and tried to get his answer of yes or no on each item, and Hull seemed to feel that our B Proposal was a demand on the United States by Japan, and seemed very displeased. He said there was no cause for Japan's making such demands, and that he was greatly discouraged in the attitude of Japan of insisting on direct answers when he was trying so hard to arrange a peaceful negotiation between the two countries.

We (Japanese Ambassadors) kept a calm appearance throughout the talk, and at no time became excited, and the opponent's attitude was also the same.

Hull explained that the United States was following peaceful attitude in the negotiations and he hoped Japan would also follow this peaceful attitude of the United States throughout the negotiations.

25588

JD-1:

(Y)-Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (X)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 24, 1941
 Purple (Very Urgent)
 #821 (Government Code)

1. It seems that the United States as well as England, Australia, and the Netherlands is not satisfied with evacuation merely from the Southern part of French Indo-China. We have gone out of our way to venture this proposal in order to break the deadlock. We absolutely cannot make any further concessions.

2. Our expectations, as I told you in my #798,^b go beyond the restoration of Japan-American trade and a return to the situation prior to the exercise of the freezing legislation and require the realization of all points of Proposal B with the exception of clauses 6 and 7. Therefore, our demand for a cessation of aid to CHIANG (the acquisition of Netherlands Indies goods and at the same time the supply of American petroleum to Japan as well) is a most essential condition. In view of the fact that this is a just demand, the fact that the government of the United States finds it hard to accept it makes us here in Japan suffer inordinately. Therefore, on the basis of what I told you in my #816,^c as well as all that has gone before, please make every effort to persuade the Government of the United States.

3. Insofar as what we propose in Proposal B is concerned, the United States has misconstrued it as our demand. We here in Japan, in view of the extremely critical situation, only hope most earnestly for a speedy settlement. Naturally, that's all we want. Speaking further on this, it is necessary to warn the United States against enticing England, Australia, the Netherlands, etc., in paving the way for a joint hostile set-up. As you have written, we would like to secure the agreement of other competent countries in accordance with the gist of my #731^d at the same time Japan and the United States reach an understanding.

Army 25176

Trans. 11/24/41 (S)

^a Not available.
^b S. I. S. #25040 which tells Ambassador NOMURA to present Proposal B to the U. S. Government and says that no further concessions will be made.
^c See S. I. S. #25176.
^d S. I. S. #24333 in which Tokyo instructs Washington to impress upon the American officials the importance of having Great Britain and the Netherlands also agree to the proposals.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 24, 1941
 Purple (Very Urgent)
 #822. Secret outside the department.

Re my #821.^a

On the 23d I asked the American Ambassador in Tokyo to visit me and added the following to what I had told him in my caption telegram: The movement of Japanese troops from southern French Indo-

China to the north is very important from a military standpoint. The occupation of northern French Indo-China is related to the basic settlement of the China incident, whereas the occupation of the southern portion was related to the freezing of funds by England and America. At the present time a total withdrawal of troops is utterly impossible and when the American President, acting as a spokesman for CHIANG KAI-SHEK, brings a proposal of peace to Japan in the China question, if Japan accepts this and enters into negotiations, it is only proper that we demand that America should not interfere with our efforts for peace. The above solution is not only the best, but the only way. Until this point is made clear, it is absolutely incompatible with the sentiment of the Japanese people to settle the Japan-American negotiations and it is impossible for us to understand why America does not agree to this. I have been making the greatest efforts for our new proposal from the standpoint of cooperation with the American peace policy and have tried to cut down our stipulations, making them clear and concise. When these negotiations are established, we intend to pursue an increasingly peaceful policy on this basis. After I had told him this, the Ambassador left at once to cable the gist to his home office.

Army 25177

Trans. 11-24-41 (S)

• S. I. S. #25176.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 24, 1941
Purple
#823 (Restricted Distribution)

For both Ambassadors.

The time limit set in my message #812 * is in Tokyo time.

Army 25178
JD 6744

Trans. 11/24/41 (NR)

• S. I. S. #25138 in which the deadline is extended from the 25th to the 29th.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Nanking
25 November 1941
(Purple)
#499

Re your #818*

To Naval authorities:

We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer ?) for a while.

25390

JD-1: 6848

(F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

25 November 1941

(Purple)

#1177

Re your #792*

In this office we are withholding all reports regarding the content of the Japanese-American negotiations themselves or any predictions regarding the future. The State Department also is exercising extreme caution in its press conferences. Hence the Japanese correspondents here are transmitting various trends of the negotiations copied from newspaper articles here that are based on pure conjecture. Among these correspondents are those who recognize that the articles are valueless but who are being pressed by the head office for news. I have observed particularly this meaningless competition to get the news among the correspondents who have come to Washington from New York. That this senseless competition to gather inaccurate news will not exert a harmful influence on the course of the negotiations themselves is something that I cannot guarantee. In view of this situation I would greatly appreciate it if the Foreign Office would speak a word of caution to the newspapers concerned regarding this useless competition between their special correspondents in collecting news regarding these negotiations. And it would be particularly helpful if the head offices of the newspapers concerned would issue orders direct to their special correspondents along this line.

25434

JD-1:6880

(H) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Hanoi

To: Tokyo

25 November 1941

(Purple—YO)

#118

(Strictly secret.)

We are advised by the military that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt the Cabinet will make a decision between peace and war within the next day or two. It goes without saying here, of course, that if the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are brought to a successful termination, the various enterprises shall be launched in accordance with the plans which have been laid down in advance.

Should, however, the negotiations not end in a success, since practically all preparations for the campaign have been completed, our forces shall be able to move within the day.

Under these circumstances, however, there shall have to be some alterations in the program we have laid out for the various enterprises. We shall, undoubtedly, have to establish organs and conduct negotiations which will not conflict with the campaign. The thing that we are most concerned about is whether or not, in the event of war, the status quo will be maintained as far as the French Indo-China's governmental set-up is concerned. I feel that it is essential

that we not only be advised of this, but it must be done immediately as we wish to make all prearrangements as far in advance as possible.

If you have any opinions as to the outcome of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, will you please inform this office of them together with whatever other pertinent information you may deem wise to impart to us.

Of course, I realize that secrecy is of the utmost importance. According to press reports, however, the United States conferred with the representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and even of China, in Washington, and hence the governments of these countries are now aware of the matters being discussed in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. Moreover, by means of (courier ?) service, the military here are aware of not only our stand in the negotiations but also of the general atmosphere of the said negotiations.

We feel as if we, a Foreign Office organ, alone have been left out of the picture. As you pointed out in your circular message #2353* the situation is becoming exceedingly critical. Please, therefore, make arrangements to advise us on these points by means of either cable or by special messenger services.

25345

JD-1: 6838

(D) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S-TT)

*Available, dated 19 November.

[Secret]

From: Bangkok

To: Tokyo

25 November 1941

(Purple)

#849 (In 2 parts, complete)

In the event of the Empire's taking decisive action in a southward advance, it will of course be necessary in the exercise of a belligerent's rights to make clear the relations of sovereign and subjects. On the one hand it will be absolutely necessary to bring Thai into our camp. My conversation with Pibul as reported in my #834* was undertaken with this as the underlying motive. If and when Japan at last does make her proposals of joint defense, the following three points should be made especially definite, and Thai should be led to voluntarily take an attitude of cooperation with us.

(1) In the event of an attack upon Burma and Malay, there would of course be a temporary infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of Thailand, but after our objectives have been attained, restoration would immediately be made, and the independence of Thai would be respected even more than at present while Thai is maintaining neutrality.

(2) In case she cooperates in a positive way with Japan, full assurances will be given that Thailand's swamp lands will be reclaimed in the areas concerned.

(3) In the event of Thai's assets in England being frozen great fluctuation would result in the value of Thai's money, but Japan would make available sufficient funds to create a foundation for a yen "bloc" money system, and also give every consideration to providing petroleum and other essential commodities.

To summarize: By cooperating with Japan the racial longings of Thailand will be realized, and with indivisible relations with Japan her existence as an independent nation will be strengthened . . . (three lines missed) . . . stop with as simple a . . . as possible to the effect that "will cooperate in every way for the realization of the objectives of East Asia coprosperity and stability", while the particulars as necessity may require will be put into a secret treaty . . .

Furthermore, in the light of Japan's basic national policy which has for its purpose the establishment of an East Asia coprosperity sphere, and the emancipation of the Asiatic peoples, it goes without saying that Thailand's sovereignty must not be impaired beyond the minimum limits of necessity, and that her standing as an independent nation must be maintained to the very last; while strictest military discipline must be used to reassure the Thai populace and strict control should by all means be exercised over any attempts at profiteering.

Have sent ----- by the hand of Consul General Asada who has returned to Japan, but to make doubly sure I am also cabling it to you.

25389

JD-1:6844

(F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (S-TT)

*Available, dated 21 November.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington
November 26, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#830

To both Ambassadors.

It seems that the American newspapers think that there is a connection between the question of withdrawing our army from French Indo-China and that of the freezing of assets. As I have already indicated in my #798,^a my proposal made on the 17th, even if submitted by you, would be inadequate to meet the situation. Our final proposal envisages an agreement on the basis of the "B" proposal *in toto* (it excludes from the "B" proposal paragraphs 6 and 7; namely, the question of non-discrimination in trade and the question of the Three-Power Agreement, and includes, as indicated in my #816,^b the proposal which the United States Government made on the 12th; that is, the question of mediation by the United States for the purpose of establishing peace between Japan and China as contained in our Proposal "B"), and so the acceptance of this proposal is the most that we can expect. In view of the fact that time is getting short with but few days left this month, I would like to have you at once contact the United States authorities again and do your utmost in getting them to accept our proposal.

I need not suggest the following, for you, no doubt, have already thought of it. I would like to have you make full use of influential Americans about whom you have wired me in the past and put pressure on the United States authorities indirectly as well.

Army 25790

Trans. 12-5-41 (6)

^a S. I. S. #25040 which states that no further concessions can be made and if the U. S. does not consent to Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off.

^b S. I. S. #25175. If the U. S. accepts Proposal B, Japan will have no objection to letting Pres. ROOSEVELT act as mediator between Japan and China.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 26, 1941
Purple (Priority)
#833 (To be handled in Government Code)

Re my #798*

When you reach a settlement in accordance with our new proposal, it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods in connection with clauses 2 and 3 of that proposal. Of these goods, the acquisition of petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent requirements of the Empire. Therefore, in accordance with the course of negotiations, prior to the signing of an understanding, and at as early a date as possible, I would like to have you make our wishes known insofar as petroleum imports are concerned along the following lines:

4,000,000 tons per year from the United States. (This figure is the average amount of imports during the years 1938, '39, and '40 from the United States. The breakdown according to type, aviation gasoline included, corresponds to the actual figures covering imports before the freezing legislation went into effect.) That is to say, roughly 333,000 tons per month.

In addition, on the basis of past negotiations and roughly in the agreed amounts, we hope to import from the Netherlands Indies 1,000,000 tons per year.

After the establishment of a verbal agreement, I would like to have a definite promise of the above incorporated into an exchange of documents between Your Excellency and the Secretary of State.

Furthermore, these figures are to be taken as the basis for negotiation (however, they can not be called our absolute minimum figures). On the other hand, as far as we are concerned, along with a restoration of trade in the future, we hope for an increase of these figures over the past. Therefore, after you have read all this, please negotiate along these lines to the best of your abilities.

Army #25346

Trans. 11/26/41 (S)

E

* S. I. S. #25040 which states that no further concessions can be made and if the United States does not consent to Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple

#836. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>English</i>
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai	Nyuu Yooku
(Three-Power Treaty question)	(New York)
Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai	Shikago
(The question of nondiscrimina-	(Chicago)
tory treatment)	Sanfuranshisuko
Shina Mondai	(San Francisco)
(The China question)	Itoo Kun
Soori	(Mr. Itoo)
(Premier)	Date Kun
Gaimudaijin	(Mr. Date)
(Foreign Minister)	Tokugawa Kun
Rikugun	(Mr. Tokugawa)
(The Army)	Maeda Kun
Kaigun	(Mr. Maeda)
(The Navy)	Endan
Nichi-bei kooshoo	(Marriage proposal)
(Japan-American negotiations)	Kimiko San
Daitooryoo	(Miss Kimiko)
(President)	Fumeko San
Haru	(Miss Fumeko)
(Hull)	Shoobai
Kokunaijoosei	(Trade)
(Internal situation)	Yama Wo Uru
Jooho Suru	(To sell the mountain)
(To yield)	Yama Wo Urenu
Jooho Sezu	(Not to sell the mountain)
(Not to yield)	Kodomo Gaumareru
Keisei Kyunten Suru	(The child is born)
(Situation taking critical turn)	

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO: Setagaya 4617
 Section Chief KASE: Yotsuya 4793
 The Minister's residence: Ginza 3614
 The Vice-Minister's residence: Ginza 1022

Army #25344
 JD-6841

Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

26 November 1941 (1745 EST)

(Telephone code)*

Trans-Pacific Telephone

To Kumaicho Yamamoto** from Kurusu:

Wakasugi speaking, said:

"This is Wakasugi speaking at Kurusu's request. Kurusu and Nomura have at this very moment gone to meet Hull with whom they had an appointment at 4:45."

Yamamoto: "Would they then meet the President?"

Wakasugi: "The would (arrange ?) (to) meet the President after seeing Hull, but they had not yet taken steps to see the President. Hull has been conversing with the Chinese for three days past and had seen the Chinese today also. The future of the present talks would be decided during the course of today's conversations."

Yamamoto: "Call me by telephone again upon completion of today's meeting."

Wakasugi: "Have you anything you want me to tell Kurusu?"

Yamamoto: (Reply unintelligible to interceptor and according to him unintelligible to Wakasugi as well.)

After above few unintelligible sentences Wakasugi concluded with a promise to phone later.

(Note: A call has been placed for 2100 EST this evening).

25348

JD-1: 6842

(M) Navy Trans. 26 Nov. '41 (12-TT)

*See JD-1: 6841 (S. I. S. #25344).

**Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

26 November 1941 (1946 to 1953 EST)

(Telephone Code)**

Trans-Pacific Telephone

To Kumaicho Yamamoto* from Kurusu:

Kurusu: "I have made all efforts, but they *will not yield**** I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already," he interrupted himself, "you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how things will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems."

Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: "If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable."

Yamamoto: "The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also." After thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: "The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult."

Kurusu: "I believe it is of no avail".

Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.

Kurusu: "I rather imagine you had expected this outcome."

Yamamoto: "Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished."

Kurusu: "I am unable to make any movement (i. e. progress?) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation."

25349

JD-1: 6843

(M) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (12-TT)

*Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.

**See JD-1: 6841, (S. I. S. #25344), of this date.

***Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The interceptor read this as "Sore . . . kess" (that . . . this morning) and translated this as "It is now . . .", with a distinct pause before and after this phrase. However, the telephone code was not available to him. Verification will follow receipt of record.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

November 26, 1941

Purple (Extremely urgent)

#1180. (Part 1 of 2)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

Army 25435

JD: 6891

Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple (Extremely urgent)
#1180. (Part 2 of 2)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

Army 25436

JD: 6896

Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
Purple (Extremely urgent)
#1189. (Part 1 of 2)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

Army 25441

Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 26, 1941

Purple (Extremely urgent)

#1189. (Part 2 of 2)

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

Army: 25442

Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 26, 1941

Purple (Extremely urgent)

#1190. (Part 1 of 2)^a

Judging from the progress of present Japanese-American relations, with which you are well acquainted through successive telegrams, the American proposal on the 26th (message #1189^b) showed a great disparity between the demands of both parties. Unfortunately, there are no hopes of acceptance of our demands within the time limit you set.

Although we have requested the agreement of various countries to the numerous demands made, the United States presented this proposal after having conferred with the same countries. Although we cannot allow ourselves to be caught napping by this scheming, we must follow out instructions. Up to the present we have only been able to press them for an early solution. During this time we have not expressed any final intention. Even the President on the 17th said that there would be "no last words." If we do not cause any stop in the present negotiations, in the case of taking independent action after the time set—

Army 25444

Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

^a Part 2 not available.
^b S. I. S. #25441.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 26, 1941

Purple (Extremely Urgent)

#1190. (Part 2 of 2)^a

To be handled in Government Code.

The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that there are considerations of convenience having to do with my interview with the President, should there be anything that you would want me to say at that time, please wire me back at once.

Army 25480

Trans. 11-29-41 (1)

^a S. I. S. #25444. (Part 1 of 2).

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 26, 1941

Purple (Extremely Urgent)

#1191 Part 1 of 4.

On the 26th at the request of Secretary HULL, KURUSU and I visited him. First of all, we read over cursorily the documents he handed us, which we sent you in separate messages #1192^a, 1193^b and 1194^c, and then engaged in an argument. The gist of it was as follows:

(1) HULL said: "Although we have conferred with the various nations concerned and have studied your proposal of the 20th (B proposal with 6 and 7 left out) for five days, we have decided that we cannot consider it."

(2) I said: "You talk of reconciling the American proposal of June 21st with ours of September 25th, but this is vastly different from either."

HULL retorted: "As for that I want you to read and compare the paragraph I point out with the one immediately preceding it. I said that it was a plan for reconciling both the Japanese and American proposals. Since the opening of conversations, the contents of it have been kept secret and, therefore, in this country where popular opinion counts for so much, various surmises are arising; particularly rumors are being circulated to the effect that we are leaving China in the lurch. I myself am in the foreground and in spite of what Japan said at the time of our conversation of the 22nd, various important people are still uttering non-pacific statements. There does not seem to be much I can do in the fact of that."

Army 25481

Trans. 11/29/41 (2)

- See S. I. S. #25485.
- See S. I. S. #25489.
- See S. I. S. #25491.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 November 26, 1941
 Purple (Extremely Urgent)
 #1191 Part 2 of 4.

To be handled in government code.

(3) Concerning Section 1 of the proposal, I pointed out that of the four principles, the fourth has changed the so-called Stimson Doctrine; but I got no clear reply. I reminded him of their insistances so far concerning the principle of non-discrimination and said that if we applied that immediately to China there would be a sudden darkening of the already cloudy economic situation and that this was improper and impossible.

HULL replied: "I fully understand that and the principle as such does not necessarily have to be put into effect right away."

(4) Concerning 1 of Section 2 of this proposal, I said: "If this plan aims to revive a Nine-Power Treaty set-up, we cannot feature it at all because we have fought a four year war in China without a cent of profit."

To this he countered with no strong rebuttal.

Army 25482

Trans. 11/29/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 November 26, 1941
 Purple (Extremely Urgent)
 #1191 Part 3 of 4

(5) I said that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same section were out of the question and, as for paragraph 4, for a country like the United States, who recognizes the Chungking Government, to say that she cannot desert the Chiang Regime is just like us saying that we certainly cannot desert the Nanking Regime."

In reply HULL said: "The evacuation under 3 would be carried out by negotiations. We are not necessarily asking that it be effected

immediately. As for the Nanking Government, according to the best reports available to us, it hasn't much influence over China as a whole any way."

I retorted: "Well, that argument is based on the statement that in the long history of China there have been many rises and falls of governments."

(6) When we came to the question of the Three Power Treaty, I said: "For the United States to hope, on one hand, that she can make us make the last possible concession regarding the Three Power Pact and on the other virtually to say to us concerning the China question 'apologize to Chungking' is certainly strange. I do not suppose that that is what the President meant the other day when he spoke of 'introducing'."

HULL made no special answer.

Army 25483

Trans. 11/2/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 26, 1941

Purple (Extremely urgent)

#1191. (Part 4 of 4)

I said, "Well, I have read this only cursorily. It is a very difficult plan for us to consider accepting. As far as the China part is concerned, it contains clauses which are entirely out of the question so I, who would like to see an understanding established between Japan and the United States, do not know if I should even report it to Japan as it now stands. I have grave doubts. We will both read it over again and consider it fully. Then we will reply." Finally I said, "I wonder if the United States means that there is no other way but for us to consider this plan. You know the President the other day said that between friends there are no last words. I wonder if you could arrange for an interview." To the former he replied that in a word this was a plan, and to the latter he said that, although he did not think that much progress was being made, he would manage the matter.

Army 25484

Trans. 11-29-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

27 November 1941

(Purple)

#841

Please make the following corrections throughout the entire English text of the B Proposal:

Delete the "the" preceeding the word "peace" in "the peace in the Pacific";

Change "elucidating" to affirming";

Change "agreed upon" to "reached; and

Delete "mutual" from "mutual understanding".

25791

JD-1: 7079

(D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
 To: Washington
 27 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #842

In the middle of your message #1280*, there is the part which mentions that the United States might make a protective occupation of the Dutch East Indies. Now this is a very important matter, and a point which we would like to know more about.

Will you please give us the reason for your mentioning this point, and any other item which might be of help to us in this matter.

25781

JD-1: 7080

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 27 November 1941
 (J 19)
 Circular #2409 (In 4 parts, complete)
 Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324

(Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message.)

(Part 1)

Handle as Chief of Office routing.

With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

Example. A message meaning:

"Japan and U. S. S. R. military have clashed", will read:

"HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, clerks, have both been ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) S T O P (end spell)."

In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word S T O P will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARI" (end) will not be used).

(Part 2)

Code Word	Meaning
ARIMURA	Code communications prohibited.
ASAI	Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA	Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.
ASIKAGA	Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.
AZUMA	Pressure on Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTI	Prepare for evacuation.

*Code Word**Meaning*

HANABUSA	Preparations for evacuation have been completed.
HANAZONO (?)	Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (or consul) there.
HATAKEYAMA	Relations between Japan and (blank) have been severed.
HATTORI	Relations between Japan and (blank) are not in accordance with expectation.

(Part 3)

HIZIKATA	Japan's and ' (blank's) military forces have clashed.
HOSINO	Japan and (blank) are entering a full fledged general war.
IBARAGI	Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations between Japan and the country to which you are accredited.
INAGAKI	Have you - ?- - the . . . (blank) . . . matter?
ISHIKAWA	I have - ?- - the . . . (blank) . . . matter.
KASHIWAGI	We are commencing <i>military action</i> ? against . . . (blank) . . .
KOBAYAKAWA	Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan, to persons of . . . (blank) . . . nationality.
KODAMA	Japan.
KOMIYAMA	China.
KOYANAGI	England.
KUBOTA	U. S. S. R.
KURIBARA	France (?)
KUSUNOKI	Germany.
MATUTANI	Italy.

(Part 4)

MINAMI	U. S. A.
MIWATA	Canada.
MIYAZAKI	Mexico.
MOROKOSI	Brazil.
MOTIZUKI	Panama.
NAGAMINE	Argentina.
NAKAZATO	Thailand.
NANGO	French Indo-China.
NEGI (?)	Netherlands East-Indies.
OGAWA	Burma (?).
OKAMOTO	Malaya.
OKUMURA	Australia.
ONIZUKA	Union of South Africa (?).
ONODERA	Enemy country.
OTANI	(?) (Possibly: friendly, or allied country?)
ONISI	Year.
SIMANAKA	Day (?)
SAKAKIBARA	Tsuki) Month

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
SIGENOI	(KŌ) Paragraph
SANZYŌ	(Toki) Time
ITIRŌ	1
NISAKU	2
SANTARŌ	3
YOITI	4
GORŌ	5
MASAROKU	6
SIMETARŌ	7
YASOKITI	8
HISAMATU	9
ATUMI	0

25609

JD-1: 6985

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

27 November 1941 (2327-2334 EST)

(Telephone Code)—(See JD-1: 6841) (S. I. S. #25344)

*Trans-Pacific**Telephone*

(Conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief, Yamamoto.)

*Literal translation**Decode of Voice Code*

(After connection was completed:)

KURUSU: "Hello, hello. This is Kurusu".

YAMAMOTO: "This is Yamamoto".

KURUSU: "Yes, Hello, hello."

(Unable to get Yamamoto for about six or eight seconds, he said aside, to himself, or to someone near him:)

KURUSU: "Oh, I see, they're making a record of this, huh?"

(It is believed he meant that the six second interruption was made so that a record could be started in Tokyo. Interceptor's machine had been started several minutes earlier.)

KURUSU: "Hello. Sorry to trouble you so often."

YAMAMOTO: "How did the matrimonial question get along today?"

KURUSU: "Oh, haven't you got our telegram* yet? It was sent—let me see—at about six—no, seven o'clock. Seven o'clock. About three hours ago.

"There wasn't much that was different from what Miss Umeko said yesterday."

"How did the negotiations go today?"

"There wasn't much that was different from Hull's talks of yesterday."

*Literal translation**Decode of Voice Code*

YAMAMOTO: "Oh, there wasn't much difference?"

KURUSU: "No, there wasn't. As before, that southward matter—that south, SOUTH—southward matter, is having considerable effect. You know, southward matter."

YAMAMOTO: (Obviously trying to indicate the serious effect that Japanese concentrations, etc. in French Indo-China were having on the conversations in Washington. He tries to do this without getting away from the "Miss Umeko childbirth, marriage" character of the voice code.)

YAMAMOTO: "Oh, the south matter? It's effective?"

KURUSU: "Yes, and at one time, the matrimonial question seemed as if it would be settled."

"Yes, and at one time it looked as though we could reach an agreement".

KURUSU: "But—well, of course, there are other matters involved too, but—that was it—that was the monkey wrench. Details are included in the telegram* which should arrive very shortly. It is not very long and you'll be able to read it quickly."

YAMAMOTO: "Oh, you've dispatched it?"

KURUSU: "Oh, yes, quite a while ago. At about 7 o'clock."

(Pause.)

KURUSU: "How do things look there? Does it seem as if a child might be born?"

"Does it seem as if a crisis is at hand?"

YAMAMOTO: (In a very definite tone): "Yes, the birth of the child seems imminent."

"Yes, a crisis *does* appear imminent."

KURUSU: (In a somewhat surprised tone, repeating Yamamoto's statement):

"It *does* seem as if the birth is going to take place?"

"A crisis *does* appear imminent?"

(Pause.)

KURUSU: "In which direction. . ."

(Stopped himself very abruptly at this slip which went outside the character of the voice code. After a slight pause he quickly recovered, then to cover up the slip, continued:)

KURUSU: "Is it to be a boy or a girl?"

YAMAMOTO: (Hesitated, then laughing at his hesitation took up Kurusu's cue to re-establish the voice code character of the talk. The "boy, girl, healthy" byplay has no other significance):

YAMAMOTO: "It seems as if it will be a strong healthy boy."

*Literal translation**Decode of Voice Code*

KURUSU: "Oh, it's to be a strong healthy boy?"

(Rather long pause.)

YAMAMOTO: "Yes.

"Did you make any statement (to the newspapers) regarding your talk with Miss Kimiko today?"

"Did you make any statement regarding your talks with the President today?"

KURUSU: "No, nothing. Nothing except the mere fact that we met."

YAMAMOTO: "Regarding the matter contained in the telegram** of the other day, although no definite decision has been made yet, please be advised that effecting it will be difficult."

KURUSU: "Oh, it is difficult, huh?"

YAMAMOTO: "Yes, it is."

KURUSU: "Well, I guess there's nothing more that can be done then."

YAMAMOTO: "Well, yes."

(Pause)

YAMAMOTO: "Then, today . . ."

KURUSU: "Today?"

YAMAMOTO: "The matrimonial question, that is, the matter pertaining to arranging a marriage—don't break them off."

"Regarding negotiations, don't break them off."

KURUSU: "Not break them? You mean talks."

(Helplessly:)

KURUSU: "Oh, my."

(Pause, and then with a resigned laugh:)

KURUSU: "Well, I'll do what I can."

(Continuing after a pause:)

KURUSU: "Please read carefully what Miss Kimiko had to say as contained in today's telegram*."

"Please read carefully what the President had to say as contained in today's telegram*."

YAMAMOTO: "From what time to what time were your talks today?"

KURUSU: "Oh, today's was from 2:30."

(Much repeating of the numeral 2)

KURUSU: "Oh, you mean the duration? Oh, that was for about an hour."

YAMAMOTO: "Regarding the matrimonial question."

"Regarding the negotiations."

"I shall send you another message. However, please bear in mind that the matter of the other day is a very difficult one."

Literal translation

KURUSU: "But without anything,—they want to keep carrying on the matrimonial question. They do. In the meantime we're faced with the excitement of having a child born. On top of that Tokugawa is really champing at the bit, isn't he? Tokugawa is, isn't he?"

(Laughter and pause.)

KURUSU: "That's why I doubt if anything can be done."

YAMAMOTO: "I don't think it's as bad as that."

YAMAMOTO: "Well,—we can't sell a mountain."

KURUSU: "Oh, sure, I know that. That isn't even a debatable question any more."

YAMAMOTO: "Well, then, although we can't yield, we'll give you some kind of a reply to that telegram."

KURUSU: "In any event, Miss Kimiko is leaving town tomorrow, and will remain in the country until Wednesday."

YAMAMOTO: "Will you please continue to do your best."

KURUSU: "Oh, yes. I'll do my best. And Nomura's doing everything too."

YAMAMOTO: "Oh, all right. In today's talks, there wasn't anything of special interest then?"

KURUSU: "No, nothing of particular interest, except that it is quite clear now that that southward—ah—the south, the south matter is having considerable effect."

YAMAMOTO: "I see. Well, then, good bye."

KURUSU: "Good bye."

Decode of Voice Code

"But without anything,—they want to keep on negotiating. In the meantime we have a crisis on hand and the army is champing at the bit. You know the army."

"Well,—we can't yield."

"In any event, the President is leaving town tomorrow, and will remain in the country until Wednesday."

25443

JD-1: 6890

(M) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 ()

*JD-1: 6915 (S. I. S. #25495). Outline of interview on 27 November with Roosevelt-Hull-Kurusu-Nomura.

**Probably #1189 (S. I. S. #25441-42). (JD-1: 6896). Washington reports the two proposals presented by the U. S. on 26 November.

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 27 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #1204

Re your #842*.

The United States has been conferring with the Netherlands on subjects pertaining to U. S. claims and because we asked them to do so. In the midst of these talks, the White House suddenly came forth with the announcement on the 24th, that the United States is occupying Dutch Guiana, with the agreement of the government of the Netherlands, for the purpose of protecting it.

As was made plain in the text of this announcement, the main objective of this occupation was to guarantee accessibility to aluminum produced there, which is vital to the national defense of the United States. Ordinarily, the Netherlands Government would dispatch its armed forces stationed in the Netherlands East Indies for this purpose, but she is unable to do so at present because of the present situation in the southwest Pacific area. For this reason, the U. S. Army is being used to protect the aluminum mines in that area. At the same time, at the invitation of the Netherlands Government, Brazil is also taking part in protecting them.

The Netherlands Foreign Minister stopped in the United States en route to visiting the Netherlands East Indies, and conferred with U. S. government officials. Since then, there has been a considerable increase in the amount of military supplies being shipped to the Netherlands East Indies; the traffic of technicians and experts between the United States and N. E. I., has swung up sharply. From these indications as well as from the history of the Netherlands East Indies, it is believed, that depending upon the atmosphere at the time the Japanese-U. S. negotiations break off, Britain and the United States may occupy the Netherlands East Indies. They will do this, probably, much in the same manner as U. S.-Brazil joint occupation of Netherlands Guiana, in the name of protecting the products of the N. E. I. which are vital to national defense, tin and rubber.

I feel that it is essential that we give careful consideration to this possibility. I made reference to this point in my message #1180**. The gist of this message does not differ from that contained in that message.

25535

JD-1: 6914

(D) Navy Trans. 11-29-41 (X)

*Not available.

**JD-1: 6991 (S. I. S. #25435-36).

[Secret]

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 27 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #1206 (In 4 parts, Part 4 not available)

On the 27th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the President. (Secretary Hull was also present.) The résumé of our talks follows:

The President: "In the last Great War, Japan and the United States were together on the side of the Allies. At that time, both

Japan and the United States were given ample proof that Germany failed to comprehend the way the people of other countries think.

"Since these conversations were begun, I am aware of the fact that much effort has been made by the Japanese side, too, by those who cherish peace. I am highly appreciative of this fact. It is clear that the majority of the American people are anxious to maintain peaceful relations with Japan. I am one of those who still harbors much hope that Japanese-U. S. relations will be settled peacefully."

I: "Your recent proposal will no doubt be the cause of painful disappointment to the Japanese Government."

The President: "To tell you the truth, I, too, am very disappointed that the situation has developed in the manner that it has. However, during the several months that these conversations were being conducted, cold water was poured on them when Japan occupied southern French Indo-China. According to recent intelligences, there are fears that a second cold water dousing may become an actuality." (He apparently meant the increase in our troops to French Indo-China and our occupation of Thai.) (See my message #1205*.) "I fully understand that the general public in Japan who has been living in war conditions for the past year, cannot see a parallel with conditions in the United States, which is living under peaceful conditions.

"During all of the time, however, that Your Excellency and Secretary Hull have been conversing, we have never heard of or seen concrete proof of any peaceful intention by the leading elements of Japan. This has made these talks an exceedingly difficult undertaking.

(Part 2)

"Even the suggestion that the present situation be overcome by a 'modus vivendi' would be without any value if in the final analysis the basic principles of international relations of Japan and the United States do not agree. If there is a basic difference, no stop gap measure could carry any weight, it seems to me.

"In my conversations with Churchill on the high seas, for example, it was predetermined that our respective basic policies coincided. Moreover, even the subjects which were to be agreed upon had been clearly defined in advance."

Kurusu: "Judging from the records of the developments of our negotiations in the past, the differences of opinions between Japan and the United States were not differences in the basic principles of each. Rather, the differences arose in the practical applications thereof. For a very simple example Japan has no disagreements to the principle of non-discriminatory treatment of commerce, strongly advocated by the United States.

"However, it is when we consider the immediate application of this principle in China, bringing about a radical and sudden change in the economic situation there, it is only natural that Japan insists upon certain special conditions. I feel that this difference may have been the source of some misunderstanding."

Hull: "By your frequent explanations, we thoroughly understand that point. According to advice I have received, however, there are approximately 250,000 Japanese merchants in China at present who followed or accompanied the military. These are engaging in various business enterprises. There have been indications that various incidents have arisen involving the relations between these merchants

and nationals of a third country. If you are going to consider the profits of these people, the problem of course will become an exceedingly difficult one."

Kurusu: "Japan's claims are not based on such minor factors, but concern only the various major problems."

(Part 3)

We then went on and brought up the subject which has reference to the President's "suggestions".

The President: "have not abandoned giving consideration to that matter. However, it is first essential that both Japan and China simultaneously desire that that be done."

We pointed out that from a practical standpoint that would be very difficult to accomplish. To this, the President said:

"In domestic issues, I have had several experiences along the same lines. No doubt, some method will be found in this case, too."

I. "We have, as yet, received no instructions from Tokyo regarding your proposal. I, for one, hope that you, Mr. President, whose statesmanship I respect highly after over thirty years of close acquaintance with it, will find some way that will lead to a settlement."

The President: "To tell you the truth, I have since the end of last week, twice postponed a trip which I was going to take for my health, because of a critical domestic issue, and because of the arrival of Ambassador Kurusu to the United States. I am leaving tomorrow afternoon, Friday, for the country for a rest." (He looked very tired). "I plan to return next Wednesday. I would like to talk with you again then. It would be very gratifying, however, if some means of a settlement could be discovered in the meantime."

(Part 4 not available.)

25495

JD-1: 6915

(D) Navy Trans. 11-29-41 (X)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

27 November 1941

(Purple)

#1206 (Part 4 of 4) (Parts 1, 2, and 3 previously translated)

In the middle of our talks, Hull, with reference to the cause for the failure to agree upon a modus vivendi, said:

"There are other factors other than those pointed out by the President. Japan has sent vast numbers of troops to French Indo-China with which to keep the military powers of other countries checked. With this advantage on her side, Japan carries in one hand, the Tripartite Pact, and in the other, the Anti-Communism Pact. Armed with these, she demands of the United States that petroleum be made available to her.

"It would be absolutely impossible to reconcile the people of the United States to granting such a demand. As I stated during our last conversations, while we here are putting forth our best efforts in attempting to bring about peaceful settlements of Japanese-U. S.

differences, your Premier nor your Foreign Minister nor any other influential person utters not a single word nor moves one finger to facilitate these talks of ours. On the contrary, they insist upon promoting the establishment of a New Order through might. This is an exceedingly regrettable state of affairs."

Parts 1, 2, & 3 see S. I. S. 25495.

25608

JD-1: 6915

(D) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 28, 1941.
Purple (CA)
#844

Re your #1189 *

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 ^b and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

Army 25445

JD 6898

Trans. 11-28-41 (S)

* S. I. S. # 25441, # 25442.
^b S. I. S. # 25435, # 25436.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
November 28, 1941
J 19 (Priority)
#118

Re your #232 *

To be handled in government code.

Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication being severed when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the

usual telegraphic channels. Do not destroy the codes without regard to the actual situation in your locality, but retain them as long as the situation there permits and until the final stage is entered into.

Army 25859

Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

^a Not available.
^b S. I. S. #25432 in which Tokyo sends a circular giving hidden-meaning words which will be broadcast in the event that code communication is cut off.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Hanoi

November 28, 1941

Purple (YO)

#93

Re your #118 ^a.

The trend of Japan-American negotiations is as I told you in my circular #2414 ^b. The current outlook is as I delineated in my circular #2416 ^b. Even though the worst possible situation developed, and it will in all likelihood, the Imperial Government has made no decisions with regard to changing the position of the French Indo-Chinese Government. Therefore, I would like to have you give due consideration to the policy of maintaining the status quo for the time being. If you have no objections, bearing this in mind, I would have you act with prudence.

We have transmitted this to France and Germany.

Army 25547

Trans. 12-1-41 (5)

^a S. I. S. #25345 in which Hanoi suggests that they be advised as early as possible whether the status quo will be maintained as far as French Indo-China's governmental set-up is concerned, so that pre-arrangements can be made.

^b Not available.

[Secret]

From: Rio

To: Santiago

November 28, 1941

J-19

Circular #326 (Message from Tokyo Circular #2416)

(To be handled in Government code)

Concerning Japanese-American negotiations, the counter proposal presented to us by the United States on the 27th, overlooks all we stand for; therefore, of course we disregard it. There is nothing to do but break off negotiations, and our relations with England and the United States within the next few days will assuredly take a critical turn. The above is for your information only.

Army 26000

Trans. 12/9/41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 28, 1941

Purple (Priority)

#1209. To be handled in Government Code.

What the Imperial Government must, of course, consider is what Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and China, egged on by the United States, will do in case the Imperial forces invade Thailand. Even supposing there is no armed collision with British forces, in the Oral Statement of President ROOSEVELT on the 17th of this month he prophesied that suitable action would be taken immediately in case Japan carries on any further penetration beyond French Indo-China. Moreover, newspaper reports at present would tend to lead to the conclusion that, even though England and the United States might not oppose us militarily within Thai, the United States assisting all nations concerned would adopt the policy of so-called joint defense throughout the whole southwestern Pacific area; thus, as I said in my #1204 *, there is no slight possibility that she might occupy the Netherlands Indies on the excuse that this action would be necessary for purposes of defense. I am sure you already have all these things in your mind, but in view of the gravity of the present situation, I just wanted to remind you again.

Army 25793

Trans. 12-6-41 (X)

* S. I. S. #25535 in which Ambassador NOMURA discusses the United States' occupation of Dutch Guiana and says it is believed that, depending upon the atmosphere at the time the Japanese-American relations break off, Britain and the United States may occupy the Netherlands East Indies. He says it is essential that the Japanese give careful consideration to this possibility.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 28, 1941

Purple

#1214. To be handled in Government Code

Re my #1190*

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the paper: "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

This we must carefully note.

Army 25548

Trans. 12-1-41 (2)

* S. I. S. #25444 and #25480 in which NOMURA expresses the danger of the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption.

[Secret]

From: Hsinking
 To: Tokyo
 November 28, 1941
 Purple
 #781. Strictly Secret

To be handled in Government Code.

In view of the situation, after conferring with the competent authorities, the following measures having to do with the treatment of British and American nationals in Manchukuo in the event that war breaks out with England and the United States are as outlined below. We are unanimously agreed on these matters. Should there be any questions regarding them, please wire me at once.

I. *Policy.* On the outbreak of war with England and the United States, after you have at the appropriate time gathered all these nationals together, they are to be returned each to his own homeland at as early a date as possible. However, until this return can be arranged, they are to be interned in places of concentration in Manchukuo.

The control of such property as they might leave behind will be administered by the Manchukuo Government.

II. *Detailed outline.*

1. Persons to be interned:
 - a. British nationals—339.
 - b. American citizens—81.
 - c. Of these, consular officials and Catholic missionaries are to be given preferential treatment.
 - d. Nationals of the Soviet or other third powers observed to be obnoxious characters with pro-British and American leanings are to be suitably taken care of.
2. *Time and Method of Internment.*
 - a. Persons mentioned in the paragraph above are to be advised to get in touch with the Japanese Chief of Detention. They are to be concentrated in the three areas, Harbin, Mukden and Chōkinshū.*
 - b. Then, depending on negotiations, they will be returned each to his own country. When evacuation is through the Soviet, we will release them at Manchuli, and when they are to be transported to Shanghai, they will be released in Dairen.
 - c. This will be carried out by the Manchukuo Police authorities. (In Kwantung Province the procedure will be controlled by the Provincial Police Office.)
 - d. All property left behind is to be administered through legal measures by the Manchukuo Government.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
29 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#857

Re my #844*

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

25496

JD-1: 6921

(F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6898 (S. I. S. 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be 'de facto' ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
29 November 1941
(Purple)
#1216

In the Washington special intelligence dated the 28th concerning the White House interview, President Roosevelt is the person meant where reference is made to "authoritatively stated" and to an "administration spokesman". We understand that Roosevelt particularly requested that the source be kept unclear.

(Please exercise caution in handling this).

25711

JD-1: 7038

(D) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Berlin

To: Tokyo

29 November 1941

(Purple)

#1393 (In 3 parts, complete)

By his request, I was supposed to have called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop during the evening of yesterday, the 28th. Suddenly, however, he requested that the time be postponed and it was not until 10:30 at night that I finally saw him.

This delay was occasioned by the fact that a long conference of the bigwigs of the government and military, from Goering down, was being held at the official residence of the Fuehrer. The war against the Soviet Union has now taken definite shape and the outcome can be unerringly foretold. Next year's campaigns were mapped at this conference, taking into consideration the points brought up at the conference of the various Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Europe. It is an absolute certainty that Japan's moves were also given discussion at this conference.

1. Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any reports regarding the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.

Ribbentrop: "It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan.

"As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations being concluded successfully, because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.

"If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself."

I: "I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and the United States?"

Ribbentrop: "Roosevelt's a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he would do."

Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops*, and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech as well as that of Ribbentrop's, I feel that German attitude toward the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.

(Part 2)

2. I made inquiries as to the future of the war against the Soviet Union.

Ribbentrop: "The Fuehrer has stated that he is now determined to crush the Soviet Union to an even greater extent than he had planned at first. He is now bent on completely wiping out that state and went on to announce that practically all of the main military objectives had been attained and that a greater part of the German troops would shortly be brought back to Germany.

"Following up those campaigns, the Caucasus campaign will be launched in earnest. Next Spring Germany will advance to and cross the Ural Mountains and chase Stalin deep into Siberia."

I: "Approximately when do you expect that?"

Ribbentrop: "The campaign will be launched in about May of next year, according to present schedules."

I: "According to what you say, Germany is apparently preparing to gamble quite a bit in her Russian campaign. We hope that air connections between Germany and Manchukuo can be established at an early time."

Ribbentrop: "That is an item that Germany has been considering for some time. By summer of next year I do not believe that air connection from the Ural area to Manchukuo will be an impossibility."

3. I then asked him about the campaign against England proper to which he replied that before launching landing operations against England, Germany will probably completely wipe out Britain's influence in the Near East, Africa, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea. I got the impression that more emphasis is being placed on this area than heretofore. So, I asked whether it was Germany's intention to conclude the war without attempting to go through with a campaign against England.

Ribbentrop: "Germany has, of course, made all necessary preparations for this campaign. However, Germany is in receipt of intelligences which would seem to indicate that all is not well within England herself. For example, we hear that there is a split within the ranks of the Conservatives; that Churchill's influence is on the wane; that Bevin, Chief of the Labor Party, is advocating revolutionary measures. All of these are tending to make the preservation of order there increasingly difficult.

"Of course, I am not one to implicitly believe all of this. However, I am convinced that things are getting bad in England. Under these circumstances, it may be that Germany's various other campaigns may cause England to fall even without our going through with our landing operations against England herself.

(Part 3)

"In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever, in international affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share of the African colonies. Germany desires above all else, to control European Russia."

4. In conclusion, I said: "I am fully aware of the fact that Germany's war campaign is progressing according to schedule smoothly. How-

ever, suppose that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only Great Britain as an actual enemy but also have all of those areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?"

Ribbentrop: "We would like to end this war during next year. However, under certain circumstances, it is possible that it will have to be continued on into the following year.

"Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point."

In closing this conference, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested that the contents of our talks be kept a strict secret. Please, therefore, exercise particular caution in handling this message.

I have shown copies of this message to the military and naval attache's, Lt-Gen. (Vice Adm.?) Nomura, and Maj-Gen (Rear Adm.?) Abe. Please show a copy to the Army and Navy authorities in Tokyo, too.

(In the last section of the first part of this message, we wrote * * * "the U. S. would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops" * * * That should have read: "the U. S. would undoubtedly try to avoid war".)

25556

JD-1: 6942

(D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (7)

* See end of message.

[Secret]

From: Bangkok

To: Tokyo

29 November 1941

(Purple)

#872 (In 2 parts, complete)

Re my #855.*

As a result of my conversation with PIBUN**, I have been able to ascertain his attitude to a large degree, and therefore through Yoshioka who as the outside agency of the Naval Attache's office, we have suggested to SIN and WANITTO*** that, in the event of Thai's abandoning her neutrality policy in the future, it would be better both from the standpoint of face and also for material reasons for her to go through the formality herself of requesting cooperative action from the nation concerned, rather than to be put in the position of being compelled to consent to it because of pressure brought to bear. The shifts within the government mentioned in my caption message, are a result of the above. When SIN heard this from Yoshioka, he said that this is a matter he has been concerned over the past two years, and as he feels that he himself is the most suitable person to handle the matter he promised to put forth every effort for its realization. He is also said to have told WANITTO that the matter should be left to him. WANITTO and SIN are keeping in touch with us through Yoshioka in regard to subsequent developments within the government, and we are giving them appropriate

guidance under cover. The main points of the same are as follows: (Yoshioka's mediation in this puts him in a "delicate" position in relation to the army attache' so this should be kept absolutely confidential within the department).

(1) Whenever there is discussion in the cabinet the points raised are, the real intentions of Japan, that is, the meaning of the East Asia Coprosperity plan, the involvements of the southward expansion policy, the extent of commodity supplying, and the duration of the time of stationing troops. Great Britain seizes upon these points and furnishes all kinds of contradictory material with which to keep the pro-British elements busy. To meet this WANITTO presents the absolute necessity of union between Japan and Thai and this has already become the firm conviction of the pro-Japanese group, and there thus is no need for further discussion as far as they are concerned. However the opposition have been bringing up troublesome arguments and hold tenaciously thereto. Since it was so difficult to convince them an appeal was made to us for material with which to counter them and their arguments.

(2) Since then the pro-Japanese group have been having better success in their attempts, and their position has become more favorable. As a result the opposition, since about the 25th has kept silent. However, the matter has not been concluded.

(Part 2 being translated)

From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
29 November 1941
(Purple)
#872 (Part 2 of 2)

3. The question of joint military action between Thai and Japan has already been brought up by the pro-Japanese faction, but up to date, they have expressed a desire to pursue a course of strict neutrality. They had taken a fairly firm stand that the first one, regardless of whether this be Britain or Japan, who makes the first move shall be considered Thai's enemy. Therefore, for Japan to be looked upon as Thai's helper, she should put Britain in a position to be the first aggressor. For the purpose of accomplishing this, Japan should carefully avoid Thai territory, and instead, land troops in the neighborhood of KOTAPARU in British territory, which would almost certainly force Britain to invade Thailand from PATANBESSA. The consequence would be Thai's declaration of war on Britain.

This strategy is being given careful consideration. Apparently this plan has the approval of Chief of Staff BIJITTO. Our naval Attache has advised the Naval General Staff, also, I think.

4. WANITTO and SIN are both considerably concerned of the weak character of PIBUN. As a means of making PIBUN make a decision, they think that it would be well to have some outside pressure brought to bear on him. As one means, they suggest that some undesirable Japanese be forcibly removed from Thai by Japan, and then to publicize this as the forerunner of a general evacuation of Japanese nationals from Thai.

From the above and from other considerations, including that of the tone of PIBUN's radio broadcast which was reported in my message #871****, the situation here may show some unexpectedly speedy and

favorable developments. I feel that we should not fumble this situation, but should proceed carefully and take the best advantage of it.

25499

JD-1: 6923

(D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6881 (S. I. S. #25417).
 **Premier and Foreign Minister.
 ***Actively in charge of Foreign Office.
 ****Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Berlin
 November 30, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #985. (Part 1 of 3)*

Re my Circular #2387.^b

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986 *) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

Army 25552

JD: 6943

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

* Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S. I. S. #25553
^b Not available.
 • See S. I. S. #25554, 25555.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Berlin
 November 30, 1941.
 Purple (CA)
 #985. (Part 3 of 3)

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.

Army 25553

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Berlin

November 30, 1941

Purple

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code)
(Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

Army 25554

Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Berlin
 November 30, 1941
 Purple
 #986. (Part 2 of 2)

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

Army 25555

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST)
 Telephone Code
 TransPacific Radio Telephone

(NOTE.—Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night)

Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

Yamamoto: "Yes. I see."

Kurusu: "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y: "Is there any special significance to this?"

K: "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."

Y: "Is that so?"

K: "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving."

(Pause.)

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."

Y: "We *are* being careful."

K: "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." (i. e. Premier's speech)

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code.)

K: "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan.)

Y: "No particular ---- (one or two words faded out) ----"

K: "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y: "Yes."

K: "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches ! ! ! ! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."

Y: "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K: "Let's see—this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause.)

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"

Y: "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K: "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y: "Well then—Goodbye."

25497

JD-1: 6922

(M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 30, 1941

Purple

#1222 (Secret)

Premier TOJO's speech was published here on the 30th in the newspapers under conspicuous headlines. They printed especially noticeably the sentence, "The exploitation of the Asiatics by Americans 'must be purged with vengeance'." On the other hand, according to the newspapers, a White House secretary has issued an announcement to the effect that Secretary HULL had at once telephoned the President, resting at Warm Springs, concerning the Premier's speech and, as a result, the President, changing his schedule, was leaving Warm Springs on the afternoon of the 30th and is expected to return to Washington on the morning of the first. Inasmuch as this speech will be used extensively for propaganda purposes by the Americans, will you please take suitable steps. Furthermore, will you please send me at once copies of the text (both Japanese and English)?

Army 25761

Trans. 12/5/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Manila (Nihro)
 To: Tokyo
 November 30, 1941
 Purple (Priority)
 #809

Due to the straining of international relations, we have destroyed in readiness for emergency out of the codes kept at this office the Yokohama Special Bank code, the TU code, MATU Chinese Character List (it was, of course, reported in my #806 (?)) on the 29th.

As a result we find it impossible to decipher your message of the 29th (Yokohama Special Bank request telegram — number of words 18.)

Will you please wire the same in the Foreign Office code.

25862

Trans. 12/7/41 (6)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 1 December 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #865

Re my #857*.

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

25605

JD-1: 6983

(D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6921 (S. I. S. #25496).
 **JD-1: 6710 (S. I. S. #25138).
 ***Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 1 December 1941
 (Purple)
 Circular #2436

When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval Attache's office there and make use of chemicals

they have on hand for this purpose. The Attaché should have been advised by the Navy Ministry regarding this.

25545

JD-1: 6939

(D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

1 December 1941

(Purple)

Circular #2444

The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. Regardless of the contents of my Circular message #2447*, the U. S. (office) retains the machines and the machine codes.

Please relay to France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey from Switzerland; and to Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico from Washington.

25606

JD-1: 6984

(D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: London

1 December 1941

(Purple)

Circular #2443

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

In regard to the disposition of the machine please be very careful to carry out the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to taking apart and breaking up the important parts of the machine.

As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one word SETUJU in plain language and as soon as you have carried out the instructions wire the one word HASSO in plain language.

Also at this time you will of course burn the machine codes and the YŪ GŌ No. 26 of my telegram. (The rules for the use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador resident in England.)

25787

JD-1: 7091

(H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (L)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.

To: Hsinking.

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#893

----- In the event that Manchuria participates in the war ----- in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan..

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

25783

JD-1: 7092

(H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (5-AR)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#1225 (Part 1 of 3)*

When I and Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on the 1st, we conveyed to him the matter contained in your message #857*. Roughly speaking, Hull's reply stayed within the bounds of his earlier explanations. He placed the most emphasis on two points, namely, the tone and trend of the Japanese Government's expressions and movements and that of the general public opinion organs; and, the increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China.

From the beginning of today's conference, Secretary Hull wore a deeply pained expression. Without wasting any time, he brought up the subject of the Premier's statement, (see my message #1222**), and said that that was one of the reasons for the President's sudden return to Washington. (Upon our arrival at the State Department, we found not only newspaper men, but even some members of the Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these speculators were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic.)

We, therefore, replied that we were convinced that the Premier's statement had been erroneously and exaggeratedly reported in the vernacular. We pointed out that regardless of who the speaker may be if only an excerpt from his speech is reported, without having the entire text available, it is quite possible that the reader will get exactly the opposite meaning from that intended by the speaker.

We went on to advise the Secretary that we were at present awaiting the delivery of the entire text.

During the course of our explanations, the Secretary showed visible signs of relief.

He said: "Since our talks were begun recently, there has not been a single indication of endorsement and support from Japan. I have not heard of any steps being taken in Japan aimed at facilitating these conversations, all of which is exceedingly regrettable."

25778

(D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

JD-1: 7042

* For Part 2 see S. I. S. #25715.

*JD-1: 6021 (S. I. S. #25496).

**Available, dated 30 November (S. I. S. #25761).

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and 3 not available)

(Message having the indicator 20803* is part one of three.)

For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and dissatisfaction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the President recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, after over four years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense.

Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by successfully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give his support and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in this direction.

With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China . . . the government of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it has been receiving report after report during the past few days, from U. S. officials stationed in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army and navy; the landing of various types of arms; and the movements of transport vessels. Concern is felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was that they feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in the southwestern Pacific area).

As to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the Japanese army and navy joins forces with the Germans; even if, in actuality, that is not what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible eventuality, and all nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces in that area.

25715

JD-1: 7042

(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (7)

*Not available, probably is Part 1 of this message.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#1225 (Part 3 of 3)

(Purple)

Hull: "In the final analysis, that means that Hitlerism is being given indirect support, and for this reason please exercise the utmost of caution.

"In view of the fact that Japan is acting in the manner described above, there is absolutely no way of bringing about a settlement of the situation.

"Disruptions in Japanese-U. S. relations is exceedingly unfortunate, not only for our two countries, but to the world in general. There shall be nothing constructive about a Japanese-U. S. war. We fully realize that it can be nothing other than destructive. For this reason, we are still highly desirous of bringing these conversations to a successful conclusion.

"However, with the existence of the above described conditions, and because of the nature of this country, the Secretary of State and the President are placed in an exceedingly difficult position."

I: "It seems mutually regrettable that all of our efforts which lead to the 21 June and 25 September proposals, should have been in vain."

In general he expressed his agreement to this.

Hull: "The recent situation in Japan and the U. S. public opinion made it necessary for us to return to the most recent proposal."

We then said that behind the problems at hand, there has always been the China problem.

"As I have pointed out on several occasions", I said, "this has been the bitterest experience since the Washington Conference. Peace between Japan and China could not be attained through any such terms as were contained in your most recent proposal. We hear your argument to the effect that you cannot stand by and do nothing while China dies. The converse of that argument should be even stronger. That is, that it is of the utmost importance for us to avoid standing by and watching our own respective countries die, just because of the China problem."

Hull indicated his agreement with this, but went on to say:

"Because the situation is as I have already described, I hope that Japan will take steps to bring about order through her public organs."

25778

JD-1: 7042

(D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#1226

Re my #1222*

Following up the reporting of Premier Tojo's speech, the press here carried reports of the speech delivered by Vice President Ando of the Imperial Rules Assistance Association, on the 30th. Special attention was paid in these dispatches to those parts of the speech in which the Vice President advocated the reinvigorating of the alliance ties with Germany and Italy, and where he pointed out the United States as being the biggest obstacle to the establishment of the Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere.

This report together with the report of President Roosevelt's sudden decision to return immediately to Washington and the disclosure of Hull's conferences with the British Ambassador on the 29th and the 30th, is attracting considerable attention of the general public

The general tone of these reports is that Roosevelt decided to cut his vacation short and rush back to Washington because Hull advised him by telephone that Premier Tojo had made an unusually strong speech, and relayed to him that a Far Eastern crisis may be at hand. Within governmental circles, although decisive comments were withheld, the general opinion seems to be that Tojo's speech indicates the refusal of the Japanese Government to accept the proposals submitted to it by the United States on the 26th. These circles also seem to feel that the speech indicated Japan's decision to give up hope for the talks and to resort to stronger measures.

The press on the 1st carried a U. P. dispatch from Tokyo reporting that though Japan was not satisfied with the United States' reply, Japan is desirous of having the discussions continue for at least two more weeks. In view of the reports of the Premier's speech, this report has an ominous tone about it.

Some of the newspapers comment that since Japan's invasion of Thai has already been definitely mapped out, the above is merely a means of stalling for time so as to give the Japanese a chance to seize the most opportune moment with respect to developments in Europe. to launch this attack.

25726

JD-1: 7054

(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#1227

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

25727

JD-1: 7055

(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#1230

Re your #865.*

The immediate reasons for the President's sudden return to Washington are as I reported in my message #1222**. Basically speaking, however, the United States has been aroused against us by the reports of Premier Tojo's speech to Parliament, and by the speech of Cabinet official Kaya and Suzuki to the Convention of the Imperial Rules Assistance Association. The dispatches concerning these speeches gave one the impression that anti-foreignism, crushing of Britain and the United States, were the points most emphasized.

Japan's true motives are being further doubted here because of the reports of increased troop movements in French Indo-China.

Thus, in the midst of this atmosphere, fraught with suspicion as it was, the report of Premier Tojo's speech arrived, in which it was alleged that the Premier advocated the purging of all Britons and Americans out of the Far East.

Since the alleged speech was made at a time when the United States was expectantly awaiting our reply to their official note of the 26th to Japan, particular importance was attached to it. (It is possible that the U. S. Government assumes that the speech was made by way of expressing our complete disapproval of the U. S. proposal and that it foreshadowed our launching a military campaign. Some of the newspapers go to the extreme of commenting that if the speech is given a literal interpretation it can mean nothing except a declaration of war.)

The President's speeches concerning foreign affairs are consistently very cautiously worded, for they are usually taken as a description of U. S. national policy. It is almost natural that people who are accustomed to interpret speeches in that manner, reacted the way they did to the Premier's speech.

I assume that you have already taken measures to do so, but may I suggest that when the Prime Minister or any Cabinet officer is to touch upon Foreign Affairs, careful consideration be given to those factors. I make this suggestion only because our country is at a very critical point in her history. Even if the worst eventuality

materializes, we should be in a position to show all neutrals and outsiders the complete innocence on our part.

25728

JD-1: 7056

(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

*JD-1: 6983 (S. I. S. #25605).

**Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Washington

December 2, 1941

Purple

CORRECTED TRANSLATION

#867. (Strictly Secret)

1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code (Oite) and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)

2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.

3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "haruna."

4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.

5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic Official KOSAKA brought you. (Hence, the necessity of getting in contact with Mexico mentioned in my #860^a is no longer recognized.)

Army 25640

Translated 12-3-41 (X) Corrected 12-4-41

^a S. I. S. #25550 in which Tokyo wires Washington advising them to have KOSAKA return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru which sails on the 28th. If this makes it impossible for KOSAKA to make his trip to Mexico, make some other arrangements with regard to KOSAKA's business in Mexico.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Havana

December 2, 1941

J 19-K 9

Circular #2445 Strictly secret.

Take great pains that this does not leak out.

You are to take the following measures immediately:

1. With the exception of one copy of the O and L code, you are to burn all telegraph codes (this includes the code books for communication between the three departments and the code books for Army and Navy communication).

2. As soon as you have completed this operation, wire the one word Haruna.

3. Burn all secret documents and the work sheets on this message.

4. Be especially careful not to arouse the suspicion of those on the outside. Confidential documents are all to be given the same handling.

The above is preparatory to an emergency situation and is for your information alone. Remain calm — — —.

Also sent to Ottawa, Vancouver, Panama, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Seattle and Portland.

Army 25879

Trans. 12/8/41 (3)

[Secret]

From: Bern (Mitani)
To: Ankara
December 2, 1941
J 19-K 9

(Tokyo Circular #2447)

Orders have been issued to our diplomatic officials in North America (including Manila), Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas (including Timor), Singora, Chienmai, and to all our officials in British (including our Embassy in London) and Netherlands territory to inform me immediately upon the burning of all their telegraphic codes except one copy of *Oite* and "*L*".

Relay from Berlin to Lisbon, Helsinki, Budapest and Vienna; Relay from Rome to Bucharest, ———; relay from Berne to Vichy, Ankara, Lisbon, Madrid; relay from Rio to Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago, ———, Mexico, Panama, Bogota; relay from Bangkok to Hanoi, Saigon; relay from Canton to Haihow, ———.

Army 25837

Trans. 12/6/41 (M)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Singapore
December 2, 1941
Purple

Circular #2450 (5 parts complete.)

Re my Circular #2409^a.

We have drawn up the following table for the particular needs of your localities to supplement for the already given list.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
KIKUTI	Shipments on the road whereby CHIANG receives assistance (the Burma road ?) are now very lively.
KAGEYAMA	Shipments along the road whereby CHIANG receives assistance (the Burma road ?) have now virtually stopped.
(DE ?)GUTI	... (blank) ... (blank) ... has been forced backward at ... (blank) ...
AYAOKA	The Burmese Independence movement is gradually gaining momentum. The officers are endeavoring to quell this with every resource, however, the movement is gradually growing more fierce.
ITAGISI	On the ... the Burma ... (blank) ... was attacked by the Independents wing with pistols (or dynamite).
FUKUNISI	On the ... th in the ... (blank) ... area rioting broke out.

Code Word
MIYAMOTO

Meaning
I will continue the action I described to you until advised by you to do otherwise, then I will end it immediately.

(Part II)

KITAMURA

Recently . . . (blank) . . . American military planes arrived at . . . (blank) . . .

MUTO

. . . (blank) . . . and pilots numbering . . . (blank) . . . arrived at . . . (blank) . . .

NAGAOKA

. . . (blank) . . . divisions of . . . (blank) . . . troops arrived at . . . (blank) . . . and left for . . . (blank) . . . on the . . . th.

INABA

. . . (blank) . . . divisions of . . . (blank) . . . troops are reportedly concentrated on the . . . (blank) . . . border.

YASIROEN

The Independents movement at . . . (blank) . . . and negotiations thwarting England are now progressing smoothly.

TUMURA

At present there is a total of . . . (blank) . . . enemy merchant men docked at . . . (blank) . . .

HINO

Merchant ships now docked at . . . (blank) . . . are as follows: American . . . (blank) . . . ; British . . . (blank) . . . ; Netherlands . . . (blank) . . .

NAGAI

. an merchant ships left for . . . (blank) . . . loaded with arms.

HIGUTI

Our means of communication with Burma and the South Seas is disrupted and we cannot receive.

SEGAWA

Our resident Nationals have been camped.

Part III

YASUI
NARUSE

It is reported that riots are breaking out. Progressing with preparations to bomb oil fields.

KUBOTA
NIBA

Oil fields bombed.

The residents of ————— area re preparing to flee.

MOORI

Orders issued to residents of . . . (blank) . . . area to flee.

SEKYA
TUKAMOTO
OCHIAI
KURIBARA
NISIYAMA
YAMANOUTI
NOSE
KURODA
HIRAI
INOYAMA
ENDOO

Morale wavering.

Netherlanders.

Japanese Nitta Natives.

Japanese.

Premier.

Specialists' Commission.

High tide (?)

Some officers and private citizens -----.

Telegraphy.

The Yamashita Agency.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
ATUKAI	The Nakamura Company.
KOIZUMI	India.
ABE	Java.
EDOGUTI	Sumatra.
HIROSE	Celebes.
HUKUI	Borneo.
INOUE	_____
FUKA	British India.
KASAURA	Ceylon.
IKAWA	_____
 (Part IV)	
HUJIMURA	Hainan Island.
IJIMA	The Spratleys.
ARIASA	Singapore.
HURUYA	Pinan.
NIWA	Bangkok.
KAMIYA	Chien mai* _____ Singora.
ISIDA	Saigon.
NINOMIYA	_____
HOSOKAWA	_____
NEZU	Tonkin.
YOKOTA	Cambodia.
NUMATA	_____
WATANZAKA	Manila.
NOZAKI	_____
KERI	Batavia.
SEKINE	Menado.
SERISAWA	Makassar.
SONE	_____
ANDO	Pankaran-Brandan*.
DOBASI	Pankan Susu*.
FUKUSIMA	Mandalay.
HAKAMATSU	Palembang.

PART V

ISTUMOTO	Jambi.
NAKINO	Tarakan.
MAKINO	Pa _____ Pan.
SAKURAI	Sageirinda*.
TAKANO	Sanga Sanga*.
UEDA	Puura*.
YANAGIYA	Banka*.
WATAGI	Biriton*.
EGAWA	Sunda*.
AIDA	Malacca.
BANDO	Sumaran*.
FUNABASI	Timor.
IKEDA	New Guinea.
KATAGIRI	Lashio.
MIZOCUTI	The Perurisu* region.
NUKADA	The Geta* region.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
SAWAKAWA	The Kota Bharu Region.
TAKESITA	East.
UTSUNOMIYA	West.
YAMANE	South.
ARAMAKI	North.
DOOKE	Island.

Army 25943

Trans. 12/9/41 (NR)

* See S. I. S. #25609 in which Tokyo sends out a circular containing hidden-meaning words to be used as an emergency system for dispatches.

*Kana spelling.

[Secret]

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)

To : Santiago

2 December 1941

(J 19)

Circular #328

Tokyo to Rio de Janeiro as Circular #2431, 29th November

Re my Circular #2409.*

Additions to the list already sent; please use with others.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
KASIMA	Have Japanese living there been interned?
KANŌ	Japanese living here are all safe.
KIKUTI	Japanese living here have all been interned.
KATUNO	Some of Japanese living here have been interned.
KAWASIMO	The wave length of General Information broadcast will be changed to . . kilocycles from . . . (day) . . . (month) . . .
KAKAO (Kayao)	Reception of General Information broadcast bad, please change wave length.
TUJIKITA	Please change wave length of General Information broadcast to a shorter wave length than the present wave length.
TABUSE (Tabuti)	Please change wave length of General Information broadcast to a longer wave length.
SAITŌ	The time of General Information broadcast is to be changed starting on . . . (day) . . . from . . . (time) . . . to . . . (time) . . .
HAYASAKI	Please change time of General Information broadcast, starting on . . . (day) . . . to, from . . . (time) . . . to . . . (time) . . .
ISEZAKI	100 (hyaku).
WANAMI	1,000 (sen).
YASUNO	10,000 (man).
UNO	100,000 (jyu man).
ITIOTA	1,000,000 (hyaku man).
(perhaps ITIOKA)	
(probably UTIOKA)	

26144

JD-1:

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)

To: Santiago

2 December 1941

(J 19)

Circular #329 (In 3 parts, complete)

Tokyo to Rio as Circular #2432, on 29 Nov.

Re my Circular #2409*.

The following are added this date to my Circular #2409*, for special use in your area. Please use them together with the others, (after making them up in a table).

(Translator's note. Underlined values are doubtful due to garbles. Probable correct value added below in parenthesis.)

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
ASHINA*	From . . . (blank) . . . (date), Japanese ships stopping here will not be allowed to take on fuel.
DATE*	Please telegraph probable amount of . . . (blank) . . . that can be imported.
KAWAHARA	I estimate we can probably import about . . . (blank) . . . tons of . . . (blank) . . .
NIWAGUCHI (Kawaguchi)	It is impossible to carry out . . . (blank)
NAKAMUTA (Nakamura)	. . . Are in the process of arranging for importation of . . . (blank) . . .
SATUNAKATA (Munakata)	Send communications via . . . (blank)
KAZAMA	. . . (country).
TOKUSIMA	Communications will be through offices stationed in . . . (blank) . . . (country).
TAKENOUTI	Japanese ship should arrive in . . . (blank)
YA GI (YANAGI)	. . . (country) on . . . (blank) . . . (month)
TONEGI	. . . (blank) . . . (day).
	Is it possible for Japanese ships to come to . . . (blank) . . . (country)?
	It is not possible to send Japanese ships to . . . (blank) . . . (country).
	It is possible to send Japanese ship(s) to . . . (blank) . . . (country).

(Part 2)

TAKAGI	Minerals
SAWAMURA	Lead.
SUMI (Kasumi)	Mercury.
IWASAKI	Petroleum.
HIROHATA	Diamonds for industrial use.
ITAMI	Platinum.
KADA	Copper.
NAKAGAWA	Carat.
MAEHATA	Peru.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
MASUKO	Chile.
SENEDA	Colombia.
TAKENAKA	Paraguay or Uruguay (?)
SIMAZU	Paraguay or Uruguay. (?)
IMAZAWA	Venezuela.
FUJIKAKE	San QINY**
HASIMOTO	Cuba.
SINDO	Havana.
TIBA	Rio de Janeiro.
TOZAWA	Sao Paulo.

(Part 3)

HASEGAWA	Riberao Preto.
IRIFUNE	Santos.
ENOMOTO	Bauril.
BEPPU	Curityba.
TIKAMATU	Belem.
SUETUGU	Buenos Aires.
OKIZUMI	Santiago.
YAMATO	Lima.
UMEGAWA	Bogota.
HARA	Caracas.
ISONO	Montevideo. (?)
FUKAMATI	Asuncion.

Relay from Rio de Janeiro to TPT***, Lima, Sao Paulo. Mexico
City relay to Washington, Panama, Havana, Caracas (?), Bogota.

25830

JD-1

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

*JD-1: 6985 (S. I. S. #25900). List of code names to be used in plain language messages, with indicator
S T O P at end.

**Code value is QINY, (probably Salvador or Domingo).

***Probably "Buenos Aires and Santiago."

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
Purple
#1232 (Part 1 of 2)

COMPLETED TRANSLATION

Re my #1231.*

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233.* Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that

she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

Army 25659-B

Trans. 12/3/41 (7)

* Not available.

*Original translation incomplete from this point on.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

December 2, 1941

Purple

#1232 (Part 2 of 2)

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot over-emphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settle-

ment. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233*.

Army 25660

Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

December 2, 1941

Purple (Urgent)

#1234

Strictly Secret.

Re your #862*.

I knew that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE at the State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE said, "At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate and dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was the American newspapers that made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make any explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present the newspapers of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please advise them hereafter concerning this point."

Army 25730

JD: 7059

Trans. 12-4-41 (2)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

December 2, 1941

Purple

#1239

Re my #123.*

On the 2nd in a press interview the President stated that he had sent us an inquiry that day concerning our increasing troops in French Indo-China. Expressing his own views for the first time, he briefly stated that the trend of Japanese-American negotiations for the past few days and our rumored increasing of troops in southern French Indo-China had both thrown obstacles in the way of the progress of the negotiations (see special intelligence from Washington). This was the first interview since returning from Warm Springs, and particular attention is to be paid to the fact that he referred directly to negotiations.

Army 25690

Trans. 12/4/41 (NR)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Canton
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
J-19

#512 Secret outside the department

If hostilities are to begin we here are all prepared. The army has completed all preparations to move immediately upon Thai. Should the British resist to the bitter end, it is understood that the army is prepared to go so far as to militarily occupy the country.

(Japanese)

Army 26103

Trans. 12/11/41

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
3 December 1941
(Purple)

#875 Chief of Office routing

Re your #1232*.

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement.

25725

JD-1: 7057

(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 7021 (S. I. S. #25659-60).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
3 December, 1941
(Purple)

#876

Re your 1227* (Washington to Tokyo).

As you are well aware, during the tenure of the previous cabinet, a meeting between the leaders of the two countries was suggested by us but the proposal failed to materialize. It is felt that it would be inappropriate for us to propose such a meeting again at this time. Please be advised of this decision.

25699

JD-1: 7018

Navy Trans. 12-3-41

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#877

Re #1225* from Washington to Tokyo.

Your message #1225* of course refers to the U. S. proposal of June and our September proposal but it goes without saying that the one we are holding to now is our 20 November proposal, which now supercedes the September proposal.

25700

JD-1: 7019

Navy Trans. 12-3/41

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#878 (In 2 parts, complete)

Re your #1225*.

Chief of Office routing.

1. Apparently, the United States is making much of the statements issued by our governmental organs, the trend of the public opinion, as well as of our troop movements in the south. They have used these as an excuse to doubt our sincerity in wanting to bring about a successful settlement in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations.

We explained the truth behind the alleged Tojo statement in my message #866**. The English translation (this was done in the offices of the Domei News agency) of that statement was very different from the original, and that was responsible for the unexpected reactions.

With regard to guiding general public opinion, this Minister himself has made considerable effort.

The State Department should be in receipt of a report from the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this point. As a matter of fact, as your report in your message #1148*** Secretary Hull has expressed his satisfaction over the change for the better along these lines.

In spite of this, the tone of some of the U. S. newspapers seem to be unduly ominous. Moreover, the radio (particularly those which are aired via short wave from San Francisco very recently) has been daily broadcasting in considerable detail, the progress being made in the negotiations. It is quite evident that persons who have access to the records of the meetings are acting as liaison agents for those broadcasts, for otherwise it would be impossible to obtain some of the information that is being aired. We feel that it is very inappropriate for the United States to criticize us without looking after her own house.

(Part 2)

2. Recently, Britain, the United States, and others have been making military preparations against Japan at an every increasing tempo. At the same time, they have been acting in a more and more antagonistic manner of late. For example, on the 20th of last month, a

U. S. plane made a reconnaissance flight over Garanpi in the southern part of Formosa. (We filed a protest with the U. S. Ambassador on the 27th regarding this matter). Since then, however, the British and the United States have shown no indication of ending such activities. In view of the very critical times, we cannot help but hope that such incidents would cease.

3. Our proposal which was submitted on 20 November was based on just principles. Will you please point out again that these principles undoubtedly offer the best chance of leading to an eventual settlement. (We assume that when the United States says in their counter proposal that our terms are not in sympathy with the existing principles, they refer to the contents of Article 4 in which it is stated that the peace between Japan and China shall not be disturbed. We are insisting that all aid to Chiang cease as soon as Japanese-Chinese negotiations, at the instigation of the President of the United States, are launched. Hence, our proposal in no way conflicts with the spirit of the so-called fundamental principles being proclaimed by the United States. Please bear that in mind.

25720

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 7042 (S. I. S. #25715).

**Available, dated 3 December.

***JD-1: 6737 (S. I. S. #25174).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: — (Circular)
3 December 1941
(PA-K2)
Circular #2461

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE)* (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment, and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you, so please notify us of this fact immediately.

This message is as a precaution.

25855

JD-1: 7123

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)

*"Hidden Word" code to be used in plain Japanese language messages.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Vancouver
3 December 1941
(PAK-2)
#92

Please retain the "hidden meaning" codes and the codes to be used in conjunction with radio broadcasts until the last moment. If you have already destroyed them, advise and we will retransmit them.

26787

JD-1: 7775

(D) Navy Trans. 12-24-41(CN)

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1243

If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls.

25721

JD-1: 7050

(F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1243

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

25785

JD-1: 7098

(D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1245

Terasaki now in the midst of — — — intelligence work at a most important time, would like to have him stay over a while and go by the sailing on the 19th. Takagi busy on Tatsuta Maru business. (Negotiating with State Department for securing space) — — —
— — — air plane.

(NOTE.—Many gaps in this message.)

25722

JD-1: 7051

(F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
December 3, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1256.

Re your #875 *.

I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on

this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once.

Army 25849
JD: 7128

Trans. 12/7/41 (1)

* See S. I. S. #25725—Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indo-China.

[Secret]

From: Rome
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple—CA)
#985

Re your message #985* to Berlin.

On this day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, I, accompanied by Ando, called on Premier Mussolini, (Foreign Minister Ciano was also present). I described the developments in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations in accordance with the contents of your message #986** to Berlin.

Mussolini: "I have been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U. S. talks from the very beginning and therefore am not at all surprised to receive your report. As a matter of fact, in view of the utter bull-headedness of the United States and the meddlesome nature of President Roosevelt, I should say that the outcome was nothing but what should have been expected. One of the aims of the United States is to make the Far East her own, from an economic standpoint. I have felt from the beginning that if it was the intention of the United States to separate Japan from the Axis first and then intervene in Europe, the United States was doomed to fail because of Japan's loyal and sincere nature.

"As Your Excellency and Your Excellency's predecessor know, I wholeheartedly endorse Japan's policy of creating a New Order in East Asia. This has been true in the past, is true now and will be so in the future. I am one who is firmly convinced that Japan has every right to be the leader of the Great East Asia area."

I continued by relating to him the contents of your message referred to in the heading, (with regard to paragraph 3 of that message, I

said that I had been advised that some arrangements were being made between our Ambassador in Berlin and Ribbentrop).

With regard to paragraph 2, Mussolini said that should war break out, Italy would give every military aid she had at her disposal, i. e., that she would make every effort to keep the British navy checked in the Mediterranean.

Mussolini: "Recently, the formation of an Italian-German air force bloc was discussed so as to afford closer cooperation between the two to apply further pressure on the British in the Mediterranean. The negotiations on this proposal have progressed to a point where it may be signed any day now."

Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on the United States and Great Britain, I asked, would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: "Of course. She is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point."

With reference to paragraph 3, I submitted the French text of your message #987***, as one proposal, and asked him whether he preferred it to be separately or jointly. He replied that as long as it was done simultaneously with Germany it did not make much difference to him, but if it were done jointly he thought it would give the impression of more strength. He said he would confer with Ambassador MAKKENZEN.

Mussolini failed to bring up the subject of Soviet Russia, so the matter was not brought up at all.

In the first part of this message, please correct "N-NKEN WA" to "KINKENSHA WA".

25833

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (W-TT)

*JD-1: 6043 (S. I. S. #25552-53).

**JD-1: 6044 (S. I. S. #25554-55).

***Not available.

[Secret]

From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#892

In order to meet an emergency situation it is most important that we have our currency arrangements for Thailand in readiness. Therefore please have the Finance Minister appoint a suitable person as a member of the Embassy Staff, and send him out as soon as possible.

25724

JD-1: 7053

(F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Peking

To: Net

3 December 1941

(Purple)

Circular #616 (In 3 parts, complete)

Peking to Tokyo #763 (Most secret outside the Ministry).

Kitazawa, Commander Army of North China.

Arisue, Vice Chief of Staff.

Nishimura, 4th Section, Staff Headquarters.

Kazayama, Chief of Staff.

Shiozawa, Liaison Officer, Chinese Development Board.

At a meeting on December 1st and 2nd, of the above five, the following conclusions and decisions were reached:

"If this war does start, this will be a war which will decide the rise or fall of the Japanese Empire. For this reason it goes without saying, do not have small, or local, insignificant matters, occupy you. Instead quiet such things immediately and settle in a most advantageous way to us. In addition, all administrative control of these districts should be carefully planned anew with the above in view. For example, 'the fact that this war is one which is unavoidable for the existence of Japan and the maintenance of peace in East Asia' should be made very clear to all foreign nations and thus internally strengthen the unity of the people while guiding the world's public opinion in a direction beneficial to Japan. Thus both during the period of war and at the end of the war during the peace negotiations the greatest benefit will accrue to Japan.

"Especially on the minds of the southern native peoples we must make an impression so as to draw them towards us and against the United States and Britain. For this purpose, when this war starts all district and regional authorities must as much as possible adhere to existing international laws, etc. and under no condition should any action which would look like 'stealing while the house burns' to foreign countries be taken which might result in the loss of the main issue for a small immediate local profit.

(Part 2)

"In order to end this affair in a profitable note for Japan, one need but remember that in the Russo-Japan war it was necessary to have President Roosevelt act as peace mediator, to appreciate that for the expected coming war the only one who can be imagined as an intermediary is the Pope. This fact should be kept in mind in any step which is taken in the occupied territory. And for this reason too the enemy's position should be considered, and the handling of enemy churches etc. in China should be carefully studied.

"It is evident that Japan will have to put everything that they have in the coming war, and for this reason it is only natural that our burden in China be made as light as possible, so that our strength must be saved. For this reason matters other than political or economic, that can be handled by China should as much as possible be left to China to manage and thereby get credit for this from the Chinese, too.

"It can be imagined that the next war is to be a longer one than the China incident, so that in this region the main issue should be the obtaining of materials. For this reason the question of closed trade and methods of gathering material should again be thoroughly studied.

(Part 3)

II "The military will of course try to handle matters as much as possible according to the International code. They will increase even more their close cooperation with the Legations, especially regarding protection of churches. In this regard they have already planned a complete education of the soldier groups stationed in the occupied territories."

Arisue mentioned that he was on close terms with the Vatican here
----- (2 lines garbled) -----

(Arisue mentioned that he had always approved of allowing the Chinese to handle their own affairs and as a matter of fact he had been acting with that in mind. However, he was only worried that by handing over the management of things to the Chinese, that they might get the mistaken idea that the Japanese had become weakened. This point should be kept in mind and any action of this kind should be done in such a way as to not let them get such a mistaken idea.)

"It is of course important to obtain materials, but regarding easing the ban on free trade in enemy territory, this subject should be studied from various angles."

III Shiozawa expressed his agreement with most items mentioned, and declared that very close touch has been kept with military forces and different methods of leading North China politically were being studied.

26881

JD-1: 7848

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-26-41 (C-NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 4, 1941
Purple
#881

Re my #867.*

Before you burn the codes brought you by KOSAKA, have him teach all your telegraphic staff how to use them. If you have not yet burned the keying described in my Circular #2400^b, keep it in your custody until the last moment. Moreover, send it by some suitable plane to our ministry in Mexico in care of Junior Secretary MATSUI or Secretary NAGAKI in San Francisco or some other suitable courier. Wire this to Mexico and let me know what reply they make.

Army 25754

Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

* S. I. S. #25640 which gives instructions regarding the destruction of codes.

^b See S. I. S. #26753.

(Secret)

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 4, 1941
 Purple (Urgent)
 #891

To be handled in Government Code.

Re your #1256*.

What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875^b. I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message.

Army 25731
 JD-7105

Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

* Not available.
^b S. I. S. #25726.

(Secret)

From: Tokyo
 To: Net
 December 4, 1941
 Purple
 Cir #2467

Departmental secret to be handled in Government code. Strictly secret outside the department.

On the 4th, the Government held a conference for control and liaison and decided on the policy which Manchukuo must follow in case of a sudden change in the International relations. It is as follows:

Policy

When Japan enters a war, Manchukuo for the time being shall not enter it because of Manchukuo's relation to Japan and her policy. Manchukuo shall treat Great Britain, the United States and Netherland Indies as enemy countries, and shall take measures to that end.

The Principal Points.

1. Manchukuo shall not recognize either the consuls and or as enjoying privileges and shall forbid them to carry on their duties. (The use of code telegrams and short wave radio sets shall be prohibited). Furthermore in regards to the treatment to be accorded, performance of their duties. Manchukuo shall accord treatment in the spirit of fairness following the methods employed by Japan in dealing with latest

2. Manchukuo follows the same methods as Japan in dealing with public and private properties of and the

3. Manchukuo shall not recognize any request addressed to any third power for the protection of consulate buildings and the interests of the residents. However, Manchukuo shall carry out her legal measures following the methods employed in Japan for dealing with and do so in the spirit of fairness and justice.

4. In the treatment to be accorded the citizens of Soviet Russia residing in Manchukuo in view of the existence of a neutrality treaty between Soviet Russia and Japan, she shall keep in step with Japan and take every precaution so as not to provoke Soviet Russia.

This message sent to Peking, Nanking, and Shanghai.

(Japanese)

Army 25994

Trans. 12/9/41 NR

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Nanking, Shanghai, Peking, Hsinking

December 4, 1941

Purple

Circular #2468 Separate wire, Restricted Distribution.
(Secret outside the Department).

1. Until a state of war develops between Japan and the Netherlands, the Netherlands Government will be considered a quasi-enemy power. Already they have put into force prohibitions regarding the use of codes and are exercising rigid control and surveillance of our officials (consequently it is indicated that they are positively working in conjunction with enemy powers).

2. In the event the Netherlands declares war, we will issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war exists between Japan and the Netherlands. In the event that a state of war exists between our country and the Netherlands before the Netherlands has actually made a declaration of war, we will issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war exists between Japan and the Netherlands. Otherwise, in accordance with International Law, we will treat her as an enemy nation.

A. The advantages accruing the Netherlands Government through repudiation would be that at the same time she carried out her repudiation she would declare the Minister to be persona non grata. Though there are indications that she has gone beyond this, there will be no need to handle the situation any other way but in accordance with (1) above.

B. Should the Netherlands Government repudiate this, there will be no responsibility under International Law for the Netherlands to protect our nationals in the Netherlands East Indies. Then, too, even after a state of war has been brought about in her relations with us, she will be forced to stand in the position of not accepting a protest under International Law. Then again, she could bring about great inconvenience by demanding the evacuation of our Consular officials.

C. To date the Netherlands Government has actually maintained her position under International Law, but should she repudiate this, there would be no advantage in any other plan but A, mentioned above. Then, too, in the event that the Netherlands Government begins hostilities, this would indicate her intention to repudiate our relationships and there would be no necessity to handle her in any other way but as a qiesa enemy nation.

(Translation sketchy due to garbles.)

Army 26101

(Japanese)

Trans. 12/11/41

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Hsinking
 December 4, 1941
 Purple
 #909 (Strictly Secret)

Re my #892*.

On the fourth, in a joint conference with the Government Control Board, we decided upon steps which we will have Manchukuo take in case the international situation turns critical. Differing from what I said in my #873* our policy was changed as follows:

"When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities, for the time being Manchukuo will not participate. Because Manchukuo is closely bound up with the Japanese Empire and because England and the United States and the Netherlands have not recognized the Government of Manchukuo, as a matter of fact, Hsinking will regard those three nations as de facto enemies and treat them accordingly."

Wherever "England and the United States" and "English and Americans" occur in the text, we changed them to "England, the United States, and the Netherlands" and "English, Americans and Netherlands."

(Japanese)

Army 26142

Trans. 12/11/41 (5)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Berlin
 To: Tokyo
 December 4, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #1410

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.

Army 25807
 JD-7134

Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 5 December 1941
 (Purple)
 #896

Re your #1245*

Will you please have Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of days.

25839
 JD-1: 7140

(D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 7051 (S. I. S. #25722).

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

5 December 1941

(Purple)

#1261 (In 2 parts, complete)

On the 5th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on Secretary Hull, and, putting the matter contained in your instructions in writing, submitted it to him.

Hull: "You explain the matter as if the Chinese have concentrated troops near the border and that there is a fear that they would take aggressive action."

We: "Whether or not they would attack and where from if they do attack, depends entirely on such things as the military strengths of each and on other considerations. We who do not have a clear picture of the exact conditions on the scene, cannot make any explanations other than those contained in the instructions we receive."

"However, the fact remains that there is a possibility that the Chinese would take the offensive. We have been in receipt of advices for some time past that the Chinese have been concentrating large forces in the Kwangsi area."

Hull said that he would relay the explanations to the President.

While we were there, we continued along the following line:

"Fundamentally speaking, it was because we wanted to avoid just exactly what happened as a result—namely, the misinterpretations and the consequent belligerent argumentations—of the President's most recent inquiries, that we wished to bring about a speedy settlement through our 20 November proposal."

"You keep bringing up the subject of our occupation of French Indo-China. Basically this is merely a phase of 'power politics'. Your country herself, has stated that the 'best defense is an offense'. Your military men in particular have taken this adage literally, and as proof thereof, have been making every effort to strengthen the army and the fleet of the ABCD. With this situation being flaunted before their eyes, our army and navy cannot remain unconcerned."

So saying, we repeated the gist of the contents of your message #878**.

(Part 2)

Hull: "Since these conversations were started this spring until 24 July when Japan occupied the southern part of French Indo-China, the United States continued to permit the exporting of oil to Japan. During that time, I was the target of terrific criticism for allowing this, from Senators and from many other sources. Even in those times, the opposition to allowing this was of blistering intensity. Public opinion would absolutely prohibit the resumption of exporting of petroleum to Japan today."

We: "If the relationship between Japan and the United States underwent some improvement and if peaceful cooperation between our two countries is established, in accordance with that which is Your Excellency's custom to advocate, the concern you express now would automatically be dissolved."

"We are convinced that the correct starting point leading to the above described ideal situation, is to settle our major differences indi-

vidually, rather than attempt to reach a blanket agreement, along the lines proposed by us on 20 November."

Hull then pointed out that the general tone of our press and other publications were making it difficult for the United States and Japan to reach an agreement. We therefore said that the same can be said of a portion of the U. S. press and went on to relate to him the contents of paragraph 1 of your message #878**.

(Translator's note: Last 5 lines of text unreadable).

25842

JD-1: 7139

(D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)

**JD-1: 7049 (S. I. S. #26720).

*JD-1: 7105.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

5 December 1941

(Purple)

#1268

Re your #867*.

From Councillor of Embassy Iguchi to the Chief of the Communication Section:

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.

25836

JD-1: 7136

(M) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)

*(Dated 2 December) JD-1: 7017 (S. I. S. #26640): Directs Washington to destroy all copies of codes except one copy of certain ones, and also destroy one code machine.

[Secret]

From: Peking

To: Tokyo

5 December 1941

(Purple)

Cir #625—(Circular Number) To be handled in government code.

Re my secret military communication #262* of November 30th.

1. Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillance over her consulates and prohibited all communication between them and the enemy countries.

2. Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America we have taken steps to prohibit the use of code messages and the use of wireless by the Holland consulates.

3. In case war breaks out with Holland we will take the same steps toward that country that we have taken in the case of Britain and America.

26108

JD-1: 7335

(H) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (AR)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Peking.
 To: Shanghai.
 5 December 1941
 (Purple)
 #626 (Circular)

Peking to Tokyo #770 (To be handled in government code)

Re your Circular #2467*

(Strictly confidential)

1. It is recognized that the treatment accorded to the property and staff of the consulates of Britain, America, and Holland in North China should be, as a matter of policy, comparable to that accorded them in occupied territory. We have gone ahead with our preparations on this basis. This is for your information.

2. Is there any objection to our adopting the policy of recognizing a suitable person of a third power (say for instance Belgium, Spain, or Brazil) as custodian of the interests of Britain, America, and Holland in North China.

Relayed to NANJŌ (GAISIN), Shanghai.

26107

JD-1: 7334

(H) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (5-AR)

*JD-1: 7246. Re policy of Manchukuo in event Japan enters war. S. I. S. No. 26994.

[Secret]

From: Panama (Akiyama)
 To: Tokyo
 5 December 1941
 (PA-K2)
 #367

Re your #134.*

Reporting destroying by burning the code books in accordance with instructions.

26068

JD-1: 7313

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (7)

*Available, badly garbled, not yet identified.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 6, 1941
 Purple (Urgent)
 #897

Re your #1268.*

To Counselor IGUCHI from KAMEYAMA.

What I meant in paragraph 2 of my #867^b was that of the two sets of "B" code machines with which your office is equipped, you are to burn one set and for the time being to continue the use of the other.

Army 25835

Trans. 12/6/41 (S)

* Not available.

^b S. I. S. #26640 regarding the destruction of codes and one code machine in the Washington office

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
 To: Washington
 December 6, 1941
 PA-K2
 #899 (Strictly Secret.)

1. The recent occupation of Netherlands Guiana by American troops, or call it what you will—occupation it is, is the first example in the present war of the United States' invading South America. In the light of the Havana agreement, French territory may next be expected to be taken over. As for the Good Neighbor Policy, so far it has been used merely for getting military bases and aeronautical rights together with certain economic and financial interest. But now that the situation is tenser, the hitherto good neighbor, the United States, will no longer hesitate to use arms. This at length has come to the surface, and we must be on the strictest alert.

2. Based on an agreement with France, we penetrated Southern French-Indo China for joint defense. Scarcely were our tracks dry, when along comes good old nonchalant America and grabs Netherlands Guiana. If she needs any of the American countries for her own interest, hiding under the camouflage of joint defense, she will take them, as she has just proven. This is a menace to the Latin American nations; so will you please at every opportunity, impress upon the Government and people of the country to which you are accredited that the United States bodes them naught save ill. Moreover, please investigate the following points and wire me back.

(1) Has there been any other agreement or understanding established between the Netherlands Government and the Latin American Nations and the United States besides the one concerning Netherlands Guiana? If so, what is it like with reference say to bases, troop movements, annexation, etc.?

(2) The attitude of the country to which you are accredited toward this act of aggression, and the trend of public opinion.

Please send to all Ambassadors and Ministers in Central and South America (including San Paula).

Sent to Washington. Washington will send to Ottawa.

25868

Trans. 12/7/41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 6, 1941
 Purple
 #901

Re my #844^a.

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902^b (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make

every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

Army 25838

JD: 7149

Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

^a See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

^b Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 1 of 14) Separate telegram

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views, concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

JD-1: 7143

25843

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense

of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, willfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

JD-1:7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41(S)

25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 3 of 14).

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental —(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

JD-1:7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41(S)

25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-17143
25843

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD-1:7143
25843

Navy Trans. 12-6-41(S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would

endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD:1-7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41(S)

25843

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 4, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

25843

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is

presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD-1:7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one country—(45 letters garbled or missing)—been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the —es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD1-7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States,

Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n—(50 letters missed)—sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD1-7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD-1: 7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902. (Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of

frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, *ANDND** presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT*** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD-1: 7143
25843

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

*Probably "and as."

**Probably "China, can but."

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
7 December 1941
(Purple—Eng)
#902 Part 14 of 14

(NOTE.—In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

25843

JD-1: 7143

(M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#904

Re my #902.

There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person.

Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.

Army 25844

JD: 7144

Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
December 6, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#1003

Re 2 of your #1418 *.

1. From the standpoint given in 4 of my #985^b, we would like to avoid bringing about any situation likely to result in an armed clash

with Soviet Russia until strategic circumstances permit it; and so get the German Government to understand this position of ours and negotiate with them so that at least for the present they would not insist upon exchanging diplomatic notes on this question.

In doing this, explain to them at considerable length that insofar as American materials being shipped to Soviet Russia through any point lying within the scope of our intelligence are concerned, they are neither of high quality nor of large quantity, and that in case we start our war with the United States we will capture all American ships destined for Soviet Russia. Please endeavor to come to an understanding on this line.

2. However, should Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP insist upon our giving a guarantee in this matter, since in that case we shall have no other recourse, make a ----- statement to the effect that we would, as a matter of principle, prevent war materials from being shipped from the United States to Soviet Russia via the Japanese waters and get them to agree to a procedure permitting the addition of a statement to the effect that so long as strategic reasons continue to make it necessary for us to keep Soviet Russia from fighting Japan (what I mean is that we cannot capture Soviet ships), we cannot carry this out thoroughly.

3. In case the German Government refuses to agree with 1 or 2 and makes their approval of this question absolutely conditional upon our participation in the war and upon our concluding a treaty against making a separate peace, we have no way but to postpone the conclusion of such a treaty. This point is intended for you to bear in mind.

4. Concerning our participation in the war and the question of our promising not to conclude a separate peace, I shall wire you later.

Army 25925

Trans. 12/8/41 (NR)

* Not available.
 b Parts 1 and 3, S. I. S. Nos. 25552, 3; Part 2 not available. Tokyo informs Berlin that there is extreme danger of war suddenly breaking out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan and that if Russia joins hands with England and the United States against her, Japan will turn upon her with all her might.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Canton

December 6, 1941

Purple

#225 (Strictly secret)

Re your #516 *.

You are to note the following points:

1. In your communication to the British and American Consuls, the statement, "We will take over the concessions and other interests", is not necessarily accurate so you had better change it to "We will place the settlements and other interests under the control of the Imperial Army."

2. The evacuation of the Consular staffs and resident Nationals of hostile nations will have to parallel and coincide with measures concerning the departure of our Consular staffs and our resident Nationals, so when you receive orders from Headquarters you may proceed to handle this matter.

3. Public property of hostile nations, Consulates, and buildings will be seized or commandeered and after being sealed they will be in our custody.

4. Private property, even though it might serve us in some military way, cannot be seized. It might merely be taken over and kept under surveillance.

(Japanese)

Army 25997

Trans. 12/9/41 (5)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Bangkok
December 6, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
(CA)
#852.

The (—)* day (X Day) decided by the ———^b liaison conference on the 6th (?)^c is the 8th and the day on which the notice is to be given is the 7th (?) (Sunday). As soon as you have received this message, please reply to that effect.

Army 25881

Trans. 12/8/41 NR)

Translator's assumptions:

* "Proclamation" or "declaration."

^b "Ambassadorial" or "China."

^c This word is garbled and could be either the word "6th" or the word "November."

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1272

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advise of these individuals.

(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us ----- (MESSAGE INCOMPLETE) -----

Army 25846
JD: 7176

Trans. 12/7/41 (2T)

[Secret]

From: Bangkok
 To: Tokyo
 December 6, 1941
 Purple
 #919 (Departmental Secret)

Re your #821^a and #23^a addressed to Your Excellency from Singora.
 All telegraphic codes referred to have been destroyed on December 5th
 Army 25885

Trans. 12-8-41 (NR)

^a Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 7, 1941
 Purple (Urgent—Very Important)
 #907 To be handled in government code

Re my #902.^a

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

Army 25850

Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #25843—text of Japanese reply.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 7, 1941
 Purple (Urgent)
 #908 (To be handled in government code)

All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations, matters have come to what they are now, despite all the efforts you two Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well as for what all the members of the Embassy have done.

Army 25853

Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 7, 1941
 Purple (Urgent)
 #909

From Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO to Commercial Attache IGUCHI and his staff as well as to Secretary YŪKI.

I, together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate and heartily thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many months in behalf of our country despite all difficulties in coping with the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue to be in good health.

Army 25858

Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 7, 1941
 Purple (Extremely Urgent)
 #910

After deciphering part 14 of my #902 ^a and also #907 ^b, #908 ^c and #909 ^d, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

Army 25854

Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #25843—text of reply.

^b S. I. S. #25850.

^c S. I. S. #25853.

^d S. I. S. #25858.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.
 To: (Circular)
 7 December 1941
 (Purple)

#2492 Confidential within diplomatic circles.

The Departments concerned have been giving study to the question of handling enemy subjects, and enemy property in Japan, as well as the handling of neutrals, and on the 6th the results were reported to the Imperial Headquarters; the main points of which I am giving in my separate circular #2493*. Both this message the separate message are addressed to Manchoukuo, Taiwan, NANSŌ, (for foreign propaganda), Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Hankow, Canton.

Peking will contact Kalgan, and *Dairen* (?). Tsingtao will contact Tsinan; Canton will contact Amoy.

25966

JD-1: 7229

(F) Navy Trans. 12-9-41 (C-NR)

*JD-1: 7231 (S. I. S. #25967).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Net
 7 December 1941
 (Purple)

Circular #2493 (In 2 parts, complete) Secret Separate message
 Policies:

In regard to our handling of enemy subjects and enemy property in Japan, we will approach this matter in the magnanimity of a great nation, complying with international law as far as possible, and exercising care not to give the enemy nations or other third party nations any occasion for taking retaliatory measures, or for making unfavorable propaganda.

Main points:

(1) Diplomatic officials of enemy countries:

(a) Evacuation. The evacuation of enemy diplomatic officials will be carried out on the basis of exchanges for our diplomatic and consular officials resident in enemy countries.

(b) Handling of the above until their evacuation. The inviolable rights pertaining to diplomatic officials of enemy countries, whose duties come to an end simultaneously with the beginning of war, will be respected as a general rule. However, telephones will be cut off, and the use of both code and plain language telegrams will be prohibited. Short wave radios and wireless transmitters will be seized. Members of the staffs of embassies and legations, for the present, as a general rule will be allowed to live in the embassy or legation compounds, and no inconvenience will be caused in the matter of daily living.

(2) Consular officials:

(a) Evacuation. As far as possible consular officials will be handled under the same heading with diplomatic officials.

(b) The handling of the same until the time of their evacuations: The offices will be closed and sealed. Short wave radio and wireless equipment will be seized. Members of consulate staffs for the time being will be allowed to live at their present places of abode and as far as conditions warrant may use their official residences, with no restrictions upon their daily living.

(3) Enemy subjects residing in Japan:

In addition to such police surveillance and protection as is necessary, individuals regarding whom there is ample ground for suspicion will be rounded up; and all military men, seamen, or aviation personnel as well as those qualified for these services, persons of special technical skill, persons suspected of being foreign spies, and all males between 18 and 45 will for the present be placed under arrest. However in view of the fact that we have a very large number of subjects residing in enemy territory, we will exercise caution so that there may be nothing of the nature of ill-treatment occasioned for them.

(4) Publicly owned enemy property:

Such public property, aside from embassy, legation and consular buildings, which can be used either directly or indirectly for military purposes will, if necessary, be confiscated.

(5) Privately owned enemy property: Privately owned property will not be seized or confiscated except in the event of general requisitioning.

(6) While no special restrictions will be placed upon the diplomatic and consular officials of neutral countries resident in Japan, those of quasi enemy countries (such as Panama, Iran, Norway, Belgium, Egypt, Greece, etc.) will be denied the use of codes.

The evacuation of the enemy diplomatic and consular officials who are in Manchoukuo and China will be handled in the same manner as the above.

25967

JD-1:

(F) Navy Trans. 12-9-41 (C-NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: (Circular telegram)
7 December 1941
(Plain Japanese language using code names)
Circular #2494

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

25856

JD-1: 7148

(M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: (Circular)
7 December 1941
(Purple)
Circular #2499 (Part 1 of 3) (Part 2 not available)

In the event of international crisis following upon our pursuance of our national policy regarding the China affair, which was decided on at the liaison-conference held on November 13th, the following steps will be taken in China:

(1) British concessions—upon issuance of orders, the present force will occupy and take over these areas. However, every effort will be made to accomplish this end through the instrumentality of existing set-ups.

(2) Shanghai International Settlement and the Peking Legation compounds: Upon issuance of orders, our troops will take over these grounds, however, without exceeding their present strength they will make every effort to maintain order and avoid causing confusion.

Also this will be accomplished by the aid of the existing set-ups and their staffs as well as that of various important Chinese agencies.

(3) Amoy settlement: The same procedure as the above will be employed.

(Part 2 not available)

JD-1: 7210

(A) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR)

25937

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: (Circular)
7 December 1941
(Purple)

Circular #2499 (Part 3 of 3) (Part 2 not available)

Upon declaration of war by Japan, the Nanking government will not be directed to participate in war but will be directed to maintain close relations and absolute cooperation with Japan.

(10) In maintaining close relations with our country the Nanking Government will be directed and guided in strengthening its morale and organization so that it may help alleviate Japan's burden in participating in a protracted world war.

(11) Steps will be taken to propagate among the people through the cooperation of the Nanking Government, the true meaning of the present war, and to issue orders to maintain quiet and order among the general public.

(12) Regarding economic plans in China, with a view to retaining and increasing mutual economic self-sufficiency, the emphasis will be

placed on the utilization of productive powers, solicitation of local capital and investments, increased production of commodities. For this purpose efforts of every department will be made use of.

NOTE.—Those departments in the above category which are connected with the Nanking Government will continue to maintain even closer contact with that government.

25937

JD-1: 7210

(A) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

7 December 1941

(Purple)

#1278

Re your #910.*

Your instructions and your #911** have been duly received and decoded, and as soon as we have composed and dispatched this telegram we will commence the demolition and destruction by fire.

Also we have destroyed the codes brought by Kosaka. (The HA code, O code, NE code, and the YO code).

Furthermore, the key of your #881***, first part, and your Circular #2400****, should have been burned but because the mails to Mexico are not safe it has not yet been sent.

Please be advised of the above.

26047

JD-1: 7299

(H) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 7147 S. I. S. 26854. Directs destruction of remaining cipher machine and machine codes.

**Not available.

***JD-1: 7101 S. I. S. 26754. Instructions for disposing of codes.

****JD-1: 7076 S. I. S. 25753. Re new keying method for cipher machine.

[Secret]

From: Budapest

To: Tokyo

December 7, 1941

LA

#104

Re my #103.*

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

Relayed to Berlin.

Army 25866

JD 7184

Trans. 12/7/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
December 8, 1941
Purple (Priority)
#1437 Limited distribution

Re my #143(9?).^a

At 1:00 p. m. today (8th) I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they may meet them.

It goes without saying that this is only for your secret information.

Army 25978

Trans. 12/9/41

^a Not available.

EXHIBIT NO. 2

JAPANESE MESSAGES CONCERNING MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, SHIP MOVEMENTS, ETC.

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NOTE.—Except for messages of particular interest (see section 7) and messages relating to Hawaii (see section 1), this exhibit includes only those messages transmitted after 1 August 1941.

All the messages were classified "Secret" at the time of translation.

[1]

1. HAWAII

A. MESSAGES TRANSLATED BEFORE 7 DECEMBER 1941

[2] From Honolulu (Okuda)
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
2 December, 1940
(J17-K6)
#216

The following ships were observed at Pearl Harbor on the 1st:

Battleship: Texas type-----	1
Total-----	1
Heavy cruiser:	
Indianapolis type-----	1
Unidentified type-----	2
Total-----	3

Light cruiser :	
Honolulu type -----	2
Omaha type (1 in dock) -----	6
Total -----	8
Destroyer : -----	27
Submarine : -----	6
Special Service ship: 1 troop ship -----	3
A so two des.royers off Waikiki.	

JD-1: 268 13655 2 December, 1940

Navy Trans. 1-14-41 (2)

From: Honolulu (Okuda)
 To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
 20 December, 1940
 (J17-K6)
 #232

1. There was no ship movement in Pearl Harbor on the 19th.
2. On the same day, I dispatched a man to Lahaina and learned that the fleet has not been in for over three weeks. Apparently training is being done elsewhere.

JD-1: 393 13868 20 December, 1940

Navy Trans. 1-23-41 (2)

[3] From: Honolulu (Okuda)
 To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
 24 December, 1940
 (J17-K6)
 #234

It is reported that ships from the battleships down returned to Pearl Harbor on Dec. 20th. and will stay until Jan. 4 (5th or 6th) on Christmas leave.

JD-1: 74 13380 24 December, 1940

Navy Trans. 1-6-41 (2)

From: Honolulu (Okuda)
 To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
 6 January, 1941
 (J17-K6)
 #002 (in 2 parts—complete)

Re my message #234 of last year.*

Vessels seen in Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 5th were as follows:

Five battleships (New Mexico, Mississippi, and probably the Idaho as well as two of the Texas class); five heavy cruisers (one of the Portland class, three of the ——— class, and one of the New Orleans); nine light cruisers (five) of the Honolulu class and four of the Omaha class); 37 destroyers; five destroyer tenders; two (patrol boats?); several special service ships (of which two seemed to be submarines, but it could not be definitely determined); two heavy cruisers in (dry dock?); one vessel—either a battleship or a cruiser, is outside the harbor.

Key-shaped cranes, similar to those toward the stern of the Idaho class cruisers, are being constructed on the five light cruisers of the Honolulu class, on the extreme end of the after-deck.

It was also noted that the more modern masts have replaced the mainmasts which used to be on the four Omaha class vessels.

The vessels which were previously reported to be mine sweepers are, in reality, patrol boats, so please make corrections.

JD-1: 165 13495 6 January, 1941

Navy Trans. 1-10-41 (2)

*JD-1 74 (SIS #13380).

[4] From: Honolulu (Okuda)
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
7 January, 1941
(J17-K6)
#003

Re my #002*.

Battleships New Mexico (flag), Oklahoma, Idaho, and Mississippi, together with many cruisers and destroyers left Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 6th for training. It is reported that they will return on the 12th†).

JD-1: 185 13525 7 January, 1941

Navy Trans. 1-10-41 (2)

*JD-1: 165.

From: Honolulu (Okuda)
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
9 January, 1941
(J17 K6)
#005

Re message #474* of last year from (Manila) to you.

It is reported that the light cruiser Cincinnati returned here from the Philippine Islands. This message sent to Washington and Manila.

JD-1: 434 13899 9 January, 1941

Navy Trans. 1-25-41 (7)

*Not available.

From: Honolulu (Okuda)
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
16 January, 1941
(J17 K6)
#011 (2 parts, complete)

Re my #008*.

1. The capital ships returned to Pearl Harbor immediately. The Pennsylvania arrived on the 14th.

2. The number of vessels seen in the harbor on the morning of the 16th was as follows: 5 battleships (Mississippi, New Mexico, Idaho, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma), 5 light cruisers of the Omaha class (of which one is in dock), 19 destroyers, 2 destroyer tenders, 1 patrol boat, 7 vessels which may have been patrol boats, 3 transports. The Yorktown is not in port.

[5] 3. It is reported that the capital ships Arizona, Tennessee, California, West Virginia, Colorado and Maryland which are at present around the mainland, will return here by 1 February.

The CinCUS shifted the flag from the New Mexico to the Pennsylvania on 15 January.

JD-1: 629 14163 16 January, 1941 Navy Trans. 1-31-41 (2)

*Available, not translated; too garbled to read. (Re: U. S. Navy ship movements.)

From: Honolulu (Okuda)
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
21 January, 1941
(J17 K6)
#014

The aircraft carriers Lexington and Enterprise, together with four destroyers arrived in Pearl Harbor from the mainland on the 21st.

JD-1: 563 14078 21 January, 1941 Navy Trans. 1-30-41 (2)

From: Honolulu (Okuda)
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
28 January, 1941
(J17 K6)
#018

Re contents of my No. 11*.

1. Four battleships of the Colorado class and fourteen destroyers arrived in Pearl Harbor from the continent on the 27th.

2. The following vessels were seen in Pearl Harbor during the afternoon of the 27th, (the numbers in the parentheses represent the increase since the previous day); 9 battleships (4); 2 aircraft carriers; 1 heavy cruiser (1); 14 light cruisers (3); 4 old light cruisers of the Omaha class (1); 48 new destroyers (12); patrol boats, 5 Eagles (1) and 3 SC's (1); 1 submarine tender; 1 oil supply ship. There was also one destroyer lying outside of the harbor.

3. One cruiser of the 10,000 ton class and one light cruiser (both were included in the counts in the above paragraph) were alongside the repair dock. They were apparently being equipped with anti-U-boat wirings, and with antiaircraft guns.

[6] JD-1:747 14304 28 January, 1941 Navy Trans. 2-6-41 (2)

*JD-1: 629. Re: U. S. Navy ship movements (SIS #14163).

From: Honolulu (Okuda)
To: Tokyo
February 6, 1941
J17-K6
#25

This morning I observed the following ships of war in Pearl Harbor: 8 battleships, 3 of which were of the San Francisco, Pensacola and

New Orleans class. Of the 5 remaining, 3 were of the Honolulu class and 2 of the Omaha class.

16 destroyers

3 destroyer tenders

10 _____

4 auxiliary ships.

Now, the airplane carrier Enterprise, accompanied by 14 or 15 destroyers and some 6 submarines, left on the morning of the 5th.

Have forwarded by mail in code form to Washington, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.

ARMY #14405

Trans. 2/10/41 (7)

From: Honolulu (Okuda)

To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

21 February, 1941

(J17 K6)

#029 (In 2 parts, complete)

1. The capital ships and others departed from Pearl Harbor on the 13th and returned on the 19th. (It is said that they will depart again on the coming Wednesday and return on the following Wednesday).

[7] Judging from the statements by various sailors who were on these vessels, the training was apparently held in the vicinities of Kauai, Lahaina and Hilo.

2. The following vessels were seen in Pearl Harbor in the afternoon of the 20th.

Seven battleships (three of the New Mexico class, two of the Pennsylvania class, one each of the Oklahoma and California classes); four heavy cruisers, (two of the New Orleans class and two of the Portland class); ten light cruisers, (four of the Honolulu class; six of the Omaha class of which one is in drydock); thirty destroyers; three destroyer tenders; aircraft carriers, Yorktown and Enterprise; one troop transport; one submarine tender; (no submarines were visible).

Besides the above, three destroyers and one vessel of the Pensacola class were at anchor outside of the harbor, while one destroyer was sailing in the general direction of Lahaina.

Mailed to _____, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle.

JD-1: 1189 14967 21 February, 1941 Navy Trans. 2-28-41 (2)

From: Honolulu (Okuda)

To: Tokyo

February 24, 1941

J17-K6

#31

The Enterprise came into port from the continent on the 21st, having transported 31 Army pursuit planes of the Curtiss-Hawk P36 classification. She immediately returned to the continent; (there is a rumor that she went on to Manila). I have observed the following ships in Pearl Harbor:

6 battleships, two of the New Mexico, two of the Pennsylvania, one of the Oklahoma, and one of the California type.

4 heavy cruisers, two of the New Orleans, and two of the Portland class.

7 light cruisers, three of the Honolulu and four of the Omaha type.
The aircraft carrier Yorktown.

35 destroyers.

[8] 3 destroyer tenders for those destroyers.

1 auxiliary ship.

3 hospital ships.

36 submarines.

Have forwarded by mail in code form to Washington, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.

ARMY 15149

Trans. 3/8/41 (2)

From: Honolulu (Okuda)

To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

27 February, 1941

(J17 K6)

#034

Re my #29*.

Apparently the Fleet goes to sea for a week of training and stays in Pearl Harbor one week. Every Wednesday, those at sea and those in the harbor change places. This movement was noted on last Wednesday, the 26th.

The following vessels were seen in Pearl Harbor on the 27th: 4 battleships (1 of the California class and 3 of the Maryland class); 4 heavy cruisers (all of the San Francisco class); 6 light cruisers (4 of the Honolulu class and 2 of the Omaha class); 25 destroyers (of which 3 were outside of the harbor); 2 destroyer tenders; 1 troop transport; several transports; several submarines; and 2 submarine tenders.

The Yorktown was not in port. A vessel which appeared to be a heavy cruiser was anchored outside of the harbor.

JD-1: #1339 15165

Navy Trans. 3-7-41 (2)

*JD-1: 1189; U. S. Navy ship movements in Pearl Harbor.

[9] From: Honolulu (Okuda)

To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

10 March, 1941

(J18 K8)

#043

Vessels seen in Pearl Harbor on (9th) were the following:

Four battleships (two of the New Mexico class and two of the Pennsylvania class).

Five heavy cruisers (two of the _____ class, one of the _____ class, and two of the _____ class).

Six light cruisers (four of the _____ class and two of the Omaha class).

Yorktown.

25 destroyers (_____).

Two destroyer tenders.

Several submarines.

One submarine tender.

Several transports.

Mailed to Washington, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle.

JD-1: 1842 15976

Navy Trans. 4-5-41 (S)

[10] From: Honolulu

To: Tokyo

May 12, 1941

J18-K8

#78

Warships observed at anchor on the 11th in Pearl Harbor were as follows:

Battleships -----	11
Colorado, West Virginia, California, Tennessee, Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Oklahoma, and Nevada.	
1 old battleship (a target ship, probably the Utah).	
Heavy cruisers -----	6
Pensacola class 1.	
----- class 1.	
----- class 1.	
San Francisco (?) class 3.	
Light cruisers -----	10
----- class 5.	
Omaha class 5.	
Destroyers -----	37 (?)
Destroyer tenders -----	2
Submarine tenders -----	1
Submarines -----	11
Eagle boats (?) -----	10
Transports -----	several

The airplane carrier "The Lexington", accompanied by two destroyers, is cruising off the east shores of Oahu Island.

ARMY 177784

Trans. 6-4-41 (2)

[11] From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

May 26, 1941.

J18-K8.

#86

Warships anchored in Pearl Harbor on the 24th (?) and the 25th (?) were as follows: six battleships—the Pennsylvania, Arizona, California, Tennessee, Oklahoma, and Nevada; light cruisers, seven, four of the ----- class and three of the Omaha class; destroyers, nineteen; destroyer tenders, one; submarines, five, submarine tenders, one; -----, four; -----, one; large type oil tankers, two; transports, three, aircraft carriers ----- (rest of message consisting of two groups unintelligible).

ARMY 19955

Trans. 7/24/41 (7)

From: Honoliulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
June 14, 1941
J18-K8
#100

On the 11th (?) two English converted cruisers entered Pearl Harbor and are at present undergoing repairs at the old (?) dry docks.

ARMY 18805

Trans. 6/30/41 (2)

From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Washington
September 22, 1941
J-19

Circular #38. Message to Tokyo #173.

Re my message #166.*

A — destroyer left port on the 16th bound for New Caledonia. Naval Captain G. T. GARGENLIEU, High Commissioner for Pacific territories under the jurisdiction of the DeGaulle Regime, and Commander G. GABANTER, Commander of Defense, took passage on this destroyer to take up their new posts.

ARMY 23095

Trans. 10-6-41 (2)

* Not available.

[12] From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Honolulu
September 24, 1941
J-19
#83

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

ARMY 23260

Trans. 10/9/41 (S)

[13] From: Honolulu (Kita)

To: Washington

29 September 1941

(J19)

Circular #041

Honolulu to Tokyo #178

Re your #083*.

(Strictly secret.)

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels:

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message to Washington #48**): KS.

2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier): KT.

3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island: FV.

4. Alongside in Ford Island: FG. (East and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.

JD-1: 5730 23312

(D) Navy Trans. 10-10-41 (X)

*Not available.

**Available, dated 21 August.

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Honolulu (Riyoji)

15 November 1941

(J19)

#111

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

JD-1: 6991 25644

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)

[14] From: Honolulu (Kita)

To: Tokyo

November 18, 1941

J-19

#222

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219^a on that day.

Area A^b—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C^c—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D^d.

^a Available, dated November 14. Code under study.

^b Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

^c East Loch.

^d Middle Loch.

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1 000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to _____.

ARMY 23817

Trans 12/6/41 (2)

[15] From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Honolulu

November 18, 1941

J-19

#113

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, ~~Manila Bay~~ *Honolulu*,^a and the Areas Adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

ARMY 25773

Trans. 12/5/41 (S)

^a Probably means Mamala Bay.

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Honolulu

November 20, 1941

J-19

#111

Strictly secret.

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet _____ bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

ARMY 25694 JD 7029

Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

From: Tokyo

To: Honolulu

29 November 1941

J-19

#122

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

JD-1: 7086 25823

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

[16]

B. MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941

From: Honolulu (Kita)

To: Tokyo

November 24, 1941

J-19

#234 (Part 1 of 2)

Re your #114^a.

Strictly Secret.

1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.

^a Not available.

2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.

3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.

4. The manner in which the fleet moves:

Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.

ARMY 26351 (Japanese)

Trans. 12-16-41 (2)

[17] From: Honolulu

To: Tokyo

November 24, 1941

J-19

#234 (Part 2 of 2)

The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days at a stretch.

The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama.

The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet, carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.

Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in groups of ———, have been known to spend more than three weeks in operations in the Manila area.

Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying operations outside Manila harbor.

ARMY 26352 (Japanese)

Trans. 12/16/41 (2)

[18] From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Honolulu

November 28, 1941

J19-K9

#119

Re your message #243.*

Secret outside the Department.

Intelligences of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner:

* Available in code under study.

1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements.

2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure.

ARMY 25880 JD-7158

Trans. 12/8/41 (S)

[19] From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
November 28, 1941
J-19
#238

Military report:

(1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet ?).

(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are:—number of shots—12; interval of flight—13 seconds; interval between shots—2 minutes; direct hits—none.

(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January.

(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet ?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor.

ARMY 25928 JD-7212

Trans. 12-8-41 (7)

[20] From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
(J19)
#241 (In 2 parts, complete)

Re your #119*.

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

Direction based on:

(1) That direction taken when the ships start out is usually south-east by south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for the "KAIUI" straits northwards.

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is not suitable as a ocean maneuver practice sea.

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official travel routes.

Distance based on:

- (1) Fuel is plenty full and long distance high speed is possible.
- (2) Guns can not be heard here.
- (3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message #231** were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152 nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 miles) is possible, however, figuring on 50% of the time being used for maneuver technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be a point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.

JD-1: 7294 26053

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

*JD-1: 7158.

**Available, dated 23 November.

[21] From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 2, 1941
J-19
#123

(Secret outside the department.)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advice me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

ARMY 27065 JD 8007 (Japanese)

Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

NOTE.—This message was received here on December 23.

From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(PA-K2)
#247

Ship report:

2nd. Military transport (name unknown) sailed out toward mainland.

3rd. RARIN came into port from San Francisco.
26065

JD-1: 7309

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

[22] From: Honolulu (Kita)

To: Tokyo

3 December 1941

(PA-K2)

#245 (In 2 parts, complete)

(Military secret.)

From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

<i>Meaning</i>		<i>Signal</i>
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units	Preparing to sortie.	1
A number of carriers	Preparing to sortie.	2
Battleship divisions	All departed between 1st and 3rd.	3
Carriers	Several departed between 1st and 3rd.	4
Carriers	All departed between 1st and 3rd.	5
Battleship divisions	All departed between 4th and 6th.	6
Carriers	Several departed between 4th and 6th.	7
Carriers	All departed between 4th and 6th.	8

26145

[23] 2. Signals.

I. Lanikai* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

	<i>Signal</i>
One light between 8 and 9 p. m.-----	1
" " " 9 and 10 p. m.-----	2
" " " 10 and 11 p. m.-----	3
" " " 11 and 12 p. m.-----	4

II.

Two lights " 12 and 1 a. m.-----	5
" " " 1 and 2 a. m.-----	6
" " " 2 and 3 a. m.-----	7
" " " 3 and 4 a. m.-----	8

(Part 2)

III. Lanikai* Bay, during daylight.

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the following:

<i>Times</i>	<i>Signal</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Signal</i>
1900-2000-----	3	2200-2300-----	6
2000-2100-----	4	2300-2400-----	7
2100-2200-----	5	0000-0100-----	8

V.K.G.M.G.*** Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

B. CHIC. . CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium * * * * at a point halfway be- [24] tween Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40' N., longitude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:

Time	Signal	Time	Signal
From 7-8-----	3 or 6	From 9-10-----	5 or 8
From 8-9-----	4 or 7		

JD-1: 7370

(M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

*Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.
 **A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.
 ***A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.
 ****At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.

From: Honolulu (Kita)

To: Tokyo

3 December 1941

(PA-K2)

#248

Ship report.

December 3rd. Wyoming and 2 seaplane tenders left port. No other movements.

26066

JD-1: 7310

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

[25] From: Honolulu (Kita)

To: Tokio

December 4, 1941

PA-K2

#249

On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1,100 ton class. She had but one funnel and carried one 4 inch gun fore and aft. _____.

Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor took some mail to the British Consular Office and received some mail in return.

ARMY 26161 (Japanese)

Trans. 12/12/41 (2)

[26] From: Honolulu (Kita)

To: Tokyo

5 December 1941

(PA-K2)

#252

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

- (2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.
 (3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:
 8 battleships.
 3 light cruisers.
 16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and ———— were in dock.

26029

JD-1: 7280

(D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

*Available. dated 29 November.

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Honolulu

December 6, 1941

PA-K2

#128

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123* the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

ARMY 26158 JD 7381 (Japanese)

Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

* Not available.

[27] From: Honolulu

To: Tokyo

December 6, 1941

PA-K2

#253

Re the last part of your #123.*

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa,^b there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

[28] 2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

ARMY 25877

Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

* Not available.
 • Kana spelling.

270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[29] From: Honolulu

To: Tokyo

December 6, 1941

PA-K2

#254

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were ——— and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

ARMY 25874 JD-7179

Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

[30]

2. PANAMA CANAL

[31]

A. TRANSLATED BEFORE 7 DECEMBER 1941

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)

To: Panama

August 2, 1941

J-19

#63

If possible, I would like you to telegraph me concerning the transit of the canal by English and American merchant ships.

ARMY 23506

Trans. 10-15-41 (S)

From: Panama (Akiyama)

To: Tokyo

August 18, 1941

J-19

#120

Report on observations:

1. Ships moving through the Panama Canal toward the Atlantic:

August 15th	Four U. S. submarines (number ———)
" 16th	Two " freighters
" 17th	One " "
	One ——— "

2. Moving toward Pacific:

August 15th	One U. S. freighter
	One DeGaulle Government destroyer (Triumphant) (now anchored at Balboa)

3. August 17th

One U. S. destroyer anchored at Balboa
One warship which appeared to be a
cruiser was seen to arrive.

Recently five large-size destroyers have been in port (taking on fuel, rations and other supplies).

ARMY 22813

Trans. 9-29-41 (S)

Panama (Akiyama)

)

glas B-18, the Martin B-17A bombers, totaling 100
as a number of heavy Boeing 24's, which have been
lbrook Field in the past, completely disappeared about
. I am attempting to find out where they went.
heard that approximately (35 or 45 ?) two-motored
es are stationed at the newly constructed Agua Dulce
he province of Cocli.

5

Trans. 9/30/41 (S)

na (Akiyama)

941

refer to (?) of my message #120. The Triumphant
for Tohita on the 17th according to report.
19th two United States freighters and 1 British freighter
ed to transmit the Canal toward the Pacific.

23342

Trans. 10/11/41 (2)

3. #22813. Panama reports movements of ships through the Panama Canal.

From: Panama (Akiyama)

o

r 22, 1941

passing through the Canal between the 17th and 21st are
as:

Pacific bound:

1. American Tanker
4. American Freighters

Atlantic bound:

- 2 American Tankers
- 4 American Freighters
- 1 English Freighter

7 #22954

Trans. 10/2/41 (J)

From: Buenos Aires

Panama

September 1941

lar #146

Buenos Aires to Tokyo #416.

Strictly secret; C. O. R.

When Minister Yamagata* was in Panama he was asked by the
Panamanian Minister there to deliver some maps and charts of the Panama

Canal Zone for him, which he did. Since then, we had Usui go to Chile to take charge of those maps and upon their arrival here they were delivered to the Italian Ambassador. At the same time, we requested that we be given copies of them.

Recently, these copies were delivered to us. (At the time of this delivery, Assistant Attache Kameda and Usua were present to ascertain that they were exact copies of the originals). And we entrusted them to our Navy's courier Tatuma who is returning home on the Buenos Aires Maru.

The Italian Ambassador here requests that upon the arrival of these papers in Tokyo, we notify the Italian Government to that effect through (our Embassy in Rome?)

Minister Yamagata has already advised Chief of Bureau Terasaki regarding this matter. The Navy has also sent a report.

23814

JD-1: 5970

(D) Navy Trans. 10-22-41 (X)

*Minister to Chile.

[35] From: Panama (Akiyama)

To: Washington

September 30, 1941

J 19

#51

(Message to Tokyo #188.)

On the (29th?) two (French ?) warships left port bound for the Pacific. One vessel of the Omaha class left port on the night of ——— for an unknown destination. In spite of the rumor that the raider is in the neighborhood of the Galapagos, rumors are circulating that it is in water adjacent to the Canal.

Relayed to Washington.

ARMY 23304

Trans. 10/10/41 (X)

[36] From: Panama (Akiyama)

To: Tokyo

October 2, 1941

J-19

#190 (2 parts complete)

1. Since the recent shift in military aviation efforts to the Pacific Area the "Panama Air Depot" located at France Field was transferred to Curunda Heights (immediately adjacent to Albrook Field).

2. Rear Admiral SADLER, Commander of the 15th Naval District, since the extensive activities on the Pacific end of the Canal, made public on the 1st a statement to the effect that because of the increase of naval supplies a four-story warehouse built on pier 18 (it will be completed the middle of November), the ammunition unloading pier (west of pier 18) consisting of 32 buildings, and the existing buildings in the neighborhood of the Balboa dry dock would all be taken over as warehouses. Furthermore, the petroleum supply tanks at Boca on the Pacific side and at Mt. Hope (the railroad junction from which the line branches to Colon and Ft. Randolph) on the

recently it is believed that these tanks have been camouflaged and taken over.

Intelligences at hand concerning the construction of a depot at Corozal which would contain sufficient food for the Canal Zone for a six-month period, even though the lines between this point and the United States are severed.

9

Trans. 10-20-41 (2)

From: Panama (Akiyama)

941

Priority)

On the 30th and the 2nd, three American freighters and one hospital ship transited the canal to the Pacific, and nine freighters and one American liner transited the canal to the Atlantic.

668

Trans. 10/18/41 (2)

From: Panama (Akiyama)

10

, 1941

9) (Urgent)

Message #193.

Ship left for the Pacific at 11:00 A. M. on the 3rd.

On the 3rd until the morning of the 4th three American freighters, the French steamer moved out into the Pacific. During the same day, seven American freighters, the "Union tanker", one destroyer and two British freighters went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic (one of the two British freighters was of the 10,000 tons class). All of the vessels bound for the Atlantic went through the Canal successively. The two cruisers which I mentioned in my previous message accompanied these vessels as far as Balboa. There would seem indicated that their entire cargoes were made up of military supplies.

Reported to Washington.

Y 23664

Trans. 10/18/41 (2)

Not available.

From: Panama (Akiyama)

Tokyo

October 6, 1941

4

The result of my investigations, as I reported in my secret letter of October 12, are as follows:

1. The airplane bases which the United States is constructing are located at La Chorrera in Panama province, (please refer to part 4 of my report).

of my #149^a) Chitre in Herrera province, Mensabe^b in Los Santos province and at Remedios and Las Ra—Hasu in Chiriqui province.

2. The Panamanian airports already constructed which will be converted into military establishments are the ones at David in Chiriqui province and Paidonya^b outside the limits of Panama City.

3. Airports which have been surveyed but because of the poor condition of the terrain have not been constructed, are the airports at Guarare in Los Santos province and at eight other projected points.

ARMY 24465

Trans. 11/7/41 (2)

^a Not available.
^b Kana spelling.

[39] From: Panama (Akiyama)

To: Tokyo

October 18, 1941

J-19

#220 (Part 1 of 2)

1. Ship movements from the 14th to the 18th:

Moving toward the Pacific: 4 American, 1 British freighters; 2 American tankers.

Moving toward the Atlantic: 4 American, 2 British, 1 Dutch freighters; 1 American tanker, 1 American passenger steamer. Recently ships have been going through the canal at night.

2. In order to find out the plans of the Canal command, I inspected the military establishment at the Pacific end on the 10th. (Naturally they do not allow us to inspect the forts.) I found that construction is going on at a rapid rate and the whole area is being covered with fortifications. Specifically, at Albrook Field, 3 large hangars, storehouses for airplane parts, underground tanks, and 8 barracks to accommodate 200 men each.

At Corozal, 4 two-hundred-men barracks, 55 two-family officer's quarters and a 500-patient hospital are nearing completion.

ARMY 23909

Trans. 10-23-41 (2)

[40] From: Panama (Akiyama)

To: Tokyo

October 18, 1941

J-19

#220 (Part 2 of 2)

At Fort Clayton there are stationed, as before, the 2nd Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st Engineers, and the 33rd Infantry. Besides barracks for the (signal ?) unit attached to these groups, 18 or (48 ?) barracks large enough to accommodate 250 persons each are approaching completion. In addition to the recently completed hangars at Howard Field, barracks for 26 companies have been roughly completed at Fort Kobbe. Some of these are already in use (details will be sent (by mail ?)). In the Canal Zone there are between the two oceans three cruisers, 8 new type destroyers, 18 submarines, one gunboat, and one submarine tender. The construction work of the submarine base at Balboa is progressing. According to information com-

—, 16-inch guns have been emplaced on Pearl Islands, warships of (this country?) are patrolling the waters

Trans. 10/24/41 (2)

: Panama (Akiyama)

41

7th, a warship of the *Omaha* class left this port for the

same day, two single-funnel destroyers, one light cruiser, 60 ton class transport were anchored in Balboa harbor.

26th, one American destroyer and two submarines were in the harbor at Cristobal.

On the 22nd until the 27th, four American and four British vessels passed through the Canal bound for the Pacific (one of the vessels was of the 14,000 ton class). Six American merchant ships, one American tanker, and one Netherlands cargo ship passed through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic.

5

Trans. 11/19/41 (2)

From: Panama (Akiyama)

, 1941

On the 3rd, one American destroyer was seen to pass through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic. On the same day, an American warship (which did not seem to be the *Zane*), having two gun turrets on her fore deck and airplane equipment on her after deck, 3,000 tons, was seen to pass through the Canal going in the direction of the Atlantic.

From the 2nd to the 4th of this month, nine American freighters passed through the Canal heading in the direction of the Atlantic. Five American Freighters and one American passenger vessel as one Danish ship were observed passing through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic.

4749

Trans. 11/14/41 (2)

From: Panama (Akiyama)

To

October 1941

According to news from an Italian source, it is reported as forty army air officers of Italian origin who had been training

at Riohato departed for China during the end of October. It is thought that they were sent to China as they are of Italian blood and would not be suitable for Europe.

2. Report on ships passing through Panama.

November 2nd, an army transport of over 6,000 tons, with capacity load of army men, headed for Pacific.

3. November 4th, two cruisers of Omaha type anchored at Balboa.

4. Ships that passed during 4th and 5th towards Pacific, one U. S. freighter, one British freighter, 1,400 tons. From Pacific, three U. S. freighters, one U. S. tanker, one British freighter, 20,000 tons.

JD-1: 6745

(Y) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (7)

25228

[44] From: Panama (Akiyama)

To: Tokyo

November 10, 1941

J-19

#265

1. The warship mentioned in my #262* is not of the Vanoc class but has been confirmed to be the Diomedes. Its destination is the Pacific.

2. On the 10th two American submarines moved through the Canal into the Pacific.

ARMY 24989

Trans. 11/19/41 (2)

* Available in code under study.

From: Panama (Akiyama)

To: Tokyo

11 November 1941

(J 19)

#273

Ships passed through Panama on 11th and 12th.

To Pacific: Freighters: 1 American, 2 British, (one 10,000 ton with tower looked like warship).

To Atlantic: Freighters: 3 American, 3 British, (One with 2 guns, two with 1 gun.)

JD-1: 6748

(Y) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (2)

25231

[45] From: Panama (Akiyama)

To: Tokyo

November 12, 1941

J-19

#282

1. On the night of the 11th, a British light cruiser went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic. This cruiser is understood to have undergone repair in San Francisco and seems to have been the *Liverpool*.

th, a British military transport of approximately 27,000 Union Castle class, passed through the Canal on its way to Sicily, filled to capacity with military personnel.

November, 12 Douglass two-motored bombers and six B-24 planes, flew here to increase the Canal air force.

Trans. 12/3/41 (2)

from: Panama (Akiyama)

1941

Shipping report:

A commercial ship of Union Castle type passed through toward the Canal, with about 1000 of what seemed like evacuees (women and children) and a few wounded, aboard, on the 13th.

A heavy cruiser which passed through on the 11th is believed to be going through to make up a convoy on the Atlantic, and looks like it had accompanied #1 (Union Castle type commercial ship) through the Pacific. The German reports say it is a Liverpool class ship, not the Liverpool.

An Omaha type ship has the bow painted black and the stern white and at a glance looks like a destroyer.

1 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (J)

from: Panama (Akiyama)

18, 1941

On the 18th, one British ship and one Netherlands vessel of approximately 17,000 tons went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic. One 10,000 ton British vessel and one American ship went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic.

A destroyer and one submarine are undergoing repairs in the Canal.

5774

Trans. 12/5/41 (2)

B. TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941

from: Panama (Akiyama)

1941
December 20, 1941

On the 19th and 20th, four American cargo ships, one British ship and one tanker, and one French ———, passed across to the

2. An American cargo ship and one tanker passed across to the Atlantic.

3. (—— message goes off ——.)

ARMY 26092 (Japanese)

Trans. 12/10/41 (2)

[49] From: Panama (Akiyama)

To: Tokyo

November 22, 1941

J-19

#321 (Part 1 of 4)

Strictly secret.

I suppose you are already acquainted with these facts but the manner of defending the canal is now as follows:

1. The United States is publishing as though it were utterly true that a Troy horse has been found not only among the foreigners in Panama but also in government circles. However, this country replies that her principle is Panama for Panamanians. ARIAS stated that though Panama was weak, if certain concessions were made to neighboring countries, the United States might be defied. The United States, however, fixed his regime good and proper. At present the canal officials are checking over, one by one, 2,000 Germans, 700 Italians, and 400 Japanese.

2. I hear that the United States has set up in Panama air bases (some of which have ——), anti-aircraft gun bases, and airplane detector bases (some of these detectors are said to be able to discover a plane 200 miles away). Thus we see that in her policy toward South America the United States is now exerting unprecedented pressure.

ARMY 26820 (Japanese)

Trans. 12/25/41 (X)

[50] From: Panama (Akiyama)

To: Tokyo

November 22, 1941

J-19

#321 (Part 2 of 4)

Strictly secret.

In spite of the fact that it is in violation of the treaty concluded in 1936, the United States is coercing Panama where the canal is. She is expending vast sums of money there, and if necessary will take still more drastic steps. However the difference in the points of view is forever and eternally a cancer's growth in the relations of the two countries.

3. From the Pacific to the Atlantic coast, between Panama and Colon, there is no thoroughfare. The reason why one has not been constructed, is that the jungle constitutes a natural defense for the canal. As an indication of the United States' policy of defense, lately they have begun to construct a road even of macadam which will probably go as far as Colon. However it is not yet completed. This is an exceptional case in preparation for the possible destruction of

so seems that when complete the American continental extend as far as the borders of Colombia, but when this tain.

(Japanese)

Trans. 12/25/41 (X)

#26794. Part 1, S. I. S. #26820. Part 4 available, being translated.

: Panama (Akiyama)

1941

3 of 4 *)

ted States Government is going on the assumption that n the Canal will be made from both air and sea. preparation for a possible attack from the Pacific side, ced the special fleet recently, as I have already indicated um. They have mapped out an area 900 (kilometers?), er of the radius at Panama, as a patrol area and are con- ling it. The Army has built fortifications here and there y of Panama in which there are 16'' and 14'' gun em- (These forts are equipped with hygienic facilities. The ndulging in pleasures. The distance ——— of the forti- ——— exceeds 1500 (kilometers?).) In addition, leavoring to guard such vital points as locks, spillways, lly the control tower controlling the spillway on Lake he electric plant.

94 (Japanese)

Trans. 12/25/41 (2)

nd 4 available. Being translated.

om: Panama (Akiyama)

22, 1941.

art 4 of 4 *)

-air defenses (?) on lock #1, which is now being used, are roved. (Of course, there are anti-air defenses (?) at lock e naval defense area, patrolled against possible lightning tends in the north from Salina Cruz on the Tehuantepec o Monepene^b (on ?) the Gulf of Fonseca. The southern end to the air base on the Galapagos Islands. ent army strength is 47,000; naval, 10,000; air force, 5,000. on, it is estimated that there is approximately twice this gen- , made up of the families and laborers (excluding Pan-).

96830 (Japanese)

Trans. 12-25-41 (X)

rts 1, 2 and 3 of 4 see S. I. S. #26820, #26821 and #26794 which report ilitary and naval preparations in the Panama region. elling.

From: Washington
To: Panama
1 December 1941
(J 19)
#040

Report passage through the Canal of the U. S. S. MISSISSIPPI,
NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON, WASP.

JD-1: 7318 26084 (G) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (X)

[53]

3. PHILIPPINES

[54]

A. TRANSLATED BEFORE 7 DECEMBER 1941

From: Tokyo
To: Manila
1 August 1941
(Purple)
#245 (or 246) (?)

Please inform us regarding the camouflage and distinguishing marks
of the American naval and military aeroplanes in Manila.

20983

JD-1: 4506 (H) Navy Trans. 8-13-41 (6-AR)

From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
August 2, 1941
Purple
#474

1. Anchored warships—Dfionomi.*
2. There is (are) anchored Danish ship(s) ----- garbled -----
after loading at Webu * (Ebu ?) will leave for America. In addition
two ships touched port on the 1st and 2nd from Orongabo.*
3. Harrison and Coolidge entered port on the 31st and 1st respec-
tively.

20513

ARMY

Trans. 8/5/41 (6)

* Kana spelling.

[55] From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
August 2, 1941
Purple
#476

Re your #245.*

In observing planes on practice flights, I notice that the color of
military and naval planes has not been changed and that they are not
camouflaged. However, I have heard that among the naval planes
there are those which have been observed to be painted a light green.

making additional secret investigations, that is all for
 5-
 re, in recent times, the number of planes flying above
 decreased considerably.

Trans. 8/7/41 (6)

m: **Manila** (Nihro)

41

ce of primary order.

estroyers sailed on the fourth. All the war ships at an-
 sailed. There are, however, several small destroyers in
 orhood of Corregidor*. (This was observed by the crews
 en Maru and the Kaisoku Maru.)

six-hundred American soldiers have arrived in Manila
 lidge. (This was learned from the crew of the Coolidge.)

334

Trans. 8/7/41 (6)

In Cavite Province at the entrance of Manila Bay.

rom: **Manila** (Nihro)

o

, 1941

our #254.*

the time a non-commissioned officer of the American Navy
 confidentially that the ship mentioned in my #414* (8?)*
 Warspite and I took this to be reliable information. This
 ship, however, had its name painted over. Some spies who
 he ship when it docked report that it was something like a
 vessel. It was further reported that this ship moored at
 pier on the —th. Now, considering the shallowness of the
 ere, I do not see how it could have been the Warspite. (When
 cinnati approaches that dock, it gradually lets out water bal-
 Judging from its shape, I would say that it was a light cruiser
 eander class. (According to another report it was an 8,000-
 ft. This seems rather accurate.) (2) Among the members
 crew who came on shore there were some with such names
 RK. GEORGE, etc., on their hatbands and we also have a spy
 to the effect that some forty-eight soldiers wounded in the Med-
 ean were being accommodated. (3) I know nothing of the
 ent of this ship after my #451.*

ly no British ships save this has entered port here (that is
 rom the Taggubwno (?) mentioned in my #494.*

Y 21094

Trans. 8/16/41 (6)

available.

S #20468) British cruiser which was anchored at Cavite for several days departed
 — on the 27th.

[58] From: Manila
 To: Tokyo
 August 20, 1941
 Purple
 #532

Re your Circular #1793 *.

I am reporting to you below information which I have been able to get, though it may be somewhat incoherent.

1. There are many tall buildings in the city, to the upper stories of which admittance is forbidden. It is thought, therefore, that anti-aircraft guns have been placed in them. It is fairly certain that guns have been placed on the Great Eastern Hotel (some have actually seen ten disguised machine guns on the top of it,) the (hitchcock?) Avenue Hotel (this is the former Marco Polo Hotel), and on the Insular Life and the Trading Commerce. Besides these, I presume guns have been placed on top of the Capitol, the Municipal Building, the post office, etc. (I believe that the army and the navy both have in their possession a map giving the locations of the tall buildings in the city.).

2. A person has seen during the evenings in the latter part of July, 36 anti-aircraft guns being transported to Camp Murphy.

ARMY 21461

Trans. 8/26/41 (6)

* Not available.

[59] From: Manila
 To: Tokyo
 August 20, 1941
 Purple
 #533 (Report of Primary Importance)

Last March work was begun on the reparation of the airplane base south of Darurakku * on the way to San Miguel. For a time, however, the work was stopped. Lately it seems that the undertaking has been resumed.

Eye witnesses say that they are using about 300 employees and are hurrying the work along. I understand that at present the gliding ground is being prepared.

ARMY 21563

Trans. 8/28/41 (6)

* Kana spelling.

[60] From: Davao (Kihara)
 To: Tokyo
 August 22, 1941
 J-19
 #104 (Intelligence of Primary Importance)

Because too much time would be required to fill in the paddy fields as originally planned in the construction of a new air base, it is rumored that these plans have been changed. Construction is to begin on an air base which will be laid down between the sea and the paddy fields where now stands a cocoanut grove. In order that bombing planes can use this air field, four concrete runways are to be constructed. It is understood that some 2,500 recruits from among the local populace will be used in this construction enterprise. Four

red wheelbarrows which will be used in this construction already been unloaded onto the pier. When I last visited I made an investigation of the land they planned to use, and I told me that they would have to use more than three feet of soil in these paddy fields. A great deal of work will be entailed, not only in the cutting down and removal of the cocoanut trees in

63

Trans. 10/28/41 (6)

From: Davao (Kihara)

1941

During the middle of July a number of American destroyers entered the harbor of Jolo. We have intelligence to the effect that no ships came to this port from Hawaii, but we have no evidence to substantiate it.

During the last ten days of July, 6 American destroyers entered the harbor of Jolo, ^aKabunko ^band Kanbin. ^c(Please refer to part 3 of the report.) While in the area of these three ports, they engaged in practice with live ammunition.

During the middle of August, one large airplane capable of carrying passengers landed on the water in the vicinity of Jolo and was tied up for a number of hours.

It is understood that there are approximately 2,000 drums of gasoline stores within the military establishment at Jolo.

Furthermore, reports on the movements of war vessels in and out of the port of Jolo are prone to be delayed because of the existing conditions. Do you want me to send this sort of delayed information by wire? Please wire.

23958

Trans. 10-24-41 (6)

—
on the island of the same name, one of the southernmost islands of the Sulu Island group.
spelling.
available.

From: Manila (Nihro)

Cebu

1st 1941

2)

Ships in port on the 23rd.

A. Manila.

Transports 6.

HON

PISU (Arrived the morning of the 23rd).

B. Cavite.

Destroyers 1. (Arrived from Manila on the 21st).

Transports GORUDOSTNA (entered port about a month ago and is now under repairs.)

2. The oiler TORINIRCIC left harbor on the 22nd headed for Tarakan in order to take on oil.

3. Recently several destroyers and submarines have been stationed in the vicinity of Mariveles. We are investigating the number stationed at present.

4. Brig. General Cragette arrived here on the 20th apparently on the Dutch ship TIBADAEKY and had a conference with MacArthur on the 21st.

5. According to newspaper reports the CHANTO (formerly the Hilda Maersk) arrived here the 20th after having been repaired at Olongapo and her sister ship the KABARUNDO (formerly the Gertrude Maersk) is at present being repaired there. Hence the floating drydock must have been there formerly, however we will continue investigations.

6. On the 16th a ship which appeared to be the MADDO and two destroyers arrived in Cebu and all left that same night.

21518

JD-1: 4810

(H) Navy Trans. 8-27-41 (6-AR)

[63] From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

August 26, 1941

Purple

#554

Four "S" ^a boats on the 24th and "REI" on the 25th entered the harbor.

ARMY 21611

Trans. 8/29/41 (6)

^a Submarine.

[64] From: Manila

To: Tokyo

August 30, 1941

Purple

#559 (Primary Intelligence)

1. Warships at anchor in this harbor on the 30th:

(1) In Manila, 3 destroyers of the Bell class; 6 submarines (submarines left port on the 27th but have returned). Furthermore, the tanker Trinity came to this port on the 27th and dropped anchor here (please refer to Part 2 of my #543 ^a).

(2) One destroyer (undergoing repairs) Gorudosu.

2. A large portion of the submarines, according to intelligences which have come to me, are now in the Ringaen ^b area.

3. 500 American soldiers arrived here on the Cleveland the 29th. Furthermore, on the same day the Migsk entered this harbor. (Though details of this ship could not be ascertained, it is understood that she is loaded to capacity with military equipment.

ARMY 21666

Trans. 9/2/41 (6)

^a S. I. S. #21518 regarding boats in harbor at Manila.

^b Lingayen on the west coast of the Island of Luzon.

1: Tokyo (Toyoda)

41

to intelligences obtained by naval authorities, the *Houston* arrived on the 20th or there about to pass through the harbor since that time they have not been able to learn where it is to investigate the waters in and around Manila for some warship and then make your report.

7

Trans. 11/8/41 (6)

Manila (Nihro)

1941

The *Lehead* returned to port on the 31st. Two destroyers left 1st.

3

(H) Navy Trans. 9-16-41 (AR)

From: Tokyo

a

1941

confidential.

As to the points you were to note, from now on in case there is a change, report once a week, but report each change of the as they occur:

arrival and departure of *Houston*.

arrival and departure of more than 5 or 6 destroyers or sub-

arrival and departure of naval ships other than American; detail the particulars and relationships involved).

1937

(H) Navy Trans. 9-11-41 (6-AR)

From: Manila (Nihro)

yo

1941

)

On the 7th, the *Houston* and two destroyers entered port.

22061

Trans. 9/11/41 (6)

From: Manila (Nihro)
 To: Tokyo
 11 September 1941
 (Purple)
 #595

The *Houston*, which we reported having entered on the 7th, has been alongside the pier loading fuel and stores until today when it left for unknown destination accompanied by two submarines and two destroyers.

22254

JD-1: 5153

(M) Navy Trans. 9-15-41 (5-AR)

From: Manila
 To: Tokyo
 13 September 1941
 (Purple)
 #601

1. Ships in port on the 13th:
 BUKKU (Black Hawk?)
 2 destroyers.
 BERU
 1 submarine

2. On the 13th an American cruiser of the Brooklyn class entered port and is taking on supplies. It is said to have come from Hawaii. I am investigating names of ships and other details but am sending this much on for the present.

22422

JD-1: 6263

(H) Navy Trans. 9-17-41 (6-AR)

[68] From: Manila
 To: Tokyo
 15 September 1941
 (Purple)
 #604

Re my #601*.

According to secret information received, it is the *St. Louis*, with three other vessels (names unknown) said to be starting for Singapore. It was observed that waves of about 24 or 25 knots are painted on the bows. At present explosives are being lowered (red flags being hoisted).

22430

JD-1: 5271

(F) Navy Trans. 9-18-41 (6-AR)

*JD-1: 5268 (SIS #22422).

la (Nihro)

6, 1941

04^a.

the harbor early on the 16th loaded with food supplies. Three sea planes (single wing) were observed. Designated in my previous message. It is also reported that d here ?) by way of Australia but whether this is true or now.

3

Trans. 9/25/41 (6)

130. I have secret information that the St. Louis and three other ships Singapore and that they apparently have ammunition on board.

m: Manila (Nihro)

3, 1941

ernoon of the 17th, the *Phoenix* came in port and is now d at the pier.

ed two more ships of the same type will soon arrive.

7

Trans. 9/20/41 (6)

a (Nihro)

, 1941

nchored here, the 26th, are:

x
a

boat (12,000 to 13,000 tons, number of crew unknown) approximately 200 sailors.

^a (Peters ?), which entered the harbor on the 18th, is ve carried 500 soldiers.

Trans. 9-27-41 (6)

1: Manila (Nihro)

, 1941

sage #618.^a

x left port the morning of the 22nd.

Trans. 9/27/41 (6)

From: Davao (Kihara)

To: Tokyo

September 26, 1941

J-19

#135

Upon my arrival to take up my post here, I heard the following report concerning Zamboanga: ^a

Since last August American destroyer tenders, destroyers and submarines enter that port from the South Seas every Saturday. After they have lain at anchor for one or two days they leave again for the South. In summing up the statements of members of the crews of these boats, it appears that these warships ply the waters from Jolo ^b to Tawao ^c and Tarakan ^d on the island of Borneo.

ARMY 24468

Trans. 11/7/41 (6)

^a A city on the island of Mindanao.

^b Name of the island connecting the main Philippine group to Borneo.

^c Town in British North Borneo.

^d In Netherlands Borneo.

[71] From: Tokyo

To: Davao

October 2, 1941

J-19

#62

Re your #105.^a

Please wire me the location and movements of fishermen and _____ since your last report.

ARMY 25697

Trans. 12-4-41 (6)

^a Not available.

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)

To: Manila

October 4, 1941

Purple

#318

I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest.

ARMY 23207

Trans. 10/8/41 (6)

[72] From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

October 14, 1941

Purple (Primary Intelligence)

#685

On the afternoon of the 13th, the *Houston*, the *Marblehead*, the *Hoh*,^a five destroyers, and two mine layers left port. Their destination is unknown.

The following ships are tied up in this harbor at the present time: The *Black Hawk*, the *Pas*,^a four destroyers, 10 submarines (the sub-

^a Kana spelling.

of Classes 170 and 190), and the *Gold Star* (all of the
ned submarines are tied up on either side of the *Gold*
taking on supplies).

5

Trans. 10/21/41 (6)

m: Manila

941

f reliability A.
ternoon of the 17th the

DO

stroyers
bmarines (140 class)

U

minelayer and

TRINITY

rbor.

ion to the above ships in port at present on the 18th are

Manila.

The same as my #685*

Cavite.

REI

2 minelayers

—— (4 groups missing).

scale barracks are being constructed at NUEBA ESIHA
Jabanatuan and Laur (about 131 kilometers from Manila).

said that mechanized maneuvers are being carried out be-
ur and Aguilla.

04

(H) Navy Trans. 10-22-41 (6-AR)

952 (SIS #28755).

From: Manila (Nihro)

CVO

20, 1941

ury intelligence. The Houston, the Marblehead, eight de-
s, ten submarines (of the 170 and 190 class) and one mine
ft port on the morning of the 20th. Their destination is
n.

23906

Trans. 10/24/41 (6)

From: Davao (Kihara).

To: Tokyo

21 October 1941

(J 19)

#156

Regarding my #124*.

As an air base for central Mindanao district, 300 men are being managed by Americans, and the ground is now being leveled.

An under ground hangar and under ground oil tanks are planned; however, the material for this is delayed so that building on this is not progressing as planned.

Already several times a week planes are flying here, and it seems they are expecting large heavy bomber planes too, very soon.

25580

JD-1: 6945

(Y) Navy Trans.12-1-41 (6)

*Not available.

[75] From: Manila

To: Tokyo

October 24, 1941

Purple

#707

1. Two destroyers, the Ton^a and the Maddo,^a two submarines, and one mine layer touched port on the afternoon of the 23rd.

2. The President Cleveland, which entered the port on the afternoon of the 23rd, landed American soldiers (an unconfirmed report is that there were 2,500).

3. The Chester, a Class A Cruizer no doubt convoying the Cleveland, also entered the port on the afternoon of the 23rd.

4. Referring to my #661^b and #685^c the Gold Star was a mistake for the Ohotos^a (or Ohotou^a) (estimated to be a 10,000 ton ship formerly Norwegian and remodeled after the war).

ARMY 23980

Trans. 10/27/41 (S)

^a Kana spelling.

^b Not available.

^c See S. I. S. #28755. Manila wires Tokyo the ships that are laid up in the harbor at the present time and the ones that left port on the afternoon of the 18th.

[76] From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo.

25 October 1941

(Purple)

#711

1. The REI^{*} and one destroyer left during the morning of the 25th. Destination is not known.

2. Ships in port are the following:

a. Manila.

TON*

MADDO*

CHESTER

BUKKU*

BERU*

ROYGXOMU (?)

HON*

5 destroyers

11 large submarines

5 small submarines

ite.

PASU* (under repair)

2 destroyers

re indications that all of the vessels are to be repainted
olor (almost a grey). the **TON*** and one destroyer have
repainted.

(D) Navy Trans. 10-29-41 (6-AR)

alents for these abbreviations are:

gley

iston

Marblehead

Black Hawk

abel

'on

nopus

1: **Manila (Nihro)**

41

BU entered Cavite on the 26th and the **REI** entered on
of the 27th.

orning of the 27th, 3 destroyers, 11 submarines of the
TON and 2 minelayers left port, destination unknown.

24284

(H) Navy Trans. 11-3-41 (6-AR)

B

41

and the **MADDO**** sailed on the afternoon of the 28th
er on the morning of the 29th. Destination unknown.

25164

(H) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (5-AR)

1 (Nihro)

941

J*, **MADDO***, **HON***, 7 destroyers, 8 submarines and 3
entered port on the 31st. But the **TON*** left again on
f the 1st, destination unknown.

orning of the 1st the President Cleveland and the Presi-
left port loaded with American soldiers whose time was
ncertain).

3. According to reports received from [78] what we believe are reliable sources the number of American military and naval planes in the Philippine Islands is as follows:

- (a) Military planes.
 Large bombers, 29.
 Scout planes, 324.
 The same, B type, 62.
 Fighters, 317.
 The same, B type, 131.
 Pursuit planes, 302.
 The same, D type, 69.
 Training planes, 49.
 Total 1,283.

- (b) Naval planes.
 Large flying boats, 26.

4. Ships in port on the 1st: MADDO,* BUKKU,* PISU,* HON,* BERU,* 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, WOHOTOSU, 3 minelayers. In Cavite: REI,* PASU,* 2 Z.

5. According to a report from the De La Rama steamship company two of their ships, the Dona Estaban (1,616 tons), and the MADBUKARU (191 tons), had been requisitioned by the local American Army.

JD-1: 6335
 24533

(H) Navy Trans. 11-8-41 (6-AR)

* Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are: TON (Houston); MADDO (Marblehead); HON (Heron); BUKKU (Black Hawk); PISU (Canopus); BERU (Isabel); REI (Langley); PASU (Canopus).

[79] From: Manila (Nihro)
 To: Tokyo
 1 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #723

(RE your #318)*

Strict guard is being maintained hence the gathering of information is extremely difficult. We are making secret investigations but I will wire you the following newspaper and foreign office reports for the present.

1. The incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Army is progressing slowly but surely and it is reported that by the end of the year the incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Additions to the barracks at the various camps are being rushed to completion. It seems that particular emphasis is being placed on the concentration of military strength.

Localities are as follows: Kabanatuan, San Marcelino ————
 ———— (several groups missing).

Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers stationed in the vicinity Lingayen during the month of November. Army maneuvers are to be carried out during the middle of the month. This may be a temporary measure.

vicinity of Mariveles more than 3000 workmen are being
the work on the various projects. However, there are
1300 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there.

1, what I estimated to be between 2000 and 3000 infantry
anila by bus headed north. Their destination may have
e place. It is being investigated at present. It appears
rports are being built there and the docks are being

an area the surveillance is particularly strict and it is
1 the entry of Filipinos is prohibited.

being rushed on the road between Dingalan and
ur?) and by the middle of October there were less than
rs that had not been completed [80] and this
ed in the near future. The road between Infanta and
ig widened to 5 meters. Work is being carried on day
the progress is amazing.

ere are 30 or 40 fighter planes, 20 or 30 light bombers
ore of *altitude planes* (?) it is said.
Mail.

(H) Navy Trans. 11-4-41 (S-TT)

"I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the
thern coasts of the island of Luzon, reporting their progress, strength, etc.
igate anything else which may seem of interest." (SIS #23207)

1, Hihro)

941

J, BERU D-8, S-13 and M-3 left on the afternoon of
ation unknown ——— and D-1 are now
zil ?).

Trans. 11/13/41 (6)

: Manila (Nihro)

941

ut a month ago little by little brown soldiers have been
Stotsenburg Barracks. The number at present is about
ousand. In view of the fact that these soldiers speak
may be "Iko's." I understand that they are not very
American soldiers. We are now secretly investigating
e come from.

2. Taraiaō.^a Recently the Miguel Air Field has been extended to form a rectangle about 1,000 meters long.

3. All the wooden bridges on the national highway between Taraiaō and Lingayen^b have been replaced with concrete bridges.

4. At the foot of a hill situated to the north of Teraiaō (the hill overlooks the Lingayen Gulf) about 200 barracks have been constructed. I understand that new barracks are being built at Ste Ignatia.

5. From what I hear the American soldiers stationed at Stotsenburg maintained an arrogant attitude toward the Filipinos and, since there have been two or three cases of assault on Filipinas, the Filipinos are furious.

ARMY 24626

Trans. 11/12/41 (6)

^a Tarallo, Camarines Province.

^b Pangasinan Province, Luzon, Philippine Islands on Lingayen Gulf.

[82] From: Tokyo

To: Manila

5 November 1941

(Purple)

#355

For Secretary Yuki.

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the following items. Please arrange as you think best for the same:

These items in regard to each port of call:

- (1) Conditions at air ports on land.
- (2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.
- (3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces.
- (4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

JD-1: 6424

(F) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (6-AR)

24696

[83] From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

November 6, 1941

Purple

#735

Of first importance. Re my #743^a.

The following information has been pieced together from two intelligence reports.

1. 50 American officials and 1200 Philippine soldiers are stationed at Bugallon in Pangasinan^b province. There are also 8 light tanks and 8 aircraft guns (with fixed mounts). There is a number of American artillery men stationed in the Yashiyama (literally—Coconut(?) mountain) between Sual^c and Lingayen^d.

2. There are 10 two-motored light bombers, 190 Curtis fighting planes (up to now intelligence reports have given the number to be 60 but recently reinforcements were received) and 400 American air force officers stationed at Iba in Zambales^e province. A division of Philippine soldiers (15,000) are stationed at San Marcelino. This division is composed of 3 infantry regiments, 3 field artillery companies and 3

and armored artillery companies and it is expected that a
 nt of a large number of tanks will soon be received. They
 y started the construction of a new air field there.
 ore, 320 Philippine soldiers are stationed at Botolan.
 re now constructing barracks at three points (out 4 kilo-
 ; than 10) kilometers and 22 kilometers) on the [84]
 'arlac to Santa Ignacia in Tarlac province which will ac-
 100, 1000, 1500 soldiers respectively, a total of 3,000. Also
 is being started on a new air field 5 kilometers south of
 e year plan) apparently a part of the leveling has already
 d. A military road from Capas through O'Donnell to
 Zambales province is almost completed. (Upon several
 ely troop camouflaging was observed.)
 y 200 light tanks were (landed?) at Stotsenburg in Pam-

13

Trans. 11/15/41 (6)

5.
 th of Manila beyond Tarlac province.
 Province.
 rn side of the peninsula across the bay from Manila.
 west shore of Manila Bay between Tarlac and Bataan Province.

m: Manila

1941

:353.^a

ttting that portion of the message following *Raichaku*.

3 my #723.^b

ie last part of last month a reinforcement of 4 or 5 thou-
 has been received in the province of Bataan.^c They were
 ng the coast and in the central mountain districts at Say-
 en, Linao, Limay, etc.

ellent military highway has been constructed between
 fariveres (154 kilometers to 157 kilometers from Manila)
 asts and in the interior. Sentries are posted at the en-
 biting the passage of civilians, Philippine military and
 ossessing special permits _____

erful?) guns and many defenses seem to have been put in.
 the road between Bagac and Balanga has already been
 to a military highway, construction of a military road
 loron and Olongapo has been suspended. I believe that
 onnections between these places have been by boat for a

ncomplete).^c

4

Trans. 11/14/41 (S)

#24382; in which Manila wires a report on the defense activities in the
 s gathered from newspapers and foreign office reports.
 vince across the bay from Manila.
 ntioned in this message are in Bataan province.
 of the message was not retransmitted.

[86] From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

November 8, 1941

Purple

#742

The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 8th are as follows: The *Marblehead*, the *Black Hawk*, eight destroyers, nine submarines, the *Heron*, the *Wohotosu*,^a the *Isobel*, and the tanker *Trinity* (the latter arrived on the 8th).

ARMY 24745

Trans. 11/14/41 (6)

^a Kana spelling.

From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

November 10, 1941

Purple

#745

1. The *Houston* touched port at Cavite on the 8th.
2. Four destroyers left port on the 10th. Destination unknown.
3. Two cargo boats (former president boats of the 10,000 ton class with the names painted over) entered port on the 9th, landing 2,300 soldiers.

ARMY 24755

Trans. 11/14/41 (6)

[87] From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

November 10, 1941

Purple

#746

Re my #722,^a first part of part 3—the number of large attack planes, latest models, 4-motored B-19's, is 32.

Re my #727,^b the black soldiers are American negroes.

ARMY 24850

Trans. 11/17/41 (6)

^a See S. I. S. #24533; in which Manila informs Tokyo in regard to the number of American military and naval planes in the Philippine Islands.

^b See S. I. S. #24626; in which Manila reports on defense activities in the Philippines, saying they are secretly investigating where the 2 or 3,000 brown soldiers arriving at the Stotsenburg Barracks have come from.

From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

November 12, 1941

Purple

#753

On the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port. She is now tied up at dock #7 and is taking on _____. It is thought likely that this vessel accompanied one of the President line ships into port. This vessel preceded the cruiser into port.

ARMY 24923

Trans. 11/18/41 (6)

n: Manila (Nihro)

, 1941

to a report handed on to me by a Japanese who has lived
ce of Ilocos Norte for some fourteen or fifteen years, the
s been ascertained.

present time there are approximately 400 Philippine
seven or eight officers stationed in Laoag.^a It is being
ever, that the Philippine troops will be increased to
y 1,700. At the present time they are constructing
tracks.

ems to be no indication that they plan the expansion of
vil airport in Laoag (length, 1,200 metres; width, 850
are they stationing any military planes at that field.
reconnaissance flight nightly (one plane) over the coastal
icinity of the city, no extensive activity is in progress.
it is said that Claveria^b and Burgos^b are being equipped
-----, the details are unknown. (I am continuing my
igations in this connection.)

Trans. 11/21/41 (6)

Province of Ilocos Norte on the Island of Luzon, P. I.
northern shore of the Island of Luzon, P. I.

t: Manila (Nihro)

1941

ven me by a Japanese who resides in Camarines Norte^a

rea at the present time there does not seem to be many
ed. Only about 60 members of the Philippine Patrol
with headquarters in Daet,^b are located in that area.
or six of these patrolmen are dispatched as a relief unit
nd Jose Panganiban.^d

l Airport at Paracale is not being used at the present
as the military air field at Daet is concerned, though
ilitary planes landed there during February of this
t time to this there has not been a single military plane
field. As this field is located right on the beach, should
it is said that naval planes could land in the shipping
e beach as well.

oint of land, San Muricio,^e north of Jose Panganiban
hat they are equipping ----- with -----, but this has
ed. (I am continuing my secret investigations.)

4. Twelve or thirteen coastal reconnaissance planes were seen to have flown over the area within a period of three days. Toward the latter part of last year 13 American freighters are said to have entered the port of Pangniban. Since then, almost on the average of once a week, American freighters sail from Batgasan¹ to Hondagua.⁵

ARMY 25162

Trans. 11/24/41 (6)

- [90] * Province near southeastern extremity of Luzon.
^b City on southeastern extremity of the Island of Luzon.
^c Seaport in the province of Camarines Norte.
^d English spelling. Cannot identify.
^e English spelling. Point of land cannot be identified.
^f Seaport in southwestern Luzon.
^g Seaport on Lopez Bay off Lamon Bay.

From: Manila

To: Tokyo

13 November 1941

(Purple)

#757

1. The CA heavy cruiser of my #753* was the Portland.
2. On the morning of the 13th a British destroyer of the Defender type entered port.
3. It has been ascertained that 8 (or 4 ?) of the nine submarines of my #742* are of the 129 class. They have entered port here recently but the exact date is uncertain.

JD-1: 6503 24780

(H) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (S-22)

*Not available.

[91] From: Tokyo

To: Manila

15 November 1941

(Purple)

#368

Strictly confidential.

Re your #746*.

Please ascertain by what route the large bombers went to the Philippines, and also please make investigations again as to their number.

JD-1: 6753 25236

(H) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (AR)

*JD-1: 6545 (SIS #24850). Reports 32 B-19 bombers in the Philippines.

From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

15 November 1941

(Purple)

#767

1. It has been ascertained that the ship of my #757*, paragraph 2, was a British transport, the AWATEA which entered port at the same time under convoy, (12000 or 13000 tons, 700 or 800 soldiers on board). Both ships sailed again on the evening of the 14th, destination unknown.
2. On the afternoon of the 14th, 4 destroyers, 11 submarines, 1 mine-layer, entered port.

port on the 15th :

ila:

MADDO

Portland

BUKKU

BERU

BERU**

HON

VOHOTOSU

destroyers

10 submarines

minelayer

ivate:

HON

PASU

5237

(H) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (AR)

118 #24780). Re movements of U. S. Naval and British Naval craft in
ed.

1941

transmitting our machine telegram of the 14th with indi-
cause of a mistake on the plug board, as follows:

ing is from a report of a Japanese resident in Cebu.

nt there are about 300 American and 2,500 Filipino
oned there. (There are four barracks each with a
out 500 or 600 soldiers.

ort has an area of about 196 acres but is being enlarged
ivict labor). About 12 planes (of medium size) used
ine Army, have been transported to Java by air, and 12
n Army planes, (monoplanes—whether they were scout
uit planes was not clear), are now stationed there. In
se there is one large bomber in the hangar (double type,
anes).

quarters of the former patrol force are being used as the
storehouse and all sorts of provisions are being stored

nd of September, about 20 American warships anchored
est coast of the Sulu Archipelago. Around the middle
o destroyers and one cruiser entered Cebu harbor and
ith, one oil supply ship of the 20,000 ton class, and a
ruiser of the 10,000 ton class, entered port and anchored
ee days. It has been recognized that occasionally two
ican ships anchor around the south of Mactan, Bacol,

n open drydock at MAKUGAA (operated by Chinese)
dling ships up to 10,000 tons.

4933

(H) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (S-TT)

[93] From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

17 November 1941

(Purple)

#769

On the morning of the 17th the

MADDO*

Portland

J** 10 ships

M*** 1 ship

left port. Destination unknown.

JD-1: 6761 25244

(H) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (AR)

*Marblehead?

**May be garble for "D"—destroyer.

***Minelayer.

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Manila

November 20, 1941

Purple

#372 (Strictly Secret)

Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of drift —— presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay*.

Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo.

ARMY 25314

Trans. 11-26-41 (6)

* Near Manila, P. I.

[94] From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

November 22, 1941

Purple

#785

1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown.

On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the President Harrison) entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and materiel.

2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were:

Manila—Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black Hawk; Isobel; Heron; Wohotosu*; Pisu*; one mine layer; 9 destroyers; 20 submarines.

Cavite—Houston (?); Canopus.

ARMY 25471

Trans. 11/29/41 (6)

* Kana spelling.

a (Nihro)

1941

together various reports, it appears that a large amount of property was removed from the "port area" during the "black-out" of the 21st. Forty or fifty civilian buses (carrying property of the Manila Electric Company) were seen in the Rizal district. Investigations are being made to find out if these buses were with troops.

At two o'clock in the afternoon of the 22nd, 60 light tanks (one gun, two ———) and 20 ammunition trucks were seen on Bridge 1). These light tanks and ammunition trucks were the 21st grouped near the headquarters of the "port area" command. It is conjectured that (troops ?) arrived on military barges entering the harbor. An English language "bulletin" stated that a large number of light tanks and ammunition trucks arrived at four and six o'clock on the afternoon of the 22nd in Zambayan in Bulacan Province and San Fernando in Pampanga Province. I believe that these had been landed sometime during the night. The final destination of these tanks and trucks is now unknown.

It is seen that there are two or three hundred American soldiers near the "port area" which have been imported at short notice, creating a hurried atmosphere. Also, troops have newly arrived at certain places in 1) the hills within the city. They are American reinforcements. Feeling among the people in Manila has become tense.

Trans. 12/1/41 (6)

1: Manila (Nihro)

1941

23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland * (1,000 tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port.

On 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.

On 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown.

25708 (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (6-AR)

1. S. S. HOLLAND (of 8000 tons).

1 (Nihro)

1941

On 26th, BUKKU*, 2 destroyers, 10 submarines, left port on 26th. Destination unknown.

25782 (H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR)

Hawk.

From: Manila (Nihro)
 To: Tokyo
 November 28, 1941
 Purple
 #799

Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day.

ARMY 25764

Trans. 12/5/41 (6)

[97]

B. TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941

From: Manila (Nihro)
 To: Tokyo
 29 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #805

Ships in port on the 29th.

1. Manila:

Submarine tender WOTOSU and HORAN *

Submarines 190 class 5

Submarines 170 class 5

Submarines 180 class 5

(When the 180 class entered port there were 8 but 3 departed, destination unknown.)

Submarines 150 class 5

Submarines small size 4

Oilers, 2 (PISU * and TRINITY)

Destroyers, 2

Gunboats, 1 (BERU *)

2. Cavite:

TON *

PASU * (being repaired).

3. It was announced on the 27th that for a time the lights at Sangley Point in Cavite, at Manila, Baguio, and on the buoys in the bay would be turned out.

JD-1: 7207 25935

(H) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR)

*Probably HOLLAND, PECOS, ISABEL.

[98] From: Manila (Nihro).
 To: Tokyo.
 1 December 1941
 (Purple)
 #812

Ships in port on the 1st.

1. A. Manila.

Submarine tender HOLLAND.

Submarines, small, 2.

ines, large, 6.

2 (PISU* and TRINITY).

ts, 1 (KASUBERU).

ASU* which was undergoing repairs at Cavite lies at
or off ———.

hip, 1 (4000 ton class), taking on provisions.

marine tender WOTOSU.

e submarines and

oyers, left port this morning, destination unknown.

can Navigation (10,000 ton class) entered port about
from it are being unloaded 12 objects 1 meter in diameter
eters in length. I think they are boilers. (I am making
).

Danish ship, the Manchén Maersk (10,000 ton class),
ry Panama, present name unidentifiable (under inves-
red port this morning, about half loaded, it appeared.
eighters (6000 ton class) are at the pier taking on cargo,
certainable.

or Kellogg (American registry, 6000 ton class), entered
days ago, unloaded crude oil and is scheduled to load

steban (requisitioned by the American Army) entered
ning.

TON.*

25936

(H) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR)

s, Canopus, and Houston.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

A. TRANSLATED BEFORE 7 DECEMBER 1941

ia (Ishizawa)

41

side the department.)

transport planes turned out to be two DC 5's of KUNI-
ow, according to a newspaper report, the KUNIRUMU^b
ned planes are:

e DC 5 type

e DC 3 type

e DC 2 type

skheeds

e Sikorsky S 43 type

e Guranmen^b G. E. 21 type

laviland Dragon

e Fokker EHS 7 type

e Fokker LHU 12 type

And it is understood that the Kacfuera^b EMU has 4 of the DC 3 type.

While the Java class Cruiser was still at anchor in Puriooku^b harbor, on the morning of the 27th, one destroyer of the Bankerutu^b class entered port.

ARMY 21721

Trans. 9/3/41 (5)

^a Not available.
^b Kana spelling.

[101] From: Tokyo (Toyoda)

To: Singapore and Batavia

September 6, 1941

Purple

Cir. #1947 (Strictly Secret)

After you have made an immediate investigation on the following matters, please make a report, sending it to us in an appropriate manner.

1. Please inform me as to the various types of fishing entered into by Japanese from the point of view of their use in fishing of gasoline-powered vessels ("gasoline-powered vessels" is a military term for vessels known as "sea arks" which have a considerable cruising ability).

2. In regard to these fishing concerns who operates these so-called "sea arks":

- (a) List the number of vessels for each concern separately.
- (b) Give the tonnage of each vessel.
- (c) The speed of each vessel.
- (d) Whether or not they have wireless equipment.
- (e) Give the present position of each ship.
- (f) Should we require the use of these fishing vessels, please advise us as to the method by which we could transmit instructions for each vessel. (This is particularly important.)
- (g) The time of day we should wire these orders. (This is particularly important.)

[102] (h) Please ascertain the length of time required subsequent to receipt of orders to move from their present position to the southern part of French Indo-China.

ARMY 22009

Trans. 9/10/41 (6)

From: Tokyo

To: Singapore

October 22, 1941

Purple

#316

Strictly secret

From the Vice-Chief of General Staff. Through Chancellor TAHIRA please report the following two things concerning the air force now stationed in the Federated Malay States:

1. Their drills and battle maneuvers (aerial formations).
2. Investigate their organization.

ARMY 23902

Trans. 10-24-41 (S)

41

JURIYA from the Assistant Chief of Staff.

lease inspect and report on the air force in the Dutch
rd to:

ning, formation, and aerial combat methods.

anization, types, number and location of planes.

es and number of planes being sent from England and
d States.

Trans. 10/24/41 (S)

m: Batavia

41

in the Foreign Office.

in the Military.

vey to Assistant Chief of Staff: (Very secret).

—— message #25.

te and reliable information regarding the N. E. I. air
yet in hand, I will merely report the main items:

concerning destroyer units:

tion —— 3 planes in small triangle formation (some-
es in a diamond shaped formation) and three of these
aking one unit.

their combat methods, they have been observed to work
f having three pursuit planes attack light bombers from
elow, attacking one plane at a time, but aside from this
re not known.

concerning organization:

on headquarters —— in the army —— —— at
The first Bandoeng air force is at Malang in western
e second air force seems to have charge of eastern and
(its symbol is "LFX"). The number of planes stationed
to be combat planes 9(?)2 planes —— —— light
—— ———.

of planes: (The number of planes given in brackets
liable).

estroyer) planes: ZATAISUHUOOKU and Curtis in-

—— —— reconnoiter and bombing plane—Curtis—
out 5(?)).

pers: Glen Martin and Lockheed (about 150).

ts: DONIERU (about 20) and recent Catalina 5 sea-
um and small types, about 50).

[104] (c) The number of planes for both army and navy total about 500 of first line planes, and adding second line planes it would come to between 700 and 1000, (including training planes). During the review of troops on 1 September, about 100 planes were flying over Batavia.

(d) Points at which planes are stationed: (numbers given are very unreliable). Also see Java message #18* in regard to stations.

(1) Aviation force #1. Bandon.

Light bombers, 30.

Combat planes, 70.

KARIJATE "LFX"*** and ——— parachute troops (temporarily created).

TIRIRITAN**. Combat planes, 12; light bombers.

"LFX" BOITE SPORUHU**, combat 70, light bombers, 6.

PUMXNBUKKU**, (on south coast) ——— some light bombers.

(2) Aviation force #2. "LFX".

AARAN**, quite a number of light bombers.

SOERABAJA, (north field), combat planes, 40; scout planes, 30; light bombers, 30.

MAOSTMATOI**, (west of MAJION), light bomber "LFX".

JOKUJA**, light bomber, combat plane.

(3) Naval planes:

SOERABAJA, flying boats, 20, (including some Catalinas recently arrived). Seaplanes, "LFX".

TANJONPURIOOKU**, flying boats, "LFX".

(4) Outlying territories:

Menado, flying boats on the lake to the south, "LFX".

Anbon, flying boat, "LFX". Barikupapan, light bomber, "LFX".

[105] (3) The situation as regards replenishments and arrivals:

(a) Two Catalina flying boats were ferried from the United States in early part of September, and three the latter part of October.

(b) Others, it would seem, are being imported from time to time by American and Dutch ships, but the actual facts are not known.

(c) According to newspaper reports contracts have been made in the United States amounting to \$24,000,000 for the purchase of two-motored medium weight bombers of the B type.

(d) The supplementary naval appropriation just passed provides 14,340,000 guilders for plane purchases for the purpose of creating a torpedo plane force.

(e) There seem to be supply depots at each of the flying fields at Soerabaja and Bandoeng; and assembling and repair of planes are done at these places.

(4) Other items:

(a) Of late volunteer flying corps are being organized in various places for the purpose of training second line pilots, and there are already about 40 each in training at Batavia and Soerabaja.

there has been an increase of plane accidents (especially in the Netherlands East Indies. This is thought to be due to efforts at expansion ———).

(F) Navy Trans. 10-30-41 (6-AR)

n: Honkong (Yano)

.941

Tokyo #542

been rumors to the effect that the Canada army troops sent to the Orient.

1 (morning) a Canadian Pacific line steamer came in by a British warship. This ship had on board about 1,000 soldiers, who were entered in the Kuryushinho barracks. These are Canadian volunteers and are of mixed nationality. Regarding the strength, etc. of this division a secret, but according to another 2000 are expected.

London, Ottawa. Relay to Shanghai and Nanking.

25481

(Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (CN)

(Togo)

e

1941

— — — — that a squadron consisting of eight ships of the fleet and ten other boats set out from port on November 4th with 1,000 British troops, including many aviators, heading for the United States. Therefore, please pay particular attention to

Trans. 11-25-41 (6)

B. TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941

,

e

941

(Abstract)

mediate report on ships in port and movements of capital

26263

(A) Navy Trans. 12-13-41 (AR)

[108]

5. WEST COAST

[109]

A. TRANSLATED BEFORE 7 DECEMBER 1941

From: San Francisco (Muto)

To: Tokyo

September 18, 1941

J-19

#218

According to a spy report, the English warship *Warspite* arrived here from Bremerton on the ——— and is at present moored near the (naval arsenal at Mare Island ?). It has been determined that it requires two more months for repairs at Liverpool (my message #187*).

Relayed to ———, Los Angeles and Seattle.

ARMY 22689

Trans. 9/25/41 (2)

* Not available.

From: Seattle (Sato)

To: Tokyo

September 20, 1941

J-19

#123

1. The following warships are now at Bremerton:

The *Warspite* (repair work continuing. The upper part of the bridge and the left side of the bow spotted here and there with red paint.)

Maryland class—one ship (the bridge, turrets and other main armaments have been painted red. Also, they seem to be constructing mountings on the foreward main deck for ten anti-aircraft guns.

Saratoga class air-craft carrier, 1 ship (tied up alongside the pier.)

[110] One ship which appears to be a cruiser (it has two smoke stacks but we were unable to distinguish anything else.)

One other ship just arrived for repair.

2. The New Mexico class ship mentioned in message #101* has departed.

ARMY 22776

Trans. 9-27-41 (2)

* Not available.

From: San Francisco (Muto)

To: Washington

October 2, 1941

J-19

Circular #222. Message to Tokyo as #230.

1. One Oklahoma class battleship has arrived in port and is moored in front of the Bethlehem ship-building yard. No reconstruction work is going on on the outside but a great deal of repair work appears to be in progress within the ship.

2. It has been announced by the local headquarters of Naval District #(?) that the Hunter's Point shipyard, which was bought

which has been undergoing repairs, will be taken over in the near future in advance of expectations. (Refer letter #216^a of last year.)

Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle and Honolulu.

Trans. 10-17-41 (2)

in Tokyo (Toyoda)

41

I would like to have you refer in your reports to the warships as follows:

As there are no great changes in the movement and bases, report on them at least once every ten days. In the daily intelligence, report such on each occasion.

On arrival or departure of American flagships of the fleet or

more than ten vessels of any type arrive or depart from the base.

On arrival or departure of warships of countries other than the United States (give as detailed a report as possible on the class and name).

When anti-aircraft patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes, report it at once.

Trans. 10/29/41 (S) —

by (Sato)

41
city)

When warships entered Bremerton Naval Yard on the 21st: (repairs are to be made to her bridge), the Maryland which seems to be a cruiser.

— and Los Angeles.

Trans. 11/4/41 (7)

from: Seattle (Sato)

941
city)

On the occasion of Navy Day, the 27th, fifteen Coast Guard vessels entered the harbor here in single file. Their names were the *Kane*, *Ciruma*,^a the *Brooks*, the *Fox* (the above listed

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vessels have had their four-inch guns replaced by five-inch guns; all of these were brand-new ones), the Frigate *Bird*, the *Crow*, the *Pintail*, the *Eagle 57*, *Batukei*,^a the *Butternut*, the *Amber*, the *YP 83, 87, 89*, and *90*.

ARMY 24997

Trans. 11/19/41 (2)

^a Kana spelling.

From: Seattle (Sato)

To: Tokyo

November 10, 1941

J-19 (Priority)

#165 (Message to Washington Circular #80.)

Vessels anchored in Bremerton on the 9th: *Saratoga*, *Warspite*, *Colorado*, (I have confirmed that the latter ship is the one which I have reported on successive occasions as the *Maryland*) and the *Charleston*.

Relayed to ——— and Los Angeles.

ARMY 24990

Trans. 11/19/41 (2)

[113]

B. TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941

From: Seattle

To: Tokyo

December 6, 1941

PA-K2

#184 (Urgent intelligence.)

1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the *Warspite* (came out of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the *Colorado*.

2. The *Saratoga* sailed the same day.

ARMY 25876

Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

[114]

6. MISCELLANEOUS

[115] From: Havana (Nanjo)

To: Tokyo

August 2, 1941

J-19

#44 (Strictly secret)

Between the 16th and the 24th of July, the following American war-ships were anchored in the naval harbor of Guantanamo: 2 battle-ships; 4 light cruisers; 4 destroyers; 2 Coast Guard cutters; 2 (long range ?) heavy bombing planes.

ARMY 23382

Trans. 10-13-41 (2)

San Francisco
1941

431

report beginning December 1st on the following:
nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed, (or at
ived), and port of destination, (or from where it started),
arture, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war
in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea.

25710

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (2)

7. OTHER MESSAGES OF PARTICULAR INTEREST,
TRANSMITTED BEFORE 1 AUGUST 1941

From: Tokyo (Matuoka)
ington (Koshi)
ry, 1941

parts—complete)

#43 *.

formation we particularly desire with regard to intelligence
; U. S. and Canada, are the following:

ngthening or supplementing of military preparations on the
oast and the Hawaii area; amount and type of stores and
; alterations to air ports (also carefully note the clipper

p and plane movements (particularly of the large bombers
planes).

ether or not merchant vessels are being requisitioned by the
nent (also note any deviations from regular schedules), and
; any remodelling is being done to them.

lling up of army and navy personnel, their training, (outlook
euvers) and movements.

ords and acts of minor army and navy personnel.

utlook of drafting men from the view-point of race. Particu-
whether Negroes are being drafted, and if so, under what
ions.

ersonnel being graduated and enrolled in the army and navy
viation service schools.

Whether or not any troops are being dispatched to the South
c by transports; if there are such instances, give description.

utlook of the developments in the expansion of arms and the
action set-up; the capacity of airplane production; increase in
anks of labor.

General outlooks on Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, with par-
ar stress on items involving plane movements and shipment of
ary supplies to those localities.

. Outlook on U. S. defense set-ups.

1:

738 1030 (continued)

Navy Trans. 2-20-41 (1)

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[118] 12. Contacts (including plane connections) with Central and South America and the South Pacific area. Also outlook on shipment of military supplies to those areas.

Please forward copies of this message as a "Minister's Instruction" to New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, Portland (Chicago or New Orleans?) Vancouver, Ottawa, and Honolulu. Also to Mexico City and Panama as reference material.

JD-1:

#14738 1030 15 February, 1941

Navy Trans. 2-20-41 (1)

[119] From: Tokyo (Matuoka).

To: Honolulu (Riyoji).

15 February, 1941

(J17 K6)

#008

Re my #73 to Washington*.

In gathering intelligence material, your office will pay particular attention to paragraphs 1 and 2.

JD-1:

#14729 1035 15 February, 1941

Navy Trans. 2-20-41 (S)

*JD-1 : 1030—Outlines details of intelligence information desired.
(SIS #14738)

From: Tokyo (Matuoka)

To: San Francisco (Riyoji)

15 February, 1941

(J17 K6)

#020

Secret.

Re my #73 to Washington*.

Will your office please pay particular attention to gathering intelligence material which will fall under the classifications outlined in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 12.

JD-1: 1031

#14733 15 February, 1941

Navy Trans. 2-20-21 (S)

*JD-1 : 1030—Outlines details of intelligence information desired.
(SIS #14738)

[120] From: Tokyo (Matuoka)

To: Los Angeles (Riyoji)

15 February, 1941

(J17 K6)

#013

Secret.

Re my #73 to Washington*.

tion with collecting intelligence material, your office will
 lar attention to contents of paragraphs 1, 2, 8, 9 and 11.

5 February, 1941

Navy Trans. 2-20-41 (S)

o—Outlines details of intelligence information desired.
 8)

yo (Matuoka).
 York (Riyoji).
 ry, 1941

#73 to Washington*.
 ering intelligence material, your office will pay particular
 to contents of paragraphs 4, 6, 7, and 9.
 1033

15 February, 1941

Navy Trans. 2-20-41 (S)

1030—Outlines details of intelligence information desired.
 4738)

Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister).
 ncouver (Japanese Consul)
 uary, 1941
 3)

t.
 y #73 to Washington*.
 athering intelligence material, your office will lay particular
 on paragraph 10.
 1034

6 15 February, 1941

Navy Trans. 2-20-41 (S)

: 1030—Outlines details of intelligence information desired.
 #14738)

From: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
 Vancouver
 ary 26, 1941
 36

my #8.*
 ase wire reports covering the positions and movements also of the
 of Canada's Pacific Fleet. Please transmit to Ottawa and from
 office — to the Naval Attache.

FY 15310

Trans. 3/18/41 (S)

re S. I. S. #14738. Directs Vancouver, in gathering intelligence material, to lay
 ular stress on general outlooks in Alaska and Aleutian Islands, especially on items
 ring plane movements and shipments of military supplies to those localities.

From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

To: Singapore

May 16, 1941

PA-K2

#120 (Strictly Secret)

According to a telegram from our consul in Colombo, a New York Reuters dispatch states that it is reported that the United States has already stationed a fleet in the Indian Ocean. Please pay great attention to the movements of American warships.

ARMY 19894

Trans. 7/23/41 (6)

[122] From: Tokyo (Jap Foreign Minister)

To: Mexico (Koshi)

23 June 1941

(Purple)

#106

Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama Canal and vicinity, please have career attache Kihara make an official trip to Panama. (It might be well to have secretary Yoshimizu accompany him.)

Have the maps taken out by plane, and then have Sato, the Naval Attache, bring them to Tokyo with him when he returns.

Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their #62* from Panama to me, mentioned the question of a trip, get in touch with them regarding date and time of arrival. (American surveillance will unquestionably be vigilant. There are also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also, any telegrams exchanged between you and Panama should be very simple.**)

18581

JD-1:3198

Navy trans. 6-24-41 (S)

*Available, not yet translated—dated 17 June.

**i. e. "Kantan"—may also mean "Brief, short"; hence, cryptographically secure, or may infer that they should be in plain language, but innocuous in appearance.

[123] From: Vladivostok

To: Tokyo

25 June 1941

(Red)

#230

There has been no great change in conditions here up to the 25th. Emergency measures are in force, the regulation of commodities and supplies to the defense force ———. The fleet and the air corps began practice on the 24th. The attitude toward Japan (?) has undergone no change. Some civilians talk to the officials.

Details of military conditions are as follows:

1. Conditions on the 22nd.

(1) About 7:30 p. m. emergency orders were issued to the army and navy sentries who had gone out for the evening and they could be seen everywhere in the city running to their posts of duty.

out 9 p. m. one truck loaded to capacity with armoured
 and following this three navy trucks loaded with 4-turret
 machine guns could be seen moving out to guard (duty).
 fleet was inactive and nothing out of the ordinary could
 . The corps that had charge of air defense seemed to be at

tions on the 23rd.

tary trucks were going back and forth constantly in con-
 h the air defense.

fleet was still inactive, but part of it engaged in target

radio broadcast throughout the day concerning coastal

itions on the 24th:

change on the land front from the previous day. The num-
 bers in the city seemed to be about as before.

94 18959 (continued) (H) Navy Trans. 7-2-41 (6-AR)

(2) The warships that had been in the harbor for the
 al days sailed out early in the morning apparently for prac-
 euvres.

he air corps began making flights from this morning. The
 ho are on duty in the city in ordinary times began practicing
 it.

25th.

o change during the forenoon.

he fleet had already gone out for practice maneuvers but the
 s left in the harbor at 8 a. m. were as follows:

light cruiser

mine layer

submarine tender

destroyers

torpedo boats

10-20 submarines

5 special service ships

of these were being repaired.

(H) Navy Trans. 7-2-41 (6-AR)

From: Vladivostok

okyo

7 1941

)

port on recent naval activities in this area.

nce the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities
 have tightened up on watch and are engaged in naval prepara-
 by enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality. However,
 exercises are limited to only one section of the force for there
 many ships which are undergoing repairs. Evidently the prepara-
 s are intended for defense against Japan.

.) Activities of the fleet.

A part of the ERI type and SICHA type submarines assigned to this area appear to be operating somewhere else, for there are comparatively few submarines in port at present. However, the remainder of submarines, the torpedo boat division, mine layer division, mine sweeper division, high speed torpedo craft division, etc. are still here and are either undergoing repairs or are engaged in exercises. The first phase of exercises ended with the basic maneuvers in early June and the 2nd phase is already underway. Lately the departure of craft from the bay has become infrequent but since the war, those craft which do go out seldom return, even though it be Saturday or Sunday. Not only this, but planes of types SB, E15, E16 and OFUBOOHU are quite active and it appears that they are engaged in exercises with the fleet. However, the exercises appear to be greatly handicapped by so many ships being placed under repairs.

19616

JD-1: 3709

(A) Navy Trans. 7-16-41 (3)

[126] From: Manila (Nihro)

To: Tokyo

25 July 1941

(Purple)

#433

The United States is making a concentrated effort to strengthen Philippine defenses. There are at present 460 planes, and about 1300 pilots. Army force numbers 10,000 and an effort is being made to increase this number. The Philippine Army numbers about 130,000 including those on active duty, reserve lists and the gendarmerie. In an emergency, about 100,000 men could be turned over to U. S. officers to command, it is estimated by the bureau concerned.

20387

JD-1: 4155

(D) Navy Trans. 8-1-41 (6-AR)

EXHIBIT NO. 3

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSES	PRECEDENCE
	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESS	
SOLL VENBER 1941	COM 12.	PRIORITY
		ROUTINE
		RRRRR
		DEFERRED
RG N	CINCPAC CINCAF COM 14 COM 16	PRIORITY
		ROUTINE
		RRRRR
		DEFERRED
DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.		IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
252203 CR 0600		☐
ME:	DATE	TIME
		OCT 20

NOTES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PACIFIC SHIPPING THRU TORRES
CINCPAC AND CINCAF PROVIDE NECESSARY
FOR YOUR DISPATCH 230258.

TOP SECRET

ON
12 16 38 38W CNO FILE
200P FILE

BE A TRUE COPY.

Joseph W. Lindahl
Lt. Comdr

SECRET

in Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

MASTER

EXHIBIT NO. 4

(Exhibit No. 4 is a map of the Hawaiian Islands showing the record of early flights 7 December 1941 obtained by Opana radar detector station. This map is printed as Item No. 1 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

EXHIBIT NO. 5**ARMY EXHIBIT****INDEX TO ARMY EXHIBIT**

<i>Section</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Page</i> ¹
I.	Unit Locations by District, Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941.....	1
II.	Strength Report by Unit and Station, Hawaiian Department, 30 November 1941.....	2-5
III.	Principal Weapons of Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, 7 December 1941.....	6
IV.	Copy of Record of Early Flights, 7 December 1941, Obtained by Opana Detector Station.....	7
	Copy of Mobile Detector Station Records Prior to 7:00 a. m., 7 December 1941.....	8
V.	Status of Combat Planes, Before and After the Attack, 7 December 1941.....	9
VI.	Time of Take-offs by Airfield after Beginning of Attack 7 December 1941.....	10
VII.	Action and Disposition of Antiaircraft Batteries, 7 December 1941...	11-12
VIII.	Army Casualties, 7 December 1941.....	13

[1]

SECTION I**Kauai District:**

3d Battalion, 299th Infantry (less Companies "K" & "L") and attached troops.

Company "C", 299th Infantry.

1st Platoon, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning.

Air Corps Detachment.

Maui District:

1st Battalion, 299th Infantry (less Company "C") and attached troops.

Company "K", 299th Infantry (MOLOKAI).

4th Platoon Signal Company, Aircraft Warning.

Air Corps Detachment.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original Exhibit.

t:
on, 299th Infantry and attached troops.
achment, KILAUEA MILITARY CAMP.
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning.
Detachment.

ry Division (less 299th Infantry Regiment).
ry Division.
oast Artillery Command.
Air Force.

r Battalion (Aviation).
pany
, 1st Separate Chemical Battalion.
uck Train.

SECTION II

PORT BY UNIT AND STATION, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

30 NOVEMBER 1941.

	Enlisted	Officer		Enlisted	Officer
th			[5] Fort Shafter—Oahu:		
...	67	3	9th Sig Serv Co.....	327	1
...	88	22	53rd CA Brig.....	181	14
...	262	37	64th CA.....	2,085	73
...	350	59	Hq Ft Shafter.....	0	16
...			Hq Med Depot.....	29	3
...	24	2	Hq Haw Dept.....	230	153
...	1,313	56	MP Co, Haw Dept.....	156	2
...	1,337	58	Det QM Ft Shafter.....	155	0
...			Det MD Ft Shafter.....		
...			Det FD Ft Shafter.....		
...	161	3	Fort Weaver—Oahu: 97th CA..	3,163	262
...	20	3		329	17
...	279	26	Hawaiian Ordnance Depot—		
...	119	0	Oahu:		
...	82	0	61st Ord Co.....	62	2
...	64	0	62nd Ord Co.....	68	2
...	61	-----	63rd Ord Co.....	65	1
...	786	32	74th Ord Co.....	39	1
...	128	5	Hq Haw Ord Dpt.....	0	11
...			Vet Genl Hosp.....	9	2
...				243	19
...	313	8	Hickam Field—Oahu:		
...	169	5	8th Bomb Group.....	1,264	146
...	29	2	8th Cml Co Av.....	115	3
...	0	16	11th Bomb Group.....	930	126
...	511	31	12th Sig Plat AB.....	27	1
...			13th QM Co Tr.....	67	2
...	712	28	17th AB Group.....	940	24
...	507	10	Hq 18th Bomb Wing.....	173	16
...	463	12	19th Trans Sqd.....	140	7
...	339	15	39th QM Co.....	37	1
...	76	9	324 Sig Av Co.....	73	4
...	2,097	74	407th Sig Avn Co.....	72	3
...			428th Sig Avn Co.....	73	3
...	347	11	481st Ord Co Av.....	118	4
...	435	13	482nd Ord Co Av.....	129	4
...	70	7	740 Ord Co Av.....	26	1
...	9	14	Haw Communs.....	45	1
...	852	45	Haw Air Depot.....	0	21
			Weather Haw.....	31	2
			Hq, Hq Sqn Haw AF.....	242	41
			Det FD & MD Hickam		
			Fld.....	167	0
			Det QM Haw Dept.....	161	11
			Sta Hosp.....	0	23
			Hq Hickam Fld.....	0	34
			Tow Target Det.....	122	8
				4,304	428

20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

	Enlisted	Officer		Enlisted	Officer
lo—Hawaii: 299th Inf.....	453	15	Schofield Barracks—Oahu—		
mestead Field—Molokai:			Continued		
99th Inf.....	94	3	65th Engr Bn.....	521	19
Honolulu—Oahu:			72nd Sep QM Co.....	23	2
299th Inf.....	5	9	89th FA Bn.....	378	15
Dist Engr Off.....	0	16	90th FA Bn.....	480	20
Kam Schools.....	1	1	97th CA.....	475	24
McKinley High.....	2	2	98th CA.....	1,154	52
Punahou Academy.....	2	1	298th Inf.....	856	63
Roosevelt High.....	0	1	299th Inf.....	28	1
Univ of Hawaii.....	0	3	804th Engr Bn Av.....	610	21
Finance Off USA.....	5	3	Haw Pack Train.....	221	2
			Det Sta Vet.....	17	0
	15	36	Haw Cml WF Dept.....	18	2
hue—Kauai: 299th Inf.....	191	9	Sig Co Air Warn.....	348	13
hofield Barracks—Oahu:			Sta Hosp.....	275	137
Co "A" 1st Cml Bn.....	207	3	Hq Det Sch Brks.....	338	45
3rd Engr Bn.....	523	19	Rec Center.....	800	0
8th FA Bn.....	391	15		21,273	906
11th FA Bn.....	590	19	[5] Tripler General—Oahu:		
11th QM Bn.....	141	1	Det QM TGH.....	278	126
11th Tank Bn.....	122	4	Det MD TGH.....		
11th Ord Co.....	133	2	Walluku—Maui: 299th Inf.....	430	25
13th FA Bn.....	392	15			
19th Inf.....	2,090	56	Wheeler Field—Oahu:		
21st Inf.....	2,225	62	Hq 14th Pur Wing.....	120	8
24th Inf Div.....	185	20	15th Pur Group.....	790	82
24th Med Bn.....	92	8	18th Pur Group.....	848	106
24th Sig Co.....	133	4	18th AB Group.....	752	54
24th Div Arty.....	101	10	45th Sig Plat.....	23	1
25th Inf Div.....	184	23	307th Sig Co Av.....	71	3
25th Med Bn.....	91	8	674th Ord Co.....	49	2
26th Sig Co.....	136	5	696th Ord Co.....	54	3
25th Div Arty.....	146	12	741st Ord Co.....	36	2
27th Inf.....	2,135	54	Det QM Haw Dep.....	124	7
33rd Sep QM Co.....	191	2	Det MD WH Fld.....	37	11
34th Engrs.....	1,243	40	Det FD WH Fld.....		
35th Inf.....	2,122	63	Det 39th QM Co.....	74	0
52nd FA Bn.....	392	16		2,978	279
63rd FA Bn.....	363	15		40,469	2,490
64th FA Bn.....	403	14			
and total:					
Enlisted.....				40,469	
Officers.....				2,490	
					42,959


6]

SECTION III

PRINCIPAL WEAPONS OF HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND

16" guns.	4 3" seacoast guns.
14" guns (obsolescent).	36 155 mm guns.
12" guns (2 obsolescent).	86 3" antiaircraft guns (70% mo-
12" mortars (obsolete).	mobile).
8 8" guns.	20 37 mm antiaircraft guns.
6" guns (obsolescent).	107 caliber .50 antiaircraft guns.

1



SECTION V

of planes, before and after the attack, 7 December 1941

HICKAM FIELD

avy mb- r	Medium bomber		Light bomber		Pursuit			Observation			
	B-18*	B-12*	A-20	A-12*	P-40	P-36*	P-26*	O-47	O-49	OA-8	OA-9
17											
6	20		5								
6	12		7								
12	32		12								
4	10		5								
4	10		5								
8	20		10								
4	12		2								

FIELD (including planes temporarily assigned to Haleiwa)

1	1		2	52	20	10	1		1	3
0	2		0	35	19	4	0		0	0
1	3		2	87	39	14	1		1	3
1	1		1	27	16	4	1		1	1
0	2		1	30	19	4	0		0	0
1	3		2	57	35	8	1		1	1
				30	4	6				2

BELLOWS FIELD

				12			4	2		
				0			2	0		
				12			6	2		
				6			4	1		
				4			2	0		
				10			6	1		
				2				1		

SECTION VI

FIELD AFTER BEGINNING OF ATTACK, 7 DEC. 1941

Hickam Field

1:30 p. m. 2 B-18's
3:20 p. m. 3 B-17's

Wheeler Field

9:30 a. m. 5 P-40's
6 P-36's
12:00 noon 5 P-40's
3:00 p. m. 11 P-40's

Bellows Field

9:50 a. m. 1 O-47	3:00 p. m. 3 O-47's
10:40 a. m. 3 O-47's	3:49 p. m. 6 P-40's
12:45 p. m. 5 P-40's	

Haleiwa Field

8:15 to 10:00 a. m., Two flights, each consisting of 4
P-40's and 1 P-36.

[11]

SECTION VII

ACTION AND DISPOSITION OF 53RD CA BRIGADE (ANTI-AIRCRAFT) ON
7 DECEMBER 1941

64th CA (AA) Regiment

All 3-inch gun batteries and automatic weapons batteries of the 64th CA (AA) were alerted at Fort Shafter at 8:15 a. m. and were in position as follows:

Battery "A" (Searchlight) at Honolulu, 10:00 a. m.
 "B" (3-inch) at Aiea, 10:00 a. m.
 "C" (3-inch) at Allamānu, 10:30 a. m.
 "D" (3-inch) south of Allamānu, 11:00 a. m.
 "E" (Searchlight) at Ewa-Pearl Harbor, time not known.
 "F" (3-inch) at Pearl City, 11:05 a. m.
 "G" (3-inch) at Ahua Point, 10:30 a. m.
 "H" (3-inch) at Ft. Weaver, 11:45 a. m.
 "I" (37 mm.) at Allamānu.¹
 "K" (37 mm.) at Hickam Field.¹
 "L" (37 mm.) at Hickam Field.¹
 "M" (37 mm.) at Wheeler Field, 11:55 a. m.

97th CA (AA) Regiment

Batteries of the 97th CA (AA), except Battery "A" at Fort Kamehameha, were stationed at Ft. Weaver. They were alerted between 7:55 and 8:10 a. m. and were in position ready to fire as follows:

Battery "A" (Searchlight) at Ft. Kamehameha, 8:34 a. m. (Engaged enemy with small arms at 8:34 a. m.)
 "F" (3-inch) at Ft. Kamehameha, 8:55 a. m. (Engaged enemy at 9:00 a. m.)
 "G" (3-inch) at Ft. Weaver, 8:30 a. m. (Engaged enemy at 8:30 a. m.)
 "H" (3-inch) at Ft. Barrett, 10:20 a. m.
 "B", "C", "D", "E", and 3d Bn not yet organized.

98th CA (AA) Regiment

Batteries of the 98th CA (AA) Regiment were stationed at Schofield Barracks with the exception of Battery "D" which was stationed at Camp Malakole. They were in position ready to fire as follows:

Battery "A" (Searchlight) at Schofield Barracks, time not known.
 "B" (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks, 9:55 a. m.
 "C" (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks, 10:30 a. m.
 "D" (3-inch) at Puuloa Dump, South of Ewa, 11:45 a. m.
 "E" not yet organized.
 "F" and "G" (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air Station, 1:15 p. m.
 "H" (3-inch) at Waipahu High School, 1:30 p. m.
 3rd Bn 98th CA (AA) not yet organized.

¹ Known only that batteries were in position before 11:45 a. m.

(AA) Regiment (less 3rd Bn.)

251st at Camp Malakole were alerted at 8:05 a. m.
 1st Battalion were in position and ready for action as

chlight) at Ewa, time not known.

h) at West Loch, 11:45 a. m.

h) at Ewa Beach, 11:45 a. m.

h) at South of Ewa, 11:45 a. m.

l.) at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, 12:41 p. m.

m.) at Navy Recreation Area, 12:30 p. m.

m.) at Tank Farm, Schofield Barracks, 11:00 a. m.

m.) at Navy Yard, 12:05 p. m.

m 55th CA

was at Sand Island when the attack started and
 with 3-inch guns at 8:15 a. m., shooting down two
 at time.

SECTION VIII

ES, 7 DECEMBER 1941, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

-----	194
-----	360
-----	22
-----	2
Law 490) -----	1
-----	21
-----	600

the foregoing Sections I-VIII, Exhibit No. 5, in-
 maps and diagrams:)

acific Ocean showing distances in miles between
 San Francisco, California; Honolulu, T. H., and
 Johnston, Palmyra, and Christmas Islands; and
 d Tokyo, Japan. This map is printed as Item
 S-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint


n Islands showing disposition of Army forces.
 l as Item No. 3 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA-
 gs of Joint Committee.)

owing Army installations, including airfields.
 as Item No. 4 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA-
 s of Joint Committee.)

eler Field, Oahu, T. H., showing number and
 g Japanese planes, times of attacks, disposition
 nes, and locations of bomb explosions. This
 Item No. 5 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS
 t Committee.)

im Field, Oahu, T. H., showing number and
 g Japanese planes, times of attacks, disposition
 locations of bomb explosions. This diagram
 No. 6 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to
 Committee.)


vs Field, Oahu, T. H., showing number and
 g Japanese planes, times of attacks and dis-
 nes. This diagram is printed as Item No. 7
 STRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Com-




First Army photos of the bombing of Hickam Field, Hawaii, Dec. 7, 1941. Wrecked main PX, Hickam Field, 11:30 AM.




First Army photos of the bombing of Hickam Field, Hawaii, Dec. 7, 1941. Machine-gunned army truck. Note bits of flesh and shattered rifle in foreground.




First Army photos of the bombing of Hickam Field, Hawaii, Dec. 7, 1941. Wreckage of pursuit ship after bombing.




First Army photos of the bombing of Hickam Field, Hawaii, Dec. 7, 1941. Firemen preparing to make attempt to extinguish oil flames.




First Army photos of the bombing of Hickam Field, Hawaii, Dec. 7, 1941. Wrecked P-40 at Bellows Field, machine-gunned on ground.




First Army photos of the bombing of Hawaii, Dec. 7, 1941. Damage to barracks, Wheeler Field.




First Army photos of the bombing of Hickam Field, Hawaii, Dec. 7, 1941. Barracks burning after being attacked by Japanese bombers.




First Army photos of the bombing of Hawaii, Dec. 7, 1941. Rear view of Hangar No. 11, Hickam Field.



First Army photos of the bombing of Hawaii, Dec. 7, 1941. Hangar No. 3 bombed by Japanese, Wheeler Field, Hawaii.



First Army photos of the bombing of Hawaii, Dec. 7, 1941. Base Engineering Building, Wheeler Field, Hawaii.



First Army photos of the bombing of Hawaii, Dec. 7, 1941. Remains of ten barracks after fire caused by attack of Jap bombers. Practically all were filled when barrack was machine gunned. Wheeler Field, T. H.

Item
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EXHIBIT NO. 6**NAVY EXHIBIT**

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ITEM 1

(Item 1 is a map of the North Pacific Ocean showing the disposition of the United States Pacific Fleet on 7 December, 1941. This map is printed as Item No. 8 in **EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee**)

ITEM 2

TABLE OF DISTANCES

table presents distances between important U. S. and other points in the Pacific Ocean (one nautical land miles; all distances are shortest navigable

<i>Nautical miles</i>	MIDWAY to—Con.	<i>Nautical miles</i>
2, 091	Guam.....	2, 301
2, 278	Salpan.....	2, 195
ong Beach) 2, 228	Manila.....	3, 685
4, 685	WAKE to—	
2, 409	Yokohama.....	1, 740
1, 134	Hitokappu (tunnel).....	1, 865
1, 904	Sasebo.....	2, 255
711	Ominato.....	1, 025
1, 660	Kwajalein.....	636
190	Eniwetok.....	533
959	Truk.....	1, 117
2, 124	Guam.....	1, 334
1, 990	Manila.....	2, 772
3, 028	MANILA to—	
2, 260	Pearl Harbor.....	4, 767
4, 767	Midway.....	3, 685
okosuka) 3, 397	Wake.....	2, 772
4, 072	Guam.....	1, 499
3, 683	San Francisco.....	6, 221
3, 370	Palao.....	930
n (Tunnel) 3, 150	Takao.....	495
	Sama (Hainan).....	720
2, 250	Sasebo.....	1, 349
ennel) 2, 035	Yokohama.....	1, 758
2, 898	Shanghai.....	1, 156
2, 260	Hong Kong.....	631
1, 034	Singapore.....	1, 330
1, 425	Saigon.....	907
2, 146	Davao to Palao.....	600

ITEM 3

ap of the Hawaiian Islands showing fleet operating Hawaiian area. This Map is printed as Item No. 9 in ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Com-

ITEM 3A

map of the Hawaiian Islands showing U. S. Naval In- the Hawaiian area. This map is printed as Item No. ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint

ITEM 4

Time comparison tables for each hour of the day at Greenwich, Washington, D. C., San Francisco, Hawaii, Japan, and Manila on December 6, 7 and 8, 1941

<u>D. C.</u>	<u>SAN FRANCISCO</u>	<u>HAWAII</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>MANILA</u>
00 ↑	1600 ↑	1330 ↑	0900 ↑	0800 ↑
00	1700 ↑	1430 ↑	1000 ↑	0900 ↑
00	1800 ↑	1530 ↑	1100 ↑	1000 ↑
00	1900 ↑	1630 ↑	1200 ↑	1100 ↑
00	2000 ↑	1730 ↑	1300 ↑	1200 ↑
00	2100 ↑	1830 ↑	1400 ↑	1300 ↑
00	2200 ↑	1930 ↑	1500 ↑	1400 ↑
00	2300 ↑	2030 ↑	1600 ↑	1500 ↑
00	0000 ↑	2130 ↑	1700 ↑	1600 ↑
00	0100 ↑	2230 ↑	1800 ↑	1700 ↑
00	0200 ↑	2330 ↑	1900 ↑	1800 ↑
00	0300 ↑	0030 ↑	2000 ↑	1900 ↑
00	0400 ↑	0130 ↑	2100 ↑	2000 ↑
00	0500 ↑	0230 ↑	2200 ↑	2100 ↑
00	0600 ↑	0330 ↑	2300 ↑	2200 ↑
00	0700 ↑	0430 ↑	0000 ↑	2300 ↑
00	0800 ↑	0530 ↑	0100 ↑	0000 ↑
00	0900 ↑	0630 ↑	0200 ↑	0100 ↑
00	1000 ↑	0730 ↑	0300 ↑	0200 ↑
00	1100 ↑	0830 ↑	0400 ↑	0300 ↑
00	1200 ↑	0930 ↑	0500 ↑	0400 ↑
00	1300 ↑	1030 ↑	0600 ↑	0500 ↑
00	1400 ↑	1130 ↑	0700 ↑	0600 ↑
00	1500 ↑	1230 ↑	0800 ↑	0700 ↑

INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

<u>SAN FRANCISCO</u>	<u>HAWAII</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>MANILA</u>	<u>GREENWICH</u>
1600 ↑	1330 ↑	0900 ↑	0800 ↑	0000
1700	1430	1000	0900	0100
1800	1530	1100	1000	0200
1900	1630	1200	1100	0300
2000	1730	1300	1200	0400
2100	1830	1400	1300	0500
2200	1930	1500	1400	0600
2300	2030	1600	1500	0700
0000	2130	1700	1600	0800
0100	2230	1800	1700	0900
0200	2330	1900	1800	1000
0300	0030	2000	1900	1100
0400	0130	2100	2000	1200
0500	0230	2200	2100	
0600	0330	2300	2200	
0700	0430	0000	2300	
0800	0530	0100	0000	
0900	0630	0200	0100	
1000	0730	0300	0200	
1100	0830	0400	0300	
1200	0930	0500	0400	
1300	1030	0600	0500	
1400	1130	0700	0600	
1500	1230	0800	0700	

<u>D. C.</u>	<u>SAN FRANCISCO</u>	<u>HAWAII</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>MANILA</u>
00	1600	1330	0900	0800
00	1700	1430	1000	0900
00	1800	1530	1100	1000
00	1900	1630	1200	1100
00	2000	1730	1300	1200
00	2100	1830	1400	1300
00	2200	1930	1500	1400
00	2300	2030	1600	1500
00	0000	2130	1700	1600
00	0100	2230	1800	1700
00	0200	2330	1900	1800
00	0300	0030	2000	1900
00	0400	0130	2100	2000
00	0500	0230	2200	2100
00	0600	0330	2300	2200
00	0700	0430	0000	2300
00	0800	0530	0100	0000
00	0900	0630	0200	0100
00	1000	0730	0300	0200
00	1100	0830	0400	0300
00	1200	0930	0500	0400
00	1300	1030	0600	0500
00	1400	1130	0700	0600
00	1500	1230	0800	0700

1. TABLE FOR CONVERTING NAVY TIME TO CIVILIAN TIME FOR
EACH HALF HOUR OF THE DAY.

TIME CONVERSION

<u>NAVY</u>	<u>CIVILIAN</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>CIVILIAN</u>
0000	MIDNIGHT	1200	NOON
0030	00:30 A.M.	1230	12:30 P.M.
0100	1:00 A.M.	1300	1:00 P.M.
0130	1:30 A.M.	1330	1:30 P.M.
0200	2:00 A.M.	1400	2:00 P.M.
0230	2:30 A.M.	1430	2:30 P.M.
0300	3:00 A.M.	1500	3:00 P.M.
0330	3:30 A.M.	1530	3:30 P.M.
0400	4:00 A.M.	1600	4:00 P.M.
0430	4:30 A.M.	1630	4:30 P.M.
0500	5:00 A.M.	1700	5:00 P.M.
0530	5:30 A.M.	1730	5:30 P.M.
0600	6:00 A.M.	1800	6:00 P.M.
0630	6:30 A.M.	1830	6:30 P.M.
0700	7:00 A.M.	1900	7:00 P.M.
0730	7:30 A.M.	1930	7:30 P.M.
0800	8:00 A.M.	2000	8:00 P.M.
0830	8:30 A.M.	2030	8:30 P.M.
0900	9:00 A.M.	2100	9:00 P.M.
0930	9:30 A.M.	2130	9:30 P.M.
1000	10:00 A.M.	2200	10:00 P.M.
1030	10:30 A.M.	2230	10:30 P.M.
1100	11:00 A.M.	2300	11:00 P.M.
1130	11:30 A.M.	2330	11:30 P.M.

ITEM V

J. S. Pacific Fleet at 8 a. m. on 7 Dec. 1941 (except ships in Pearl Harbor which are listed separately)

Ship name	Ship No.	Remarks
Enterprise.....	CV 6.....	This group of ships was designated Task Force Eight. Location was about 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor returning from Wake Island. Ships consisted of the following types: Aircraft Carrier..... 1 Heavy Cruisers..... 3 Destroyers..... 9 Total..... 13
Northampton.....	CA 26.....	
Chester.....	CA 27.....	
Salt Lake City.....	CA 25.....	
Balch.....	DD 363.....	
Maury.....	DD 401.....	
Craven.....	DD 382.....	
Gridley.....	DD 380.....	
McCall.....	DD 400.....	
Dunlap.....	DD 384.....	
Benham.....	DD 397.....	
Fanning.....	DD 385.....	
Ellet.....	DD 298.....	
Lexington.....	CV 2.....	This group of ships was designated Task Force Twelve. Location was about 460 miles from Midway Island enroute Midway. Ships consisted of the following types: Aircraft Carrier..... 1 Heavy Cruisers..... 3 Destroyers..... 5 Total..... 9
Chicago.....	CA 29.....	
Portland.....	CA 33.....	
Astoria.....	CA 34.....	
Porter.....	DD 356.....	
Drayton.....	DD 366.....	
Flusser.....	DD 368.....	
Lamson.....	DD 367.....	
Mahan.....	DD 364.....	
Indianapolis.....	CA 35.....	This group of ships was designated Task Force Three. Ships consisted of the following types: Heavy Cruiser..... 1 Destroyer Mine-sweepers..... 5 Total..... 6
Hopkins.....	DMS 13.....	
Southard.....	DMS 10.....	
Dorsey.....	DMS 1.....	
Elliot.....	DMS 4.....	
Long.....	DMS 12.....	
Minneapolis.....	CA 36.....	Location was in the Fleet Operating Area, about 25 miles south of Oahu. Ships consisted of the following types: Heavy Cruiser..... 1 Destroyer Mine-sweepers..... 4 Total..... 5
Chandler.....	DMS 9.....	
Hovey.....	DMS 11.....	
Boggs.....	DMS 3.....	
Lamberton.....	DMS 2.....	
Plunger.....	SS 179.....	Three submarines. About 200 miles east of Oahu.
Pollack.....	SS 180.....	
Pompano.....	SS 181.....	Destroyer. About 60 miles southwest of Oahu.
Litchfield.....	DD 336.....	
Thresher.....	SS 200.....	Submarine. About 60 miles southwest of Oahu.
Robin.....	AM 3.....	Minesweeper. About 550 miles southwest of Oahu.
Wright.....	AV 1.....	Seaplane tender. About 300 miles west of Oahu.
Sonoma.....	AT 12.....	Ocean-going tug. Between Oahu and Wake.
Trout.....	SS 202.....	Submarine.
Argonaut.....	SM 1.....	Submarine. Near Midway.
Regulus.....	AK 14.....	Cargo ship. Near Midway.
Tambor.....	SS 198.....	Submarine. Near Wake.
Wm. Ward Burrows.....	AP 6.....	Transport. Enroute Wake.
Triton.....	SS 201.....	Submarine.
Kuala.....	AG 33.....	Enroute Palmyra, 60 miles northeast.
Kingfisher.....	AM 25.....	Minesweeper.
Louisville.....	CA 28.....	Heavy cruiser. Escort duty Solomons Is. area.
Pensacola.....	CA 24.....	Heavy cruiser. Escort duty Samoa area.
Seminole.....	AT 65.....	Ocean-going tug. Honolulu to San Diego.
Neches.....	AO 5.....	Oiler. Between San Francisco and Pearl Harbor.

AL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

U. S. Pacific Fleet at 8 a. m. on 7 Dec. 1941—Continued

Ship name	Ship No.	Remarks
Antares.....	AKS 3.....	Stores issue ship.
Vega.....	AK 17.....	Cargo ship.
Seagull.....	AM 30.....	Minesweeper.
Arctic.....	AF 7.....	Stores ship. At degaussing range.
Clark.....	DD 361.....	Ships at the Mare Island Navy Yard consisted of the following types:
Cushing.....	DD 376.....	
Perkins.....	DD 377.....	
Preston.....	DD 379.....	
Smith.....	DD 378.....	
Rathburne.....	DD 113.....	
S-27.....	SS 132.....	
S-28.....	SS 133.....	
Nautilus.....	SS 168.....	
Cuttlefish.....	SS 171.....	
Tuna.....	SS 203.....	
Kanawha.....	AO 1.....	Destroyer tender..... 1
Sabine.....	AO 25.....	
Kaskaskia.....	AO 27.....	Total..... 17
Pelican.....	AV 6.....	
Bridge.....	AF 1.....	
Dixie.....	AD 14.....	
Ballard.....	AVD 10.....	Seaplane tender.
Saratoga.....	CV 3.....	Ships at or off San Diego consisted of the following types:
Concord.....	CL 10.....	
Dent.....	DD 116.....	
Talbot.....	DD 114.....	
Waters.....	DD 115.....	
S-18.....	SS 123.....	
S-23.....	SS 128.....	
S-34.....	SS 139.....	
S-35.....	SS 140.....	
Harris.....	AP 8.....	
Ortolan.....	ASR 5.....	Oiler..... 1
Cuyama.....	AO 3.....	Total..... 12
Sepulga.....	AO 20.....	Oiler. Near San Diego.
Pinola.....	AT 33.....	Ocean going tug.
Platte.....	OA 24.....	Oiler.
Procyon.....	AK 19.....	Stores ship.
Boreas.....	AF 9.....	Stores ships.
Aldebaran.....	AF 10.....	
Tippecanoe.....	AO 21.....	Oiler.
Colorado.....	BB 45.....	Ships in Puget Sound Navy Yard:
Casco.....	AVP 12.....	
Williamson.....	AVD 2.....	
Teal.....	AVP 5.....	Seaplane tender.
Gillis.....	AVD 12.....	Seaplane tender.
Brazos.....	AO 4.....	Oiler. About 600 miles east of Dutch Harbor.
Richmond.....	CL 9.....	Light cruiser. Off Peru.
Trenton.....	CL 11.....	Light cruiser.
Fulton.....	AS 11.....	Submarine tender. Off Guatemala.
GAR.....	SS 206.....	Submarine. Off Mexico.

Name of ship	Position on 7 Dec. 1941, USAO	LAUNCHES	General cargo	None	
S. S. Hawaiian Planter	1-S 167-W (between Honolulu and Samoa).	Samoa.	General cargo	None	3 December.
S. S. Harry Luckenbach	12-N 165-W (between Honolulu and the Fiji Islands).	Suva, Fijis.	do	do	5 December.
S. S. Jane Christensen	10-N 163-W (between Honolulu and Samoa).	Samoa.	do	do	4 December.
S. S. Mauna Loa	8-N 167-W (between Honolulu and the Fiji Islands).	Suva, Fijis.	do	do	3 December.
U. S. S. Chaumont	4-S 170-W (near Samoa)	Manila.	Troops	U. S. S. Pensacola	29 November (Convoy No. 4002).
U. S. S. Niagara	do	do	Some general cargo	do	Do.
U. S. S. Republic	do	do	Troops	do	Do.
U. S. A. T. Willard A. Holbrook	do	do	do	do	Do.
U. S. A. T. Meigs	do	do	General cargo	do	Do.
S. S. Bloemfontein	do	do	Troops and general cargo	do	Do.
S. S. Coast Farmer	do	do	General cargo	do	Do.
S. S. Admiral Halstead	do	do	do	do	Do.
U. S. A. T. Irving L. Hunt	6-N 167-W (between Fiji Islands and Honolulu).	Honolulu.	do	None	Bound for Honolulu.
U. S. A. T. Scott	8-S 171-E (near Solomons Islands)	do	Troops	U. S. S. Louisville	Do.
S. S. President Coolidge	do	do	do	do	Do.

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In addition, the following ships were in the ports indicated.

Name of ship:	Location on 7 Dec. 1941. 0800
S. S. Mariposa.....	Sidney.
S. S. Portmar.....	Do.
S. S. Collingsworth.....	Port Darwin.
S. S. Perida.....	Do.
U. S. A. T. Liberty.....	Port Moresby.
M. V. Day Star.....	Soerabaja, Java.
S. S. Admiral Cole.....	Philippine Islands.
S. S. American Leader.....	Do.
S. S. President Grant.....	Manila.
U. S. A. T. Ludington.....	Canton Island.

ITEM 7

(Item 7 is a map of the South coast of Oahu, T. H., showing the approaches to the Pearl Harbor Entrance Channel and the Inshore Patrol Area. This map is printed as Item No. 11 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

ITEM 8

(Item 8 is a map showing the Pearl Harbor Anchorage Plan, 7 December, 1941. This map is printed as Item No. 12 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

ITEM 9

List of ships present at Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack Dec. 7, 1941

Name	Class	Tonnage	Year completed
Battleships:			
West Virginia.....	West Virginia.....	31,800	1923
Maryland.....	do.....	31,500	1921
Tennessee.....	Tennessee.....	32,300	1920
California.....	do.....	32,600	1921
Pennsylvania.....	Pennsylvania.....	33,100	1916
Arizona.....	do.....	33,100	1916
Nevada.....	Nevada.....	29,000	1916
Oklahoma.....	do.....	29,000	1916
Heavy cruisers:			
New Orleans.....	New Orleans.....	9,950	1934
San Francisco.....	do.....	9,950	1934
Light cruisers:			
St. Louis.....	St. Louis.....	10,000	1939
Helena.....	Helena.....	10,000	1938
Phoenix.....	do.....	10,000	1938
Honolulu.....	do.....	9,650	1937
Raleigh.....	Raleigh.....	7,050	1922
Detroit.....	do.....	7,050	1922
Destroyers:			
Bagley.....	Gridley.....	1,500	1938
Patterson.....	do.....	1,500	1938
Ralph Talbot.....	do.....	1,500	1938
Helm.....	do.....	1,500	1937
Mugford.....	do.....	1,500	1936
Henley.....	do.....	1,500	1937
Jarvis.....	do.....	1,500	1937
Blue.....	do.....	1,500	1938
Conyngham.....	Mahan.....	1,500	1937
Reid.....	do.....	1,480	1937
Tucker.....	do.....	1,500	1937
Case.....	do.....	1,500	1937
Shaw.....	do.....	1,500	1935
Cassin.....	do.....	1,500	1935
Downes.....	do.....	1,500	1936
Cummings.....	do.....	1,465	1937

*sent at Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack
Dec. 7, 1941—Continued*

	Class	Tonnage	Year completed
	Porter	1, 850	1937
	do	1, 850	1936
	Farragut	1, 365	1934
	do	1, 395	1935
	do	1, 395	1935
	do	1, 365	1935
	do	1, 395	1935
	do	1, 345	1934
	do	1, 410	1935
	do	1, 395	1935
	Flush Deck DD	1, 060	1918
	do	1, 060	1918
		920	1917
	Tambor	1, 475	1941
	do	1, 475	1940
		1, 110	1933
		2, 730	1929
		1, 540	1932
		1, 430	1914
		1, 190	1920
		1, 160	1918
		1, 190	1920
		1, 190	1920
		1, 190	1920
		1, 160	1918
		1, 160	1918
		1, 160	1918
		6, 000	1907
rs:		1, 190	1922
		1, 190	1921
		1, 190	1922
		1, 196	1921
		840	1918
		840	1918
		840	1918
		840	1918
		840	1918
		840	1918
	Repair ship	13, 480	1923
	do	9, 435	1909
	Battle damage, repair ship	9, 245	1918
	Oiler	21, 077	1941
	do	16, 800	1919
	Destroyer tender	1, 245	1921
	do	1, 245	1921
	Seaplane tender	13, 880	1940
	do	17, 606	1940
	Small seaplane tender	840	1918
	do	840	1918
	Destroyer seaplane tender	1, 190	1919
	do	1, 190	1918
	Miscellaneous auxiliary	11, 400	1920
	do	4, 400	1915
	Hospital ship	8, 660	1927
	Store issue ship	13, 900	1939
	Submarine tender	14, 200	1939
	Target ship	19, 800	1909
	Oceangoing tug	1, 270	1940
	do	1, 080	1912
	Ammunition ship	7, 025	1920
	Destroyer seaplane tender	1, 190	1920
	Submarine rescue vessel	1, 060	1918

ITEM 10

s a diagram showing air searches flown in the Hawaiian December 1941, (b) prior to the Japanese attack 7 December (c) after the Japanese attack 7 December 1941. This printed as Item No. 13 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS-Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

ITEM 11

Table summarizing number of Japanese planes taking part in attack

	Torpedo planes	Dive bombers	Horizontal bombers	Totals
Total number of planes making attacks (including those which repeated)	21	90	45	156
Total number of planes (exclusive of those which repeated)	21	48	36	105
Phase I (torpedo and dive-bomber attacks)	21	30	15	66
Phase II ("Lull")		¹ 15		15
Phase III (horizontal bomber attacks)		18	¹ 21 (9)	48
Phase IV (dive-bomber attacks)		¹ 27		27

¹ Engaged in earlier attacks.

Location	Squadron	Number of planes	Type	Number available	Number in operating condition	Readiness in operating condition	Readiness of crews	Number participating in combat	Service assignment
NAS, Pearl Harbor	VJ-1	18	9 J2F-4	18	18	Operational	Same as planes	0	Utility.
	VJ-2	10	9 JRS-1	10	10	Operational	Same as planes	0	Do.
	VJ-2	2	10 J2F-4	2	2	do	do	0	Utility included in Patrol Plane Report.
			2 PBV-1					0	Normally based at Ewa.
Ewa, Marine Air Station.	VMJ 252	1	1 R3D-2	1	1	1 in repair	do	0	Utility.
	VMJ-252	8	1 R3D-2	1	1	Operational	do	0	Do.
			1 JO-2	1	1	do	do	0	Do.
			2 J2F-4	2	2	do	do	0	Do.
			1 JRS-1	1	1	do	do	0	Do.
			1 SNJ-3	1	1	do	do	0	Do.
			1 SB2U-3	1	1	do	do	0	Do.
			1 SBD-1	1	1	do	do	0	Utility (also included in Marine Scout Bomber Report).
NAS, Puunene (Mauli)	VJ-3	8	4 JRB-1	4	4	do	do	0	Utility.
			1 J2V	1	1	do	do	0	Do.
			1 JRF-4	1	1	do	do	0	Do.
			2 BT-1	2	2	do	do	0	Do.
			PBV-1	2	2	do	do	0	Do.
NAS, Johnston Island	VJ-2	2						0	Utility (also included in Patrol Plane Report).
Pearl Harbor		4	F4F-3	4	4	do	do	0	Left by aircraft carriers.
		3	SBD-2	3	3	do	do	0	Do.
Kanoehe		1	OS2U	1	1	Warming up on airstrip.	do	0	Commandant's plane.

AL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PATROL PLANES

Kaneohe	VP 11 VP 12	12 12	PBY-5 PBY-5	12 12	12 12	On 4-hour notice, 6 on 30-minute notice, 1 under repair.	On 4-hour notice, 5 on 4 hours, 6 on 30-minute notice.	0 0	Fleet operations. Do.
Midway	VP 14 VP 21	12 12	PBY-5 PBY-3	12 12	10 11	4 on 4-hour notice, 3 on 30-minute notice, 3 in air, 2 under repair. 7 in air, 4 on 10-minute notice, 1 under repair.	Same as planes do	11 0	Fleet operations, 3 covering operating area south of Oahu. Fleet operations, 4 as ready striking force; 5 search 120-170°; 2 rendezvous Lexington planes. Repair. Fleet operations.
Pearl Harbor	VP 21 VP 22 VP 23 VP 24	1 14 12 6	PBY-3 PBY-3 PBY-5 PBY-5	1 14 12 6	0 12 11 5	1 under repair. 12 on 4-hour notice, 2 under repair. 11 on 4-hour notice, 1 under repair. 4 in air, 1 30-minute notice.	Same as planes do do	0 0 0	Repair. Fleet operations. Do. 4 planes, inter-type tactics.
Johnson Island	VJ-2 VJ-2	2 2	PBY-1 PBY-1	2 2	2 2	Operational do	do do	0 0	Utility. Do.

WARD antisub action.

(Item 13 is a types, and op aircraft on 7 in EXHIBIT mittee.)

Units	Class
2 Nevada	
2 Pennsylv	
2 Tennessee	
1 Colorado	
1 West V	
2 New C	
3 Brookl	
1 St. Lo	
2 Omaha	
8 Farro	
8 Mah	
8 Gridl	
1 Alle	
2 Self	
2 Flu	
4 Des	
8 De	
5 By	
1 J	
1 F	
1	
1	
1	
2	
1	
1	
2	
3	

ITEM 13

nap of Oahu, T. H., showing the disposition, number, ational and readiness condition of the U. S. Navy ecember 1941. This map is printed as Item No. 14 -ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Com-

ITEM 14

Aircraft guns, by ship classes and types of guns

Type	5-inch, 38-cal- iber	5-inch, 25-cal- iber	3-inch, 50-cal- iber	3-inch, 23-cal- iber	1 1/2 quad- ruple mount heavy AA ma- chine guns	.50 cal- iber AA ma- chine guns	.30 cal- iber AA ma- chine guns	37 milli- meter
Battleships		16	4			16		
do		16	4			16		
do		16	8			16		
do		8	4			8		
do		8	4			11		
Heavy cruisers		16	4		4	16		
Light cruisers	8	16	6		6	24		
do	8		2		2	8		
do			18			16		
Destroyers	40					32		
do	40					40		
do	32					32		
do			3			4		
do					4	4		
do				2		4		
High speed minesweep- ers.						24		
Light mine- layers.				8		16		
Repair ship			3			10		
do			2			4		
do			1			4		
Oiler	4		4			4		
do			4			4		
Destroyer tenders.			8			8		
Seaplane tender.	4					10		
do						8		
Small seaplane tenders.			4			4		
Ex-destroyer seaplane tenders.						12		
Stores issue ships.			4			4		
do			4			2		
Miscellaneous auxiliaries.			4			4		
Submarine rescue ves- sel.			2			2	2	
Sub tender				4		4		
Gunboat						2		1
Minelayers			12			12	12	
Tug			1			4		
Ammunition ship.			2			4		
Store ship			4			4		
Minelayer			1					
	136	96	121	14	16	397	14	1

out of ships' arsenals numerous light landing force guns, .30 caliber Lewis machine guns
matic rifles, to augment standard antiaircraft batteries.

INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ITEM 15

U.S. naval forces and installations resulting from the attack on the island of Oahu on 7 Dec. 1941

ships were sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor:

Name	Tonnage	Sunk
Arizona	33, 100	Sunk.
California	32, 600	Do.
West Virginia	31, 800	Do.
Oklahoma	29, 000	Capsized.
Nevada	29, 000	Heavily damaged.
Maryland	31, 500	Damaged.
Pennsylvania	33, 100	Do.
Tennessee	32, 300	Do.
Delaware	10, 000	Heavily damaged.
Honolulu	10, 000	Damaged.
Raleigh	7, 050	Heavily damaged.
Haw	1, 500	Do.
Cassin	1, 500	Heavily damaged, burned.
Downes	1, 500	Do.
Westal	9, 435	Badly damaged.
Oglala	6, 000	Sunk.
Turtiss	13, 880	Damaged.
Utah	19, 800	Capsized.

BATTLESHIPS

ms. Sank at her berth as a result of being hit by torpedoes and about eight heavy bombs. One (estimated as 2,000 pounds) exploded the forward bow was considered to be a total wreck except for what could be salvaged and reassigned.

tons. Sank at her berth as a result of hits by torpedoes and one or more near bomb misses. Also received a hit on starboard upper deck abreast of foremast, caused by 5-inch powder fire. She sank gradually for resting rather solidly on a mud bottom so that the bow was about 12 feet of water and the port side of the bow was about 3 feet of water.

8,800 tons. Sank at her berth as a result of four to five hits and at least two bomb hits and rested on the bottom. Spaces flooded up to 2 or 3 feet below the main deck. Damage from torpedoes was in the midship area, extending both below water and above water. A large hole was made in the firetop and the boat deck and apparently on the port side on the main or second deck. This extensive wreck and a terrific powder and oil fire spread over the whole area and extended to the foremast including the bridge. A second bomb hit the top of the mainmast and passed through the 6-inch top. The nature of the damage was defective material. This bomb did not explode but the slide of the left gun. Subsequently, another hit on the port side of the torpedo were located aft under the

tons. Capsized at her berth within 8 to 11 minutes after receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. The ship was being upside down with a considerable portion of the starboard side above water.

Nevada.—20
and by at least
misses caused
respectively.
fire damage to
second deck to
from side to
down to the
caused consid-
structure and
Maryland
small bomb
deck forward
causing on
ably 500 pe
under water
This explo
ments caus
temporari

Pennsyl
starboard
but not c
casualties
not exten
Tenne.
type).
ing a la
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officers
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Struck by one or more aircraft torpedoes and two near misses. Each of the near misses hit the hull on the port and starboard bows, and one hit near the foremast, caused explosion and wrecked the vertical area extending from the second deck. Several bomb hits wrecked the forecastle and No. 1 turret, and this damage extended to the main deck. Fragments from a bomb hit amidships caused damage to the mainmast, stack, and other parts, and many casualties to 5-inch gun crews.

1,000 tons. Two bomb hits in the forecastle. One bomb (probably 100 pounds) passed through the forecastle chain pipes and exploded on the main deck, causing considerable damage. The second bomb (probably 100 pounds) passed through port side of the ship about 12 feet below the construction and repair storeroom, wrecked flats and bulkheads in that area, and caused serious leaks in the sides and bottom. These were repaired without going into drydock.

1,100 tons. One bomb hit near after 5-inch gun. The damage from bomb explosion was considerable, of serious nature, although there were a large number of 5-inch guns put out of commission. The damage did not extend to the second deck.

1,200 tons. Two bomb hits (probably 15-inch shell bombs) struck the center gun of No. 2 turret, causing which necessitated replacement of the gun. This did considerable local fragment damage. Another bomb struck the top of No. 3 turret. This bomb was a serious damage except for putting one rammer out. The *Tennessee* also suffered serious damage aft in due to fire resulting from the great heat caused by burning from the *Arizona*. The shell plates around the turret that buckled and joints broken.

LIGHT CRUISERS

1,000 tons. Hit at frame 80 starboard side by aircraft. The flooding of No. 1 and 2 firerooms and the forward part of the starboard engine was found to be seriously damaged. Repairs to hull were completed at Pearl Harbor, and the ship proceeded to Mare Island under two shafts to await repairs.

1,000 tons. Damaged by large bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through deck and exploded 15 or 20 feet from the mainmast at frame 40. This explosion caused considerable damage and resulted in the flooding of storerooms and magazine area and also dimmed out the electric power cables of the mainmast. Most of the flooding resulted from rupture of a magazine. The hull of the ship was not opened up but leaked from pulled joints and rivets. Permanent repairs were completed at Pearl Harbor.

1,050 tons. Hit by one aircraft torpedo amidships on the starboard side, which flooded the forward half of the machinery plant. The

ship was also hit by one bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through three decks and out the ship's side and finally exploded about 50 feet away. The damage from the explosion was not extensive but, together with the hole made in the side, caused serious flooding on the port side aft. This flooding was out of all proportion to the extent of damage and resulted from inability to close armored hatches tightly against the water head. The bomb struck only a few feet abaft of the gasoline stowage. Permanent repairs to the hull were completed at Pearl Harbor.

DESTROYERS

Shaw.—1,500 tons. Hit by one bomb while docked on floating drydock and by many fragments from another bomb which struck the drydock. The serious fire following the bomb hits resulted in blowing up of forward magazine and heat damage to shell plating in the forward areas. The after part of the ship was not seriously damaged. The *Shaw* was redocked on the same drydock on January 26, 1942, for installation of a false bow at about frame 50.

Cassin and *Downes*.—*Cassin* was struck by one bomb and *Downes* by two (probably 500 pounds). One bomb explosion aft between the two vessels apparently knocked the *Cassin* partly off the drydock blocking and caused her to fall over on the *Downes* when the dock was being flooded during the raid. This caused a serious structural failure amidships and considerable local damage in way of the bridge. The torpedo warheads in the starboard tube of the *Downes* were set off and blew out the main deck and starboard side of the vessel in that area. This caused some damage to boilers and engines. A serious oil fire followed the explosion and caused extensive damage to the hull of both vessels. Fragments and explosions caused over 200 holes in the hull of the *Cassin* and probably well over 400 in the hull of the *Downes*.

REPAIR SHIPS

Vestal.—9,435 tons. Struck by two bombs (probably 500 pounds). One bomb hit forward and exploded in the steel shape storage which stopped a large part of the fragments and minimized damage considerably. The other bomb struck aft and exploded in the hold, causing a large number of fragment holes through the shell. Flooding aft caused the after part of the vessel to submerge to the main deck. The vessel was alongside the *Arizona* when the raid commenced and was beached at Aiea to prevent further sinkage.

MINELAYERS

Oglala.—6,000 tons. Sunk by one aircraft torpedo which passed under the ship from the starboard side and exploded against the starboard side of the *Helena*. Vessel sank slowly at 10-10 dock and capsized against the dock about 1½ hours after being struck.

SEAPLANE TENDERS

Curtiss.—13,880 tons. Struck on kingpost starboard crane by Japanese airplane out of control. This resulted in some wreckage and damage due to fire. Machinery of the crane was seriously damaged,

ere put out of commission. One bomb (prob-
the forward end of the hangar on the port
exploding on the second deck. The explosion
d a great amount of wreckage and loss of

MISCELLANEOUS AUX.

Struck by two, and possibly three, aerial tor-
berth. Ship was within a few degrees of being

ITEM 16

AND MARINE CORPS AIRCRAFT LOSSES

d damage to installations at Ford Island Naval
Naval Air Station, the marine air base at Ewa,
hown in the following table:
il Air Station.

	Airborne	Non- airborne	Total
-----	0	4	4
-----	0	3	3
-----	0	19	19
-----	0	0	0
-----	0	0	0
-----	0	0	0
-----	0	0	0
-----	0	0	0
-----	0	26	26

—The only portion of this station subject to severe
lane hangars and parking area in the southwest

to the station was as follows:

s set on fire apparently as a result of a bomb ex-
y to the east of the hangar and the consequent
the nearby patrol planes which were ignited by
were at least five bomb hits in the vicinity of
largest producing a crater approximately 20 feet
feet deep. The northeast corner of Hangar No. 6
l by fire. In addition to the damage to the seaplane
r damage was inflicted on Hangar No. 38 by nearby

9.

	Airborne	Nonair- borne	Total
-----	0	0	0
-----	0	0	0
-----	0	27	27
(S)-----	0	1	1
-----	0	0	0
-----	0	0	0
-----	0	0	0
-----	0	28	28

(2) *Installations*.—A complete hangar (No. I), in which planes were already stored, was destroyed together with the planes and with fire-fighting apparatus which had been brought there to fight the fire.

Two other hangars under construction, one almost completed, were not bombed. The seaplane parking area and the Aqua system were damaged.

3. *Ewa*.

(1) *Plane losses*.

	Airborne	Nonairborne	Total
Fighters (VF).....	0	9	9
Scout Bombers (VSB).....	0	18	18
Patrol Bombers (VPB).....	0	0	0
Observation/Scouts (VO-V8).....	0	0	0
Utility (VJ).....	0	3	3
Training (VN).....	0	1	1
Transports (VR).....	0	2	2
Total.....	0	33	33

(2) *Installations*.—Considerable damage was suffered by material, installations, machinery, tentage, and buildings at Ewa. Damage to Government motor vehicles was slight, but privately owned automobiles suffered heavily. Damage to aircraft was extremely heavy as the primary objective was aircraft on the ground and attacks were made on individual aircraft by enemy planes using explosive and incendiary bullets from extremely low altitudes.

4. Five Scout planes from the carrier *Enterprise* were lost.

ITEM 17

COMPOSITION OF TASK FORCE ALLOCATED TO PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Striking force

Commanding Officer: CinC 1st Air Fleet, Vice Admiral Chuichi NAGUMO.

Battleship Division 3 (1st Section) (HIEH, KIRISHIMA), 2 Battleships.

Carrier Division 1 (KAGA, AKAGI).

Carrier Division 2 (HIRYU, SORYU).

Carrier Division 5 (SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU), 6 Aircraft Carriers.

Cruiser Division 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA), 2 Heavy Cruisers.

Destroyer Squadron 1 (ABUKUMA), 1 Light Cruiser, 4 Destroyer Divisions, 16 Destroyers.

11 Train Vessels.

Advance expeditionary force

Commanding Officer: CinC 6th Fleet, Vice Admiral Mitsumi SHIMIZU.

ISUZU, YURA, 2 Light Cruisers.

KATORI, 1 Training Light Cruiser.

I-class submarines (including Submarine Squadrons 1, 2, 3) 20 Submarines (I-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22-24, 68, 69, 74)..

Midget submarines, 5 Midget submarines.

6 Train Vessels.

ITEM 18

(Item 18 is a map of the North Pacific Ocean showing the track of the Japanese Striking Force. This map is printed as Item No. 15 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

ITEM 19


showing air searches flown in the Hawaiian Islands, (b) prior to the Japanese attack 7 December 1941, and the Japanese attack 7 December 1941, and the Striking Force. This diagram is printed as BITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of

ITEM 20


showing track of Japanese plane attack routes. This diagram is printed as Item No. 17 in EXHIBITS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

NOTE

and hereto copies of official photographs of damages and installations at Pearl Harbor on 7 December



U. S. S. *Raleigh*, light cruiser, with decks awash after Jap attack on Pearl Harbor.




U. S. S. *Shaw*—Hit by three bombs which exploded her forward magazine, the 1,500-ton destroyer *Shaw* lies a twisted mass of wreckage in the heavily bombed floating drydock YFD-2. Note the bow of the *Shaw* lying on its side in the foreground. Part of the drydock, at right, is under water while the other side is listing heavily. Both the *Shaw* and the drydock are now back in use.

INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK




After the Japanese attack—Warships damaged at Pearl Harbor in the Japanese attack of December 7, 1941.



The side of the hull of the capsized mine ship *Oglala* is shown here in Pearl Harbor before she was salvaged. The *Oglala* capsized after being hit in the Japanese raid of December 7, 1941. In the background alongside Ford Island the hull of the capsized *Oklahoma* can be seen.


ATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK



Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Hangar and planes damaged and set afire by Japanese bombs.



U. S. S. *Arizona*, at height of fire, following Japanese aerial attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 7, 1941.




U. S. S. *Maryland*—Moored inboard of the U. S. S. *Oklahoma*, which capsized, the 31,500-ton *Maryland* was damaged slightly and was one of the first ships to rejoin the fleet after the Japanese attack.




Pearl Harbor attack—Jap version—"Our Sea Eagles' determined attack had already opened, and a column of water from a direct torpedo hit on a *Maryland* class is rising. On the surface of the water concentric waves are traced by the direct torpedo hits, while murky crude oil flows out. The three bright white streaks between the waves are the torpedo tracks. In the distance the conflagration at the Hickman Field hangars is seen." The above caption and Japanese aerial photograph were sent to neutral countries for propaganda purposes.

INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK




Wing from Japanese bomber shot down on the grounds of the Naval Hospital, Honolulu, T. H., December 7, 1941.




U. S. S. *Raleigh*—Torpedoed and bombed, the 7,000-ton light cruiser U. S. S. *Raleigh* is held afloat near her anchorage in Pearl Harbor by a barge. The capsized U. S. S. *Utah* is in the background. The *Raleigh* rejoined the fleet months ago.

INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK




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


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
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK



Reckage of the U. S. S. *Shaw* at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, hit directly on the forecastle during Japanese aerial attack, December 7, 1941.




U. S. S. *Doris* at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in a damaged condition, December 7, 1941.





es—Destroyer, hit by Japanese bombs during attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. U. S. S. *Cassin*, destroyer, in about same position behind the *Downes*.

N PEARL HARBOR ATTACK




Hangar burning after Jap air raid on Pearl Harbor, T. H.






Hangar burning after Jap air raid on Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 7, 1941.

ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK



This port quarter shot of the *West Virginia*, taken from the capsized *Oklahoma*, shows a general view of the damage to the *West Virginia*, sunk in the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941.






Back in the fight—Run aground opposite Hospital Point, during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the U. S. S. *Nevada*, known as the "Cheerup Ship," lived up to its name by being one of the first of the Pearl Harbor casualties to go back into action.

IGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

California hit—Battered by aerial bombs and torpedoes, the U. S. S. *California* settles slowly into the mud and muck of Pearl Harbor. Clouds of black, oily smoke pouring up from the *California* and her stricken sister ships conceal all but the hulk of the capsized U. S. S. *Oklahoma* at extreme right.



Seaman rescued—A small boat rescues a seaman from the 31,800-ton U. S. S. *West Virginia* burning in the foreground. Smoke rolling out amidships shows where the most extensive damage occurred. Note the two men in the superstructure. The U. S. S. *Tennessee* is inbound.



U. S. S. *Vestal*—This U. S. repair ship, twice bombed by Japanese fliers, was beached after the ship started flooding. The *Vestal* has since been repaired.



Patrol planes, *Catalina* type (PBV), wrecked on Ford Island at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, during Japanese attack, December 7, 1941.




Hangar area at NAS Kaneohe Bay, T. H., showing damage wrought by Japanese bombing attack of December 7, 1941. Altitude 700 feet. Looking northwest.





NAVAL AIR STATION—This is the wreckage-strewn naval air station at Pearl Harbor following one of the Japanese sneak attacks on the morning of December 7, 1941. In the background, an explosion sends a mass of flames and smoke high into the sky.




U. S. S. *Nevada*—Beached at Hospital Point.



The U. S. S. *Oklahoma*, shown capsized following Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 7, 1941.



The U. S. S. *Oklahoma*, shown capsized following Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 7, 1941.






MAGAZINE OF U. S. S. SHAW EXPLODES—This, one of the most remarkable combat photographs of all times, was made at the exact moment the destroyer blew up during Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 7, 1941.




U. S. S. *Shaw*, destroyer, shortly after Japanese aerial bomb made direct hit, Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941.






Hangar area at NAS Kaneohe Bay, T. H., showing damage wrought by Japanese bombing attack of December 7, 1941. Altitude 500 feet. Looking west.



Wreckage of U. S. S. *Arizona*, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 7, 1941.




U. S. S. *Downes* and *Cassin* at drydock No. 1 are the only battleships in the Pacific Fleet, which survived the attack. The *Pennsylvania* is new hulls.



Cassin—The jumbled mass of wreckage in the foreground is the U. S. destroyer, *Downes* (left) and *Cassin* (right). In the rear is the U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*, 33,100-ton Flagship of the fleet, which suffered relatively light damage during the Japanese attack. The *Pennsylvania* was repaired shortly after the attack. Main and secondary armaments of the *Downes* and *Cassin* are being transferred

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK



Wreckage of the U. S. S. *Arizona* lying in the mud at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

end